PSV Calculations & Flare

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Psv calculations & flare

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S hashikant Khopade at Ingenero
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Psv calculations & flare

Document Transcript
1. L&T- CHIYODA LIMITEDDate: Feb.15, 2007 PROCEDURE FOR PRESSURE LTC-PB-P0-004

SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 1 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN
PROCEDURE FOR PRESSURE SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONS & FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN
General 1 NUT/MPR NPK/KNK/RHD SS Feb., 15, 2007 Revision 0 First Issue SJR SS MH March, 12,
1996Revision. Description Prepared By Reviewed By Approved Approved No. By DateL&T -CHIYODA
PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
CONTENTS1 SCOPE
..................................................................................................................................... 52
CODES AND PRACTICES ................................................................................................... 53
DEFINITION OF TERMS..................................................................................................... 63.1
Pressure Relief Device ............................................................................................................ 63.2
System pressures .....................................................................................................................
63.3 Device
Pressures...................................................................................................................... 73.4
Relieving conditions ................................................................................................................ 74
PRESSURE RELIEF VALVES............................................................................................. 74.1
Types of Pressure Relief Valves............................................................................................. 84.2
Back Pressure .......................................................................................................................... 95
SET PRESSURE, ACCUMULATION LIMITS AND RELIEVING PRESSURE ........ 116
OVERPRESSURE ................................................................................................................ 146.1
Over Pressure Criteria ......................................................................................................... 146.2
Principal Causes.................................................................................................................... 157
PSV RELIEF LOAD CALCULATIONS AND PHILOSOPHY ...................................... 157.1 External
Fire.......................................................................................................................... 157.2 Blocked
/ Closed Outlets (Exit block).................................................................................. 217.3 Cooling or
Column Reflux or Pump around failure.......................................................... 217.4 Tube Rupture /
Plate & Frame Heat Exchanger Failure.................................................. 227.5 Control Valve failure
............................................................................................................ 257.6 Hydraulic / Thermal
Expansion .......................................................................................... 287.7 Power Failure (Steam
or Electric)....................................................................................... 29L&T -CHIYODA

SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 3 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN7.8
Instrument Air Failure ......................................................................................................... 307.9
Air Cooled Exchanger failure .............................................................................................. 307.10
Cooling Water failure ........................................................................................................... 317.11
Abnormal Heat Input ........................................................................................................... 317.12
Check Valve Mal-operation ................................................................................................. 317.13
Loss of Heat in Series fractionation system........................................................................ 327.14
Liquid Overfill....................................................................................................................... 328
SIZING FOR PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE .................................................................... 358.1 Sizing
for Vapor or gas relief............................................................................................... 358.2 Sizing
for Steam Relief ......................................................................................................... 378.3 Sizing
for Liquid Relief ........................................................................................................ 379 DESIGN
OF PIPING UPSTREAM OF RELIEF DEVICE ............................................. 3910
DETERMINATION OF FLARE DESIGN CAPACITY.................................................. 4011 SIZING
OF FLARE HEADER ........................................................................................... 4212 DESIGN OF
PIPING DOWNSTREAM OF RELIEF DEVICE...................................... 4413 FLARE STACK
SIZING ..................................................................................................... 4513.1 Flare Stack
Diameter............................................................................................................ 4513.2 Flare Stack
Height ................................................................................................................ 4514 DESIGN OF
FLARE KNOCKOUT DRUM...................................................................... 4714.1 Horizontal
Knockout Drum ................................................................................................. 4714.2 Vertical
Knockout Drum...................................................................................................... 4815 DESIGN
OF SEALS IN FLARE SYSTEM........................................................................ 4915.1 Sealing of the
Flare Stack..................................................................................................... 4915.2 Sealing of
Piping Headers .................................................................................................... 4916 PURGING
OF FLARE HEADER AND FLARE TIP....................................................... 52L&T -CHIYODA
Procedure for Calculating Flare Header Purge................................................................. 5216.2
Procedure for Calculating Flare Tip Purge........................................................................ 5217 P&I
DIAGRAM FOR FLARE SYSTEM........................................................................... 5218
ANNEXURES........................................................................................................................
5318.1 Annexure-1 [Tables, Figures (as per API-520/521)] ..........................................................
5318.2 Annexure-2 (Environment factor data) ..............................................................................
6818.3 Annexure-3 (Vapor pressure and Heat of vaporization of pure single component paraffin
hydrocarbon liquids) ................................................................................. 7018.4 Annexure-4
(Sizing for Two-phase Liquid/Vapor Relief)................................................. 7118.5 Annexure-5
(Examples for Calculation of Relief load) ..................................................... 8318.6 Annexure-6
(Typical Flare Load Summary sheet) .......................................................... 10918.7 Annexure-7
(Flare Header / PSV outlet line sizing) ........................................................ 11018.8 Annexure-8 (Flare
stack, Figure-A, B) ............................................................................. 11218.9 Annexure-9 (Flare
knock out drum, Figure-C) ............................................................... 11418.10 Annexure-10 (Seal
drum, Figure-D) ................................................................................. 11418.11 Annexure-11
(Typical flare system P&I Diagram).......................................................... 11518.12 Format for Relief
load calculation sheets ......................................................................... 11619 OTHER
REFERENCES .................................................................................................... 11619.1
Handbook by Crosby.......................................................................................................... 11619.2
Questions and Answers for API-520 / 521 ........................................................................ 116L&T CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL
ONLY
SCOPEThis document covers the standard design procedure to perform PSV sizing calculations.
Thesafety of personnel and the protection of equipment due to overpressure are the basis for thedesign,
sizing, and selection of pressure relieving systems. All systems and pressure reliefdevices shall meet the
applicable codes, industry standards and practices as well as relatedowner/PMC job instructions.The
objective is to apply a systematic examination to all modes of operations and engineeringintentions to the
mechanical integrity of the equipment and piping systems based on allcredible incidents. Provisions shall
be made to contain or safely relieve any excessive pressuresin the system. These provisions shall include
utilization of the applicable standards as listed infurther sections.The equipment and piping systems shall
be designed, fabricated, tested, and assembled inaccordance with project specifications and shall be
subject to the vendors quality assuranceand control procedures, including third party inspection.The
practices outlined in this document shall be followed, for all Process unit areas includingrelated Utilities,
Offsite, licensor and non-licensor packages. Also this manual presents thestandard design procedure of a
flare system.2.0 CODES AND PRACTICES API RP 520 Part I and II : Recommended Practice for the
Sizing, Selection and Installation of Pressure-Relieving Devices in Refineries. API RP 521: Guide for
Pressure-Relieving and Depressuring systems. API STD 526: Flanged Steel Pressure-Relief valves. API
STD 527: Commercial Seat Tightness of Safety Relief Valves with Metal to Metal Seats API STD 2000:
Venting Atmospheric and Low-pressure Storage Tanks (Non refrigerated and refrigerated) ASME Boiler
and Pressure Vessel Code, Sec I, Power Boiler ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Sec VI,
Recommended Rules for Care and Operation of Heating Boilers ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel, Sec
VIII, Pressure Vessels, including Appendix ANSI/ASME B31.3, Chemical Plant and Petroleum Refinery
Piping ANSI/ASME Power Piping B31.Wherever the code differs and/or conflicts, the more appropriate
practice shall apply inagreement with Client/PMC/Owner.L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&TCHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
DEFINITION OF TERMS3.1 Pressure Relief DeviceActuated by inlet static pressure to prevent a rise of
internal fluid pressure in excess ofspecified design value. The device may be a pressure relief valve, a
non-reclosing pressurerelief device or a vacuum relief valve. Pressure Relief Valve: Non-reclosing
pressure Vacuum relief A pressure relief device relief device: Device: designed to open and relieve A
pressure relief device excess pressure and to reclose which remains open after after normal conditions
have operation. been restored. a). Rupture disk device: a). Relief valve: Valve opens Actuated by static
normally in proportion to the differential pressure pressure increase over the between the inlet & opening
pressure. Used outlet of the device and primarily with incompressible designed to function by fluids.
bursting of a rupture b). Safety valve: Characterized disk. by rapid opening or pop action. a). Pinactuated device: Normally used with Actuated by static compressible fluids. pressure and designed to c).
Safety Relief valve: May be function by buckling or used as either a safety or relief breaking a pin, which
valve depending on the holds a piston or plug in application. place.3.2 System pressures (Refer
Annexure-1, Figure-1) Maximum operating pressure is the maximum pressure expected during normal
system operation. Maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP) is the maximum permissible gauge
pressure at the designated coincident temperature. This pressure is determined by the vessel design rules
for each element of vessel using actual nominal thickness, exclusive of any other allowances such as
corrosion etc. The MAWP is normally greater than the design pressure but must be equal to design
pressure when design rules are used only to calculate the minimum thickness for each element and
calculations are not made to determine the value of MAWP. The MAWP is the basis for the pressure
setting of the pressure relief devices. Design pressure of the vessel along with design temperature is
used to determine the minimum permissible thickness of each vessel element. This pressure may be used
in place of MAWP where MAWP has not been established. Design pressure is equal to or less than
MAWP.L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA
PERSONNEL ONLY
Accumulation is the pressure increase over the MAWP of the vessel allowed during discharge through
pressure relief device, expressed in pressure units or % of MAWP or design pressure. Overpressure is
the pressure increase over the set pressure of the relieving device allowed to achieve rated flow,
expressed in pressure units or % of set pressure. It is same as accumulation when the relieving device is
set to open at MAWP of the vessel.3.3 Device Pressures Set pressure is the inlet gauge pressure at
which the device is set to open under service conditions. In general, the set pressure of single installed
PSV is equal to the MAWP of the protective equipment. If the MAWP is not defined, the design pressure
would be applicable for the set pressure. Backpressure is the pressure that exists at the outlet of pressure
relief device as a result of the pressure in the discharge system. It is the sum of the superimposed and
built-up backpressures. Built-up Backpressure is the increase in pressure at the outlet of pressure relief
device that develops as a result of flow after the pressure relief device or devices open. Superimposed
backpressure is the static pressure that exists at the outlet of pressure relief device at the time the device
is required to operate. It is the result of pressure in the discharge system coming from other source and
may be constant or variable.3.4 Relieving conditions The term relieving conditions is used to indicate the
inlet pressure and temperature on a pressure relief device during an overpressure condition.4.0
PRESSURE RELIEF VALVES Pressure relief devices are required for all equipment subject to
overpressure that results from outside pressure sources, external heat input or exothermic reactions. This
section summarizes the design approach to the sizing and selection of pressure relief devices to protect
equipment against overpressure from operating and fire contingencies. All pressure relief devices shall be
stamped with the ASME Code Symbol for Section I or for Section VIII application as required. All
pressure relief valves shall be bench tested to verify the set pressure prior to final installations, except
those requiring in situ testing for ASME Section I applications. Acceptable types of pressure relief
devices include spring-loaded pressure relief valves, pilot-operated pressure relief valves, rupture disks
and rupture pins. Pressure relief valves shall be designed and constructed in accordance with API STD
526 and API STD 527 and sized in accordance with API RP 520 PT I and API RP 521. For pressure
relief valves in water and steam services, appropriate sections of the ASME Code shall apply. The ASME
Code shall be the minimum acceptable where local codes do not cover relief valves or are less stringent.
Weight-loaded pressure relief valves shall not be used without OWNER / PMC approval. Venting and
breathing equipment for low-pressure, aboveground storage tanks at less than 1.03 bar gauge (15 psig)
shall be sized as specified by API STD 2000, Sections 1-3 or API STD 620, Section 6.L&T -CHIYODA
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 8 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN4.1 Types of
Pressure Relief Valves4.1.1 Conventional pressure relief valveIt is a spring loaded pressure relief valve
whose operational characteristics are directly affectedby changes in the backpressure. (Refer Annexure1, Figure-2)The operation of a conventional spring loaded pressure relief valve is based on a force
balance(Refer Annexure-1, Figure-19). The spring load is preset to equal the force exerted on theclosed
disc by the inlet fluid when the system pressure is at the set pressure of the valve. Whenthe inlet pressure
is below the set pressure, the disc remains seated on the nozzle in the closedposition. When the inlet
pressure exceeds set pressure, the pressure force on the discovercomes the spring force and the valve
opens. When inlet pressure is reduced to a levelbelow the set pressure, the valve re-closes. The pressure
at which the valve re-seats is theclosing pressure. The difference between the set pressure and the
closing pressure is blowdown.4.1.2 Balanced pressure relief valveIt is a spring-loaded pressure relief
valve that incorporates a bellows or other means forminimizing the effect of backpressure on the
operational characteristics of the valve. (ReferAnnexure-1, Figure-3)When a superimposed backpressure
is applied to the outlet of a spring-loaded pressure reliefvalve, a pressure force is applied to the valve disc
which is additive to the spring force. Thisadded force increases the pressure at which an unbalanced
pressure relief valve will open. Ifthe superimposed backpressure is variable then the pressure at which
the valve will open willvary (Refer Annexure-1, Figure-22). In a balanced-bellows pressure relief valve, a
bellows isattached to the disc holder with a pressure area AB, approximately equal to the seating area
ofthe disc, AN, (Refer Annexure-1, Figure-23). This isolates an area on the disc, approximatelyequal to
the disc seat area, from the backpressure. With the addition of a bellows, therefore, theset pressure of
the pressure relief valve will remain constant in spite of variations in backpressure. It is important to
remember that the bonnet of a balanced pressure relief valve mustbe vented to the atmosphere at all times
for the bellows to perform properly.When the superimposed backpressure is constant, the spring load
can be reduced tocompensate for the effect of backpressure on set pressure and a balanced valve is not
required.Balanced pressure relief valves should be considered where the built up backpressure is toohigh
for conventional pressure relief valve. Balanced pressure relief valves may also be used asa means to
isolate the guide, spring, bonnet and other top works parts within the valve from therelieving fluid.4.1.3
Pilot operated pressure relief valveIt is a pressure relief valve in which the major relieving device or main
valve is combined withand controlled by a self-actuated auxiliary pressure relief valve (pilot). (Refer
Annexure-1,Figure-6)A pilot operated relief valve consists of the main valve, which normally encloses a
floatingunbalanced piston assembly, and an external pilot. The piston is designed to have a larger
areaL&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA
PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 9 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGNon the top
than on the bottom. Up to the set pressure, the top and bottom areas are exposed tothe same inlet
operating pressure. Because of the larger area on the top of the piston, the netforce holds the piston
tightly against the main valve nozzle. As the operating pressureincreases, the net seating force increases
and tends to make the valve tighter. This featureallows most pilot operated valves to be used where the
maximum expected operating pressureis higher than the percentage shown in Annexure-1, Figure-1. At
the set pressure, the pilotvents the pressure from the top of the piston; the resulting net force is now
upward causing thepiston to lift, and process flow is established through the main valve. After the
overpressureincident, the pilot will close the vent from the top of the piston; thereby reestablishingpressure, and the net force will cause the piston to reseat.The lift of the main valve piston or
diaphragm, unlike a conventional or balanced spring-loaded valve, is not affected by built-up
backpressure. This allows for even higher pressures inthe relief discharge manifolds. The pilot vent can
be either directly exhausted to atmosphere orto the main valve outlet depending upon the pilots design
and users requirement. Only abalanced type of pilot, where set pressure is unaffected by backpressure,
should be installedwith its exhaust connected to a location with varying pressure (such as to main valve
outlet).Slight variations in back pressure may be acceptable for unbalanced pilots.4.2 Back
PressurePressure existing at the outlet of a pressure relief valve is defined as backpressure. Regardlessof
whether the valve is vented directly to atmosphere or the discharge is piped to a collectionsystem, the
backpressure may affect the operation of the pressure relief valve. Effects due tobackpressure may
include variations in opening pressure, reduction in flow capacity, instabilityor a combination of all
three.Backpressure, which is present at the outlet of pressure relief valve when it is required tooperate, is
defined as superimposed backpressure. This backpressure can be constant if thevalve outlet is connected
to a process vessel or system, which is held at a constant pressure. Inmost cases, however the
superimposed backpressure will be variable as a result of changingconditions existing in the discharge
system.Backpressure, which develops in the discharge system after the pressure relief valve opens,
isdefined as built-up backpressure. Built-up backpressure occurs due to pressure drop in thedischarge
system as a result of flow from the pressure relief valve.The magnitude of the backpressure, which
exists at the outlet of a pressure relief valve, after ithas opened, is the total of the superimposed and builtup backpressure.4.2.1 Effects of superimposed back pressure on pressure relief valve
openingSuperimposed backpressure at the outlet of a conventional spring loaded pressure relief valveacts
to hold the valve disc closed with a force additive to the spring force. The actual springsetting can be
reduced by an amount equal to the superimposed backpressure to compensate forthis.Balanced pressure
relief valves utilize a bellow or piston to minimize or eliminate the effect ofsuperimposed backpressure on
set pressure. Many pilot operated pressure relief valves havepilots which are vented to atmosphere or are
balanced to maintain set pressure in the presenceof variable superimposed back pressure. Balanced spring
loaded or pilot operated pressureL&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL
ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 10 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGNrelief valves
should be considered if the superimposed backpressure is variable. However, ifamount of variable
superimposed backpressure is small, a conventional valve could be usedprovided: The set pressure has
been compensated for any superimposed back pressure normally present and The maximum pressure
during relief does not exceed the code-allowed limits for accumulation in the equipment being
protected.4.2.2 Effects of back pressure on pressure relief valve operation and flow
capacityConventional Pressure Relief Valves:Conventional pressure relief valves show unsatisfactory
performance when excessivebackpressure develops during a relief incident, due to the flow through the
valve and outletpiping. The backpressure tends to reduce the lifting force, which is holding the valve
open.Excessive built-up backpressure can cause the valve to operate in an unstable manner.
Thisinstability may occur as flutter or chatter. Chatter refers to the abnormally rapid reciprocatingmotion
of the pressure relief valve disc where the disc contacts the pressure relief valve seatduring cycling. This
type of operation may cause damage to the valve and interconnectingpiping. Flutter is similar to chatter
except that the disc does not come in to contact with the seatduring cycling.In a conventional pressure
relief valve application, built-up back pressure should not exceed10% of the set pressure at 10%
allowable overpressure. When the back pressure is expected toexceed these specified limits, a balanced
or pilot operated pressure relief valve should bespecified.Balanced Pressure Relief Valves:A balanced
pressure relief valve should be used where the built-up backpressure is too high forconventional pressure
relief valves or where the superimposed back pressure varies widelycompared to the set pressure.
Balanced valves can typically be applied where the total backpressure (superimposed + built-up) does not
exceed approx. 50% of the set pressure. Thespecific manufacturer should be consulted concerning the
backpressure limitation of aparticular valve design.With a balanced valve, high backpressure will tend to
produce a closing force on theunbalanced portion of the disc. This force may result in a reduction in lift
and an associatedreduction in flow capacity. Capacity correction factors, called back pressure correction
factors,are provided by manufacturer to account for reduction in this flow. Typical
backpressurecorrection factors may be found for compressible fluid service in figure-30 and
forincompressible fluid (liquid) service in figure-31.Pilot-Operated Pressure Relief Valves:For pilotoperated pressure relief valves, the valve lift is not affected by back pressure. Forcompressible fluids at
critical flow conditions, a back pressure correction factor of 1.0 shouldbe used.L&T -CHIYODA
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 11 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN4.2.3 Effects
of back pressure and header design on pressure relief valve sizing and selection The pressure relief valve
discharge line and flare header must be designed so that the built-up backpressure does not exceed the
allowable limits. In addition, the flare header system must be designed in order to ensure that the
superimposed backpressure caused by venting or relief from another source will not prevent relief valve
from opening at a pressure adequate to protect equipment as per applicable code. For a balanced
pressure relief valve, superimposed backpressure will not affect the set pressure of the relief valve.
However total backpressure may affect the capacity of the relief valve. Sizing a balanced relief valve is a
two step process: - The relief valve is sized using a preliminary backpressure correction factor, Kb. Once a preliminary valve size and capacity is determined, the discharge line and header size can be
determined based on pressure drop calculations. - The final size, capacity, backpressure and
backpressure correction factor can then be calculated. For a pilot operated pressure relief valve, neither
the set pressure nor the capacity is typically affected by backpressure for compressible fluids at critical
flow conditions. Tail pipe and flare header sizing are typically based on other considerations.5.0 SET
PRESSURE, ACCUMULATION LIMITS AND RELIEVING PRESSURE Contingency Single Valve
Installations Multiple Valve Installations Maximum Maximum Maximum Set Maximum Set pressure
Accumulated pressure % Accumulated % pressure % pressure % Nonfire Cases First Valve 100 110 100
116 Additional - - 105 116 valve(s) Fire Cases First Valve 100 121 100 121 Additional - - 105 121
valve(s) Supplemental - - 110 121 valveL&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA
PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 12 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGNAll values are
% of MAWP. The maximum accumulated pressure equals to the relievingpressure of PSV.Example:
Determination of Relieving Pressure for a Single-Valve Installation
(OperatingContingencies)Characteristic ValueValve Set Pressure Less than MAWP Protected vessel
MAWP, psig 100.0 Maximum accumulated pressure, psig 110.0 Valve set pressure, psig 90.0 Allowable
overpressure, psi 20.0 Relieving pressure, P1, psia 124.7Valve Set Pressure Equal to MAWP Protected
vessel MAWP, psig 100.0 Maximum accumulated pressure, psig 110.0 Valve set pressure, psig 100.0
Allowable overpressure, psi 10.0 Relieving pressure, P1, psia 124.7Example: Determination of Relieving
Pressure for a Multiple-Valve Installation(Operating Contingencies)Characteristic ValueFirst Valve (Set
Pressure Equal to MAWP) Protected vessel MAWP, psig 100.0 Maximum accumulated pressure, psig
116.0 Valve set pressure, psig 100.0 Allowable overpressure, psi 16.0 Relieving pressure, P1, psia
130.7Additional Valve (Set Pressure Equal to 105% of MAWP) Protected vessel MAWP, psig 100.0
Maximum accumulated pressure, psig 116.0 Valve set pressure, psig 105.0 Allowable overpressure, psi
11.0 Relieving pressure, P1, psia 130.7Example: Determination of Relieving Pressure for a Single-Valve
Installation (FireContingencies)Characteristic ValueValve Set Pressure Less than MAWP Protected vessel
overpressure, psi 31.0 Relieving pressure, P1, psia 135.7L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&TCHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 13 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGNValve Set
Pressure Equal to MAWP Protected vessel MAWP, psig 100.0 Maximum accumulated pressure, psig
121.0 Valve set pressure, psig 100.0 Allowable overpressure, psi 21.0 Relieving pressure, P1, psia
135.7Example: Determination of Relieving Pressure for a Multiple-Valve Installation
(FireContingencies)Characteristic ValueFirst Valve (Set Pressure Equal to MAWP) Protected vessel
overpressure, psi 21.0 Relieving pressure, P1, psia 135.7Additional Valve (Set Pressure Equal to 105%
MAWP) Protected vessel MAWP, psig 100.0 Maximum accumulated pressure, psig 121.0 Valve set
pressure, psig 105.0 Allowable overpressure, psi 16.0 Relieving pressure, P1, psia 135.7For steam
Boilers: As per ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section-I, Set pressure and Accumulation limits
Single Valve Installations Multiple Valve Installations Maximum Maximum Maximum Maximum Set
Accumulated Set pressure Accumulated pressure % pressure % % pressure % (As per ASME PG- (As
per ASME PG- 72 & PG-67.5) 72 & PG-67.5) First Valve 100 103 ** 100 103 ** Additional - - 103 103
** valve ** Maximum up to 106% of MAWP (as per ASME PG-67.2). However, normally safety valves
shall be designed to attain full lift at a pressure no greater than 3% above their set pressure (As per ASME
PG-72). All values are % of MAWP. The maximum accumulated pressure equals to the relieving pressure
of PSV.L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA
PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 14 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN Number of
PSVs Each boiler shall have at least one safety valve / safety relief valve and if it has more than 500 ft2
(47 m2) of bare tube water heating surface, or if an electric boiler has a power input more than 1100
kW, it shall have two or more safety valve / safety relief valves. For a boiler with combined bare tube and
extended water-heating surface exceeding 500 ft2 (47 m2), two or more safety valve / safety relief
valves are required only if the design steam generating capacity of the boiler exceeds 4000 lb/hr (1800
kg/hr).6.0 OVERPRESSURE6.1 Over Pressure CriteriaAll equipment and piping systems must be
protected when the internal or external pressure canexceed the design condition of the system due to an
emergency, upset condition, operationalerror, instrument malfunction or fire. Pressure relieving devices
are installed to ensure that asystem or any of its components are not subjected to pressures that exceed
the code-allowablepressure accumulation. Any circumstance that reasonably constitutes an overpressure
typehazard under the prevailing conditions shall be analyzed and evaluated.Assumptions - It is assumed
that trained operators will staff the plant. - In evaluating a given emergency condition, certain
assumptions must be made concerning equipment not affected by the emergency in order that relief rate
may be determined. - The simultaneous occurrence of two or more conditions which could result in
overpressure will not be considered if the causes are unrelated, i.e., if no process, mechanical, or
electrical commonality exists among the causes. - The opening and closing action of control valves and
the automatic start-up of equipment will not be considered as a substitute for pressure relieving devices
for equipment protection because power supply to these items in an emergency is not considered reliable.
As a general rule, final overpressure protection is to be provided by means of a mechanical pressurerelieving device. - Equipment not affected by a utility failure being evaluated will be considered to remain
in operation while control functions and other systems will be assumed to operate as designed. - Flow
rates through the equipment and other conditions during the emergency will be assumed to be at the
normal rates except where the particular primary emergency case under consideration would alter the
flow. - In case of fire, the flow is assumed to have stopped and been contained within a defined system.
- The possibility of an operator inadvertently opening or closing any one valve or taking any incorrect
action in the wrong sequence or at the wrong time will be considered. (However, block valves, electric
switches, and other equipment items that are locked or car sealed in the correct position will not be
considered involved in any cases of operator error).L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&TCHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 15 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN6.2 Principal
CausesThe following lists some common principal causes of overpressure, which shall be analyzed
todetermine the individual relieving flow rates for pressure relieving devices. Also, clarificationof the
failure and overpressure protection device is provided where applicable.The list is not intended to be allinclusive but is intended to serve as a guide.1. External Fire2. Exit Block Or Blocked Outlet3. Cooling Or
Column Reflux Failure Or Pump around failure4. Tube Rupture5. Control Valve Failure6. Hydraulic /
Thermal Expansion7. Power Failure8. Instrument Air Failure9. Loss of fan in air cooled exchangers10.
Cooling water failure11. Abnormal heat input to reboiler.12. Check Valve mal-operation13. Loss of Heat
in series fractionation system14. Liquid Overfill7.0 PSV RELIEF LOAD CALCULATIONS AND
PHILOSOPHY7.1 External FireAssume that all fluid flow to the equipment has stopped, and that the
liquid level inside theequipment is at the top of its normal working range.In calculating fire loads from
individual vessels, assume that vapor is generated by fireexposure and heat transfer to contained liquids at
operating conditions. The calculationprocedure is as mentioned below.For determining pressure relief
device capacity for several interconnected vessels, each vesselshould be calculated separately, rather than
determining the heat input on the basis of thesummation of the total wetted surfaces of all vessels.
Vapors generated by normal process heatinput are not considered. No credit is taken for any escape path
for fire load vapors other thanthrough the pressure relief device (which may be a common relief valve for
more than oneconnected vessel), nor is credit allowed for reduction in the fire load by the
continuedfunctioning of condensers or coolers.Equipment, which normally operates dry, must be
evaluated for the expansion of vapor orsupercritical fluid due to fire. A procedure is as mentioned under
section for unwetted areacalculations.The insulation system for an equipment item shall be considered
individually. Credit may betaken for equipment insulation in reducing the required relief load if project
specificationsconcerning fireproofing insulation are met.L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&TCHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 16 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGNSee
calculation procedure for details.For vessels filled with both a liquid and a solid (such as molecular sieves
or catalysts), thebehavior of the vessel contents normally precludes the cooling effect of liquid boiling.
Hencefireproofing and depressurizing should be considered as alternatives to protection by pressurerelief
devices, unless provision of pressure relief is required by local regulations.Piping and piping components
are generally not considered to require protection againstoverpressure due to fire exposure, consistent
with requirements of ASME B31.3.To determine the total vapor capacity to be relieved when several
vessels are exposed to asingle fire, a processing area may be divided into a number of smaller single fire
risk areas byincreased spacing. A single fire risk area is defined as a group of equipment items that
issurrounded on all sides by clear access ways that are at least 6 metre wide. The space underpipe racks
is considered an access way if it is at least 6 metre wide. For the estimation of thevapor relief load, it is
assumed that all (and only) the equipment contained within a single firerisk area is exposed to the same
fire. The largest of the vapor relief loads calculated from eachof the individual fire risk areas into which
the plant is subdivided is used as the basis for theanalysis of the vapor collection system (if any) based on
fire exposure.Overpressure protection from fire exposure for heat exchangers: In general, heat
exchangers donot need a separate pressure relief device for protection against fire exposure since they
areusually protected by pressure relief devices in interconnected equipment or have an openescape path
to atmosphere through cooling water return lines. This is true even if the heatexchanger has a manual
block valve between it and the pressure relief device since it is notexpected that operators will close this
valve during a fire incident. However, in situationswhere a fail-close control valve or an automatically
actuated emergency isolation valve couldisolate the heat exchanger from the pressure relief device
providing protection against fireexposure, a separate pressure relief device to protect the exchanger may
be required.Fire exposure protection for heat exchangers that are provided with blocks and bypasses
topermit cleaning while the rest of the unit is operating, present a special situation. Again,interconnected
equipment usually provides the required overpressure protection but theseexchangers are expected to be
occasionally isolated from the system. In this case, one of twooptions is available to provide protection:
installing a pressure relief device or relying onoperating procedures. If the operating procedure option is
used, this operating procedure mustdirect the operators to drain all liquid from the exchanger immediately
upon isolating it fromthe system, and maintaining the exchanger dry" and unpressurized during the
period of time itis isolated from the pressure relief device that would normally provide protection. To
increasethe probability that this operating procedure is followed, a caution sign to that effect shall
bepermanently placed at the block valves of all exchangers equipped with a bypass.Fire exposure
overpressure protection for air-cooled exchangers is discussed in belowmentioned calculation
procedure.L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&TCHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 17 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM
DESIGNCALCULATION PROCEDURE FOR EXTERNAL FIRE SCENARIO:Refer ANNEXURE-5,
Section-18.5.1 (Examples for Calculation of Relief).1. For Wetted Surface: The following formula should
be applied. The process flows from / to the system would be stopped and the protective equipment is
assumed to be contained within defined system. Q W =
...(Eq.01) L Where adequate drainage and
firefighting equipment exist; Q = 21000 F A 0 . 82 ; For British unit..(Eq.02) Q =
27140 F A 0 . 82 ; For Metric unit..(Eq.03) Where adequate drainage and
firefighting equipment do not exist; Q = 34500 F A 0 . 82 ; For British unit..
(Eq.04) Q = 61000 F A 0 . 82 ; For Metric unit(Eq.05) Where; British unit
Metric unit W : Relieving Capacity lb/h kg/h Q : Total heat absorption (input) to the Btu/h kcal/h wetted
surface F : Environmental Factor (#1) - - A : Total wetted surface (#2) ft2 m2 L : Latent heat (#3) Btu/lb
kcal/kgIn calculating the total wetted surface of the equipment, the expanded volume of the liquid inthe
vessel should be used. The expanded volume includes the thermal expansion of the liquidas it is heated
from its initial temperature to its boiling point at the accumulated vesselpressure.These equations apply to
process vessels and pressurized storage. For storage vessels withdesign pressure of 15 psig (100 kPa) or
lower see API 2000 for recommended heat absorptiondue to fire(#1) Environmental FactorRefer to
Annexure-2(#2) Wetted Surface Exposed to FireThe wetted surface area used to calculate heat
absorption for a practical fire situation isnormally taken to be the total wetted surface within 25 ft (7.62
m) above grade. Grade"L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 18 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGNusually
refers to ground level, but any other level at which a major fire could be sustained,such as a solid
platform, should also be considered. In the case of vessels containing a variablelevel of liquid, the high
level is considered. Specific interpretations of A to be used for variousvessels are as follows:1. Horizontal
Drums The wetted vessel surface within 25 ft (7.62 m) above grade, based on high liquid level, is used.2.
Vertical Drums - The wetted vessel surface within 25 ft (7.62 m) above grade, based on high liquid level,
is used.3. Fractionators and Other Towers - An equivalent tower dumped" level is calculated by adding
the liquid holdup on the trays to the liquid at high liquid level hold up at the tower bottom. The surface
that is wetted by this equivalent level and which is within 25 ft (7.62 m) above grade is used. Level in the
reboiler is to be included, if reboiler is an integral part of the column4. Storage Spheres - The total
surface exposed within 25 ft (7.62 m) above grade, or up to the elevation of the centerline whichever is
greater, is used.5. Shell and Tube Heat Exchangers and Piping - The surface area of a tower reboiler and
its interconnecting piping should be included in the wetted surface of exposed vessels in a fire risk area.
The surface area of piping, other than that for reboiler, is not normally included in the wetted surface
area.6. Storage tanks - Maximum inventory level up to the height of 25 ft (7.62 m) (portions of the
wetted area in contact with foundation or ground are normally excluded). For tanks of 15-psig operating
pressure or less; see API STD 2000.7. Air Cooled Exchangers:Refer to API RP 521 sect. 3.15.7OrOnly
that portion of the bare surface on air-cooled exchangers located within the fire zone areabeing evaluated
needs to be considered in the calculation of fire loads. Air fins located directlyabove pipe racks are also
normally excluded since they are shielded from radiation by thepiping. The bare area is used instead of
the finned area because most types of fins would bedestroyed within the first few minutes of fire
exposure.The following types of air-cooled exchangers need not be considered in the calculation of
reliefloads due to fire:Gas cooling services. There will be no vapor generation due to fire and the tubes
are likely tofail due to overheating.Air-cooled partial or total condensers that meet the following criteria: a.
The tubes are sloped so that they are self-draining. b. There is no control valve or pump connected
directly to the condenser liquid outlet.For these services, condensation will stop in the event of a fire, and
any residual condensatewill drain freely to the downstream receiver. However, in this case, the normal
condensingload for the air-cooled condenser must be added to the calculated fire load from other
sources,unless it can be established that the source of condensing vapors would stop in the event of
aL&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA
PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 19 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGNfire.For aircooled condensers that do not meet the above criteria, and for liquid coolers, the wettedarea used to
calculate the relief load should be the bare area of the tubes located within the firezone area and within 25
feet (7.5m) above grade (or any other surface at which a major firecould be sustained, such as a solid
platform). For tubes located higher than 25 feet (7.5m)above grade (or other surface at which a major
fire could be sustained), the wetted area shall betaken as zero for forced draft units (the tubes would be
shielded from radiant heat exposure bythe fan hood) and as the projected area (length times width) of the
tube bundle for induceddraft units.8. Piping:It may be appropriate to add a percentage of the vessel area
to account for vapor generation inpiping associated with the vessel under consideration.(#3) Latent Heat
calculationsIf relieving pressure is beyond critical pressure, use 50 Btu/lb as latent heat.Single Component
Systems:Refer to Annexure-3 (Vapor pressure and Heat of vaporization for pure single
componentparaffin hydrocarbon liquids)OrFor single component systems, the term equals the latent
heat of vaporization at relievingconditions. It may be determined from a flash calculation as the difference
in the specificenthalpies o f the vapor and liquid phases in equilibrium with each other, or it may be
obtainedfrom API RP 521, Appendix A, Figure A-1 or other literature sources. For such systems,
thelatent heat, the vaporization temperature, and the physical properties of the liquid and vaporphases in
equilibrium remain constant as the vaporization proceeds. The peak relief load willalways occur at the
start of the fire, when the wetted surface, A, and consequently, the heatinput, Q, are both at a
maximum.Multi-component Systems:Refer to Annexure-3 (Vapor pressure and Heat of vaporization for
pure single componentparaffin hydrocarbon liquids)OrFor multi-component systems, the vaporization of
the liquid initially in the vessel at the start ofthe fire proceeds as a batch distillation in which the
temperature, vapor flow rate andphysical properties of the vapor and liquid in equilibrium with each other
change continuouslyas the vaporization proceeds. The peak relief load may or may not coincide with the
start ofthe fire. In general, such systems require a time-dependent analysis to determine the requiredrelief
area and the corresponding relief rate. The following approach is suggested: Assumethat all vapor and
liquid inflows into and outflows from the vessel (other than the fire reliefload) have stopped.Using the
composition of the residual liquid inventory in the vessel, perform a bubble pointflash at the accumulated
pressure. In doing this flash, the flow rate of the feed stream to theflash can be set at any arbitrary value.
For convenience, it is suggested that the mass flow ratebe set numerically equal to the mass inventory of
liquid initially in the vessel or 1000 units ofmass flow rate (lb/h or kg/s).Flash the liquid from the
preceding flash at constant pressure and the weight percent vaporizedL&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL
ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 20 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGNequal to 1%
to 5%. Divide the heat duty calculated for this flash by the mass flow rate ofvapor generated. The result
is the heat absorbed per unit mass of vapor generated, . NOTETHAT, IN GENERAL, THIS VALUE
WILL NOT EQUAL THE LATENT HEAT OFVAPORIZATION, NOR WILL IT EQUAL THE
DIFFERENCE IN VAPOR AND LIQUIDSPECIFIC ENTHALPIES. In fact, the value thus calculated will
generally exceed the latentheat of vaporization, especially in the case of wide boiling mixtures. The reason
is that asignificant portion of the heat absorbed goes into raising the temperature of the system (mostof
which is residual liquid at this point) to the equilibrium temperature of the flash (i.e. sensibleheat).Using
the value of calculated from Step 3; calculate the relief vapor rate, W2. For Un-wetted Surface: Unwetted wall vessels are those in which the internal walls are exposed to a gas, vapor or super-critical
fluid. The following formula should be applied:
1 . 1506
.(Eq.06)
T1
A (T W T 1 )1 . 25
W = 0 . 1406 M P1
Where; W : Relieving Capacity lb/hr M : Molecular Weight of
Gas lb/lbmole P1 : Relieving pressure (=set pr.+allow. Over press.+atm. Press.) psia (lb/in2 A) A :
Exposed surface area ft2 TW : Vessel wall temperature R The recommended maximum vessel wall
temp. for the usual carbon steel plate material is 1100 F (593.33 C). Where vessels are fabricated from
alloy materials, the value for TW should be changed to more appropriate recommended maximum. T1 :
Gas temperature, absolute, in R, at the upstream relieving pressure, R determined from the relationship,
P1
T1 =
Where, Pn : Normal operating gas pressure, psia (lb/in2 A) Tn :
Normal operating gas temp. in RRelieving temperature for wetted & un-wetted surface are often above
the design temperatureof the equipment being protected. If, however, the elevated temperature is likely to
causevessel rupture, additional protective measures should be considered such as: Cooling the surface of
a vessel with water Depressuring systems Earth-covered storageL&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 21 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN7.2 Blocked /
Closed Outlets (Exit block)Refer ANNEXURE-5, Section-18.5.2 (Examples for Calculation of Relief).The
capacity of the relief device must be at least as great as the capacity of the sources ofpressure. If all
outlets are not blocked, the capacity of the unblocked outlets may properly beconsidered.The quantity of
material to be relieved should be determined at conditions thatcorrespond to the set pressure plus
overpressure instead of at normal operatingconditions.The effect of friction drop in the connecting line
between the source of overpressure and thesystem being protected should also be considered in
determining the capacity requirement.Base for relief capacity (blocked outlet): Liquid relief Vapor relief
Maximum liquid pump-in rate Total incoming steam and vapor that generated therein at relieving
conditions7.3 Cooling or Column Reflux or Pump around failureRefer ANNEXURE-5, Section-18.5.3
(Examples for Calculation of Relief).Reflux Flow Failure - In some cases, failure of reflux (e.g., pump
shutdown or valve closure)will cause flooding of the condenser, which is equivalent to the pressure relief
valve capacityrequired for total loss of coolant. Compositional changes caused by loss of reflux may
producedifferent vapor properties, which affect the relieving capacity. Usually, a pressure relief
valvesized for total tower overhead will be adequate for this condition, but each case must beexamined in
relation to the particular components and system involved.Pump around Flow Failure - The relief
requirement is in the vapor condensed by the pumparound circuit evaluated at the relieving pressure and
temperature. Pinch out" of steam heatersmay be considered, if appropriate. When pump around duty is
high, or the feed to thefractionators is highly superheated, loss of a pump around may cause a significant
reduction intower cooling and result in dry-out of the tower. Therefore, the potential for dry-out should
beevaluated. The relief load due to fractionators dry-out is usually the sum of the entire vaporfeeds
entering the fractionator plus any stripping steam or reboiler vapor (where applicable).Because of the
difficulty in calculating detailed heat and material balances at relievingpressure, the simplified bases
described in following table have generally been accepted fordetermining relieving rates.1 Total
condensing The relief requirement is the total incoming vapor rate to the condenser, recalculated at
temperature that corresponds to the new vapor composition at relieving pressure and the heat input
prevailing at the time of relief. The surge capacity of the overhead accumulator at the normal liquid level
is generally limited to less than 10 minutes. If cooling failure exceeds this time, reflux is lost, and the
overhead composition, temperature and vapor rate may change significantly.2 Partial The relief
requirement is the difference between the incoming andL&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&TCHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 22 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN condensing
outgoing vapor rate at relieving conditions. The incoming vapor rate shall be calculated on the same basis
as total condensing. If the composition or rate of the reflux is changed, the incoming vapor rate to the
condenser should be determined for the new conditions.3 Fan Failure (AFC Because of natural
convection effects, credit for a partial failure) condensing capacity of 20% to 30% of normal duty is
often used unless the effects at relieving conditions are determined to be significantly different.4 Louver
closure Louver closure on air-cooled condensers is considered to be total failure of the coolant with the
resultant capacity established in point 1 & 2.5 Top-tower reflux Total incoming steam and vapor plus that
generated therein at failure relieving conditions less vapor condensed by side stream reflux.6 Pump
around The relief requirement is the vaporization rate caused by an amount circuit of heat equal to that
removed in the pump around circuit. The latent heat of vaporization would correspond to the latent heat
under relieving conditions.7 Side stream Difference between vapor entering and leaving section at
relieving reflux failure conditions.7.4 Tube Rupture / Plate & Frame Heat Exchanger FailureRefer
ANNEXURE- 5, Section-18.5.4 (Examples for Calculation of Relief).Regarding the heat exchangers,
there are some failure modes where the lower pressure sidecould be exposed to fluid from the highpressure side.When design pressure of the low-pressure side is equal to or greater than ten-thirteenth
thedesign pressure of the high-pressure side, no need to calculate the relieving rate due to
tuberupture.Tube failure shall be considered a potential source of overpressure for the low-pressure side
ofheat exchangers except for the following heat exchanger types:(a) Tubular reactors and waste heat
boilers with tubes 1.5 in. (38 mm) and larger in diameter, in which the tubes have wall thickness
equivalent to process piping, and in which the tubes are welded to the tube sheet.,(b) Double-pipe
exchangers except those with multiple tubes.(c) Shell and tube exchangers that meet ALL of the
following criteria: (1) Tube vibration is not likely based on a rigorous tube vibration analysis. (2) Tube
wall thickness is at least one standard gauge thicker than the minimum required for the specified material
or a detailed equipment strategy has been developed, documented and reviewed by experienced
equipment specialists (both mechanical and metallurgical). The equipment strategy must specifically
recognize the application of the 6mm corrosion hole concept (see below) and, consider all potential
Equipment Degradation Modes. In addition, inspection data with similar designs, process conditions and
metallurgy should confirm that no degradation has been found.L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 23 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN (3) The
tubes are not subject to erosion. (4) The tubes will operate at temperatures warmer than -150F
(-101C). (5) The tubes are not subject to fatigue or creep. (6) The process fluid will not cause
aggressive corrosion or degradation of tubes and tube sheets (for example pitting from salt deposits,
corrosion from acidic condensates or stress corrosion cracking). (7) An appropriate tube inspection
program will be developed for the exchanger bundle in consultation with Materials Engineering
specialists.All these heat exchanger types shall be evaluated for potential overpressure in the event
ofleakage through a 0.25in. (6mm) Hole due to corrosion.If a pressure relief device is required to protect
the low-pressure side, the relief rate is definedby the maximum flow through the two open ends resulting
from a guillotine cut of a singletube at the tube sheet. In calculating this maximum flow rate, it is
assumed that the normalprocess flow into the low-pressure side has stopped and the pressure difference
across the tubeopening is the difference between the maximum operating pressure of the high-pressure
sideand the design (set) and/or relieving pressure of the low-pressure side.Flow rate capacity from both
side of a ruptured tube is defined as follows. It is based on asingle orifice equation with a discharge coefficient of 0.7. For liquids that do not flash whenthey pass through the opening or vapors, this formula
shall be applied.1. Liquid flow and conventional (conservative) equation for vapor flow: W = 0 . 7 A 2
(P1 P2 ) 1 ...(Eq.07)2. Critical vapor flow: P2 < 0.5 x P1
k 1
W = 0 . 7 A P1 1 k
k+1
k +1
.(Eq.08) In case k = 1.4 (conservative),
then W = 0 . 7 0 . 685 A P1 1 ..(Eq.09)3. Non critical vapor flow W = 0.7 0.685

A P 1 1 W = 0 .7 Y A 2 ( P1 P2 ) 1 .(Eq.10)L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL
2
...(Eq.11)
.5
1 r
1 r
Y= r
In case k = 1.4 (conservative), then
.(Eq.12)
k1
k 1
1r
1 r 0 . 286
Y = r 1 . 43 3
Where, W : Mass flow rate kg/s A : 1. For STHE:
Cross sectional area of one side of ruptured tube x 2 m2 2. For PLHE: (**) P1 : Absolute upstream
pressure based on maximum operating pressure pa a P2 : Absolute downstream pressure (PSV set
pressure) pa a r : P2 / P1 - k : Ratio of specific heat, Cp/Cv - : Density at upstream pressure kg/m3(**)
Plate and Frame Heat Exchanger failure case:The following two types of failure modes are recommended
based on experience(s) in pastprojects 1) Failure mode of a 6 mm "pinhole" from one side to the other,
which is referenced in API RP 521. 2) Gasket Failure Mode (Rectangular opening)The potential leak
should be quantified as the flow through orifice in the same way we woulddo it for a shell and tube
exchanger (assuming flow from the high pressure side set pressure tothe low pressure side relief
pressure). The size of the orifice should be calculated as thehydraulic equivalent of a rectangular opening
0.0625 (1/16) inch wide, with a length equal tothe diameter of the relevant inlet or outlet (semicylindrical) flow header on the exchanger. TheCrane fluid flow handbook has equations for calculating
the "hydraulic radius" for a circularopening equivalent to a flow path of arbitrary cross-section. This
method has the advantage ofbeing based on vendor input, and is consistent with the most industry
practice.For two phase flashing fluids, the flow models developed by DIERS and others shall be used
indetermining the relieving rate through the failure.L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&TCHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 25 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN7.5 Control
Valve failureRefer ANNEXURE- 5, Section-18.5.5 (Examples for Calculation of Relief).Automatic control
devices are generally actuated directly from the process or indirectly from aprocess variable (cascaded),
e.g., pressure, flow, liquid level, or temperature. When thetransmission signal or operating medium fails,
the control device will assume either a fullyopen or fully closed position according to its basic design (the
fail-safe position), althoughsome devices can be designed to remain stationary in the last controlled
position.When examining a process system for overpressure potential, it shall be assumed that any
oneautomatic control valve could be either open or closed, regardless of its specified fail-safeaction under
loss of its transmission signal or operating medium.When the control valve size (flow coefficient, Cv) is
known it shall be assumed that this sizevalve is installed, and the maximum flow rate through the fully
open control valve shall becalculated based on the installed Cv. If the required relief area for any pressure
relief device isdependent on, or may be affected by, the maximum flow rate through a control valve,
apermanent sign shall be attached to the control valve stating that the installed Cv shall not beincreased
without confirming the capacity of any pressure relief device that may be impactedby the proposed
change.As a minimum, the following individual control valve failures shall be considered in theanalysis of
control systems for determination of pressure relief requirements:(a) Failure in the closed position of a
control valve in an outlet stream from a vessel or system.(b) Failure in the wide-open position of a
control valve admitting fluid (liquid or vapor/gas) from a high-pressure source into a lower pressure
system.(c) Failure in the wide open position of a control valve which normally passes liquid from a highpressure source into a lower pressure system, followed by loss of liquid level in the upstream vessel and
flow of high-pressure vapor. No credit is allowed for the response of the level controller, which under
normal conditions would close the control valve upon loss of liquid level, since this scenario could be
caused by the level controller failure. If detailed analysis indicates that flow through the wide-open
control valve is mixed phase, then this should be considered when determining the maximum flow
through the control valve. High pressure may also be generated in the piping system as a result of liquid
slugs being pushed by the vapor; hence the potential for excessive pressure from this event should also
be evaluated.(d) Failure in the closed position of a control valve in a stream removing heat from a system.
(e) Failure in the open position of a control valve in a stream providing energy (heat) to a system.When a
control valve is equipped with a bypass, the installed flow coefficient (Cv) of thebypass valve shall not
exceed that of the control valve. The following additional scenariosshall be analyzed:(f) The control valve
fails wide open with its bypass valve partly open. To calculate the relieving rate for this case, the flow
rate through the partly open bypass valve is calculatedL&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&TCHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 26 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN using a Cv
for the partially open bypass valve equal to 50% of the installed Cv of the control valve in its wide-open
position, regardless of the actual size of the bypass valve.(g) The bypass valve is wide open with the
control valve closed or blocked-in. The relieving rate for this case is the flow rate through the wide-open
bypass valve using the installed Cv of the bypass valve in its fully open position.For the control valve or
its by pass valve that gives high differential pressure as describedbelow, the capacity of downstream PSV
must be at least as great as the capacity passingthrough the valve(s).P1 P2 x 1.5Where,P1: Upstream
pressure of control valve, kg/cm2 AP2: Downstream pressure of control valve, kg/cm2 AFlow rate
through a Failure opened control valve is calculated as follows:1. Liquid flow and conventional
(conservative) equation for vapor or steam flow: W = 27 . 3 C VE L (P1 P2 ) ..
(Eq.13)2. Critical vapor flow: P2 < 0.5 x P1 M W = 56 . 9 C VE P1 T1 ...
(Eq.14)3. Non critical vapor flow: W = 311 C VE N T1 (P 1 2 P2 2 ) .(Eq.15) W =
65 . 7 C VE M T1 (P 1 2 P2 2 ) ..(Eq. 16)L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&TCHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 27 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN4. Critical
Steam Flow: 11 . 76 C P1 W = VE 1 + (0 . 00126 T SH ) .(Eq.17)5. Non critical
steam flow: 13 . 51 C P2 2 2 VE P1 W = 1 + (0 . 00126 T SH ) ...(Eq.18)Where,W : Mass

flow rate kg/hrCVE : Control valve flow co-efficient, Or - Refer ANNEXURE-5, Ssection 18.5.5 for
CVE value table Or Refer (***) P1 : Pressure at control valve inlet based on the normal operating kg/cm2
A pressure P2 : Pressure at control valve outlet that is equal to PSV relieving kg/cm2 A pressure M :
Molecular weight kg / kgmole T1 : Temperature at control valve inlet K : Upstream vapor density at
normal conditions (= M/22.4141) kg/Nm3 L : Liquid density kg/m3 TSH : Steam degree of superheat (=
Superheated temp. Saturated K temp.)(***)Alternate method for calculation of Cv (During initial stage
before the control valve isselected): 1. At first, please calculate process required CV value for
corresponding control valve. 2. Use 200 % of calculated required CV value for PSV calculation for no
bypass configuration across control valve. 3. Use 300% of calculated required CV value for PSV
calculation with bypass valve (same size as that of main control valve) configuration [take as 200% is
max CV X 150% (50% is by bypass valve open)].Note:100% CV is process required CV value200% CV
is Max CV value300% CV is Max CV + bypass valve openL&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&TCHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
Hydraulic / Thermal ExpansionRefer ANNEXURE- 5, Section-18.5.6 (Examples for Calculation of
Relief).Thermal expansion is the increase in liquid volume caused by an increase in temperature.
Mostcommon causes are the following:1. Piping or vessels are blocked-in while they are filled with cold
liquid and are subsequently heated by heat tracing, coils, ambient heat gain or fire.2. An exchanger is
blocked-in on the cold side with flow in the hot side.3. Piping or vessels are blocked-in while they are
filled with liquid at near ambient temperatures and are heated by direct solar radiation. X 1 (NPS X
NPS 1) relief valve is commonly used. Two general applications for whichthermal relieving devices larger
than X 1 (NPS X NPS 1) relief valve might be requiredare long pipelines of large diameter in
uninsulated aboveground installations and large vesselsor exchangers operating liquid-full.For liquid full
systems, expansion rates for the sizing of relief devices that protect againstthermal expansion of the
trapped liquids can be approximated using the following formula: BH V = For British unit .
(Eq.19) 500 G C ; B H V = ; For Metric unit .(Eq.20) 997 G
CWhere, British unit Metric unit V : Relieving rate Gpm m3/hr B : Cubical expansion co-efficient (#1) for
the liquid at 1/ F 1/ C the expected temperature H : Total heat transfer rate. For heat exchangers, this
can Btu/hr kcal/hr be taken as maximum exchanger duty during operation. G : Specific gravity referred to
water = 1.0 at 60 F. - - Compressibility of liquid is usually ignored. C : Specific heat of trapped fluid
Btu/lb F kcal/kg C #1 Typical values of cubical expansion coefficient for hydrocarbon liquids and
water at 60 F Gravity of liquid (API) Value (per F) 3 34.9 0.0004 35 50.9 0.0005 51 63.9
0.0006 64 78.9 0.0007 79 88.9 0.0008 89 93.9 0.00085 94 100 and lighter 0.0009 Water
0.0001L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA
PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 29 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGNIf the
blocked-in liquid has a vapor pressure higher than the relief design pressure, then thepressure relief
device should be capable of handling the vapor generation rate.7.7 Power Failure (Steam or Electric)(1)
Normal Individual and Process Unit Basis for Pressure Relief Sizing Considerations The following
contingencies shall be considered as the basis for evaluating overpressure that can result from electric
power failures:(a) Individual failure of power supplies to any one item of consuming equipment, such as
a motor driver for a pump, fan or compressor.(b) Total failure of power to all consuming equipment in a
process unit supplied by a unit substation.(c) General failure of power to all equipment supplied from any
one bus bar in a substation servicing one or more process units. Note that some substation designs
include a hierarchy of bus bars. With such an arrangement, a design contingency such as a ground fault
in a higher-level bus bar will result in loss of all power to the lower level bus bars.In the case of the bus
bar contingency, the basic assumption for this contingency is a groundfault in the bus bar. Thus, the
impact it will have on the equipment will be affected by thedesign of the substation and the protective
equipment provided. Some substations are designedwith normally closed circuit breakers isolating
adjacent bus bars, when these are fed from thesame electrical feeder. When a ground fault occurs in a
bus bar, these circuit breakers open,thus isolating the fault and preventing the ground fault from
extending to other bus bars andperhaps causing the complete substation to fail. The basic philosophy is to
assume thatnormally closed circuit breakers will function. For example, if the substation is designed
suchthat a single feeder provides power to two bus bars separated by a normally closed circuitbreaker,
the design contingency for this design would be the loss of power to the equipmentconnected to the bus
bar having the ground fault. If in the example above, the substation weredesigned without any circuit
breaker, then the design contingency would be the loss of bothbus bars.Other substation designs use
normally open circuit breakers that are meant to close upon lossof a power source to permit continued
operation by obtaining power from a different source.Since this type of protection implies action by a
device/instrument in order to preventoverpressure in the equipment, no credit may be taken for the
potential continuation of powerdelivery. Hence, the contingency of loss of power to a bus and the
normally open circuitbreaker failing to close and reestablish power needs is evaluated as a design
contingency.During design it may not be known from which bus bar a piece of equipment will be
receivingits power at the time of failure. Therefore, the combination of equipment losing power fromany
single bus bar fault that results in the highest release rate shall be used as the design basisfor this
contingency. Alternatively, the design specification may specify the arrangement ofequipment within the
available bus bars.For units in which spared equipment is supplied from different bus bars in the same
substation,loss of any one bus bar will, on average, result in loss of power to one-half of the
equipment.Hence, for the design of a closed flare header system, a release equal to one-half of the
releasefor the worst combination of equipment loss can be assumed as a design contingency.L&T CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL
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SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 30 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN(2)
Consideration of Plant-wide Power Failure The following general power failures on a plant-wide scale
must be considered.(a) Failure of purchased power supply to the plant.(b) Failure of internally generated
power supply to the plant.(c) Total power failure in any one major substationTotal electrical power failure
may result in loss of seawater, cooling water, steam andinstrument air if these utilities rely on electrically
driven equipment for their availability.In case of partial failure, equipment that is not affected by the
failure of concern will beconsidered to remain in operation and the controls will be assumed to operate as
designed.Reference to the electrical one-line diagrams and steam system P&IDs shall be made
todetermine the extent of failure. For example, consider a cooling water circulating systemconsisting of
two parallel pumps in continuous operation, with drivers having different andunrelated sources of power.
If one of the two energy sources should fail, credit may be takenfor continued operation of the
unaffected pump, provided that the operating pump would nottrip out due to overloading. Similarly, credit
may be taken for partial continued operation ofparallel, normally operating instrument air compressors
and electric power generators that havetwo unrelated sources of energy to the drivers.Backup systems
which depend upon the action of automatic startup devices (e.g., a turbine-driven standby spare for a
motor-driven cooling water pump, with PLC control) shall not beconsidered an acceptable means of
preventing a utility failure for normal pressure relief designpurposes, even though their installation may be
fully justified by improved reliability of plantoperations.In cases of fan failure of the air-cooled
exchangers, refer to section7.97.8 Instrument Air FailureIn case of total instrument air failure, the
inventory in the instrument air receiver/header shallbe adequate to allow a safe shutdown without causing
overpressure and subsequent release tothe flare header.The failure position of control valves upon loss of
instrument air shall be specified such thatpotential hazards, including overpressure, are minimized. It shall
be assumed that, upon partialor total loss of instrument air, all control valves affected by the failure will
assume theirspecified failure position. Control valves that are specified to initially fail stationary shall
beeither assumed to drift to their specified ultimate failure position or assumed to remain at theirlast
controlling position, whichever condition is more restrictive from an overpressureprotection
standpoint.7.9 Air Cooled Exchanger failureLoss of air-cooled exchanger capacity may result from fan
failure, inadvertent louver closure,pitch control failure, or variable speed motor driver failure.Refer
Section-18.5.7, ANNEXURE- 5 (Examples for Calculation of Relief).L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 31 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN7.10 Cooling
Water failure(1) Normal Individual and Process Unit Basis for Pressure Relief Sizing ConsiderationsThe
following design contingencies shall be considered as the basis for evaluating overpressurethat can result
from cooling water failures:(a) Individual failure of water supply to any one cooler or condenser.(b) Total
failure of any one lateral supplying a process unit that can be isolated from the offsite main.(2)
Consideration of Plant-wide FailureThe following general cooling water failures shall be considered:(a)
Failure of any section of the offsite cooling water main.(b) Loss of all the cooling water pumps that
would result from any design contingency in the utility systems supplying or controlling the pump
drivers.Relief load calculation can be done based on the following conditions:Total Condenser : Total
normal incoming vaporPartial Condenser : Normal condensing rateRefer Section-18.5.8, ANNEXURE- 5
(Examples for Calculation of Relief).7.11 Abnormal Heat InputRefer Section-18.5.9, ANNEXURE- 5
(Examples for Calculation of Relief).The required capacity is the maximum rate of vapor generation at
relieving conditions(including any non-condensable produced from over-heating) less the rate of
normalcondensation or vapor outflow.In every case potential behavior of the system and each of its
components shall be considered.Some examples are: Design value should be used for an item such as
valve. Built-in overcapacity shall be used for burners, heater etc. Where limit stops are installed on
valves, the wide-open capacity, rather than the capacity at the stop setting, should normally be used.
However, if mechanical stop is installed and is adequately documented, use of the limited capacity may be
appropriate. In Shell & Tube heat exchange equipment, heat input should be calculated on the basis of
clean rather than fouled conditions.7.12 Check Valve Mal-operationRefer ANNEXURE- 5, Section18.5.10 (Examples for Calculation of Relief).A check valve is not effective for preventing overpressure
by reverse flow from a high-pressure source. Experience indicates a substantial leakage through check
valves.The following guidelines apply to the evaluation of reverse flow through check valves as aL&T CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL
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SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 32 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGNpotential
source of overpressure.(1) A pressure relief device is not required to protect piping against potential
overpressure caused by reverse flow if the pressure of the high-pressure source does not exceed the
short-term allowable overpressure for piping. The short term allowable overpressure for piping is 133%
of the maximum continuous pressure for the specified flange rating at the flange operating temperature.
(2) A pressure relief device is not required to protect a pressure vessel against potential overpressure
caused by reverse flow if the pressure of the high-pressure source does not exceed MAWP of the vessel.
With the explicit approval of the OWNER / PMC, on a case- by-case basis, a pressure relief device may
not required if reverse flow from the high- pressure source does not exceed the maximum allowable
accumulated pressure of the vessels.(3) For piping or pressure vessels not covered under 1 and 2 above,
a pressure relief device may be required to protect against potential overpressure caused by reverse flow
through a failed check valve. The following scenarios shall be considered: Scenario Number of Check
Potential Overpressure Scenario No. Valves in Series 1 1 Partial failure of check valve. Assume failed
check valve behaves as a restriction orifice with a diameter equal to 1/3 the nominal diameter of the
check valve. Use this basis for reverse flow of liquid, vapor and liquid followed by vapor. 2 2 or more
Partial failure of one check valve. Failed check valve behaves as a restriction orifice with a diameter equal
to 1/3 the nominal diameter of the check valve. Each of the remaining check valves in series is assumed
to behave as a restriction orifice with a diameter equal to 1/10 the nominal diameter of the check
valve.7.13 Loss of Heat in Series fractionation systemIn series fractionation, i.e., where the bottoms
from the first column feeds into the secondcolumn and the bottoms from the second feeds into the third,
it is possible for the loss of heatinput to a column to overpressure the following column. Loss of heat
results in some of thelight ends remaining with the bottoms and being transferred to the next column as
feed. Underthis circumstance, the overhead load of the second column would consist of its normal
vaporload, plus the light ends from the first column. If the second column does not have thecondensing
capacity for the additional vapor load, excessive pressure could occur.7.14 Liquid OverfillRefer
ANNEXURE- 5, Section-18.5.11 (Examples for Calculation of Relief).Pressure relief devices are often
located in the vapor space of partially liquid filled vessels suchL&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 33 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGNas towers,
distillate drums, refrigeration flash drums, etc., which could overfill during a plantupset. In all cases, if
overfill can result in a pressure above the design pressure of the vessel,the pressure relief device must be
sized to prevent overpressure due to liquid overfill.In analyzing liquid overfill, two general scenarios must
be considered:(a) Liquid outflows stop while liquid inflows continue at design flow rates.(b) Liquid
inflows increase above design flow rate (for example, due to a control valve failing open) while liquid
outflows continue at the nominal turndown rates (typically, 50% of design). For this case, the possible
overfill may be limited by the upstream vessels inventory.In determining the required relief capacity of
the pressure relief device, credit may be taken forflow through normally open process channels that are
not likely to become partially or totallyblocked as a consequence of the overfill. For example, if a steam
drum is balanced directly ona steam collection header without any intervening control valves, a failure of
the level controlvalve in the full open position will eventually cause the drum to overfill, but credit may
betaken up to the capacity of the steam piping to handle the combined flow of incoming waterplus the
design steam generation rate. If the steam piping cannot handle the resulting flow ratewithout exceeding
the drum MAWP, then the pressure relief device should be sized for thedifference between the incoming
flow and the flow rate that can be handled by the steampiping when the drum is at its accumulated
pressure. On the other hand, if there is a controlvalve between the steam drum and the steam collection
header, the capacity credit that may betaken will depend on the response of the control valve to the upset
and its capacity under theseconditions. Unless the minimum relief capacity available through the control
valve can bepredicted with confidence, no credit should be taken for it.CAUTION: The flow from the
pressure relief device because of the overfill contingency maybe two phase flow, especially if the inlet
flow normally contains vapor. In the event of two-phase flow, the pressure relief device must be
designed to relieve the vapor plus liquid, minusthe flow available through remaining normally open outlets,
unless a dedicated pressure reliefdevice is installed in the liquid stream to specifically handle the
liquid.Liquid overfill need not be considered as a design contingency for pressure relief device
sizingpurposes if BOTH of the following are satisfied:(1) The vessel has a safety critical, independent
high level alarm (LHA), and(2) The vessel vapor space above the independent LHA is equivalent to a 30
minute (or longer) holdup based on the design liquid inlet rate and a stoppage of the liquid outflow.It is
recognized that situations may arise where protection against overpressure caused byliquid overfill by the
use of a pressure relief device may not be practical, and/or may beinsufficient to ensure the integrity of
the equipment. For example, an existing disposal systemmay lack the capacity to absorb the relief load, or
the vessel support structure may not becapable of supporting the weight of a liquid filled vessel without
risk of structural failure. Insuch cases, the use of a High Integrity Protective System (HIPS) on all
incoming feeds,including start up oil, to protect against liquid overfill may be considered as an alternative
(orin addition) to a pressure relief device. The dynamics of the HIPS must be evaluated to ensurethat the
set pressure of the pressure relief device will not be exceeded and that surge pressuresassociated with the
rapid closure of the isolation valves are considered in the design ofupstream and downstream piping
systems.The use of a HIPS to eliminate the liquid overfill contingency does not eliminate the need for
aL&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA
PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 34 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGNpressure
relief device to protect the vessel against other potential overpressure contingenciessuch as fire, utility
failure or operating failure. In addition, the possibility of leakage across theHIPS isolation valves must be
considered in determining the required relief capacity of thepressure relief device protecting the vessel.
To account for possible isolation valve leakage,the pressure relief device should have sufficient capacity
to handle at least 10% of the reliefload that would arise from liquid overfill without exceeding the
allowable accumulation. Forexceptional cases where the structural supports for a vessel are not designed
for the weight ofthe vessel full of liquid and leakage cannot be tolerated, the use of double isolation valves
withan intervening bleeder discharging to the flare (all actuated by the HIPS) should be considered.The
provision of a safety critical LHA as described in the preceding paragraphs is notnecessary if either of the
following conditions is met:The pressure relief valve protecting the vessel from other contingencies has
sufficient capacityto handle the liquid overfill contingency without exceeding the Code allowable
accumulationAND the pressure relief valve discharges to a closed system, ORThere is no credible
scenario that could lead to liquid overfill. For example, the maximumpressure that can be developed by
the feed system is lower than the set pressure of the pressurerelief valve protecting the vessel (plus static
head, if applicable).When liquid overfill is a credible overpressure scenario, the design pressure of all
theequipment affected by the overfill condition shall be set sufficiently high to account for anyliquid static
head attributable to the overfill condition. As an example, consider a reboileddistillation column that is
protected against overpressure due to liquid overfill by a pressurerelief device located at the top of the
column. In this case, the design pressure of the reboilershould be at least equal to the set pressure of the
pressure relief device plus any liquid statichead developed between the pressure relief device inlet and the
top of the reboiler as a result ofthe overfill scenario.Another example involves an overhead receiver
associated with a distillation column.Consider a hypothetical scenario in which the receiver is overfilled
due to loss of the productand/or reflux pumps. If the pressure relief device protecting the receiver is
located on thetower overhead, the level in the overhead system will continue to rise up to the condenser
inlet.At this point the level will not increase further since there will no further condensation.Instead the
lack of a disposal route for the overhead vapor will cause the tower pressure reliefvalves to open.
Therefore, as a minimum the tower pressure relief valves must be designed forthe full overhead flow
rate. In addition, the design pressure of the overhead receiver must takeinto account the maximum fill
level that will be reached during the contingency. For thisexample, the drum design pressure should be at
least as high as the set pressure of the pressurerelief valve(s) protecting the tower plus the liquid static
head between the top of the drum andthe top of the flooded condenser.L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 35 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN8.0 SIZING
FOR PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE8.1 Sizing for Vapor or gas reliefCritical flow pressure (PCF): Critical
flow rate is that corresponding to the limiting velocity,the velocity of sound in the flowing fluid at that
location.The critical flow pressure (PCF) in absolute unit is calculated by following formula,
2
k 1
PCF = PR
k+1
.(Eq.21)Where,PCF : Critical
flow nozzle pressure, in psiaPR : Upstream relieving pressure, in psiak : Specific heat ratio, Cp/Cv8.1.1
Sizing for critical flow: If PSV back pressure PCF ; flow is Critical , The orifice area is calculated by the
formula, W TZ A= C K d PR K b K c M ...(Eq.22) Where, A : Required effective discharge
area in2 W : Required relieving rate lb/hr C : Coefficient due to k (= Cp/Cv) of the gas or vapor at
relieving conditions. This can be obtained from lbmole R lbm Annexure-1, Figure-32 or Annexure-1,
Table-8. Where k cannot be determined, it is suggested that a value of C lb f hr equal to 315 be used.
Kd : Effective coefficient of discharge = 0.975, when PSV is - installed with or without Rupture disk PR
: Relieving pressure (= ser press. + over press. + atm. psia Press.) Kb : Capacity correction factor due to
back pressure. (Refer - Annexure-1, figure-30) The back pressure correction factor applies to balanced
bellows valves only. For conventional and pilot operated valves use a value for Kb = 1. Kc : Combination
correction factor, - = 1.0 when rupture disk is not installed = 0.9 when rupture disk is installed in
combination with PSV T : Relieving temperature R (= F + 460) Z : Compressibility factor at relieving
conditions - M : Mol. Wt of vapor or gas at relieving conditions lb/lbmoleL&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 36 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN8.1.2 Sizing
for sub-critical flow: If PSV back pressure PCF ; flow is Sub-Critical , The orifice area (for conventional
and pilot operated valves) is calculated by the formula, W Z T A= 735 F2 K d K c M PR (PR
PB ) (Eq.23) For balanced pressure relief valves equation for critical flow should be used. Where, A
: Required effective discharge area in2 W : Required relieving rate lb/hr F2 : Coefficient of sub-critical
flow. Refer Annexure-01, - figure-34 or use the following equation,
1 r
F2 = r
k1
1r
k 1
Where, k = sp. Heat ratio, Cp/Cv r
= ratio of back press. to relieving pressure; PB/PR Kd : Effective coefficient of discharge = 0.975, when
PSV is - installed with or without Rupture disk Kc : Combination correction factor, - = 1.0 when rupture
disk is not installed = 0.9 when rupture disk is installed in combination with PSV Z : Compressibility
factor at relieving conditions - T : Relieving temperature R=(F+460) M : Mol. Wt of vapor or gas at
relieving conditions lb/lbmole PR : Relieving pressure (= ser press. + over press. + Atm. psia Press.) PB :
Back pressure psiaL&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&TCHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 37 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN8.2 Sizing
for Steam Relief Pressure relief devices in steam service that operate at critical flow conditions may be
sized using equation, W A= 51 .5 PR K d K b K c K N K SH (Eq.24) Where, A :
Required effective discharge area in2 W : Required relieving rate lb/hr PR : Relieving pressure (= ser
press. + over press. + atm. Press.) psia Kd : Effective coefficient of discharge = 0.975, when PSV is
installed - with or without Rupture disk Kb : Capacity correction factor due to backpressure. (Refer
Annexure- - 1, figure-30) The backpressure correction factor applies to balanced bellows valves only.
For conventional and pilot operated valves use a value for Kb = 1.0. Kc : Combination correction factor, = 1.0 when rupture disk is not installed = 0.9 when rupture disk is installed in combination with PSV KN
: Correction factor for Napier Equation, - = 1 where PR 1500 psia 0.1906 x PR - 1000 = where PR 1500
psia 0.2292 x PR - 1061 and 3200 psia KSH : Superheat steam correction factor (Refer Annexure-1,
Table-9). - For saturated steam at any pressure KSH = 1 In accordance with the requirements of the
ASME Boiler & Pressure vessel code, section I Power Boiler, accumulated pressure shall be limited to
106% of the MAWP, and the relieving capacity of 110% of calculated value is required.8.3 Sizing for
Liquid Relief Valves in the liquid service that are designed in accordance with ASME code which require
a capacity certification may be sized using the equation, V G A= 38 K d K w K c K v PR PB
.(Eq.25)L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&TCHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 38 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN Where, A :
Required effective discharge area in2 V : Volumetric Flow rate U.S. gpm Kd : Rated co-efficient of
discharge = 0.65, when PSV is installed with - or without Rupture disk in combination Kw : Correction
factor due to backpressure. If the backpressure is - atmospheric, use a value for Kw of 1.0. The
backpressure correction factor applies to balanced bellow valves only (Refer Annexure-1, figure-31).
Conventional and pilot operated valves require no special correction. Kc : Combination correction factor,
- = 1.0 when rupture disk is not installed = 0.9 when rupture disk is installed in combination with PSV Kv
: Correction factor due to viscosity as determined from Annexure- - 1, Figure-36 or from the following
equation, 1
2.878 342 .75
0.9935 + KV =
1 .5
(N Re ) (N Re )
0 .5 Where NRe
= Reynolds number. Refer equation mentioned below to determine the value of NRe. G : Specific gravity
of the liquid at the flowing temperature referred to - water at standard conditions PR : Relieving pressure
(= ser press. + over press.) psig PB : Back pressure psig When a relief valve is sized for viscous liquid
service, it should first be sized as if it were for a nonviscous type application (i.e. Kv = 1.0) so that a
preliminary required discharge area, A, can be obtained. From API STD 526 standard orifice sizes, the
next orifice size larger than A should be used in determining the Reynolds number (NRe), from
following equation, V 2800 G N = Re A ..(Eq.26) Where, R : Reynolds
Number - Q : Flow rate at flowing temperature U.S. gpm G : Specific gravity of the liquid at the flowing
temperature - referred to water at standard conditions : Absolute viscosity at flowing temperature cP A
: Effective discharge area in2L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 39 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN After the
Reynolds number (NRe), is determined, the factor Kv is obtained and correct the preliminary required
discharge area. If the corrected area exceeds the chosen standard orifice area, the above calculation
should be repeated using the next larger standard orifice size.9.0 DESIGN OF PIPING UPSTREAM OF
RELIEF DEVICEPiping upstream of a relief device should be designed with as few restrictions to flow
aspossible and should not be pocketed.The flow area through all pipe and fittings between a pressure
vessel and its relief valve shallbe at least the same as that of the valve inlet (e.g. isolation valves shall be
full bore).Depending on the actual relief valve capacity, the pressure drop of the inlet piping and
fittingsshall not exceed 3% of the valve set pressure (this is to avoid chatter, which will result
insignificant seat damage and loss of capacity). Exceptions to this requirement are only allowedin the
case of a pilot-operated valve with a suitably arranged remote pilot connection close tothe source of
overpressure. Refer Figure-4 & 5.The above is especially applicable to relief valves handling gas or
vapor. Relief valves in pureliquid service require special attention, since in this case chatter may also be
caused by theacceleration of the (non expandable) liquid in the inlet piping: a change in pressure
amountingto more than 3% of the set pressure will readily occur and cause valve chatter.In this case the
likelihood of chatter can be limited by installing a relief valve with a specialliquid trim (linear flow
characteristic) thereby avoiding the need to take the relief valvecapacity to determine the pressure drop of
the inlet piping.When two or more relief valves (spares not counted) are fitted on one connection, the
cross-sectional area of this connection shall be at least equal to the combined inlet areas ofthe valves, and
the above pressure drop requirement shall apply for the combined flow of thevalves.Relief valves on cold
process streams shall have an uninsulated inlet line of sufficient length toprevent icing of the relief valve,
in particular the disk and spring. Alternatively, heat tracingmay be required. Special attention shall be paid
in this respect to valves, which discharge intothe atmosphere, i.e. in those having open outlets, which
may become blocked with ice.To avoid the need for special high temperature materials, relief valves on
hot process streamsmay be installed using an uninsulated length of inlet line, creating a cold dead ended
legbetween the process stream and the relief valve. However, consideration should be given tovapor
condensation, deposit formation and solidification, which would affect operation of therelief valve.L&T CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL
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SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 40 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGNFigure4&510.0 DETERMINATION OF FLARE DESIGN CAPACITY The first requirement in the design of a
flare system is a detailed analysis of all possible situations involving fluids discharged from pressure relief
or emergency depressurizing devices, or both to determine the maximum load condition. This section
presents guidelines on the method of calculations for maximum flare load for design of a flare system.
STEP-1 Identify all the equipments (pressure vessels, heat exchangers, compressors etc.) and lines that
needs to be protected against overpressure and whose safety valve discharge is connected to flare
header. STEP-2 Make a listing of all the safety valves with Tag nos. and service that are required to
protect equipments and lines identified in STEP-1 STEP-3 Study all the process systems and piece of
equipments individually and make separate evaluations for each relief valve for all applicable
contingencies. The contingencies as mentioned in section 6.2 should be considered while calculating the
relieving capacities of safety valves. STEP-4 Check for Vapor depressurizing source from the P&IDs.
Vapor depressurizing systems are auxiliary facilities that provide means for rapidly reducing the pressure
in equipment by release of vapors. Depressurizing streams are frequently introduced into the sameL&T CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL
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SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 41 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN headers
servicing pressure relief valves. If a common flare header is used, the loads caused by depressurizing
must be added to the loads of various pressure relief valves, which might be expected to discharge
simultaneously. STEP-5 Prepare a Flare Load Summary table for the purpose of process system
analysis. Typical Flare Load Summary table is enclosed in Annexure -6. Flare Load summary should
include all the safety valves in the plant connected to a common flare header and all the possible causes
of over pressurization with corresponding relieving rates, phase, molecular weight, temperature, pressure
etc. STEP-6 The contingency, which contributes to the maximum flare load, should be considered for
the flare system design. This requires careful consideration of potential occurrences that could affect
several vessels or systems and cause them to relieve simultaneously. The maximum load is not
necessarily the largest mass flow rate at any time but rather it is the flow that will impose the highestpressure drop in the system. Thus, the temperature and molecular weight of the vapors must be known.
Since, the simultaneous occurrence of two or more unrelated contingencies is unlikely, unrelated
contingencies should not be used as a basis for determining the maximum system load (e.g. it is
extremely remote to have a power failure and fire at the same time). Hence, the basis for maximum load
should be either of following items: 1. Individual failure (Single contingency contributing the maximum
load) 2. Emergency depressurization 3. Group failure (from any of below mentioned contingencies
contributing to the maximum cumulative load) 1) Fire Envelope Potential fire areas shall be identified and
clearly shown on a plot plan. The fire areas / envelopes shall be numbered and each number shall be used
for calculating PSV outlet / Flare header sizing. Typical fire area (fire zone) of 2500 5000 ft2 should be
assumed, depending on the drainage of the plot. The height of the flame to be considered shall be 25 ft
(7.62 m) from grade or a platform on which liquid can accumulate (concrete platform). 2) Cooling water
failure 3) General Power failure (Total or Partial) NOTE (for Group failure cases): a. General
recommendation from member to author the API safety valve standard: To size the lateral piping from the
relief valve to main flare header for the relief valve rated capacity, and then size the flare header based
upon evaluation of the expected simultaneous loads from the sources connected to the header. These
loads are the calculated relief loads from the equipment, not the valve capacities. b. Estimate the
properties of gases in the headers from the following mixture relationships (i indicates the ith
component).L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&TCHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 42 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN M = W i
W
...(Eq.27) M
i T = (W T ) i W i .
(Eq.28) = (X i i Mi ) (X i Mi ) ..
.(Eq.29) Where, Wi - Weight of component i in total stream Ti - Temperature of
component i in total stream Xi - Weight fraction of component i in total stream i - Viscosity of
component i in total stream Mi - Molecular weight of component I in total stream11.0 SIZING OF
FLARE HEADER Individual discharge from Main flare header leading to KOD PSV to sub-header Subheaders in each section of KOD to Flare stack the plant to Main Flare Header The major criteria
governing the sizing of headers are backpressure and gas velocity. Flare header size large enough to
prevent excessive backpressure on the plant safety valves and to limit gas velocity and noise to
acceptable levels. The procedure for sizing of flare header is outlined below:L&T -CHIYODA
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 43 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN a. Start at
the flare tip, where outlet pressure is atmospheric and estimate the pressure drop across the flare tip for
the relief design flow. Typical tip drop is 2.0 psi as per API-521 (This may be checked with
manufacturer data). Pressure drop through seals must also be included. b. In certain cases, B/L pressures
are provided in the ITB documents (design basis). Hence, the start point would be at the B/L. c.
Determine the appropriate relief contingencies (Section 10, Step 6) yielding maximum loads d. Calculate
the relevant fluid properties in case of Group failure contingencies. e. Assume a measured size for flare
header / sub header / PSV outlet line. f. Estimate the equivalent pipe lengths between Flare tip Or B/L
position and different sections in the system for the above identified governing cases (Section 10, Step 6)
and estimate losses through fitting, expansion and contraction losses. g. Limit the Mach no. of 0.2 (as
per API-521) at the flare header. h. Calculate the inlet pressure for each section of the line by adding the
calculated pressure drop for that section to the known outlet pressure. i. Continue calculations, working
towards the relief valve. j. Check calculated backpressure at the relief valve against the maximum
allowable backpressure (MABP). The calculated backpressure should be less than the MABP. k. Limit the
MABP to about 10% of the set pressure for conventional relief valves and 40% of the set pressure for
balanced -bellows relief valves (This may be checked with manufacturer data) l. The design shall also
ensure that if two or more depressuring valves in any process system are opened simultaneously, flow
from the high-pressure system will not back up into the low-pressure system sufficiently to overpressure
it or hinder its operation. m. Adjust header size until the calculated backpressure does not exceed the
MABP for each valve in the system (for the above identified Governing cases). In-house developed MSEXCEL based program (Flare.xls) for the above header sizing procedure can be used for calculations.
Refer Annexure-7 for typical flare header design calculations / PSV outlet line sizing.L&T -CHIYODA
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 44 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN Specific
Criteria for sizing the flare header (Based on experience(s) in domestic projects) Pressure at the B/L of
the individual plant: 1.5-kg/cm2 g Back pressure allowable at the PSV discharge: 1.7-kg/cm2 g12.0
DESIGN OF PIPING DOWNSTREAM OF RELIEF DEVICEThe discharge piping installation must
provide for proper pressure relief device performanceand adequate drainage. Consideration should be
given to the type of discharge system used, thebackpressure on the pressure relief device, and the setpressure relationship of the pressurerelief devices in the system.Auto-refrigeration during discharge can
cool the outlet of the pressure relief device and thedischarge piping to the point that brittle fracture can
occur. Materials must be selected whichare compatible with the expected temperature.Once the
maximum design load on each header, sub-header, and lateral has been ascertained itis possible to size the
downstream piping system. By starting from the tip of the flare or ventstack where the pressure is
atmospheric or critical, and adding each calculated pressure drop,the built-up back pressure downstream
of each relief or depressuring device can be determined.Adjustments in the assumed line sizes may then
be made in order to ensure that the operationof the relief or depressuring device is not hindered. If the
required piping becomes excessivelylarge, particularly in systems where low backpressures are allowed,
it may be preferable toreplace non-balanced spring-loaded relief valves with balanced bellows types, thus
increasingthe maximum allowablepressure and so meeting the following relief valve selection criteria: i)
Variable back pressure < 10% of set pressure; use non balanced spring loaded relief valves; ii) Variable
back pressure < 21% of set pressure for fire cases and applying equipment following ASME VIII; use
non balanced spring loaded relief valves; iii) Variable back pressure < 50% of set pressure; use balancedbellows spring- loaded relief valves; iv) Variable backpressure <= 70% of set pressure; use pilot-operated
relief valvesVelocities in sub headers / PSV outlet lines may be higher, up to Mach no. 0.7.The provision
of small branches and instrument connections on flare relief systems shall beavoided, because they are
vulnerable to acoustically induced vibration.L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 45 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN13.0 FLARE
STACK SIZING The sizing of a flare stack requires the determination of flare stack diameter and flare
stack height.13.1 Flare Stack Diameter Flare stack diameter is generally sized on a velocity basis,
although pressure drop should be checked. It may be desirable to permit a velocity of unto 0.5 Mach for
a peak, short- term, infrequent flow, with 0.2 Mach maintained for the more normal and frequent
conditions. The formula relating Mach No. to flare tip diameter is as follows : 11 .61 W T Mach ..no .
= 100 P d 2 kM .(Eq.30) Where W - Flow rate of gas, kg/s k - Cp./Cv M Molecular weight of gas P - Flowing pressure at the flare tip in kg/cm2a d - Flare tip diameter, metre13.2
Flare Stack Height Flare stack height is generally based on radiant heat intensity generated by the flame.
(a) Thermal radiation calculations must be done to avoid dangerous exposure to personnel, equipment and
the surrounding area (tree, grass). The following formula is used for finding the intensity of radiation. Q
r K = 4 R 2 ..(Eq.31) Where K - Intensity of radiation,
kW/m2 - Emmisivity Qr - Heat release due to combustion, kW R - Distance from the midpoint of the
flame to the object being considered, Metre A list of vendor recommended emissivity values for the most
frequently flared gases is as follows: Carbon Monoxide 0.075 Hydrogen 0.075 Hydrogen Sulfide 0.07
Ammonia 0.07L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&TCHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 46 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN Methane 0.1
Propane 0.11 Butane 0.12 Ethylene 0.12 Propylene 0.13 The maximum value of emmisivity of any gas is
0.13 (as per GPSA) The radiation levels commonly used for designs are: Personnel, short time exposure:
1500 Btu/hr-ft2 (or) 4.732 kW/m2 Personnel, continuous exposure: 500 Btu/hr-ft2 (or) 1.58 kW/m2
Solar radiation adds to the calculated flame radiation and is dependent upon specific atmospheric
conditions and site locations. A typical design range is 250 to 330 Btu/hr-ft2 (0.79-1.04 kW/m2). (b) To
calculate the intensity of radiation at different locations, it is necessary to determine the length of the
flame and its angle in relation to the stack (Refer Annexure-8, Figure-A). A convenient expression to
estimate length of flame Lf is shown below: L f = 1 . 201 Q r 10 ( 6 ) 0 . 474 ..(Eq.32)
Where Qr - Heat release due to combustion kW Lf - Length of flame in metre The center of the flame is
assumed to be located at a distance equal to 1/3 the length of the flame from the tip. The angle of the
flame results from the vectorial addition of the velocity of the wind and the gas exit velocity. VW = tan
1 ..(Eq.33) V ex Where Vw - Wind velocity m/s Vex Exit gas velocity m/s The co-ordinates of the flame center with respect to the tip are: Lf Lf XC = sin &
YC = cos ....(Eq.34) 3 3 The distance from any point on the ground level to the center of the
flame is: R= ( X XC )2 + (HS + YC )2 ..(Eq.35) At the stack base i.e. X
= XcL&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA
PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 47 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN R 2 = (H S
+ YC ) ...(Eq.36) 2 R = H S + YC
..(Eq.37) Where X - Sterile radius, metre Hs - Height of
the stack, metre Flare stack height can be estimated based on the above equations.14.0 DESIGN OF
FLARE KNOCKOUT DRUM A knockout drum is usually provided near the flare base, and serves to
recover liquid hydrocarbons, prevent liquid slugs, and remove large (300 - 600 micron) liquid particles.
All flare lines should be sloped toward the knockout drum to permit the liquid to drain into the drum for
removal. The design procedure is given below: Calculate the dropout velocity of a particle in a stream by
using the following equations. g d p ( L V ) U d = 1 . 15 V C ..(Eq.38)
Where Ud - Dropout velocity, m/s g - Acceleration due to gravity, 9.8 m/s2 dp - Particle diameter, metre
L - Density of liquid at operating conditions, kg/m3 v - Density of the vapor at operating conditions,
kg/m3 C - Drag coefficient (Refer Annexure-8, Figure-B) The economics of vessel design should be
considered in selecting a drum size and may influence the choice between a horizontal and vertical drum.
When large liquid is expected and vapour flow is high, a horizontal drum is often more economical.14.1
Horizontal Knockout Drum STEP-1 A horizontal vessel with an inside diameter D, and a cylindrical length
L should be assumed. This gives the following total cross-sectional area At. D 2 At =
.(Eq.39) 4 STEP-2 Based on the liquid hold up t min.,
calculate the cross sectional area of the liquid segment AL. QL t AL =
(Eq.40) L WhereL&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 48 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN QL - Liquid
rate, in m3/min STEP-3 Calculate the cross sectional area remaining for the vapor flow by AV = A t A
L (Eq.41) STEP-4 Calculate the total diameter using the
following equation. D = h L + hV (Refer Annexure-9, Figure-C).(Eq.42) Where hL - Depth of all
liquid accumulation, in metre. hV - Vertical space for the vapor flow, in metre. STEP-5 Calculate the
liquid drop out time, in seconds hV = .
(Eq.43) U d STEP-6 Calculate the velocity of the vapor, in m/s QV U V =
(Eq.44) AV Where QV - Volumetric flow rate of
vapor, in m3/s STEP-7 Calculate the drum length, in metre L min = U V
.(Eq.45) L = L min + N 1 + N 2 + 0 . 3
(Eq.46) Where N1 - Feed (inlet) nozzle diameter, in metre N2 - Vapor outlet nozzle diameter, in metre
STEP-8 L must be less than or equal to the above assumed cylindrical length; otherwise, the calculation
must be repeated with a newly assumed cylindrical length.14.2 Vertical Knockout Drum STEP-1 If
vertical vessel is considered, the vapor velocity is equal to the dropout velocity and the drum diameter is
determined as follows: QV At = ..(Eq.47) U
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SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 49 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN At 4 D =
.(Eq.48) STEP-2 Based on the liquid hold up t min.,
calculate the height of the liquid segment hl, in metre. Q t hL = L
..(Eq.49) At Where QL - Liquid rate, in m3/min
STEP-3 Height of the drum (in metre) can be determined as follows: H min = hL + N 1 + N 2 +1
..(Eq. 50) Where hL - Height of liquid segment, in metre. N1 - Feed (inlet)
nozzle diameter, in metre. N2 - Vapor outlet nozzle diameter, in metre.15.0 DESIGN OF SEALS IN
FLARE SYSTEM To prevent air from entering into the flare system and forming explosive mixture prior
to the ignition point, it is necessary to seal the flare system. Sealing of a flare system involves two
aspects: (i) Sealing of the flare stack (ii) Sealing of piping headers15.1 Sealing of the Flare Stack This is
also known as gas seal. This is a vendor-designed system. An effective stack seal is one able to minimize
air passage into the system while using low purge flow. As the gas seal is a vendor specific item, the
process designer has to specify the type of purge gas available for the gas seal, point of injection of purge
gas and quantity of purge gas.15.2 Sealing of Piping Headers The sealing of the piping headers up to the
flare stack base is generally accomplished by means of a liquid seal drum at the bottom of the flare stack.
The most commonly found seal is shown in Fig-4. A vacuum seal leg is dipped into a vertical seal drum
filled with water. Whenever a vacuum condition occurs the liquid level in the seal leg will rise and break
the vacuum thus preventing the ingress of air. The process design of seal drum will include sizing the
seal leg, depth of water seal and dimensions of seal drum.L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&TCHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 50 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN DESIGN
METHOD: The design method followed herewith is based on the recommended practice given by API
RP 521. (a) Height of Seal Leg The height of seal leg is calculated by a pressure balance at the stack
bottom (Ref Annexure-10, Figure-D). X + P1 = X + Y + P2 ..
(Eq. 51) Y = P1 P2 ....(Eq.52) Where P1 - Pressure
at stack, in Metre P2 - Min. pressure expected at header, in Metre Y - Height of seal/vacuum leg from
top of liquid surface (Minimum of 2.0 m as per Lummus spec.) X - Water seal depth (normally 2 ft or
0.6 m) (b) Diameter of seal drum (i) Seal volume for vacuum break: Total vertical height of seal pipe h =
Y + X + d ....(Eq.53) Where d - ID of seal pipe d 2h
Volume of pipe (V )= ...(Eq.54) 4 A minimum of V m3 should be
maintained for seal. Diameter of seal drum (D 2 d 2 out )X =V ....
(Eq.55) 4 From the above equation, diameter of seal drum D can be calculated. To accommodate for
liquid volume in horizontal pipe run up to nozzle projection and for any other factors use 20% over
design. (ii) Seal volume with non vacuum conditions in flare stack :L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 51 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN As per API,
D = 2 d ..(Eq.56) Where D - Seal drum diameter d
- Seal pipe diameter (c) Height of seal drum The height of the vapor space HV in a vertical drum should
be approximately 0.5- 1.0 times the diameter D to provide disengaging space for entrained seal liquid. A
minimum dimension of 3 feet (1 metre) is suggested in API RP 521. Tan/Tan height of seal drum = H V
+ X + 0.5 * ..(Eq.57) * Height of seal liquid below submerged inlet pipe assumed
as 0.4- 0.5 mL&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&TCHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
PURGING OF FLARE HEADER AND FLARE TIP16.1 Procedure for Calculating Flare Header Purge A
large amount of purge gas is usually required after a hot release to prevent air from entering the system
when the system gas inventory cools and condenses. This additional gas injection should be on automatic
temperature and pressure control and the rate of gas injection may be estimated as follows: (a) Examine
the process calculations of all the relief valves and isolate the relief condition which has a potential for
maximum percentage of condensation (b) Calculate the maximum condensation on the basis of
calculation of heat loss through the flare header and latent heat of condensation. (c) Convert
condensation rate obtained in step (b) to kgmole/hr. (d) Purge gas flow (PGR1) = 2 x Rate of
condensation (kgmole/hr)16.2 Procedure for Calculating Flare Tip Purge (a) Use purge gas velocity of
0.03 m/s for the flare tip. (b) For the flare tip diameter, calculate the volumetric flow rate of purge gas at
flare tip conditions. d 2 Purge gas rate (PGR2) = 0 . 03 3600 m3/hr..(Eq.58) 4 Where d
- Flare tip diameter, in Metre17.0 P&I DIAGRAM FOR FLARE SYSTEM The important features of P&I
diagram of flare stack are as follows: (a) Continuous Purge Gas Supply: To ensure that the flare system
does not experience a vacuum condition continuous purge gas through a pressure control valve
controlling the flare header pressure should be provided. An alarm for low flare header pressure and
purge failure should be provided. (b) The flare header should drain by gravity towards the flare knock out
drum. Thus the flare header should slop continuously towards the flare knockout drum and no pockets
are allowed.L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&TCHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 53 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN (c) The
flare knockout drum should be provided with pressure and temperature indications. (d) A seal should be
maintained in the flare stack base to prevent flame backup and ingress of oxygen. There should be
continuous supply of make up water to the seal. The overflow nozzles in the seal drum which discharges
the condensed hydrocarbons and water should be located high enough to allow the flow to take place
towards the flare knockout drum. (e) When flame monitoring is specified, the status of each
thermocouple installed on the pilots shall be monitored by temperature trip amplifiers located in the panel
enclosure.Refer Annexure-11 (Typical flare system P&I Diagram)18.0 ANNEXURES18.1 Annexure-1
[Tables, Figures (as per API-520/521)] Tables Sr. TABLE NO. DESCRIPTION No. 1 Table-8 Values of
coefficient C (API-520, page-50) 2 Table-9 Superheat correction Factors, KSH (API 520, page-51) 3 4
Figures Sr. FIGURE NO. DESCRIPTION No. 1 FIGURE-1 Pressure level relationships for pressure
relief valves (API-520, page-3) 2 FIGURE-2 Conventional Pressure relief valve (API-520, page-6) 3
FIGURE-3 Balanced-bellows pressure relief valve (API-520, page-7) 4 FIGURE-6 Pilot operated valve
(API-520, page-11) 5 FIGURE-19 Pressure Relief Valve Operation Vapor / Gas service 6 FIGURE-22
Typical effects of superimposed back pressure on the opening pressure of Conventional Pressure relief
valves 7 FIGURE-23 Typical effects of superimposed back pressure on the set pressure of Balanced
Pressure relief valves 8 FIGURE-30 Backpressure correction factor Kb for balanced bellows pressure
relief valve (vapors and gases) (API-520, page-37) 9 FIGURE-31 Capacity correction factor, Kw Due to
back pressure on Balanced-Bellows pressure relief valves in liquid service. (API 520, page 38) 10
FIGURE-32 Curve for evaluating coefficient C in the flow equation from the specific heat ratio, assuming
ideal gas behavior (API 520, page 44)L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 54 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN 11
FIGURE-34 Values of F2 for sub critical flow (API 520, page-48) 12 FIGURE-36 Capacity correction
factor, Kv, Due to viscosity (API 520, page 54)Table-8L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&TCHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 55 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGNTable-9L&T
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SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 56 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGNFigure1L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA
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SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 59 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGNFigure-6,
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Annexure-2 (Environment factor data)L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 69 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGNL&T CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL
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Annexure-3 (Vapor pressure and Heat of vaporization of pure single component paraffin hydrocarbon
liquids)L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA
PERSONNEL ONLY
Annexure-4 (Sizing for Two-phase Liquid/Vapor Relief)L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&TCHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
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Annexure-5 (Examples for Calculation of Relief load) 18.5.1 External Fire Single Component System
Wetted Surface Area Pset = 3.5 barg 3200 mm BTM EL 4100 mm 25 feet ( 7620 mm ) Data Input Data
Symbol Value Unit Design Pressure / Set pressure Pset 3.50 barg Accumulation a 21 % o Relieving
Temperature Tr 154.0 C Relieving Pressure Pr 4.2 barg Back Pressure Pb 2.06 barA Latent Heat @
relieving condition L 502.4 kcal / kg Cp / Cv @ 60 F, ATM k 1.33 (-) MW of Vapor/Gas M 18.02
Kg/Kmol Type of vessel Vertical (-) Inside Dia D 4.50 m Liquid Level for fire case H 3.20 m Vessel
Length X 7.35 m Environmental Factor F 1.0 Relief load (W) Calculation Q Formulae W = ----- L Q =
37140 * F * A0.82 Wetted area (A1) = Cylindrical surface area + Bottom head area (Non skirted vessel)
Cylindrical surface area = x D x H Bottom head area = 1.084 * D2 2 Wetted area A1 = 67.18993 m 2
Other Wetted Area (Piping) A2 = 6.718993 m 2 Total Wetted Area ( A1+A2) A = 73.9 m Total heat
absorption (In-Put) Q= 1265241 Kcal / hr Relieving capacity W= 2518.394 Kg / hrL&T -CHIYODA
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 84 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN Multicomponent System 200 mm 25 feet 3900 mm ( 7620 mm ) BTM EL 6500 mm Data Input Data Symbol
Value Unit Design Pressure / Set pressure Pset 76.00 barg Accumulation a 21 % o Relieving Temperature
Tr 278.0 C Relieving Pressure Pr 92.0 barg Back Pressure Pb 7.60 barA Latent Heat @ relieving
condition L 305 kcal / kg Cp / Cv @ 60 F, ATM k 1.15 (-) MW of Vapor/Gas M 29.60 Kg/Kmol Type of
vessel Vertical (-) Inside Dia D 6.50 m Liquid Level for fire case H 3.70 m Vessel Length (TL-TL) X
33.91 m Environmental Factor F 1.0 Relief load (W) Calculation Q Formulae W = ----- L Q = 37140 * F
* A0.82 Wetted area (A1) = Cylindrical surface area + Bottom head area (Non skirted vessel) Cylindrical
surface area = x D x H = 75.5553 m2 2 Bottom head area = 1.084 * D = 45.799 m2 Wetted area A1 =
121.35 m2 Other Wetted Area (Piping) A2 = 12.14 m2 Total Wetted Area ( A1+A2) A = 133.5 m2 Total
heat absorption (In-Put) Q= 2054514 Kcal / hr Relieving capacity W= 6736.112 Kg / hr Simulation
Approach 3 QH Simulation Outputs 1 2 Relieving Temperature Molecular Weight Cp/Cv Simulation
Inputs Z factor Relieving Pressure Flow rate (Y) kg/hr Flow VF = 5% Composition Vapor wt. Fraction
Latent heat = QH/YL&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&TCHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 85 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN Unwetted
Surface Area ( Gas Expansion ) Pset=10.4 barg 25 feet ( 7620 mm ) Data Input Data Symbol Value Unit
Design pressure / Set Pressure Pset 150.90 psig Accumulation a 21 % Relieving Pressure Pr 197.3 psia
Vessel Wall Temperature TW 1560 deg R Normal Operating Gas Pressure Pn 87.07 psia Normal
Operating GasTemperature Tn 567.27 deg R MW of Vapor/Gas M 19.60 lb/lbmole Type of vessel
Verticle (-) Inside Dia D 1.50 ft Vessel Length (TL - TL) L 6.00 ft Relief load (W) Calculation Formula
A (TW Tr )1.25
W = 0.1406 M Pr
1.1506
Tr
Gas Temperature Tr = (P1/Pn) x
Tn = 1285.4 oR Unwetted Surface area (A) = Cylindrical surface area + Head area (Non skirted vessel) +
Piping surface area Cylindrical surface area = x D x L = 28.274 ft2 2 Head area = 2.168 x D = 4.878
ft2 2 Other unwetted Area (Piping) = 3.315 ft Total unwetted surface area (A) = 36.468 ft2 Relieving
capacity, W = 94.326 lb / hr 42.786 Kg / hrL&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 86 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN 18.5.2 Exit
Block Or Blocked Outlet Inadvertant Closing of Outlet (E.g. Control Valve ) Wv Control Valve Close Wv
Relief Load: Relieving rate can be determined from material balance i.e highest value from all the cases
and the properties should be determined by simulation at relieving conditions. Simulation Approach 1 2
Simulation Inputs Input Relieving Pressure Normal Operating Temperature Normal Operating Pressure
Composition Simulation Outputs Relieving Temperature Relieving propertiesL&T -CHIYODA
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 87 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN 18.5.3
Column Reflux Or Pump around failure Normal operation At relieving condition V=73283 Kg/hr
V=133945 Kg/hr V=59815Kg/hr V=206825 Kg/hr V=147506 Kg/hr L= 74130 Kg/hr L=59319 Kg/hr
V=73573 Kg/hr V=73664 Kg/hr V=73421 Kg/hr V=146947 Kg/hr L= 60524 Kg/hr V=29595 Kg/hr
L=59878 Kg/hr L=2025623 Kg/hr V=177230 Kg/hr L=60372 Kg/hr Data Input Data Symbol Value Unit
Design Pressure / Set Pressure Pset 3.50 barg Accumulation a 16 % Multiple PRV Relieving Pressure Pr
5.07 barA 0 Relieving Temperature Tr 10 C Back Pressure Pb 2.06 barA Back Pressure Factor Kb 1.00
(-) Cp / Cv @ 60 F, ATM k 1.35 (-) Compressibility Factor @ Relieving Z 0.97 (-) MW of Vapor/Gas M
24.40 Relief load (W) Calculation Assumptions 1 Normal feed rate to column 2 Normal reboiler heat duty
and vapor load to column 3 Vapor to feed stage considered same as outlet from reboiler (during normal
operation) 4 Normal heat duty removal from the exchangers. Relieving load will be the excess flow
leaving the reflux drum top outlet. i.e 73283 Kg/hr. Simulation Approach 1 Simulation Outputs Relieving
Temperature Simulation Inputs Relieving properties Relief Pressure Composition Vapor fractionL&T CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL
ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 88 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN Pset=3.5
barg D.P = 3.5 barg Process Gas Out Process Gas In BFW In Data Input Data Symbol Value Unit
Design Pressure of High Pressure side 7 barg Design Pressure of Low Pressure side 3.5 barg Set
Pressure Pset 3.50 barg 451325 Pa A Absolute upstream pressure based on P1 5.10 barA maximum
operating pressure 510000 Pa A Accumulation a 10 % Relieving Pressure Pr 4.86 barA 0 Relieving
Temperature Tr 120 C Back Pressure Pb 2.06 barA Tube O.D Do 38.10 mm Tube Thickness t 3.40 mm
Tube I.D Di 31.30 mm Density of High Pressure Side 943.30 Kg/m3 Relief load (W) Calculation When
design pressure of the low pressure side is equal to or greater than 10/13 the design pressure of the high
pressure side no need to calculate relieving rate due to tube rupture. (Design pressure of low pressure
side) >= 10/13 x ( Design Pressure of High Pressure side) 3.5 >= 10/13 x 7 3.5 >= 5.385 Condition is
not satisfying , so we have to follow tube repture case Di /4 = 2 2 C/s area of tube (A) = 769.45 mm 2
A = 0.000769 m Relieving Rtae (W) = 2 x 0.7 x A x (2(P1-Pset) x )0.5 = 11.33374 Kg/s = 40801.45
Kg/hrL&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA
PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 89 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN P set=10.4
barg W = m-m 1 m1 m P1 T1 P2 L Data Input Data Symbol Value Unit Flow rate @ normal operating
condition mn 10441.2 Kg/hr P1 2 Control valve upstream pressure 26.6 barA 27.12402 Kg/cm A P2 2
Control valve down stream pressure 6.2 barA 6.32214 Kg/cm A 0 Upstream fluid Temperature T1 40 C
313 K Upstream fluid density L 18.374 Kg/m3 Design Pressure / Set Pressure P set 10.40 barg
Accumulation a 10 % Relieving Pressure Pr 12.45 barA 0 Relieving Temperature Tr 62 C MW of Vapor /
Gas M 18.40 Kg/kmol Relief load (W) Calculation Control Valve Pressure drop = 20.4 bar Calculation for
Cv P2 <= 0.5 x P 1 6.2 <= 13.3 Critical Vapor Flow Cv for Critical Vapor Flow mn Cv = 56.9 x P 1 x
(M/T 1)0.5 = 27.903 For 80% opening of the valve Cv value = 34.878 From Cv selection table (3"globe
valve single seat body) Selected Cv value = 47 Cv selected = Control Valve Cv + Bypass Valve Cv ( i.e
50 % of Control Valve) = 47 + (47/2) Cv selected = 70.5 Critical flow rate through a failure opened
control valve is calculated as follows m = 56.9 x Cv x P 1 x (M/T 1)0.5 = 25871.4 Kg/hr Gas flowing
through vessel outlet at normal condition (m 1) = 9492 Kg/hrL&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 90 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN Cv Selection
Table for Control ValveL&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
ONLY
Hydraulic / Thermal Expansion Pset= 10 barg CWR CWS Data Input Data Symbol Value Unit Design
Condition : Pressure(Tube side) 10 barg Pressure(Shell side) 16.7 barg o Temperature T 48 C Relieving
Condition : Pressure(Tube side) Pr 12.5 barg o Temperature Tr 48 C Set pressure Pset 10 barg o Cubical
Expansion Co-efficient B 0.0001 C Total Heat transfer rate H 20094582.98 Kcal/hr Specific Gravity G 1
(-) Specific Heat of trapped Fluid C 1 Kcal/KgoC Relief Load (W) Calculation A 3/4" X 1 " relief valve is
commonly used for thermal expansion. BxH Relieving Rate (V) = 997 x G x C 3 = 2.015505 m /hr =
2015.505 Kg/hrL&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&TCHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 93 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN 18.5.5 Air
Fin Cooler / Condenser failure Normal operation At relieving condition V=59669 Kg/hr V=133945 Kg/hr
V=133945 Kg/hr V=133945 Kg/hr V=59815Kg/hr L= 74130 Kg/hr V=73573 Kg/hr V=73573 Kg/hr
V=73421 Kg/hr V=133242Kg/hr L= 60524 Kg/hr L= 703 Kg/hr L= 703 Kg/hr L=60372 Kg/hr Data Input
Data Symbol Value Unit Design/Set Pressure Pset 3.50 barg Operating Pressure 0.77 barg Accumulation
a 10 % Relieving pressure Pr 3.85 barg Relief Load (W) Calculation Assumptions 1) Normal feed rate to
column 2) Normal reboiler heat duty and vapor load to column 3) Vapor to feed stage considered same as
outlet from reboiler (during normal operation) 4) Normal heat duty removal from the exchangers. From
Figure. Air fin cooler inlet = Air fin cooler outlet at failure = 133945 Kg/hr Water cooled condensor outlet
vapor flow rate = 133242 Kg/hr Relieving Rate = Condensor outlet flow rate(Vapor) - Reflux drum outlet
flow rate (Vapor) = 59669 Kg/hrL&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 94 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN Calculation
of fluid properties at relieving conditions The fluid properties at relieving conditions can be calculated by
using simulation 2 Overhead Vapor 1 Feed Bottom 3 Input for simulation (Stream-1) Data Symbol Value
Unit Flowrate of feed (Note-1) FF 207518 kg/hr Composition of feed (Based on mixture of Note1)
Relieving pressure Pr 3.85 barg Vapor fraction y 1 Note-1 Quantity of Vapor condensed in Quantity of
Feed = failed exchanger during normal + noncondensable operation (74130 kg/hr) vapors(73573 kg/hr )
Output of simulation (Stream-2) Data Symbol Value Unit o Relieving temperature Tr 87.8 C Molecular
weight of relieving fluid M 66.71738 ------- Compressibility factor of relieving fluid Z 0.919243 ------Cp/Cv of relieving fluid ----- 1.093393 These output of simulation (Relieving temperature & Fluid
properties) can be used as input for PSV sizing calculationsL&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&TCHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
Cooling Water failure Normal operation At relieving condition V=557 Kg/hr V=133945 Kg/hr
V=59815Kg/hr V=133945 Kg/hr V=133945 Kg/hr L= 74130 Kg/hr V=73573 Kg/hr V=73573 Kg/hr
V=73421 Kg/hr V=74130 Kg/hr L= 60524 Kg/hr L= 59815 Kg/hr L=60372 Kg/hr Data Input Data
Symbol Value Unit Design/Set Pressure Pset 3.50 barg Operating Pressure 0.77 barg Accumulation a 10
% Relieving pressure Pr 3.85 barA Relief Load (W) Calculation Assumptions 1) Normal feed rate to
column 2) Normal reboiler heat duty and vapor load to column 3) Vapor to feed stageconsidered same as
outlet from reboiler (during normal operation) 4) Normal heat duty removal from the exchangers. From
Figure. Vapors at water-cooled exchanger inlet = Vapor at water-cooled exchanger outlet (cooling water
failure) = 74130 Kg/hr of vapor & 59815 kg/hr of liquid Relief load (W) = Condensor outlet flow
rate(Vapor)-Reflux drum outlet flow rate (Vapor) = 557 Kg/hrL&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
Abnormal Heat Input from reboiler In case of more flow of heating fluid (e.g. Inadvertent opening of
control valve on heating fluid inlet or outlet line), total heat flow to reboiler may increase which in turn
may increase vapor flow rate from reboiler to column. This may lead to over pressure of the Column. In
such a scenario, additional vapor flowrate (required relieving flowrate) can be calculated considering
either of the following two approaches. This approach should be evaluated on case-to-case basis. Step 1:
Calculate heat duty during abnormal heat input to reboiler based on heat exchanger geometry. Q1 = Uc
A LMTD Where, Q1 = Total heat input during abnormal condition A = Heat transfer area based on
thermal rating (m2). Uc = Clean overall Heat transfer co-efficient based on Thermal rating of reboiler
(Kcal/hr.m2.C) LMTD = Log. Mean Temp Difference (Re-calculate LMTD considering process side
outlet temperature at relieving pressure, C) NOTE: If heat duty calculated by Step-1 is less than
normal heat duty of reboiler, there is no need to consider this relief scenario. No further calculations
are required in such a case. Step 2: Calculate maximum possible heating fluid flow rate based on size
(selected Cv, refer Section 7.5) of control valve present on its inlet or outlet line. Calculate possible heat
duty based on this flow rate as per following equation. Q2 = (M HOT ) ( HOT ) Where, Q2 = Total
heat input based on maximum possible flow rate of hot fluid MHOT = Vapor flow rate of hot fluid to
reboiler (kg/hr) HOT = Latent heat of hot fluid (Kcal/kg) Step 3:L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 97 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN Consider the
lower of the two values of heat duty (Q1 & Q2 calculated above) as governing heat duty (Q) to find out
process vapor flow from reboiler. Step 4: Calculate vapor flow rate from reboiler to column based on
following equation. Q M Abnormal = Abnormal Where, M Abnormal = Vapor flow rate of process
fluid to column during abnormal condition (kg/hr) Abnormal = Latent heat of process fluid (Kcal/kg)
Step 5: Calculate required relieving flow rate based on following equation. W = M Abnormal M Normal
Where, W = Required relieving rate (kg/hr) M Normal = Vapor flow rate of process fluid to column
during normal operation (kg/hr)L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL
Check valve mal-operation P1=70.25 Kg/cm2A 1st 2nd 2nd 2nd Absorber P4= 19.765 Kg/cm2A Standby
Data Input Data Symbol Value Unit Downstream pressure of first NRV P1 70.25 kg/cm2 A T1 o
Downstream temperature 40 C Properties at above mentioned conditions : Molecular weight M 19.47 (-)
Cp/Cv K 1.21 (-) Compressibility factor Z 0.887 (-) Intermediate pressure (Note-1) P2 60 kg/cm2 A Pipe
bore Di 657 mm Data Symbol Value Unit Intermediate pressure (Note-1) P2 60 kg/cm2 A Properties at
above mentioned conditions (P2 & T2): (Note-2) o Downstream temperature T2 35.87 C Molecular
weight M 19.47 (-) Cp/Cv K 1.215 (-) Compressibility factor Z 0.895 (-) Intermediate pressure (Note-1)
P3 35 kg/cm2 A Pipe bore Di 431.8 mm Data Symbol Value Unit Intermediate pressure (Note-1) P3 35
kg/cm2 A Properties at above mentioned conditions (P3 & T3): (Note-2) T3 o Downstream temperature
24.88 C Molecular weight M 19.47 (-) Cp/Cv K 1.239 (-) Compressibility factor Z 0.926 (-) Relieving
pressure P4 19.765 kg/cm2 A Pipe bore Di 431.8 mm Note: 1) Downstream pressures are intermediate
pressures and are obtained by satisfying the criticality condition [NON-CRITICAL => (P2>Pc)]. 2) The
properties such as T2, T3, K, Z at the intermediate pressures can be calculated by using simulation.
Relief Load (W) Calculation M * P1 * 11.7946 Density = ---------------------------- (273.15+T1) * Z
Mass flow Volumetric Flow = ---------------------- DensityL&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&TCHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONSRev: 1 Page 99 of 116 AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN K ------- K - 1 2 Critical pressure = ---------- * P1 K+1 If P2 >Critical pressure then flow is "Noncritical" otherwise
"Critical" K+1 -------- Factor C = 2.8 * 2 K-1 K * --------- K+1 Mass Flow ----------------------------------------- Bore = M C * P1 * ---------------------- Z * ( 273 + T 1) 2 0.25 -------- 2 K-1 K+1 --------- --- --------- K+1 K-1 d / d = ----------------------------------------------------------- 2 K+1 ----- ------- P2 K P2
K --------- --- --------- P1 P1 Bore Final = d / d X Bore Find the mass flow rate at final bore value equal
to bore actual value Bore Actual = 33% of Di For First check valve Bore Actual = 10% of Di For
remaining each check valveL&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL
100. L&T- CHIYODA LIMITED Date: Feb 15, 2007 PROCEDURE FOR PRESSURE SAFETY LTC-PBP0-004 VALVE CALCULATIONS AND FLARE Rev: 0 SYSTEM DESIGN Page 100 of 116Annexure-6
(Typical Flare Load Summary sheet) Failed check valve behaves as a restriction orifice.As per section
7.12 orifice diameter equal to 1/3 the nominal diameter of the check valve. Each of the remaining check
valves in series is assumed to behave as a restriction orifice with a diameter equal to 1/10 the nominal
diameter of the check valve. *RESTRICTION ORIFICE CALCULATION by INST HAND BOOK
(E.SATO) BORE,mm 657 Full=28" 6C3AS BORE,mm 431.8 Full=20" 9C3AS BORE,mm 431.8 Full=20"
9C3AS FLOW,kg/hr 63664.68282 FLOW,kg/hr 54077.16714 FLOW,kg/hr 31832.34141 73291.55456
Nm3/hr 62254.2903 36645.77728 1096.040106 m3/hr 1085.481414 1093.003606 MW 19.47 MW 19.47
MW 19.47 Cp/Cv 1.21 1.21 Cp/Cv 1.215 1.215 Cp/Cv 1.239 1.239 Z 0.887 Z 0.895 Z 0.926 2 2
P1,kg/cm2A 70.2584 68.901 barA P2,kg/cm A 60 58.8408 barA P3,kg/cm A 35 34.3238 barA T1,?C 40
T2,?C 35.87 T3,?C 24.88 3 3 3 DENS 58.08608873 kg/m DENS 49.81860257 kg/m DENS
29.12372954 kg/m 2 2 2 Pc 39.52291234 kg/cm A Pc 33.69438902 kg/cm A Pc 19.49495324 kg/cm A
FACTOR,C 1.821304411 FACTOR,C 1.823998064 FACTOR,C 1.83679161 CRITICAL(P2<P1*0.5)
CRITICAL(P3<P2*0.5) CRITICAL(P3<P4*0.5) BORE 43.34973168 mm 43.15489583 mm
43.17641515 mm NONCRITICAL NONCRITICAL NONCRITICAL 2 2 2 P2,kg/cm A 60 OK
NONCRITICAL P3,kg/cm A 35 OK NONCRITICAL P4,kg/cm A 19.765 OK NONCRITICAL
0.036715796 0.037546103 0.04150499 0.020816252 0.037461013 0.041493352 d/d 1.15242481 d/d
1.000567377 d/d 1.000070113 BORE,mm 49.9573063 APPLICABLE BORE,mm 43.17938092
APPLICABLE BORE,mm 43.17944239 APPLICABLE 218.781 BORE x 33.33% 43.18 BORE x 10%
43.18 BORE x 10% L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
101. L&T- CHIYODA LIMITEDDate: Feb 15, 2007 PROCEDURE FOR PRESSURE SAFETY LTC-PBP0-004 VALVE CALCULATIONS AND FLARE Rev: 0 SYSTEM DESIGN Page 101 of 116 18.5.9
Liquid Overfill Knock-out Drum LT LT LT D ata Input D ata Sym bo l Valu e U nit F low rate to KO D
at rated condition 71852.4 Kg/hr F luid density L 988 Kg/m 3 Vessel Inside D iam eter Di 3.5 m T L-T
L length L 8 m Length above H LL LH 4.8 m H igh Liquid Level H LL 3.2 m Liquid O verfill scenario is
not considered when below conditions are satisfying. 1 R esidance tim e for vapour space >= 30 m inute
2 Vessel has safety critical, independent high level alarm C hecking for above scenario /4 x D i x L H +
/24 x D i 2 3 Volum e of vapor space = 3 = 51.79374 m 3 Flow rate (m 3/h) = 72.7251 m /hr R
esidance tim e in vessel vapor space = Volum e of vapor space 3 Flow rate (m /hr) = 0.712185 hrs =
42.73111 m inutes R esidance tim e in vessel vapor space >= 30 m inutes 42.73111 >= 30 m inutes
Liquid overfill scenario need not to considered LT (2 out of 3) can be considered for safety
critical,Independent high alarm level L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA
102. L&T- CHIYODA LIMITEDDate: Feb 15, 2007 PROCEDURE FOR PRESSURE SAFETY LTC-PBP0-004 VALVE CALCULATIONS AND FLARE Rev: 0 SYSTEM DESIGN Page 102 of 116 18.5.10
Alternate approach for PSV relief load calculations (Reduced reboiler duty method) This method
describes the relief load calculation for the following scenarios: Loss of condenser Loss of reflux
Loss of feed Loss of upstream Reboiler Tower Simulations: Normal simulation: First simulate the tower
for the normal operation based on the process basis information provided. It is very important to match
this simulation with the actual process data available for the respective system. Relief simulations: Tower
simulations for various over pressure scenarios will be done at reduced reboiler duty straightaway.
Following is the procedure to determine the reduced reboiler duty at a constant dirty UA L&T CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL
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103. L&T- CHIYODA LIMITEDDate: Feb 15, 2007 PROCEDURE FOR PRESSURE SAFETY LTC-PBP0-004 VALVE CALCULATIONS AND FLARE Rev: 0 SYSTEM DESIGN Page 103 of 116 L&T CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL
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104. L&T- CHIYODA LIMITEDDate: Feb 15, 2007 PROCEDURE FOR PRESSURE SAFETY LTC-PB-
P0-004 VALVE CALCULATIONS AND FLARE Rev: 0 SYSTEM DESIGN Page 104 of 116 L&T CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL
ONLY
105. L&T- CHIYODA LIMITEDDate: Feb 15, 2007 PROCEDURE FOR PRESSURE SAFETY LTC-PBP0-004 VALVE CALCULATIONS AND FLARE Rev: 0 SYSTEM DESIGN Page 105 of 116 L&T CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL
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106. L&T- CHIYODA LIMITEDDate: Feb 15, 2007 PROCEDURE FOR PRESSURE SAFETY LTC-PBP0-004 VALVE CALCULATIONS AND FLARE Rev: 0 SYSTEM DESIGN Page 106 of 116 For tower
relief simulations, specify the number of trays equal to the actual number of trays. If there are any
convergence issues, then try reducing the number of trays, If the tower does not converge even after
reducing the number of trays, then use multiple flash drum method. 18.5.11 PVRV / PCV / Emergency
load calculations for TanksThe below calculation is based on API-2000. L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL
107. L&T- CHIYODA LIMITEDDate: Feb 15, 2007 PROCEDURE FOR PRESSURE SAFETY LTC-PBP0-004 VALVE CALCULATIONS AND FLARE Rev: 0 SYSTEM DESIGN Page 107 of 116DESIGN
DATA / INPUT: 1 Tank ID = 4 m 2 Tank T/T height = 5.11 m 3 Tank operating pressure = 0.004903
barg 50 mmWC(g) 0.4903 Kpa(g) 4 Tank working temperature = 50 5 Inbreathing N2 PCV = 113-PCV1153 6 Outbreathing N2 PCV = 113-PCV-1152 7 Pressure & Vacuum Relief = 113-PVRV-1151 8
Emergency Venting by Blow-off Hatch. = 9 SP for 113-PCV-1153 = barg 10 SP for 113-PCV-1152 =
barg 11 SP for 113-PVV-1151 = barg 12 SP for Blow-off Hatch = barg 13 Filling rate = 11 m/h 14
Emptying rate = 11 m/h 15 Tank Capacity = 64 m 16 Tank Design Presure = 29.4 mbarg 300
mmWC(g) 2.9420 Kpa(g) -4.9 mbarg -50 mmWC(g) -0.4903 Kpa(g)ASSUMPTIONS: 1 The Normal
Boiling Point of tank liquid (50% LA) is less than 149C. 2 Blow-off hatch provided for Emergency
Venting. 3 o 3 3 Density of Nitrogen is taken as 9.72 Kg/m at 7.6 barg , 25 C. 9.72
Kg/mCALCULATION:(A) INBREATHING CALCULATION (VACUUM : EMPTY) (1) As per API std.
2000, for boiling point < 149C ( Table-1B - Column -1) The requirement for venting capacity for
maximum liquid movement out of the tank should be equivalent to 0.94 Nm/h of Air for each cubic
meter, per hour of maximum emptying rate. Maximum Emptying rate = 11 m/h Nm/h air required for
this flow rate = 10.3 Nm/h of air = 10.7 Nm/h of N2 (2) Thermal Inbreathing Requirements for
Thermal Venting Capacity API From Table-2B, Column-2 of API Std. 2000, 2000, Table 2B Therefore,
for tank capacity = 64 m, by interpolation, Tank Capacity Inbreathing Outbreathing Thermal venting
capacity = 3.37 + (64-20)* (16.9 -3.37) / (100-20) FP>=37.8 FP<37.8 3 3 3 3 = 10.8 Nm/h of Air m
Nm /h Nm /h Nm /h = 11.2 Nm/h of N2 1 1.69 1.01 1.69 20 3.37 2.02 3.37 100 16.9 10.1 16.9(B)
OUTBREATHING CALCULATION (PRESSURE : FILLING) (1) As per API std. 2000, for boiling point
< 149C ( Table-1B - Column -3) The requirement for venting capacity for maximum liquid movement
into the tank and the resulting vaporization should be equivalent to 2.02 Nm/h for each cubic meter, per
hour of maximum filling rate Normal Venting Requirements Maximum Filling rate = 11 m/h API 2000,
Table 1B Nm/h air required for the above filling rate = 22.22 Nm/h of air Inbreathing Outbreathing Flash
/ Boiling Point Liq. Moving Liq. Moving In Nm/h N2 required = 23 Nm/h of N2 Out 0 3 3 3 3 C Nm /h
/ m /h Nm /h / m /h (2) Thermal Outbreathing FP >=37.8 0.94 1.01 From Table-2B, Column-4 of API
Std. 2000, BP>=148.9 0.94 1.01 Therefore, for tank capacity = 64 m, by interpolation, FP<37.8 0.94
2.02 Thermal venting capacity = 3.37 + (64-20)* (16.9 -3.37) / (100-20) BP<148.9 0.94 2.02 = 10.8
Nm/h of Air 11.2 Nm/h of N2 (3) Outbreathing Requirment for 113-PCV-1153 Fails Open ( Nitrogen)
The basis is 113-PCV-1153 fail open with upstream Max. N2 pressure at 7.6 barg and downstream
operating pressure of 0.004903 barg .The max flow(full bore) is 55 kg/h. Max Flow (form CV
calculation) = 55 kg/h Molar Flow = 1.96 kgmol/h Nm/h flow of N2 = 44.012 Nm/h 42.51 Nm/h of
Air As per API Std. 2000, "The Normal Venting capacity shall be atleast the sum of the Venting
requirements for Liquid movement and thermal effect - (Ref: Cl: 4.3.2 page 4) L&T -CHIYODA
108. L&T- CHIYODA LIMITEDDate: Feb 15, 2007 PROCEDURE FOR PRESSURE SAFETY LTC-PBP0-004 VALVE CALCULATIONS AND FLARE Rev: 0 SYSTEM DESIGN Page 108 of 116(C)
Emergency Venting capacity calculation: (1) EXTERNAL FIRE CASE Nm/h = 881.55 x Q x F / L x
(T/M)^0.5 Where, 0.566 Q = Heat input from fire exposure in watts = 224200*A A = Weted surface area
in m F = environmental factor from table, 1B L = Latent heat of vaporization at relieving Pr & Temp, in
J/kg T = Relieving temp in K M = Molecular weight of vapor Design pressure of the tank = 0.03 barg
(<0.07 barg) H= Height of Vertical tank = 5.11 m Height to be considered as per API = 5.11 m (Vertical
height or 9.14m whichever is lower) (Ref:Page 9 of API Std 2000 - notes below Table-3B) Wetted
Surface Area of Tank = (PI x D x H) Wetted Surface Area Calculated , A = 64 m Refering to given table
on page-9 of API std 2000, Heat Input to be considered , Q = 2364583.315 watts Latent heat of
vaporisation = 2218200 J/kg Relieving temperature = 105.5 C = 378.5 K Molecular weight = 18.11
kg/kgmol Environmental factor considered = 1 Venting requirement = 4296 Nm/h of AIR (2) Steam coil
tube rupture case Amount of steam released from 2" ruptured coil = 12531 Kg/h (from equation of tube
rupture) Latent heat of condensing steam at relieving P = 2252.6 KJ/Kg Latent heat of tank liquid at
relieving P = 2218.2 KJ/Kg Amount of tank liquid vaporised = Heat released by condensed steam / Latent
heat of tank liquid = 12725 Kg/h Vapour density = 0.8921 Kg/m3 Venting requirement = 14264 m3/h
tank vapour (MolWt = 18.11) = 10197 Nm3/h of tank vapour = 6368 Nm3/h of Air L&T -CHIYODA
109. L&T- CHIYODA LIMITEDDate: Feb 15, 2007 PROCEDURE FOR PRESSURE SAFETY LTC-PBP0-004 VALVE CALCULATIONS AND FLARE Rev: 0 SYSTEM DESIGN Page 109 of 11618.6
Annexure-6 (Typical Flare Load Summary sheet) L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&TCHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
Annexure-7 (Flare Header / PSV outlet line sizing) 18.7.1 Individual Failure Single contingency
contributing the POWER LOST TO UNIT LINE NO. FROM PSV-328123 A/B/C/D SUBHEADER
SUBHEADER FLARE KOD TO SUBHEADER HEADER FLARE KOD B/L Nominal Dia. inch 18 20 30
30 Pipe Class - A1A A1A A1A A1A Schedule - S10 S10 I.D. mm 445.2 495.3 746.16 746.16 Length m
50 58 479 115I Roughness mm 0.0500 0.0500 0.0500 0.0500N Flow Rate Nm3/hr 24,085.2 72,255.7
72,255.7 72,255.7P Viscosity CP 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02U MW - 85.82 85.82 85.82 85.82T Cp/Cv - 1.08
1.08 1.08 1.08 Z - 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909 Temp degC 125 125 125 125 Press., @In kg/cm2G 1.711
1.686 1.515 1.343 Press., @In BarG 1.679 1.653 1.486 1.317 Flow Area m2 0.156 0.193 0.437 0.437
Weight Flow kg/h 92221 276663 276663 276663 Weight Flow kg/s 25.617 76.851 76.851 76.851 Gas
Density @In kg/m3 7.6782 7.6058 7.1285 6.6477 Volume Flow @In m3/s 3.336 10.104 10.781 11.561
Velocity @In m/s 21.432 52.442 24.654 26.438 Re. No. - 3.66E+06 9.88E+06 6.56E+06 6.56E+06 Fric.
Factor - 0.01269 0.01219 0.01149 0.01149 Press., @Out kg/cm2G 1.686 1.515 1.343 1.300 Press.,
@Out BarG 1.653 1.486 1.317 1.275 GasDns @Out kg/m3 7.606 7.129 6.648 6.527 Vol. Flow @Out
m3/s 3.368 10.781 11.561 11.774 Velocity @Out m/s 21.636 55.953 26.438 26.926 Mach no. @Out 0.111 0.287 0.136 0.138 PIPE FRICTION LOSS 0.026 0.171 0.172 0.043 PSV Set Pressure (Kg/cm2G)
3.5 PSV Type (Conv./Balanced Bellows) Pilot operated Acceptable Back Pressure (Kg/cm2G 1.93 Line
size is acceptable or not Yes Total Pressure Drop 0.41 O 90 Elbow 2 3 12 5 O 45 Elbow Reducer 1
Expander 1 Gate valve 1 Flow thro straight outlet tee Flow thro side outlet tee Equivalent Length, meters
35.6 29.7 179.1 74.6 Straight Length, meters 7.0 14.0 150.0 20.0 Total length, meters 49.6 57.7 479.1
114.6 maximum load)L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY
111. L&T- CHIYODA LIMITEDDate: Feb 15, 2007 PROCEDURE FOR PRESSURE SAFETY LTC-PBP0-004 VALVE CALCULATIONS AND FLARE Rev: 0 SYSTEM DESIGN Page 111 of 11618.7.2
Group failure18.7.2.1 Fire Envelope, Combined Cooling water Envelope-8L&T -CHIYODA
PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY 68
m 7m 5m 1.23 1.16 1.4 Cp/Cv 135 172 143 Temp oC
Annexure-8 (Flare stack, Figure-A, B)L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA
113. L&T- CHIYODA LIMITEDDate: Feb 15, 2007 PROCEDURE FOR PRESSURE SAFETY LTC-PBP0-004 VALVE CALCULATIONS AND FLARE Rev: 0 SYSTEM DESIGN Page 113 of 116 Flare Stack
Height (Figure-A) Determination of Drag Coefficient (Figure-B) Drag Coefficient, C L&T CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL
ONLY
Annexure-9 (Flare knock out drum, Figure-C)18.10 Annexure-10 (Seal drum, Figure-D)L&T -CHIYODA
Annexure-11 (Typical flare system P&I Diagram)L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T-
CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY

Format for Relief load calculation sheets19.0 OTHER REFERENCES19.1 Handbook by Crosby19.2
Questions and Answers for API-520 / 521L&T -CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA
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PSV Calculations & Flare

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Psv calculations & flare

by Yogesh Kumar, Working at Indian Oil Corporation on Feb 25, 2013

S uzane Helmond at BAM Construct UK

Psv calculations & flare

1. L&T- CHIYODA LIMITEDDate: Feb.15, 2007 PROCEDURE FOR PRESSURE LTC-PB-P0-004

or Electric)....................................................................................... 29L&T -CHIYODA

Where; W : Relieving Capacity lb/hr M : Molecular Weight of

Where, Pn : Normal operating gas pressure, psia (lb/in2 A) Tn :

.(Eq.08) In case k = 1.4 (conservative),

then W = 0 . 7 0 . 685 A P1 1 ..(Eq.09)3. Non critical vapor flow W = 0.7 0.685

In case k = 1.4 (conservative), then

Where, W : Mass flow rate kg/s A : 1. For STHE:

steam flow: 13 . 51 C P2 2 2 VE P1 W = 1 + (0 . 00126 T SH ) ...(Eq.18)Where,W : Mass

Where, k = sp. Heat ratio, Cp/Cv r

2.878 342 .75

Gas Temperature Tr = (P1/Pn) x

CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY L&T- CHIYODA PERSONNEL ONLY

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