Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando
Guerrero, discovered that the documents regarding the testimony of the
witnesses in an investigation of oil companies had disappeared from his office.
Then, the day following the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion
edited by herein respondent Gregorio Perfecto published an article against the
Philippine Senate. Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256 of
the Spanish Penal Code provision that punishes those who insults the Ministers
of the Crown. Hence, the issue.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in
force and can be applied in the case at bar?
HELD: No.
REASONING: The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256
of the SPC was enacted to protect Spanish officials as representatives of the King.
However, the Court explains that in the present case, we no longer have Kings
nor its representatives for the provision to protect. Also, with the change
of sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish to American, it means
that the invoked provision of the SPC had been automatically abrogated. The
Court determined Article 256 of the SPC to be political in nature for it is about
the relation of the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court emphasized that it is a
general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory, the previous
political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. Hence, Article 256 of
the SPC is considered no longer in force and cannot be applied to the present
case. Therefore, respondent was acquitted.
Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay
Captain together with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay
Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of 1982.
Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February
8, 1987 be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking
over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and
appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by
virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution and not because their term
of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election
Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to
have been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional
Constitution.
Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC
Gov on Feb 8, 1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay
Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and effect.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having become
inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to
designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part:
"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years x x x."
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw,
therefore, the term of office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act
of 1982 should still govern.
Francisco vs. HR
Ernesto Francisco, Jr. vs. The House of Representatives
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
Carpio Morales, J.:
Facts: On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution
which directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). Then on June 2,
2003, former President Joseph Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices. The complaint was
endorsed and was referred to the House Committee in accordance with Section
3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss the same on
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. On October 23, 2003, a
second impeachment complaint was filed against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by abovementioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
Issues:
1. Can the Court make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable
offense?
2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment
adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional.
3. Whether or not the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section
3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Held:
1. No. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution
has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Although Section 2 of Article XI
of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these,
namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of
judicial review have been met in this case; and
(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with
eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to
the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
(1) Yes. The Courts power of judicial review is subject to several limitations,
namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise
of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have standing to
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that
he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine
qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal
branch of government is put in issue.The Court disagrees with the respondents
contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he is not an official
nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a personal stake on
the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official
nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the
JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and
nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard,
the JBCs duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in
the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be
affected by the Courts ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of
nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The
claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of
concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the
right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
(2) Yes. The word Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution
is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether
the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in
either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The
seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to
provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting.
FACTS:
1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18
September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares
at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as
its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share,
or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong
Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the
necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per
share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995.
Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter,
but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive
that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of
51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong
Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.
ISSUE:
RULING:
Prefatory Statement:
Under the Constitution (Article II, Section 26), "the State shall guarantee equal
access to opportunities for public service xxx." Would the Comelec's act of
disqualifying the so-called "nuisance" candidates violate this
Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President.
Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates
who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a
political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national
constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming
that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public
service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the
number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide
campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly
erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential
candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the
office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has
numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to
wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and
he has a platform of government.
ISSUE:
RULING:
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a
privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor
elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the
plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an
interpretation of the sort.The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of
Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies."
The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and
there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal
access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the
provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but
merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of
the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the
courts.Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact
positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into
public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is
to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause
as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are
not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed
under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as
"equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless
interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the
intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous
foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.The privilege
of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations.
Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found
in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates. As long
as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the
equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the
burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is
minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing
that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they
create.The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the
disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run
for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its
electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State
At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was
disqualified.
In the same year, the Collector of Internal Revenue (CIR) assessed the estate for
deficiency tax amounting to about P161k. Campos Rueda refused to pay the
assessed tax as he claimed that the estate is exempt from the payment of said
taxes pursuant to section 122 of the Tax Code which provides:
That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal
property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign
country which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax
of any character in respect of intangible person property of the Philippines not
residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country of which
the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption
the exempt category provided for in Section 22 of the Tax Code. Thus, recognition
is not necessary. Hence, since it was proven that Tangier provides such exemption
to personal properties of Filipinos found therein so must the Philippines honor the
exemption as provided for by our tax law with respect to the doctrine of
reciprocity.
2012 Posted
Facts: William Reagan imported a tax-free 1960 Cadillac car with accessories
valued at US $ 6,443.83, including freight, insurance and other charges. After
acquiring a permit to sell the car from the base commander of Clark Air Base,
Reagan sold the
car to
Corps stationed in Sangley Point, Cavite for US$ 6,600. Johnson sold the same,
on the same day to Fred Meneses, a Filipino. As a result of the transaction, the
Commissioner rendered Reagan liable for income tax in the sum of P2,970.
Reagan claimed that he was exempt as the transaction occurred in Clark Air Base,
which as he contends is a base outside the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Reagan was covered by the tax exemption.
Held: The court ruled in the negative. The Philippines, as an independent and
sovereign country, exercises its authority over its entire domain. Any state may,
however, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its
sovereign rights. It may allow another power to participate in the exercise of
jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. By doing so, it by no
means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. The
areas retain their status as native soil. Clark Air Base is within Philippine
territorial jurisdiction to tax, and thus, Reagan was liable for the income
tax arising from the sale of his automobile in Clark. The law does not look with
favor on tax exemptions and that he who would seek to be thus privileged must
view that Imelda should have first sought the lifiting of the sequestration order.
Being void, the Sandiganbayan has the power to strike it down on sight.
FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking,
illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was
impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were
begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption
against Estrada were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11
senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging
evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an
uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel
resigned after casting his vote against Estrada
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and
joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to
be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He
added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the
seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his
post. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at
EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace.
Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to
enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in
cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for
judgment confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the
Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.
ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
RULING:
1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch
of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I
EDSA II
exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole
government.
exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to
petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of
the President.
extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from
it cannot be the subject of judicial review
intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and
the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review.
presented a political question;
involves legal questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for
resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987
Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of
governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling
on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct
calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.
3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and
subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr.
As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts
as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of
Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is
the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress
has clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature
and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada
can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a
President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily.
That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the
de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed
by this Court.
4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder,
bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these
crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the
alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision
of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him
with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public
officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as
such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.
5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are
incompatible. Also, since our justice system does not use the jury system, the
judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily
manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not present
enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the
judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the
cases against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the
publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge and that
the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less with prosecution.
law was meant to comply with the terms of the third United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in February 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they
contend, among others, that the law decreased the national territory of the
Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional. Some of their particular arguments
are as follows:
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other
ancillary treaties this also resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine waters as
archipelagic waters which, in international law, opens our waters landward of
the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels (innocent passage) and aircrafts
(overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security,
contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in
violation of relevant constitutional provisions;
c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the
Scarborough Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as a regime of islands pursuant to
UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the
livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not
a means to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing
to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory.
What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the international
law principle on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the
execution of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting
statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and
continental shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it.
Under the old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the
rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994
square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the
exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime was increased to 586,210
sq. na. mi. (See image below for comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of
the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise
treaty-based rights.
in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired
dominion and sovereignty.
b. UNCLOS may term our waters as archipelagic waters and that we may term it
as our internal waters, but the bottom line is that our country exercises
sovereignty over these waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that. However, due
to our observance of international law, we allow the exercise of others of their
right of innocent passage. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to
absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary
international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international
community.
c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratlys), as well as the Scarborough
Shoal, as a regime of islands did not diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS
and under the baselines law, since they are regimes of islands, they generate
their own maritime zones in short, they are not to be enclosed within the
baselines of the main archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group). This is
because if we do that, then we will be enclosing a larger area which would already
depart from the provisions of UNCLOS that the demarcation should follow the
natural contour of the archipelago.
Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal through effective occupation.
NOTES:
Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones
where we exercisetreaty-based rights:
a. territorial waters 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise
sovereignty
b. contiguous zone 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we
can enforcecustoms, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).
c. exclusive economic zone 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we
have the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive
economic zone
Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf this is covered
by Article 77 of the UNCLOS.
Razon v. Tagitis
December 3, 2009
Brion
Paolo Q. Bernardo
If you can, please go beyond the summary-doctrine boxes; especially so you
understand the ratio of the Court. Apologies for the delay AND length; as for the
length, I omitted a lot of facts I deemed irrelevant. Lastly, please see the
dispositive.
SUMMARY: Engr. Morced N. Tagitis was last
seen in Jolo, Sulu. His disappearance was
reported to the Jolo Police Station. It was
unacted upon for a month and hence e Mary B. Tagitis
(Tagitis), Engr. Tagitis's wife, filed a Petition for the Writ
of Amparo with
the Court of Appeals against certain members of
the the PNP.
The CA issued the Writ of Amparo.
The PNP members appealed the decision of the CA to the Supreme Court. They
mainly
dispute:
1. the sufficiency in form and substance
of the Amparo petition filed before
the CA;
2. the sufficiency of the legal remedies
the Tagitis took before petitioning for
the writ;
3. the finding that the rights to life,
liberty and security of Tagitis had
been violated;
4. the
sufficiency
of
evidence
supporting the conclusion that Tagitis
was abducted;
5. the conclusion that the CIDG
Zamboanga was responsible for the
abduction; and,
6. generally, the ruling that the respondent discharged the burden
of proving the allegations of the petition by substantial evidence
DOCTRINE:
On the test for the sufficiency of a petition for
writ of amparo:
To read the Rules of Court requirement on
FACTS:
Engr. Morced N. Tagitis is a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior
Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship
Programme
He was last seen in Jolo, Sulu.
Muslim studies and Tagitis fellow student
counselor at the IDB reported Tagitis disappearance to the Jolo Police Station.
Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of
More than a month later , the Mary B. Tagitis (Tagitis), Engr. Tagitis's wife, filed a Petition for the Writ
of Amparo (petition)
When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another IDB
On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo. The basis for the issuance by the Court of the Writ is
as follows:
At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the Tagitis from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based
on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved.
Thereafter, the CA issued an ALARM WARNING that Task Force Tagitis of the PNP did not
appear to be exerting
dispute:
e. Applying these rules in the present case, the petition amply recites in its
paragraphs 4 to 11 the circumstances under which Tagitis suddenly
dropped out of sight after engaging in normal activities, and thereafter
was nowhere to be found despite efforts to locate him.
i. The petition alleged, too, under its paragraph 7, in relation to
paragraphs 15 and 16, that according to reliable information, police
operatives were the perpetrators of the abduction.
ii. It also clearly alleged how Tagitis rights to life, liberty and security
were violated when he was "forcibly taken and boarded on a motor
vehicle by a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence
operatives," and then taken "into custody by the respondents police
intelligence operatives since October 30, 2007, specifically by the
CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, x x x held against his will in an earnest
attempt of the police to involve and connect [him] with different
terrorist groups."
f. If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of
supporting affidavit, as required by Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule.
i. This requirement, however, should not be read as an absolute one
that necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if not strictly
followed.
g. Where, as in this case, the petitioner has substantially complied with the
requirement by submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the
facts relied upon, the strict need for the sworn statement that an
affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled.
h. Section 5(d) of the Amparo Rule requires that prior investigation of an
alleged disappearance must have been made, specifying the manner and
results of the investigation.
i. The Court rejected the petitioners argument that the Tagitis's petition
did not comply with the Section 5(d) requirements of the Amparo
Rule, as the petition specifies in its paragraph 11 that Kunnong and
his companions immediately reported Tagitis disappearance to the
police authorities in Jolo, Sulu as soon as they were relatively certain
that he indeed had disappeared.
2. The present case is one of first impression in the use and application of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo in an ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE situation.
a. The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof."
i. However, while the Rule covers "enforced disappearances"
this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this
jurisdiction.
b. The Court clarifies that it does not rule on any issue of criminal
culpability for the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance. This is
an issue that requires criminal action before our criminal courts based on
existing penal laws.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
4. The PNP and CIDG are accountable because Section 24 of Republic Act No.
6975, otherwise known as the "PNP Law," specifies the PNP as the
governmental office with the mandate "to investigate and prevent crimes,
effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist
in their prosecution."
a. The PNP-CIDG is the "investigative arm" of the PNP and is mandated to
"investigate and prosecute all cases involving violations of the Revised
Penal Code, particularly those considered as heinous crimes."
b. Under the PNP organizational structure, the PNP-CIDG is tasked to
investigate all major crimes involving violations of the Revised Penal
Code and operates against organized crime groups, unless the President
assigns the case exclusively to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI).
c. Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members
were the ones who were remiss in their duties when the government
completely failed to exercise its duties in entertaining the complaints of
Tagitis.
d. To fully enforce the Amparo remedy, the Court refers this case back to
the CA for appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of the PNP
and the PNP-CIDG investigations and actions, and the validation of their
results through hearings the CA may deem appropriate to conduct.
DISPOSITIVE:
The Court:
a. Ruled that the disapperance of Engr. Tagitis is an enforced disappearance
covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
b. Without any specific pronouncement on exact authorship and
responsibility, declaring the government accountable for the enforced
disappearance of Engr.Tagitis;
c. Holding the PNP directly responsible for the disclosure of material facts
known to the government and to their offices regarding the disappearance
of Engr. Morced N. Tagitis, and for the conduct of proper investigations
using extraordinary diligence, with the obligation to show investigation
results acceptable to this Court;
d. Ordering Col. Kasim impleaded in this case and holding him accountable
with the obligation to disclose information known to him and to his "assets"
in relation with the enforced disappearance of Engr. Tagitis;
e. Referring this case back to the CA for appropriate proceedings directed at
the monitoring of the PNP investigations, actions and the validation of their
results;
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall
provide for legislative powers over:
1. Administrative organization;
2. Creation of sources of revenues;
3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;
4. Personal, family, and property relations;
5. Regional urban and rural planning development;
6. Economic, social, and tourism development;
7. Educational policies;
8. Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the
general welfare of the people of the region.
The President has sole authority in the treaty-making.
ARTICLE XVII (AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS)
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed
by:
1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
2. A constitutional convention.
Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1
hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the
approval of such amendment or revision.
MOA-AD states that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the
present constitution and laws shall come into force upon signing of a
comprehensive compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal
framework. The presidents authority is limited to proposing constitutional
amendments. She cannot guarantee to any third party that the required
amendments will eventually be put in place nor even be submitted to a plebiscite.
MOA-AD itself presents the need to amend therein.
Sec. 1. Title. This Act shall be known as "The Initiative and Referendum Act."
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. The power of the people under a system of
initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole
or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby
affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall
mean:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments
to the
purpose.
Initiative
on
the
Constitution
which
refers
to
petition
proposing
through a
reject a
legislation through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes,
namely:
c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an
act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and
on the
referred to as the
Commission.
(g) "Local government units" refers to provinces , cities, municipalities and
barangays.
(h)
Panlalawigan,
twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories,
of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may
be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987
Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.
(c)
c.1.
rejected,
amended
or
repealed,
c.2.
c.3.
as
the
case
the
the
reason
may
be;
proposition;
or
reasons
therefor;
c.4.
c.5.
that
it
signatures
is
not
of
the
one
of
the
petitioners
exceptions
or
provided
registered
voters;
herein;
and
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which
shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.
(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance passed by
the legislative assembly of an autonomous region, province or city is deemed
validly initiated if the petition thereof is signed by at least ten per centum (10%)
of the registered voters in the province or city, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters
therein; Provided, however, That if the province or city is composed only of one
(1) legislative district, then at least each municipality
in a province or each
the date of the initiative or referendum which shall not be earlier than forty-five
(45) days but not later than ninety (90) days from the determination by the
Commission of the sufficiency of the petition.
Sec.
9. Effectivity
of
Initiative
or
Referendum
Proposition. (a)
the
Sec. 13. Procedure in Local Initiative. (a) Not less than two thousand (2,000)
registered voters in case of autonomous regions, one thousand (1,000) in case of
provinces and cities, one hundred (100) in case of municipalities, and fifty (50) in
case of barangays, may file a petition with the Regional Assembly or local
legislative body, respectively, proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or
amendment, of any law, ordinance or resolution.
(b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative body within (30)
days from its presentation, the proponents through their duly authorized and
registered representative may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice
thereof to the local legislative body concerned.
(c) The proposition shall be numbered serially
Secretary of Local Government or his designated
autonomous regions, ninety (90) days in case of provinces and cities, sixty (60)
days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays, from
notice mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect the required number
of
signatures.
(f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar, or his designated
representative, in the presence of a representative of the proponent, and a
representative of the regional assemblies and local legislative bodies concerned
in a public place in the autonomous region or local government unit, as the case
may be. Signature stations may be established in as many places as may be
warranted.
(g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the Commission on Elections,
through
whether or not the required number of signatures has been obtained. Failure to
obtain the required number is a defeat of the proposition.
(h) If the required number of the signatures is obtained, the Commission shall
then set a date for the initiative at which the proposition shall be submitted to
the registered voters in the local government unit concerned for their approval
within ninety (90) days from the date of certification by the Commission, as
provided in subsection (g) hereof, in case of autonomous regions, sixty (60)
days in case of the provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of
municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The initiative shall
then be held on the date set, after which the results thereof shall be certified
and proclaimed by the Commission on Elections.
Sec. 14. Effectivity of Local Propositions. If the proposition is approved by a
majority of the votes cast, it shall take effect fifteen (15) days after certification
by the Commission as if affirmative action thereon had been made by the local
legislative body and local executive concerned. If it fails to obtain said number of
votes, the proposition is considered defeated.
Sec. 15. Limitations on Local Initiatives. (a) The power of local initiative shall
not be exercised more than once a year.
(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal
powers of the local legislative bodies to enact.
(c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall
adopt in toto the proposition presented, the initiative shall be canceled. However,
those against such action may, if they so desire, apply for initiative in the
manner herein provided.
Sec. 16. Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies. Any proposition or
ordinance or resolution approved through the system of initiative and referendum
as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended, by the local
legislative body concerned within six (6) months from the date therefrom, and
may be amended, modified or repealed by the local legislative body within (3/4)
of all its members: Provided, however, that in case of barangays, the period shall
be in (1) year after the expiration of the first six (6) months.
Sec. 17. Local Referendum. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4 hereof,
any local legislative body may submit to the registered voters of autonomous
region, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays for the approval or
rejection, any ordinance or resolution duly enacted or approved.
Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Commission
within sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case
of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of barangays.
The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.
Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the
proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to
this Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative
body to enact the said measure.
IV. Final Provisions
Sec. 19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code. The Omnibus Election
Code and other election laws, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act,
shall apply to all initiatives and referenda.
Sec. 20. Rules and Regulations. The Commission is hereby empowered to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of this Act.
Sec. 21. Appropriations. The amount necessary to defray the cost of the initial
implementation of this Act shall be charged against the Contingent Fund in the
General Appropriations Act of the current year. Thereafter, such sums as may be
necessary for the full implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual
General Appropriations Act.
Sec. 22. Separability Clause. If any part or provision of this Act is held invalid
or unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and
effective.
Sec. 23. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5
and 6: That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to
12%, after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase
the VAT rate is an abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because
such delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI Consti. They argue
that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services which cant
be included within the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this
refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the
government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They also said
that the President has powers to cause, influence or create the conditions
provided by law to bring about the conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege
that no guiding standards are made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance will
make the recommendation.
Held: The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which
are strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power
which can never be delegated is the authority to make a complete law- complete
as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable, and
to determine the expediency of its enactment. It is the nature of the power and
not the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise which determines the
validity of its delegation.
For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standard. A
sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps
out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.
increased rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the
operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified
fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate
upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No discretion would
be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact
that the word SHALL is used in the common proviso. The use of the word SHALL
connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation
and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12%
rate upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a
duty, which cannot be evaded by the President. It is a clear directive to impose
the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present.
Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the
existence of a fact--- whether by December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as a
percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the national
government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and
1%. If either of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by
legislative mandate, must submit such information to the President.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it
describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his
authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the
legislative process can go forward.
thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local
Government Code to enforce all laws and ordinances, and to maintain public
order
in
the
barangay.17crallawlibrary
Petitioner claims that while the issuance of the TPO is ex parte, there must be a
judicial determination of the basis thereof. He contends that the allegations in
respondents affidavit attached to the petition, and without admitting the same to
be true, are nothing more than normal or usual quarrels between a husband and
wife which are not grave or imminent enough to merit the issuance of a TPO.
We
are
We quote
again
Section
15
thus:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
not
of
RA
9262
persuaded.
for
ready
reference,
November 3, 2008
from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve this
through the medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a
national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory random drug test.36
To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is
substantial enough to override the individual's privacy interest under the
premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug menace cuts across gender,
age group, and social - economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the
sale, manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs, with their ready market, would
be an investor's dream were it not for the illegal and immoral components of any
of such activities. The drug problem has hardly abated since the martial law
public execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a
laid back stance with respect to this modern - day scourge. Drug enforcement
agencies perceive a mandatory random drug test to be an effective way of
preventing and deterring drug use among employees in private offices, the threat
of detection by random testing being higher than other modes. The Court holds
that the chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy
on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the
search, and the well - defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide
authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug
test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo,
constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees
also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil
Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high
standard of ethics in the public service.37 And if RA 9165 passes the norm of
reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the
test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be
accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost
responsibility and efficiency.38
Petitioner SJS' next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the
ground of undue delegation of power hardly commends itself for concurrence.
Contrary to its position, the provision in question is not so extensively drawn as to
give unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug
testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug testing for students of secondary
and tertiary schools and officers/employees of public/private offices should be
conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall undergo drug testing. In the
case of students, the testing shall be in accordance with the school rules as
contained in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of
officers/employees, the testing shall take into account the company's work rules.
In either case, the random procedure shall be observed, meaning that the
persons to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an unplanned
way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the
confidentiality of the test results are established.
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, "rendering service to or
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of
law reads:Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. -- A Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:(4) By rendering services
to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country: (a) The
Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with
said foreign country; or(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on
Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines: Whatever
doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in
the U.S. Marine Corps.On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his
Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.[3] He ran
for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in
the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over
petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection. respondent
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz
was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he
is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of the
Constitution.Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the
HRET's decision on the following grounds:
The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who
became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon
his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz
may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost his Philippine
citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to
reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the
Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such
citizenship.Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status
as a natural-born citizen when he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in
Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of
being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by
naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of
citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the
citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in
accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have
to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship,
necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said
enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine
citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such
persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the
reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable
law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to
go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is
perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary
qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.A final
point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge"
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members
of the House.[29] The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check
"whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.[30] In the absence thereof, there
is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the
decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgment for that of the latter
for the simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire
into the correctness of the assailed decision.[31] There is no such showing of
grave abuse of discretion in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was
erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his
service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA
2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who
Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the
Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won
over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with
respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the
HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6
of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring
Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said election.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can
still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same
in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship
due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to,
or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after
separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry
in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of
allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the
son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to
recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.