Académique Documents
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This generic includes add-on modules that affs of nearly any sort
could read about why US China relations are good. Weve included
a couple of reasons those relations are bad including a mini India DA
and a more mini-South Korea DA that could be a good foundation for
additional research. Weve also included a wide variety of
uniqueness and internal links and answers that should help you as
you are writing advantages frontlines for your case negs.
For a few turns, we did not do specific answers because they were
being covered by other generics or starter files. So, for example
although there is a US China relations good for the economy module,
you can find answers in the Chinese Economy DA. For other
arguments, like Climate change, you can find answers in the
preinstitute files.
Laundry List
The U.S.-China
relationship is the most consequential in the world today , period, and it will do
much to determine the shape of the 21st century. That means that we have to get it right.
challenging." All of those attributes are true, but I would respectfully add one more to that list:
Since President Obama first took office, that's exactly what he has focused on doing. What he has worked to build over the
past six years and what we are committed to advancing over the next two as well is a principled and productive
relationship with China. That's why he and I have both met each with our Chinese counterparts in person dozens of times.
It's why President Obama hosted the Sunnylands summit last June, shortly after President Xi took office. It's why a couple
of weeks ago, I invited Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi and the ambassador and others in his delegation to my
hometown of Boston, where we spent a day and a half together charting new opportunities for our bilateral relationship.
And it's why I will join the President in China next week on what will be my fourth trip to the country since I became
remember that not too long ago U.S.-China ties were centered on a relatively narrow set of bilateral and regional matters.
incapable of generating anything more than a partisan soundbite for the next 20 minutes.
Policy and in Global Economy and Development and is Director of the John L.
Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. Wang Jisi is Director of the
Center for International and Strategic Studies and Dean of the School of
International Studies at Peking University, March 2012 Addressing U.S.-China
Strategic Distrust, John L. Thornton China Center Monograph Series Number4,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/3/30%20us%20china
%20lieberthal/0330_china_lieberthal.pdf accessed 7-16-16 DDI -TM)
When it comes to mutual strategic distrust, the military/security sphere is
both important and pernicious. We therefore focus especially on ideas to reduce
distrust in this realm. Strategic postures The United States and China are now
making significant decisions regarding both doctrine and investments in
military capability. Broadly, the U.S. is reducing anticipated military expenditures
and at the same time reconfiguring forces to assure that American goals in the AsiaPacific can be met. China is in the midst of a significant buildup of its military
capabilities to be commensurate with its increasing regional and global activities and
interests. Their respective efforts are likely to contribute to increased strategic
mistrust unless the two sides address a central question: what array of military
deployments and normal operations will permit China to defend its core security
interests and at the same time allow America to continue to meet fully its obligations
to its allies and friends in the region? The answer will not be completely comfortable
for either sideChinas military is already developing capabilities to force changes in
American platforms and plans, and Beijing cannot realistically hope to achieve the
capacity to dominate the surrounding seas out to the first island chain against
determined American efforts to prevent that domination. As of now, each side is
developing doctrines that are ill-understood by the otherChina talks about
securing the near seas and the U.S. talks in terms of an Air-Sea Battle
doctrine that is now evolving into a Joint Operational Access Concept
(JOAC). These doctrines both reflect and shape threat perceptions. Almost
unique to the military sphere, moreover, is that decisions are made in
anticipation of requirements 10-20 years from now, as it generally takes
that long to move from initial agreement to develop a major new weapons
system to integration of the actual system into combat capability and
doctrine. Each side, in addition, as best it can monitors the decisions the
other side is making about this long-term future and reacts accordingly.
While the specific concerns and operational assumptions behind each
doctrine are opaque, each is increasingly being couched in terms that can
easily justify escalating military expenditures as both militaries attempt to
achieve basically unattainable levels of certainty. U.S. analysis regards China
as having adopted an anti-access and area denial strategy, but many details about
Chinese aspirations are very unclear. The Chinese side is anxious over its lack of
understanding of either the Air Sea Battle Concept or the new JOAC. There is,
therefore, now a pressing need for a serious discussion of the respective doctrines
Strategic and Economic Dialogue the S&ED in Beijing. This annual dialogue is unique in its level and
scope. It is led on the U.S. side by Secretaries Kerry and Lew and brings a number of Cabinet-level and
other senior U.S. government officials together with their Chinese counterparts to work on the major issues
facing us. The breadth of the agenda in the two tracks strategic and economic reflects the breadth of
Climate Change
2ac/1nc module
US-China cooperation also spills over to working together
to combat climate change- only this can spur reducing
pollution and catalyze global movement towards clean
energy
The Conversation 15
(US News, Why China and the U.S. Have Found Common Purpose on Climate
Change, 12-10-2015, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/12/10/whychina-and-the-us-have-found-common-purpose-on-climate-change accessed
7-15-16 DDI GR)
the United States and China forged a climate change
partnership that would have been almost unthinkable not long ago.
Not only have both countries committed to emissions reduction and
sustainable energy goals of substantial ambition, they are pursuing
those goals in concert. This bilateral climate cooperation has been
crucial to the UN climate summit in Paris and will continue to be so
after any agreements are signed. Following years at loggerheads , the
converging positions of the worlds two largest emitters are
becoming invaluable components of future climate response actions .
Over the past year,
So why is this happening? A combination of domestic, bilateral and international forces help explain the transformation, and reveal its
Beijings most prominent challenge in 2014, while a top climate adviser deemed an acute pollution
episode in the capital unbearable. [READ: Primer: The UN Climate Summit in Paris] In response, the
metrics for measuring local bureaucratic success and promotions through party ranks emphasize
environmental performance more than ever before. Punitive measures against polluters are gaining
strength, and efforts to transform energy systems are accelerating through rapid expansions in solar, wind
and nuclear sectors. Such measures have the corollary effect of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, which
has changed the ways that Chinese leadership views international pressure to act on climate change.
Outside pressures to reduce Chinas carbon emissions used to be viewed as anathema to the countrys
development needs, and a distraction from its core business of wealth generation and societal
development. They are now seen as opportunities for gaining partnerships, technical support and finance
to help China transition toward a cleaner energy future. This includes expanding Chinas manufacturing
and export of clean-energy technologies, which have strong economic growth potential. Xis China thus
looks to the international climate arena for help addressing its domestic energy transition and pollution
reduction goals. That the measures taken will also reduce climate risks is an added bonus. U.S. Executive
Action RELATED CONTENT FILE - In this Aug. 10, 2010, file photo, Rep. Lamar Smith, R-Texas speaks during
a news conference on Capitol Hill in Washington. With a re-election campaign looming, President Barack
Obama is pushing Congress to overhaul the immigration system, but lawmakers seems to have little
appetite to take on the issue. GOP Digs in Heels on Climate Action In the US, executive branch boldness
has the Obama administration toeing the line of what is politically and legally tenable to advance some
form of the environmentally progressive agenda the president campaigned on in 2008. Frustrated with
congressional intransigence and international inertia, the administration has opted for executive regulation
at home and bilateral partnerships abroad. Obamas Clean Power Plan places new emissions standards on
power plants and vehicles, mandates and supports clean energy expansion, and seeks to cut energy waste
and improve infrastructure. On the first day of the Paris summit, the U.S. announced Mission Innovation
and officials touted the potential for technologies to lower emissions and further encourage private-sector
investment in clean energy innovation. And in defending its Clean Power Plan, the White House
emphasizes public health dividends, job creation, economic growth and long-term energy security. Like
China, U.S. leadership sees these measures as being in the countrys long-term economic and strategic
interests, and not merely as a ticket out of climate pariah status. Federal actions suggest this is not
bluster, but a key part of the Obama administrations vision for the countrys future. Some Welcome
Common Ground Bilaterally, American and Chinese diplomats have come to see climate change
cooperation as low-hanging fruit in an agenda otherwise brimming with strategic tension. From currency
markets and competitive free trade groupings to maritime navigation and the rise of Chinas military, the
relationship does not lack for wicked problems. Climate change used to be just another avenue for
strategic posturing, with China clinging to its status as a developing country with little culpability for the
problem, and the U.S. justifying its inflexibility through Chinas inaction. Those days have passed, at least
for now. Beijing and Washington now see opportunity in the climate problem, and view it as a refreshingly
non-zero sum game. They recently formed and now cofund the U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center,
with a mandate extending through 2020, and are pursuing technical cooperation on issues from carbon
capture and sequestration to sustainable urban infrastructure. These connections feed into growing
business ties, manifested most publicly through the annual U.S.-China Clean Energy Forum. Such ties
create incentives that are likely to keep climate cooperation from being a flash in the pan. Global Enablers
and Implications This
. The U.S.
insists upon enhanced international norms and practices around
verification, which it sees as essential to prevent the approach of
voluntary commitments from becoming a house of cards. The two
countries' ability to extend their cooperation to this issue will help
determine the Paris outcome. [ALSO: Obama Pressures China's Xi Jinping on Cybersecurity] The U.S.
and China can likewise drive efforts to lubricate the gears of global
commerce and reduce barriers to cooperation in clean energy
sectors. Complex intellectual property and trade regulation
challenges currently keep clean energy trade from reaching its full
potential. These hurdles will not disappear overnight, but Paris is an
appropriate forum for developing strategies to address them. More
fundamentally, the U.S. and China are in a position to ensure that
moves toward the flexible and voluntary do not devolve into reduced
ambition and the shirking of loose commitments. If these two
economic and polluting behemoths show earnestness and ambition
in Paris and beyond, the world is likely to follow.
underreported past coal consumption, and that it may resist including strong verification protocols in the Paris agreement
40% and 60%, according to the report. The report also connected
climate change to rising food prices and political instability, for
instance the riots in Asia and Africa after food price shocks in 2008.
"The impacts are already evident in many places in the world. It is
not something that is [only] going to happen in the future," said
David Lobell, a professor at Stanford University's centre for food security, who
devised the models. "Almost everywhere you see the warming effects have a
negative affect on wheat and there is a similar story for corn as well. These
are not yet enormous effects but they show clearly that the trends are big
enough to be important," Lobell said. The report acknowledged that there
were a few isolated areas where a longer growing season had been good for
farming. But it played down the idea that there may be advantages to climate
change as far as food production is concerned. Overall, the report said,
"Negative impacts of climate change on crop yields have been more
common than positive impacts." Scientists and campaigners pointed to
the finding as a defining feature of the report. The report also warned for
the first time that climate change, combined with poverty and
economic shocks, could lead to war and drive people to leave their
homes.
the worst effects of climate change, and both view climate change and energy security as two of the
greatest challenges of our time as stated in their leaders joint statement in January 2011. Just before the
Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, President Hu Jintao addressed the 2009 UN Climate Summit and
said, Climate change is one of the serious challenges to the survival and development of mankind.
Chinas 2008 White Paper on Climate Change stated that, China is vulnerable to the adverse effects of
climate change, like droughts, disruptive storms, and inundation of coastal zones and decreased
agricultural production. The US National Intelligence Council (NIC) concluded in 2008 that, Climate
change will have wide-ranging implications for national security interests over the next 20 years, including
destructive storm activity, increased water scarcity, reduced agricultural yields, disease and pandemics,
mass migration, increased conflict and destabilized states. During his remarks on the Cancun Climate
Conference, President Obama asserted that, No nation, however large or small, wealthy or poor, can
escape the impact of climate change. Economically speaking, China and the United States both face
unprecedented opportunities to shift the traditional economic mode to low carbon development associated
with mitigating climate change. President Hu Jintao recently encouraged low carbon growth to the 2010
APEC Summit; Chinas National Peoples Congress passed the Renewable Energy Law; before the
Copenhagen Convention China set the goal that, by 2020, carbon emission intensity per unit of GDP will be
reduced by 40% 45% compared to that in 2005; and Shanghai Expo 2010 took low carbon as its core
theme. In his 2011 State of the Union address, President Obama announced a target of generating 80% of
electricity from clean energy sources by 2035 (presently it is less than 40%) and become the first country
to have a million electric vehicles on the road by 2015. Politically speaking, global climate change
governance needs the full engagement of China and the United States. The United States, the worlds
largest carbon emitter, is not a member of the Kyoto Protocol and even opposes the Kyoto regime with
Japan and Russia. As the main global energy organization, the International Energy Agency (IEA) doesnt
include China as a full member. Global governance on climate change is notably becoming more and more
fragmented: the divergences among developing countries, particularly on emissions targets and
timetables, are becoming larger, while the inherent conflicts on the Kyoto Protocol between the umbrella
group (Japan, Russsia, and the US) and the EU continue to reduce the Kyoto regimes effectiveness.
Concurrently, the climate change governance landscape is evolving and there are new mechanisms such
as the G20 and WTO that will replace to some extent the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
should improve China-US cooperation to a position of co-progress in three ways: Global Accountability,
Climate Conference, it was resolved that any decisions on the future of the Kyoto Protocol will be deferred
until Durban, particularly the global goal for substantially reducing global emissions by 2050, and the
implementing the regime for financial, technological and capacity-building support to developing countries.
To begin with,
China and the United States can help to work out the
unequivocal commitments on global emission vision associated with
common but differentiated principle(s), and they also should shift
global attention from mitigation to adaptation measures to cope
with climate change by technology and market measures which are
the preferred ways to address climate-induced social economic
impacts. China and the United States both face unprecedented
extensive business opportunities for win-win cooperation. The
burgeoning new energy and low carbon business will create a carbon
economy worth thousands of billions of dollars . In his 2011 State of the Union
address, President Obama maintained clean energy issues as a high priority for his administration which
has been associated with jobs, competitiveness and the future. China will spend $293 billion in clean and
alternative energy investment before 2020, and the clean energy market will likely amount to $555 billion
in 2020. In cooperation with China the largest global market the US can certainly achieve economic
growth and enhanced competitiveness. Coal made up about 70% of Chinas electricity generation over the
past year. In the clean coal area, GE and the Chinese company Shenhua have signed a joint venture
agreement on coal-gasification technology. Since 2006, Chinas installed capacity of wind power has
doubled over the past four consecutive years and brings extensive market business. In January 2011,
American UPC Renewables and China Guodian signed an agreement on wind-power projects in China
involving about $1 billion in investment. In 2010, China planned to start construction of more than 20
nuclear power generators, accounting for 40% of the worlds installations. During President Hu Jintaos visit
in 2011, Westinghouse Electric and China State Nuclear Power Technology Corp. worked together on
intensive fossil fuel energy infrastructure. Chinas economy, however, is also dependent on exported
services and goods with extensive energy consumption. U.S. Secretary of Energy Steven Chu stressed that
China and the United States consume 15% and 25%, respectively, of global energy supplies, but that the
Conference, such as agreeing to the 2050 global mitigation reduction target and solidifying developed
countries second commitment period in the Kyoto Protocol offer solutions to a more harmonious
relationship between man and nature.
Bilaterally, American and Chinese diplomats have come to see climate change
cooperation as low-hanging fruit in an agenda otherwise brimming with strategic
tension From currency markets and competitive free trade groupings to maritime navigation and the rise
.
of Chinas military, the relationship does not lack for wicked problems. Climate change used to be just
another avenue for strategic posturing, with China clinging to its status as a developing country with little
culpability for the problem, and the U.S. justifying its inflexibility through Chinas inaction. Those days have
passed, at least for now. Beijing and Washington now see opportunity in the climate
problem, and view it as a refreshingly non-zero sum game . They recently formed and now
cofund the U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center, with a mandate extending through 2020, and are
pursuing technical cooperation on issues from carbon capture and sequestration to sustainable urban
infrastructure. These connections feed into growing business ties, manifested most publicly through the
annual U.S.-China Clean Energy Forum. Such ties create incentives that are likely to keep
climate cooperation from being a flash in the pan This growing US-China alignment has
.
accelerated because of changes in the direction of international climate change diplomacy. UNcentric approaches have largely abandoned the holy grail of an encompassing and binding
global agreement that covers an exhaustive range of climate issues. Disaggregated and
largely voluntary approaches now rule the day, which allows the U.S. and China to chart their
own paths without feeling overly constrained or dictated to by international accords. The U.S.
insists upon enhanced international norms and practices around verification, which it sees as
essential to prevent the approach of voluntary commitments from becoming a house of cards.
The two countries' ability to extend their cooperation to this issue will help determine the Paris
outcome. The U.S. and China can likewise drive efforts to lubricate the gears
energy trade from reaching its full potential. These hurdles will not disappear overnight, but
Paris is an appropriate forum for developing strategies to address them. More fundamentally,
the U.S. and China are in a position to ensure that moves toward the
flexible and voluntary do not devolve into reduced ambition and the
shirking of loose commitments. If these two economic and polluting
behemoths show earnestness and ambition in Paris and beyond, the world
is likely to follow.
Chinese economy
Chinas goals of modernization mean good US-China are
relations are imperative
Xin 12 (Qiang, Professor and Deputy Director of the Center for American
Studies @ Fudan University, Cooperation Opportunity or Confrontation
Catalyst? The implication of Chinas naval development for ChinaUS
relations, Journal of Contemporary China, Taylor and Francis)
Chinas intentions. Following Chinas adoption of its Reform and Open Door policy in 1979, China has witnessed a great
30-year economic boom. Unanimously and repeatedly, Chinese leaders have pledged their determination to fulfill the twophase development roadmap by achieving fundamental modernization, or a Xiaokang (well-to-do) society by 2020, then
maintain a network of friendly and constructive bilateral and multilateral relationships with peripheral countries and global
Global Economy
2ac module
US China economic relations key to global growth
Bwambale 16
Bwambale, Taddeo,Uganda journalist, China, US set for talks on economy, maritime differences,
June 5th 2016, Sunday Vision http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1426167/china-us-settalks-economy-maritime-differences (DDI AGH)
BEIJING - Top officials from China and the US are this week scheduled to meet in Beijing to discuss economic and bilateral ties that have in
recent months been fraught with tension. Officials from the two countries will meet under the Eighth Round of China-US Strategic and
over $440b, highlighting potential for stronger ties, Zeguang added. In recent weeks, the US has announced plans to sanctions on 'cheap'
steel exports from China while China describes the move as an act of 'protectionism'. Around the same time, China and the US have had close
encounters in the South China Sea, an area claimed by China, subject to overlapping claims by her neighbours. The US accuses China of
militarizing the sea by reclaiming and erecting outposts on it, while China blames the US for interfering in a regional dispute and deploying
economy-maritime-differences#sthash.jRpp8SBv.dpuf
Kemp, 10, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asias
Growing Presence in the Middle East, [Director of Regional
Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White
House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for
national security affairs and senior director for Near East and
are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to
political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to,
Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are
more failed states. Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and
its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of
nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan
increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and
weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the
Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these
to maintain an open, liberal, rules-based order in Asia. This is not containment of China, Masuo was quick to point out. If the game board is transparent and fair, China can play a mutually beneficial game with
other Asian countries. One example Masuo highlights is how the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) spurred the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to do better. But, she adds, such friendly
competition requires a quiet U.S. military presence in the background. And despite a much-touted rebalance to Asia, experts on the panel remain unconvinced of U.S. commitment to the region. In dealing with
China not only Japan, but Vietnam and the Philippines, in a way, were all disappointed about Obamas actions towards [China] reclaiming islands [in the South China Sea]. He sent naval vessels only three times so
This
sentiment is echoed by Kan Kimura, a professor at Kobe Universitys
Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies, who explains,
American people have to understand how [strongly Asian peoples
fear the] withdrawal of U.S. troops. For reassuring nervous Asian
partners, U.S. commitment isnt enough U.S. messaging is also
important. This is easier said than done, of course. Putting aside the
isolationist sentiment that the bombastic presumptive Republican
nominee Donald Trump has resurrected during this campaign
season, even official Obama administration messaging can be
received, or interpreted, differently based on any given audience
states own preoccupations.
As a
maritime power, the United States has expected more from Japan,
demanding that Japan play a larger role in recent disputes in the
East and South China Seas. Because of this, Japan has seen the more
hard-line elements of U.S. China policy, leading to expectations that
the United States will be around to stand up to China for decades.
far, and its just too weak, Masuo lamented. And if Trump was going to succeed him, maybe [Trump wouldnt] do anything, but then, this Asian power balance is gone.
In geopolitics, a countrys placement in a particular geographic circumstance will shape their assessment of potential threats
and other countries intentions. Kimura expanded on this concept to explain why Japan and South Korea have such different perceptions of the tenor of U.S.-China relations.
Meanwhile, as a land power, South Korea has not had to deal with the same sort of U.S. expectations and has mostly sat out the disputes in the East and South China Seas. Not having seen the hard-line elements
that Japan interacts with, South Korea expects the United States to take a softer policy tack, and believes Washington will give them a hall pass when it comes to leaning on China. The challenge for the United
States, Kimura concluded, is to send a clearer message to Asian countries. Its a typical Goldilocks dilemma: while Japan overestimates how hard-line U.S. China policy will be, South Korea underestimates it. There is
some strength to the argument that ambiguity serves U.S. interests, however. As Kimura noted, from the U.S. perspective, a clear commitment could raise concerns about moral hazard; countries such as the
Philippines might be willing to take unnecessary risks if they believe Washington will have their back. Amid all this concern about the strength of U.S. commitment, there is a bright spot, as Tuong Vu, a political
science professor at University of Oregon, points out: the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a good example of the U.S.s biggest efforts to involve Vietnam, to help Vietnam deal with the Chinese threat.
Asia for its own narrow economic interests. The only interest a country can reliably be expected to defend is its own. In the long-term, [including Vietnam in the TPP] will pay off for the U.S., Vu predicts. The
Obama administration knows of these concerns and has been trying to assiduously address them. And his preferred successor, the presumptive Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton, is also known for her lucid
understanding of the important role that American leadership plays in the Asia-Pacific region. But with Trumps candidacy, all bets are off, and Asian leaders are scrambling to plan for a future where the United
States is no longer interested in being the preeminent balancer in Asia.
Angells work can provide insight into the possibility of conflict between the United
States and China. According to a 2011 RAND study, conflict between the United
States and China would likely lead to a global contraction greater than the one
that occurred in 2008. For the United States, the economic losses would likely
be even higher given the interdependent nature of the U.S.-Chinese
economies. In 2014, total U.S.-China trade was worth &592 billion, China was
the United States second largest trading partner, third largest export market, biggest
source of imports, and the largest foreign holder of American debt, with $1.24 trillion
worth of U.S. Treasury bonds in December 2014. According to Angells theory, if the
United States cares about prosperity, it should avoid a war with China, from
which it can only suffer economic losses. This potential for economic loss can act as a
deterrent for both the United States and China, so the United States should not
consider reducing economic dependence on China as a way to increase its own
security, as some pundits have suggested. Beyond economic ties between the
United States and China, the United States should encourage Chinas
further integration into the world economic system. The United States
should not oppose Chinese efforts to join, or create, multilateral economic
institutions, such as the new Chinese led Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. In
addition, the United States should not attempt to persuade allies from increasing
economic ties with China, as it will reduce the chance of an ally dragging the United
States into a war with China. It would be hard to find anyone in either China or
America who would argue that a conflict would increase prosperity. Both
economies are too big to fail without having severe effects on the entire
international economic system. Because of this, there exists a state of
mutually assured economic destruction between the two countries. Despite
this, as John Mearsheimer point out, states value security over economic prosperity,
because without security they cannot ensure their survival. This is not to say that the
United States should break its economic ties with China, or try to slow Chinas
economic growth. That would hurt the United States economically and would have
little utility for increasing security. In addition, the more economically integrated
China and the United States are, the higher the cost is for China to
challenge the current system, reducing the chance of war. However, if China
perceives that it can benefit from conflict with the United States, Chinas action will
be the same whether its perception is correct or not.
Military Cooperation
US China good relations facilitates military cooperation
and absence of good relations, more military tension
emerges
Glaser, Senior Adviser for Asia, Freeman Chair in China Studies,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014 (Bonnie S. "USCHINA RELATIONS Managing Differences Remains an Urgent Challenge."
Southeast Asian Affairs (2014): 76-82. DDI TM)
In the military realm, there are other factors that are already driving the US
and China towards greater strategic competition. China is developing
capabilities that are aimed at denying the US Navy easy access in a crisis to
its near seas - the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea which occupy significant portions of the Western Pacific. From China's
perspective this is a defensive strategy that is referred to in Chinese
writings as aimed at "counter-intervention". The US views the
development of these capabilities, which it terms "anti-access/area
denial", as threatening its ability to protect its interests in the AsiaPacific, including defending its allies. To ensure that it can maintain
freedom of access and manoeuvre in the waters around China, the US is
applying operational concepts such as Air-Sea Battle. Although this competition is already
underway, the two countries are so far able to effectively isolate the military competition from the broader political and
North Korea
2ac module
High level coop between US and China solves North Korea
nuclear prolif
Dingli 16 (Dr. Shen Dingli is a professor and Vice Dean at the Institute of
International Studies, Fudan University. He is also the founder and director of
Chinas first non-government-based Program on Arms Control and Regional
Security at Fudan University. Dialogue Represents the Way Forward, China
US Focus. March 14. http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/dialoguerepresents-the-way-forward/, DDI-PN)
The fact that the defiance of the DPRK drives a wedge between China & US
and China & ROK lays bare the vulnerabilities of these bilateral relations. To
overcome this challenge, the three countries must rise above a flurry
of diplomatic rhetoric and engage in high-level dialogue for
pragmatic outcomes. During his visit to the US, Minister Wang Yi put forth a
strategy whereas it hardens the stick and sweetens the carrot of the deal
to up the ante for continued defiance, and entice the DPRK back to the
negotiating table. For the stick, the newly adopted UN Security Council
resolution demands aviation fuel embargo against the DPRK, which may well
serve to ground the entire fleet in the DPRK. For the carrot, the goal is to
promote denuclearization in tandem with transition from armistice to peace
on the Korean Peninsula and realize enduring peace and security on the
Peninsula. The high-level dialogue between China and the US led to
speedy progress and final consensus on the UN resolution after
weeks of prolonged negotiations. Minister Wang Yi reiterated that
the new resolution would effectively deter the nuclear programs in
the DPRK, which bodes well for China-US and China-ROK cooperation
in this regard. The international community is closely watching if the
resolution can be effectively implemented. But the high-level interaction
between China and the US, in and of itself, helps both sides to
understand each others stance better, and ultimately has led to an
outcome acceptable to both sides. China agrees to toughen
sanctions because it is determined to realize denuclearization on the
Korean peninsula and ensure the security of China. The US
understands Chinas concerns thanks to the dialogue and subscribes
to the parallel track of solutions seeking denuclearization and
replacement of armistice with peace agreements, which opens the
door to negotiations of a peace agreement with the US when the
DPRK is committed to abandoning nuclear programs.
ongoing
tensions on the Korean Peninsula have the potential to undermine
trust and increase military competition between China and the
United States, a development that is set to detrimentally affect
overall Sino-US relations and cannot be in the interest of either
party. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. Seoul, under the government of Park Geun-hye and
a large-scale joint US-ROK military operation against North Korea is increasingly becoming less realistic. Third,
after repeated provocations from the North, has abandoned engagement and stepped up its bellicose rhetoric and uncompromising stance
against North Korea. Over the last decades, both sides have mastered the game of bringing tensions to the precipice and then pulling back.
However, as tensions rise, there is less and less flexibility in this perennial brinkmanship with both sides in danger of losing control during a
future confrontation as martial propaganda and provocations will reach unprecedented heights. In addition, there is little understanding how
much control Kim Jong-un genuinely exercises over the military and the party and whether they would stand down in the face of South Korean
provocations when given the order by the supreme leader. Certain South Korean policies have also helped to further fuel tensions. For
example, ever since 2010, South Korea has implemented a disproportional response theory of deterrence. As John Delury, a professor at
Yonsei University, explained in an interview with The Diplomat: Seoul has proclaimed that for every one shot fired by the North, the South will
hit back with 3 to 5 times greater force. That principle for deterring the North along the contested maritime border seems to apply to the DMZ
[Demilitarized Zone] as well. This concept of deterrence increases the chance of an escalating spiral of attacks and counter-attacks that could
eventually lead to full-scale war. A military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula has the potential to once more draw in both the United
States and China. Beijing is committed to the defense of the North under the 1961 Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and
Mutual Assistance, whereas the United States and South Korea have kept a mutual defense treaty since 1953. However, China has repeatedly
said that in a conflict provoked by the North, it would not uphold its treaty obligations. (Indeed, according to a US scholar, China has tried to
have the clause requiring it to defend North Korea revoked.) Any type of large-scale military operation on the Korean Peninsula will almost
certainly involve large-scale destruction of human life and property. As the commander of US forces in South Korea, General Curtis Scaparrotti
recently testified: Given the size of the forces and the weaponry involved, this would be more akin to the Korean War and World War IIvery
complex, probably high casualty. North Korean artillery could shell Seoul with thousands of rounds within the first hour of a full-scale war. Yet,
Next to an arsenal of
approximately 700 (potentially nuclear-armed) Soviet-designed
short-range ballistic missiles (and an unknown number of
intermediate-range and long-range missiles), North Korea also has
one of the worlds largest chemical weapons stockpiles including
certain weapon systems could make a confrontation even worse than the Korean War.
This could further fuel the ongoing US-China arms race in the
Asia-Pacific region. Consequently, given ongoing inter-Korean
political dynamics, the disastrous consequences of full-scale war on
the Korean Peninsula, and the potential of ongoing inter-Korean
crises to disrupt and damage the China-US relationship, it is of vital
interest to both Beijing and Washington to craft a more constructive
approach towards North Korea, centered around dialogue and
persistent diplomatic initiatives and despite a new set of UN
sanctions. As John Delury noted in an email exchange with The Diplomat: Sanctions work best when implemented and more
military power.
important lifted in the context of negotiation, and a robust diplomatic process backed by political will on both [all] sides. This does not
necessarily mean the resumption of Six-Party Talks, but rather quiet backdoor channel diplomacy laying the groundwork for future
negotiations. A diplomatic deal with the United States and South Korea might be useful for Kim Jong-un at this juncture given that it would
We should stop
fighting the idea of his [Kim Jong-uns] existence, and instead use
our leverage inherent in helping him deepen his legitimacy to get
things we want, according to Delury. One sign that the United
States would be open to such a dialogue, presumably spearheaded
by China, is that US Secretary of State John Kerry on February 23rd
did not outright dismiss the suggestion of Chinese Foreign Minister
Wang Yi to pursue in parallel tracks the denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula and the replacement of the Korean armistice with
a peace agreement. For the time being and no matter how
unpleasant, Beijing and Washington have a vested interest in stable
relations with Pyongyang and the timing might just be right for a
concerted Sino-US diplomatic effort. Indeed, it is a political
necessity.
cement his legitimacy in the upcoming Seventh Korean Workers Party Congress in May 2016.
with a current inventory of 2,500 to 5,000 tons, according to the South Korean Ministry of National Defense.32 A RAND analysis says that 1
Weapons Convention (CWC) which bans the use and stockpiling of chemical weapons. North Korea is suspected of maintaining an ongoing
weapons agents.35
A nuclear
attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million
Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many
more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese
death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would
be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive
debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun
and bring on a nuclear winter around the globedestroying
agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and
destruction. Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe
would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding
its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than
double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States.
The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of
billions of dollars modernizing its nuclear weapons and nuclear
production facilities over the next decade.
the United States would win any nuclear war with China. But what would that victory entail?
But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet,
there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and
China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened
Pacific power.
to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of Chinas
offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared
publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.
however, reduce the prospects for avoiding a negative political spiral and increase the probability of war. In short,
Grounding my analysis in
defensive realism and its more general rational variant therefore
has significant implications for U.S. policy. Because defensive
realism finds that the pressures generated by international structure
will allow China to rise peacefully, regional issues that could derail
this promising trajectory become more important.
states less secure and major power war a not unlikely outcome.11
pragmatic awareness of the issues on which they disagree, and both appreciate the importance of not permitting those
specific disagreements to prevent cooperation on major issues where cooperation can be mutually beneficial. In addition,
the leaders and top working-level officials on both sides have gained substantial experience in dealing with each other
and, in many cases, have come to know each other fairly well.1 The above are promising dimensions of U.S.-China
are grounds for deep concern about the future. As of early 2012 the U.S. has withdrawn its forces from Iraq and is on
schedule to draw down its involvement in the Afghan conflict, and Washington is rebalancing its policy in the direction of
Asia and the Pacific. This shift reflects President Obamas basic perspective, as Americas self-described first Pacific
role there. In November 2011 the Obama Administration publically committed to devote the necessary resources to
sustain this leadership role in Asia, even as its domestic fiscal challenges threaten substantial cuts in the overall defense
China is
expanding its roles in the Asia-Pacific region. Since 2000, virtually every Asian country,
budget and make funding of major overseas commitments potentially more controversial at home.2
as well as Australia, has shifted from having the U.S. as its largest trade partner to having China as its largest trade
partner. Most of these countries have also invested directly in Chinas economy. In short, almost every Asian country now
builds continued participation in Chinas economic growth into its own strategy for future prosperity. Although Chinas
economic and political interests are increasingly reaching around the world, its geoeconomic and geopolitical center of
Chinas military
capabilities are improving substantially as a result of double-digit annual
growth in its defense expenditures nearly every year since the mid-1990s . A
gravity remains in Asia, or what the leaders of China refer to as its periphery. In addition,
significant portion of that growth has been in force projection capabilities, especially in the navy and also in the air and
missile forces. The Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) is still many years away from being a global military power, but its
capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region have expanded markedly over the past fifteen years.
priorities,andoptimalsolutions,butthenetresultislikelytobeenhancedunderstanding,morecommongoals,andgreaterstrategicstability.
Space
2ac module
Good US China relations solve space conflicts
Weeden 15 (Providing National, 9-9-2015, "An Opportunity to Use the
Space Domain to Strengthen the U.S.-China Relationship," NBR ,
http://nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=602, DDI NB)
U.S.-China relationship in space has the potential to be a stable foundation
for a stronger overall relationship between the two countries. Space was arguably a
The
stabilizing element in the relationship between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War by providing national capabilities to
reduce tensions and an outlet for collaboration. Although the future of the U.S.-China relationship will be characterized by both competition
capabilities enable secure, hardened communications with nuclear forces, enable the verification and monitoring of arms control treaties, and
provide valuable intelligence. Such capabilities are the foundation of the United States ability to defend its borders, project power to protect
its allies and interests overseas, and defeat adversaries. The space domain, however, is currently experiencing significant changes that could
affect the United States ability to maintain all these benefits in the future. A growing number of state and nonstate actors are involved in
space, resulting in more than 1,200 active satellites in orbit and thousands more planned in the near future. Active satellites coexist in space
along with hundreds of thousands of dead satellites, spent rocket stages, and other pieces of debris that are a legacy of six decades of space
activities. As a result, the most useful and densely populated orbits are experiencing significant increases in physical and electromagnetic
congestion and interference. Amid this change, China is rapidly developing its capabilities across the entire spectrum of space activities. It has
a robust and successful human spaceflight and exploration program that in many ways mirrors NASAs successes in the 1960s and 1970s and
is a similar source of national pride. Although it still has a long way to go, China is developing a range of space capabilities focused on national
security that one day might be second only to those of the United States. Some of Chinas new capabilities have created significant concern
within the U.S. national security community, as they are aimed at countering or threatening the space capabilities of the United States and
other countries. The massive changes in the space domain and Chinas growing capabilities have affected the U.S.-China relationship in space.
There is growing mistrust between the two countries, fueled in part by their development and testing of dual-use technologies such as
rendezvous and proximity operations and hypervelocity kinetic kill systems. This mistrust is compounded by a misalignment in political and
strategic priorities: China is focused on developing and increasing its capabilities in the space domain, whereas the United States is focused on
maintaining and assuring access to its space capabilities. Despite these challenges and concerns, there are concrete steps that the United
States and China can take to manage tensions and possibly even work toward positive engagement. In 2011, President Barack Obama and
then Chinese president Hu Jintao issued a joint statement on strengthening U.S.-China relations during a visit by President Hu to the White
House. As one of the steps outlined in the statement, the two presidents agreed to take specific actions to deepen dialogue and exchanges in
the field of space and discuss opportunities for practical future cooperation. President Xi Jinpings upcoming visit presents an opportunity to
build on the 2011 agreement and take steps toward these goals. The first step should be to have a substantive discussion on space security.
President Obama should clearly communicate the importance that the United States places on assured access to space, U.S. concerns with
Both countries
should exchange views on space policies, including their interpretations of
how self-defense applies to satellites and hostile actions in space. Doing so
can help avoid misunderstandings and misperceptions that could lead either
country to unwittingly take actions that escalate a crisis. Second, Presidents Obama and Xi
recent Chinese counterspace testing, and the potential negative consequences of any aggressive acts in space.
should discuss specific ideas for cooperation in civil and scientific space activities and the use of space for peaceful applications on earth.
Continuing to exclude China from civil space cooperation will not prevent it from developing its own capabilities; this approach will only ensure
Space weather,
scientific research, exploration, capacity building for disaster response, and
global environmental monitoring are all areas where the United States and
China share joint interests and could collaborate with each other and other
interested countries to help establish broader relationships outside the
military realm. In addition, the United States should take steps on its own to stabilize the relationship. First and foremost, it should
that China cooperates with other countries in space in a way that advances its own national interests and goals.
get serious about making U.S. space capabilities more resilient. Increasing resilience would support deterrence by decreasing the benefits an
adversary might hope to achieve and also help ensure that critical capabilities can survive should deterrence fail. While resilience has been a
talking point for the last few years, the United States has made little progress toward achieving the goal. Radical change is thus needed in how
Washington develops and organizes national security space capabilities. Moreover, the United States should embrace commercial services to
diversify and augment governmental capabilities, while encouraging allies to develop their own space capabilities. Second, the United States
should continue to bolster the transparency of space activities by increasing the amount of space situational awareness (SSA) data available to
satellite operators and the public. Greater transparency reinforces ongoing U.S. and international initiatives to promote responsible behavior in
space and also helps mitigate the possibility for accidents or naturally caused events to spark or escalate tensions. Shifting responsibility for
space safety to a civil agency that can share and cooperate more easily with the international community and working with the international
community to develop more publicly available sources of SSA data outside the U.S. government are two steps that would enhance trust,
improve data reliability, and reinforce norms of behavior. The consequences of not addressing the current strategic instability in space are real.
A future conflict in space between the United States and China would have
devastating impacts on everyone who uses and relies on space. Both the
United States and China have acknowledged the dangers of outright conflict
and have pledged their interest in avoiding such an outcome. Taken together,
the initial steps outlined here could help stabilize the U.S.-China strategic
relationship in space, mitigate the threat of the worst-case scenario, and
work toward a more positive outcome that benefits all.
A war in space would have staggering implications. If conflict were to erupt , say,
over Chinas territorial claims to the South China Sea or Russias aggression in Eastern Europe,
Americas military satellites wouldnt be the only space assets at risk.
Fighting would also likely cripple the civilian satellites that control so much of
modern life, from cellphone networks to ATMs and personal GPS units. And although
such a conflict might start in space, experts say it could easily turn into full-scale war on
Earth. If war does extend into space somedayand I hope it never doesthe first [nuclear]
response is not going to be in space , warns General John Hyten, head of the U.S. Air Force Space Command.
This year, the Pentagon will spend $2 billion on measures to counter threats to its national security satellites. That amount is expected to soar
as part of the $22 billion set aside to maintain U.S. superiority in space in 2017. Senior U.S. officials explain such large investments reflect the
Pentagons recognition of a major shift in U.S., Chinese and Russian capabilities. For the first 25 years after the Cold Wars end, they note,
Americas conventional forces were unmatched, thanks largely to the advantages their satellites gave them on the battlefield. Making their
excessive
efforts to restrict all U.S. cooperation is not in the interests of the
United States. Denying the Chinese access to U.S. know-how will not
reduce the threat of Chinese military space ventures: the Chinese
will continue to acquire the necessary capabilities either from the
international space community or by developing the capabilities
themselves. (Note that most space technology applications are neutral to whether the application is overtly military or civilian.)
that would uniquely and substantially increase the capabilities of systems that pose a significant military threat, but
This path has resulted in the expansive capability they have fielded over the past decade and the advances we anticipate in the decades
Chinese may be less inclined to develop more sophisticated counterspace methods, such as covert co-orbital intercept, since this could lead to
a counterspace arms race, which, the Chinese recognize, the United States is in a better technological position to win.
Trade
Therefore, to advance
the cooperation agenda is the best way to manage the China-U.S.
relationship. To advance the cooperation agenda, we have first to identify the
convergent interests between China and the U.S.. In 2016, what is the most
important convergent interest between the two countries? Economy. If you read
scenario would be bad not only for our two countries, but also for the whole world.
Premier Li Keqiangs government work report and watch the U.S. economic performance in the 4th quarter of 2015, you
can see that economic growth tops the agenda of both the Chinese and American governments. On Jan 27, when
President Xi Jinping met with Secretary of State John Kerry in Beijing, Xi pointed out: Ive emphasized several times,
the U.S. are negotiating a bilateral investment treaty. If concluded, this treaty
will be another milestone in China-U.S. economic cooperation, taking our
economic cooperation to a higher stage. Chinese companies, both public and
private, are going global. The U.S. is one of their most coveted investment markets. The Chinese economy is
going through a restructuring process. To fix the problem of pollution and upgrade the Chinese industry, American
companies can do a lot in China. BIT will open up a new phase of
China-U.S. economic and investment cooperation and give a push to
Chinas badly needed economic reform. 2. To work together to ensure the
success of the G20 Summit scheduled for Sept. 4-5 in Hangzhou. China-U.S.
cooperation can play a crucial role in making this summit a success, which is
very important to boost confidence and stimulate growth.It takes two to
tango. China and the U.S. have to take every opportunity to strengthen
cooperation in the economic area for the benefit of the two countries and the
global economy.
AT India DA
India; they often cite the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to buttress this point. Indias increasing role in Southeast Asia, specifically
in the South China Sea, also puts pressure on the relationship. One clear instance of this is the decision of Vietnam to award exploration
projects to Indias state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Company in the South China Sea, an action which China has raised objections to time and
again. In May 2015, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman categorically stated that Any oil and gas exploration work should get approval first
Chinas One Belt, One Road project. A number of U.S. analysts told me that India should focus on the BCIM Corridor instead of worrying over
balance of trade is presently skewed in favor of China. For the period April 2015-January 2016, Indias trade deficit was $44.7 billion, with
Indias exports to China standing at a mere $7.56 billion while imports stood at $52.26 billion. For 2014-2015, the trade deficit for New Delhi
negotiations continue,
and there is no reason to believe they will not ultimately succeed . After
subsequently appointing new envoys to help manage the dispute. Despite a recent setback,
all, China has settled its land border with 12 of the 14 countries on its periphery, sitting in stark contrast with increasing Chinese maritime
assertiveness in the East and South China seas. As for Pakistan, India's view of China's patronage is complicated. India holds grievances over
such issues as China's support for Pakistan's nuclear program, yet it is dangerous for India if Pakistan feels overly threatened. Making Pakistan
feel secure is extremely challenging, especially as India's power grows. Thus a transparent Chinese role in Pakistani affairs is in India's longterm interest transparency that will depend highly on India improving bilateral relations with China. Finally, China's naval presence in the
Indian Ocean is another major concern for India; an expansion due mainly to China's dependency on energy imports from the Middle East. The
long-term trajectory of this issue depends on a combination of China reducing its reliance on sea-borne oil imports, and on the improving
strength and assertiveness of India. As China has no maritime claims in the Indian Ocean, maritime tension will likely be a consequence of
of interests emerge between China, India and Russia. All three countries have a strong preference for a multipolar world order and the dilution
of American hegemony. All three countries consider the principle of state sovereignty to be the pre-eminent norm of international relations,
have a mercantile bent to their economic policies and already cooperate on many of these issues through the BRICS grouping. There are
certainly significant pitfalls and risks in the China-India relationship. But should those be navigated successfully, the US may well find itself
with a worse relationship with India, Russia and China than the three have with each other. This is because strategic tension between India and
China is finite, while their shared interests are broad and enduring.
Most
conversations focused on the contentious aspects of the
relationship, and ignored an unnoticed transformation taking place
between Beijing and Delhi. If Americans fail to recognize the nuances in the relationship between
mark. Perhaps the greatest misconception I came across in D.C. concerns the India-China relationship.
China and India, their Asia policy is bound to be heavy-handed and Washington could lose an opportunity to shape
regional politics in a positive way. I found that there are a handful of reasons why U.S. analysts are out of sync with the
changes taking place in the Beijing-New Delhi relationship. First,
Neither
India nor the United States should look at Sino-Indian relations as a
zero-sum game. Former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao wisely stated that the world is big
enough for both India and China to grow. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has
Washington have dissonance on many strategic issues, but still share a robust economic relationship.
emphasized that India and China will need to work jointly in the 21st century. China and India both understand the need
for connectivity. In this context, both countries seem to have made some progress on the Bangladesh, China, India,
Myanmar (BCIM) Corridor, an important component of Chinas One Belt, One Road project. A number of U.S. analysts told
me that India should focus on the BCIM Corridor instead of worrying over Chinas investment in Pakistan through the
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Efforts are also being made to increase connectivity between both countries by
increasing the number of flights. In the economic sphere, there is much room for improvement between New Delhi and
Beijing. The balance of trade is presently skewed in favor of China. For the period April 2015-January 2016, Indias trade
deficit was $44.7 billion, with Indias exports to China standing at a mere $7.56 billion while imports stood at $52.26
billion. For 2014-2015, the trade deficit for New Delhi was estimated at $48.48 billion. However, Chinese investments in
India are increasing. India-China relations are no longer restricted to New Delhi and Beijing; interactions between the two
countries states and provinces are also increasing. India is seeking to reach out to Chinese provinces with whom it did not
have links previously. Increasing ties between Indian states and Chinese provinces enriches and supports high-level
diplomatic ties. Already, a number of Indian chief ministers have visited China. During Modis visit last year to China, an
annual State and Provincial Leaders forum was inaugurated. Speaking at the launch, the Indian prime minister made a
significant point: A number of decisions can be taken quickly by the State governments. These interactions also make the
State governments more sensitive and aware of the international dynamics and requirements. Liberalizing visa regimes
will also help strengthen people-to-people contacts and trade. India has bolstered the relationship by beginning an e-visa
facility for Chinese citizens. This improvement is evident in the increase in number of tourists arriving in India on e-visas,
which has gone from a little over 2,700 in October 2014 to 56,477 in October 2015. It is important for members of the
strategic community and the government in the United States who study India to interact with analysts outside Delhi .
It
is also critical to understand the increasing links between a number
Like many advocates of stronger U.S.- Indian ties, Burns fails to recognize
that two countries with the same system of government do not
necessarily develop similar interests or policies. In the case of India,
the burdens of colonialism and economic underdevelopment have
led it to oppose much of the U.S. agenda. Like China, India continues to
view the United States as a presumptuous superpower and competitor. And if
India realizes its goal of becoming an economic powerhouse with global
influence, New Delhi's rivalry with Washington, particularly in South
Asia, will likely intensify. Although Burns writes that "the United States
and India should continue to strengthen their defense and political
coordination in the Asia-Pacific region," he neglects to mention that India
appears uninterested in cooperating on this front. The United States has
included India in multilateral strategic discussions on the AsiaPacific region, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, with
Australia and Japan, which sought to respond to increased Chinese
power, but India has not made such meetings a priority. New Delhi
has also been conspicuously absent from the two combined naval
task forces the United States assembled to combat terrorism and
piracy in the Indian Ocean. And despite providing development assistance
to Afghanistan, India has refused to participate in the International
Security Assistance Force, NATO'S security mission in Afghanistan. When
India does participate in multilateral organizations, it routinely
opposes initiatives proposed by the United States and other Western
powers. India's opposition to interfering in other countries' domestic affairs
has led New Delhi to vote against human rights resolutions in the UN General
Assembly and to openly criticize UN involvement in such crises as the civil
wars in Libya and Syria. New Delhi has also opposed the West on many
economic issues, working with the other so-called BRICS nations Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa to create alternatives to the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other Bretton
Woods institutions. Still, Burns holds out hope that Obama and Indian
Prime Minister Narendra Modi will "work together to promote stability in
India's South Asian neighborhood." If India's actions are anything to go on,
however, it appears that the country prefers to work alone to
maintain its regional dominance-and it views the United States as a
threat. As a U.S. diplomat serving in South Asia from 1985 to 2004, I
watched Indian officials repeatedly pressure neighboring countries
not to cooperate with Washington, often because New Delhi
believed, erroneously, that such cooperation would raise the U.S.
military's profile in South Asia. In early 2014, India protested U.S. calls
for fair and inclusive elections in Bangladesh because it feared that
voters would not elect a pro-India party. To gain leverage over its
neighbors, India has had its foreign intelligence agency provide
financial support to antigovernment insurgencies in Bangladesh,
Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Two of the insurgent groups India has backedMaoist militants in Nepal and Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka-have killed
Laundry List
the spectrum would cite an interest by the Chinese in forging stronger relations with unique and untapped foreign markets for the exportation
companies and workers are willing to brave thousands of miles to relocate to. With estimates of over one million Chinese currently living
across the African continent, the push to attract greater business initiatives will require migrants to believe that they will prosper relatively
uninhibited overseas. The Ebola crisis in West Africa has affected the ability of Chinese companies to conduct business in the region. A Chinese
diplomat was quoted as claiming that while the nearly 1,500 Chinese workers in Liberia face little risk of exposure to Ebola, the disease has
negatively impacted the operations of many Chinese businesses. Xue Xiaoming, vice-chairman of the Chinese Chamber of Industry and
Commerce in Nigeria, stated that many potential Chinese companies looking to invest in what has become Africas largest economy have put
existing plans on hold in response to international airlines suspending flights to Ebola-affected countries. This economic interest may have
stirred up humanitarian aid by China in combating Ebola in West Africa. The relief efforts mark a rare action on their behalf when referring to
dating back to Mao Zedongs regime. Chinese workers worldwide administered over 240 million medical treatments in 71 countries, 45 of
which located in Africa. These efforts were curbed under Deng Xiaoping when the state turned its efforts towards intensive economic
development, perhaps a signal that the previous decades of work was not simply mercantilist policy but the result of humanitarian inspiration.
From the American perspective, the amount China has donated still
reflects only a fraction of U.S. humanitarian monetary assistance . Even in
West Africa, the U.S. (ranked 1st in 2012 in humanitarian assistance donations) allocated US$100 million to aid in the Ebola crisis through
U.S.A.I.D. (United States Agency for International Development) as of September 2014, with congress assessing whether to send an additional
amount in the form of C.D.C. personnel and equipment that would bring the overall total of U.S. aid to US$250 million. This is despite not
possessing the same breadth of business interests as China in the region (only trading at a rate of nearly half that of China within the
continent). However, the organizational purposes of U.S.A.I.D., to end extreme poverty and to promote resilient, democratic societies while
advancing our security and prosperity, reflect the myriad of intentions behind humanitarian aid donations backed by the U.S. government.
motivations, both states have seemingly formed a stake in aiding the West African nations.
Conflicts general
gamble that reasserted single-party rule can manage the development of a complex, maturing economy and satisfy the
growing expectations of an increasingly educated, urban and informed society. The Chinese leaderships crude attempt to
command the Chinese stock markets to rally earlier this year, reminiscent of King Canutes confrontation with the
Communist party leadership to play the nationalist card, perhaps with an actual military move, Galtieri-style, against one
of Chinas Malvinas/Falkland Islands, would be very strong. Probably this would not be a direct confrontation with a formal
adopted by the west during the last two decades of the cold war (although obviously not expecting it to end the same
efforts to find shared ground on climate change, the world economy and geopolitical issues from North Korea to Syria. The
intensive business ties that already exist should buttress the relationship. There is already an extraordinary people-topeople relationship, embracing many millions of better-off Chinese who have studied, worked and lived in the west.
This strategy should be coordinated with key US allies who have their own major
relationships with China, such as Australia, Germany and Britain, which will welcome Xi on a state visit next week.
War, the US has established and always maintained the worlds strongest naval power. On 3 May 2010, US Defense
Secretary Robert Gates detailed the multilayered supremacy of the US navy in terms of nuclear- powered carriers, largedeck amphibious ships, nuclear-powered submarines, Aegis- class combatants and the displacement of battle fleets.
Thereby, Secretary Gates announced confidently that the United States stands unsurpassed on, above, and below the
high seas.20 By contrast, confined by the availability of a limited budget and the weakness of industrialtechnological
including strategic nuclear submarines, long-range force-projection capabilities, anti-air capabilities, and anti-submarine
capabilities, to software, characterized by the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, level of
sophistication in joint warfighting, and mature operational proficiency across the board.21 Impressed by the sophistication
of US military equipment during his visit to the US in May 2011, General Chen Bingde, the Chief of the General Staff of the
PLA, said frankly that China does not have the capability to challenge the United States.22 Additionally, but of great
importance for a blue-water navy, the existence of the US navys widespread military bases and facilities, as well as their
network of global allies, further dwarfs the PLAN. The inferiority of the PLAN is evident both in quality and quantity, which
prevents the PLAN from becoming an elite naval power at present.23
Cyber security
Increased relations mean we let down our guard - theyll
just attack us
Gertz 16 (Bill, senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon. Prior to joining
the Beacon he was a national security reporter, editor, and columnist for 27
years at the Washington Times. March 18, 2016. China Continuing Cyber
Attacks on U.S. Networks The Washington Free Beacon
http://freebeacon.com/national-security/china-continuing-cyber-attacks-on-us-networks/)
Six months after China pledged to halt cyber espionage against the United
States, Beijings hackers continue to conduct cyber attacks on government
and private networks, the commander of U.S. Cyber Command told Congress. Despite a formal
pledge made by Chinese leader Xi Jinping in September, cyber operations from China are
still targeting and exploiting U.S. government, defense industry, academic,
and private computer networks, Adm. Mike Rogers, the Cybercom chief, said in prepared
testimony to a House Armed Services subcommittee on Wednesday. Rogers echoed comments on
continued Chinese cyber attacks made by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper in February.
Clapper said in Senate testimony that it
more ransomware activity, Rogers said. In his prepared testimony to the subcommittee, Rogers
said cyber attacks by a range of nations and non-state actors are intensifying.
While North Korea has not conducted a repeat of its November 2014 cyber attack against Sony Pictures
Entertainment, we have seen a wide range of malicious cyber activities aimed against American targets
and victims elsewhere around the world, and thus we are by no means sanguine about the overall trends
in cyberspace, he said. Cyber attacks are ubiquitous. Literally every American who has connected to a
network has been affected, directly or indirectly, by cyber crime, Rogers said. By this point millions of us
have had personal information stolen, or seen our accounts or credit compromised. Some 300 American
companies involved in critical infrastructure, such as electrical power, finance, communications and
transportation, are working with Cybercom to study ways to protect against major cyber attacks, Rogers
noted. We
India Relations DA
1nc module
Link - India perceives strong US-China relations as zerosum. Close Us China ties erodes India and US relations
Madan 2015 (Tanvi ,ellow in the Project on International Order and
Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, The U.S.India Relationship and China, January 20, 2015, 7/14/2016
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/01/20-us-india-relationshipand-china-madan; DDI AH)
Today, both India and the U.S. have relationships with China that
have elements of cooperation, competition and, potentially, conflict
though in different degrees. Each country has a blended approach
of engaging China, while preparing for a turn for the worse in
Chinese behavior. Each sees a role for the other in its China strategy. Each thinks a good relationship with
the other sends a signal to China, but neither wants to provoke Beijing or be forced to choose between the other and
China. Each also recognizes that Chinaespecially uncertainty about its behavioris partly what is driving the India-U.S.
partnership. Arguably, there have been three imperatives in the U.S. for a more robust relationship with India and for
supporting its rise: strategic interest, especially in the context of the rise of China; economic interest; and shared
democratic values. Indian policymakers recognize that American concerns about the nature of Chinas rise are responsible
for some of the interest in India. New Delhis own China strategy involves strengthening India both security-wise and
economically (internal balancing) and building a range of partnerships (external balancing)and it envisions a key role for
the U.S. in both. Some Indian policymakers highlight another benefit of the U.S. relationship: Beijing takes Delhi more
seriously because Washington does.
forcing India to choose between the two countries. From the U.S. perspective, any deterioration in Sino-Indian relations
might create instability in the region and perhaps force it to choose sides. Too much Sino-Indian bonhomie, on the other
hand, would potentially create complications for the U.S. in the bilateral, regional and multilateral spheres.
pace of the buildup that should cause concern. Pakistans arsenal of short-range tactical nuclear weapons is a game-changer in other ways.
was strong evidence that the attackers were Pakistani and belonged to a Pakistan-supported militant group. Indian public outrage and
Institution and former U.S. Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill agree that if there were another Mumbai, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi
would not step back from using military force in response, unlike his predecessors. Indian public opinion would demand retaliation, especially
after the unpopular degree of restraint exercised by the Singh government after the Mumbai attacks. But there remains no meaningful seniorlevel dialogue between the two states last Augusts planned meeting between the two national security advisers was cancelled after
disagreements about Kashmiri separatists. There may be little the United States or the world can do to forestall this conflict still looming just
over the horizon. Nevertheless, the tremendous dangers of this situation require U.S. policymakers to devote more time and energy in trying
to do so, and some small steps may help. The United States should work hard to catalyze confidence-building measures between the two
sides, seeking to open more peacetime channels to create dialog and potential conflict mediation options for the future. Neither nations
military currently has any direct communications. Quiet, off-the-record meetings between senior military leaders would help lessen tensions
and establish some degree of mutual dialog and understanding before a crisis erupts. The United States should also sponsor unofficial tabletop
exercises involving representatives of each side to explore how escalation in a nuclear conflict could unfold. The United States should also
reach out to current (and former) civil and military decision-makers on both sides to develop and grow bilateral relationships that could prove
vital in the next crisis. Both the United States and NATO should also emphasize the limited battlefield utility of TNW, as well as their wellresearched estimates of the damage that would have been wrought by using them to defend Western Europe from a Soviet armored invasion.
And the United States should continue to encourage Pakistan to slow its fielding of tactical nuclear weapons, and keep them under tight
central control well away from vulnerable forward-deployed positions. The lack of any tangible results from the U.S. governments recent
series of modest steps now to try to avert the worst outcomes from this dangerous pink flamingo hiding in plain sight is an investment well
worth making.
to limit the prospects for Beijings dominance of the region. As the strategic gap between India and China growsfor
China is rising much faster than IndiaDelhi can only bridge it through a combination of internal and external balancing.
powers and the intersection of their maritime policies with those of the United States are bound to churn the security
politics of the Indo-Pacific for decades to come.
wants to provoke Beijing or be forced to choose between the other and China.
Each also recognizes that Chinaespecially uncertainty about its behavioris partly what is driving the India-U.S. partnership. Arguably, there
have been three imperatives in the U.S. for a more robust relationship with India and for supporting its rise: strategic interest, especially in the
context of the rise of China; economic interest; and shared democratic values. Indian policymakers recognize that American concerns about
the nature of Chinas rise are responsible for some of the interest in India. New Delhis own China strategy involves strengthening India both
security-wise and economically (internal balancing) and building a range of partnerships (external balancing)and it envisions a key role for
the U.S. in both. Some Indian policymakers highlight another benefit of the U.S. relationship: Beijing takes Delhi more seriously because
Washington does. But India and the U.S. also have concerns about the other when it comes to China. Both sides remain uncertain about the
whether the quest for strategic autonomy will allow India to develop a truly strategic partnership with the U.S. There are also worries about
the gap between Indian potential and performance. Part of the rationale for supporting Indias rise is to help demonstrate that democracy and
As things
stand, neither India nor the U.S. is interested in the others relationship with China being too
hot or too coldthe Goldilocks view. For New Delhi, a too-cosy Sino-U.S.
relationship is seen as freezing India out and impinging on its
interests. It would also eliminate one of Washingtons rationales for a stronger relationship with India. A China-U.S. crisis or conflict,
development arent mutually exclusive. Without delivery, however, this rationaleand Indias importancefades away.
on the other hand, is seen as potentially destabilizing the region and forcing India to choose between the two countries. From the U.S.
perspective, any deterioration in Sino-Indian relations might create instability in the region and perhaps force it to choose sides. Too much
Sino-Indian bonhomie, on the other hand, would potentially create complications for the U.S. in the bilateral, regional and multilateral spheres.
recognize that China will play a crucial role in Asiait is the nature of that role that concerns both countries. Their anxiety has been more
evident since 2009, leading the two sides to discuss Chinaand the Asia-Pacific broadlymore willingly. They have an East Asia dialogue in
place. There is also a trilateral dialogue with Japan and talk of upgrading it to ministerial level and including Japan on a more regular basis in
Minister Modi has implicitly criticized Chinese behavior in the region (and potentially in the Indian Ocean), with his admonition about countries
with expansionist mindsets that encroach on others lands and seas. In a departure from its predecessor, his government has shown a
willingness to express its support for freedom of navigation in the South China Sea in joint statements with Vietnam and the U.S. In an op-ed,
the prime minister also stated that the India-U.S. partnership will be of great value in advancing peace, security and stability in the Asia and
relationship with India and for supporting its rise: strategic interest, especially in the context of the rise of China;
security-wise and economically (internal balancing) and building a range of partnerships (external balancing)and it
envisions a key role for the U.S. in both. Some Indian policymakers highlight another benefit of the U.S. relationship:
Beijing takes Delhi more seriously because Washington does.
India and the U.S. also have concerns about the other when it
comes to China. Both sides remain uncertain about the others willingness and capacity to play a role in the
But
Asia-Pacific.
Some in the U.S. also have reliability concerns about India. They question
whether the quest for strategic autonomy will allow India to develop a truly
strategic partnership with the U.S. There are also worries about the gap
between Indian potential and performance. Part of the rationale for
supporting Indias rise is to help demonstrate that democracy and
development arent mutually exclusive. Without delivery, however, this
rationaleand Indias importancefades away.
neither India nor the U.S. is interested in the others
relationship with China being too hot or too coldthe Goldilocks view. For
New Delhi, a too-cosy Sino-U.S. relationship is seen as freezing India
out and impinging on its interests. It would also eliminate one of
Washingtons rationales for a stronger relationship with India. A ChinaAs things stand,
U.S. crisis or conflict, on the other hand, is seen as potentially destabilizing the region and forcing India to choose between
the two countries. From the U.S. perspective, any deterioration in Sino-Indian relations might create instability in the
region and perhaps force it to choose sides. Too much Sino-Indian bonhomie, on the other hand, would potentially create
complications for the U.S. in the bilateral, regional and multilateral spheres.
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/09/22/u.s.-india-ties-in-age-of-xijinping/ii7f; DDI - AH )
These are just some of the issues on the agenda for Xis state visit to
Washington. But heres the catch: some issues on that agenda could bring
Washington and New Delhi closer, but others could drive them apart as
American coordination with Beijing risks creating wedges between
the United States and India. One example of the former involves
domestic investment rules in China. Beijing has deployed regulations
and standards as a non-tariff barrierto the detriment of U.S. and
Indian investment alike. But an example of the latter involves intensifying
climate change coordination in the run-up to Decembers multilateral
negotiations in Paris: the United States and China are moving into alignment
on climate, even as New Delhi stands apart and flirts with seeking
exceptional treatment. That points to a challenge that the United
States and India must now confront: At the strategic level, Chinas
rise has brought Washington and New Delhi closer. But at the
tactical leveland sometimes, even at the strategic levelU.S. and
Indian goals and choices are not always in alignment. One problem is
political. It is difficult to imagine a major East Asian security contingency
Taiwan, Korea, the South or East China Seasto which U.S.-India operational
coordination would be relevant. India would almost certainly keep itself aloof,
influenced by many of the same Indian voices that helped to scuttle refueling
support of the United States in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Another problem
involves Indian perceptions of American ambivalence about India-China
security tensions. The United States, for its part, would likely try to remain
aloof from a blowup on the India-China border, not wishing to be caught in
the middle. That would, predictably, raise hackles in New Delhi about
U.S. unreliability, further fueling Indian skepticism of Americas
China policy. Washington encountered precisely this suspicion full force in
2009, when it issued a U.S.-China joint statement that included references to
South Asia. Many in India choked on this statementfirst, because they
suspected a U.S.-China condominium on New Delhis security
equities; second, because few, if any, in India regard Beijing as a
neutral party in South Asia; and third, because many fret that
Washington could sideline New Delhi, working against Indian
interests in pursuit of expanded U.S.-China cooperation.
world economy has changed dramatically since the mid-2000s. For decades, G-7 countries beat a path to Asias door. But the other foot now
wears the shoe as many economies, including Western economies, increasingly rely on Asian industrial and household consumers. Asian
countries have become much more than traders. They are investors, builders, lenders, and, in some areas, a growth engine. China is a central
player in this Asian drama. Indeed, for all its challenges, including a pronounced economic slowdown, China is the top trading partner of more
than sixty countries, many of them in Asia. Overcapacity and slackening Chinese demand have rocked numerous economies, especially
commodity producers. But If China succeeds in rebalancing its economy toward a new model, it will foster some new demand drivers, for
example through the accelerated growth of household consumption. Nor is Chinas slowdown, or its recent stock market turbulence, likely to
alter its increasingly central role as an investor and builder of infrastructure. These could ultimately change Asias economic face, not least in
South Asia, as Beijings One Belt, One Road infrastructure initiative converges with other efforts, including a $40 billion Silk Road Fund and
the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and BRICS Bank, both of which India has joined as a founding member. Chinas foreign and
economic policies are converging in unprecedented ways. Beijing burned a sizeable chunk of its $4 trillion in foreign exchange reserves amid
the summers market turbulence. But it retains reservessome now being recycled into investments offshorelarger than the nominal GDPs
of India, South Korea, and Thailand combined, and equivalent in size to the worlds fourth-largest economy. Chinas abundance of capital is an
extension of Beijings foreign policy: it will continue to leverage state-backed financial vehicles for economic and strategic ends. Now, take
security. From the maritime commons to the cyber domain, U.S.-China security competition has become increasingly intense. But India, along
with some others in Asia, shares elements of these American concerns. Washington and Beijing have some clashing security concepts in Asia,
not least in the South China Sea. So too do New Delhi and Beijing in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. These are just some of the issues on
in China. Beijing has deployed regulations and standards as a non-tariff barrierto the detriment of U.S. and Indian investment alike. But an
and China are moving into alignment on climate, even as New Delhi
stands apart and flirts with seeking exceptional treatment .
announcing the test, and two, and more importantly, for creating long-lasting
debris in low-earth orbit. While the test generated anger and public outcry, it
did not result in any real punitive measures. The informal moratorium on
ASAT tests, which had lasted for two and a half decades, was broken by the
Chinese ASAT test. Thereafter, the United States tested an ASAT missile in
2008, which the international community was much more comfortable with
because it was done openly and did not lead to the creation of long-lasting
debris. For India, however, China has been of particular concern.
Beijing's activities in recent years have been driven by competition with the
United States, so the capabilities it is developing are much more advanced
than what are necessary to deter India. Nonetheless, India has to be
mindful of Chinese advances. Following China's ASAT test, the scientific
and technical communities and the Indian Air Force leadership, as
well as sections of the political leadership, started debating whether
India should be developing its own ASAT capability, and whether this
capability should be demonstrated or simulated. India has a missile
defense system under development, and the potential for India to acquire an
ASAT capability is linked to its missile defense capabilities. The Indian
Defence Research and Development Organisation has been developing
missile defense capabilities independently but is also increasingly looking
to partner with the United States and other countries. In contrast,
China has followed the route of developing an ASAT capability first and later
developing missile defense based on its ASAT capability. How do China's
space capabilities play into the regional politics of the subcontinent? India is
closely monitoring China's space cooperation initiatives in South
Asia. China launched a satellite for Pakistan in 2011, and another for Sri
Lanka in 2012. Our concerns are informed by the nuclear precedent;
cooperation with China was critical for the Pakistani program. India
feels that if Pakistan, which today has very limited space
capabilities, cooperated with China, it could become a capable power
in the space realm. The two major concerns are an independent Pakistani
ASAT capability and further development of Pakistan's long-range missile
capabilities. An ASAT capability is not quite as simple as rocket technology,
but it would not be the hardest thing for Pakistan to achieve either. For
China, Sri Lanka is extremely important in the maritime security context, and
for the Maritime Silk Road program. IndiaSri Lanka relations have gone
through ups and downs, but the new president, Maithripala Sirisena, and new
prime minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, both have a friendly disposition
toward India. Nonetheless, there are strict limits to Indian influence in
Colombo. Critically, Sri Lanka is in dire need of economic opportunities and
faces huge developmental challenges. Even if India had all the goodwill to
support and help Sri Lanka, it does not have the deep pockets that China
does. India is concerned that space cooperation may become yet
another path for China to make inroads in Colombo.
Impact economy
US-India relations key to increased economic liberalization
Joshi et al 13 (Sunjoy, C. Raja Mohan, Vikram Sood, Rajeswari Pillai
Rajagopalan, Ph.D., James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Walter Lohman, Lisa Curtis
and Derek Scissors, Ph.D. "Beyond the Plateau in U.S. India Relations,"
Heritage Foundation, April 26,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/beyond-the-plateau-in-usindia-relations, DDI-PN)
If the IndiaU.S. relationship was imagined in the past decade in abstract
terms and lofty possibilities, the reality today is that both New Delhi and
Washington need each other even more than before. In the 2000s, the
United States was at the peak of the unipolar moment. What drove
Washington to re-craft the relationship with New Delhi was not the
prospect of immediate gain or an urgent need for Indian
partnership, but the perceived value of a long-term strategic
investment in India. For New Delhi, the affections of George W. Bush
and the civil nuclear initiative constituted an unexpected and
significant political bonus at a moment when India's international
trajectory was on an upward trend. Today, when Washington and
New Delhi find themselves in more difficult circumstances, their
bilateral partnership acquires greater salience. It is no longer
aspirational, but an important mutual need. At the core of the
revitalized relationship must be a strengthened economic
engagement. The economic crisis in the United States and the
slowdown in India's growth have increased the value of a deepening
partnership. Plenty of good ideas are around; these include the
conclusion of a bilateral investment treaty, the negotiation of a free
trade agreement, promotion of energy security at a moment the U.S.
is likely to emerge as a major exporter of natural gas, and
liberalization of American work visas for Indian service
professionals. These proposals, however, must be related to a
renewed commitment to economic liberalization on both sides.
Despite the intense politicization of economic policy in both
countries, it should be possible to find many convergences and work
on them. At the political and strategic level, India, like so many other nations
after the Cold War, has often worried about unconstrained American power.
At this juncture, though, India must concern itself more with the
consequences of a potentially precipitous decline in American power or the
loss of U.S. political will.
"A
In
this kind of war, biologically there are going to be people surviving
somewhere on the planet but the chaos that would result from this
will dwarf anything we've ever seen," Helfand said. The study said that the black carbon aerosol particles kicked
in 1945. "With a large war between the United States and Russia, we are talking about the possible, not certain, but possible, extinction of the human race. "
into the atmosphere by a South Asian nuclear war would reduce US corn and soybean production by around 10 percent over a decade. The particles would also
reduce China's rice production by an average of 21 percent over four years and by another 10 percent over the following six years. The updated study also found
Obama pledged in 2009 to work toward abolition but said that the United States would keep nuclear weapons so long as others exist. Nine countries are believed
to possess nuclear weapons, with Russia and the United States holding the vast majority.
However, little has been written about how the United States should respond if diplomacy fails that is, if a nuclear war breaks out between India and Pakistan, how can the
United States contain the conflict so it does not come to involve other nations with alliances or interests in the region and significantly larger nuclear arsenals?
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/09/priorities-for-primeminister-modis-visit-us-and-india-must-cooperate-for-asian-stability, DDI-PN)
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modis visit to the United States next
week provides an opportunity to strengthen U.S.India ties, which
stagnated during the second term of Modis predecessor, Manmohan
Singh. During the visit, President Barack Obama should demonstrate
the importance the U.S. attaches to the bilateral relationship and
offer cooperation on economic, defense, and security issues. The Obama
Administration has at times relegated the relationship with India to a lower category of priority than it merits, but both sides have shown
interest in moving beyond negative atmospherics and specific irritants, like the revocation of Modis U.S. visa over the 2002 Gujarat riots and
last years arrest of a U.S.-based Indian diplomat. The visit will be observed closely by other Asian powers: namely, China and Japan, both of
to meet Prime Minister Modi on September 29 and 30 following a major speech that Modi will give the day before to around 20,000 people,
most of them Indian Americans, in Madison Square Garden. In an official announcement of the ObamaModi meetings, a U.S. National Security
Council official said that Modis White House engagements over a two-day period are a sign of the importance the Administration attaches to
its relations with India. Although Modi will not address a joint session of Congress (as the Indian American community had earlier hoped)
because Congress is out of session, the U.S. Senate passed a bipartisan resolution last week designating September 30 as U.S.India
Partnership Day and noting that the relationshipmade up of a special and permanent bondwill continue to define the 21st century. Busy
Foreign Policy Agenda Modis visit to the U.S. is part of a hectic foreign policy schedule. In early September, Modi made a successful five-day
visit to Japan, where he and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe agreed to elevate their dialogue to a Special Strategic and Global
Partnership. Japan committed to investing $35 billion in Indian projects over the next five years, and the two sides agreed to explore elevating
their trilateral dialogue with the U.S. to the foreign minister level, a step that Washington would welcome. Many viewed Modis remark that
Japan and India were focused on economic development, not expansionism, as an oblique criticism of China and its approach to territorial
visit to India last week did not go as well as anticipated, largely due to a flare-up in border tensions. Chinese leaders had put on a charm
offensive toward India shortly after the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power. Recognizing that Indias clout on the world stage is likely to
grow under Modi, the Chinese sought to focus on cooperation, not competition. President Xis decision to skip Pakistan on his visit to South
Asiaeven though it was likely due to concerns about the internal security situationplayed well in India. As the Chinese Presidents visit
of Xis visit. PM Modi called on China to demarcate the LAC, which further dampened the atmosphere and took the focus away from the
India agreed to destroy some military structures along the border and both sides withdrew their troops, clearing the way for a planned visit to
with a large Muslim minority that provides a model of an ethnically and religiously diverse society that maintains freedom for its citizens.
tensions drive home the important role that India plays in the U.S.
Asia rebalance strategy. During Modis visit, the U.S. should: Highlight the opportunity to expand economic and
business relations so long as Modi remains committed to a pro-liberalization agenda. A major part of the visit will consist of Modi interacting
with the U.S. business community in New York and Washington in an effort to encourage greater U.S. investment, especially in Indias
infrastructure sector. U.S. leaders must make clear to Modi that U.S. businesses are looking for signs that India will maintain momentum on
economic reform and provide a stable and private-sector-friendly business environment. Emphasize defense cooperation in an atmosphere of
strategic understanding, building on steps announced by U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel during his visit to India in August. Modi has
highlighted the need to modernize Indias armed forces, and the U.S. is poised to play a significant role in helping to fill Indian defense
requirements. During his August visit to India, Secretary Hagel discussed dozens of proposals for India to consider with regard to co-production
of defense items and transfer of technology. Hagel said that the U.S. is willing to be patient while India considers its security needs and would
NATO forces draw down. Given al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiris recent pledge to launch a South Asia wing and the Islamic State gaining
ground in Iraq, the imperative for close U.S.India counterterrorism cooperation has never been stronger. Obama and Modi must coordinate
their responses to these brewing threats and seek ways to cooperate in preventing the Taliban from staging a comeback in Afghanistan.
Manage expectations on visit outcomes to avoid a sense of disappointment. In the past, the relationship has suffered from each side having
overly optimistic expectations of what the other side can deliver to solidify ties. While the two sides have largely convergent strategic
interests, the fact that they are both large democracies means that institutional change can be complex and slow. For this reason, initiatives
like the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative aimed at breaking down bureaucratic obstacles to defense cooperation are particularly
important, but these initiatives also require patience and persistence and take time to bear fruit. Conclusion The stage is set for a successful
Modi visit to Washington, but the White House must guard against allowing the myriad international crises happening around the globe to
Impact- Terrorism
US-India cooperation has been crucial in developing the
counterterrorism groups on both sides
Joshi et al 13 (Sunjoy, C. Raja Mohan, Vikram Sood, Rajeswari Pillai
Rajagopalan, Ph.D., James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Walter Lohman, Lisa Curtis
and Derek Scissors, Ph.D. "Beyond the Plateau in U.S. India Relations,"
Heritage Foundation, April 26,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/beyond-the-plateau-in-usindia-relations, DDI-PN)
IndiaU.S. cooperation in counterterrorism increased significantly
after 9/11. The U.S.India Cyber Security Forum was set up in 2002,
but experienced setbacks that have dampened some of the enthusiasm for
cooperating in this particular arena. The 2008 terrorist attacks in
Mumbai and the extent of help sought and given by the U.S. in the
investigations, as well as diplomatic efforts by India, culminated in
the Bilateral Counterterrorism Cooperation Agreement in 2010.
Other joint initiatives include interactions between security and
intelligence officials, exchange visits of senior leadership of security
and intelligence units, joint training exercises, and U.S. assistance
to India in enhancing critical investigation skills. A key component of
this cooperation has been the State Department's Anti-Terrorism
Country Assistance Plan for India for training more than 2,000
officials from various intelligence, police, paramilitary, and security
agencies. These Indian officials have undergone training in forensic
analysis, evidence gathering, bomb blast investigations, human
rights, extradition, and prosecution. In 2012, training capsules
widened to include air and seaport security. There is now a strong
working relationship between the U.S. Computer Emergency
Readiness Team and India's Computer Emergency Response Team.
North korea
In view of
their real national interests, however, China and North Korea will not
turn away from each other, despite their cooling relations. From a
long-term, historical viewpoint, ties between the two countries will
eventually stabilize and strengthen, but under one condition North
Koreas nuclear impasse must not drag on forever. Among all of
Chinas diplomatic ties with its various neighbors in Northeast Asia,
relations between China and North Korea have been relatively
stable, with plenty of flexibility. Geographic proximity, a condition
neither party is able to change, makes it unrealistic for the two sides
to break off relations. As part of his foreign policy, President Xi
Jinping has been vigorously looking for allies among Chinas
neighbors, and has even approached Japan and the Philippines in
order to bridge differences. Why should he abandon North Korea and
create a large flashpoint right along Chinas northeast border ? The
believe that it would be within Chinas strategic interests to cool down, or even break off, its relationship with North Korea.
significance of China-North Korean relations can be better appreciated when one looks at Chinas relations with the Asia-Pacific powers.
nuclear weapons would severely threaten the security environment of China and all of Northeast Asia. Thus, as North Koreas closest friend,
Beijing proposed the six-party talks to allow the parties involved to negotiate and resolve the dispute. The six-party talks are in fact Chinas
attempt at testing the water as a responsible player in regional and international affairs. The West is aware of this. This is why every time
Historically, however, ChinaNorth Korean relations have never been significantly affected by
North Koreas nuclear programs. When North Korea launched the
Taepodong-1 missile in 1998, an international outcry for sanctions
ensued. Less than two years later, Kim Jong-il visited China in secret .
Chinese President Jiang Zemin paid a reciprocal visit to Pyongyang
in 2001, and was received by Kim with great ceremony. When North Korea dropped
the Korean nuclear issue rears its head, the United States points fingers at China.
out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty* in 2003 and was determined to develop nuclear weapons, China promptly hosted a six-party talk.
In October of that same year, National Peoples Congress Standing Committee Chairman Wu Bangguo visited North Korea and was welcomed
. President Hu
Jintaos state visit to Pyongyang in 2006, one year prior to a North
Korean nuclear test, was not only an endorsement of the friendly
and positive relations between the two countries, but also intended
to show concern over the escalation of North Koreas nuclear
program. Confidential diplomatic talks between China and North
Korea continued after the nuclear test, with Beijing becoming the
de-facto key to engaging North Korea. Kim Jong-il visited Beijing again in secret in January 2006, three
months after Hus state visit. In October 2006, North Korea detonated a nuclear device. Ties between China and
North Korea continued to develop in the aftermath of the nuclear
test. One indicator was Xis first visit to North Korea in 2008, after
he was elected the vice president of China at the plenary sessions of
the National Peoples Congress and the National Peoples
Consultative Conference. Xi was also the first high-ranking Chinese
official to visit North Korea after the National Congress of the
Communist Party of China in 2007. After North Koreas second nuclear test in April 2009, and the
with unchanging hospitality. This was followed by another visit by Kim Jong-il to China in April 2004
announcement shortly afterwards that it would quit the six-party talks, Premier Wen Jiabao still managed to visit the country in October 2009.
Interestingly, 2009 was also the year of China-North Korean Friendship. In the same year, North Korean Premier Kim Yong-il was
ceremoniously received in China. Kim Jong-il visited China another three times in a row over the period of one year, in May and August of 2010
From these
visits it is obvious that high-level contact between the two countries
was not affected by North Koreas nuclear programs. Relations between the two
and later in May 2011. Then-Vice Premier Li Keqiang (now Chinas premier) also visited North Korea in October 2011.
countries only started to show signs of deterioration after the sudden death of Kim Jong-il. Since Kim Jong-un took power, North Korea has
carried out two nuclear tests, in February 2013 and February 2016. In between these two dates, North Koreas military second-in-command
Choe Ryong-hae showed up in China twice; and on the Chinese side, Vice Chairman of the National Peoples Congress Li Jianguo, Vice President
Although less
intense and frequent, top-level contact between China and North
Korea has continued despite the two countries cooling relations.
Xis policy toward North Korea does show a subtle departure from
policy under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. But in essence, the bilateral
ties between China and North Korea are not challenged by any
major, hard-to-bridge differences, especially ideological differences,
such as those China has with the United States, South Korea, and
Japan. Relations between the two countries are only beset by North Koreas nuclear development a multilateral dispute. China
and North Korea will not turn away from each other over North
Li Yuanchao, and Politburo Standing Committee member Liu Yunshan have all paid visits to North Korea.
difference of Xis approach to North Korea from his predecessors goes no further than strategic adjustments toward one of the two poles,
without actually breaking the balance. A move toward outright enmity is an unlikely scenario within the foreseeable future. Another analogy is
the love-and-hate relations between the United States and its major ally in the Middle East Saudi Arabia. Many Americans are furious over
the Saudi elements involved in the 9/11 attack, but the U.S. government kept on friendly terms with its ally. The United States did not turn
away from or criticize Saudi Arabia because of its monarchial regime, nor did it compromise the common strategic interests it shares with the
Saudis in the region, despite domestic outrage. The Sunni rulers, meanwhile, are apprehensive about American animosity, but they continued
to regard the United States as the most reliable friend in the Middle East. If one day, China and North Korea can develop a partnership like that
between the United States and Saudi Arabia, their relationship will have reached a true balance. *Corrected. The original stated that North
Korea dropped out of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty. In fact, North Korea was never a signatory.
from the US and South Korea, with an aim to further isolate North Korea by new sanctions.
Chinas
possibility to really give North Korea a lesson, since China, in
Expectations have become higher across both the US and South Korea on
their eyes, is the sole patron of the country, especially in the economic sense. The China card,
Looking back on history, North Koreas nuclear issue had once almost been resolved in the
1990s with the agreed framework being reached between the US and North Korea
themselves. That should have been a historical legacy for the Clinton administration, if it could
have overcome the domestic obstacles made by the Republican Congress. (There is similar
allies would resort to military deterrence, sanctions and isolation as the main tools to deal
with the country, so as to make it yield under pressure.
closest friend, has been relied upon to make all the tough
measures.
China doesnt want to take a hardline stance on North
Korea
Lankov 16 (Andrei, professor of Korean Studies at Kookmin University,
Seoul. He is the author of "The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed
Stalinist Utopia". Don't expect China to ice North Korea, Al-Jazeera-Asia.
January 28. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/01/don-expectchina-ice-north-korea-160128061357218.html, DDI-PN)
China is far from happy about North Korea's nuclear ambitions. For
the past three years, the Chinese put a remarkable level of pressure on
North Korea. However, things have changed. The reason becomes
obvious from talks I had in the Chinese capital - a significant intensification of
the Sino-US imperial rivalry. Indeed, if China follows US suggestions and
introduces comprehensive economic sanctions against North Korea,
it might virtually knock the economy out cold because roughly three
quarters of North Korea's economic exchanges are now with China.
Even the decision to stop subsidised trade - above all, the shipment
of oil to North Korea at artificially low prices - will deal a serious
blow to Pyongyang. China can take such measures, but why would
they? After all, the North Korean state is not well known for caring
about its level of economic development. Sanctions have to be strong
enough to seriously endanger North Korea's domestic political stability.
However, China would clearly not welcome a political crisis on the northern
half of the Korean peninsula. If North Korea is to plunge into Syria-style
domestic chaos, China is likely to be hit hardest.
the subsequent events has made them decide to reverse course. Beijing
appears to consider North Korea as a buffer zone against greater US
influence in the region. Recently, the Chinese resolve has been tested
twice: in mid-December when the North Koreans suddenly cancelled a highprofile performance of a North Korean musical group (because Chinese
officials strongly objected to paeans to nuclear weapons that were to be
sung), and the beginning of January when the nuclear test was conducted.
example, when the U.S. starts with a list of 40 entities to sanction and China
whittles it down to three, Washington could choose to point out that gap and
work with other countries to try to sanction those entities, instead of
declaring victory. Washington could also increase criticism of China for
permitting North Korea to use its airspace, land border, and waters to transfer
illicit items to other countries--clearly in violation of UN Security Council
resolutions.
Space
Impact defense they say we solve space
No space war China wants peaceful space use
McKenzie, 15
David McKenzie is an award-winning international correspondent for CNN based in
Johannesburg, South Africa. May 29, 2015. Chinese astronaut calls for cooperation, access to
International Space Station CNN http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/28/asia/china-space-mckenzie/
(DDI AGH)
China wants greater cooperation with other nations in space, particularly the United States, the
country's most experienced astronaut has told CNN in an exclusive interview. Fifteen nations including the United States, Russia and Japan
China's involvement has always been a nonstarter because of longstanding resistance from U.S. legislators. "As an astronaut, I have
cooperate on International Space Station missions, but
a strong desire to fly with astronauts from other countries. I also look forward to going to the International Space Station," Commander Nie
of the Shenzhou-10 mission inside Space City, the center of China's space program, near Beijing last month. In 2011, Congress passed an act
to bar NASA from having any bilateral contact with individuals of the Chinese space program because of national security fears. "Every time it
gets mentioned at all anywhere near Congress, it gets shut down immediately," space analyst Miles O'Brien told CNN. "There is tremendous
skepticism there about China. It is viewed as a foe, it is viewed as a government that seeks to take our intellectual property -- our national
United States and Russia started their space programs early. They are the pioneers," he said. He says foreign astronauts are welcome to visit
by replicating their Soyuz space craft -- which they dubbed the Shenzhou. But it has been steadily checking off the boxes in manned space
flight. In 2003, it put its first man in space. In 2008, it completed its first space walk. And in 2013 Nie and his crew completed the country's
impeding those rights or developing capabilities intending to do so; take those actions necessary to protect its space
confidence-building measures to encourage responsible action in, and the peaceful uses of, space. The new policy also
notes that the US will consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures if they are equitable, effectively
verifiable, and enhance the national security of the US and its allies. The language in this new policy suggests that this is
intelligence, remote sensing, navigation, and monitoring, among other things. Since the US currently asserts its political
year, when the draft resolution was considered by a GA committee focusing on issues of arms control. On Tuesday, 129
nations represented in the General Assembly voted to adopt the measure, which was cosponsored by 40 nations including China and Syria and is known as the
no first placement initiative. It is noteworthy that the only government
objecting to the substance of our initiative is the United States, which for many years
has stood in almost complete isolation trying to block successive efforts of the international community to prevent an arms race in outer
proposal.
annihilation in the Cuban Missile Crisis was the primary deterrent, the South China Sea Crisis has deterrents of its own. US
and China putting economic sanctions on each other would be catastrophic for both countries due to their
interdependence. Other powers in the world would also prioritise US-Chinese mediation as sanctions would affect their
economies too. As long as American diplomacy is geared towards preventing Chinas zero sum game in the region without
overstepping its own legal and military boundaries,
stable region.
Teeney-tiny
South Korea DA
1nc module
A nuclear armed South Korea will destabilize the region and cause
nuclear prolif
Kuzminski 16 (Frank, Kuzminksi is an active duty Army officer and currently serves
as a strategic planner on the Army Staff at the Pentagon. A graduate of West Point and
Harvard University, Major Kuzminski served as an infantry officer for 10 years, including
two years with the U.S. Armys Second Infantry Division in South Korea. No Nukes in
South Korea, 3/10/16 accessed 7/15/16 at
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/03/01/no_nukes_in_south_korea_109090.html;
DDI-NB)
In a recent article, U.S. Army Major Christopher Lee argues that the United
States should allow South Korea to obtain its own nuclear arsenal, stating
that it is the only way for the South to prevent Kim Jong-Un from furthering
his nuclear and ballistic missile program. This argument is a false dichotomy
and fails to consider, or at least properly weigh, the global and strategic
consequences of such an outcome. First of all, the United States does not
dictate which countries can and cannot pursue nuclear weapons; South Korea
is party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and remains committed
to not developing a nuclear arsenal. Moreover, a nuclear-armed Republic
of Korea (ROK) will, in fact, make the region less secure, and threaten
to turn the South into a pariah state like its errant, northern neighbor.
Additionally, Seoul going nuclear would undermine the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and lead to a collapse of the delicate
nonproliferation regime. By encouraging a nuclear-armed South Korea, the
United States risks seriously eroding the credibility of its extended
deterrent, and the strength of its alliances. South Korea acquiring its
own nuclear arsenal will achieve little beyond destabilizing the region. While
North Korea defiantly continues its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, it
keeps the bulk of its military positioned forward and able to attack the South
with little or no warning; North Koreas long range artillery and known stocks
of chemical and biological weapons are just as threatening as, if not more
destructive than, North Koreas nascent nuclear arsenal. Kim Jong-Un does
not need a nuclear-tipped Unha-3 ballistic missile, or even a submarine
launched ballistic missile to turn Seoul into a sea of fire. The real purpose
behind Pyongyangs nuclear program is to ensure the regimes long-term
survival, and to convince the world that North Korea be taken seriously.
According to the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper,
North Koreas ballistic missile threat is aimed at the United States, and a
nuclear South Korea will not neutralize this threat. Instead, it will dramatically
alter the regional balance of power and incense China, which already
strongly opposes the deployment of a U.S. Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD) battery to South Korea. China will likely consider
its interests directly threatened, leading to further polarization over the North
Korean issue, and a costly breakdown in Sino-South Korean relations. China is
South Koreas top trading partner by far South Korea can only lose in a
strategic contest with China. One can also speculate that Japan, which
forswears nuclear weapons largely due to being the only country ever
attacked by them, will not tolerate being left out of a North East Asian nuclear
arms race, especially given the recent security reforms championed by Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe. These effects may spill over into other regions, such as
the Middle East, where the potential for nuclear proliferation exists. If
countries perceive the United States is ceding its leadership in preventing the
spread of nuclear weapons, in favor of the parochial interests of a regional
power like South Korea, one can easily envision that other countries, such as
Saudi Arabia, will withdraw from the NPT and develop their own nuclear
weapons. The potential for a nuclear arms race among second-tier
powers will not make the world a safer place. At stake is not only the
viability of the global nonproliferation regime, which has kept the total
number of nuclear-armed states to nine, but also other agreements, such as
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which limits Irans capacity to
produce fissile material in exchange for sanctions relief, and is predicated on
the enduring strength of the NPT. Controlling the worlds most dangerous
weapons is founded on global consensus and confidence in the international
communitys commitments to keeping the costs of acquiring nuclear
weapons prohibitively high. If the U.S. suddenly reverses its long-standing
policies, and encourages South Korea to develop nuclear weapons, the
whole system is at risk of collapsing. The subsequent finger-pointing and
accusations by those opposed to a nuclear-armed South Korea will also seal
the growing perception that Americas global leadership on important matters
is waning towards irrelevance.
to its own strategic considerations and concerns over the safety of United States Forces Korea (USFK)
entrapment, and potentially are linked to problems surrounding escalation and crisis management. As John
Power noted in a recent piece, the more extreme critics of moral hazard and alliance exploitation, such as
Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump,
protection without paying for it. Others, such as Doug Bandow, offer a far more informed and
nuanced analysis of the alliance, yet still suggest the U.S. should remove its troops from South Korean soil
argue that Japan and the ROK would quickly become close allies to balance against China and the DPRK if
the U.S. were to withdraw from East Asia. We disagree both with Trumps factually baseless rhetoric and
domestic
politics in South Korea would push Seoul to choose internal
balancing through increased defense spending, or even to acquire its own
nuclear deterrent, before reaching out to Tokyo to replace a terminated alliance with
the U.S. While we support South Koreas efforts to take on an increasingly
independent role for its own national defense, we are skeptical regarding proposals for a
Bandows overall conclusions. Although we are sympathetic with Kellys views, we believe
sudden or fundamental change to such a long-standing and relatively successful security architecture.
With this in mind, we hope a critical analysis of the role that moral hazard plays in the alliance, can provide
Perhaps the most dangerous impact of the United States allowing South
Korea to obtain nuclear weapons is the erosion of confidence in
Americas nuclear umbrella, or extended deterrent, which underwrites its
seven military alliances, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). Such a move would represent a striking policy reversal by the United
States, as articulated in President Obamas Prague speech in 2009, and
violate security commitments made by the U.S. to its allies. At the 47th ROKU.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) held in Seoul on November 2nd,
2015, ROK Minister of National Defense Han Min-koo and U.S. Secretary of
Defense Ash Carter affirmed the continued U.S. commitment to provide and
strengthen extended deterrence for the ROK using the full range of military
capabilities, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The United States has
led the global security order since the end of World War II, largely on
the premise of a credible, extended deterrent afforded by its nuclear
arsenal. Indeed, NATOs Strategic Concept, adopted in November of 2010,
clearly defines nuclear deterrence as a core element of the Alliances overall
strategy. Any indication that Washingtons nuclear umbrella is somehow
imprecise, as Major Lee suggests, would raise serious doubts about
Washingtons commitment to its allies. Given Russias revanchism in Ukraine
and on NATOs flank in Eastern Europe, as well as Chinas coercive behavior
in the South China Sea, such doubts will surely invite further aggressive
behavior by these countries, lead to a more dangerous world, and
reinforce the narrative of a declining and retrenched United States.
Major Lee does correctly point out, however, that the international
community is not doing enough to curb North Koreas nuclear ambitions.
Although the recently announced dialogue on basing a U.S. Army THAAD
battery on the Korea peninsula is a positive step, this capability is aimed at
defending both South Korea and the U.S. homeland from North Korean
ballistic missiles, and it doesnt really prevent North Korea from developing
more nukes. Its no secret that China, Pyongyangs sole benefactor, has
grown weary of Kim Jong-Uns belligerence. The U.S. and ROK must work
together to convince Beijing that a unified Korea run from Seoul is a better
alternative to the status quo. This will require a lot of effort to address the
potential for millions of North Korean refugees fleeing north into China in the
event of regime collapse, not to mention U.S. troops presence in Korea post
stability at
the high end of conflict could create overall instability by making lower levels
of conflict relatively safe and thereby erode extended deterrence . In the North
Korea context, some experts fear that its leaders might see a survivable secondstrike capability as
a shield from behind which it can launch conventional provocations and war. In short, a
escalate conflict to the nuclear threshold for fear of crossing it. Paradoxically, however,
survivable second-strike might give North Koreas leaders confidence that they can manage the risks of
escalation because nuclear weapons would deter a full retaliatory response from the United States and
conventional military capabilities and therefore indifferent to this threat. It is true that allied forces far
States can get reinforcements to the peninsula. Once US reinforcements arrive, the more assured is North
Koreas defeat. This strategy is evident in reports about North Koreas military posture. For instance, the
650,000 troops, 8,000 artillery, 2,000 tanks and formidable special operations forces numbering around
100,000.28 Of course, North Korea does not need to unify the peninsula to inflict a significant blow against
a conflict by firing a demonstration shot; for area denial effects by targeting access points to North Korea
or military ports in the South, such as the Port of Busan, where the US might otherwise disembark forces;
or for operational effects by targeting military bases away from civilian population centers, such as air
states will sometimes engage in provocative behavior and even full-scale war
as a diversionary tactic to deflect attention from domestic woes or to
galvanize opposition to domestic challengers . This should be a familiar theme to
most North Korean analysts since domestic motivations have long been considered a primary
driver for North Koreas external provocations. For instance, some analysts speculate
that securing the militarys backing for the transition of leadership to Kim Jong Un from his father, Kim Jong
Il, was a primary motivation for the sinking of the Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong island in 2010 .
Nuclear weapons could provide the North with added confidence that
it can launch such diversionary provocations with relative impunity
in the future. The answers to these questions do not bode well for the stabilizing
prospects of a nuclear-armed North Korea. However, it would be wrong to assume that
increased confidence in its nuclear weapons will fundamentally alter North Koreas behavior. First, its
leaders are not irrational or suicidal. We should not expect nuclear weapons to suddenly trigger a reckless
drive toward unification or a nuclear attack from out of the blue, for instance. Second, North Korea has a
long history of limited but violent provocations, ostensibly to either weaken, delegitimize and humiliate
Terrorism
China uses counter-terrorism cooperation with the US to
exacerbate oppressive policiesETIM
Drennan 15
(Justine Drennan, fellow at Foreign Policy, 2-10-2015, "Is China Making Its
Own Terrorism Problem Worse?," Foreign Policy,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/09/is-china-making-its-own-terrorismproblem-worse-uighurs-islamic-state/ (DDI AGH)
Meanwhile, its unclear if the group Beijing singles out as the greatest threat, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, comprises a distinct, self-
in Afghanistan that amounted to a small, run-down shack. The highlight, in Robertss words: A one-time opportunity to fire a few bullets with
listing. Officials at Washingtons Chinese Embassy and Chinas State Council didnt return repeated calls and emails seeking comment.
What worries Human Rights Watchs Bequelin, as several countries including the United
States move to scale up counterterrorism cooperation with China,
isnt so much that other countries believe Chinas inflated claims.
Its more that the need to cooperate on security and other goals may
mean de facto acceptance of, or even practical assistance for,
Chinas repressive policies.
Thursday, Global Times said ISIS had executed one of these Uighur recruits in September and two in December when they tried to flee its control, attributing the
information to an anonymous Kurdish official.
Many experts
dismiss Global Timess numbers. I assume there are Uighurs joining ISIS, but I also
assume the numbers are quite small in comparison to other groups throughout the world, said Sean Roberts, a George Washington University professor who studies the
minority group. Were probably talking about 20 to 30 people max. Nicholas Bequelin, a Hong-Kong-based senior researcher with Human Rights Watch,
called
Chinese medias figure of 300 implausibly high. Its likely that the rise of the Islamic State has
given a few disenfranchised young Uighurs a cause to fight and potentially die for. Still, experts say any increase in
Uighur extremism is largely due to the fact that the very policies
China says are meant to combat terrorism have actually made the
threat worse. Chinese reports about hundreds of Uighurs fighting with the Islamic State are likely intended
to make the Uighurs look as if theyre a threat, an Islamist terrorist
organization, said Dru Gladney, an anthropologist who studies ethnic identities in China. Several international media outlets havere peated the
numbers from Chinese media. But Chinas inflated claims are ultimately
counterproductive, Gladney said. They create more fear and
marginalization, which exacerbates the problem. China isnt wholly inventing the threat.
Propaganda material from a group China links to ETIM that calls itself the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) suggests there are at least 30 to 40 Uighur jihadis in Syria and Iraq,
according to Washington Institute for Near East Policy fellow Aaron Zelin, who runs the website Jihadology.net. TIP has an increasingly active online presence that includes
footage of young children firing guns in mountain valleys. In recent years, it has also claimed responsibility for attacks like the Tiananmen Square SUV incident via videos
in which its purported leader, Abdullah Mansour, has called for more attacks. But many researchers doubt TIPs claims, as its accounts of attacks often contradict facts on
the ground that dont seem to indicate the sophistication of internationally organized terrorist operations. The general consensus, according to Georgetown professor
James Millward, is that radicalized Uighur expats, who mostly seem to be based in Pakistan rather than Iraq and Syria, havent provided any operational support for recent
violence in China, but rather just propaganda. And any who are fighting with Middle Eastern jihadi groups dont seem to be rising very high in their ranks, said Raffaello
warning that silencing moderate voices can only make tensions worse. Indeed, acts of apparent Uighur terrorism within China have risen sharply over the past couple
years. An attack last March by eight knife-wielding men and women at a train station in Yunnan provinces city of Kunming left 29 dead and at least 130 wounded. In April,
people armed with knives and explosives killed three and injured 79 at the railway station in Xinjiangs capital, Urumqi. The next month, attackers crashed two cars into
shoppers at an Urumqi market and set off explosives, killing 31 and injuring more than 90. The Munich-based World Uyghur Congress, the leading advocacy organization
for the minority (which uses an alternate spelling of the groups name), condemns violence but says China uses the threat of terrorism to stifle peaceful dissent as well.
Alim Seytoff, the Washington spokesman for the group, told Foreign Policy by email that he didnt know whether any Uighurs had joined ISIS, but if they had, they by no
means represent the vast majority of peace-loving Uyghur people, just as those who joined ISIS from the U.S., the U.K., Australia and Europe by no means represent the
China is
conflating the Uyghur peoples legitimate demands for human
rights, religious freedom, and democracy with international Islamic
terrorism, he said. Gladney, the anthropologist, said any Uighurs with ties to ISIS were more likely driven by resentment of China than by aims of global
freedom-loving peoples of America, Great Britain, Australia and Europe. In order to deflect criticism of its Xinjiang policies,
jihad. They may want militant training to fight China and even to establish a Uighur state, he said, but theyre less interested in creating a global caliphate. Analysts also
note that those who do desire a global caliphate seem to have little more than a passing interest in Uighurs relatively parochial aspirations, despite some token gestures,
such as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadis reference to Chinese violations of Muslim rights last July, and exaggerated claims about such abuses made last fall by an al Qaeda-run
magazine.
Counterplan
Note that some of the alt cause cards could also be used as cp solvency for
relations adv.
ROC CP
Ending support for ROC key to US China relations and
coop on other issues
Glaser, 2015 (Charles L., Professor in the Elliott School of International
Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington
University., International Security, Spring 2015, google scholar UT, pg 40-90)
China considers
U.S. support of Taiwan a key source of strategic distrust. A recent
study by two leading authorities on U.S.-China relations concludes
that Beijing views U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as confirming
American arrogance and determination to interfere in Chinas
domestic affairs and to prevent peaceful unification from occurring,
thereby harming a clearly-articulated Chinese core interest. In a similar
vein, their report argues that continuing to provide Taiwan with advanced
weapons . . . is viewed as pernicious in Chinese eyes and has added
to suspicion that Washington will disregard Chinese interests and
sentiments as long as Chinas power position is secondary to
Americas.68 Nathan and Scobell conclude that most Chinese see strategic motives at the root of American
behavior. They believe that keeping the Taiwan problem going helps the
U.S. tie China down.69 Similarly, a prominent Chinese analyst
argues: The position the U.S. takes on the Taiwan issue
determines the essence of American strategy toward China, and thus
determines the quality and status of U.S.-China relations.70 Xu Hui, a
States does not take a position on what the final outcome of the Taiwan issue should be,
professor at Chinas National Defense University, holds that U.S. policies toward Taiwan have been and are the
fundamental cause of some anti-American sentiment among the Chinese public. . . . I assure you that a posture change
of the U.S. policy on Taiwan will remove the major obstacle for our military-tomilitary relations and also strengthen Sino-
In short, ending
the U.S. commitment to Taiwan has the potential to dramatically
improve U.S.-China relations, which in turn could increase the
possibility of cooperation on other issues and reduce the
probability of competition and conflict. Second, ending the U.S. commitment to defend
American cooperation by winning the hearts and minds of 1.3 billion Chinese people.71
Taiwan could greatly moderate the intensifying military competition between the United States and China, which is
adding to strains in their relationship.72 Most directly, the United States is developing its AirSea Battle concept to
counter Chinas A2/AD capabilities, which are intended primarily to undermine the U.S. ability to come to Taiwans aid.73
The impact of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan on Chinas military requirements and capabilities, however, arguably
reaches much further. China worries that in a conflict over Taiwan the United States will interrupt its SLOCs. This
vulnerability would leave China open to U.S. coercion during severe crises and conventional wars.74 The United States
dominates the SLOCs from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca and still enjoys signicant military advantages in the
South China and East China Seas. The requirement for both China and the United States to control these SLOCs during
a crisis or war creates a security dilemma, which adds to strains in the U.S.-China relationship. There is no militarytechnical solution to this security dilemma, however, because two countries cannot control the same space.75 A
decision by the United States to end its commitment to Taiwan could moderate this security dilemma in two important
ways. By eliminating the scenario that is most likely to bring the United States and China into a large war,
accommodation should significantly reduce the importance that China places on controlling its SLOCs. Although China
would likely still find U.S. control undesirable, the military threat the United States posed to Chinas security would be
greatly reduced. In addition, as explained above, U.S. accommodation could signal that U.S. goals in the region are
limited, which should contribute to improving the U.S.-China relationship by increasing Chinas assessment that U.S.
motives are benign, which would in turn further reduce the severity of the security dilemma.76
Uniqueness/Brink Relations
[both ways]
encourage China to exhibit greater transparency with respect to its military spending and modernization. This will help
countries better understand the motivations of the Peoples Liberation Army. We continue to encourage China to use its
military capabilities in a manner conducive to the maintenance of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
on that front probably remains less likely than a more limited war involving North Korea, although it would
also be cataclysmic. As perhaps the worlds preeminent trading and exporting nation, Beijing has little
appetite for international isolation on the scale of North Korea. But it also has very real ambitions, growing
military capability and a government that has placed the quest for ever-growing geopolitical power at the
conventional or nuclear war between the United States and China as marginally lower than the risk of a
ties, causing unsettling ripple effects throughout the Asia-Pacific region and globally, US-China relations were in dire need
Any
observer of Sino-American relations should be both cautiously
optimistic but skeptical. Establishing equilibrium in ties between the US
and China has been hard enough over the years sustaining it has been even
harder. If theres been one overriding characteristic in the relationship over the past 30 years, it has been
fluctuation and disequilibrium. As a result, this summit could not
have come at a more propitious time. The period since President Obamas state visit to China
of stabilization. Now the key question is how long can the new stability achieved at the summit last?
in November 2009 until this past week has been perhaps the worst period in two decades of relations since the
but smart, strategy. Tactically, the administration sought to shape the summit atmosphere by rolling out four cabinet
secretaries Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Secretary of Treasury Timothy Geithner
and Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke in the week leading up to Hus arrival to each give tough high-profile speeches
These highprofile speeches by leading cabinet secretaries set the tone going
into the summit and allowed the US side to articulate its China policy
and concerns about Beijings behavior. This was good both for
Beijing to hear as well as for building domestic political support
behind the administrations China policy. The administration coupled the toughness in its
outlining American expectations from China across virtually every area of the relationship.
pre-summit speeches with the warm, respectful welcome for Hu at the summit. The administration understood well that
what Hu and his entourage wanted most from the summit, by significant measure, was largely the symbolism of protocol.
This is true for one important reason: The Chinese Communist Partys (CCP) political legitimacy rests in part on restoring
Chinas international dignity as a major global power. Ever since 1949, when the Communists came to power, this has
been the consistent narrative that the CCP has told its people. Thus, with all the protocol trappings of a high-level state
visit a welcome at Andrews Air Force base by Vice-President Joseph Biden with a phalanx of armored Cadillac limousines,
staying at Blair House, a White House South Lawn honor guard reception and 21-gun salute, black-tie state dinner and
statement released by the two sides at the conclusion of the summit was a good step in the right direction, setting out
common positions and perspectives on a range of issues. But so too did the joint statement issued at Obamas November
2009 summit in Beijing only for it to become a stillborn document that immediately foundered on a series of irritants and
stability and improved levels of trust. What it did not produce, though, are new mechanisms of institutionalized
of institutionalized working groups that forge tangible cooperation across bilateral, functional, regional and global issues
365 days per year. Looking to the future, cooperative moves by both sides will likely take place in a parallel rather than
joint fashion. Whether the issue is North Korea or Iran, commercial or currency differences, release of imprisoned
dissidents or increasing press freedoms, Beijings ability to appear to be overtly cooperating with a US agenda will be
The Chinese
military, internal security and intelligence services, protected
domestic industries, and the Communist Party propaganda
apparatus all have vested institutional interests in countering
American influence and, to some extent, benefit from an
antagonistic relationship with the United States. For its part, the US military,
severely constrained by domestic nationalistic pressures and bureaucratic constituencies.
intelligence services, protectionist and xenophobic elements in Congress, the human rights community, and other
domestic actors similarly have a stake in an adversarial relationship with China. While these domestic actors will no doubt
was certainly going to create a challenge. However, with what can only
be described as a ring of tensions running from the East China Sea all
the way to the very ends of the South China Sea, from allegations of
cyber espionage on both sides to comments from high-level military
officials that seem more menacing by the day, it seems a clash of
some sorts is increasingly possible.
To many policymakers in
Washington, U.S. engagement has perhaps been too successful. Few
of the global order to become one of the primary stakeholders in that order.
would have imagined that the economic backwater that was China in the 1970s might become the worlds biggest
economy less than 50 years later.
sees similar ambiguity in U.S. intentions. True, constructive engagement with the United States has been a key enabler of
the Obama administrations rebalance to Asia, although articulated in terms that are at best neutral to Chinas
emergence, is frequently couched in the language of managing Chinas rise, which is not, on its face, reassuring to Beijing
nations, a team of mine at the Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs has concluded
after analyzing the historical record.
It was the rise of Athens, and the fear that this inspired in Sparta,
that made war inevitable. Others identified an array of contributing causes of the
Peloponnesian War. But Thucydides went to the heart of the matter,
focusing on the inexorable, structural stress caused by a rapid shift
in the balance of power between two rivals. Note that Thucydides identified two
key drivers of this dynamic: the rising powers growing entitlement, sense of its importance, and demand
for greater say and sway, on the one hand, and the fear, insecurity, and determination to defend the
status quo this engenders in the established power, on the other. In the case about which he wrote in the
fifth century B.C., Athens had emerged over a half century as a steeple of civilization, yielding advances in
philosophy, history, drama, architecture, democracy, and naval prowess. This shocked Sparta, which for a
century had been the leading land power on the Peloponnese peninsula. As Thucydides saw it, Athenss
position was understandable. As its clout grew, so too did its self-confidence, its consciousness of past
injustices, its sensitivity to instances of disrespect, and its insistence that previous arrangements be
revised to reflect new realities of power. It was also natural, Thucydides explained, that Sparta interpreted
the Athenian posture as unreasonable, ungrateful, and threatening to the system it had establishedand
changes in relative power, but he also focused on perceptions of change among the leaders of Athens and
Spartaand how this led each to strengthen alliances with other states in the hopes of counterbalancing
the other. But entanglement runs both ways. (It was for this reason that George Washington famously
cautioned America to beware of entangling alliances.) When conflict broke out between the second-tier
city-states of Corinth and Corcyra (now Corfu), Sparta felt it necessary to come to Corinths defense, which
left Athens little choice but to back its ally. The Peloponnesian War followed. When it ended 30 years later,
Sparta was the nominal victor. But both states lay in ruin, leaving Greece vulnerable to the Persians. Eight
years before the outbreak of world war in Europe, Britains King Edward VII asked his prime minister why
the British government was becoming so unfriendly to his nephew Kaiser Wilhelm IIs Germany, rather than
keeping its eye on America, which he saw as the greater challenge. The prime minister instructed the
Foreign Offices chief Germany watcher, Eyre Crowe, to write a memo answering the kings question.
Crowe delivered his memorandum on New Years Day, 1907. The document is a gem in the annals of
diplomacy. The logic of Crowes analysis echoed Thucydidess insight. And his central question, as
paraphrased by Henry Kissinger in On China, was the following: Did increasing hostility between Britain
and Germany stem more from German capabilities or German conduct? Crowe put it a bit differently: Did
Germanys pursuit of political hegemony and maritime ascendancy pose an existential threat to the
independence of her neighbours and ultimately the existence of England? The British Grand Fleet on its
way to meet the Imperial German Navys fleet for the Battle of Jutland in 1916 (AP) Crowes answer was
unambiguous: Capability was key. As Germanys economy surpassed Britains, Germany would not only
develop the strongest army on the continent. It would soon also build as powerful a navy as she can
afford. In other words, Kissinger writes, once Germany achieved naval supremacy this in itself
regardless of German intentionswould be an objective threat to Britain, and incompatible with the
existence of the British Empire. Three years after reading that memo, Edward VII died. Attendees at his
funeral included two chief mournersEdwards successor, George V, and Germanys Kaiser Wilhelm
along with Theodore Roosevelt representing the United States. At one point, Roosevelt (an avid student of
naval power and leading champion of the buildup of the U.S. Navy) asked Wilhelm whether he would
consider a moratorium in the German-British naval arms race. The kaiser replied that Germany was
unalterably committed to having a powerful navy. But as he went on to explain, war between Germany and
Britain was simply unthinkable, because I was brought up in England, very largely; I feel myself partly an
Englishman. Next to Germany I care more for England than for any other country. And then with
and Asia over the past half millennium offers a succession of variations on a common storyline.
Where they diverge and we have significant and well-known areas of disagreement we will work to ensure that our
overlooks the role of leaders who have the ability to set policy and to shape relationships. It gives short shrift to the fact
that our two economies are becoming increasingly intertwined, which increases each sides stake in the success of the
other.
It undervalues the fact that leaders in Washington and Beijing are fully
cognizant of the risk of unintended strategic rivalry between an emerging
power and an established power and have agreed to take deliberate actions
to prevent such an outcome. And it ignores the reality of the past 35 years
that, in spite of our differences, U.S.-China relations have steadily grown
deeper and stronger and in doing so, we have built a very resilient
relationship. We view Chinas economic growth as complementary to the
regions prosperity, and Chinas expanded role in the region can be
complementary to the sustained U.S. strategic engagement in the AsiaPacific. We and our partners in the region want Chinas rise to contribute to
the stability and continued development of the region. As President Obama and Secretary
Kerry have made very clear, we do not seek to contain China; to the contrary, we welcome the emergence of a stable,
show respect for universal values and international law both at home and
abroad.
interests as mutually non-threatening states, and make cooperation more likely since both have an interest in opposing
height of the cycle resources are often applied to unwise projects. During recessions, companies either downsize or go out
of business, resulting in short spurts of high unemployment. America tolerates these fluctuations because she long ago
decided to trade economic stability for higher long term growth. This has succeeded over the past century. This growth,
combined with other advantages, ensures the U.S. will endure as a superpower. America utilizes its advantages to
maintain a global maritime trade order in the form of organizations like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund,
and World Trade Organization, resulting in economic growth for the world and a successful consumption-based economy
at home.
Economically, America is
strong in areas like food production, education, technology, and
Communist Party to project power abroad while retaining it at home.
institutions founded at the end of World War II that have benefited the people of both nations. This
recognition is a helpful step toward addressing some of the concerns
that China seeks either to undermine those institutions or to short
circuit their effectiveness through the development of parallel
institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
As with the cybersecurity agreement, however, it remains to be seen whether Chinas actions will match its words.
Commitments from the U.S. side to implement the 2010 IMF quota and governance reforms as soon as possible and to
however, reduce the prospects for avoiding a negative political spiral and increase the probability of war. In short,
Grounding my analysis in
defensive realism and its more general rational variant therefore
has significant implications for U.S. policy. Because defensive
realism finds that the pressures generated by international structure
will allow China to rise peacefully, regional issues that could derail
this promising trajectory become more important.
states less secure and major power war a not unlikely outcome.11
Sutter goes on to explore U.S. relations with the important nations and subregions in Asia. The very first nation that he
the first
twenty-five years of the post-Cold War period saw Chinas tougher
approach to secure its interests in the Asia-Pacific which has been
manifested in Chinese assertiveness and expansion over maritime
territorial and other disputes involving the United States Asian
allies. Apart from illustrating the economic, political and strategic drivers of the United States undertaking leadership
responsibility in the Asia-Pacific, Sutter points out three set of strong restrains on Chinas
tough measures in foreign affairs related to the United States:
Domestic preoccupations, strong interdependence, and Chinas
insecure position in the Asia-Pacific. This means that China is
strongly constrained in the region, and not in a position to seriously
confront and challenge the United States.
touches on in his examination of the United States and Asia is necessarily China. According to Sutter,
keeping the enemy within limits and resisting any invasion .12 Even though in the past
few decades the PLAN has achieved major developments in its capabilities, the PLANs primary focus
remains on missions for near-sea operations: to resist seaborne aggression,
protect national sovereignty, and safeguard maritime rights and interests .13 In
line with the defensive strategy, General Liang Guanglie, Chinese Defense Minister, clearly stated that the goals of
ongoing navy modernization will be limited to a strong coastal defense and certain measures for blue water combat.14
Driven by its aim to boost the ability to fight in regional sea wars under the circumstance of information technology as
past generations of political leaders. The two new catchphrases that have come to the fore in the foreign policy of the Xi-
Chinas revised
rhetoric positioning in international affairs. The countrys new leaders hope to play a major role
in the joint reconstruction of a post-crisis world order, one that is no
longer based on the principles of a unipolar system but that reflects the interests
of the worlds new rising powers. This, however, does not represent a major deviation
from Chinas general foreign policy principles, but stands in line with
Chinasoldstrategy of a peaceful re-ascent.
Li-administrationtheChinese dreamand thenew type of great power relationsillustrate
implicit declaration of the South China Sea as Chinas core national interest in 2010, ignited a new wave of suspicion
transitionthat the question whether history will repeat itself becomes a serious concern for policy-makers and analysts
Great War? addresses this important and contentious question: will Chinas rise challenge US predomi-nance and replicate
prewar European Great Power rivalry? This edited volume was produced under the auspices of the Belfer Center at
Harvard University and the contributors make a concerted effort to examine some of the factors leading to the first Great
War, from balance of power politics and alliances to regime types and domestic coalitions. Several themes emerge from
the book, some of them deeply worrying, while others will reassure readers that sanity will prevail more than a century
after the Great War.
China's interests and influence is normal and natural, it is inevitably unsettling to many Americans and Asians, particularly
when it involves employment of military and quasi-military assets. China's greater global activism also makes more salient
the reality that almost all of the core challenges of this era"such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, cyber security,
opposition to trade and investment liberalization, climate change, and epidemics"are more manageable when the United
states and China can cooperate or act along parallel lines and far less tractable when the two countries see their interests
An Gang: After the conclusion of the seventh S&ED, do you still believe that the China-U.S. relations are undergoing a
to cooperate despite deteriorating security relations underscores the fundamental difference between U.S.-Soviet Cold
As to the maritime security issue in China-U.S. relations, how do you evaluate its future development? Is it becoming a
Improved security relations will require an extended period of U.S. and Chinese restraint that will contribute to mutual
confidence in each other's strategic intentions.
sales. It will be important for policymakers to understand and weigh in on what package of arms will contribute to stability
across the Taiwan Strait. There is an element of symbolism to exactly what weapons Taipei requests (and what it actually
purchases if those requests are approved). Getting the package right will take considerable technical and diplomatic skill.
shortly. Thus, the Presidents decision appears to be a dubious one on the one hand, it reflects the
administrations
direct military
confrontation between the two powers is out of question, since it
would be suicidal for both. But the dominant strategy in the postWorld War II period has been that of proxy wars rather than direct
confrontation. And in this context Taiwan plays an important role in the U.S. strategy in Asia
unwillingness to approve the new package for several months. Definitely, a
Pacific. But with the growing military might of mainland China, the disparity between it and the tiny island
which China considers part of its territory, is becoming more and more obvious. At present, Taiwan has
only 388 fighter aircraft compared to 1,680 of China. China, in its turn, would be an obvious loser in the
lie along two axes one, between the administration and the Congress, another one, within the
administration between the Pentagon and the State Department. The Pentagon and the military insist that
increased arms sales to Taiwan would mean more jobs for Americans, and this view is ardently supported
by the majority of congressmen and senators. The State Department prefers not to spoil the relationship
with China, and earlier this week it became known that for the first time ever no State Department
representative would address the annual U.S. Taiwan industry conference on defense and security ties.
Apparently, the State Departments stance has a stronger influence on President Obama. The whole story
may also have an impact on Taiwanese presidential elections scheduled for January 2012. The present
Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou, elected in 2008, has based his policy towards mainland China on the
principles of bringing the two sides closer through commercial ties, and by doing this; he managed to bring
tensions between the two countries to their lowest level since 1949. His main opponent, Tsai Ing-wen has
adopted a more hawkish approach towards mainland China, and according to the Financial Times
newspaper, American officials have already expressed distinct doubts about whether she (Ms. Tsai) is both
elections, it would make her task to stick to the policies much more complicated
P. Lawrence sailing within 12 nautical miles of Fiery Cross Reef, on which China is constructing a 3,000 meter airstrip for
For the United States and its allies, China in the South
China Sea has been behaving contrary to customary international
law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Indeed, China has engaged in
a continuous effort to create legal ambiguity over its territorial
claims in the South China Sea paired with so-called gray zone coercionthe use of China Coast Guard (CCG) and
military aircraft.
maritime militia vessels to establish facts on the ground in the surrounding water while avoiding open military conflict and
U.S. intervention.
At the end of March 2015, the commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet told an audience in Canberra that "China is creating a
Military buildup
Military competition increase tension in relationship
Glaser, 2014 (Bonnie S. Senior Adviser for Asia, Freeman Chair in China
Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, "US-CHINA RELATIONS
Managing Differences Remains an Urgent Challenge." Southeast Asian Affairs
(2014): 76-82. ProQuest.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1650876560/A406786705834EF3PQ/1?
accountid=36295, DDI TM)
In the military realm, there are other factors that are already driving the US
and China towards greater strategic competition. China is developing
capabilities that are aimed at denying the US Navy easy access in a crisis to
its near seas - the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea which occupy significant portions of the Western Pacific. From China's
perspective this is a defensive strategy that is referred to in Chinese
writings as aimed at "counter-intervention". The US views the
development of these capabilities, which it terms "anti-access/area
denial", as threatening its ability to protect its interests in the AsiaPacific, including defending its allies. To ensure that it can maintain
freedom of access and manoeuvre in the waters around China, the US is
applying operational concepts such as Air-Sea Battle. Although this competition is already
underway, the two countries are so far able to effectively isolate the military competition from the broader political and
Spying
U.S. close-in surveillance in the Chinese EEZ results in
the negative political relationship between China and US
Empirics prove.
Glaser, 2014 (Bonnie S. Senior Adviser for Asia, Freeman Chair in China
Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, "US-CHINA RELATIONS
Managing Differences Remains an Urgent Challenge." Southeast Asian Affairs
(2014): 76-82. ProQuest.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1650876560/A406786705834EF3PQ/1?
accountid=36295, DDI TM)
China strongly objects to US close-in surveillance
activity near its 12 nm territorial waters and air space. China could begin to
more aggressively push back against US surveillance. There are precedents for a more
aggressive push back: in 2001, a Chinese pilot aggressively intercepted a US EP-3
surveillance plane, which resulted in his death and the forced landing of the
US plane on Hainan Island where twenty-four crew members were held for
eleven days. The crisis was defused, although it had a long lasting negative impact on relations between the two
militaries. In 2009, Chinese vessels harassed US surveillance ships on several
occasions and came very close to causing a collision. China's newly
established Air Defense Identification Zone further heightens the possibility of
an accident. Past incidents suggest that the US and China would prevent escalation and quickly move to contain
Incident in China's Exclusive Economic Zone
negative fallout. However, domestic publics would become engaged immediately, making it more difficult to defuse the
Mixed record on implementing its obligations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its failure to date
to join the WTOs Government Procurement Agreement (GPA); and Intervention in currency markets to limit
the appreciation of the renminbi (RMB) against the dollar (and other major currencies) in order to make
Chinas exports more globally competitive.
decision was not based on China, Obama said, but part of normalizing ties with the ex-enemy.
clear course aimed at containing China. In an editorial, the paper said that the
move risked turning the region into a tinderbox of conflicts. The former bitter foes have
turned into friends and are seeking to boost their commercial,
military and political relations, it said, adding the move showed there are no eternal
allies or perpetual enemies, only eternal and perpetual interests.
example in the aftermath of North Korea's third nuclear test when both joined the other members of the UN Security
impose on North Korea. The US increasingly supports imposing Iran-like sanctions on North Korea that would seek to
cripple the economy and force Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear programme. Beijing adamantly opposes such a strategy,
in part because it could cause instability that could spill over China's borders, but also because it believes that economic
prosperity and enhanced security will be needed before Pyongyang will give up its nuclear weapons. The efficacy of
economic sanctions without China's cooperation would be limited, but could have some effect if other nations were to go
along with the US. Differences over sanctions on North Korea would likely increase US-China bilateral tensions, but might
not derail the overall relationship.
emphasized with a clear hope any areas of competitionwith a clear understanding that there would be competition in
several years (and far from a comprehensive list), Beijing has sought to enforce lines drawn over vast expanses of the
South China Sea along with building islands in this hotly contested area, declared an Air-Defense Identification Zone in the
East China Sea without any prior warning along with booting regional allies like the Philippines out of disputed reefs far
closer to the Philippines than China. The goal, many would argue, is to dominate Asia, but more importantly, displace the
United States as the preeminent power in the region. In fact, it now seems America, along with its allies and partners, are
slowly moving towards a much more intense security competition with China in the months and years to come, the
consequences of which cannot be simply swept asideespecially considering Washington and Beijing both have nuclear
pilot of the J-8 was killed while the U.S. aircraft was forced to undertake an emergency landing in China on Hainan Island.
A tense standoff ensued. Thankfully the U.S. crew was released weeks later. When one considers carefully incidents like
the above combined with Beijings clear attempts to alter the status quo, it is vital that Washington respond accordingly to
not only reinforce Americas commitment to the region but demonstrate clear American leadership.
factors fueling Chinese doubts about U.S. motives in the region and Chinese worries about a war over Taiwan make
control of the Northeast Asian SLOCs far more important. These worries contribute to military competition and strained
political relations, thereby increasing the probability of conflict over the longer term. Second, a grand bargain would deal
fully with this counterargument by requiring resolution of these other disputes.
He opposes democracy
promotion, multilateralism, security guarantees, and, implicitly,
keeping the global commons open for use by all nations.
United States does much, much less in the world than it does now.
Internal links
If
the US continues to welcome China's booming investment, it could receive
between $100 billion to $200 billion from China by 2020, which would add
between 200,000 and 400,000 full-time jobs in the US. China is the largest trading partner
of a growing number of countries, from Asia to Africa and from Latin America to the Middle East. A trade regime
without China's participation is unlikely to succeed. China-led new initiatives
such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) complement the work
of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. "Pivot" and "new type of
great power relations" are attempts by the United States and China,
respectively, to handle the complicated relationship, but they are poorly
defined and largely misunderstood by the other side. Americans generally
believe that China has become more assertive in foreign policy and intends to
replace the US in global affairs. Many Chinese genuinely think the United
States is trying to block China's rise. Lack of trust has been identified as the
outstanding problem between the two countries. But how to build trust?
Going forward, the two countries must first readjust their mentality. For China,
the priority remains at home. Chinese leaders must resist the temptation to
flex muscles abroad. It is not time to abandon Deng Xiaoping's dictum of lying low and focusing on growth.
The United States, on the other hand, must be realistic and remove
ideological lenses to overcome the "China fear". It must also rein in its
smaller allies in Asia so as to avoid conflicts that will drag the US and China
into direct confrontation.China and the United States are joined at the hip. There is no bad blood between
establishments and acquisitions in the US. Chinese-affiliated companies directly employ more than 80,000 Americans.
them. They cannot afford to allow hardliners or protectionists to interfere with the generally cooperative relationship.
Mutual
accommodation and appreciation will enhance personal relations as
well as relations between nations.
Disagreement on certain issues and occasional quarrels are part of the normal life in a relationship.