Docket: T-1557-15

Montral, Quebec, November 12, 2015

PRESENT:

Prothonotary Richard Morneau

BETWEEN:
DAVID RAYMOND AMOS
Plaintiff
and

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

Defendant

ORDER

UPON reviewing the motion records filed by the parties in connection with a motion in
writing by the defendant for an order pursuant to rules 221(1)(a) and (c) of the Federal Courts
Rules [the rules] striking out the plaintiffs statement of claim in its entirety, without leave to
amend, on the grounds that said claim discloses no reasonable cause of action against the
defendant, and that same claim is frivolous and vexatious;

AND UPON being satisfied that this Court can adjudicate on the instant motion without
holding an oral hearing;

Page: 2

CONSIDERING that the Court fully agrees with the following analysis contained in
paragraphs 17 and 21 of the defendants written representations contained in her motion record
in chief and filed in support of her motion:

17. Within the 96 paragraph Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff

addresses his complaint in paragraphs 14-24, inclusive. All but
four of those paragraphs are dedicated to an incident that occurred
in 2006 in and around the legislature in New Brunswick. The
jurisdiction of the Federal Court does not extend to Her Majesty
the Queen in right of the Provinces. In any event, the Plaintiff
hasnt named the Province or provincial actors as parties to this
action. The incident alleged does not give rise to a justiciable cause
of action in this Court.
()
21. The few paragraphs that directly address the Defendant provide
no details as to the individuals involved or the location of the
alleged incidents or other details sufficient to allow the Defendant
to respond. As a result, it is difficult or impossible to determine the
causes of action the Plaintiff is attempting to advance. A generous
reading of the Statement of Claim allows the Defendant to only
speculate as to the true and/or intended cause of action. At best, the
Plaintiffs action may possibly be summarized as: he suspects he is
barred from the House of Commons.
[footnotes omitted]
Based on the foregoing, I conclude that it is plain and obvious that the statement of claim
discloses no reasonable claim and that it is fundamentally vexatious. Furthermore, I see no
possibility that it could be salvaged by way of further amendment.

CONSEQUENTLY, this Court hereby orders that:

Page: 3

1. The plaintiffs statement of claim is struck out in its entirety, without leave to
amend.

2. No costs are awarded to the defendant since none were requested by same.

Richard Morneau
Prothonotary

Docket: T-1557-15
Fredericton, New Brunswick, December 23, 2015
PRESENT:

The Honourable Mr. Justice Bell

BETWEEN:
DAVID RAYMOND AMOS
Plaintiff
and

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

Defendant

ORDER

(Delivered orally from the Bench in Fredericton, New Brunswick, on December 14, 2015)

The Plaintiff seeks an appeal de novo, by way of motion pursuant to the Federal Courts
Rules (SOR/98-106), from an Order made on November 12, 2015, in which Prothonotary
Morneau struck the Statement of Claim in its entirety.

At the outset of the hearing, the Plaintiff brought to my attention a letter dated September
10, 2004, which he sent to me, in my then capacity as Past President of the New Brunswick
Branch of the Canadian Bar Association, and the then President of the Branch, Kathleen Quigg,

Page: 5

(now a Justice of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal). In that letter he stated:

As for your past President, Mr. Bell, may I suggest that you check the
work of Frank McKenna before I sue your entire law firm including you.
You are your brothers keeper.

Frank McKenna is the former Premier of New Brunswick and a former colleague of mine
at the law firm of McInnes Cooper. In addition to expressing an intention to sue me, the Plaintiff
refers to a number of people in his Motion Record who he appears to contend may be witnesses
or potential parties to be added. Those individuals who are known to me personally, include, but
are not limited to the former Prime Minister of Canada, The Right Honourable Stephen Harper;
former Attorney General of Canada and now a Justice of the Manitoba Court of Queens Bench,
Vic Toews; former member of Parliament Rob Moore; former Director of Policing Services, the
late Grant Garneau; former Chief of the Fredericton Police Force, Barry McKnight; former Staff
Sergeant Danny Copp; my former colleagues on the New Brunswick Court of Appeal, Justices
Bradley V. Green and Kathleen Quigg, and, retired Assistant Commissioner Wayne Lang of the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

In the circumstances, given the threat in 2004 to sue me in my personal capacity and my
past and present relationship with many potential witnesses and/or potential parties to the
litigation, I am of the view there would be a reasonable apprehension of bias should I hear this
motion. See Justice de Grandprs dissenting judgment in Committee for Justice and Liberty et al
v National Energy Board et al, [1978] 1 SCR 369 at p 394 for the applicable test regarding
allegations of bias. In the circumstances, although neither party has requested I recuse myself, I

Page: 6

consider it appropriate that I do so.

AS A RESULT OF MY RECUSAL, THIS COURT ORDERS that the Administrator

of the Court schedule another date for the hearing of the motion. There is no order as to costs.

B. Richard Bell
Judge

Docket: T-1557-15
Citation: 2016 FC 93
Toronto, Ontario, January 25, 2016
PRESENT:

I.

The Honourable Mr. Justice Southcott

BETWEEN:
DAVID RAYMOND AMOS
Plaintiff
and

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

Defendant

ORDER AND REASONS

[1]

This is a motion by the Plaintiff, appealing an Order of Prothonotary Richard Morneau

dated November 12, 2015, which struck out the Plaintiffs Statement of Claim on the basis that it
disclosed no cause of action and was vexatious.

[2]

For the reasons that follow, this motion is allowed in part.

Page: 8
II.

Preliminary Matter

[3]

At the beginning of the hearing of this matter, the Plaintiff raised the question whether I

would be in a conflict of interest in hearing his motion. He advised that some of the evidence,
which he considers to support his action, was previously provided to members of my former law
firm and that he had discussed jurisprudence related to cyberbullying with some of these
individuals. He raised the possibility of communication between me and my former colleagues
on this evidence. The Plaintiff confirmed that, while he was raising this for my consideration, he
was not asserting that I was in a conflict of interest or asking me to recuse myself but was
leaving this decision to my discretion. The Defendant confirmed that it did not have concerns
regarding any conflict of interest arising from the circumstances described by the Plaintiff.

[4]

I advised the parties that I did not have concerns about conflict of interest arising from

the circumstances the Plaintiff had described and that I would proceed to hear his motion. For the
record, I confirm that I have had no discussions about the Plaintiff or any of the abovementioned evidence with any former colleagues and that I had no prior knowledge of that
evidence. The relevant test is whether the circumstances described by the Plaintiff create a
reasonable apprehension of bias, taking into account what an informed person would conclude,
viewing the matter realistically and practically and having thought the matter through (see
Justice de Grandpres dissenting judgment in Committee for Justice and Liberty et al v National
Energy Board et al, [1978] 1 SCR 369 at page 394). I am unable to identify an apprehension of
bias based on these circumstances.

Page: 9
III.

Background

[5]

The Plaintiff has filed a 53-page Statement of Claim against Her Majesty the Queen,

claiming $11 million in damages and a public apology from the Prime Minister and provincial
Premiers, for being illegally barred from access to parliamentary properties, and seeking a
declaration from the Minister of Public Safety that the Canadian government will no longer
allow the RCMP and the Canadian forces to harass him and his clan.

[6]

The Defendant filed a motion seeking an Order striking out the Statement of Claim

without leave to amend. In granting the Defendants motion on the basis that the Statement of
Claim disclosed no cause of action and was vexatious, the Prothonotary indicated that he agreed
with the analysis contained in the following paragraphs of the Defendants written
representations:
17.
Within the 96 paragraph Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff
addresses his complaint in paragraphs 14-24, inclusive. All but
four of those paragraphs are dedicated to an incident that occurred
in 2006 in and around the legislature in New Brunswick. The
jurisdiction of the Federal Court does not extend to Her Majesty
the Queen in right of the Provinces. In any event, the Plaintiff
hasnt named the Province or provincial actors as parties to this
action. The incident alleged does not give rise to a justiciable cause
of action in this Court.
()
21.
The few paragraphs that directly address the Defendant
provide no details as to the individuals involved or the location of
the alleged incidents or other details sufficient to allow the
Defendant to respond. As a result, it is difficult or impossible to
determine the causes of action the Plaintiff is attempting to
advance. A generous reading of the Statement of Claim allows the
Defendant to only speculate as to the true and/or intended cause of
action. At best, the Plaintiffs action may possibly be summarized
as: he suspects he is barred from the House of Commons.

Page: 10
[footnotes omitted]
IV.

Plaintiffs Position

[7]

In his written representations filed in support of this motion, the Plaintiff explained that,

in response to the Defendants motion to strike, he had requested an oral hearing before a judge.
He also takes the position that the Prothonotary did not have the authority under Rule 50 of the
Federal Court Rules, SOR/98-106 to render a final judgment in this matter without the consent
of the parties.

[8]

On the merits of his claim, the Plaintiff takes issue with the Prothonotarys conclusion

that his Statement of Claim discloses no reasonable cause of action. The Plaintiff argues that he
is still barred today from access to parliamentary properties and public records buildings and that
the Queen of England rules over every jurisdiction in Canada. He also takes the position that due
process of law prevents summary dismissal of his Statement of Claim without an opportunity for
him to present evidence in support. He includes in his Motion Record an affidavit and exhibits
upon which he wishes to rely.

[9]

While the Plaintiffs Notice of Motion raises only his appeal of the Prothonotarys Order,

his written representations also seek an order that the Defendant be found in default and that 11
million dollars plus costs of the motion before the Prothonotary and this motion be awarded to
the Plaintiff.

Page: 11
V.

Defendants Position

[10]

The Defendant argues that the Prothonotary had the authority under Rule 50 to dismiss

the Statement of Claim and to do so without an oral hearing. It is also the Defendants position
that, under Rule 221(2), no evidence shall be heard on a motion to strike a claim for disclosing
no reasonable cause of action.

[11]

The Defendants position is that it is plain and obvious that the Plaintiffs claim cannot

succeed. The arguments in support of this position are summarized in the paragraphs quoted
above that the Prothonotary recited from the Defendants written representations. The Defendant
also notes that the claim appears to rely on Section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms as the basis for the relief sought and submits that the allegations of Charter violations
are so vague and deficient that his causes of action cannot be maintained as pleaded.

[12]

The Defendant also takes the position that the Plaintiffs claim is statue-barred as the

exclusion from legislative properties allegedly occurred in 2004 and 2006, is frivolous as it is
based on no rational argument supported by the evidence or law, and is vexatious as the
Statement of Claim refers to the Plaintiff bringing this action to see if he will be barred from
parliamentary property before polling day in the recent federal election.

[13]

In the Defendants submission, the defects in the Statement of Claim cannot be cured by

amendment, as there is no basis in law to support a cause of action even if the Plaintiff were to
provide more detail surrounding his factual allegations.

Page: 12
[14]

In the alternative, if the appeal were to be allowed, the Defendant seeks an extension of

time to file a Defence to the claim.

VI.

Issues and Standard of Review

[15]

The Federal Court of Appeal in Merck & Co v Apotex Inc, 2003 FCA 488, formulated as

follows at paragraph 19 the test for the standard of review by Federal Court judges of
prothonotaries decisions:
Discretionary orders of prothonotaries ought not be disturbed on
appeal to a judge unless:
a) the questions raised in the motion are vital to the final issue of
the case, or
b) the orders are clearly wrong, in the sense that the exercise of
discretion by the prothonotary was based upon a wrong
principle or upon a misapprehension of the facts.

[16]

If the questions raised in the motion are vital to the final issue of the case, then the judge

must exercise his or her discretion de novo. The Defendant has acknowledged that, as the
Prothonotarys decision disposed of the action, it was vital to the final disposition of the case,
and this appeal should therefore be conducted as a review de novo.

[17]

This motion raises the following issues:

A.

Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to rely on his affidavit evidence in support of this
motion;

B.

Whether the Statement of Claim fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action;

C.

Whether the Statement of Claim is frivolous or vexatious; and

Page: 13
D.

VII.

Analysis

A.

[18]

Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to default judgment.

Evidentiary Ruling

I ruled at the hearing that I would not consider the new evidence which the Plaintiff

wished to introduce in support of his motion. While the appeal before me is to be conducted as a
review de novo, the law is clear that, barring exceptional circumstances, such review is to be
conducted based on the evidence that was before the Prothonotary when he made his Order (see
Hung c Canada (Procureur Gnral), 315 FTR 67 [Hung], affirmed, 2007 FCA 17).

[19]

Exceptional circumstances permitting introduction of new evidence would require that

the evidence could not have been made available earlier, its introduction will serve the interests
of justice, it will assist the Court, and it will not seriously prejudice the other side (see Mazhero v
Canada (Industrial Relations Board), 2002 FCA 295). There are no exceptional circumstances in
the present case that would warrant departing from the principle in Hung. The evidence could
have been made available in response to the motion before the Prothonotary, and the decision
under appeal turns on the allegations in the Statement of Claim, not on the availability of
evidence to support such allegations.

B.

[20]

Jurisdiction of Prothonotary

The Plaintiffs argument that the Prothonotary did not have the authority to issue the

Order under appeal is based on Rule 50(1)(c)(i), which provides that a Prothonotary cannot hear

Page: 14
a motion for summary judgment or summary trial, other than in an action where the amount
claimed does not exceed $50,000. However, the Defendants motion was not a motion for
summary judgment or summary trial, for which Rule 213 provides, but rather a motion to strike
under Rule 221. It was therefore within the Prothonotarys jurisdiction and this argument must
fail.

C.

[21]

Requirement for Oral Hearing

The motion heard by the Prothonotary was filed in writing under Rule 369. While Rule

369(2) allows a respondent to a motion in writing to object to the motion being disposed of in
writing, Rule 369(4) then allows the Court either to dispose of the motion in writing or to fix a
time and place for an oral hearing. The Prothonotary referred in his Order to being satisfied that
the Court could adjudicate the motion without an oral hearing and was entitled by the Rules to
reach this conclusion.

D.

[22]

Failure to Disclose Cause of Action

I agree with the Defendants assertion in its written representations that the Plaintiffs

Statement of Claim is repetitive and contains numerous irrelevant and extraneous allegations.
However, as noted in those representations, in the Prothonotarys Order, and in the Plaintiffs
oral submissions before me, the claim focuses significantly on allegations that the Plaintiff has
been barred from the legislature in New Brunswick. The Prothonotary adopted the Defendants
position that the jurisdiction of the Federal Court does not extend to Her Majesty the Queen in
right of the Provinces. This is of course correct.

Page: 15
[23]

However, as I raised with the Defendants counsel at the hearing, the Statement of Claim

alleges that the actors, who barred the Plaintiff from the New Brunswick legislature in 2004,
included the Royal Canadian Mounted Police [RCMP]. Under Section 17 of the Federal Courts
Act, RSC 1985, c F-7 [Act], the Federal Court does have jurisdiction over claims against the
federal Crown based on liability of servants of the federal Crown such as the RCMP. I would
therefore have difficulty in striking out the Statement of Claim on the basis adopted by the
Prothonotary and have accordingly considered, as I must on a hearing de novo, whether the other
arguments raised by the Defendant warrant the action being struck.

[24]

Focusing on the final paragraph of the Statement of Claim in which the Plaintiff sets out

the relief he seeks, I am aware of no basis on which the Court would have authority to order
either (i) a public apology by the Prime Minister and each Premier for the illegal barring of a
citizen from parliamentary properties or (ii) a declaration from the Minister of Public Safety that
the Canadian government will no longer allow the RCMP and the Canadian forces to harass him.
Therefore these claims for relief should be struck as failing to disclose a reasonable cause of
action.

[25]

I also agree with the Defendant that much of the Statement of Claim does not conform to

the rules of pleading, which require a concise statement of the material facts upon which the
party relies and not including evidence by which such facts are to be proven (see Rule 174). As
argued by the Defendant, this makes it difficult for the Defendant to know the intended cause of
action to which it must respond. Other than in relation to the allegation of having been barred
from the New Brunswick legislature in 2004, this conclusion extends to the claims related to

Page: 16
being barred from legislative properties. I do not consider these claims to be capable of
benefiting from amendment.

[26]

I also note that the allegation of having been barred from the New Brunswick legislature

in 2006 does not allege involvement of any servants of the federal Crown, and the Statement of
Claim expresses uncertainty related to the Plaintiff being barred from the House of Commons.

[27]

My conclusion is that, other than in relation to the allegation of having been barred from

the New Brunswick legislature in 2004, the claims related to being barred from legislative
properties should be struck as failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action. However, I cannot
reach this same conclusion with respect to the Plaintiffs claim for damages (in some amount) for
what appears to be his principal complaint, that he was barred from the New Brunswick
legislature in 2004 for political rather than legal reasons. The Statement of Claim does contain
some precision in relation to the Plaintiffs principal complaint, as paragraph 14 of the Statement
of Claims identifies the date on which he alleges he was barred from the New Brunswick
legislature and identifies, although not by name, the alleged participants in this event, including
the RCMP officer acting as Aide-de-Camp to the Lieutenant Governor of New Brunswick.

[28]

I must therefore consider whether this event, as pleaded by the Plaintiff, is capable of

supporting a cause of action. As acknowledged by the Defendant, in considering this question I

must give the Statement of Claim a generous reading (Paradis Honey Ltd v Canada (Minister of
Agriculture and Agri-Food), 2015 FCA 89). This is particularly so, given that the Plaintiff is
self-represented. I am unable to conclude that the Defendant has met the high burden necessary

Page: 17
to have this component of the action struck. Although the Plaintiff has not articulated a specific
legal theory for the cause of action upon which he bases his claim for damages arising from
being barred from the New Brunswick legislature, this does not preclude a cause of action being
supported by his stated allegations. As an example, I raised with the Defendants counsel during
the hearing the tort of misfeasance in public office addressed in Meigs v Canada, 2013 FC 389
[Meigs], one of the cases cited by the Defendant on this motion. At paragraph 13 of that case,
this Court identified the elements of that tort as follows:
[13] As in both the cases of Odhavji Estate v Woodhouse, 2003
SCC 69 [Odhavji] and Lewis v Canada, 2012 FC 1514 [Lewis], I
must determine whether the plaintiffs statement of claim pleads
each element of the alleged tort of misfeasance in public office:
a) The public officer must have engaged in deliberate and unlawful
conduct in his or her capacity as public officer;
b) The public officer must have been aware both that his or her
conduct was unlawful and that it was likely to harm the plaintiff;
and
c) There must be an element of bad faith or dishonesty by the
public officer and knowledge of harm alone is insufficient to
conclude that a public officer acted in bad faith or dishonestly.
Odhavji, above, at paras 23, 24 and 28

[29]

In Meigs, the Statement of Claim was struck out as failing to disclose material facts

necessary to meet the elements of this test related to the public officers statement of mind.
However, in the case at hand, the Plaintiff has alleged that those who barred him from the
legislature in 2004, including the police (which the Plaintiff states includes the RCMP), did so
for political reasons. I am of course reaching no conclusion as to the truth of these allegations or
the damages claimed by the Plaintiff. However, reading the Statement of Claim generously and
with the presumption of truth required on this motion, I cannot conclude that, were the

Page: 18
allegations true, it is plain and obvious that such allegations could not support a cause of action
which sounds in some measure of damages, nominal or otherwise.

E.

[30]

Limitation Period

The Defendant notes that the allegations involving the RCMP and the New Brunswick

legislature occurred in 2004 and therefore argues any resulting claim is barred by the six year
federal limitation period prescribed by section 39(2) of the Act. However, as acknowledged by
the Defendant at the hearing, other than in exceptional circumstances, a statute of limitations is
not a basis for a motion to strike but rather should be raised in a defence and argued after the
plaintiff has had an opportunity to reply (see Kibale v The Queen (1990), 123 NR 153 (FCA) and
Byer v Canada, 2002 FCT 684).

[31]

I do not consider exceptional circumstances to apply to this case that would warrant

departing from the usual practice of waiting until after pleadings are closed to raise the
application of a limitation period. In reaching this conclusion, I note in particular that the Court
has not yet had the benefit of argument on whether the applicable limitation period is one
applicable under the laws of New Brunswick as contemplated by section 39(1) of the Act, as
opposed to the federal period under section 39(2) of the Act relied on by the Defendant, or on the
potential for extension of the applicable period.

F.

Frivolous and Vexatious

Page: 19
[32]

Finally, I cannot agree with the Defendants arguments that the allegations surrounding

the Plaintiff being barred from the New Brunswick legislature are frivolous and vexatious. The
Defendant argues the claim is frivolous, as there is a scarcity of law pleaded. However, in my
view, the analysis should focus on the facts that have been pleaded and, as noted above, I cannot
conclude that it is plain and obvious that the facts pleaded are not capable of supporting a cause
of action.

[33]

The Defendant also argues the claim is vexatious, as the Statement of Claim refers to the

Plaintiff wanting to see if he will be barred from parliamentary property before polling day in the
recent federal election. While this does suggest mixed motives in filing the action, the Plaintiff
has also claimed damages, such that it cannot be said that the claim cannot lead to any practical
result.

G.

[34]

Default Judgment / Extension of Time to File Defence

In summary, the Plaintiffs appeal is allowed in part, as my conclusion is that the

Statement of Claim cannot be struck in its entirety. The Plaintiffs allegations related to having
allegedly been barred from the New Brunswick legislature in 2004 by actors including the
RCMP survive the motion to strike. When filing its original motion to strike which was heard by
the Prothonotary, the Defendant indicated an intention to defend this action if its motion was not
successful. It is therefore not appropriate to grant default judgment as requested by the Plaintiff
but rather is appropriate to grant the Defendant a suitable period of time to file a Statement of
Defence. I will afford the Defendant 30 days from the date of my Order or the date of any
decision resulting from any appeal of my Order.

Page: 20
[35]

Without the benefit of argument from the parties as to the effect, on a paragraph-by-

paragraph basis in the Statement of Claim, of a decision that preserves a portion of the Plaintiffs
claim, my Order will reflect that the claims for relief in the final paragraph of the Statement of
Claim are struck except for the claim for monetary relief for allegedly being barred by the RCMP
from the New Brunswick legislature in 2004. However, I recognize that, before filing a
Statement of Defence, the Defendant may wish to present a motion arguing which specific
paragraphs of the Statement of Claim should be struck in order to accord with my decision. As
such, my Order will provide that the Defendant is at liberty to do so and that the time for filing a
Statement of Defence will also take any such motion into account.

H.

[36]

Costs

Given the divided success on this appeal, no costs will be awarded.

Page: 21
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that:
1.

the Plaintiffs appeal is allowed in part;

2.

the Order of Prothonotary Morneau dated November 12, 2015 is set aside;

3.

the claims for relief in the final paragraph of the Plaintiffs Statement of Claim are
struck without leave to amend, with the exception of the claim for monetary relief
for allegedly being barred by the RCMP from the New Brunswick legislature in
2004;

4.

the Defendant is at liberty to present a motion, to be filed within 30 days of the

date of this Order or any decision resulting from any appeal of this Order, arguing
which specific paragraphs of the Statement of Claim should be struck in order to
accord with my decision;

5.

the time for the Defendant to file a Statement of Defence is extended to 30 days
from the later of the date of this Order, the date of any Order resulting from a
motion by the Defendant arguing which specific paragraphs of the Statement of
Claim should be struck in order to accord with my decision, and the date of any
decision resulting from any appeal of either such Order; and

6.

No costs are awarded on this motion.

"Richard F. Southcott"
Judge

FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET:

T-1557-15

STYLE OF CAUSE:

DAVID RAYMOND AMOS v HER MAJESTY THE

QUEEN

PLACE OF HEARING:

FREDERICTON, NEW BRUNSWICK

DATE OF HEARING:

JANUARY 11, 2016

ORDER AND REASONS:

SOUTHCOTT J.

DATED:

JANUARY 25, 2016

APPEARANCES:
David Raymond Amos

FOR THE PLAINTIFF

(SELF-REPRESENTED)

Jill Chisholm

FOR THE DEFENDANT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
William F. Pentney
Deputy Attorney General of
Canada

FOR THE DEFENDANT

Docket: A-48-16

Ottawa, Ontario, May 12, 2016

Present:

TRUDEL J.A.

BETWEEN:
DAVID RAYMOND AMOS
Appellant
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Respondent

ORDER

The appellant appeals an order of Southcott, J. of the Federal Court (2016 FC 93) wherein,
amongst other relief, he allowed to stand part only of the appellants Statement of Claim filed in
that Court (T-1557-15);

The respondent has filed a Notice of cross-appeal alleging that the appellants Statement of
Claim should have been struck in its entirety;

Page: 2

Most recently, the appellant sent to the Registry a letter accompanied by a Notice of Motion to
request an oral hearing;

The motion is for:

To request that the Justices of the Federal Court of Appeal notify William Brooks
(Brooks), the Commissioner of Federal Judicial Affairs and Bob Paulson
(Paulson), the Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP),
that they should finally uphold the law and the mandates of their offices before
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN (CROWN) is subject to lawsuits in the United
States of America (USA) and Canada. The actions in the Federal Court (File No.
T-1557-15) by William Pentney QC, the Deputy Attorney General of Canada,
Prothonotary Richard Morneau and Justice Richard Southcott have caused the
CROWN to lose the right to claim sovereign immunity in the USA in defense of
certain actions that the Amos Clan plans to put before courts of law in the USA
and Canada.

By letter dated May 5, 2016, the respondent asks that a case management Judge be assigned to
this file, otherwise there will be considerable procedural difficulties that will prevent the Appeal
from proceeding in the most expeditious and least expensive manner;

In his Notice of Appeal of Southcott J.s Order, the appellant seeks the following relief:
1)

That the ORDERS of MR. PROTHONOTARY RICHARD

MORNEAU and MR. JUSTICE RICHARD F. SOUTHCOTT be
revoked; and

2)

The Defendant/Respondent be found in Default; and

3)

Award the Plaintiff/Appellant eleven million dollars ($11,000,000.00)

in the form of relief plus the costs.

Page: 3

On appeal to this Court, the best that the appellant can hope for is that his Statement of Claim be
reinstated to its original form and content and the matter returned to the Federal Court for
continuation of the proceeding on the merits - all of this, of course, if it were decided that the
respondents cross-appeal should be dismissed;
All this raises a question as to the relevance of the proposed Notice of Motion.

THIS SAID, IT IS ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:

a) The request for an oral hearing of the appellants Notice of Motion (undated and
unsigned) is denied;

b) If the appellant insists on presenting his Motion, it shall be duly served and filed in
Form 369 in accordance with the Federal Courts Rules SOR/98-106 (the Rules);

c) The appellant shall, in the next 10 days (no later than May 26, 2016) serve and file his
proposal as to the contents of the Appeal Book unless he agrees with the respondents
proposal contained in a letter dated March 3, 2016;

d) If the parties disagree, the appellant shall, no later than June 10, 2016, serve and file a
proper Notice of Motion under Rule 369 to request that the Court determine the
contents of the Appeal Book;

e) These timelines and the prescriptions of the Rules shall be followed or this appeal
could be dismissed without any further delay;

Page: 4

f) The request to have this case managed by a Judge is denied.

"Johanne Trudel"
J.A.

Docket: A-48-16

Ottawa, Ontario, July 4, 2016

Present:

STRATAS J.A.

BETWEEN:
DAVID RAYMOND AMOS
Appellant
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Respondent

ORDER
WHEREAS the appellant moves for a case management order, an order requiring the
Administrator to prepare the appeal book, and an order settling the contents of the appeal book;

AND WHEREAS the appellant has already sought case management and that request
was refused by this Court on May 12, 2016; and the appellant has not pointed to any new
circumstances warranting a change from that ruling; in any event, case management is granted
only in exceptional circumstances and that has not been established here;

Page: 2
AND WHEREAS the Court is not persuaded that the Administrator should prepare the
appeal book;

AND WHEREAS the transcripts are not necessary for the appeal;
AND WHEREAS items 7, 11 and 12 in the appellants list of proposed contents are not
relevant and are not necessary for the appeal;

AND WHEREAS Orders made by the Court are to be included in the appeal book;

THIS COURT ORDERS that the appeal book shall be prepared by the appellant in
accordance with Rule 344 and contain the documents listed in paragraph 2 of the respondents
draft order found at page 7 of its written representations. The appeal book shall be filed within 60
days of this Order. The motion is otherwise dismissed.

"David Stratas"
J.A.