Atta, Via, Citta, and Nibbna

(Brahmli Bhikkhu, Bodhinyana Buddhist Monastery, Perth, 2001, revised 2007)

Introduction
Suppose a monk were to say: ... this is the Dhamma, this is the discipline (vinaya), this is the Masters
teaching, then, monks, you should neither approve nor disapprove his words. Then, without approving or
disapproving, his words and expressions should be carefully noted and compared with the Suttas and
reviewed in light of the discipline. If they, on such comparison and review, are found not to conform to the
Suttas or the discipline, the conclusion must be: Assuredly this is not the word of the Buddha, it has been
wrongly understood by this monk, and the matter is to be rejected. But where on such comparison and
review they are found to conform to the Suttas or the discipline, the conclusion must be: Assuredly this is
the word of the Buddha, it has been rightly understood by this monk. 1 (1)2
Thus, when anyone claims to speak Dhamma, their statements should be compared with the suttas and vinaya. This
becomes particularly important with reference to the deeper aspects of the Dhamma, the understanding of which is
hampered by distorted perceptions and thoughts (vipallsa) and which only the ariyas3 see clearly.4
Probably the most profound of these aspects is Nibbna. Over the years, and in particular in recent times, the concept
of Nibbna has given rise to a large number of interpretations, some based on meditative experience and others on
scriptural study and logical deduction. Not surprisingly, many of these interpretations are mutually contradictory.
In the following paper I propose to quote from the sutta and vinaya piakas5 in order to shed some light on the validity
of a number of these interpretations. To this end I will inquire into the connection between atta, via, and citta on
the one hand and Nibbna on the other. In conformity with the four great standards quoted above, I shall try to let
the word of the Buddha speak for itself.6
1

D II 124,3-18 :
Idha bhikkhave bhikkhu eva vadeyya: ... aya Dhammo aya Vinayo ida Satthu ssanan ti, tassa bhikkhave bhikkhuno bhsita neva
abhinanditabba na paikkositabba. Anabhinanditv appaikositv tni pada-vyajanni sdhuka uggahetv Sutte otretabbni Vinaye
sandassetabbni. Tni ce Sutte otriyamnni Vinaye sandassiyamnni na ceva Sutte otaranti na Vinaye sandissanti, niham ettha gantabba:
Addh ida na ceva tassa Bhagavato vacana, imassa ca bhikkhuno duggahtan ti, iti heta bhikkhave chaeyytha. Tni ce Sutte
otriyamnni Vinaye sandassiyamnni Sutte ceva otaranti Vinaye ca sandissanti, niham ettha gantabba: Addh ida tassa Bhagavato
vacana, imassa ca bhikkhuno suggahtan ti.
This is an abbreviated version of the well-known four great standards, cattro mahpades.
2

The number in parentheses found after each quote have been added for ease of reference.

In the suttas the designation ariya refers to people who have penetrated and understood the Dhamma, i.e. the four noble truths. The ariyas are
usually enumerated as eightfold: sotpannas, sakadgms, angms, Arahants, and those on the path for the realisation of each of these four
attainments. The least of the ariyas are the dhammnusr and saddhnusr, cf. S III 225. A non-ariya, someone who has not penetrated the Dhamma
with full insight, is called a puthujjana (many-folk) in the suttas.
4

This might appear to open up an alternative avenue for ascertaining what is and what is not the true Dhamma: getting the answer from an ariya.
In practice, however, one is never going to be able to establish beyond doubt whether any particular person is an ariya. For the settlement of
controversial issues, one will therefore have no choice but to turn to the word of the Buddha.
5

Apart from a few instances, I will unfortunately have to confine myself to Pali sources.

It might be useful at the outset of this paper to briefly summarise the use of Nibbna in the suttas. Whenever Nibbna is defined it is always in
the same way:
The destruction of lust, the destruction of hatred, the destruction of delusion: this, friend, is called Nibbna.
CDB, p.1294,9 or S IV 251,19-20; A3:55/A I 158f; etc.
Nibbna in this sense refers to the state of being an Arahant.
Sometimes Nibbna is used to describe the state of final Nibbna after the death of an Arahant:
Then the Ven. Sriputta addressed the monks: Friends, this Nibbna is happiness, this Nibbna is happiness. When this had been
said, the Ven. Udyin said to Ven. Sriputta: What, friend Sriputta, is the happiness in this case, when nothing is felt? Just that,
friend, is the happiness in this case, (the fact) that nothing is felt. A IV 414,25 (my translation)
It is this aspect of Nibbna that will be the main focus of this paper.
Occasionally Nibbna, or more accurately a perception based on an ariyas direct knowledge of Nibbna, is said to be the object of a particular type
of samdhi that appears to be attainable only by Arahants:
The cessation of existence is Nibbna; the cessation of existence is Nibbna, just one perception arises, and just one perception
ceases, the cessation of existence is Nibbna; and yet, on that occasion I was percipient. A V 9,28 (spoken by Ven. Sriputta; my
translation)

Atta - Self
It is not uncommon to come across attempts to justify the existence of an atta (a permanent self) using the Buddhas
teachings and the claim that the end of the Buddhist path is the freeing of this atta from suffering.7 But the evidence
quoted to support such claims is often weak, and it frequently relies on sutta quotes whose interpretation is difficult.
So let us go through some of the Buddhas more straightforward statements concerning atta:
Whether there is an arising of Tathgatas or no arising of Tathgatas, that element still persists, the
stableness of the Dhamma, the fixed course of the Dhamma, that all formations (sakhr) are
impermanent ... that all formations are suffering ... that all things (dhamm) are non-self.8 (2)
I would suggest that the Buddha uses things (dhamm) in the last phrase to counter any misunderstanding that
there might be an atta outside of conditioned phenomena (sakhr). In this context consider the following:
Monks, as far as there are things (dhamm) conditioned (sakhat) or unconditioned (asakhat),
dispassion (virga) is reckoned best of those things, that is to say ... Nibbna.9 (3)
(my translation)
Dhamma is thus a wider term than sakhata/sakhra, and it includes Nibbna.10
Bhikkhus, you may well cling to that doctrine of self that would not arouse sorrow, lamentation, pain,
grief, and despair in one who clings to it. But do you see any such doctrine of self? - No, venerable sir. Good, bhikkhus. I too do not see any doctrine of self that would not arouse sorrow, lamentation, pain,
grief, and despair in one who clings to it.11 (4)
Sometimes it is argued that it is clinging (updna) in itself that gives rise to suffering. However, the reason why
clinging to anything causes suffering is because the object of clinging sooner or later changes. If there were such a
thing as a permanent self, clinging to it would not give rise to suffering, and the Buddha would not have seen any
problem with such clinging. But the fact is that the Buddha did not recommend any sort of clinging:
When, Ngita, one dwells contemplating the rise and fall in regard to the five aggregates affected by
clinging, repulsiveness in respect of clinging is established.12 (5) (my translation)
Bhikkhus, since a self and what belongs to a self are not apprehended as true and established, then this
standpoint for views, namely, This is self, this the world; after death I shall be permanent, everlasting,

See Harvey, pp.17-19, for a short survey of such attempts. Other than Peter Harveys references there has also been the suggestion that the
anatta doctrine is a strategy of spiritual development that is not meant as a metaphysical position on the existence of an atta; see hnissaro
Bhikkhu.
8

A3:134/A I 286 :
Uppd v bhikkhave Tathgatna anuppd v Tathgatna hitva s dhtu dhammahitat dhammaniymat sabbe sakhr anicc ...
sabbe sakhr dukkh ... sabbe dhamm anatt.
The translation is in part taken from Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhis translation of a similar passage at S II 25.
9

A II 34,22 :
Yvat bhikkhave dhamm sakhat v asakhat v virgo tesa dhammna agga akkhyati yadida ... nibbna.

10

See also Norman (1991), p207,1.

11

M I 137,24 :
Ta bhikkhave attavdupdna updiyetha ya-sa attavdupdna updiyato na uppajjeyyu sokaparidevadukkha-domanassupys.
Passatha no tumhe bhikkhave ta attavdupdna ya-sa attavdupdna updiyato na uppajjeyyu sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupys ti. - No hetam bhante. - Sdhu bhikkhave, aham-pi kho ta bhikkhave attavdupdna na
samanupassmi ya-sa attavdupdna updiyato na uppajjeyyu sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupys.

12

A III 32,9 :
Pacasu kho Ngita updnakkhandesu udayabbaynupassino viharato updne pikklyat sahti.

eternal, not subject to change; I shall endure as long as eternity - would it not be an utterly and completely
foolish teaching?13 (6)
Then the Blessed One took up a little lump of cow-dung in his hand and said to that bhikkhu: Bhikkhu,
there is not even this much individual existence that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change,
and that will remain the same just like eternity itself. If there was this much individual existence that was
permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, this living of the holy life for the complete cessation of
suffering could not be discerned. 14 (7)
It is, Ananda, because it is empty of self and of what belongs to self that it is said, Empty is the world.15 (8)
Friends, I do not speak of form as I am, nor do I speak of I am apart from form. I do not speak of feeling
as I am, nor do I speak of I am apart from feeling. I do not speak of perception as I am, nor do I speak of
I am apart from perception. I do not speak of volitional formations as I am, nor do I speak of I am apart
from volitional formations. I do not speak of consciousness as I am, nor do I speak of I am apart from
consciousness.16 (9)
Ie, there is no atta in or outside of the five khandhas.
What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard form as the Tathgata? - No, friend. - Do you regard
feeling ... perception ... volitional formations ... consciousness as the Tathgata? - No, friend.
What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard the Tathgata as in form? - No, friend. - Do you
regard the Tathgata as apart from form? - No, friend. - Do you regard the Tathgata as in feeling? As
apart from feeling? As in perception? As apart from perception? As in volitional formations? As apart from
volitional formations? As in consciousness? As apart from consciousness? - No, friend.
What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard form, feeling, perception, volitional formations, and
consciousness [taken together] as the Tathgata? - No, friend.
What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard the Tathgata as one who is without form, without
feeling, without perception, without volitional formations, without consciousness? - No, friend.
But, friend, when the Tathgata is not apprehended by you as real and actual here in this very life, is it
fitting for you to declare: As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu whose taints
are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the breakup of the body and does not exist after
death?17 (10)
13

M I 138,5 :
Attani ca bhikkhave attaniye ca saccato thetato anupalabbhamne yam-pida dihihna: so loko so att, so pecca bhavissmi nicco dhuvo
sassato aviparimadhammo, sassatisama tatheva hassm ti, nanya bhikkhave kevalo paripro bladhammo ti.

14

S III 144,10 :
Atha kho Bhagav paritta gomayapia pin gahetv tam bhikkhum etad avoca: Ettako pi kho bhikkhu attabhvapailbho natthi nicco
dhuvo sassato aviparimadhammo sassatisama tatheva hassati. Ettako ce pi bhikkhu attabhvapailbho abhavissa nicco dhuvo sassato
aviparimadhammo, na yidam brahmacariyavso payetha sammdukkhakkhayya. Yasm ca kho bhikkhu ettako pi attabhvapailbho
natthi nicco dhuvo sassati aviparimadhammo, tasm brahmacariyavso payati sammdukkhakkhayya.
15
Note that the denial here of individual existence does not imply the existence of a universal self or any other non-individual permanent entity.
S IV 54,15 :
Yasm ca kho nanda suam attena v attaniyena v, tasm suo loko ti vuccat ti
16

17

S III 130,22 :
Evam eva khvham vuso na rpam asm ti vadmi, na pi aatra rp asm ti vadmi, na vedanam asm ti vadmi, na pi aatra vedanya
asm ti vadmi, na saam asm ti vadmi, na pi aatra saya asm ti vadmi, na sakhre asm ti vadmi, na pi aatra sakhrehi asm
ti vadmi, na viam asm ti vadmi, na pi aatra viam asm ti vadmi.
S III 111,14 :
Ta ki maasi, vuso Yamaka,rpa tathgato ti samanupassas ti. - No hetam vuso.- Vedana ... saa ... sakhre ... via
tathgato ti samanupassas ti. - No hetam vuso.
Ta ki maasi vuso Yamaka rpasmi tathgato ti samanupassas ti. - No hetam vuso. - Aatra rp tathgato ti samanupassas
ti. - No hetam vuso. - Vedanya tathgato ti samanupassas ti. - No hetam vuso. - Aatra vedanya tathgato ti samanupassas ti.
- No hetam vuso. - Saya tathgato ti samanupassas ti. - No hetam vuso. - Aatra saya tathgato ti samanupassas ti. - No
hetam vuso. - Sakhresu tathgato ti samanupassas ti. - No hetam vuso. - Aatra sakhrehi tathgato ti samanupassas ti. - No

Again, there is no permanent entity called Tathgata, i.e. no atta, inside or outside of the five khandhas. Also, there is
no Tathgata, or atta, either before or after Parinibbna.18
Bhikkhus, I am is a conceiving (a perturbation/a palpitation/a proliferation/an involvement with
conceit); I am this is a conceiving (etc.); ... Conceiving (perturbation/palpitation/proliferation/
involvement with conceit) is a disease, conceiving (etc.) is a tumour, conceiving (etc.) is a dart. Therefore,
bhikkhus, you should train yourselves thus: We will dwell with a mind devoid of conceiving (etc.). 19 (11)
With the fading away of ignorance and the arising of true knowledge, I am does not occur to him; I am
this does not occur to him; ...20 (12)
If Arahants discovered their true atta, wouldnt it occur to them that I am and I am this?

Via - Consciousness
It is sometimes argued that even if there is no atta, the purpose of the Buddhist training is to attain a permanent
form of consciousness (via). But if there were such a thing as a permanent consciousness devoid of suffering,
that would be precisely the sort of phenomenon that the Buddha would describe as a self: it is the characteristics of
impermanence and suffering that make the description of something as atta impossible.21 If this argument is
accepted, it follows that the idea of a permanent consciousness that is anatta is inherently self-contradictory.
It might also be noted here that the mere absence of the thought or perception I am in certain states of deep
samdhi does not mean that by attaining those states one has penetrated the Buddhas teaching of anatta. When one
emerges from these states the notion I am will reappear, often taking that state of samdhi itself as its object.22 As
long as the underlying tendency and view I am have not been abandoned, the perception I am will always return
in spite of such periods of temporary absence.23
Let us now turn to what the Buddha said about consciousness:
hetam vuso. - Viasmi tathgato ti samanupassas ti. - No hetam vuso. - Aatra vi tathgato ti samanupassas ti. - No
hetam vuso.
Ta ki maasi vuso Yamaka, rp vedan sa sakhr via tathgato ti samanupassas ti. - No hetam vuso.
Ta ki maasi vuso Yamaka, aya so arp avedano asa asakhro avio tathgato ti samanupassas ti. - No hetam vuso.
Ettha ca te vuso Yamaka diheva dhamme saccato thetato tathgato anupalabbhiyamno, kalla nu te ta veyykaraa: Tathha
Bhagavat dhamma desitam jnmi yath khsavo bhikkhu kyassa bhed ucchijjati vinassati na hoti param maran ti?
See also S III 118,14 and S IV 383,10.
Note that what is here translated as not apprehended by you as real and actual is from the same Pali as what is translated as not apprehended
as true and established in quote 6 above.
18

Although Nibbna and Parinibbna seem to be used synonymously in the suttas, I use Parinibbna throughout this paper in the usual sense of
final Nibbna or khandha-Nibbna, i.e. the Nibbna reached by the Arahant at death.
19

S IV 202,20 :
Asm ti bhikkhave maitam (ijitam/phanditam/papacitam/mnagatam) eta; ayam aham asm ti maitam (ijitam, etc.) eta; ...
maitam (etc.) bhikkhave rogo, maitam (etc.) gao, maitam (etc.) salla. Tasm ti ha bhikkhave amaitamnena (etc.) cetas
viharissm ti.

20

S III 47,3 :
Tassa avijjvirg vijjuppd asm ti pissa na hoti, ayam aham asm ti pissa na hoti ...

21

See in particular the Anattalakkhana Sutta at S III 66f (the title here being paca).

22

Deep states of samdhi will be particularly attractive to grasp as a self because of their qualities of peace, stability, contentment, bliss, etc. If one
has not heard or properly understood the Buddhas teachings, it seems there will be an almost irresistible pull towards seeing these states as ones
true atta.
23

Cf. M I 47,23 :
Asm ti dihimnnusaya. The underlying tendency to the view and conceit I am .

Is consciousness permanent or impermanent? - Impermanent, venerable sir. - Is what is impermanent

suffering or happiness? - Suffering, venerable sir. - Is what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to
change fit to be regarded thus: This is mine, this I am, this is my self? - No, venerable sir.24 (13)
For in many discourses I have stated consciousness to be dependently arisen, since without a condition
there is no origination of consciousness.25 (14)
And what are the conditions for the arising of the various types of consciousness?
Bhikkhus, consciousness is reckoned by the particular condition dependent upon which it arises. When
consciousness arises dependent on eye and forms, it is reckoned as eye-consciousness; when consciousness
arises dependent on ear and sounds, it is reckoned as ear-consciousness; when consciousness arises
dependent on nose and odours, it is reckoned as nose-consciousness; when consciousness arises dependent
on tongue and flavours, it is reckoned as tongue-consciousness; when consciousness arises dependent on
body and tangibles, it is reckoned as body-consciousness; when consciousness arises dependent on mind
and mind-objects, it is reckoned as mind-consciousness.26 (15)
In fact, by definition, consciousness exists only together with its object of cognition:
It cognises, it cognises, friend; that is why consciousness is said. What does it cognise? It cognises: [This
is] pleasant; it cognises: [This is] painful; it cognises: [This is] neither-painful-nor-pleasant. It cognises, it
cognises, friend; that is why consciousness is said.27 (16)
Objectless consciousness does not exist:
Feeling, perception and consciousness, friend - these states are conjoined, not disjoined, and it is
impossible to separate each of these states from the others in order to describe the difference between
them. For what one feels, that one perceives; and what one perceives, that one cognises.28 (17)
Bhikkhus, though someone might say: Apart from form, apart from feeling, apart from perception, apart
from volitional formations, I will make known the coming and going of consciousness, its passing away and
rebirth, its growth, increase, and expansion - that is not possible.29 (18)
Of the five aggregates it is most commonly via that is grasped as a self because, although all the other mental
factors change continuously, consciousness or awareness can appear to be an independent, unchanging, and ever24

S III 67,32 :
Via nicca v anicca v ti. - Aniccam bhante. - Yam pannicca dukkha v ta sukha v ti. - Dukkham bhante. - Yam
pannicca dukkha viparimadhamma, kalla nu ta samanupassitu: Eta mama, eso ham asmi, eso me att ti. - No hetam bhante.

25

M I 259,7 :
Anekapariyyena hi vo bhikkhave paiccasamuppanna via vutta may: aatra paccay natthi viassa sambhavo ti.

26

M I 259,13 :
Ya-ad-eva bhikkhave paccaya paicca uppajjati via tena teneva sakha gacchati: cakkhu-ca paicca rpe ca uppajjati via,
cakkhuvian-teva sakha gacchati; sota-ca paicca sadde ca uppajjati via, sotavian-teva sakha gacchati; ghna-ca paicca
gandhe ca uppajjati via, ghnavian-teva sakha gacchati; jivha-ca paicca rase ca uppajjati via, jivhvian-teva
sakha gacchati; kya-ca paicca photthabbe ca uppajjati via, kyavian-teva sakha gacchati; mana-ca paicca dhamme ca
uppajjati via, manovian-teva sakha gacchati.

27

M I 292,25 :
Vijnti, vijnt ti kho vuso, tasm vian-ti vuccati, ki-ca vijnti: sukhan-ti pi vijnti, dukkhan-ti pi vijnti, adukkhamasukhan-ti
pi vijnti. Vijnti, vijnt ti kho vuso, tasm vian-ti vuccat ti.

28

M I 293,22 :
Y cvuso vedan y ca sa ya-ca via, ime dhamm sasah no visasah, no ca labbh imesa dhammna vinibbhujitv
vinibbhujitv nnkaraa papetu. Ya hvuso vedeti ta sajnti, ya sajnti ta vijnti.

29

S III 55,10 :
Yo bhikkhave eva vadeyya: Aham aatra rp aatra vedanya aatra saya aatra sakhrehi viassa gati v gati v cuti
v upapatti v vuddhi v virhi v vepulla v papessm ti neta hna vijjati.
See also S II 114,7-27 and D II 63.

present reality. But as we have already seen, the Buddha said that consciousness is impermanent. Indeed, there is no
such thing as a permanent consciousness:
Consciousness that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change: this the wise in the world agree
upon as not existing, and I too say that it does not exist.30 (19)
There is no consciousness that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, and that will remain
the same just like eternity itself.31 (20)
With the cessation of name-and-form there is the cessation of consciousness. This noble eightfold path is
the way leading to the cessation of consciousness; ...32 (21)
Note that the eightfold path leads to the ending of consciousness, not to a state of permanent consciousness.
Bhikkhus, whatever desire there is for consciousness, whatever lust, delight, craving - abandon it. Thus
that consciousness will be abandoned, cut off at the root, made like a palm stump, obliterated so that it is
no more subject to future arising.33 (22)
By the utter destruction of delight in existence,
By the extinction of perception and consciousness,
By the cessation and appeasement of feelings:
It is thus, friend, that I know for beings Emancipation, release, seclusion.34 (23)
The body disintegrated, perception ceased,
All feelings were utterly consumed,
Mental activities were extinguished
And consciousness came to an end.35 (24)

Anidassana Via - Invisible Consciousness

Where do earth, water, fire and air no footing find?
Where are long and short, small and great, fair and foul Where are name-and-form wholly destroyed?
And the answer is:

30

S III 139,5 :
Via nicca dhuva sassata aviparimadhamma natthi sammata loke paitnam, aham pi ta natth ti vadmi.

31

S III 144,6 :
Natthi bhikkhu kici via ya via nicca dhuva sassata aviparimadhamma sassatisama tatheva hassat ti.

32

S III 64,20 :
Nmarpanirodh vianirodho. Ayam eva ariyo ahagiko maggo vianirodhagmin paipad; ...

33

S III 161,23 :
Vie yo chando, yo rgo, y nandi, y tah, tam pajahatha, eva ta viam pahnam bhavissati ucchinnamla tlvatthukata
anabhvakatam yatim anuppdadhamman ti.

34

S I 3,15 (new edition):

Nand-bhava-parikkhay,
sa-via-sakhay,
vedanna nirodh upasam,
evam khvham vuso jnmi sattna nimokkha pamokkha vivekan-ti.

35

Ud 93,12 :
Abhedi kyo nirodhi sa
vedan pitidahasu sabb
vpasamisu sakhra
viam attham agam ti.

Where consciousness is signless (via anidassana), boundless (ananta), all-luminous (sabbato pabh36),
Thats where earth, water, fire and air find no footing,
There both long and short, small and great, fair and foul There name-and-form are wholly destroyed.
With the cessation of consciousness this is all destroyed.37 (25)
Consciousness non-manifesting (via anidassana),
Boundless (ananta), luminous all-round (sabbato-pabh).38 (26)
It has been suggested that anidassana via refers to a permanent post-Parinibbna consciousness,39 but in light of
the discussion of via in the previous section such an interpretation is untenable. However, to establish the
correct interpretation of anidassana via is far from easy. Firstly, it should be noted that the expression anidassana
via only appears in the above two quotes in the whole Pali Canon. 40 Secondly, Pali verse is notoriously difficult to
translate: the correct Pali reading is often difficult to establish and poetic licence etc. can complicate matters
further41. Moreover, as in poetry in general, the exact meaning of Pali verse is often vague as its emphasis is on
appealing to emotion and intuition rather than on the pronouncement of precise doctrinal statements. Finally, Pali
verse often contains rare words and phrases that sometimes occur nowhere else in the tipiaka.42
Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, and to show that there are other interpretations of anidassana via
that are just as good or even better than that of a permanent consciousness, I shall put forward an alternative
interpretation. To this end it is necessary to analyse the above quotes in more detail.
The first thing to note is that, due to the qualifiers ananta and pabh, anidassana via is likely to refer to a state of
samdhi. Ananta is closely connected to samdhi, and it is specifically used in the standard description of the first two
immaterial attainments.43 Equally important, however, is that appama, immeasurable, which is semantically very
36

This passage describes the final Nibbna of the Arahant Dabba Mallaputta.

Although the PTS version, at D I 223,11, has the reading paha, I understand the correct reading here to be pabha. The reading paha seems to
be unique to the Sinhalese tradition and is explained by Norman, p.189,5, as likely to be an error in the Sinhalese scribal tradition, where ha and
bha are very similar and easily confused. Moreover, the reading pabha also seems to be the basis for the Chinese version of this Sutta, which has
a reading meaning shining; ref. T I 102c17.
37

D I 223,7 :
Kattha po ca pahav tejo vyo na gdhati?
Kattha dgha ca rassa ca au thla subhsubha,
Kattha nma ca rpa ca asesa uparujjhat ti?
Tatra veyykaraa bhavati:
Via anidassana ananta sabbato pabha
Ettha po ca pahav tejo vyo na gdhati,
Ettha dgha ca rassa ca au thla subhsubha
Ettha nma ca rpa ca asesa uparujjhati,
Viassa nirodhena ettheta uparujjhat ti.

Note that Maurice Walshe has destroyed for uparujjhati. Ceased would probably be better.
38

M I 329,30 :
Via anidassana ananta sabbatopabha.

39

See Harvey, p.201,7.

40

Only two almost identical occurrences in verse in the entire Pali Canon makes anidassana via a marginal concept. This in itself is a sufficient
argument to set this expression aside and not allow it to influence our interpretation of the place of via in the suttas.
41

See Warder, p.viii, and CDB, p.13. Also note the following passage in Norman (1996), p.157, commenting on the difficulty in translating Pali
verse: When John Brough, one of the greatest British Sanskrit scholars of this century [i.e. the 20th century], had just spent several years
producing his study of the Gndhr Dharmapada, and had the whole of the Dhammapada-related literature at his fingertips, he was asked if he
would produce a translation of the Dhammapada for the Pali Text Society. He replied: I cannot. It is too difficult.
42
43

Ie, anidassana via in the present case.

The first two immaterial attainments are known respectively as: ksnacyatana, the base of unlimited (ananta) space, and viacyatana,
the base of unlimited (ananta) consciousness; e.g. at M I 436,20+26.

close to ananta,44 is very frequently connected with samdhi. In particular, it is used in the standard passage on the
divine abidings,45 but it is also employed as a general qualifier of samdhi.46 As for the second qualifier, pabh, it does
not seem to be used elsewhere to directly qualify samdhi. However, the closely related term pabhassara, shining, is
often used to describe the mind without hindrances (nvaraa), the most obvious example of which is the mind in
samdhi.47 Thus, given the usage of ananta and pabh in the above quotes, it seems likely that anidassana via refers
to a state of samdhi.
Next, it is necessary to look more carefully at the structure of the above verses. In this context, an important fact
which is rarely pointed out is that the first verse (the question verse) in the first passage quoted above (quote 25)
seems to contain two questions rather than one.48 When we turn to the second verse (the answer verse), it seems
that we are again dealing with two separate answers: otherwise there would be a contradiction between the via
with various attributes described in the first line and the cessation of via described in the last line consciousness cannot be described as ananta sabbato pabha and at the same time be said to have ceased. It seems
reasonable, therefore, to assume that the first line of the question verse is answered by the first two lines of the
answer verse, and the last two lines of the question verse are answered by the last three lines of the answer verse. 49 If
this structural analysis is accepted, then it becomes clear that anidassana via is simply a form of consciousness
where earth, water, fire and air find no footing;50 it is not related to the cessation of name-and-form.51
At this point we must consider the verse in the second passage quoted above (quote 26). The wider context of this
verse makes it clear that anidassana via is not commensurate with the allness of all. 52 If all here is to be
understood as all of sasra,53 then anidassana via is not commensurate with sasra. In other words, anidassana
via must refer to a state of consciousness possessed by a person who has an outsiders perspective on sasra,
one who has seen the potential for sasra to cease.54 This potential is only known to the ariyas.55
Moreover, it seems that ananta is never used with mind or consciousness apart from describing states of samdhi. It does not seem to ever be
used to describe the normal consciousness of the Arahant, for example.
44

This semantic closeness becomes particularly important with verse. Due to metrical constraints, words which may have slightly different
import in prose often become interchangeable in verse.
45

46

I.e. the brahmavihras; e.g. at M I 38,23.

E.g. with kasia meditation at M II 14,32 and with samdhi in general at A III 51,20.

47

Of course, the mind without hindrances could also be a reference to the mind of the Arahant, but pabhassara does not seem to be used in this
sense. See e.g. S V 92,21 and A III 16,17.
48

Note that, of the three lines of the first verse, the first and the third line end with present tense indicative verbs. Thus we seem to have two
separate sentences, each being a question.
49

Note the eta in the last line of the answer verse. This would seem to refer back to nma ca rpa ca of the previous line; that is, these lines are
connected. Thus the last line cannot simply be regarded as an add-on which does not refer to any of the questions in the question verse.
50

The most obvious candidate of which would be the immaterial attainments.

51

I take long and short, small and great, fair and foul to be poetic examples of name-and-form and thus to be included within name-and-form.
In the suttas name-and-form is usually understood to encompass all phenomena apart from consciousness.
52

M I 330,2 :
Sabbassa sabbattena ananubhta.

53

I.e. the tiloka, the three worlds comprising sasra; see MLDB, p.1166, note 19. If all is not to be regarded as equivalent to tiloka, then
anidassana via potentially becomes correspondingly broader. For example, anidassana via could be a reference to the immaterial
attainments, if these are not included in all.
54

It should be noted that this does not require this consciousness to exist outside of sasra. Since consciousness is one of the five aggregates,
all consciousness is by definition included in sasra.
The cessation of sasra is nothing other than Nibbna; for further discussion on the nature of Nibbna, see the last part of this paper.
55

It should be noted that the reading in quote 26 is very uncertain. According to the Burmese version of this verse (Be: M I 405), it is the Buddha
who speaks it, referring to his own special understanding. However, according to the Sri Lankan (Ce: M I 770), the Thai (Se: M I 596), and the PTS
versions of this verse, it is spoken by Baka the Brahm, referring to his special understanding (see Anlayo, note 162 to MN 49). This is obviously
highly significant, because if the verse refers to Baka the Brahms knowledge, then anidassana via must refer to a state of consciousness that
he can access, i.e. most likely a jhna state. This interpretation is further reinforced by the Chinese version of this verse, also according to which it
was Brahm who spoke, see T I 548b11. (It may also be significant that in the Chinese there is no mention of anidassana.) Given this uncertainty in

Given the above analysis, we are now in a position to be quite specific in our understanding of anidassana via. We
have seen that anidassana via is: 1. a form of samdhi, and 2. that it is a type of consciousness accessible only to
the ariyas. 56 This description fits well with a particular type of samdhi which is encountered in several other places
in the suttas.57 This then becomes our interpretation of anidassana via.
In sum, it may never be possible to pin down the exact meaning of anidassana via with perfect certainty.
However, given the broader message of the suttas concerning via, and given that there is at least one solid
explanation of anidassana via which does not contradict this broader message, one is forced to reject the idea of
anidassana via as a permanent consciousness that remains after an Arahant has attained final Nibbna.

Appatihita Via - Unestablished Consciousness

The sutta phrase appatihita via, unestablished consciousness, is also sometimes taken as referring to
permanent post-Parinibbna consciousness. It is particularly the following two sutta passages which are used to
support this assertion:
If, bhikkhus, there is no lust for the nutriment edible food (for the nutriment contact/for the nutriment
mental volition/for the nutriment consciousness), if there is no delight, if there is no craving,
consciousness does not become established (appatihita via) there and come to growth ... Suppose,
bhikkhus, there was a house or hall with a peaked roof, with windows on the northern, southern, and
eastern sides. When the sun rises and a beam of light enters through a window, where would it become
established (patihita)? On the western wall, venerable sir. If there were no western wall, where would
it become established? On the earth, venerable sir? If there were no earth, where would it become
established? On the water, venerable sir. If there were no water, where would it become established?
It would not become established anywhere, venerable sir.58 (27)
Monks, with consciousness unestablished, the clansman Godhika has attained final Nibbna.59 (28)
In the first quote above (27), there is no good reason why appatihita via should be understood as referring to
what lies beyond Parinibbna. Note that consciousness is said to be unestablished if there is no delight, if there is no
craving. The reference to absence of craving seems to make it fairly straightforward that this concerns the living
Arahant. The second passage (28) is more ambiguous, but it can easily be read to mean that Godhika s consciousness
was unestablished at the time of death. In other words, there is no need to bring in any theory of post-Parinibbna
consciousness that clearly contradicts the suttas more general discussion of the subject. Moreover, there are other
passages in the suttas that make it clear that appatihita via refers to the consciousness of the living Arahant:60
the reading, it would be quite reasonable, maybe even preferable, to leave this verse out of the present discussion. If this is done, the most
straightforward interpretation of anidassana via is that it refers to the first two immaterial attainments.
56

This may also explain the usage of the term anidassana. Elsewhere anidassana is used to mean invisible (e.g. at M I 127,36). According to our
analysis, being accessible only to ariyas, anidassana via is invisible to all puthujjanas, including the devas of the very highest realms.
57

A3:32/A I 132ff, A10:6-7/A V 7ff, and A11:7-10/A V 318ff.

It seems from the passage at A3:32 that this samdhi is only accessible to Arahants. If this is correct, then the same would apply to anidassana
via.
58

S II 102,26-103,24 :
Kabalikre ... phasse ... manosacetanya ... vie ce bhikkhave hre natthi rgo, natthi nandi, natthi tah, appatihita tattha
via avirha ... Seyyathpi bhikkhave, kugra v kugrasl v, uttarya v dakkhiya v pcnya v vtapn, suriye
uggacchante vtapnena rasmi pavisitv, kvssa patihit ti? - Pacchimya bhante bhittiyan ti. - Pacchim ce bhikkhave bhitti nssa, kvssa
patihit ti? - Pathaviya bhante. - Pathav ce bhikkhave nssa, kvssa patihit ti? - pasmi bhante. - po ce bhikkhave nssa, kvssa
patihit ti? - Appatihit bhante ti.
See Harvey, p.202,17.
59

S I 268,1 :
Appatihitena ca bhikkhave viena Godhiko kulaputto parinibbuto ti.
See Harvey, p.209,14-210,8.
60

It is important to always make a clear distinction between the consciousness of the Arahant and the post-Parinibbna state. The fact that an
Arahant has consciousness is uncontroversial, and it seems that all of the exotic states of mind described in the suttas fall into the range of an
Arahants experience. Since this is so, there is no need to bring in any ideas of a post-Parinibbna consciousness whose existence is otherwise
clearly denied in the suttas.

When that consciousness is unestablished (apatihita via)61, not coming to growth, nongenerative, it is
liberated. By being liberated, it is steady; by being steady, it is content; by being content, he is not agitated.
Being unagitated, he personally attains Nibbna.62 (29)

Citta - Mind
Is it reasonable, as is sometimes done, to use the term citta (mind) as a synonym for Nibbna?63 There is no clear
evidence in the suttas that the Buddha ever used citta in this way, and, as I shall now try to show, the evidence to the
contrary is compelling.
Citta refers to what one in English would understand by mind. Citta is thus a comprehensive term for all mental
processes and it is particularly closely related to via. It is true that citta and via have their own more or less
distinct spheres of usage in the suttas,64 but in many instances the Buddha used them synonymously. For example,
there are several occasions in the suttas where one term appears where one would normally expect to find the other:
When that consciousness is unestablished, not coming to growth, nongenerative, it is liberated
(vimuttam).65 (30)
Usually it is the citta which is said to be liberated.
And the states in the first jhna - the applied thought, the sustained thought, the rapture, the pleasure,
and the unification of mind; the contact, feeling, perception, volition, and mind (citta); the zeal, decision,
energy, mindfulness, equanimity, and attention ...66 (31)
Normally the term citta encompasses all these mental factors, but here, since the other mental factors are
mentioned separately, citta seems to be used in place of via.
With the origination of name-and-form (nmarpa) there is the origination of mind (citta). With the
cessation of name-and-form there is the passing away of mind.67 (32)
It is usually via which is said to be thus conditioned by name-and-form. But as the context here is the four
satipahnas, the third of which is mind contemplation (cittnupassana), citta is used instead.
When in his mothers womb the first thought (citta) has arisen, the first consciousness (via) appeared,
his birth is (to be reckoned) from that time.68 (33)
61

The spelling apatihita via seems to be an error for appatihita via.

62

S III 53,27 and S III 55,23 :

Tad apatihita viam avirham anabhisakhraca vimutta. Vimuttatt hita, hitatt santusita, santusitatt na paritassati,
aparitassa paccattaeva parinibbyati.
This is a common way in the suttas to describe Nibbna in this life, i.e. the attainment of Arahant-ship, as opposed to final Nibbna. See for example
M III 244,23 where Nibbna is described in similar terms, but final Nibbna clearly happens later.
Also note that consciousness in fact becomes unestablished immediately prior to the attainment of Arahant-ship. This strengthens the
argument further.
63

Sometimes citta by itself is used as a designation for Nibbna, at other times the expression amata citta (deathless mind) is used in this
manner.
64

Cf. CDB, p.769, note 154.

65

S III 53,27 and S III 55,23 :

Tad apatihita viam avirhim anabhisakhraca vimutta.

66

M III 25,24 :
Ye ca pahamajjhne dhamm, vitakko ca vicro ca pti ca sukha ca cittekaggat ca phasso vedan sa cetan citta chando adhimokkho
viriya sati upekh manasikro ...

67

S V 184,23 :
Nmarpasamuday cittassa samudayo, nmarpanirodh cittassa atthagamo.

68

Vin I 93,20 :

Here citta and via seem to be used as synonyms.

This interchangeability of citta and via is not surprising when one considers the matter carefully. From the
suttas it can be seen that, although via as a technical term refers to only one aspect of citta (i.e. consciousness
or awareness), via devoid of other mental factors is merely a theoretical construct which in actual experience
does not occur:
Feeling, perception and consciousness, friend - these states are conjoined, not disjoined, and it is
impossible to separate each of these states from the others in order to describe the difference between
them. For what one feels, that one perceives; and what one perceives, that one cognises.69 (34)
So whenever there is consciousness, the other mental factors will also be present,70 and thus via is in effect no
different from citta. Citta in turn cannot exist without via - mind without consciousness is surely an
unintelligible concept. Thus, where there is citta, there is also via; and where there is via, there is also citta.
In practice they are inseparable and very closely related:
But, bhikkhus, as to that which
consciousness (via) ...71 (35)

is

called

mind

(citta)

and

mentality

(mano)

and

But what is called thought (citta), or mind (mano), or consciousness (via) ...72 (36)
Therefore, if via is not permanent and eternal, the same must be true for citta:
Here, a certain ascetic or Brahmin is a logician, a reasoner. Hammering it out by reason, following his own
line of thought, he argues: Whatever is called eye or ear or nose or tongue or body, that self is
impermanent, unstable, non-eternal, liable to change. But what is called thought (citta), or mind (mano) or
consciousness (via), that self is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, the same for ever and
ever! 73 (37)
But, bhikkhus, as to that which is called mind (citta) and mentality (mano) and consciousness (via)
- the uninstructed worldling is unable to experience revulsion towards it, unable to become dispassionate
towards it and be liberated from it. For what reason? Because for a long time this has been held to by him,
appropriated, and grasped thus: This is mine, this I am, this is my self. Therefore the uninstructed
Ya bhikkhave mtu kucchismi pahama citta uppanna, pahama via ptubhta, tadupdya svassa jti.
Citta which is usually translated as mind is here translated as thought because mind does not really fit the context. Perhaps mental state
would be a better translation.
69

M I 293,22. For the Pali text see note 28 above.

70

See also M III 25-29.

71

S II 94,13 :
Ya ca kho eta bhikkhave vuccati citta iti pi mano iti pi via iti pi ...
Note that in both this quote and the one below the singular ya ca kho eta/ida, and that/this which, is used. Thus citta, mano, and via
refer to the same entity. Also note that Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi here has translated itipi with and, a translation normally used for ca. A more literal
translation of itipi might be also or too: But, bhikkhus, as to that which is called mind, also mentality, also consciousness ...
It is significant that this phrase is also found in the Chinese and the Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit versions of this sutta, cf. respectively T II 81c7 and
Triph, folio 5 V3.
72

D I 21,21 :
Ya ca kho ida vuccati cittan ti v mano ti v vian ti v ...
Apparently the Tibetan counterpart to this sutta has the equivalent phrase; cf. Weller, p.26,22.
M138 provides a striking example of via and citta being used interchangeably. In the summary at the beginning of the sutta, at M III
223,10+12, via is used. Later on in the same sutta, in the section explaining this via, citta is used in its place; see M III 226,9f and M III 227,1f.
Note also that in the explanation itself via and citta are used together.
73

D I 21,16 :
Idha, bhikkhave, ekacco samao v brhmao v takk hoti vimas. So takka-pariyhata vimasnucarita saya-patibhna evam ha:
Ya kho ida vuccati cakkhun ti pi sotan ti pi ghnan ti pi jivh ti pi kyo ti pi, aya att anicco addhuvo asassato viparima-dhammo.
Ya ca kho ida vuccati cittan ti v mano ti v vian ti v, aya att nicco dhuvo sassato aviparima-dhammo sassati-sama tatheva
hassat ti.
Brahmajla Sutta, wrong view no.8.

worldling is unable to experience revulsion towards it, unable to become dispassionate towards it and be
liberated from it.
It would be better, bhikkhus, for the uninstructed worldling to take as self this body composed of the four
great elements rather than the mind (citta). For what reason? Because this body composed of the four great
elements is seen standing for one year, for two years, for three, four, five, or ten years, for twenty, thirty,
forty, or fifty years, for a hundred years, or even longer. But that which is called mind (citta) and
mentality (mano) and consciousness (via) arises as one thing and ceases as another by day and by
night. Just as a monkey roaming through a forest grabs hold of one branch, lets go and grabs another, then
lets that go and grabs still another, so too that which is called mind and mentality and consciousness
arises as one thing and ceases as another by day and by night.74 (38)
Thus, according to the suttas, holding the view that the citta is a permanent entity is a mistake. Moreover, when one
gains the full ariyan insight into the impermanent and suffering nature of the mind, one feels revulsion (nibbid) and
dispassion (virga) towards it. And when the Arahant attains final Nibbna the citta comes to an end:
Mind (citta), you led me around like a village-lad under the
influence of the four-fold distortion. Assuredly you do not
associate with the merciful great sage, the cutter of bonds and
fetters.
Like the deer roaming at will in the variegated grove, having
entered the delightful mountain, wreathed in clouds, I shall
rejoice there on the uncrowded mountain; you, mind (citta), will
certainly perish.75 (39)
You are seen, housebuilder, you will not build a house again.
All your rafters are broken your gables are torn asunder. The
mind (citta), made free of boundaries, will blow away in this very
existence.76 (40)
74

S II 94,13 :
Ya ca kho eta bhikkhave vuccati citta iti pi mano iti pi via iti pi, tatrassutav puthujjano nla nibbinditu, nla virajjitu,
nla vimuccitu. Ta kissa hetu? Dgharatta heta bhikkhave assutavato puthujjanassa ajjhosita mamyita parmaham: Etam mama,
esoham asmi, eso me att ti. Tasm tatrassutav puthujjano nla nibbinditu, nla virajjitu, nla vimuccitu.
Vara bhikkhave assutav puthujjano ima ctumahbhtika kyam attato upagaccheyya na tveva citta. Ta kissa hetu? Dissatyam
bhikkhave ctumahbhtiko kyo ekam pi vassa tihamno, dve pi vassni tihamno, ti pi vassni tihamno, cattri pi vassni tihamno,
paca pi vassni tihamno, dasa pi vassni tihamno, vsati pi vassni tihamno, tisam pi vassni tihamno, cattrsam pi vassni
tihamno, pasam pi vassni tihamno, vassasatam pi tihamno, bhiyyo pi tihamno. Ya ca kho eta bhikkhave vuccati cittam iti pi
mano iti pi viam iti pi, ta rattiy ca divasassa ca aad eva uppajjati aa nirujjhati. Seyyathpi bhikkhave makkao arae pavane
caramno skha gahati, ta mucitva aa gahati. Evam eva kho bhikkhave yad ida vuccati cittam iti pi mano iti pi viam iti pi,
ta rattiy ca divasassa ca aad eva uppajjati aa nirujjhati.

For references to the interchangeability of via and citta in non-Pali Buddhist texts (i.e. primarily Chinese and Sanskrit sources), see Anlayo,
footnote 168 to M138.
75

Th 1143-1144 :
Catubbipallsavasa adhihita
gmaala va parinesi citta ma
nanu saojanabandhanacchida
sasevase kruika mahmuni.
migo yath seri sucittaknane
ramma giri pvisi abbhamlina,
ankule tattha nage ramissasi,
asasaya citta parbhavissasi.

76

Th 184 :
Gahakraka dihosi, puna geha na khasi;
sabb te phsuk bhagg thir ca vidlit;
vipariydikata citta idheva vidhamissat ti
Note that the translation is based on the alternative reading vimariydikata in the last line.
Normans translation of vidhamissati, will blow away, can probably be improved upon. Other possible translations include: will be
demolished (cf. CDB, p.985), will be ruined, will fall away, and will be destroyed.

With the cessation of name-and-form (nmarpa) there is the cessation of mind (citta).77 (41)

Pabhassara Citta - the Radiant Mind

The expression pabhassara citta is sometimes taken to imply that the Buddha taught the Dhamma for the purpose of
attaining an eternal, radiant, and pure mind.78 But there are passages in the suttas that make this assertion
untenable:
So too, bhikkhus, there are these five corruptions of the mind (citta), corrupted by which the mind is
neither malleable nor wieldy nor radiant (pabhassara) but brittle and not rightly concentrated for the
destruction of the taints. What five? Sensual desire ... ill will ... sloth and torpor ... restlessness and
remorse ... doubt is a corruption of the mind, corrupted by which the mind is neither malleable nor wieldy
nor radiant but brittle and not rightly concentrated for the destruction of the taints.79 (42)
From this it can be seen that the pabhassara citta is simply the mind freed from the five hindrances, the most obvious
example of which is the mind in jhna.

Does Citta have two Meanings?

It has been argued that citta has different meanings in the suttas dependent on the context, sometimes referring to
the ordinary citta of the puthujjana and at other times referring to a permanent citta known to the Arahant. For
example, it has been suggested that citta vimuccati80, the mind is liberated, refers to the liberated eternal mind,
or original pure mind, known to the Arahant.
But there is no evidence for this. Nowhere did the Buddha indicate that two such different realities could both be
referred to as citta. Considering the centrality of this issue for the proper understanding of the Dhamma, it seems
highly unlikely that the Buddha should have used the term citta in such distinct ways without clearly commenting
upon it.81
In my opinion, the only possible meaning of such phrases as cittam vimuccati is that the ordinary mind is liberated
from the defilements82. There is no indication that this mind is somehow permanent. Indeed, one would have
expected citta to be used synonymously with Nibbna if this thesis were correct. But citta is never used in this way in
the suttas.83

Citta and Mano (mind)

Citta and mano are even more closely related than citta and via:84
77

S V 184,23 :
Nmarpanirodh cittassa atthagamo.

78

Cf. A I 10,5-17 : Pabhassaram ida bhikkhave citta ta ca kho gantukehi upakkilesehi upakkilihan ti.

79

S V 92,21 and A III 16,17 :

Evam eva kho bhikkhave pacime cittassa upakkiles, yehi upakkilesehi upakkiliha citta na ceva mudu hoti, na ca kammaniya, na ca
pabhassara, pabhagu ca, na ca samm samdhiyati savna khayya. Katame paca? Kmacchando ... bypdo ... thnamiddha ...
uddhaccakukkacca ... vicikicch bhikkhave cittassa upakkiles, yena upakkilesena upakkiliha citta na ceva mudu hoti, na ca kammaniya,
na ca pabhassara, pabhagu ca, na ca samm samdhiyati savna khayya.
See also A I 257,7 and M III 243,12.
80

E.g. at M I 348,31.

81

Moreover, consciousness (via) is also occasionally said to be freed; see in particular quote 30 above. If mind has a distinct meaning in the
phrase the mind is liberated, then the same would have to be true for via in this parallel construction. But we have already seen that the
Buddha rejects the idea of via as a permanent entity.
82

sav, often translated as taints, cf. MLDB, p.452,37/M I 348,27.

83

See e.g. the Asakhata Sayutta where there are 33 synonyms for Nibbna, none of which is citta.

84

As with via and citta, mano and citta have their own more or less distinct spheres of usage in the suttas. Sometimes in the analysis of mental
processes the Buddha uses mano to describe the mind in relation to mind-consciousness but not in relation to the other five types of

What is mind (citta), that is mentality (mano); what is mentality (mano), that is mind (citta).85 (43) (my
translation)
Thus is your mind (mano), and in this way is your mind (mano), and thus is your mind (citta).86 (44) (my
translation)
Always frightened is this mind (citta),
the mind (mano) is always agitated.87 (45)
Given this close relationship, even identity, between citta and mano, a whole new line of argument against the idea of
a permanent citta could be developed by showing the impermanent, non-self nature of mano. However, as I feel the
above arguments are already sufficient, I will just quote a few passages from the suttas to illustrate:
The mind (mano) is subject to disintegration ...88 (46)
The mind (mano) is non-self. The cause and condition for the arising of the mind is also non-self. As the
mind has originated from what is nonself, how could it be self?89 (47)
If anyone says, the mind (mano) is self, that is not tenable. The rise and fall of mind are discerned, and
since the rise and fall of mind are discerned it would follow: my self rises and falls. That is why it is not
tenable for anyone to say: the mind is self. Thus the mind is not self.90 (48)
The Arahants maintain that when the mind (mano) exists there is pleasure and pain, and when the mind
does not exist there is no pleasure and pain.91 (49)

consciousness. Citta on the other hand, it seems, would encompass all six types of consciousness. Outside such technical usage, however, mano and
citta seem to be used synonymously.
In addition to the examples below (in the main text) that show the close relationship between citta and mano, the following two examples are
also instructive:
Vypannacitto, paduhamanasakappo; a mind of ill-will, mental intention of hate; S III 93,14 (my translation).
Apatitthnacitto adnamnaso avypannacetaso; an undaunted mind, a non-dejected mind, a mind without ill-will;
S V 74,20 but cf. CDB, p.1904, note 69 (my translation).
In the above mano and citta, as well as ceto, seem to be used as synonyms.
Yet another example of this close relationship is the use of kya (body), vc (speech), and mano (mind) to denote the three doors of wholesome
and unwholesome actions; occasionally the three doors are denoted as kya, vc, and citta; cf. S II 231,16; S II 271,5; and S IV 112,28. See also Dhp.
348 where one finds vimuttamnaso in place of the standard cetovimutti.
85

Vin III 74,5 :

Ya citta ta mano, ya mano ta citta.

86

D I 213,27; D III 103,23; and A I 170,30 :

Evam pi te mano, ittham pi te mano, iti pi te cittan ti.
This passage concerns mind reading.
87

S I 123,3 (new edition) :

Nicca utrastam ida citta, nicca ubbhiggam ida mano.
Note that both mano and citta are usually translated as mind. When the words are used together in the suttas, translators often seem to struggle
to find a second English word that also means mind (cf. CDB, p.769, note 154).
88

S IV 53,25 :
Mano palokadhammo ...

89

S IV 130,31 :
Mano anatt. Yo pi hetu yo pi paccayo manassa uppdya, so pi anatt. Anattasambhto bhikkhave mano, kuto att bhavissati?

90

M III 283,14 :
Mano att ti yo vadeyya, ta na uppajjati. Manassa uppdo pi vayo pi payati. Yassa kho pana uppdo pi vayo pi payati: Att me
uppajjati ca veti c ti iccassa evam gata hoti. Tasm ta na uppajjati: Mano att ti yo vadeyya. Iti mano anatt.

91

S IV 124,3 :
Manasmi sati, arahanto sukhadukkham papenti; manasmim asati, arahanto sukhadukkham na papent ti.

The mind (mano) is yours, Evil One, mental phenomena are yours, mind-contact and its base of
consciousness is yours; but, Evil One, where there is no mind, no mental phenomena, no mind-contact and
its base of consciousness - there is no place for you there, Evil One.92 (50)
Again, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu who is beyond training (an Arahant) understands the six faculties - the eye
faculty, the ear faculty, the nose faculty, the tongue faculty, the body faculty, the mind (mano) faculty. He
understands: These six faculties will cease completely and totally without remainder, and no other six
faculties will arise anywhere in any way.93 (51)

Nibbna 94
The discussion so far has emphasised that, according to the suttas and vinaya, Nibbna cannot be regarded as some
sort of permanent consciousness (via) or mind (citta) and that it cannot be regarded as a self (atta). But
highlighting what Nibbna is not obviously begs the question: What then is Nibbna? Indeed, it might be asked, is it
anything at all apart from the cessation of existence?95 Consider the following discussion between Ven. Sriputta and
Ven. Mah-Kohita:
Friend, with the remainderless fading away and cessation of the six spheres of sense contact (i.e. final
Nibbna), is there anything else? ... is there not anything else?
...
Speaking thus: Friend, with the remainderless fading away and cessation of the six spheres of sense
contact, is there anything else? ... is there not anything else?, one proliferates about that which is without
proliferation.96 (52) (my translation)
Thus, it seems, the whole question of whether Nibbna is anything other than cessation is just proliferation (papaca)
- a proliferation that arises in the first place because of the illusion of a self, or more precisely, because of sakkya
dihi.97 Compare such proliferation with how the Buddha often would summarise his teachings:
92

S I 256,11 (new edition) :

Taveva ppima mano, tava dhamm, tava manosamphassa-viyatana. Yattha ca kho ppima natthi mano, natthi dhamm, natthi manosamphassa-viyatana, agati tava tattha ppim ti.

93

S V 230,23 :
Puna ca param bhikkhave asekho bhikkhu cha indriyni pajnti, cakkhundriya, sotindriya, ghnindriya, jivhindriya, kyindriyam,
manindriya; imni kho cha indriyni sabbena sabbam sabbath sabbam aparises nirujjhissanti, ani ca cha indriyni na kuhici kismici
uppajjissant ti pajnti.

94

Again, I am using Nibbna here in the sense of what is attained by the Arahant at death, not as the state of the living Arahant; cf. footnote 6
above.
95

That is, the cessation of the five aggregates. This does not imply anything except the cessation of an entirely impersonal process. This is very
different from the annihilation of an existing entity. See in particular the Yamaka Sutta, S III 109f, for a refutation of the idea that the Buddha was
an annihilationist.
96

A II 161,5-20 :
Channa vuso phassyatanna asesavirganirodh atthaa kic? ti ... natthaa kic? ti.
Channa vuso phassyatanna asesavirganirodh atthaa kic? ti ... natthaa kic? ti iti vada appapaca papaceti.

97

Speculation about the nature of Nibbna is essentially the same as speculation about the nature of the Tathgata after death. In the following
quote the Buddha states that such speculation is a result of sakkya dihi (the view of personal identity) and that with the abandonment of sakkya
dihi such speculation is also abandoned:
What, Master Gotama, is the cause and reason why, when wanderers of other sects are asked such questions, they give such answers
as: The world is eternal or the world is not eternal or the world is finite or the world is infinite or the soul and the body are the
same or the soul is one thing, the body is another or the Tathgata exists after death or the Tathgata does not exists after death
or the Tathgata both exists and not exists after death or the Tathgata neither exists nor not exists after death. And what is the
cause and reason why, when Master Gotama is asked such questions, he does not give such answers?
Vaccha, wanderers of other sects regard form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in form. They regard
feeling as self ... perception as self ... volitional formations as self ... consciousness as self, or self as possessing consciousness, or
consciousness as in self, or self as in consciousness. Therefore, when the wanderers of other sects are asked such questions, they give
such answers as: The world is eternal ... or the Tathgata neither exists nor not exists after death. But, Vaccha, the Tathgata, the
Arahant, the Perfectly Enlightened One, does not regard form as self ... self as in consciousness. Therefore, when the Tathgata is
asked such questions, he does not give such answers.

Good, good, Anurdha. Formerly, Anurdha, and also now, I make known just suffering and the cessation
of suffering.98 (53)
The whole point of the Dhamma is to teach the path to the end of suffering. To insist that Nibbna is more than just
cessation betrays that one is more concerned about salvaging a non-existent self than one is in ending suffering. By
trying to salvage what doesnt exist, one only succeeds in salvaging suffering instead.99
This may sound bleak until you realize that:
Nibbna is the greatest bliss.100 (54)
What more can you ask for?

Abbreviations:
D:
Dgha Nikya.
M:
Majjhima Nikya.
S:
Sayutta Nikya.
A:
Aguttara Nikya.
Vin: Vinaya Piaka.
Th: Theragth.
Dhp: Dhammapada.
Ud: Udna.
MLDB:Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha.
CDB : Connected Discourses of the Buddha.
All references are to the Pali Text Societys publications.

Bibliography
The above quotes, and additional ones in the notes, have been taken from the following sources:
Bodhi, Bhikkhu (trans.); The Connected Discourses of the Buddha; Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2000.
Bodhi, Bhikkhu & amoli Bhikkhu (trans.); The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha; Oxford: Pali Text Society,
2002.
Horner, I.B. (trans.); The Book of the Discipline, 6 vols; London: Pali Text Society, 1938-1966.
Ireland, John D. (trans.); The Udna: Inspired Utterances of the Buddha; Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1990.
Norman, K.R. (trans.); Poems of Early Buddhist Monks; Oxford: Pali Text Society, 1995.
Thera, aponika & Bodhi, Bhikkhu (trans.); The Numerical Discourses of the Buddha; Lanham: Altamira Press, 1999.
Walshe, Maurice (trans.); Thus Have I Heard; Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1995.

CDB, p.1391,3 or S IV 395,21.

Note that the above taking of a self in relation to the five aggregates is the definition of sakkya dihi, see M I 300,4.
98

S III 119,5 :
Sdhu sdhu Anurdha, pubbe cham Anurdha etarahi ca dukkha-ceva papemi dukkhassa ca nirodhan-ti.
Note that this passage is almost as explicit as can be that there is nothing apart from suffering and its cessation.
99

In other words, the idea that Nibbna is more than just cessation is caused by the desire for personal continuity, bhavatah. But as we have
already seen, the Buddha made it clear that having the idea of an exisiting self, which in turn is the basis for the desire for personal continuity, is a
mistake: there is no such self. As long as one is committed to the idea of a non-existent self, one is incapable of realizing ones mistake. And if one
does not realize that having the idea of a self is a mistake, the suffering of sasra continues.
100

M I 510,9 and Dhp 204 :

Nibbna parama sukha.
To understand how cessation can be the highest happiness, see the second quote in note 6 above.

In some instances no satisfactory translation was available, in particular for the Aguttara Nikya and Vinaya Piaka
quotes. In these cases I have had to translate directly from the Pali myself. I have indicated all such cases.
Other works referred to:
Harvey, Peter; The Selfless Mind; Personality, Consciousness and Nirvna in Early Buddhism; Richmond Surrey: Curzon,
1995.
Norman, K.R.; A note on att in the Alagaddpama-sutta in Collected Papers II; Oxford: Pali Text Society, 1991.
Norman, K.R.; An Epithet of Nibbna in Collected Papers III; Oxford: Pali Text Society, 1992.
Norman, K.R.; Pli translation, review article R4 in Collected Papers VII; Oxford: Pali Text Society, 1996.
hnissaro Bhikkhu, Non-self Strategy; see accesstoinsight.org.
Triph, Chandrabhl; Fnfundzwanzig Stras des Nidnasayukta (Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden); Berlin:
Akademie Verlag, vol.8, 1962.
Warder, A.K.; Introduction to Pali; Oxford: The Pali Text Society, 2001
Weller, Friedrich; Brahmjlastra, Tibetischer und Mongolischer Text; Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1934.
Anlayo; A Comparative Study of the Majjhima Nikya; forthcoming.