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Table of Contents
1. Introduction
1. Sources and Themes
2. Terms and Concepts
2. Naturalistic Presuppositions about the Body
3. Embodied Personhood
4. The Structure of Embodied Experience
1. The Body as a Center of Orientation
2. Distinctive Bodily Sensations
3. Movement and the I Can
5. Kinaesthetic Consciousness
1. Systems of Kinaesthetic Capabilities
2. Kinaesthetic Capabilities and Perceptual Appearances
3. Kinaesthetic Experience and the Experience of Others
4. Further Philosophical Issues
6. Conclusion
7. References and Further Reading
1. Primary Sources
2. Secondary Sources
1. Introduction
a. Sources and Themes
Edmund Husserl (18591938), the founder of phenomenology, addressed the body
throughout his philosophical life, with much of the relevant material to be found in lecture
courses, research manuscripts, and book-length texts not published during his lifetime. One
of the most important textsthe second volume of his Ideas Pertaining to a Pure
Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, subtitled Studies in the
Phenomenology of Constitution and usually referred to as Ideas 2was particularly
influential. Heidegger, for example, had access to it in manuscript before writing his own
major work, Being and Time (1927), and Merleau-Ponty consulted it while working on
his Phenomenology of Perception (1945); indeed, Ideas 2 first became generally known on
the basis of Merleau-Pontys references to it in Phenomenology of Perception. It has long
been known that the text posthumously published in 1952 as Ideas 2 had been shaped by not
one, but two editors, Edith Stein and Ludwig Landgrebe (each of whom worked on the text
while serving as Husserls assistant). But more recent scholarship by Sawicki (1997) suggests
that Edith Stein (18911942) should be seen as the guiding architect of the work, which she
attempted to recast in terms of her own philosophical commitments so as to correct what
she saw as problems and shortcomings in Husserls original 1912 draft. This may be why the
text as we currently have it is marked by certain gaps and tensions. In fact, no faithful
account of this seminal work will be possible until a new edition is published, fully
disentangling Husserls own train of thought from Steins argument. The present article is
therefore based on texts from all periods, and the copious amount of relevant material has
been organized in terms of four main tasks of a Husserlian phenomenology of embodiment:
bringing naturalistic presuppositions about the body to light; setting aside the naturalized
body in favor of embodied personhood; offering phenomenological descriptions of the
structure of embodied experience; and demonstrating that transcendental (inter)subjectivity
itself must be thought as kinaesthetic consciousness. Before turning to these themes,
however, let us pause for a brief overview of some of the key Husserlian terms and concepts
used in this article.
Husserls technical term constitution takes on many nuances as his work develops. But all
constitutive phenomenology is concerned with the correlation between experiencing and
that which is experiencedfor example, between perceiving and the perceived,
remembering and the remembered, and so on. This universal a priori of correlation
(Husserliana 6, 46) encompasses not only conscious performances actively carried out by
the I (for instance, a judging whose correlate is the corresponding judgment), but also deeper
strata of subjective experience that often remain unnoticed in everyday life. They can,
however, be brought to light by reflecting on the structure of the type of experience
concerned. For example, that only one side of the perceptual object actually appears to me at
any given moment has its subjective correlate in the situatedness of embodied experience, so
that any spatial thing is always seen from a particular standpoint; at the same time, that I am
currently seeing this side of the object has its subjective correlate in my capability for
movement, since I am able in principle to move in such a way as to bring other sides into
view. In short, Husserl does not presuppose a subject-object split, but operates with a subjectobject correlationa correlation he works out in detail for almost every sphere and stratum
of experience.
Moreover, as the examples indicate, a Husserlian approach to consciousness or subjectivity is
not restricted to the realm of the mental as traditionally understood; instead, the
phenomenological notion of embodied experience offers an alternative to mind-body dualism.
And Husserls investigations ultimately embrace not only the achievements and correlates of
constituting subjectivity, but also those of intersubjectivity, that is, of the we rather than
solely the I.
Finally, a general feature of Husserls terminology must also be mentioned: he frequently
takes over words used differently in other contexts and expects the reader to understand these
words not in terms of linguistic definitions set forth in advance, but in light of their referents
the experiential features or nuances that he is describing. Thus the Husserlian tradition is
not merely a tradition of texts to comment upon or argue against, but a permanent possibility
of checking descriptive claims against the touchstone of the appropriate experiential evidence
so as to confirm or correct such claims. Bearing this in mind, let us now return to the four
main moves accomplished by a Husserlian phenomenology of embodiment: criticizing
naturalistic presuppositions about the body; thematizing embodied personhood; describing
the structure of embodied experience; and investigating kinaesthetic consciousness.
Rather than automatically accepting these assumptions, Husserl brings them to light; traces
their historical development; establishes the limits of their legitimacy; and offers an
alternative account of consciousness or subjectivity, an account that relies on rigorous
philosophical methods and on a radical turn to the evidence of lived experience, rather than
on the assumptions and methods of natural-scientific cognition.
But in the course of carrying out these larger tasks, Husserl highlights a major presupposition
concerning embodiment. The received tradition, with its tendency to think in terms of the
psychophysical (even when one is not actively carrying out psychophysical investigations
or making specifically psychophysical claims), not only attempts to tie the mind to a
material body, but is already operating under a more basic assumptionnamely, that this
body can itself be taken as a physical body (Krper) like any other spatial thing, albeit a thing
with certain distinctive sorts of characteristics. For even if organisms are the province of
special natural sciences (for example, anatomy and physiology) having to do with living
rather than non-living things, it is still taken for granted that like inanimate objects, the
animate ones too belong to the realm of real, spatially extended entities to be explained in
terms of causal laws. Yet such a presupposition completely ignores what is essential to the
body as a lived body (Leib)as my body, someones body, experienced in a unique way by
the embodied experiencer concerned. In other words, what is missing in naturalism is the
body of embodiment, which must not be taken physically, but as directly experienced from
within.
Here Husserl is not challenging the right of scientific practice to approach living bodies in
causal terms; in Ideas 3 (originally written in 1912, but not published until 1952), he even
proposes a new sciencesomatologythat would incorporate both physiological
investigation of the material properties of the body as a living organism and experiential
investigation of firsthand, first-person somatic perception (for example, of sensing tactile
contact). But he does indeed insist on clarifying the presuppositions governing naturalscientific cognition, recognizing them for what they are and acknowledging their limits, so
that, as he puts it in 1936 in 9h of The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental
Phenomenology, we do not take for true being what is actually a method. Thus the
historical fact that living bodies can be, and have been, approached with natural-scientific
methods does not automatically allow us to relegate the body of embodiment to the res
extensa side of Cartesian dualism. Instead, appropriate modes of inquiry must be developed
to do justice to the body of direct experience.
Accordingly, Husserl not only provides a critique of the presupposition of the
psychophysical (and of the lived body as a physical body), but opens up several further
ways in which a phenomenology of embodiment can be pursued. In Ideas 1 (first published in
1913), he sets the body aside in order to reach the realm of pure consciousness.
Commentators sometimes mistake this strategic move for Husserls position, and accuse
him of postulating a disembodied, desituated consciousness. But the body that is set out of
play here is merely the body that is assumed to be the physical half of the inherited
dualism. Moreover, this is only the first step in the critique: Husserl is effectively suspending
the tacit hegemony of the prevailing presupposition whereby it is automatically accepted, as a
matter of course, that the body is a physical reality that is a part of natureand setting this
assumption out of play frees us to address the body and embodiment phenomenologically
rather than naturalistically. After suspending the unquestioned validity of naturalistic
presuppositions concerning the body, then, the next step is to retrieve the body of experience,
and Husserl employs various pivotal distinctions in order to open up the experience of
embodiment for phenomenological investigation.
3. Embodied Personhood
Summary: Husserl shows that embodied experience is geared into the world as a communal
nexus of meaningful situations, expressive gestures, and practical activities.
One key distinction emphasized in Ideas 2 contrasts the naturalistic attitude, as the
theoretical attitude within which natural science is practiced, with the personalistic attitude
that characterizes personal and social experience in the world of everyday lifethe
lifeworld (Lebenswelt), the cultural world that is the province of the cultural or human
sciences. Within the personalistic attitude, our intersubjective encounters are always
experienced as embodied encounters, and our ongoing practical life is already an embodied
one. Thus, for example, we greet one another with culturally specific gestures such as shaking
hands; we communicate with others, responding to their facial expressions, gestures, and
tones of voice; we use tools in practical, goal-directed actions; we rely on bodily capabilities
and develop new skills that improve with practice or grow rusty with disuse; and so on. In
other words, what we come upon are others embodying themselves in particular ways
(serenely or impatiently, adroitly or clumsily, buoyantly or dragged down by pain or fatigue,
and so forth): we immediately see embodied persons, not material objects animated by
immaterial minds, and the immediacy of this carnal intersubjectivity is the foundation of
community and sociality (with culturally specific normal embodiment playing a privileged
role as the measure from which the anomalous and the abnormal diverge). Similarly, we
make immediate use of the bodily possibilities at our disposal, which serve as the means
whereby we carry out our everyday activities, without having to appeal to psychophysical
explanations: I simply reach for my cup, pick it up, and drink from it, without ever giving a
thought to the neurophysiological processes that allow me to keep my balance as I reach,
move the cup without spilling the liquid, and swallow without choking. And even if my
abilities are compromised by illness or injury, the lived experience of I can no longer do it
is qualitatively different from the physicians causal explanations for my condition.
For the most part, Husserl himself provides passing examples, rather than extended analyses,
of embodied experience in the personalistic attitude. Yet if we recall that his aim is not to
carry out concrete cultural-scientific investigations but to clarify the philosophical bases of
the cultural or human sciences, we can see that his critique of naturalistic presuppositions
about the body both secures a theoretical foundation for work in such areas as nonverbal
communication (as well as other sorts of studies of embodiment carried out within
phenomenological psychology, phenomenological sociology, and so on), and anticipates more
recent concerns with socially shaped patterns of embodiment (including, for example, issues
of gendered embodiment, as contrasted with the biological sex of an individualalthough
even the medical assignment of sex at birth may display, in certain problematic cases,
social/cultural assumptions and priorities).
Husserls discussions of the personalistic attitude in Ideas 2 are echoed in his extensive
discussions of the lifeworld in the Crisis, and several further points concerning embodiment
can be made in this connection. First of all, for Husserl, the prescientific world of
experience is more basic than the objective world constituted as a correlate to scientific
practice in the naturalistic attitude; for example, natural-scientific investigation of the body as
an object presupposes a functioning bodily subjectivity on the part of each of the scientists
concerned, for whom their own lived bodies tacitly serve as organs of perception,
communication, and action, even while they are engaged in carrying out detailed research
into, say, the neurophysiology of motor behavior. At the same time, however, scientific
assumptions and constructs flow back into everyday lifeworldly language and experience,
so that, for instance, I may refer to my own body in anatomical terms as a matter of course, or
offer causal explanations (rather than experiential descriptions) of my own bodily condition,
even in a casual conversation with a friend. Thus although there is a functional priority of the
personalistic over the naturalistic attitude, the former is ongoingly shaped and reshaped by
the historical acquisitions of the latteras well as by its unnoticed philosophical
presuppositions and its habitual abstractions. Moreover, despite their important differences,
both the naturalistic attitude and the personalistic attitude fall within a more general attitude
that Husserl terms the natural attitude. In the natural attitude, not only are we typically
straightforwardly directed toward objects rather than reflecting on the structures of our own
subjective experience, but entities such as bodies (whether these are taken as
psychophysical realities or embodied persons) are given as ready-made realities within a
pregiven world; even the experiencer for whom such entities are given is him/herself taken as
one entity among others in the world. And the natural attitude is both all-pervasive and
anonymousit is so taken for granted that we are not even cognizant of it as an attitude at
all. But when we do become aware of it, still further insights into embodied experience
become possible.
as the organ and as the object of touchboth as the means whereby the activity of touching is
carried out, and as the phenomenon I experience through this activity (for example, the
contours and textures I can feel on the surface of my touched hand)but also that the same
touched hand that is the object explored by the touching hand is itself alive to this contact,
feeling it subjectively, so that I am living in this hand too as mine. In this connection the
term lived body may connote a certain undergoing, emphasizing affectivity (being
affected) rather than activity (although both are important for Husserl, who routinely
mentions them together in his later research manuscripts).
5. Kinaesthetic Consciousness
Summary: Husserl describes the articulation of kinaesthetic capabilities into coordinated
systems of specific movement possibilities; outlines the if-then structure through which
actualizing certain kinaesthetic possibilities brings coherent fields of appearances to
givenness; suggests how a different if-then structureone linking the deployment of my
own kinaesthetic capability with the bodily feel of the movement concernedis implicated in
coming to experience other moving bodies as other sentient beings like me; and addresses
the tension between embodiment as an ongoing dynamic, subjective process and the
body as one object among others in the world.
Husserl devotes considerable attention to the theme of motility, and sketching out some of
this work in more detail will allow us to see how his descriptive phenomenological work on
embodiment fits into the larger philosophical context of his constitutive phenomenology
(recalling that here constitution ultimately refers to the correlations between that which is
experienced and the relevant performances and achievements of consciousness or
subjectivity). Here a distinction given terminological form by one of Husserls assistants,
Ludwig Landgrebe (19021991), is particularly helpful: that between the body-as-constituted
and the body-as-constituting. The body-as-constituted is the body as experienced, that is, it is
that which is experienced in the experience; the body-as-constituting is the experiencing
body by means of which something is experienced. And for Husserl, this embodied,
experiencing subjectivity (the body-as-constituting) is above all a kinaesthetic consciousness
(Claesges 1964)not as a consciousness of movement, but as a consciousness or
subjectivity capable of movement.
Such descriptions retrieve kinaesthetic functioning from its anonymity, but remain abstract as
long as its constitutive role is not specified more precisely. For example, enacting certain
kinaesthetic possibilities brings certain correlative perceptual appearances to givenness in a
concordant, regulated, non-arbitrary manner. From here I can see this side of the house,
but this side already promises more, a situation for which Husserl uses the technical terms
inner horizon and outer horizon. The current appearance of this side points to an inner
horizon of possible future perceptions in which this very same side would itself be more fully
givenfor instance, if I were to move closer, then it could be touched as well as seen, or
what is currently seen indistinctly could be seen in more detail, and so on. But this side of
the building also points to an outer horizon of possible future perceptions of other sides, as
well as further features of the surroundings, including currently unseen sides of other objects
in the background, and so on.
Here what is important is not merely that Husserls account of perception emphasizes a
correlation between, on the one hand, an embodied perceiver functioning as a center of
orientation and, on the other hand, the perspectivity that is the invariable mode of givenness
of perceived things in space; rather, what is at stake is a coherent, explorable, transcendent,
open world. In other words, it is not merely that I see things from my own standpoint: it is
that my own motility is the subjective correlate both of the worlds open explorabilityits
transcendence beyond the aspect of it given at any momentand of its concordant
coherence, since if I enact the appropriate kinaesthetic sequences, then what is currently
emptily predelineated can be fulfilled in itself-givenness of the anticipated side or feature
concerned (or can be disappointed and corrected instead). For example, I see a corner of
the house; inseparable from the experience of this as a corner is that there is more to the
house to be seen around the corner (even if this more is as yet indeterminate), and if I
move there, then I will see precisely this more, determine its features in more detail, and
so forth (or perhaps discover that all that is left of the building is a facade). However, the ifthen relation that is at stake here is not a causal one, since the correlations in question
pertain to the ordered structure of experience purely as experienced, not to real relations
between physical entities considered in the naturalistic attitude (an attitude that we are, of
course, free to take up if we wish).
Within the phenomenological attitude, in other words, the point is not to establish causal
relations between turning my head to the left and seeing a birdbath; instead, the horizon
of freedom pertaining to kinaesthetic consciousness opens ordered fields of display that can
be seamlessly expanded as I move, so that turning my head to the left allows the
corresponding further stretch of the visible world to come into view, whatever there may in
fact be for me to see in any given situation or on any given occasion. And the same
fundamental correlation between kinaesthetic capabilities and coherent fields of spatial
display holds good for movement in any direction, as well as for the intersensorial world.
Thus the description identifies an essential structure of experience per se, rather than offering
a causal explanation of a particular empirical/factual event. Moreover, it turns out that
Husserls analyses are not confined to the kinaesthetic circumstances swung into play in
experiencing individual transcendent things in space, but demonstrate that kinaesthetic
consciousness is itself space-constituting. (Early extensive analyses are found in the 1907
lectures published in Thing and Space, but Husserl refined his account throughout his life.)
This, then, is another example of a Husserlian critique of presuppositions: he does not naively
assume space as a pregiven framework for embodied perception and action (for example,
as some kind of ready-made container), but devotes many pages to the experiential
evidence that is at stake in the givenness of various types or levels of space, including not
only the most immediate, preobjective space, but the infinite and homogeneous space of
the natural sciences.
(see Husserliana 11), matters he thematizes under the title of transcendental aesthetics
(although he takes this term in a different sense than Kants). However, a further step must at
least be touched on, one that draws upon yet another important distinctionthat between the
transcendental and the mundane. Husserls analyses of kinaesthetic consciousness assume a
transcendental attitude, yet in the natural attitude, the body isas we have seen
obviously a mundane reality, a part of the world. Although his earlier efforts were geared
toward clarifying the philosophical foundations of the sciences that study such a reality, some
of his later writings (see, for example, Husserliana 15, 282328, 64857) are framed as an
inquiry into the experiential achievements whereby transcendental consciousness
mundanizes itself in the first place (that is, takes itself as part of the world), even prior to
naturalizing itself in psychophysical terms. Without going into detail about his approach to
the problem (which is also known as the paradox of subjectivityhow can the very
consciousness that constitutes the world simultaneously be a part of this world?), it should be
emphasized that for Husserl, what is at stake is ultimately not at all how a disembodied
consciousness could somehow acquire a body. Instead, after demonstrating that
kinaesthetic capability is an essential structural moment of transcendental subjectivity itself,
he asks how kinaesthetic consciousness as an ongoing flow of purely experiential
potentialities (the possibilities of primal motility per se), and of ever-changing actualizations
of these possibilities, can come to count as a mundane entity apprehended as one thing
among others in the world (and here Husserls descriptions of the lived experience of
resistance offer important clues). In any case, however, the Husserlian critique of
presuppositions concerning the body leads to something like the possibility of transcendental
corporealitya notion that places many aspects of the Western philosophical tradition itself
into question.
6. Conclusion
Recognizing the tension between the transcendental experience of embodiment as
kinaesthetic consciousness (or indeed, of consciousness or subjectivity as kinaesthetic)
on the one hand and the mundane experience of the body as a material, psychophysical reality
on the other can now allow us to summarize two of Husserls most important contributions to
a phenomenology of embodiment (above and beyond his pioneering descriptions of essential
features of bodily subjectivity). First, taken transcendentally, embodiment is not something
accomplished once and for all, but isto borrow a telling phrase from Zaners The Problem
of Embodiment (1964)a continuously on-going act: at every moment (even during
periods of relative quiescence), I am involved in a dynamic process of embodying that is
carried out through the current actualization of my own kinaesthetic capabilities, with certain
possibilities rather than others being actualized in this or that way. This is the case whether
the particular kinaestheses swung into play at any given moment arise from instinctual
strivings, involuntary adjustments, acquired habits, or volitionally directed free movement,
and whether these patterns of kinaesthetic actualization are going completely unnoticed; are
marginally present for me; are experientially prominent due to difficulty or discomfort; or are
consciously appreciated in lucid awareness from within (note that these two sets of
possibilitiesone having to do with volition, the other with awarenesscan intersect in a
number of ways). Second, that I can apprehend myself as a psychophysical unity is not
simply something to be naively accepted, but something to be clarified as a historical
achievement whereby embodied experience is localized in a mundane object, the body, as
one item among others in a world of material, natural realities. Thus within the natural
attitude, embodiment winds up signifying the external expression of the inwardness always
already essentially pertaining to bodies insofar as they are lived bodies (as opposed to mere
physical things). And indeed, experiential evidence for the latter sense of embodiment is
readily available in everyday life in our timeswe immediately encounter one another as
embodied persons, not as machines that we suspect or conclude must harbor minds. However,
experiencing myself as an ongoing realization of my own kinaesthetic capabilities taken not
psychophysically, but sheerly experientially (which deactivates, rather than presupposing,
mind-body dualism) requires shifting from the mundane to the transcendental attitude (in
Husserls sense of the term transcendental), although once this insight has been historically
achieved, it too, like the achievements of naturalism, can flow back into everyday
experience.
In the end, then, whether he is providing a phenomenological genealogy of the
psychophysical or offering an alternative account of embodiment in terms of kinaesthetic
consciousness, Husserl provides a powerful critique of Cartesian dualism. Nevertheless, his
own interests are basically epistemological in character: the accent lies not on claims about
what the body really is, but on the epistemic contribution of embodiment itself to our
knowledge of the world in the first place (as well as on the legitimacy of the foundations of
our knowledge of such matters). And as in all of his phenomenological work, Husserl does
not merely hold a position and offer arguments to support it, but consistently and rigorously
takes the ultimate court of appeal to be the experiential evidence pertaining to the phenomena
themselvesevidence that continually outruns our inherited terms and concepts and requires
us to place them in question.
Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966; Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis:
Lectures on Transcendental Logic. Trans. Anthony J. Steinbock. Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 2001, 3 (4753); Perception and its Process of Self-Giving,
2 (58188); Appendix 25 (53436).
Husserl, Edmund. Die Lebenswelt. Auslegungen der vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer
Konstitution. Texte aus dem Nachlass (19161937). Ed. Rochus Sowa. Husserliana
39. Dordrecht: Springer, 2008, especially Part IX (603672).
b. Secondary Sources
Bernet, Rudolf, Iso Kern, and Eduard Marbach. Edmund Husserl. Darstellung seines
Denkens [1989]. 2nd rev. ed. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1996; An Introduction to
Husserlian Phenomenology. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1993,
Dodd, James. Idealism and Corporeity: An Essay on the Problem of the Body in
Husserls Phenomenology. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997.
Sawicki, Marianne. Body, Text, and Science: The Literacy of Investigative Practices
and the Phenomenology of Edith Stein. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1997, Chapter 2, D (Nature and Intellect in Ideen II, 7389); Chapter 4, B, 1
(Steins work for Husserl, 15365).
Author Information
Elizabeth A. Behnke
Email: sppb@openaccess.org
U. S. A.
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