G.R. No.

185960

January 25, 2012

MARINO B. ICDANG, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Marino B. Icdang, at the time of the transactions subject of this controversy, was the Regional Director of the Office for
Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC) Region XII in Cotabato City.
On January 19, 1998, a Special Audit Team was formed by the Commission on Audit (COA) Regional Office XII, Cotabato City
3
pursuant to COA Regional Office Order No. 98-10 to conduct comprehensive audit on the 1996 funds for livelihood projects of the
OSCC-Region XII. Hadji Rashid A. Mudag was designated as team leader, with Jose Mercado, Myrla Fermin and Evelyn Macala as
members.
In its report submitted to the COA Regional Director, the audit team noted that petitioner was granted cash advances which
remained unliquidated. In the cash examination conducted by the team on March 10, 1998, it was discovered that petitioner had a
shortage of P219,392.75. Out of the total amount of P920,933.00 released in September 1996 to their office under sub-allotment
advice No. COT-043, to cover the implementation of various socio-economic projects for the cultural communities of the region,
cash advances amounting to P407,000.00 were granted from October 1, 1996 to February 5, 1997 to officials and employees
including petitioner. Per records, it was noted that P297,392.75 of these cash advances remained unliquidated as of December 31,
4
1997.
Petitioner never denied that he received a total of P196,000.00 evidenced by disbursement vouchers and checks payable to him.
In the Audit Observation Memorandum No. 97-001 (March 18, 1998) sent by the COA Region XII to the OSCC-Region XII reflecting
the findings of the Special Audit Team, it was also disclosed that: (1) Funds intended for programs for Ancestral Domain Claim
Development and to support tribal cooperatives, were cash advanced, but the proposed projects were not implemented by the
OSCC-Region XII; (2) No official cashbooks are maintained to record cash advances and disbursements from the 1996 funds allocated
for livelihood projects; and (3) Out of the total P920,933.00 allocated for 1996 livelihood projects, the amount of P445,892.80 was
disbursed leaving a balance of P475,040.20; however, final trial balance as of December 31, 1996 showed that the office has
exhausted the allocated funds for the whole year; the utilization of the P475,040.20 could not be explained by the Accountant so
that it may be concluded that such was misappropriated. Petitioner indicated his comments on the said memorandum by requesting
for extension to restitute the amount of P306,412.75 (which included theP67,000.00 cash shortage of another OSCC-Region XII
official, Ma. Teresa A. Somorostro), and explaining that the P475,040.20 was not misappropriated as evidenced by their own
7
financial report and re-statement of allotment and obligation for the month ending December 31, 1996.
From the field interviews conducted by the audit team, it was also gathered that the intended projects covered by the cash advances
were never implemented, such as the proposed Children Development Project in Bgy. Matila; adult literacy program in Cotabato;
From the P232,000.00 accountabilities of petitioner, the COA deducted the following: P10,000.00 covered by acknowledgment
receipt by A. Anas; various cash invoices in the amount of P2,197.25; and Reimbursement Expense Receipts (RERs) in the amount
9
of P410.00. After the cash examination, petitioner was still found short ofP219,392.75. Consequently, a demand letter was sent by
the COA for petitioner to immediately produce the missing funds. In his letter-reply dated March 19, 1998, petitioner requested for
10
one-week extension to comply with the directive.
However, the one-week period lapsed without compliance having been made by petitioner. Hence, the audit team recommended
the initiation of administrative and criminal charges against him, as well as Ms. Somorostro, Chief of the Socio-Cultural Development
Concerns Division of OSCC-Region XII.
On September 21, 2000, the Office of the Ombudsman found probable cause against petitioner and Ms. Somorostro for violation of
Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
The Amended Information charging petitioner with the crime of Malversation of Public Funds

The SB ruled that the prosecution has established the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of malversation of
public funds, the presumption from his failure to account for the cash shortage in the amount ofP232,000.00 remains unrebutted. As
to the reasons given by petitioner for non-compliance with the COA demand, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
requesting that he be given another chance to present his evidence, stating that his inability to attend the trial were due to financial
constraints.
Issue
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT RENDERED ITS JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AGAINST PETITIONER DESPITE ITS KNOWLEDGE THAT
PETITIONER WAS NOT ABLE TO ADDUCE HIS EVIDENCE DUE TO VARIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES, THAT HE WAS NOT ASSISTED BY
COUNSEL DURING THE PROMULGATION OF JUDGMENT; THE GROSS AND RECKLESS NEGLIGENCE OF HIS FORMER COUNSEL
IN FAILING TO ASSIST HIM DURING THE PROMULGATION; HIS FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC DISLOCATION WHICH MADE HIM
UNABLE TO ATTEND THE SCHEDULED TRIALS IN MANILA, DAVAO CITY AND CEBU CITY, HIS RESIDENCE BEING IN COTABATO,
WHICH ALL CONSTITUTE A DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT TO BE HEARD AND TO DUE PROCESS.
Held:
The petition must fail.
At the outset it must be emphasized that the special civil action of certiorari is not the proper remedy to challenge a judgment
conviction rendered by the SB. Petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari underRule 45.
17

Pursuant to Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, decisions and final orders of the
Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] party desiring to appeal
by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the x x x Sandiganbayan x x x whenever authorized by law, may file with
the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition x x x shall raise only questions of law, which must be
distinctly set forth." Section 2 of Rule 45 likewise provides that the petition should be filed within the fifteen-day period from notice
of the judgment or final order or resolution, or of the denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration filed in due time after notice
of judgment.
As observed by the SB, the 15-day period of appeal, counted from the date of the promulgation of its decision on May 26, 2008,
lapsed on June 10, 2008, which rendered the same final and executory. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was thus filed 6 days
late. Petitioners resort to the present special civil action after failing to appeal within the fifteen-day reglementary period, cannot
18
be done. The special civil action of certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal which the petitioner already lost.
This Court has often enough reminded members of the bench and bar that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only
when there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari is not allowed when a party
to a case fails to appeal a judgment or final order despite the availability of that remedy. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are
19
mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. Appeals though filed late were allowed in some rare cases, but there must be
exceptional circumstances to justify the relaxation of the rules.
G.R. No. 183575

April 11, 2011

SPOUSES ROGELIO MARCELO and MILAGROS MARCELO, Petitioners,

vs.
LBC BANK, Respondent
Facts:
On 16 April 1997, petitioners Spouses Rogelio and Milagros Marcelo (Spouses Marcelo) obtained a P3 million loan from LBC Bank. On
27 May 1998, Spouses Marcelo obtained another loan from LBC Bank in the amount of P2.3 million. The two loans were secured by a
real estate mortgage over a parcel of land located in Baliuag, Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-64135
in the name of Spouses Marcelo.

Spouses Marcelo defaulted in the payment of their loans. Consequently, LBC Bank sought the extra-judicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage on 15 October 1998.
On 21 October 1998, the Office of the Clerk of Court and the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Malolos, Bulacan, issued a Notice of Sheriffs Sale.
After the posting and publication of the Notice of Sale, the mortgaged property was sold at a public auction on 25 November 1998.
LBC Bank, being the highest bidder, was issued a Certificate of Sale, which was eventually registered with the Bulacan Registry of
Deeds.
Spouses Marcelo failed to redeem the property within the prescribed period. As a result, on 5 December 2000, LBC Banks
Mecauayan Branch Manager, Ricardo B. Milan, Jr. (Milan), executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Title, which was filed with the
Bulacan Registry of Deeds. On 1 February 2001, Spouses Marcelos title to the subject property was cancelled and TCT No. T-145323
was issued in LBC Banks name.
4

On 12 October 2004, LBC Bank filed with the Regional trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 11, a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession over the foreclosed property.
On 1 December 2004, the trial court rendered a decision, granting the petition and directing the issuance of a writ of possession in
favor of LBC Bank
7

On 16 June 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, initially granting Spouses Marcelo certiorari petition and disposing of
the case
On 26 March 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered an Amended Decision granting the motion for reconsideration "in the interest of
substantial justice
Issue:
The sole issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals can admit new evidence in a special civil action for certiorari.
Held:
Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, states that, "The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original
15
and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings." 1avvphi1
16

Likewise, in VMC Rural Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court held:
[I]t is already settled that under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902 (An Act Expanding the
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, amending for the purpose of Section Nine of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended, known as
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), the Court of Appeals pursuant to the exercise of its original jurisdiction over Petitions
for Certiorari is specifically given the power to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve factual issues. As clearly
stated in Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act 7902:
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts
necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant
and conduct new trials or further proceedings. x x x.
Clearly, the Court of Appeals did not err in admitting the evidence showing LBC Banks express ratification of Milans consolidation of
the title over the subject property. Further, the Court of Appeals did not err in admitting such evidence in resolving LBC Banks
motion for reconsideration in a special civil action for certiorari. To rule otherwise will certainly defeat the ends of substantial
justice.

G.R. No. 187728

September 12, 2011

CHURCHILLE V. MARI and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. ROLANDO L. GONZALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Sogod, Southern Leyte, and PO1 RUDYARD
PALOMA y TORRES, Respondents.
Facts:
On October 25, 2004, petitioner AAA, private complainant below, executed a sworn statement before an Investigator of the 8th
Regional Office, Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) in Tacloban City, where she stated
that she was raped by herein private respondent on October 10, 2004 at her boarding house at Sogod, Southern Leyte. A preliminary
investigation of the case was commenced on November 4, 2004 before the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Sogod. A warrant of arrest was issued against private respondent, so he voluntarily surrendered to the Chief of Police of
Sogod on November 18, 2004 and was then incarcerated at the Sogod Municipal Jail.
On November 20, 2004, private respondent filed a Motion for Bail. Hearings on the motion commenced on December 7, 2004, but
petitioner failed to appear. Only private respondent presented evidence. Thus, on March 16, 2005, the MCTC of Sogod issued an
Order allowing private respondent to post bail set at P200,000.00. After posting a surety bond, private respondent was released
from confinement.
Pursuant to the issuance of A.M. No. 05-8-26, divesting first-level courts of authority to conduct preliminary investigation of criminal
complaints cognizable by Regional Trial Courts, records of the subject case were transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office of
3
Southern Leyte. The Prosecutor's Office issued a Resolution dated May 26, 2008, finding probable cause against private respondent
and, accordingly, an Information for Rape was filed on June 11, 2008. A warrant of arrest was immediately issued against private
respondent.
4

On June 27, 2008, private respondent was committed to detention and, on June 30, 2008, the RTC issued an Order stating that
accused had voluntarily surrendered to the Office of the Clerk of Court and arraignment was set for July 31, 2008. In the meantime,
on July 3, 2008, private respondent filed a Motion to Admit Cash Bond in Lieu of Surety Bond; thus, in an Order dated July 10, 2008,
the RTC cancelled the July 31, 2008 schedule for arraignment and reset the arraignment and hearing on said motion for August 20,
2008. At said scheduled date for arraignment and hearing on the motion, nobody appeared for the prosecution.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the same per Resolution dated March 16, 2009.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari, alleging that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in rashly and precipitately dismissing the rape case against private respondent. Respondents counter that there
was no grave abuse committed by the trial court and setting aside the dismissal of the rape case would put private respondent in
double jeopardy.
Issue:
The Court finds the petition bereft of merit.
14

Firstly, petitioners failed to observe the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. In Garcia v. Miro, the Court, quotingVergara, Sr. v.
15
Suelto, ruled thus:
The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the
fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the
first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary
or where serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or
proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason
or another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence
of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ's procurement
must be presented. This is, and should continue, to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe

Petitioners are likewise mistaken in their notion that mere pendency of their petition for transfer of venue should interrupt
proceedings before the trial court. Such situation is akin to having a pending petition for certiorari with the higher courts. In People
21
v. Hernandez, the Court held that "delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders" must be read in
harmony with Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which provides that the "[p]etition [under Rule 65] shall not interrupt the
course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the
22
public respondent from further proceeding in the case." The trial court was then correct and acting well within its discretion when
it refused to grant petitioners' motions for postponement mainly because of the pendency of their petition for transfer of venue.
The trial court cannot be faulted for refusing to countenance delays in the prosecution of the case
G.R. No. 162575

December 15, 2010

BEATRIZ SIOK PING TANG, Petitioner,

vs.
SUBIC BAY DISTRIBUTION, INC., Respondent
Facts:
Petitioner is doing business under the name and style of Able Transport. Respondent Subic Bay Distribution, Inc. (SBDI) entered in
two Distributorship Agreements with petitioner and Able Transport in April 2002. Under the Agreements, respondent, as seller, will
sell, deliver or procure to be delivered petroleum products, and petitioner, as distributor, will purchase, receive and pay for its
purchases from respondent. The two Agreements had a period of one year, commencing on October 2001 to October 2002, which
shall continue on an annual basis unless terminated by either party upon thirty days written notice to the other prior to the
expiration of the original term or any extension thereof.
Section 6.3 of the Distributorship Agreement provides that respondent may require petitioner to put up securities, real or personal,
or to furnish respondent a performance bond issued by a bonding company chosen by the latter to secure and answer for
petitioner's outstanding account, and or faithful performance of her obligations as contained or arising out of the Agreement. Thus,
petitioner applied for and was granted a credit line by the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), International Exchange Bank
(IEBank), and Security Bank Corporation (SBC). Petitioner also applied with the Asia United Bank (AUB) an irrevocable domestic
standby letter of credit in favor of respondent. All these banks separately executed several undertakings setting the terms and
conditions governing the drawing of money by respondent from these banks.
Petitioner allegedly failed to pay her obligations to respondent despite demand, thus, respondent tried to withdraw from these bank
undertakings.
3

Petitioner then filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City separate petitions against the banks for declaration of nullity
of the several bank undertakings and domestic letter of credit which they issued with the application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction. The cases were later consolidated and were assigned to Branch 101.
Petitioner asked for the annulment of the bank undertakings/letter of credit which she signed on the ground that the prevailing
market rate at the time of respondent's intended drawings with which petitioner will be charged of as interests and penalties is
oppressive, exorbitant, unreasonable and unconscionable rendering it against public morals and policy; and that to make her
automatically liable for millions of pesos on the bank undertakings, these banks merely required the submission of a mere
certification from the company (respondent) that the customer (petitioner) has not paid its account (and its statement of account of
the client) without first verifying the truthfulness of the alleged petitioner's total liability to the drawer thereon. Therefore, such
contracts are oppressive, unreasonable and unconscionable as they would result in her obtaining several millions of liability.
On November 28, 2002, a hearing was conducted for the issuance of the TRO and the writ of preliminary injunction wherein the
petitioner and the bank representatives were present. On query of the respondent Judge Normandie Pizarro (Judge Pizarro) to the
bank representatives with regard to the eventual issuance of the TRO, the latter all replied that they will abide by the sound
4
judgment of the court. The court then issued an Order granting the TRO and requiring petitioner to implead respondent as an
indispensable party and for the latter to submit its position paper on the matter of the issuance of the injunction. Petitioner and
respondent submitted their respective position papers.
As to petitioner's claim of respondent's non-filing of a motion for reconsideration before resorting to a petition forcertiorari, the CA
said that it is not a rigid rule, as jurisprudence had said, that when a definite question has been properly raised, argued and

submitted in the RTC and the latter had decided the question, a motion for reconsideration is no longer necessary before filing a
petition for certiorari
Issue:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS A QUO COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GIVING DUE COURSE AND
GRANTING PRIVATE RESPONDENT SBDI'S PETITION WHEN THE LATTER ADMITTEDLY FAILED TO FILE A PRIOR MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT, MORESO WHEN INDISPENSABLE PARTIES WERE NOT IMPLEADED WHICH SHOULD
HAVE RENDERED THE COURT OF APPEALS IN WANT OF JURISDICTION TO ACT
Held:
Moreover, certiorari, as a special civil action, is an original action invoking the original jurisdiction of a court to annul or modify the
16
proceedings of a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. It is an original and independent action that
is not part of the trial or the proceedings on the complaint filed before the trial court.
Petitioner contends that respondent filed its petition for certiorari in the CA without a prior motion for reconsideration, thus,
constitutes a fatal infirmity.
We do not agree.
Concededly, the settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition
18
for certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re19
examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions,
such as (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo had no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in
the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed
upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is
extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the
trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
proceedings were ex parte, or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of
20
law or where public interest is involved.
Respondent explained their omission of filing a motion for reconsideration before resorting to a petition forcertiorari based on
exceptions (b), (c) and (i). The CA brushed aside the filing of the motion for reconsideration based on the ground that the questions
raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and
passed upon in the lower court.lawp++!1 We agree.
Respondent had filed its position paper in the RTC stating the reasons why the injunction prayed for by petitioner should not be
granted. However, the RTC granted the injunction. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA and presented the same
arguments which were already passed upon by the RTC. The RTC already had the opportunity to consider and rule on the question of
the propriety or impropriety of the issuance of the injunction. We found no reversible error committed by the CA for relaxing the
rule since respondent's case falls within the exceptions.
G.R. No. 166888

January 31, 2007

FIRST WOMENS CREDIT CORPORATION and SHIG KATAYAMA, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. ROMMEL O. BAYBAY, in his capacity as the ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 65, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT,
*
MAKATI CITY [SIC] , RAMON P. JACINTO, JAIME C. COLAYCO, ANTONIO P. TAYAO and GLICERIO PEREZ, R
First Womens Credit Corp. (the corporation), represented by stockholder and director Shig Katayama (Katayama), filed on
November 12, 1997 a petition before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against the corporations officers Jacinto,
Colayco, Concepcion T. Sangil (Sangil) and Asuncion Cruz (Cruz), for alleged mismanagement of the corporation. The case was
4
docketed as SEC No. 11-97-5816.

The SEC, in SEC Case No. 11-97-5816, created an Interim Management Committee (IMC) for the corporation by Order of November
17, 1999. The Order was upheld by the SEC en banc on July 4, 2000.
The IMC thereupon issued directives to the corporations president Antonio Tayao (Tayao) and corporate secretary and treasurer
5
Glicerio Perez (Perez) toward the preservation of assets and records of the corporation.
The IMC, on April 14, 2000, later preventively suspended Tayao and Perez. Despite their preventive suspension, however, the two,
allegedly in conspiracy with Jacinto and Colayco, still issued various directives/memoranda to the employees of the corporation to
disobey the IMC
Held:
As to what mode of review petitioners may avail of after a court grants an accuseds motion to withdraw information and/or to
dismiss the case, Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure instructs: "Any party may appeal from a
judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy."
In availing of the remedy of certiorari before the RTC, petitioners claim that they had no plain, adequate and speedy remedy to
question the MeTCs grant of the motion.
The records of the cases show, however, that the motion was granted by the MeTC before respondents were arraigned. Thus, the
prohibition against appeal in case a criminal case is dismissed as the accused would be placed in double jeopardy does not apply.
Petitioners not having availed of the proper remedy to assail the dismissal of the cases, the dismissal had become final and
executory. On this score alone, the present petition must fail.
Technicality aside, the petition just the same fails.
Petitioners assertion that the trial court failed to comply with its mandate to make an independent assessment and evaluation of
the evidence before granting the motion does not persuade
G.R. No. 157775

October 19, 2007

LEYTE IV ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
LEYECO IV Employees Union-ALU, Respondent.
Facts:
, Leyte IV Electric Cooperative, Inc. (petitioner) and Leyeco IV Employees Union-ALU (respondent) entered into a Collective
3
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) covering petitioner rank-and-file employees, for a period of five (5) years effective January 1, 1998.
On June 7, 2000, respondent, through its Regional Vice-President, Vicente P. Casilan, sent a letter to petitioner demanding holiday
4
pay for all employees, as provided for in the CBA.
On June 20, 2000, petitioner, through its legal counsel, sent a letter-reply to Casilan, explaining that after perusing all available pay
5
slips, it found that it had paid all employees all the holiday pays enumerated in the CBA.
After exhausting the procedures of the grievance machinery, the parties agreed to submit the issues of the interpretation and
implementation of Section 2, Article VIII of the CBA on the payment of holiday pay, for arbitration of the National Conciliation and
6
Mediation Board (NCMB), Regional Office No. VIII in Tacloban City. The parties were required to submit their respective position
papers, after which the dispute was submitted for decision.
9

Voluntary Arbitrator Antonio C. Lopez, Jr. rendered a Decision in favor of respondent, holding petitioner liable for payment of
unpaid holidays from 1998 to 2000 in the sum of P1,054,393.07. He reasoned that petitioner miserably failed to show that it
complied with the CBA mandate that holiday pay be "reflected during any payroll period of occurrence" since the payroll slips did
not reflect any payment of the paid holidays.

13

14

Thirty days later, or on July 27, 2002, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA, ascribing grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction to the Voluntary Arbitrator: (a) for ignoring that in said company the divisor for computing the
applicable daily rate of rank-and-file employees is 360 days which already includes payment of 13 un-worked regular holidays under
15
Section 2, Article VIII of the CBA; and (b) for holding the petitioner liable for the unpaid holidays just because the payroll slips
16
submitted as evidence did not show any payment for the regular holidays.
17

In a Resolution dated September 4, 2002, the CA dismissed outright petitioner's Petition for Certiorari for adopting a wrong mode
of appeal.
Issue:
(1) The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in rejecting the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by
herein petitioner to assail the Decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator
Held:
Thus, the general rule is that the proper remedy from decisions of voluntary arbitrators is a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court.
Nonetheless, a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy for one who complains that
the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted in total disregard of evidence material to or
34
35
decisive of the controversy. As this Court elucidated in Garcia v. National Labor Relations Commission
[I]t has been said that a wide breadth of discretion is granted a court of justice in certiorari proceedings. The cases in which certiorari
will issue cannot be defined, because to do so would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion
of the court that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus. In the
exercise of our superintending control over inferior courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case "as
the ends of justice may require." So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do
36
substantial justice.
In addition, while the settled rule is that an independent action for certiorari may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any
37
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law and certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed remedy of
38
appeal, there are a few significant exceptions when the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be resorted to despite the
availability of an appeal, namely: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate; (b) when the broader
interests of justice so require; (c) when the writs issued are null; and (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive
39
exercise of judicial authority.
40

In this case, while the petition was filed on July 27, 2002, 15 days after July 12, 2002, the expiration of the 15-day reglementary
period for filing an appeal under Rule 43, the broader interests of justice warrant relaxation of the rules on procedure. Besides,
petitioner alleges that the Voluntary Arbitrators conclusions have no basis in fact and in law; hence, the petition should not be
dismissed on procedural grounds.
G.R. NO. 160657, JUNE 30, 2004
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner,
vs.
NIMFA P. ASENSI, respondent
Facts:
Respondent Nimfa Asensi was ordered dismissed by petitioner Civil Service Commission ("CSC") from her position as Revenue
District Officer of the Bureau of Internal Revenue in Lucena City. Her dismissal came after an investigation revealed that she had
1
falsified entries in her Personal Data Sheet (PDS) relative to her educational background. Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals, assailing the CSC Resolution ordering her dismissal.

On 9 July 2003, the Court of Appeals Fourth Division promulgated a D E C I S I O N holding that the dismissal of respondent was not
warranted, and setting aside the assailed resolution of the CSC
On 27 November 2003, the CSC, through its Office of Legal Affairs, filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorariunder Rule 65,
8
assailing the 9 July 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals, which it received on 30 July 2003. In aResolution dated 13 January 2004,
9
the Court, without giving due course to the petition, directed the respondent to file her comment thereon.
The OSG was surprised by the twin legal moves taken by the CSC without their consent and participation. On 22 December 2003, the
OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that considering the CSCs manifested intention to file its own petition, the OSG had no
recourse but to withdraw its 21 November 2003 Motion for Extension and allow the CSC to actively pursue its own case.
Held:
13

In the meantime, respondent filed her Comment on the Petition for Certiorari. She prayed for the immediate dismissal of the
petition, as the proper remedy for the CSC was not the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, but a petition for review
under Rule 45. Moreover, since the period for filing a petition for review had already elapsed, according to the respondent, the CSC
had deliberately resorted to the special civil action.
We agree with the respondent. So, we dismiss the petition. There is little need to elaborate on the reasons, which are after all,
elementary in procedural law. The special civil action for certiorari lies only to correct acts rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of
14
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse of discretion imputed to the Court of Appeals was its finding that
respondent was not guilty of the charges against her, a charge that if true, would only constitute an error in law. Certiorari will issue
only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court. As long as
a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than
15
errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by special civil action for certiorari. Neither is certiorari
16
warranted if there is another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The remedy to the adverse
17
decision of the Court of Appeals in this case is a petition for review under Rule 45.
The OSG, counsel of record for the CSC, well understood the proper procedure for appeal, and undertook the initiatory step for a
18
petition for review by filing a Motion for Extension of Time to file such petition. It is unclear if the CSC had known about the
OSGs Motion, though the answer to that question does not really matter to the disposition of this case. The Court granted the
OSGs Motion, allowing the OSG to file its Petition until 22 December 2003. The OSG, being the designated legal representative of
the Government and its instrumentalities, has a long history of association with this Court and acquired in the process an awesome
wealth of experience in appellate practice. Had the CSC relied on its counsels expertise, it would have been spared of the needless
burden of salvaging its petition from outright dismissal and, of course, the inevitable ignominy which such dismissal entails.
The Petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
G.R. No. 165486

May 31, 2006

CENTRO ESCOLAR UNIVERSITY FACULTY AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION INDEPENDENT, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, APRON MANGABAT as Voluntary Arbitrator, and CENTRO ESCOLAR UNIVERSITY
Facts:
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6728, otherwise known as the "Government Assistance To Students and Teachers in Private Education Act,"
allows private schools to increase their tuition fees on the condition that 70% of the tuition fee increases shall go to the payment of
salaries, wages, allowances and other benefits of teaching and non-teaching personnel. The petition at bar poses the issue of
whether respondent Centro Escolar University may source from the 70% incremental proceeds (IP) the integrated IP incorporated
into the salaries of its teaching and non-teaching staff pursuant to the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) entered into by their
union.
It appears that petitioner union, representing the teaching and the non-teaching staff of respondent university, has existing CBAs
with the university. Their respective CBAs granted both the teaching and the non-teaching staff increases in their compensation.

Respondent university admits that salary increases provided under Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 are taken from the university fund, while
the salary increases brought about by the IP integration are deducted from the IP
As with the salary increases for the schools faculty, the increases provided under Sections 1, 2 and 3 are also taken from the
4
university fund, while the increases under Section 4 are deducted from the IP.
Petitioner asserts that the integrated IP granted in the CBAs should not be deducted from the personnels 70% share in the IP. It
cites the common provision in the CBAs of the faculty and the non-teaching staff prohibiting the deduction of salary increases arising
from the CBA from their 70% share in the IP. Petitioner also sought the payment of additional IP for the faculty members with
overload and permanent substitution units.
On February 5, 2002, petitioner filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board a preventive mediation for the recovery of
IP losses due to the universitys alleged deduction of the cost of CBA-won economic benefits from the 70% share of the teachers and
employees in the IP.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The
appellate court dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner used a wrong mode of appeal. It held that petitioner should
9
have filed an appeal under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
issue:

Respondent court committed reversible error in dismissing the instant petition on technical ground that appeal under Rule 43 is the
proper remedy, and not certiorari under Rule 65, when no less than Section 2 of Rule 43 explicitly provides that Rule 43 does not
apply in labor cases
Held;
A petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy that is adopted to correct errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower court or
quasi-judicial agency, or when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of such court or agency amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of law or fact which is a mistake of judgment, the proper remedy should
16
be appeal. In addition, an independent action for certiorari may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy
17
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. There was no question of jurisdiction involved in the decision of the voluntary
arbitrator. What was being questioned was merely his findings of whether the universitys practice of sourcing the integrated IP in
the CBA from the 70% share of the personnel in the IP violates the provisions of the CBA. Such is a proper subject of an appeal.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition filed before it by herein petitioner.
G.R. No. 145391

August 26, 2002

AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners,

vs.
MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA,
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya ("Laroya" for brevity) and the other owned by petitioner Roberto
Capitulo ("Capitulo" for brevity) and driven by petitioner Avelino Casupanan ("Casupanan" for brevity), figured in an accident. As a
result, two cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court ("MCTC" for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case
against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, docketed as Criminal Case No. 002-99. On the other
hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict, docketed as Civil Case No. 2089.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case,
filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC
granted the motion in the Order of March 26, 1999 and dismissed the civil case.
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed
independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion for reconsideration in the Order of May 7, 1999. Casupanan and

Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court ("Capas RTC" for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac, Branch
3
66, assailing the MCTCs Order of dismissal.
Issue:
Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and
independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case.
The Courts Ruling
Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which the MCTC dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping, constitutes a
counterclaim in the criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo argue that if the accused in a criminal case has a counterclaim against the
private complainant, he may file the counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper time. They contend that an action on quasidelict is different from an action resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence, and an accused in a criminal case can be an
aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the same incident.
Nature of the Order of Dismissal
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-shopping under Supreme Court Administrative Circular
5
No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in its order of dismissal that the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular,
the order of dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly states it is with
6
prejudice. Absent a declaration that the dismissal is with prejudice, the same is deemed without prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs
dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice.
7

Section 1 of Rule 41 provides that an order dismissing an action without prejudice is not appealable. The remedy of the aggrieved
party is to file a special civil action under Rule 65. Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly states that "where the judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65." Clearly, the Capas RTCs order dismissing
the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated December 28, 1999 and August 24,
2000 in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99) are ANNULLED and Civil Case No. 2089 isREINSTATED.
G.R. Nos. 182382-83

February 24, 2010

JAIME S. DOMDOM, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. THIRD AND FIFTH DIVISIONS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Facts:
By Affidavit of February 15, 2002, Hilconeda P. Abril, State Auditor V of the Commission on Audit (COA) assigned at the Philippine
Crop Insurance Corporation (PCIC), requested the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary investigation on the
transactions-bases of the claims of Jaime S. Domdom (petitioner) for miscellaneous and extraordinary expenses as a Director of
1
PCIC, the receipts covering which were alleged to be tampered.
After preliminary investigation, the Office of the Ombudsman found probable cause to charge petitioner with nine counts of estafa
through falsification of documents in view of irregularities in nine supporting receipts for his claims for miscellaneous and
extraordinary expenses, after verification with the establishments he had transacted with. It thus directed the filing of the
2
appropriate Informations with the Sandiganbayan.
The Informations were separately raffled and lodged among the five divisions of the Sandiganbayan.
The First,Second and Fifth Divisions granted petitioners Motions for Consolidation of the cases raffled to them with that having the
3
lowest docket number, SB-07-CRM-0052, which was raffled to the Third Division.

The Sandiganbayan Third Division disallowed the consolidation, however, by Resolutions dated February 12 and May 8, 2008, it
4
holding mainly that the evidence in the cases sought to be consolidated differed from that to be presented in the one which bore
the lowest docket number. It is gathered from the records that the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division also denied petitioners Motion
5
for Consolidation.
Petitioner thus seeks relief from this Court via the present Petition for Certiorari, with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin the different divisions of the Sandiganbayan from further proceeding with the cases
6
against him during the pendency of this petition.
Petitioner argues that, among other things, all the cases against him arose from substantially identical series of transactions
involving alleged overstatements of miscellaneous and extraordinary expenses.
7

Respondent People of the Philippines (People), in its Comment, counters that petitioner failed to file a motion for reconsideration
which is a condition precedent to the filing of a petition for certiorari; that the petition was filed out of time since a motion for
extension to file such kind of a petition is no longer allowed; that consolidation is a matter of judicial discretion; and that the
proceedings in the different divisions of the Sandiganbayan may proceed independently as the Informations charged separate
crimes committed on separate occasions.
8

In the meantime, the Court issued a TRO enjoining all divisions of the Sandiganbayan from further proceeding with the trial of the
cases against petitioner until further orders.
Prefatorily, the People raises procedural questions which the Court shall first address.
Concededly, the settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari,
its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by a re9
examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.
The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as where the order is a patent nullity because the court a quo
had no jurisdiction; where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower
court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of
the question, and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner, or the subject matter of
the action is perishable;
The Court finds that the issue raised by petitioner had been duly raised and passed upon by the Sandiganbayan Third Division, it
having denied consolidation in two resolutions; that the issue calls for resolution and any further delay would prejudice the interests
of petitioner; and that the issue raised is one purely of law, the facts not being contested. There is thus ample justification for
relaxing the rule requiring the prior filing of a motion for reconsideration.
Held:
On the Peoples argument that a motion for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari is no longer allowed, the same rests on
11
shaky grounds. Supposedly, the deletion of the following provision in Section 4 of Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC evinces an
intention to absolutely prohibit motions for extension:
"No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen
(15) days."
That no mention is made in the above-quoted amended Section 4 of Rule 65 of a motion for extension, unlike in the previous
formulation, does not make the filing of such pleading absolutely prohibited. If such were the intention, the deleted portion could
just have simply been reworded to state that "no extension of time to file the petition shall be granted." Absent such a prohibition,
motions for extension are allowed, subject to the Courts sound discretion. The present petition may thus be allowed, having been
filed within the extension sought and, at all events, given its merits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Third Division of the Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to allow the consolidation of the cases
against petitioner for estafa through falsification of documents with SB-07-CRM-0052, which has the lowest docket number pending
with it. All other Divisions of the Sandiganbayan are accordingly ORDERED to forward the subject cases to the Third Division