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SUILIONG & CO., as liquidators of The Yek Tong Lim Fire, Marine, and Insurance Co.,
Ltd., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
SILVINA CHIO-TAYSAN, defendant-FRANCISCA JOSE, intervener-appellant.
Leodegario Azarraga, for appellant.
Carlos Ledesma, and Ramon Fernandez, for appellees.
CARSON, J.:
Avelina Caballero, deceased, owned during her lifetime a certain tract of land, which was duly
inscribed in her name in the land registry of the city of Manila. On March 27, 1903, she borrowed
from Francisca Jose, the intervener and appellant in this action, 1,000 pesos, Mexican currency,
and turned over her title deeds to this tract of land to the lender as security for the loan, but no
entry touching the transaction was noted in the land registry.
Avelina Caballero died on the 5th day of June, 1903, and thereafter Silvina Chio-Taysan, the
defendant in this action, instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action, known,
under the system of civil procedure in existence prior to the adoption of the present code, as an
"action for the declaration of heirship" and on the 5th day of August, 1903, the following order
declaring her to be the only and exclusive heir of Avelina Caballero, deceased, was issued in
that proceeding:
[United States of America, Philippine Islands. In the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Part III.]
It having been proven by both documental and oral evidence introduced in the abovecited case, that the petitioner Silvina Chio-Taysan y Caballero is the daughter of Jose
Chio-Taysan and Avelina Caballero, who died on the 29th of April, 1895, and on the 5th
of June, 1903, respectively, without leaving any other descendant or having executed
any will; and there being no objection whatever to the claim of the petitioner, it is hereby
declared that the said Silvina Chio-Taysan y Caballero is the legal heir abintestato of her
deceased parents, the said Jose Chio-Taysan and Avelina Caballero, in conformity with
the provisions of the Civil Code now in force. Let a certificate of this decision be issued to
the interested party and those who may hereafter apply for the same. So ordered.
A.S. CROSSFIELD, Judge.
On March 9, 1904, the registrar of deeds of the city of Manila by virtue of this order entered the
following inscription in the land registry whereby the said Silvina Chio-Taysan is made to appear
as the owner of the land in question:
Ninth inscription. Urban property. A parcel of land and a house of a strong
materials, tile roofed, built thereon, marked number eight, situated in Calle Lavezares of
the district of Binondo, this city, the remaining description of which appears in the first
inscription of this number. It has no encumbrances. Doa Avelina Caballero y
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The trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against both the defendant and the
intervener in conformity with the prayer of the complaint, and the intervener brings that judgment
before this court for review upon her bill of exceptions duly signed and certified.
We do not think that the judgment of the trial court can be sustained in so far as it wholly denies
relief to the intervener, Francisca Jose. The trial judge denied the relief prayed for by the
intervener, on the ground that her intervention in this action was for the purpose of the written
title deeds on the land, and that, since she admitted that she had admitted her claim against the
estate of Avelina Caballero, deceased, to the committee appointed in the administration
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GANCAYCO, J.:
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu the question
raised is whether the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter,
her mother-in-law.
It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a
resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales and
their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio
Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea
C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the dismissed has an estimated gross value of
about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The case was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the trial court appointed Magna Rosales Acebes
administratrix of the said estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June 16, 1972
declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their
respective share of the estate
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4;
Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4, 1975.
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Footnotes
1 III Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines 461, 1979 ed.
2 Articles 978 to 1014.
3 Art. 887 (3), Civil Code.
4 71 SCRA 262, 265 L-42257, June 14, 1976.
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CRUZ, J.:
We are faced once again with an all-too-familiar if distasteful controversy: an old woman dying
without issue and without a will and her collaterals wrangling over her properties like the soldiers
in Mount Calvary casting lots for the seamless robe of Jesus. The difference in this case is that
even before the owner's death, two of the claimants had already taken over her properties by
virtue of certain supposed transfers which are in fact that reason for this petition.
The questioned sales were effected through three deeds denominated "Bilihan ng Lupa" and
dated January 29 and February 3, 1977, 1 under which Paulina L. Baranda, a widow, sold five parcels of land to her
niece, Evangelina Baranda, and a sixth parcel to her other niece, Elisa, also a daughter of Pedro Baranda, Paulina's brother. The sales
were made, according to the documents, for the total consideration of P105,000.00 duly acknowledged as received by the transferor
from the vendees. 2
What made these transactions suspect was a subsequent complaint filed by Paulina Baranda
against her nieces on August 1, 1977, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in which she alleged
that she had signed the said deeds of sale without knowing their contents and prayed that
Evangelina and Elisa be ordered to reconvey the lands subject thereof to her. 3 This complaint
was later withdrawn pursuant to an agreement dated August 2, 1977, 4 under which the defendants, in
exchange for such withdrawal, obligated themselves to "execute absolute deeds of sale covering the
above-mentioned properties in favor of the First Party," meaning the plaintiff.
It was also stipulated in the said agreement thatc. The FIRST PARTY shall keep possession of the aforementioned deeds of sale,
as wen as the Transfer Certificate of Title of the above-listed properties, which
are in the hands of the SECOND PARTIES;
d. That any time that the FIRST PARTY desires to sell, mortgage or otherwise
dispose of or encumber the abovementioned properties, the SECOND PARTIES
shall execute the proper documents in accordance with the desire and wishes of
the FIRST PARTY.
As it turned out, only Elisa reconveyed the lot deeded to her; Evangelina never complied with the
agreement; and when Paulina died in 1982, the certificate of title over the lots in question were
still in the names of Evangelina and Elisa Baranda. 5
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On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, ** the decision of the trial court was reversed and the deeds of sale
were held valid and binding, for reasons to be discussed presently. The respondent court, in dismissing the complaint, also required the
complainants to pay P50,000.00 for attorney's fees, P30,000.00 for litigation expenses, P20,000.00 as moral damages, and P20,000.00
as exemplary damages. The petitioners are now before us to challenge that decision. 7
We address ourselves first to the basic issue, to wit, the validity of the three deeds of sale
allegedly signed by Paulina Baranda without knowing their contents. The respondent court,
rejecting the findings of the trial court, upheld the questioned deeds, stressing that they were
public documents and that their authenticity could further be sustained by the testimony of the
private respondents. We disagree.
While it is true that a notarized instrument is admissible in evidence without further proof of its
due execution and is conclusive as to the truthfulness of its contents, 8 this rule is nonetheless not
absolute but may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 9 Such evidence, as
the Court sees it, has been sufficiently established in this case.
The curious part about the supposed deeds of sale is the consideration allegedly agreed upon,
in the amounts of P25,000.00 for lots 4 and 5, P50,000.00 for lots 9, 11 and 6, and P30,000.00
for lot 8 which Evangelina testified as having been actually paid to their aunt on February 3,
1977. Especially intriguing is the source of the said purchase price, in the total amount of
P105,000.00, which by the testimony of the private respondents was paid by them in cash to
their aunt in the office of Atty. Galos, who notarized the deeds of sale. 10
According to Evangeline, the sum of P100,000.00 was given to her by a "balikbayan" boy friend,
and it was from this amount that she paid her share of the purchase price of
P75,000.00. 11 According to Elisa, her sister Evangelina lent her P15,000.00 and she raised another P15,000.00 from her
grandmother in the province to complete the P30,000.00 due from her for the lot she was buying.12 At the time of these transactions,
neither Evangelina nor Elisa was gainfully employed or had independent sources of income, both being then fresh college graduates
aged 25 and 26 years old, respectively. 13
The tale of the mysterious and generous "balikbayan" is something "out of this world," in the
language of the trial court, and we are inclined to agree, although not in those words. This Court
is itself rather perplexed that the respondent court should have accepted this tissue of lies so
readily, considering its obvious falsity. The "balikbayan" is a hazy figure, if we go by his own girl
friend's testimony, without even a name at least, let alone other personal circumstances to give
him bone and body. All we can glean from the record is that he is an exceedingly trusting and
generous person who, presumably out of love for Evangeline, willingly delivered P100,000.00 in
cold cash to her and thereafter disappeared completely. (Five years later, Evangelina was still
unmarried.) 14 Strangely, this amorphous sweetheart was not even presented at the trial to corroborate his beloved, assuming
their love was as strong as ever, or at least to protect his investment.
Elsa's explanation of how she got her own P30,000.00 is equally imaginative and was obviously
part of the fabric or fabrication woven by her sister to conjure what now appears to be a
non-existent fund. As Elisa puts it, half of the P30,000.00 she paid came as a loan from
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The sisters made another incredible claim, viz., that from the house where they and Paulina
Baranda were living together they carried the amount of P105,000.00 in cold cash to the office of
Atty. Galos where they delivered it to Paulina Baranda. 17 Apparently, Paulina then brought it back to the same
house where it came from in the first place, in a preposterous pantomime that invites laughter, not belief, and would make them out as
three silly persons from some inane nursery rhyme.
Why the nieces did not pay the money in the house instead of bringing it all the way from the
house and back is something that has not been sufficiently explained by the private respondents.
They could have shown, for example, that Paulina Baranda intended to bring it somewhere else,
say, for deposit in a bank, or for the purchase of some property, such as the ticket to the United
States where she was allegedly planning to migrate. 18 There is no evidence of such deposit or purchase,
however, no evidence at all of where that money went after it was supposedly received by Paulina Baranda on the date of the alleged
transaction. It also simply disappeared like the "balikbayan" who never returned.
Paulina Baranda herself denied under oath that she ever sold her lands to Evangelina and Elisa,
alleging in her verified complaint that she "never executed any deed" conveying the title to her
properties and "was surprised and shocked to learn" later that her transfer certificate of title to
her lots had been cancelled and new certificates of title had been issued in favor of the private
respondents.19 She withdrew this complaint only after her nieces agreed in writing to reconvey the properties to her "in order to
preserve family solidarity and in order to avoid litigation among the parties."
20
The nieces explain away this complaint by saying it was merely simulated, to prevent the U.S.
government from discontinuing her pension as a war widow on the ground that she had
squandered her property. 21 If that was her only purpose, one might well wonder why it was
necessary at all to commence litigation as a mere resale of the properties would have been sufficient
and easily effected without the asperity of a civil complaint. Considering that, as the private
respondents kept insisting, there was never any misunderstanding between them and their aunt,
there would have been no difficulty in their acceding to her request for a resale of the properties to
protect her pension. The fact that the complaint had to be filed shows they were unwilling to reconvey
the properties after the aunt demanded their return following her discovery of the fake deeds of sale,
an unwillingness further manifested when Evangelina refused to comply with this aforesaid
agreement and never reconveyed the lots supposedly bought by her.
By offering this explanation, the private respondents are in effect asking this Court to condone
and approve their attempt to deceive and defraud the government of a sister state.
There is also the issue of the capacity to sue of the petitioners who, it is claimed by the private
respondents, are not the proper parties to question the validity of the deed of sale. The reason
given is that they are not the legitimate and compulsory heirs of Paulina Baranda nor were they
parties to the challenged transactions.
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SARMIENTO, J.:
Pursuant to its Resolution of June 30, 1971, 1 the Court of Appeals 2 certified this case to the Court.
The Appellate Court declined to render a ruling, it being of the opinion that the case "involve[s] purely
questions of law over which [it] [has] nojuriscliction." 3 Specifically, the questions put to the Court are
two-fold: (1) does the court have jurisdiction to decree a partition in an action for reconveyance? (2)
may it apply the provisions of the new Civil Code in determining the successionary rights of heirs
where the decedent died during the effectivity of the old Code? 4 questions undoubtedly legal in
character. In forwarding the appeal to this Court, the Court of Appeals invokes, specifically, the
provisions of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. 5 We quote pertinent parts thereof:
SEC. 17. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
The Supreme Court shall further have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on certiorari as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of
inferior courts as herein provided, in
xxx xxx xxx
(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue;
(4) All other cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved: Provided however, That
if, in addition to constitutional, tax or jurisdictional questions, the cases mentioned in the three
next preceding paragraphs also involve questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, the
aggrieved party shall appeal to the Court of Appeals; and the final judgment or decision of the
latter may be reviewed, revised, reversed, modified or affirmed by the Supreme
Court on writ of certiorari; xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Under the Constitution then in force:
SEC. 2. ... [T]he Supreme Court [shall have] jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or
affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final
judgments and decrees of inferior courts in
(1) xxx xxx xxx
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But as we stated, the error of the court notwithstanding, the case is a closed chapter, the
decision having been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. And, as noted by the trial
court itself, it is the case that has become final and executory, and in fact, in the process of
execution. 23 A decision, no matter how erroneous, becomes the law of the case between the parties
upon attaining finality. 24
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.
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REY
CARLO
A.
RIVERA
and
GLADYS
ABAGA
RIVERA, petitioners, vs. VIRGILIO RIVERA, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
In 1993, Remigio, Jr. together with his three (3) sons migrated to the
United States, leaving behind petitioners who continued to reside in one of
the units of the duplex house.Respondent likewise migrated to the U.S.
On April 6, 1999, Consuelo sold the duplex house and lot to respondent
for five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00). At the time of the sale,
both Consuelo and respondent were residing in the same house in San
Jose, California. In the Deed of Sale, Consuelo and respondent were
represented by respondents daughters Ma. Theresa R. Ferreria and Ma.
[2]
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[4]
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the attendant defects in the sale of the property, no right or title was
transferred to respondent.
The trial court rendered judgment in the ejectment case in favor of
respondent, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against defendants Rey Carlo Rivera and Gladys Rivera in the manner
following:
1. Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to
immediately vacate the subject premises unlawfully withheld from the plaintiff;
2. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 as and by way of
unpaid rentals from April to September 1999, without prejudice to collecting the
reasonable compensation for occupancy that may be forthcoming until defendants
vacate the premises;
3. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as and by way of
attorneys fees; and
4. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on
the grounds that: (a) the respondent had no right over the property as he
did not have actual or prior physical possession thereof; (b) the nonexistent lease contract was not binding between the parties; and (c)
respondents title was not indefeasible.
On March 16, 2001, the RTC reversed the decision of the MeTC and
ruled in favor of the petitioners. It held that there was no valid contract of
lease between the parties and petitioners occupied the subject property in
the concept of a co-owner.
[6]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated March 21, 2002,
reversed the RTCs decision and reinstated the original decision of the
MeTC. It held that as registered owner of the land, respondent is entitled
to possession thereof.
[7]
Hence, this petition for review with petitioners raising the following
issues: (a) whether petitioners, being in actual physical possession of the
property since 1974, are entitled to continue in possession of the premises
Compiled by: aeejercito-beck
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Petitioners claim that the unlawful detainer suit should have been
dismissed as the respondent relied only on his title to the property in
bringing the action. They contend that respondents assertion of ownership
in the unlawful detainer case removed it from the jurisdiction of the
MeTC. Moreover, they insist that their possession of the property was not
merely by tolerance of the original owners and later on by the respondent
as they assert their fathers right as co-owner of the property.
Again, petitioners arguments must fail. It is well-settled that a person
who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action
for ejectment may be filed against him. In the case at bar, respondents
allegations in his complaint specifically show that petitioners occupied the
subject unit only with the express permission of the spouses as the original
owners. Thus, when title to the property passed on to respondent by virtue
of a contract of sale, petitioners refusal to sign the lease contract prepared
by the respondent for their use of the duplex unit rendered their continued
occupation thereof unlawful.
[9]
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[11]
The underlying reason for this ruling is to prevent the defendant from
trifling with the summary nature of an ejectment suit by the simple
expedient of asserting ownership over the disputed property.
[12]
In the case at bar, the lower court properly adjudicated ownership of the
property to respondent in the unlawful detainer case on the basis of his title
thereto. Full ownership of the subject property was surrendered to
Consuelo Rivera upon the death of Remigio, Sr. through an extrajudicial
partition signed by all the compulsory heirs. Thus, Consuelo had every
right to dispose of the property as she deemed fit. Moreover, the lower
court correctly ruled that petitioners had no hereditary rights over the
property in representation or substitution of their father as the latter was
still alive.
We stress, however, that this adjudication, is only an initial
determination of ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of
possession, the issue of ownership being inseparably linked thereto. The
lower courts adjudication of ownership in the ejectment case is merely
provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same
parties involving title to the property.
[13]
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Sandoval-Gutierrez,
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Considering that the questioned document is Segundos holographic will, and that the law favors
testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil
Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a
person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory.17
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SARMIENTO, J.:
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There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence it must be
presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of the marita. relations.
20
Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons, because it was
to take effect after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a donation between the spouses
because it involved no conveyance of a spouse's own properties to the other.
It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no modification petition of the conjugal
partnership, as held by the Court of Appeals, 21 by "mere stipulation" 22 and that it is no "cloak" 23 to
circumvent the law on conjugal property relations. Certainly, the spouses are not prohibited by law to
invest conjugal property, say, by way of a joint and several bank account, more commonly
denominated in banking parlance as an "and/or" account. In the case at bar, when the spouses Vitug
opened savings account No. 35342-038, they merely put what rightfully belonged to them in a moneymaking venture. They did not dispose of it in favor of the other, which would have arguably been
sanctionable as a prohibited donation. And since the funds were conjugal, it can not be said that one
spouse could have pressured the other in placing his or her deposits in the money pool.
The validity of the contract seems debatable by reason of its "survivor-take-all" feature, but in
reality, that contract imposed a mere obligation with a term, the term being death. Such
agreements are permitted by the Civil Code.24
Under Article 2010 of the Code:
ART. 2010. By an aleatory contract, one of the parties or both reciprocally bind
themselves to give or to do something in consideration of what the other shall
give or do upon the happening of an event which is uncertain, or which is to
occur at an indeterminate time.
Under the aforequoted provision, the fulfillment of an aleatory contract depends on either the
happening of an event which is (1) "uncertain," (2) "which is to occur at an indeterminate time." A
survivorship agreement, the sale of a sweepstake ticket, a transaction stipulating on the value of
currency, and insurance have been held to fall under the first category, while a contract for life
annuity or pension under Article 2021, et sequentia, has been categorized under the second. 25 In
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March 1, 1951
TESTATE estate of Carlos Gil, deceased. ISABEL HERREROS VDA. DE GIL, administratrixappellee,
vs.
PILAR GIL VDA. DE MURCIANO, oppositor-appellant.
Eligio C. Lagman for appellant.
Reyes, Albert and Agcaoili for appellee.
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CARLOS GIL
Testificacion:
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Nosotros los que suscribimos, todos mayores de edad, certificamos: que el testamento
que precede este escrito en la lengua castellana que conoce la testadora, compuesto de
dos paginas utiles con la clausula de atestiguamiento paginadas correlativamente en
letras y numeros en la parte superior de la casilla, asi como todas las hojas del mismo,
en nuestra presencia y que cada uno de nosotros hemos atestiguado y firmado dicho
documento y todas las hojas del mismo en presencia del testador y en la de cada uno de
nosotros.
Regarding the correctness and accuracy of the above-copied alleged will, the court below said:
. . . The only copy available is a printed form contained in the record appeal in case G.R.
No. L-254, entitled "Testate Estate of Carlos Gil; Isabel Herreros Vda. de Gil, petitioner
and appellant vs. Roberto Toledo y Gil, oppositor and appellee." Both parties are agreed
that this is a true and correct copy of the will. (P. 10, Record on Appeal).
The appeal being only on questions of law the above finding of the court below cannot be
disputed. The conclusions of law reached by said court are based on it. Moreover, the finding is
correctly based on the evidence of record. The parties agreed that said copy is true and correct.
If it were otherwise, they would not have so agreed, considering that the defect is of an essential
character and is fatal to the validity of the attestation clause.
It will be noted that the attestation clause above quoted does not state that the alleged testor
signed the will. It declares only that it was signed by the witnesses. This is a fatal defect, for the
precise purpose of the attestation clause is to certify that the testator signed the will, this being
the most essential element of the clause. Without it there is no attestation at all. It is said that the
court may correct a mere clerical error. This is too much of a clerical error for it effects the very
essence of the clause. Alleged errors may be overlooked or correct only in matters of form which
do not affect the substance of the statement.
It is claimed that the correction may be made by inference. If we cure a deficiency by means of
inferences, when are we going to stop making inferences to supply fatal deficiencies in wills?
Where are we to draw the line? Following that procedure we would be making interpolations by
inferences, implication, and even by internalcircumtantial evidence. This would be done in the
face of the clear, uniquivocal, language of the statute as to how the attestation clause should be
made. It is to be supposed that the drafter of the alleged will read the clear words of the statute
when he prepared it. For the court to supply alleged deficiencies would be against the evident
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Separate Opinions
TUAZON, J., dissenting:
The decision takes for granted that the will was written just as it was copied in the stipulation of
facts by the parties. But counsel for appellee makes the correctness of the copy an issue thereby
raising the question of not whether the burnt will possessed the statutory requirements but
whether the copy is erroneous. Since this is a chief feature on which the appellee's case is built;
since, in fact, the objection to form of the attestation clause, with which the decision wholly deals,
would disappear if the appellee's contention were well founded, it is proper that in this dissenting
opinion we should accord the matter at least a passing notice.
It may be stated as background that the original of the will was filed in the Court of First Instance
of Manila in 1943; that in 1945, before the will came up for probate, it was destroyed by fire or
looters; that in the probate proceeding after liberation, the parties submitted an agreed statement
of facts in which the will was reproduced ascopied in the record on appeal in another case
docketed in this court on appeal as G.R. No. L-254 and decided on April 30, 1948. It further
appears from the record of that case and from the decision of this court that the controversy
there concerned the right of a nephew of the testator to impugn the will, it being alleged that he
was not a legal heir and had no interest in the probate.
As transcribed in the majority decision, it will be seen that the attestation clause is truncated and
meaningless. The last of the compound sentence in incomplete, lacking an adjective phrase.
Counsel for appellee contends that the phrase "ha sido firmado por el testador" or equivalent
expression between the words "del mismo" and the words "en nuestra presencia" should be
inserted if the sentence is to be complete and have sense. The attestation clause with the
inclusion of the omitted phrase, which we italicize should read thus:
Nosotros, los que suscribimos, todos mayores de edad, certificamos que el testamento
que precede escrito en la lengua castellana que conoce la testador, compuesto de las
paginadas utiles con la clausula de atestiguamiento paginadas correlativamente en
letras y numeros en la parte superior de la casilla, asi como todos las hojas del mismo
(Ha sido firmado por el testador) en nuestra presencia y que cada de nosotros hemos
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RESOLUTION
TUASON, J.:
This appeal is before us on a motion for reconsideration of this court's decision. Whereas
formerly six justices voted for reversal and five for affirmance of the probate court's order
admitting the will to probate, the vote upon reconsideration was six for affirmance and five for
reversal, thereby making the dissenting opinion, which had been filed, the prevailing rule of the
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PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari which seeks to declare the orders of respondent Judge dated July
16, 1980 and September 23, 1980 as an exercise of a gross abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, by ruling that the properties under Group C of the testate estate of the late
Fr.Teodoro Aranas are subject to remunerative legacies.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Fr. Teodoro Aranas, a priest of the Roman Catholic Church, died on January 19, 1953. He had
executed on June 6, 1946 his Last Will and Testament which was admitted to probate on August
31, 1956. In said Last Will and Testament, Fr. Teodoro Aranas stipulated the following:
A. The return to Aniceto Aranas or his heirs of all properties acquired by Fr. Aranas from his
brother Aniceto Aranas and ten (10) parcels of land described in the Will inherited by the testator
from his parents.
B. The return to Carmelo Aranas or his heirs of all properties acquired by Fr. Aranas from his
brother Carmelo Aranas and ten (10) parcels of land described in the Will inherited by the
testator from his parents.
C. The special administration of the remainder of the estate of the testator by Vicente Aranas, a
faithful and serviceable nephew and designating him also as recipient of 1/2 of the produce of
said properties after deducting the expenses for the administration and the other 1/2 of the
produce to be given to the Catholic Church for the eternal repose of the testator's soul. Said
pertinent provision 1 reads as follows:
Fourth. It is my will that the lands I had bought from other persons should be
converged and placed under a "special administrator." The special administrator
of these lands, for his office, should receive one half of all the produce from
which shall be deducted the expenses for the administration, and the other half of
the produce should be received by the Roman Catholic Church and should be
spent for my soul, Vicente B. Aranas (Tingting), because he is a faithful and
serviceable nephew, should be the first special administrator of said properties,
without bond, until his death or until he should not want to hold the said office
anymore. Anyone of the sons of my brother Carmelo Aranas can hold the said
office of special administrator, and none other than they. Their father, my brother
Carmelo Aranas shall be the one to decide who among them shall hold the said
office, but upon the death of my said brother Carmelo Aranas, his said sons will
have power to select the one among them ourselves. The special administration
is perpetual.
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xxx
xxx
Dougal (the testator) had lived over one hundred years before he made the will, and his
physical and mental weakness and defective memory were in striking contrast with their
strength in the meridian of his life. He was blind; not deaf, but hearing impaired; his mind
acted slowly, he was forgetful or recent events, especially of names, and repeated
questions in conversation; and sometimes, when aroused for sleep or slumber, would
seem bewildered. It is not singular that some of those who had known him when he was
P a g e 67 | 95
July 6, 1918
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TEEHANKEE, J.:
Appeal from orders of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga approving the Executrixappellee's project of partition instead of Oppositors-Appellants' proposed counter-project of
partition. 1
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga, and
was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon,
Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and
Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate
child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of these
seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the oppositorsappellants.
The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the Pampango
dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the above-named compulsory heirs, together with
seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano
Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and Laureano Tiambon.
In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties appraised at
P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of land appraised at P5,849.60, household furniture
valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of Pampanga Sugar
Development Company valued at P350.00) among her above-named heirs.
Testate proceedings were in due course commenced 2 and by order dated March 13, 1961, the last
will and testament of the decedent was duly allowed and admitted to probate, and the appellee
Marina Dizon-Rivera was appointed executrix of the testatrix' estate, and upon her filing her bond and
oath of office, letters testamentary were duly issued to her.
After the executrix filed her inventory of the estate, Dr. Adelaido Bernardo of Angeles, Pampanga
was appointed commissioner to appraise the properties of the estate. He filed in due course his
report of appraisal and the same was approved in toto by the lower court on December 12, 1963
upon joint petition of the parties.
The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death thus had a total
appraised value of P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each of the seven compulsory heirs
amounted to P129,362.11. 3 (/7 of the half of the estate reserved for the legitime of legitimate children and
descendants). 4 In her will, the testatrix "commanded that her property be divided" in accordance with her
testamentary disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising
practically the entire bulk of her estate among her six children and eight grandchildren. The appraised
values of the real properties thus respectively devised by the testatrix to the beneficiaries named in
her will, are as follows:
1. Estela Dizon ....................................... P 98,474.80
2. Angelina Dizon .................................. 106,307.06
3. Bernardita Dizon .................................. 51,968.17
4. Josefina Dizon ...................................... 52,056.39
5. Tomas Dizon ....................................... 131,987.41
6. Lilia Dizon .............................................. 72,182.47
7. Marina Dizon ..................................... 1,148,063.71
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P a g e 74 | 95
1. Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix' testamentary disposition was in the
nature of a partition of her estate by will. Thus, in the third paragraph of her will, after
commanding that upon her death all her obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness
and funeral and the expenses for probate of her last will and for the administration of her
property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I
command that my property be divided" in accordance with the dispositions immediately
thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property in her estate and designated the
particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she
bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition 10 of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in
the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil Code, providing that "(S)hould a person make a partition
of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs." This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject
only to the right of compulsory heirs to their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides the safeguard for
the right of such compulsory heirs:
ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than
the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied.
ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of the
compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may
be inofficious or excessive.
This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition,
wherein the five oppositors-appellants namely Estela, Bernardita, Angelina,
Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and
assigned to them by the testatrix in her will, and the differential to complete their
respective legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash and/or
properties of the executrix-appellee, Marina, and their co-oppositor-appellant,
Tomas, who admittedly were favored by the testatrix and received in the partition
by will more than their respective legitimes.
2. This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was recognized even in Article 1056 of the
old Civil Code which has been reproduced now as Article 1080 of the present Civil Code. The
only amendment in the provision was that Article 1080 "now permits any person (not a testator,
as under the old law) to partition his estate by actinter vivos." 11 This was intended to repeal the
then prevailing doctrine 12 that for a testator to partition his estate by an actinter vivos, he must first
make a will with all the formalities provided by law. Authoritative commentators doubt the efficacy of
the amendment 13 but the question does not here concern us, for this is a clear case of partition by
will, duly admitted to probate, which perforce must be given full validity and effect. Aside from the
provisions of Articles 906 and 907 above quoted, other codal provisions support the executrixappellee's project of partition as approved by the lower court rather than the counter-project of
partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they would reduce the testamentary disposition
or partition made by the testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they would consider as mere
devises or legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free portion, and apply the other half
of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would
amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix' will, contrary to
Article 791 of the Civil Code. It would further run counter to the provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil
P a g e 75 | 95
3. In Habana vs. Imbo, 14 the Court upheld the distribution made in the will of the deceased testator
Pedro Teves of two large coconut plantations in favor of his daughter, Concepcion, as against
adverse claims of other compulsory heirs, as being a partition by will, which should be respected
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs, in accordance with Article 1080
of the Civil Code. In upholding the sale made by Concepcion to a stranger of the plantations thus
partitioned in her favor in the deceased's will which was being questioned by the other compulsory
heirs, the Court ruled that "Concepcion Teves by operation of law, became the absolute owner of said
lots because 'A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property
adjudicated to him' (Article 1091, New Civil Code), from the death of her ancestors, subject to rights
and obligations of the latter, and, she can not be deprived of her rights thereto except by the methods
provided for by law (Arts. 657, 659, and 661, Civil Code). 15 Concepcion Teves could, as she did, sell
the lots in question as part of her share of the proposed partition of the properties, especially when,
as in the present case, the sale has been expressly recognized by herself and her co-heirs ..."
4. The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary dispositions in their favor are in
the nature of devises of real property, citing the testatrix' repeated use of the words "I bequeath"
in her assignment or distribution of her real properties to the respective heirs. From this
erroneous premise, they proceed to the equally erroneous conclusion that "the legitime of the
compulsory heirs passes to them by operation of law and that the testator can only dispose of
the free portion, that is, the remainder of the estate after deducting the legitime of the
compulsory heirs ... and all testamentary dispositions, either in the nature of institution of heirs or
of devises or legacies, have to be taken from the remainder of the testator's estate constituting
the free portion." 16
Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudications and assignments in the testatrix' will of
specific properties to specific heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly appear from
the whole context of the will and the disposition by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for
some small properties of little value already noted at the beginning of this opinion) that her clear
intention was to partition her whole estate through her will. The repeated use of the words "I
bequeath" in her testamentary dispositions acquire no legal significance, such as to convert the
same into devises to be taken solely from the free one-half disposable portion of the estate.
Furthermore, the testatrix' intent that her testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications
to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore
on account of the respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the
fourth paragraph of her will, immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the third
paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise command that in case any of those I named as my
heirs in this testament any of them shall die before I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced
at the time of my death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said deceased." 17
Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in error. The testamentary dispositions of the testatrix,
being dispositions in favor of compulsory heirs, do not have to be taken only from the free
portion of the estate, as contended, for the second paragraph of Article 842 of the Civil Code
precisely provides that "(O)ne who has compulsory heirsmay dispose of his estate provided he
does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs." And
even going by oppositors' own theory of bequests, the second paragraph of Article 912 Civil
Code covers precisely the case of the executrix-appellee, who admittedly was favored by the
testatrix with the large bulk of her estate in providing that "(T)he devisee who is entitled to a
legitime may retain the entire property,provided its value does not exceed that of the disposable
portion and of the share pertaining to him as legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the
usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate." 18
P a g e 76 | 95
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AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of ricelands located at
Guimba, Nueva Ecija, with a total area of around forty- four hectares That devise was made in
the will of the late Father Pascual Rigor, a native of Victoria Tarlac, in favor of his nearest male
relative who would study for the priesthood.
The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands, appealed to this Court
from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the order of the probate court declaring that
the said devise was inoperative (Rigor vs. Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of
Victoria, Tarlac, CA-G.R. No. 24319-R, August 1, 1963).
The record discloses that Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on August 9,
1935, leaving a will executed on October 29, 1933 which was probated by the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. Named as devisees in the will were the
testators nearest relatives, namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor-Escobar, Belina RigorManaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a devise to his cousin, Fortunato
Gamalinda.
In addition, the will contained the following controversial bequest (paragraphing supplied to
facilitate comprehension of the testamentary provisions):
Doy y dejo como legado CUATRO (4) PARCELAS de terreno palayeros situados
en el municipiooo de Guimba de la provinciaaa de NUEVA ECIJA, cuyo num. de
CERTIFICADO DE TRANSFERENCIA DE TITULO SON; Titulo Num. 6530,
mide 16,249 m. cuadrados de superficie Titulo Num. 6548, mide 242,998 m.
cuadrados de superficie y annual 6525, mide 62,665 m. cuadrados de superficie;
y Titulo Num. 6521, mide 119,251 m. cuadrados de superficie; a cualquier
pariente mio varon mas cercano que estudie la carrera eclesiatica hasta
P a g e 78 | 95
Title No.
Lot
No.
Area
in
Has.
Tax
Dec.
Ass.
Valu
e
T6530
3663
1.62
49
1874
0
P
340.
00
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T6548
3445C
24.2
998
1873
0
7,29
0.00
T6525
3670
6.26
65
1873
6
1,88
0.00
T6521
3666
11.9
251
1873
3
3,58
0.00
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November 1, 1927
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the
brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3)
the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval
of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of
said business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the
failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's
business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish
laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the
provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code
which, among other things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession
as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in
question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be
situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in
accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what
the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are
presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36
Phil., 472.)
P a g e 85 | 95
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as
a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into
consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which
says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship
having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality
and, on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine
Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my
wish that the distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will,
be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands,
requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel
beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who
fail to comply with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted
legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws
of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as
the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the
testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the
civil Code provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as
not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even
should the testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law
when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is
the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
P a g e 86 | 95
June 6, 1967
P a g e 87 | 95
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A.
His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein
including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the
three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis,
various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total
of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and
allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on
account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its
"Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it
reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of
shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In
the project of partition, the executor pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will
and Testament divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the
testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as
illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is
evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court,
on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final
account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code,
it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide
for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11,
1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply
Texas law or Philippine law.
P a g e 88 | 95
P a g e 89 | 95
DECISION
ARELLANO, C.J. :
This action was brought in connection with the proceedings on the administration of the interstate estate
of Pedro Hernaez, father of the plaintiff and of the defendant. The purpose of the action is to obtain the
inclusion in the estate by collation of the values of the Naga and Panaogao properties, owned by the
defendant, that the same may be included in the inventory of the mass of the intestate succession. The
facts set up in the complaint are the following: (1) That as Rosendo Hernaez was a poor man after his
return from his student life in Manila, he was supported by his father. (2) That shortly afterwards he
purchased the Naga estate, he at that time not being engaged in any profitable trade or industry. (3)
That he was the administrator of the property of his parents. (4) That the money with which he
purchased the Naga estate belonged to his father. (5) That the Panaogao estate was purchased by
Rosendo after the death of his father.
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