Bill of Rights Digest

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Case Digests
CASE 1:
SIMON v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
G.R. No. 100150
FACTS:The case started when a "Demolition Notice," signed by Carlos
Quimpoin his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City
Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City
Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the
officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association,
Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of
three (3) days within which to vacate the questioned premises of North
EDSA.
Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were
informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give
way to the "People's Park". The group, led by their President RoqueFermo,
filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samangSinumpaangSalaysay) with the CHR
against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion
Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of
Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sarisari stores, andcarinderia along North EDSA. The CHR issued an Order,
directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties
at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint
before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the
CHR.
Convinced that petitioners carried out the demolition of private
respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia,the CHR, ordered the
disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor
of the private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food
under the Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to
"desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said
order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest.
A motion to dismiss was filed questioning CHR's jurisdiction. The
petitioners likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the
courts.A supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners,
stating that the Commission's authority should be understood as being
confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights,
BILL OF RIGHTS (PART 8)

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and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case were not civil and
political rights, but their privilege to engage in business.
The CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition
of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist".
The CHR also issued an Order denying petitioners motion to dismiss and
supplemental motion to dismiss.The CHR opined that "it was not the
intention of the Constitutional Commission to create only a paper tiger
limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it should be
considered a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate
legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to investigate
the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents
whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners.
HELD:No.The Commission on Human Rights was created by the
1987 Constitution.The powers and functions of the Commission are defined
by the 1987 Constitution, thus, among others to investigate, on its own or
on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights.
The CHR theorizes that the intention of the members of the Constitutional
Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body. This view, however, has
not heretofore been shared by this Court. In Cario v. Commission on
Human Rights, the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice
Andres Narvasa, has observed that it is "only the first of the enumerated
powers and functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication or
adjudgment," but that resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the
adjudicatory power itself.
The term "civil rights,"has been defined as referring
to those rights that belong to every citizen of the state or
country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are
not connected with the organization or administration of
the government. They include the rights of property,
marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of
contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights
appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a
state or community. Such term may also refer, in its
ABUBAKAR-ANG-BALICAS-BASCONCILLO-CABRERA-CALDINO-CATBAGAN-COSICO-CRUZ-DIZON-GERONILLA-GODUCO
ILAGAN-JAVIER-JOAQUIN-JOSOL-LUCAYLUCAY-MANGUNAY-MARAVILLA-MEJIA-MERIS-MORAL-MUNOZ-NITURA
ORIOSTE-PAAYAS-PASTORES-RIGOR-SAGUINSIN-SICCUAN-SIMBRE-TOLENTINO(JAY)-TOLENTINO(JULIE)-UY-VILLASIN

Case Digests
general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or
redressed in a civil action.
Political rights, on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to
participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of
government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right
of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-avis the management of government.
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission it is readily
apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights
that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights
violations.
In the particular case at hand, what are sought to be demolished are the
stalls, sari-saristores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected
by private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a
"People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon
City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway.
The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply
ignored. We are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition
of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can
fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and
political rights" intended by the Constitution.
The Commission on Human Rights is hereby prohibited from further
proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the
P500.00 fine for contempt.
CASE 2:
G.R. No. L-24693
July 31, 1967
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION,
INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO CHIU vs. THE HONORABLE CITY
MAYOR OF MANILA, VICTOR ALABANZA,
FERNANDO, J.:
FACTS:
On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 4760, which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor
Herminio Astorga, then the acting City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of
the respondent regular City Mayor. City of Manila derived in 1963 an
annual income of P101,904.05 from license fees paid by the 105 hotels and
motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the Manila.
Petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association,
Inc. and Hotel del Mar Inc. are duly organized and existing under the laws
of the Philippines, both with offices in the Manila, duly licensed to engage

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in the business of operating hotels and motels in Malate and Ermita
districts in Manila, while the petitioner Go Chin is the president and general
manager of Hotel del Mar Inc., and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a
resident of Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue and be sued;
The petitioners plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and
for a final judgment declaring the above ordinance null and void and
unenforceable for its alleged violation of due process, to wit: (The lower
court granted Injunction)
1. The Ordinance refrain hotels and motels from entertaining or
accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed
form in the lobby in open view;
2. The Ordinance prohibits admission of guests less than 18 years old;
3. The Ordinance imposed increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000
or 150% and 200% respectively (tax issue);
4. The Ordinance make it unlawful to lease or rent more than twice
every 24 hours;
5. The Ordinance provides for cancellation of license for subsequent
violation.
6. There is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due
process ground by invoking the principles of vagueness or
uncertainty.
ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due
process clause as held by the lower court, hence, unconstitutional, and null
and void.
HELD: No, the ordinance is valid. The injunction was lifted by reason of the
following basis:
1. All laws are presumed to be valid. The burden of showing its lack
of conformity to the Constitution resting on the party who assails it unless
the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. As
was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in
favor of validity. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has
in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of
the people. The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action
when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the
guise of police regulation.
2. The ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. This particular
manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to
safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting
purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. There is
no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to

Case Digests
minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals as there was an
alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in
Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a
necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus
become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers."
3. The increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage
"establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal"
and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government.
Moreover, it has been the settled law as far back as 1922 that municipal
license fees could be classified into those imposed for regulating
occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of nonuseful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only. Licenses
for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the
right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate,
but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are
allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former,
and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal
ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts
have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. Hence
license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes for revenue have
frequently been upheld, especially in of licenses for the sale of liquors. In
fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been declared unreasonable.
4. There was no absence of due process. It is the embodiment of
the sporting idea of fair play. There is no controlling and precise definition
of due process.The restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the
challenged ordinance makes it unlawful to lease or rent room or portion
thereof more than twice every 24 hours is reasonable not arbitrary.
Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or
illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to the
explanatory note, are being devoted.
NOTE: On October 23, 1967, a Motion for the reconsideration of this
decision was filed by petitioners, followed by a Motion for new trial. As the
Motion for reconsideration is clearly without merit, there is no occasion for
this sought-for new trial. Consequently, both motions are denied
Case 3:
G. R. No. 196425
July 24, 2012
PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS
INVESTIGATIVE AND ADJUDICATORY DIVISION, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in
his capacity as Secretary of Finance, and as an ex-officio member of the
Monetary Board, Respondents.

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FACTS:
On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Executive Order No. 12 (E.O. 12) creating the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or hear
administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption,
among others, against presidential appointees and to submit its report and
recommendations to the President.
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued
Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring its
functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
(ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division (IAD).
To enable the Office of the President (OP) to directly investigate graft and
corrupt cases of Presidential appointees in the Executive Department
including heads of government-owned and controlled corporations, the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) is hereby abolished and their
vital functions and other powers and functions inherent or incidental
thereto, transferred to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for
Legal Affairs (ODESLA), OP in accordance with the provisions of this
Executive Order.
On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed
before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit for grave misconduct against
petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the
Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent
members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, namely, Renato Velasco, Susana
Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel Landingin, which
arose from the purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand
Three Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of stock of Express
Savings Bank, Inc.
On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order signed by Executive
Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his co-respondents to
submit their respective written explanations under oath. In compliance
therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam
manifesting that a case involving the same transaction and charge of
grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et
al.", and docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already pending before the
Office of the Ombudsman.
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari.
ISSUES:

Case Digests
I. WHETHER E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING THE
GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS.
II. WHETHER E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE.
HELD:
I. Executive Order No. 13 Does Not Violate Petitioner's Right to Equal
Protection of the Laws.
Petitioner goes to assail E.O. 13 as violative of the equal protection clause
pointing to the arbitrariness of limiting the IAD-ODESLA's investigation only
to presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions in the
government. The equal protection of the laws is a guaranty against any
form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. It is embraced
under the due process concept and simply requires that, in the application
of the law, "all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed." The equal protection clause, however, is not absolute but
subject to reasonable classification so that aggrupations bearing
substantial distinctions may be treated differently from each other. This we
ruled in Farinas v. Executive Secretary, wherein we further stated that
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within
which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under
like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not.
Presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining authority of the
President. This proceeds from the well settled principle that, in the absence
of a contrary law, the power to remove or to discipline is lodged in the
same authority on which the power to appoint is vested. Having the power
to remove and/or discipline presidential appointees, the President has the
corollary authority to investigate such public officials and look into their
conduct in office. Petitioner is a presidential appointee occupying the highlevel position of Chairman of the LWUA. Necessarily, he comes under the

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disciplinary jurisdiction of the President, who is well within his right to order
an investigation into matters that require his informed decision.
There are substantial distinctions that set apart presidential appointees
occupying upper-level positions in government from non-presidential
appointees and those that occupy the lower positions in government. In
Salumbides v. Office of the Ombudsman, we had ruled extensively on the
substantial distinctions that exist between elective and appointive public
officials, thus:
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and
appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the
mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term
and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the
other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials
hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of
tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest
expression of the sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice or
selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering that
elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term,
complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be
served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were
elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed
officials are concerned.
II. Executive Order No. 13 Does Not Violate Petitioner's Right to Due
Process.
Contrary to petitioner's assertions, his right to due process was not
violated when the IAD-ODESLA took cognizance of the administrative
complaint against him since he was given sufficient opportunity to oppose
the formal complaint filed by Secretary Purisima. In administrative
proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the
person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the
minimum requirements of due process, which simply means having the
opportunity to explain ones side. Hence, as long as petitioner was given
the opportunity to explain his side and present evidence, the requirements
of due process are satisfactorily complied with because what the law
abhors is an absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. The records show
that petitioner was issued an Order requiring him to submit his written
explanation under oath with respect to the charge of grave misconduct
filed against him. His own failure to submit his explanation despite notice
defeats his subsequent claim of denial of due process.

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was no reply or response from petitioner. As of 02 November 1977, private
respondent had paid petitioner the total sum of P207,243.85.
G.R. No. 78508 March 21, 1994

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
FILEMON REMIGIO and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
(1)
On 25 August 1967, private respondent obtained from petitioner a
P65,000.00 loan secured by a real estate mortgage covering five (5)
parcels of land in Isabela described in and embraced by Transfer
Certificates of Title ("TCT") No. T-11326, T-681, T-100, and T-27 and Original
Certificate of Title No. I-1673.
(2)
Private respondent defaulted; hence on 17 November 1970,
petitioner bank extrajudicially foreclosed on the mortgage, and it acquired
the encumbered assets for the sum of P87,082.00. The sheriff's sale was
registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Isabela only on 11
October 1972.
(3)
In its letter-offer of 15 February 1971, petitioner bank
invited private respondent to repurchase the foreclosed property
for P87,082.00 plus interest and other charges. Before that, or on 18
November 1970 (or one day after the foreclosure sale), private respondent
already had paid an initial P10,000.00 to redeem the property.
Subsequently, additional payments were made by private respondent, i.e.,
P10,000.00 on 26 April 1971 and another P20,000.00 on 17 May 1971.
(4)
On 21 October 1972, Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 27 was
enacted into law that mandated an agrarian reform. Pursuant thereto, an
"Operation Land Transfer Program" was launched; among the areas it
covered were the parcels of land under TCT No. T-100, T-11326 and T-681.
(5)
On 17 April 1974, private respondent offered to buy the
foreclosed property for P284,000.00 which was the market and
appraised value thereof fixed by petitioner bank. On 24 December
1974, the Deed of Promise to Sell was executed between petitioner bank
and private respondent.
(6)
In a letter, dated 25 August 1978, sent to and received by
petitioner bank on even date, private respondent, through counsel,
inquired why he was still being made to buy the property for P284,000.00
when, in truth, he had already paid P40,000.00 of the P87,082.00
previously offered by petitioner for the redemption of the property. There
(7)
Private respondent, on 20 September 1978, instituted an action for
"Annulment of Foreclosure Deed, Breach of Contract, Sum of
Money and Damages" at the CFI, Echague, Isabela, against petitioner
bank and its Branch Manager Leuterio Genato.
(8)
On 19 March 1980, while the case was yet pending with the trial
court, petitioner bank additionally received from the Land Bank of the
Philippines P26,348.12 in cash and P160,000.00 worth of Land Bank Bonds
in payment of the foreclosed parcels covered by TCT No. T-100, T-11326,
and T-681.
The Court of Appeals adjudged, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the court declares the foreclosure of the mortgaged
properties to be without force and effect; ordering the defendant bank to
release the properties and the plaintiff to transfer the rights to the tenantsbeneficiaries in favor of the Land Bank of the Philippines; declaring the
deed of promise to sell executed by the plaintiff and the defendant bank
rescinded; ordering the defendant bank and the Land Bank of the
Philippines to recalculate the amounts of payments due for the transfer of
the subject properties in accordance with this Decision subject to the
provisions of P.D. No. 27 and in accordance with the mechanics of the
Operation Land Transfer; and annulling the order of the lower court for the
plaintiff to pay the defendant the expenses of litigation and attorney's fees.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whethere the foreclosure may still be given effect by the petitioner
bank.
HELD: NO. In passing, the Secretary of the Department of Justice has
himself opined thus:
I am aware that a ruling that lands covered by P.D. No. 27 may not be the
object of the foreclosure proceedings after the promulgation of said decree
on October 21, 1972, would concede that P.D. No. 27 had the effect of
impairing the obligation of the duly executed mortgage contracts affecting
said lands. There is no question, however, that the land reform program of
the government as accelerated under P.D. No. 27 and mandated by the
Constitution itself (Art. XIV, Sec. 12), was undertaken in the exercise of the
police power of the state. It is settled in a long line of decisions of the
Supreme Court that the Constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of
obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police
power of the state. One limitation on the contract clause arises

Case Digests
from the police power, the reason being that public welfare is
superior to private rights. The situation here, is like that in
eminent domain proceedings, where the state expropriates
private property for public use, and the only condition to be
complied with is the payment of just compensation. Technically,
the condemnation proceedings do not impair the contract to
destroy its obligations, but merely appropriate or take for public
use. As the Land Bank is obliged to settle the obligations secured by the
mortgage, the mortgagee is not left without any compensation.
The opinion deserves respect. This Court, likewise, in a number of cases
has expressed the dictum that police power subordinates the nonimpairment clause of the Constitution.
CASE 4
G.R. No. 122846
January 20, 2009
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA.

MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S.
LIM, Respondent.
Tinga, J.:
FACTS: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim)
signed into law the Ordinance which shall prohibit short time admission in
hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments
in the City of Manila. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission
and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other similarly concocted terms, are hereby
prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and
similar establishments in the City of Manila.
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation
(MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as defendant,
herein respondent City of Manila (the City) represented by Mayor Lim.
MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as
among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria
Court in Malate, Manila it was authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
259 to admit customers on a short time basis as well as to charge
customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours.

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On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC),
Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development
Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached
complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects
their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in
Manila. The three companies are components of the Anito Group of
Companies which owns and operates several hotels and motels in Metro
Manila.
The RTC issued a TRO on January 14, 1993, directing the City to cease and
desist from enforcing the Ordinance. The City filed an Answer dated
alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.
On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction
ordering the city to desist from the enforcement of the Ordinance. A month
later, on March 8, 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment arguing
that the Ordinance is constitutional.
The RTC noted that the ordinance "strikes at the personal liberty of the
individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution."
Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging
private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the
right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation that
the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless
be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay.
The City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power
pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which
confers on cities, among other local government units, the power: [To]
regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes,
restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and
transports.
The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the power of the City
under Article III, Section 18(kk) of the Revised Manila Charter, thus: "to
enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation
and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the
morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of
the city and its inhabitants, and such others as be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Chapter; and
to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two
hundred pesos fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and
imprisonment for a single offense.

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Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it
violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid
exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive
interference in their business.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the
constitutionality of the Ordinance. First, it held that the Ordinance did not
violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only
penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals
for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is
only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful
method. The lawful objective of the Ordinance is satisfied since it aims to
curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments
are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments
is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general. Finally, as held in
Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor of Manila, liberty
is regulated by law.
ISSUE:
1) WON these establishments have the requisite standing to plead for
protection of their patrons' equal protection rights
2) WON the said Ordinance is constitutional
HELD:
1) YES. In this jurisdiction, the extancy of "a direct and personal interest"
presents the most obvious cause, as well as the standard test for a
petitioner's standing. In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court
reviewed and elaborated on the meaning of the three constitutional
standing requirements of injury, causation, and redressability in Allen v.
Wright.
Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions
such as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and,
especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance.
Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their
patrons for the former to assert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth
doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to
government action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third
parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech,
the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even
constitutionally guaranteed rights. In this case, the petitioners claim that
the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their
clients. We can see that based on the allegations in the petition, the
Ordinance suffers from overbreadth. We thus recognize that the petitioners

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have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients to patronize
their establishments for a "wash-rate" time frame.
2) NO. The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of
decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be
valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed
by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1)
must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair
or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with
public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices,
namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a
day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as
conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code
through such implements as the general welfare clause.
It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the
curtailment of sexual behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the
subject establishments "have gained notoriety as venue of prostitution,
adultery and fornications in Manila since they provide the necessary
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became the
ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." Whether or not this
depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that
legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting single
adults which is constitutionally protected will be curtailed as well, as it was
in the City of Manila case.
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to
privacy and interference demands respect. As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc,
borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly stated: Man is one among
many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his
isolation, are indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are
the basis on which his civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon the
consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his
experience is private, and the will built out of that experience personal to
himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders himself. If his will
is set by the will of others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot
believe that a man no longer a master of himself is in any real sense free.
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in
Morfe, the invasion of which should be justified by a compelling state
interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently
of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional

Case Digests
protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions
into the personal life of the citizen.
We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would
proscribe or impair. There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or
renting the room out for more than twice a day. Entire families are known
to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily
out in their homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest
between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or
hotels. Indeed any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable
private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having
sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or
hotel as a convenient alternative.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving
patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with
another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a
police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other
alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private
rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist
between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be
permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be
struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v.
Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life,
liberty or property is affected. However, this is not in any way meant to
take it away from the vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys
the presumption of validity.
Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by patrons
engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus
it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare or even
unheard of. A plain reading of section 3 of the Ordinance shows it makes no
classification of places of lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to illicit
patronage and subject them without exception to the unjustified
prohibition.
The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already
prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing

Page 8 of 94
laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of
prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more
effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of
existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These
measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the
petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the
Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate
without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug
dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele
by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even
apartments.
CASE 5
SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. and JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO
vs. ROGELIO S. SOLUTA, JOSELITO SANTOS, EDNA BERNATE,
VICENTA DELOLA, FLORENTINO MATILLA, and GLOWHRAIN-SILAHIS
UNION CHAPTER
G.R. No. 163087. February 20, 2006.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Facts: Petitioner Jose Marcel Panlilio (Panlilio) was the Vice President for
Finance of Silahis International Hotel, Inc. (hotel), while respondents
Rogelio Soluta (Soluta), Joselito Santos, Edna Bernate (Edna), Vicenta
Delola (Vicenta), and Florentino Matilla (Matilla) were employees of the
hotel and officers of the Glowhrain-Silahis Union Chapter, the hotel
employees union (union).
Petitioners' version: Coronel Floro Maniego (Maniego), General Manager of
the Rapier Enforcement Professional Investigation and Security Agency,
Inc. (REPISA) which the hotel contracted to provide its security force, had
been receiving reports that sale and/or use of marijuana, dollar smuggling,
and prostitution were going on in the union office at the hotel and that
there existed a theft syndicate. He conducted a surveillance, with the
approval of Panlilio, of suspected members and officers of the union. On
January 11, 1988, Panlilio, his personal secretary Andy Dizon, Maniego,
Bulletin reporter Nonoy Rosales, and REPISA security guard Steve
Villanueva (Villanueva) entered the union office located at the hotel
basement, with the permission of union officer Henry Babay (Babay) who
was apprised about the suspected illegal activities, and searched the
premises. Villanueva found a plastic bag under a table containing dry
leaves of marijuana. Panlilio then ordered Maniego to investigate and
report the matter to the authorities.

Case Digests
Respondents' version: On January 10, 1988, Loida Somacera (Loida), a
laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight at the female locker room at
the basement of the hotel. At dawn of January 11, 1988, she heard
pounding sounds outside, prompting her to open the door of the locker
room upon which she saw five men in barong tagalog whom she did not
recognize, forcibly opening the door of the union office. She even saw one
of the men hide something behind his back. She then closed the door and
went back to bed. Soon after she heard the door of the union office
opened. In the morning of January 11, 1988, as union officer Soluta was
trying in vain to open the door of the union office, Loida narrated to him
what she had witnessed at dawn. Soluta thus immediately lodged a
complaint before the Security Officer. And he fetched a locksmith who tried
to assist him, Edna, Arnold Ilustrisimo and Ed Bautista in opening the door.
At that instant, men in barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived and
started hitting Soluta and his companions, drawing them to run to the
female locker room, and to thereafter proceed to the Engineering Office
where they called for police assistance. While awaiting the arrival of the
police, Babay and Panlilio, on the latter's request, met. At the meeting,
Panlilio told Babay that they proceed to the union office where they would
settle the mauling incident, to which Babay replied that the door of the
office could not be opened. Panlilio thereupon instructed Villanueva to
force open the door, and the latter did. Once inside, Panlilio and his
companions began searching the office, over the objection of Babay who
even asked them if they had a search warrant. A plastic bag was found
containing marijuana flowering tops.
A complaint against the 13 union officers was filed before the Fiscal's Office
of Manila, for violation of R.A. No. 6425, The Dangerous Drugs Act. An
Information was subsequently filed by the Fiscal's Office before the RTC.
After trial, the RTC acquitted the accused, disposing that the specimen
and/or the marijuana flowering tops allegedly found inside the Union Office
occupied by the accused is not admissible in evidence because of the
suspicious circumstance of confiscation,
Soluta and his fellow union officers, together with the union, then filed
before the Manila RTC a Complaint against petitioners for malicious
prosecution and violation of their constitutional right against illegal search.
After trial, the RTC held the hotel, Panlilio, Maniego and Villanueva jointly
and severally liable for damages as a result of malicious prosecution and
illegal search of the union office.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the trial court's
decision. It found herein petitioners et al. civilly liable for damages for
violation of individual respondents' constitutional right against illegal
search, not for malicious prosecution.

Page 9 of 94
Hence, the present petition of Panlilio and the hotel.
Issues: Whether or not petitioners violated private
constitutional protection against searches and seizure.
respondents'
Held: YES.
Petitioners argue that the constitutional protection against illegal searches
and seizures is not meant to be invoked against private individuals and
hence, they are not covered. Petitioners further argue that the search of
the union office was reasonable under the circumstances, given that the
hotel owns the room where the union holds office; the search was not
without probable cause as it was conducted precisely due to reports
received by petitioners that the union office was being used as a venue for
illegal activities, particularly the sale and/or use of prohibited drugs; and
the search was conducted with the consent and in the presence of union
officer Babay.
The petition fails.
Article 32 of the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 32.Any public officer or employee, or any private individual,
who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any
manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties
of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxx xxx xxx
(9)The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures;
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners had already received reports in late 1987 of illegal activities
allegedly undertaken in the union office and Maniego conducted
surveillance of the union officers. Yet, in the morning of January 11, 1988,
petitioners and their companions barged into and searched the union office
without a search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one, and
notwithstanding the objection of Babay. The course taken by petitioners
and company does not fall under any of the exceptional instances when a
warrantless search is allowed by law. Petitioners' violation of individual
respondents' constitutional right against unreasonable search thus
furnishes the basis for the award of damages under Article 32 of the Civil
Code.

Case Digests
As for petitioners' contention that property rights justified the search of the
union office, the same does not lie. For respondents, being the lawful
occupants of the office, had the right to raise the question of validity of the
search and seizure. Neither does petitioners' claim that they were allowed
by union officer Babay to enter the union office lie. Babay's account of why
petitioners and company went to the union office to consider Panlilio's
suggestion to settle the mauling incident is more credible, as is his claim
that he protested the search, and even asked if they were armed with a
search warrant.
While it is doctrinal that the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures is a personal right which may be waived expressly or impliedly, a
waiver by implication cannot be presumed. There must be clear and
convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish it to constitute a
waiver thereof. There must be proof of the following: (a) that the right
exists; (b) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; and, (c) that the said person
had an actual intention to relinquish the right. In other words, the waiver
must be voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made. The evidence shows
otherwise, however.
There is no doubt that a violation of one's constitutional right against
illegal search and seizure can be the basis for the recovery of damages
under Article 32 in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the New Civil
Code.
Art. 2219, NCC provides:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(6)Illegal search;
xxx xxx xxx
(10)Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
32, 34 and 35.
Petitioners posit that the determinants in the validity of the constitutional
right against searches and seizure cannot be invoked against private
individuals. The issue in the present civil case is whether respondent
individual can recover damages for violation of constitutional rights. Article
32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code, allows so.

Page 10 of 94
CASE 6:
RUBI V PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
MALCOLM; February 28, 1919
FACTS
Rubi and various other Manguianes in the Province of Mindoro were
ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence
from their native habitat and to establish themselves on a reservation at
Tigbao in the Province of Mindoro and to remain there, or be punished by
imprisonment if they escaped. This reservation, as appears from the
resolution of the provincial board, extends over an area of 800 hectares of
land, which is approximately 2,000 acres, on which about three hundred
Manguianes are confined. One of the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from
the reservation and was taken in hand by the provincial sheriff and placed
in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. The
Manguianes sued out a writ of habeas corpus in this court, alleging that
they are deprived of their liberty in violation of law.
The return of the Solicitor-General alleges that on February 1, 1917, the
provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 signed by the
provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, jr.. The laws primary objective is
the advancement of the welfare of the non-Christian people of Mindoro. In
one of the Whereas clauses, it was stated that the provincial governor is of
the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place most
convenient for the Mangyanes to live on. Pursuant to the Governors
powers under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of
public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake was selected as a site for
the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the
approval of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior. Under the resolution of
the Provincial Board, any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this
order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceeding sixty days in
accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code. The
resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the
executive order of the governor of the same province copied in paragraph
3, were necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of
Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and
to introduce civilized customs among them.

Case Digests
ISSUES
1. WON the Mangyans were deprived of due process when their liberty to
choose their homes were limited by the law.
2. WON the Legislature exceeded its authority in enacting the law
mandating the forcible transfer of the Mangyanes.
HELD
1. NO. None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due
process of law. Daniel Webster, in the course of the argument in the
Dartmouth College Case before the United States Supreme Court, since a
classic in forensic literature, said that the meaning of "due process of law"
is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities
under the protection of the general rules which govern society." To
constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial
proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and
notice are not requisite, a rule which is especially true where much must
be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to
particular cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is
due process a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding
enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and custom, or
newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power in furtherance of
the public good which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and
justice must be held to be due process of law." (Hurtado vs. California
[1883], 110 U. S., 516.) "Due process of law" means simply * * * "first, that
there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the
legislative department of the Government; second, that this law shall be
reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the
regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be
applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class." (U. S. vs.
Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal to the United States
Supreme Court.1) "What is due process of law depends on circumstances it
varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs.
Peabody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.)
There is no doubt in my mind that this people has not a right conception of
liberty and does not practise liberty in a rightful way. They understand
liberty as the right to do anything they will-going from one place to another
in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal

Page 11 of 94
caigins thereon. Not knowing what true liberty is and not practicing the
same rightfully, how can they allege that they are being deprived thereof
without due process of law?
But does the Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of
his liberty without due process of law apply to a class of persons who do
not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practice liberty in a
rightful way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of
such class of persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar,
that the Government should not adopt any measures looking to the welfare
and advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this
people should be let alone in the mountains and in a permanent state of
savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty
in its true and noble sense. In dealing with the backward population, like
the Manguianes, the Government has been placed in the alternative of
either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The
latter measure was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and
with national conscience.
The Mangyans will ultimately become a heavy burden to the State and on
account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations,
or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may
want to abuse them.. They understand liberty as the right to do anything
they will-going from one place to another in the mountains, burning and
destroying forests and making illegal caigins thereon. To allow them to
successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the
Government without recourse to pursue the works of civilizing them and
making them useful citizens. They will thus be left in a permanent state of
savagery and become a vulnerable point of attack by those who doubt,
may challenge the ability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered
with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They
are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines.
Nor can one say that due process of law, has not been followed. To go back
to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws,
there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according
to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of
a class.

Case Digests
2. NO. Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power,
the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful
authority. It is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great
malady requires an equally drastic remedy.
As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which in
case of doubt, would lead to the determination that section 2145 is valid, is
the attitude which the courts should assume towards the settled policy of
the Government. In a late decision with which we are in full accord, Gamble
vs. Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:
We can see no objection to the application of public policy as a ratio
decidendi. Every really new question that comes before the courts is, in
the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not determined by
differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the
aid of analogies furnished by such prior cases. In balancing conflicting
solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court
believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable operation
as a general rule 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a
person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to
him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in
reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute
slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that
section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the
police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United
States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional.
Decision Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their
liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.
CASE 7:
LIBANAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 112386 June 14, 1994

Page 12 of 94
FACTS:
Petitioner Libanan is the incumbent vice-governor of Eastern Samar and
was a former member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan prior to the 1992
elections. He was charged in conspiring to other members toprevent and
exclude Docena (Respondent), a qualified replacement of a deceased
member, from exercising his rights and prerogatives as a member of the
said body, by promulgating in their official capacities Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Resolution No. 01, Series of 1991, wherein accused
expressed their recognition of Atty. Socrates B. Alar as the official
replacement of aforesaid deceased member , notwithstanding the recall of
his appointment by the Department of Local Government, to the damage
and prejudice of Agustin B. Docena..In effect, the SANDIGANBAYAN issued
a resolution, dated 26 July 1993, suspending their respective public
position and office for ninety (90) days. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, alleging three grounds:[1] Order of Suspension if executed
shall affront the petitioners right for due process; [2] the suspension would
assault his covenant to the people of Samaras their vice-governor; and [3]
the reasons sought to be prevented by the suspension no longer exist.
Petitioner contends that the order of suspension, being predicated on his
acts supposedly committed while still a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan, can no longer attach to him now that he is the duly elected and
incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Order of Suspension given by the SANDIGANBAYAN is
valid?
HELD:
Yes. The suspension order issued to petitioner Libanan is valid.The
suspension order cannot amount to a deprivation of property without due
process of law. Public office is"a public agency or trust," and it is not the
property envisioned by the Constitutional provision whichpetitioner
invokes.
Libanans second contention neither holds water. His so
-called "covenant" with the people of Eastern Samaris far from being
synonymous to, or the equivalent of, license, and it is not one that can cut
athwart the longarm of the law.Also, Republic Act No. 3019 unequivocally

Case Digests
mandates the suspension of a public official from office pending acriminal
prosecution against him. This Court has repeatedly held that such
preventive suspension ismandatory, and there are no "ifs" and "buts"
about it.Lastly, the Court ruled that the term "office" used in the law could
apply to any office which the officercharged might currently be holding and
not necessarily the particular office under which he was charged
CASE 8:

Page 13 of 94
Court of Appeals dismissed the case, Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
a) Whether the alias writ of execution may be enforced against petitioners;
ORQUIOLA vs TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT
b) Whether petitioners were innocent purchasers for value and builders in

good faith.
G.R. No. 141463. August 6, 2002
HELD:
QUISUMBING, J.:
a.)NO. Petitioners argue that the court erred when it relied heavily on the
courts ruling in Vda. de Medina vs. Cruzin holding that petitioners are
successors-in-interest of Mariano Lising, and as such, they can be reached
by the order of execution in Civil Case even though they were not
impleaded as parties thereto. It is submitted that Medina is not applicable
in this case because the circumstances therein are different from the
circumstances in the present case. In this case petitioners acquired the lot
before the commencement of Civil Case. The right over the land of the
predecessors-in-interest of herein petitioners is based on a fully recognized
Torrens title. Petitioners in this case acquired the registered title in their
own names. This differs from the medina case where the ownership is
not by virtue of torrens title but rather as issued by the Spanish
government. Where a case like the present one involves a sale of a
parcel of land under the Torrens system, the applicable rule is that a
person dealing with the registered property need not go beyond the
certificate of title; he can rely solely on the title and he is charged
with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the
title. It is our view here that the petitioners, spouses Victor and
Honorata Orquiola, are fully entitled to the legal protection of their lot by
the Torrens system.
FACTS:
Pura Kalaw Ledesma owned a parcel of land adjacent to those owned
by Herminigilda located in Tandang Sora Quezon City. Hermingilda sold her
2 parcels of land to Mariano Lising who then registered both lots in the
name of M.B. Lising Realty and subdivided them into smaller lots. Certain
portions of the subdivided lots were sold to third persons including herein
petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola. Pura Kalaw Ledesma
filed a complaint against Herminigilda Pedro and Mariano Lising for
allegedly encroaching upon
her land. During the pendency of the action, Tandang Sora Development
Corporation replaced Pura Kalaw Ledesma as plaintiff by virtue of an
assignment of Lot 689 made by Ledesma in favor of said corporation. Trial
continued for thirty years. The trial court finally adjudged defendants
Pedro and Lising jointly and severally liable for encroaching on
plaintiffs land. By virtue of such, the Deputy Sheriff of Quezon City
directed petitioners, through an alias writ of execution, to remove the
house they constructed on the land they were occupying. A writ of
demolition was issued subsequently. Petitioners filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for prohibition with TRO. Petitioners alleged that
they bought the subject parcel of land in good faith and for value;
hence, they were parties in interest. Since they
were not impleaded in the civil case, the writ of demolition issued in
connection therewith cannot be enforced against them because to do so
would amount to deprivation of property without due process of law. The
b.)YES. This is the first time that petitioners have raised this issue. As a
general rule, this could not be done. Nevertheless, the court deem it
proper that this issue be resolved in this case, to avoid circuitous
litigation and further delay in the disposition of this case. Petitioners are
indeed builders in good faith. Petitioner spouses acquired the land in
question without knowledge of any defect in the title of Mariano

Case Digests
Lising. Shortly afterwards, they built their conjugal home on said land. It
was only in 1998, when the sheriff of Quezon City tried to execute the
that they had notice of private respondents adverse claim. The
institution of Civil Case cannot serve as notice of such adverse claim
to petitioners since they were not impleaded therein as parties. As
builders in good faith and innocent purchasers for value, petitioners
have rights over the subject property and hence they are proper
parties in interest in any case thereon. Consequently, private
respondents should have impleaded them in Civil Case. Since they
failed to do so, petitioners cannot be reached by the decision in said
case. Petition is granted.
CASE 9:
CRISPINO PANGILINAN vs.JOCELYN N. BALATBAT substituted by her
heirs,
G.R. No. 170787
September 12, 2012
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals Decision
and its Resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Decision of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), which
affirmed the decision of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) of San Fernando, Pampanga, dismissing respondents' complaint
for the annulment of the emancipation patent issued in favor of
respondents tenant, petitioner Pangilinan, which emancipation patent
covered a portion of the land sought to be retained by respondents.
Facts:
Respondent spouses Balatbat were found by the PARAD to have
landholdings totaling 25.2548 hectares, which consisted riceland and
sugarland. The riceland was covered by land reform. Out of the 25.2548
hectares of land owned by respondents, 18.2479 hectares was under
Original Certificate of Title. Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer Guevarra
found that 8.6402 hectares was riceland covered by (Operation Land
Transfer Program)P.D No. 27 and (E.O.) No. 228, while 96,077 square
meters was sugarland. The 96,077 square meters of sugarland was
subdivided by respondents. Some were utilized by respondents in a
subdivision/condominium project and others subdivided among the
children of respondents.
This case involves only Lot 21-F of the subdivision plan Psd-03-005059,
being a portion of Lot 21. The said Lot 21-F, was transferred to petitioner
as evidenced by TCT which was registered in the Register of Deeds

Page 14 of 94
pursuant to Emancipation Patent issued by the DAR. Hence, respondents
sought to cancel the said emancipation patent on the ground that they
applied to retain the land covered by it.
Respondents first filed an Application for Retention of their landholdings
under P.D. No. 27 However, it was not acted upon. They received a letter
from Guevarra informing respondents of a conference for the
determination of the value of their landholdings and the final survey of the
land preparatory to the issuance of emancipation patents. They alleged
that they received a Notice of Coverage on OCT No. 6009 under R.A. No.
6657, and a final notification to landowner, which notices were all issued
by Guevarra.
In a letter respondents, by counsel, reiterated their application for
retention to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Regional Director,
thru the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office. The DAR Regional Director
referred respondents' application for retention to the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer, which application was later endorsed to Guevarra. After
investigation and verification of the landholdings, Guevarra, in a letter
recommended to the DAR Provincial Office that respondents' re-application
for retention be denied. Register of Deeds issued TCT petitioner, pursuant
to Emancipation Patent covering Lot 21-F of the subdivision plan which is a
portion of the land sought to be retained by respondents.
This prompted respondents to file with the DAR PARAB a Complaint for
annulment of emancipation patent, ejectment and damages against
petitioners.
PARAD rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner. PARAD held that the area
of seven hectares that can be retained under P.D. No. 27 can no longer be
awarded to respondents, since they already owned an aggregate area of
more than seven hectares used for residential and other urban purposes
from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their
family. Moreover, petitioner has absolute ownership of the landholding as
he has fully paid the amortizations to the LBP.Respondents appealed the
decision of the PARAD before the DARAB. DARAB affirmed the decision.
Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of respondents.
Issue:
1.
WON CA COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT DECIDED CA-G.R.

[SP] NO. 85017 WITHOUT REQUIRING THAT PETITIONER HEREIN (AS
PRIVATE RESPONDENT) BE FURNISHED WITH A COPY OF THE
PETITION, THUS DEPRIVING THE LATTER HIS RIGHT TO BE HEARD
AND TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN OPPOSITION THERETO.
Petitioner contends that he was deprived of the right to be heard and

denied due process of law because he was not personally furnished a copy

Case Digests
of the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 85017, which copy was furnished to Mr.
Fernando Dizon, his legal counsel before the PARAD and the DARAB.
According to petitioner, the legal services rendered to him by Mr. Fernando
Dizon in DARAB Case No. 5357- P'98 was merely an accommodation to him
in Mr. Dizons capacity as Legal Officer for the Legal Services Division of
the DAR. Petitioner asserts that after the case was decided and resolved by
the DARAB, the legal assistance extended to him by Mr. Fernando Dizon
ended, simply because Mr. Fernando Dizon is not a full-fledged lawyer,
which the respondents knew very well. Thus, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated May 30, 2005, cannot be enforced against him. Petitioners
contention lacks merit.
Petitioner was not denied due process or the right to be heard as he was
furnished with a copy of the petition through his counsel of record, Mr.
Fernando Dizon, who was his legal counsel before the PARAD and the
DARAB. The Court notes that the applicable DARAB New Rules of Procedure
(1994) allows a non-lawyer to appear before the Board or any of its
adjudicators if he is a DAR Legal Officer. As Mr. Dizon was his counsel of
record before the PARAD and the DARAB, it may be presumed that
petitioner and Mr. Dizon communicated with each other as Mr. Dizon even
filed a Comment to the Petition for Review filed by respondents before the
Court of Appeals. The filing of the said Comment would show that
petitioner was informed by Mr. Dizon that respondents filed a Petition for
Review of the Decision of the DARAB with the Court of Appeals. Hence, it is
the responsibility of petitioner to engage the services of a lawyer to file a
Comment in his behalf and to inform the court of any change of counsel.
Section 2, Rule 13 (Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments and
Other Papers) of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Filing and service, defined. Filing is the act of presenting
the pleading or other paper to the clerk of court.
Service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading
or paper concerned. If any party has appeared by counsel, service
upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless
service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Where one
counsel appears for several parties, he shall only be entitled to one
copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side.
(Emphasis supplied.)
As petitioner had a counsel of record, service was properly made upon the
said counsel, absent any notification by petitioner to the court of
circumstances requiring service upon petitioner himself.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard.
Such process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard

Page 15 of 94
before judgment is rendered. Rizal Commercial Bank Corporation v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,31 held:
There is no question that the "essence of due process is a hearing
before conviction and before an impartial and disinterested
tribunal," but due process as a constitutional precept does not
always, and in all situations, require a trial-type proceeding. The
essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal
arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings.
Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process.
In this case, petitioner was not denied due process as he was able to file a
comment before the Court of Appeals through his counsel of record, DAR
Legal Officer Dizon. Moreover, records show that petitioner, with the
assistance of two lawyers, Atty. Paul S. Maglalang and Atty. Jord Achaes R.
David, filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated May 30, 2005, which motion was denied for lack of merit by
the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated December 2, 2005.
<in case tanungin.. ;) >
Supplemental Guidelines Governing the Exercise of Retention Rights by
Landowners Under Presidential Decree No. 27
xxxx
B. Policy Statements
1. Landowners covered by P.D. 27 are entitled to retain seven hectares,
except those whose entire tenanted rice and corn lands are subject of
acquisition and distribution under Operation Land Transfer (OLT). An owner
of tenanted rice and corn lands may not retain these lands under the
following cases:
a. If he, as of 21 October 1972, owned more than 24 hectares of tenanted
rice or corn lands; or b. By virtue of LOI 474, if he, as of 21 October 1976,
owned less than 24 hectares of tenanted rice or corn lands but additionally
owned the following:
- Other agricultural lands of more than seven hectares, whether
tenanted or not, whether cultivated or not, and regardless of the
income derived therefrom; or
- Lands used for residential, commercial, industrial, or other urban
purposes, from which he derives adequate income to support himself and
his family.22#
CASE 10:
Javier v. COMELEC

Case Digests
FACTS:
Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to
be members of the Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier
complained of massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying,
fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat
and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men
of Pacificador. COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the
same complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed
the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass
but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further
orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board to
immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the
outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC,
the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as
premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of
appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the
irregularities of the election must first be resolved before proclaiming a
winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself
as he was a former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was
made by only the 2nd Division but the Constitute requires that it be
proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency, Javier
was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition
close it being moot and academic by virtue of Javiers death.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of
Pacificador.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gens
tenor. The SC has repeatedly and consistently demanded the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge as the indispensable imperative of due
process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not
only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are
entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are
violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must
trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe
in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without
such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the
justice they expect.

Page 16 of 94
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance
with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls
for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches
a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already
made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have
undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial)
proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed
to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared
script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his
conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed,
on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
CASE 11:
GALMAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
144 SCRA 43
FACTS: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was
killed from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International
Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of
his head by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a span
of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then
supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando
Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts
gunned him down in turn.
President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due
to large masses of people who joined in the ten-day period of national
mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting
the military version stating that "the evidence shows to the contrary that
Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers in the
staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination
was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only
difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the
twenty-six private respondents above-named in the title of the case
involved in the military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report
would exclude nineteen of them.
Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.
Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from
rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved
by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court
also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents'

Case Digests
separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to
submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution.
But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse,
resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier
enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The same Court
majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from
receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution
(which apparently was not served on them).
Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the
dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that
the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are entitled
to due process.
However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the
accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally
absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with the
Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot
and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied petitioners' motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for
reconsideration alleging that respondents committed serious irregularities
constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross
violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign
people of the Philippines to due process of law.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

Page 17 of 94
categorizing the participation of each respondent; decided that the
presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First Division) would personally handle
the trial. A conference was held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the
First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with the
President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the
room where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the
visitors in the reception hall waiting to see the President. During the
conference, and after an agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told them
'Okay, mag moro-moronalamang kayo;' and that on their way out of the
room Pres. Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and uttered 'I know
how
to
reciprocate'.
The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had
stage-managed in and from Malacaang Palace "a scripted and
predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman
murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and
the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of
some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist. Also
predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the
twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres.
Marcos came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator
Aquino was killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired
gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder that President Marcos would
want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced
theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his
administration of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination.
such a procedure would be a better arrangement because, if the accused
are charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the
benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another
prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is
no
longer
in
office.
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause.
RULING: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and
ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be conducted with
deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due
process.
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later
when former Pres. was no longer around) affirmed the allegations in the
second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the
Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by
Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. Malacaang wanted
dismissal to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the
Investigating Panel. Malacaang Conference planned a scenario of trial
where the former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by
More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of

witnesses. The disappearance of witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's
assassination. According to J. Herrera, "nobody was looking for these
persons because they said Marcos was in power. The assignment of the
case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that the assignment
was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated
testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of the accused and their
confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail.The monitoring
of proceedings and developments from Malacaang and by Malacaang
personnel. The partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That
President Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted
may not be denied. In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid
itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of
the accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the

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prosecution
was
totally

Page 18 of 94
ignored
and
disregarded.
The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming
resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and
make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder
cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code
penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or suggestion
to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice."
mpartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal
collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public
respondents at the secret Malacaang conference (and revealed only after
fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified
respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts
would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere
tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the
truth. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are
entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at
stake.
There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void
judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy
attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all.
By it no rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts and
all claims flowing out of it are void.
Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case,
petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their
petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering
its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had required
the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no
restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not
have precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused
pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of the respondent
judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of
jurisdiction
which
substantively
prejudiced
the
petitioner.
With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be
tried before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. Respondents
accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against them before an
impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process.
The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people,
under our system of government, is to fill the public posts. Justices and
judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority
nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance
with their oath of office, guided only the Constitution and their own
conscience and honor.
CASE 12.
[G.R. No. 120282. April 20, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERT CASTILLO y
MONES, accused-appellant.
On May 25, 1993, around one oclock in the morning, Eulogio Velasco,
floor manager of the Cola Pubhouse along EDSA, Project 7, Veterans
Village, Quezon City, was sitting outside the Pubhouse talking with his
co-worker, Dorie.
Soon, Antonio Tony Dometita, one of their
customers, came out of the pubhouse. As he passed by, he informed
Eulogio that he was going home. When Tony Dometita was about an
armslength [sic] from Eulogio, however, appellant Robert Castillo
suddenly appeared and, without warning, stabbed Tony with a fan
knife on his left chest. As Tony pleaded for help, appellant stabbed
him once more, hitting him on the left hand.
Responding to Tonys cry for help, Eulogio placed a chair between
Tony and appellant to stop appellant from further attacking Tony. He
also shouted at Tony to run away. Tony ran towards the other side of
EDSA, but appellant pursued him.
Eulogio came to know later that Tony had died. His body was found
outside the fence of the Iglesia ni Cristo Compound, EDSA, Quezon
City.
Dr. Bienvenido Munoz, the medico-legal officer who autopsied Tonys
cadaver, testified that the proximate cause of Tonys death was the
stab wound on his left chest. Tony also suffered several incised
wounds and abrasions, indicating that he tried to resist the attack.
ISSUE:
1.
That the trial court in many instances showed its prejudice against
the accused and in several instances asked questions that [were] well
within the duty of the prosecution to explore and ask; it never appreciated

Case Digests
other matters favorable to the accused, like the frontal infliction of the
mortal wound and the presence [of] defense wounds which negate
treachery and superiority.
2.
That the trial judge was bias[ed] against the accused hence the
judgement of conviction.In the main, appellant questions the trial judges
(1) assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies and
(2) alleged partiality in favor of the prosecution as shown by his
participation in the examination of witnesses.
RULING:
Appellant declares that the trial judge was biased against him, for
propounding questions that were well within the prerogative of the
prosecution to explore and ask. More pointedly, appellant alleges that the
trial judge took over from the prosecution and asked questions in a leading
manner,i[32] interrupted the cross-examination to help the witness give
answers favorable to the prosecution, ii[33] and asked questions which
pertained to matters of opinion and allusions of bad moral character, which
could not be objected to by defense counsel, because they have been
ventiliated by the judge himself. iii[34] To substantiate the alleged bias and
prejudice of the judge, appellant in his brief cited several pages from the
transcript of stenographic notes.iv[35]
The allegation of bias and prejudice is not well-taken. It is a judges
prerogative and duty to ask clarificatory questions to ferret out the truth. v
[36] On the whole, the Court finds that the questions propounded by the
judge were merely clarificatory in nature. Questions which merely clear up
dubious points and bring out additional relevant evidence are within
judicial prerogative. Moreover, jurisprudence teaches that allegations of
bias on the part of the trial court should be received with caution,
especially when the queries by the judge did not prejudice the accused.
The propriety of a judges queries is determined not necessarily by their
quantity but by their quality and, in any event, by the test of whether the
defendant was prejudiced by such questioning. In this case, appellant
failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the questions propounded
by the trial judge. In fact, even if all such questions and the answers
thereto were eliminated, appellant would still be convicted.
As correctly observed by the solicitor general, there was no showing that
the judge had an interest, personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of the
case at bar. He is therefore presumed to have acted regularly and in the
manner [that] preserve[s] the ideal of the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge implicit in the guarantee of due process (Mateo, Jr. vs. Villaluz, 50
SCRA 18).vi[37] That the trial judge believed the evidence of the

Page 19 of 94
prosecution more than that of the defense, does not indicate that he was
biased. He simply accorded greater credibility to the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses than to that of the accused.
CASE 13:
G.R. No. 174431
August 6, 2012
The Heirs of JOLLY R. BUGARIN, namely MA. AILEEN H. BUGARIN,

MA. LINDA B. ABIOG and MA. ANNETTE B. SUMULONG, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
Facts: The late Bugarin was the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) when the late Ferdinand E. Marcos was still the
president of the country from 1965-1986. After the latters downfall in
1986, the new administration, through the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG), filed a petition for forfeiture of properties under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1379 against him with the Sandiganbayan. The
latter dismissed the petition for insufficiency of evidence in its August 13,
1991 Decision. After the Sandiganbayan denied its motion for
reconsideration, the PCGG sought a review of the dismissal before the
Court on December 18, 1991. Sitting En Banc, the Court found manifest
errors and misapprehension of facts leading it "to pore over the evidence
extant from the records," including Bugarins very own summary of his
property acquisitions. Thereafter, the Court found Bugarin to have
amassed wealth totaling P2,170,163.00 from 1968 to 1980 against his total
income for the period 1967 to 1980 totaling only 766,548.00. With this,
the Court held that Bugarins properties, which were visibly out of
proportion to his lawful income from 1968 to 1980, should be forfeited in
favor of the government. Bugarin moved for a reconsideration and while
his motion was pending, he passed away in September 2002. With this
development, his heirs, the petitioners herein, moved to have the case
dismissed. The Court denied both Bugarins Motion for Reconsideration and
petitioners Motion to Dismiss. Petitioners sought reconsideration but the
same was likewise denied. Still, they filed their Motion for Leave to File a
Second Motion for Reconsideration and its Admission with the attached
Second Motion for Reconsideration, but it was likewise denied on July 27,
2004 for being a prohibited pleading while the attached motion was merely
noted without action.

Case Digests
With the case back at the Sandiganbayan, hearing was set for January 12,
2005 to determine which properties of the late Bugarin would be forfeited
in favor of the government. On the said date, only the counsels of the
PCGG appeared. In the hearing of May 5, 2005, petitioners moved to
cancel the hearings on the ground that they had filed a motion for leave to
file a motion to dismiss.
On May 10, 2005, instead of a copy of their motion for leave to file motion
to dismiss, petitioners served upon PCGG their Manifestation and Ad
Cautelam Motion to Dismiss dated May 5, 2005, to which PCGG filed a
comment/opposition. the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners Motion for
Leave to File Motion to Dismiss. petitioners moved for a reconsideration of
the denial of the motion for leave of court. On March 21, 2006, petitioners
motion for reconsideration was eventually denied and the hearing to
determine the properties for forfeiture was held. The Sandiganbayan ruled,
against the petitioner. Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of this
order.
On August 30, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the April 3 Resolution.
petition for review on certiorari, pertitioner argues that they have been
denied due process.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT BUGARINS HEIRS WERE ACCORDED
THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
HELD: The Supreme court ruled in the positive stating that Foremost in
petitioners arguments is their claim that they have been deprived of their
right to due process of law when the Sandiganbayan, in its April 3, 2006
Resolution, ordered for the forfeiture of Bugarins properties pursuant to
the January 30, 2002 Decision of this Court in the Republic case. They fault
the selection process laid down in the said case which purportedly denied
them the opportunity to show that "not all of the late Bugarins properties
may be forfeited." Petitioners accuse the Sandiganbayan of allegedly
reducing their rights to a simple mathematical equation of subtracting the
late Bugarins amassed wealth against his lawful income for the same
period and using the difference as basis for choosing the properties to be
forfeited for the sole reason that their total acquisition cost was closest to
said difference. They, thus, want that another round of trial or hearing be
conducted for "further reception of evidence" to determine which among
the properties enumerated in theRepublic case are ill-gotten wealth. The
Court finds no merit in the petition.

Page 20 of 94
It is evident in the case of Republic that upon filing the petition for
forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, the government through the PCGG
offered evidence to establish that the properties acquired by Bugarin
during his incumbency as NBI Director were manifestly disproportionate to
the income he derived for the same period establishing that presumption
of prima facie unlawful acquisitions. For his part, Bugarin also offered his
evidence. This included no less than 15 witnesses and documentary
evidence consisting of 48 exhibits. As earlier stated, the Sandiganbayan
dismissed the petition for insufficiency of evidence. On review, this Court
assessed that the dismissal was plagued with manifest errors and
misapprehension of facts, thus, impelling this Court to once more "pore
over the evidence." In the end, it concluded that "respondent's (Bugarins)
properties acquired from 1968 to 1980 which were out of proportion to his
lawful income for the said period should be forfeited in favor of the
government for failure of the respondent to show, to the Court's
satisfaction, that the same were lawfully acquired."
In this case, petitioners point out that "realizing that it did not have the
power to receive evidence and to try facts, this Honorable Court remanded
the case to the Sandiganbayan for further reception of evidence as to what
properties should be forfeited in favor of the State."
The Court then took account of, and then valuated, all of Bugarins claims
regarding his income from several sources. The Court reasoned that the
income from these rentals could not have been used to finance the
purchase of real properties and shareholdings prior to 1981. Besides, the
legality of said rentals is in itself of serious doubt since the source (the real
property) from where it was derived was not wholly acquired from lawful
income. From the incomes that remained or were not excluded, the Court
proceeded to deduct the total personal expenses of Bugarin and his family
based on an "extremely" conservative computation by the Sandiganbayan
in order to arrive at the difference which represented Bugarins lawful or
disposable income that, in turn, could have been used in acquiring his
properties. Against this amount, the Court then compared his acquired
properties, and to quote:
From the summary of Bugarins assets, it can readily be seen that all of his
real properties were purchased or constructed, as the case may be, from
1968 to 1980. The total acquisition cost thereof was P1,705,583.00. With
the exception of those that had been liquidated, those acquired from 1981
onward, and those whose year of acquisition could not be determined, his
shareholdings in various corporations and other investments amounted
to P464,580.00 Hence, for the period from 1968 to 1980, he amassed
wealth in the amount of P2,170,163.00.

Case Digests
On the other hand, his total income from 1967 to 1980 P 766,548.
amounted only to P 766,548.00, Total
00
Premises considered, respondents (Bugarins) properties acquired from
1968 to 1980 which were out of proportion to his lawful income for the said
period should be forfeited in favor of the government for failure of the
respondent to show, to the Courts satisfaction, that the same was lawfully
acquired.
Based on the assiduous reassessment of evidence in the Republic case,
and after finding that Bugarins properties acquired during the period in
question were grossly disproportionate to his lawful income during the
same period without any satisfactory explanation as to how this came to
be,
the
Court granted the
petition,reversed
and
set
aside the
Sandiganbayans dismissal of the forfeiture proceedings, and ordered
forfeited in favor of the government Bugarins properties acquired from
1968 to 1980 that were disproportionate to his lawful income earned
during the same period. The case was then remanded to the
Sandiganbayan "for proper determination of properties to be forfeited" in
favor of the government.
The preceding summary of the Republic case, readily shows that Bugarin
was accorded due process. He was given his day in court to prove that his
acquired properties were lawfully attained. A review of the full text of the
said case will reveal that the summary of properties acquired by Bugarin
during his tenure as NBI Director was based on his very own exhibits. From
this enumeration, the Court set aside those properties that had been
liquidated or those that had been obtained in 1981 onwards. Even those
properties whose acquisition dates could no longer be determined were
also excluded, all to the benefit of Bugarin. What remained was a trimmed
down listing of properties, from which the Sandiganbayan may choose in
executing the order of forfeiture of the Court.
Moreover, in arriving at the amount representing his lawful income or
disposable income during his incumbency as NBI Director, the Court
subtracted from Bugarins income as stated in "Exhibit -38," the personal
expenses of his family, which according to the Court was quite
conservative, again redounding to the benefit of Bugarin.
The essence of due process is the right to be heard. Based on the
foregoing, Bugarin or his heirs were certainly not denied that right.
Petitioners cannot now claim a different right over the reduced list of
properties in order to prevent forfeiture, or at the least, justify another
round of proceedings.

Page 21 of 94
This Court continues to emphasize that due process is satisfied when the
parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
respective sides of the controversy. Thus, when the party seeking due
process was in fact given several opportunities to be heard and air his side,
but it is by his own fault or choice he squanders these chances, then his
cry for due process must fail.
When the case was remanded to the Sandiganbayan for execution,
petitioners were likewise accorded due process. Records of this case reveal
that every motion by petitioners for resetting of hearing dates was
granted, and every motion filed, either for reconsideration or leave of
court, was heard. Although their counsel claimed that he did not receive
the notice for the first hearing set on January 12, 2005 because it seemed
that it was "sent to the wrong address," the fact remains that by March 3,
2005, he had informed the Sandiganbayan of the mistake and, in fact,
provided it with the correct address. More importantly though, after the
January 12, 2005 setting, five (5) more hearings were set May 5 and 6,
September 29 and 30, and November 10, 2005. This time, petitioners were
represented. Instead of questioning the order of January 12, 2005, which
required the government to submit its list of properties to be forfeited from
the delimited list found in the Republic decision, or seek leave to provide
that court with their own alternative list of properties from the same
delimited list, petitioners chose to pursue the course of seeking for the nth
time the dismissal of the case altogether, an issue that had long been
resolved and settled by this Court in Republic.
OTHER RULING SA DUE PROCESS AS CITED BY THE SC
CASE
IN
THE
In the case of Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. v. COMELEC, 43 this

Court elucidated on this all too important right to due process,
On the due process issue, we agree with the COMELEC that PGBI's right to
due process was not violated for PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as
it did seek, a reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of due
process, we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard;
as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity
to explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is
not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied
where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack
of notice and hearing x x x. We find it obvious under the attendant
circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process. x x x. (Emphasis
supplied)

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Page 22 of 94
11.Residential
San Juan
ADDITIONAL INFO NG CASE
House,
Greenhills,
1980
650,000.00
650,000.00
1968-75
24,750.00
1975
25,000.00
25,000.00
C.Manila Polo Club [Membership

1978
Certificate No. 0125]
32,000.00
32,000.00
D.Baguio Country Club
60,000.00
OTHER INVESTMENT
LIST OF ASSETS
A.Philippine Columbian Club
Honorable Supreme Courts Decision dated January 30, 2002

YEAR
ACQUISITI
ACQUIRE
ON COST
D
REAL PROPERTY
1.Residential lot in Damarinas

1968
Village, Makati [TCT No. 247560]
91,140,.00
2.Nine (9) Residential lots, Tagaytay

1968
City [TCT No. 8695-8703]
9,340.00
3.Residential House,
Village, Makati
175,900.00
Dasmarinas
1969
B.Makati
Sports
Club
Certificate No. A-2271]
TO
BE
FORFEITE
D
PROPERTI
ES
[Stock
1985
TOTAL
9,340.00
1,395,543.0
0
BASIS NG FORFEITURE
Section 2 of R.A. No. 1379, or the "Act declaring forfeiture in favor of the
state any property found to have been unlawfully acquired by any public
officer or employee providing for the proceedings therefor," provides:
4.Residential Lot, Greenhills, San

1973
Juan, MM [TCT No. 7765]
87,288.00
5.Residential lot, Capitol District,

1972
Quezon City [TCT No. 189558]
72,750.00
6.Condominium Unit, Montepino

1973
Condominium, Baguio City
100,000.00
7.Residential lot, Valle Verde, Pasig

1976
City, MM [TCT No. (491374)10848]
263,165.00
263,165.00
Thus, when the government, through the PCGG, filed forfeiture proceedings
against Bugarin, it took on the burden of proving the following:
8.Residential House, Valle Verde,

1978
Pasig City
250,000.00
250,000.00
1. The public official or employee acquired personal or real properties

during his/her incumbency;
9.Residential lot, Calapan, Oriental

1978
Mindoro [TCT No. 2887]
5,000.00
5,000.00
2. This acquisition is manifestly disproportionate to his/her salary or other

legitimate income; and
10.Orchard and Cocoland, Puerto

Galera, Oriental Mindoro [TCT No. 1978
10926]
1,000.00
1,000.00
3. The existence of which gives rise to a presumption that these same

properties were acquired prima facie unlawfully.
87,288.00
72,750.00
SEC 2. Filing of Petition. Whenever any public officer or employee has

acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly
out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his
other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property,
said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully
acquired. x x x.

Case Digests
After the government had established these, the burden to debunk the
presumption was shifted to Bugarin. He had to explain and adequately
show that his acquisitions, even though they might appear
disproportionate, were nonetheless lawfully acquired. Section 6 of RA No.
1379 reads:
SEC.6. Judgment. If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of
the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the
court shall declare such property, forfeited in favor of the State, and by
virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of
the State, x x x.
NOT RALATED TO DUE PROCESS
Petitioners should have realized in the fallo, as well as in the body of
the Republic decision, that the properties listed by this Court were all
candidates for forfeiture. At that point, no additional proof or evidence was
required. All that was needed was for the Sandiganbayan, as the court of
origin, to make sure that the aggregate sum of theacquisition costs of the
properties
chosen
remained
within
the amount
which
was
disproportionate to the income of Bugarin during his tenure as NBI Director.
To reiterate, the case was only remanded to the Sandiganbayan to
implement the Courts ruling in the Republic case.
To grant the petition and order the Sandiganbayan to receive evidence
once again would be tantamount to resurrecting the long-settled
disposition in the Republic case. This cannot be permitted. In settling this
once and for all, Section 10 of R.A. No. 1379 is instructive.
SEC. 10. Effect of Record of Title. The fact that any real property has been
recorded in the Registry of Property or office of the Registry of Deeds in the
name of respondent or of any person mentioned in paragraph (1) and (2)
of subsection (b) of section one hereof shall not prevent the rendering of
the judgment referred to in section six of this Act.
And paragraphs (1) and (2) referred to provide,
1. Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but its ownership is
concealed by its being recorded in the name of, or held by, the
respondents spouse, ascendants, descendants, relatives, or any other
person.
2. Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but transferred by him
to another person or persons on or after the effectivity of this Act.

Page 23 of 94
It is equally clear in the earlier quoted fallo of the Republic that this Court
had already made a determination, nay, a declaration that the properties
of the late Bugarin acquired from 1968 to 1980 which were
disproportionate to his lawful income were ordered forfeited in favor of the
State. Following Section 6 of R.A. No. 1379, this means that the late
Bugarin, now being represented by the petitioners, failed to convince the
Court that the delimited list of properties were lawfully acquired. With this
failure, the said properties have been ordered forfeited to the extent or up
to that which is disproportionate to his lawful or disposable income which
was likewise determined by the Court in that case.
The properties, consisting of real and other investments, acquired within
the subject period were identified and listed down in the case of Republic.
Both the acquisition dates which were likewise indicated there were
reckoned. Still in Republic, the lawful income of Bugarin during the same
period was also determined by the Court based on his very own "Exhibit
38" minus that tempered amount representing his as well as his familys
personal expenses. Therefore, when the case was returned to the
Sandiganbayan, it was not, as petitioners ardently claim to conduct
another full blown trial or proceeding to determine or establish the very
same things that this Court had long decided in Republic. Rather, it was to
choose from among the Courts identified and declared reduced list of
properties that would approximate the amount which was beyond or out of
proportion to Bugarins lawful income also identified and declared by the
High Tribunal in the same case.
The immutability of judgment that has long become final and executory is
the core, the very essence of an effective and efficient administration of
justice. Thus, in Labao v. Flores,44 this Court reiterated the importance of
the doctrine:
Needless to stress, a decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact
or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court of the land. All the issues between the parties are deemed
resolved and laid to rest once a judgment becomes final and executory;
execution of the decision proceeds as a matter of right as vested rights are
acquired by the winning party. Just as a losing party has the right to appeal
within the prescribed period, the winning party has the correlative right to
enjoy the finality of the decision on the case. After all, a denial of a petition
for being time-barred is tantamount to a decision on the merits. Otherwise,
there will be no end to litigation, and this will set to naught the main role of
courts of justice to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the

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Page 24 of 94
maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with

finality.
ISSUE: Is PSALM mandated to give access to petitioners the necessary

information related to the bidding process herein?
WHEREFORE, the
petition
is DENIED, The
Resolutions
of
the
Sandiganbayan dated April 3, 2006 and August 30, 2006, implementing
the January 30, 2002 Decision of the Court in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, are herebyAFFIRMED.
HELD: The Supreme Court held in the affirmative and reiterated the rule in
the Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority were it was held that the
constitutional right to information includes information on on-going
negotiations before a final contract. The information must not however
constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover
recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic
secrets, and similar matters affecting national security and public order.
The court in this case will distinguish the duty to disclose information on
matters of public concern under Art III sec. 7. Unlike the disclosure of
information which is mandatory under the constitution, the peoples right
to know requires a demand or request for one to gain access to documents
and paper of particular industry. Moreover, the duty to disclose covers only
transactions involving public interest, while the duty to allow access has a
broader scope of information which embraces not only transactions
involving public interest , but any matter contained in official
communications and public documents of the government agency. Such
relief must be granted to the party requesting access to official records,
documents and papers relating to official acts, transactions, and decisions
that are relevant to a government contract. In the instant case, PSALM is
directed to furnish to petitioners with copies of all documents and records
on its file pertaining to K-Water.
CASE 14:
IDEALS vs. PSALM; G.R. 192088; October 9, 2012
FACTS: In pursuit of the governments policy towards efficiency of
delivering services to its people and to rid itself of too much workload, it
adopted privatization measures wherein functions and assets formerly of
the government are sold through bids to the private sector. As in the
instant case PSALM is a government corporation created by the Electric
Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 or EPIRA for brevity. The said law
provided for a framework for restructuring electric power industry as well
as the privatization of the assets of the National Power Corporation, the
transition to the desired competitive structure, and the definition of the
responsibilities of the various government agencies and private entities.
Said law mandated PSALM to manage the orderly sale, disposition, and
privatization of NPC generation assets, real estate and other disposable
assets, and Independent Power Producer (IPP) contracts with the objective
of liquidating all NPC financial obligations and stranded contract costs in an
optimal manner, which liquidation is to be completed within PSALMs 25year term of existence. PSALM commenced the privatization Angat HydroElectric Power Plant, bidding procedures were approved, an invitation to
bid was published in three national newspapers, the terms and conditions
for the purchase of Angat Hydro-Electric were set forth in the bidding
package. All the bidders complied with the requirements of the bidding
process and PSALM finally awarded the project to K-Water, a South Korean
based company. A petition with the Supreme Court was filed by IDEALS,
Freedom from Debt Coalition, AKBAYAN and Alliance for Progressive Labor
questioning that the bidding process was commenced without having
previously released to the public critical information as to the terms and
conditions of the sale; the parties qualified to bid and the minimum bid
price; PSALM refused to divulge significant information requested by
petitioners, matters which are of public concern.
CASE 15:
JANE CARAS vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 129900. October 2, 2001
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
Herein petitioner JANE S. CARAS has appealed from the judgment
of conviction in fifteen (15) related cases of Violation of the Bouncing
Checks Law. The evidence for the prosecution showed that the accused
obtained from complainant Chu Yang T. Atienza, on installment, various gift
checks and purchase orders from Uniwide Sales and in payment thereof,
the accused issued to the complainant fifteen (15) checks drawn against
Philippine Commercial Bank. When the checks were presented for deposit
or encashment, they were all dishonored for the reason Account

Case Digests
Closed. Despite repeated verbal and written demands made on her to
replace the dishonored checks with cash, she failed and refused to do so.
Petitioner admits having issued the checks but insists that she
issued them merely to guarantee payment of her obligation to a certain
Marivic Nakpil, alleged sister of the complainant; they were not supposed
to have been deposited in a bank. She also asserts that she was not
properly notified of the dishonor of her checks. She maintains that the
prosecution failed to show that she received the notices of dishonor
purportedly sent to her.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that B.P. 22
does not make any distinction regarding the purpose for which the checks
were issued. Thus, criminal liability attaches whether the checks were
issued in payment of an obligation or to guarantee payment of that
obligation. The Lower court ruled against the accused. Consequently, the
appealed decision is affirmed in toto.
ISSUE: Whether or not herein public respondent erred in its judgment

against the accused.
HELD: YES. The prosecution presented no evidence that would establish
petitioners actual receipt of any demand letter that could have served as
notice to petitioner. No acknowledgement receipt or return card for the first
and second demand letters was offered in evidence.
The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an
accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually
served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand that the notice of
dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the
opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22.
Although it is true that the mere act of issuing a worthless check
is malum prohibitum and is punishable under B.P. 22, the failure of the
prosecution to prove that petitioner was given the requisite notice of
dishonor is a clear ground for her acquittal. Discussion of the other
assigned errors need no longer detain the Court. However, this decision in
no way prejudices the civil obligations, if any, that the complainant might
have incurred by reason of her transactions with private complainant.

Page 25 of 94
CASE 16:
[G.R. No. 174893. July 11, 2012.]
FLORDELIZA
MARIA
REYES-RAYEL, petitioner, vs.
PHILIPPINE
LUEN
THAI
HOLDINGS,
CORPORATION/L&T
INTERNATIONAL
GROUP
PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.
FACTS:
In February 2000,
Resources (CHR) Director
2001, petitioner received
Corporate Legal Counsel of
PLTHC hired petitioner as Corporate Human

for Manufacturing for, L&T. On September 6,
a Prerequisite Notice from Sauceda and the
PLTHC, Ma. Lorelie T. Edles (Edles), which reads:
(This has reference to your failure to perform in accordance with

management directives in various instances, which collectively have
resulted in loss of confidence in your capability to promote the interests of
the Company. On numerous occasions, in the presence of colleagues and
subordinates, you made statements that serve to undermine the
Company's efforts at pursuing the HR2 Program. You ought to have realized
that when leveled by an officer of your rank, no less than a Director of the
Corporate Human Resources Division, such remarks are highly
inflammatory and their negative impact is magnified. Colleagues and
subordinates complain of your negative attitude towards the Company, its
officers and people. In view of the above, we afford you the opportunity to
submit your written reply to this memorandum within forty-eight (48) hours
from its receipt. Failure to so submit shall be construed as waiver of your
right to be heard. Consequently, the Company shall immediately decide on
this matter.)
She explained that her alleged failure to perform management directives
could be attributed to the lack of effective communication with her
superiors due to malfunctioning email system. This caused her to miss
certain directives coming from her superiors and likewise, for her superiors
to overlook the reports she was submitting. She denied uttering negative

Case Digests
comments about the HR2 Program and instead claimed to have intimated
her support for it. She further denied causing disharmony in her division.
In a Termination Notice, respondents, through Sauceda and Edles,
dismissed petitioner from the service for loss of confidence on her ability
to promote the interests of the company. This led petitioner to file a
Complaint for illegal dismissal, payment of separation pay, 13th month
pay, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and other unpaid
company benefits against respondents and its officers, namely, Sauceda,
Edles and Willie Tan (Tan), the Executive Vice-President of PLTHC. DEacIT
Petitioner alleged that:
1. the causes for her dismissal as stated in the Prerequisite Notice and
Notice of Termination are not proper grounds for termination under the
Labor Code and the same do not even pertain to any willful violation of the
company's code of discipline or any other company policy.
2. she was not afforded a hearing, investigation and right to appeal as per
company procedure for disciplining employees.
3. respondents were guilty of violating the termination provision under the
employment contract which stipulated that employment after probationary
period shall be terminated by giving the employee a three-month notice in
writing or by paying three months salary in lieu of notice.
4. the respondents acted in bad faith by subjecting her to public
humiliation and embarrassment when she was ordered to immediately turn
over the company car, vacate her office and remove all her belongings on
the same day she received the termination notice, in full view of all the
other employees.
Respondent claimed:
1. they have a wide discretion in dismissing petitioner as she was
occupying a managerial position. Her gross and habitual neglect of duties
were enough bases for respondents to lose all their confidence in
petitioner's ability to perform her job satisfactorily.

Page 26 of 94
2. that petitioner was accorded due process as she was furnished with two
notices the first requiring her to explain why she should not be
terminated, and the second apprising her of the management's decision to
terminate her from employment. IEHaSc
3. that the three-month notice for termination, as written in the
employment contract, is only necessary when there is no just cause for the
employee's dismissal and, therefore, not applicable to petitioner
The Labor Arbiter declared petitioner to have been illegally dismissed. It
was held that petitioner cannot be charged with undermining the HR2
Program of the company since evidence was presented to show that she
was already divested of duties relative to this program. Also, respondents'
accusation that petitioner caused disharmony among colleagues and
subordinates has no merit as there was ample proof that petitioner was in
constant communication with her co-workers through official channels and
email. Further, the Labor Arbiter theorized that petitioner's performance
rating demonstrated a passing or satisfactory grade and therefore could
not be a sufficient and legitimate basis to terminate her for loss of trust
and confidence. Moreover, petitioner cannot be dismissed based merely on
these vague offenses but only for specific offenses which, under the
company's code of conduct, merit the penalty of outright dismissal.
Respondents appealed before the NLRC and MODIFIED the decision of
Labor Arbiter, declaring the dismissal legal but ordering the petitioner to
pay the three months salary of respondent as indicated in the contract of
employment.
Then, appeal before the Court of Appeals. The court found that despite the
opportunity to improve, petitioner continued to display poor work attitude,
dismal performance and rancorous and abusive behavior towards coworkers as gleaned from the various emails and affidavits of her superiors
and other employees. These circumstances, taken together, constitute
sufficient cause for respondents to lose confidence in petitioner's ability to
continue in her job and to promote the interest of the company. Court of
Appeals REVERSED the decision.
Issues:
Whether the dismissal of respondent is valid? YES.

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Page 27 of 94
Whether or not the respondent is denied of due process of law?

NO.
exercise
of
this
Petitioner was accorded due process.
HELD:
There exists
employment.
special laws or under valid agreements," 48 the

management prerogative must be upheld.
valid
ground
for
petitioner's
termination
from
As distinguished from a rank and file personnel, mere existence of a basis

for believing that a managerial employee has breached the trust of the
employer justifies dismissal. "[L]oss of confidence as a ground for
dismissal does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt as the law
requires only that there be at least some basis to justify it." It is therefore
without question that the CHR Director for Manufacturing is a managerial
position saddled with great responsibility. The burden of proving that the
termination was for a valid cause lies on the employer. Here, respondents
were able to overcome this burden as the evidence presented clearly
support the validity of petitioner's dismissal.
First, petitioner indeed unreasonably failed to effectively communicate with
her immediate superior. Second, the affidavits of petitioner's co-workers
revealed her negative attitude and unprofessional behavior towards them
and the company. The third and most important is petitioner's display of
inefficiency and ineptitude in her job as a CHR Director. In the
affidavit 46 of Ornida B. Calma, Chief Accountant of L&T's affiliate
company, petitioner, on two occasions, gave wrong information regarding
issues on leave and holiday pay which generated confusion among
employees in the computation of salaries and wages. Due to the nature of
her functions, petitioner is expected to have strong working knowledge of
labor laws and regulations to help shed light on issues and questions
regarding the same instead of complicating them. Petitioner obviously
failed in this respect.
An employer "has the right to regulate, according to its discretion and best
judgment, all aspects of employment, including work assignment, working
methods, processes to be followed, working regulations, transfer of
employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline,
dismissal and recall of workers." "[S]o long as they are exercised in good
faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for the
purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under
We have examined the Prerequisite Notice, and it properly advised

petitioner to explain through a written response her failure to perform in
accordance with management directives, which deficiency resulted in the
company's loss of confidence in her capability to promote its interest. It
showed petitioner's "repeated failure to comply with work directives, her
inclination to make negative remarks about company goals and her
difficult personality," that have collectively contributed to the company's
loss of trust and confidence in her.
Neither can there be any denial of due process due to the absence of a
hearing or investigation at the company level. It has been held in a
plethora of cases that due process requirement is met when there is simply
an opportunity to be heard and to explain one's side even if no hearing is
conducted.
In sum, the following are the guiding principles in
connection with the hearing requirement in dismissal
cases:
(a)'ample opportunity to be heard' means any
meaningful opportunity (verbal or written) given to the
employee to answer the charges against him and submit
evidence in support of his defense, whether in a hearing,
conference or some other fair, just and reasonable way.
(b)a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory
only when requested by the employee in writing or
substantial evidentiary disputes exist or a company rule
or practice requires it, or when similar circumstances
justify it.
(c)the 'ample opportunity to be heard' standard in the
Labor Code prevails over the 'hearing or conference'
requirement in the implementing rules and regulations.

Case Digests
In this case, petitioner's written response to the Prerequisite Notice
provided her with an avenue to explain and defend her side and thus
served the purpose of due process. That there was no hearing,
investigation or right to appeal, which petitioner opined to be a violation of
company policies, is of no moment since the records is bereft of any
showing that there is an existing company policy that requires these
procedures with respect to the termination of a CHR Director like petitioner
or that company practice calls for the same. There was also no request for
a formal hearing on the part of petitioner.
CASE 17.
Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
The case stemmed from the resolution of the Supreme Court
stopping the respondent from investigating graft cases involving Antique
Gov. Enrique Zaldivar. The Court ruled that since the adoption of the 1987
Constitution, respondents powers as Tanodbayan have been superseded
by the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman, he however becomes the
Special Prosecutor of the State, and can only conduct an investigation and
file cases only when so authorized by the Ombudsman. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the respondent wherein he included
statements which were unrelated in the Issue raised in the Court. This
include: (a)That he had been approached twice by a leading member of the
court and he was asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on
him; (b) That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating
the COA report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it
will embarass the Court;" and (c) that in several instances, the undersigned
respondent was called over the phone by a leading member of the Court
and was asked to dismiss the cases against two Members of the Court."
Statements of the respondent saying that the SCs order '"heightens the
people's apprehension over the justice system in this country, especially
because the people have been thinking that only the small fly can get it
while big fishes go scot-free was publicized in leading newspapers.
Now, the Court Resolved to require respondent to explain in writing why he
should not be punished for contempt of court for making such public
statements reported in the media. Respondent then sought to get some
members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution of the
Zaldivar case for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little later, he in
effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the Issue
involved in proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot
expect due process from this Court, that the Court has become incapable
of judging him impartially and fairly. The Court found respondent guilty of
contempt of court and indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.

Page 28 of 94
Now, he assails said conviction, invoking his freedom of speech. Counsel
for respondent urges that it is error "for this Court to apply the "visible
tendency" rule rather than the "clear and present danger" rule in
disciplinary and contempt charges."
Issue:
Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom of
speech/expression.
Held:
Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of
free speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court.
What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of
expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that
freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of
the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There
is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of
administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of
expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning
and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other
words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are
accepted by the general community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:
... A free press is not to be preferred to an independent
judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free press.
Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable
to a free society. The freedom of the press in itself
presupposes an independent judiciary through which that
freedom may, if necessary be vindicated. And one of the
potent means for assuring judges their independence is a
free press
There was no violation. The Court did not purport to announce a
new doctrine of "visible tendency," it was simply paraphrasing Section 3
(d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which penalizes a variety of
contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct tending, directly
or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice."
Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancingof-interest test," the Court held that the statements made by respondent
Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a manner and under

Case Digests
such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech.
What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and
prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not only of the obstruction of a free
and fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader
evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the
destruction of the standards of professional conduct required from
members of the bar and officers of the courts, which has some implications
to the society.
(Book of Nachura pp155-156: Under the TEST OF VALID GOVERNMENT
INTERFERENCE AND BALANCING INTEREST TEST)
The SC said that the clear and present danger rule is not the only test
which has been recognized and applied by the courts. Another criterion for
permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press is the
balancing of interests test which requires a court to take conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given
situation.
CASE 18.
VILLARUEL, JR., petitioner, vs. REYNALDO D. FERNANDO
G.R. No. 136726. September 24, 2003 CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Panfilo V. Villaruel, Jris the former Assistant Secretary

of the Air Transportation Office (ATO), Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC).
Respondents Reynaldo D. Fernando, Modesto E. Abarca, Jr.

(Abarca), and Marilou M. Cleofas are the Chief, Chief
Administrative
Assistant,
and
Administrative
Assistant,
respectively, of the Civil Aviation Training Center (CATC).
The CATC is an adjunct agency of the ATO tasked to train air

traffic controllers, airway communicators and related civil aviation
personnel for the local aviation industry as well as for the
Southeast Asian and Pacific region.
Petitioner Panfilo V. Villaruel, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Air
Transportation Office (ATO), detailed respondents Reynaldo D. Fernando,
Modesto E. Abarca, Jr. and Marilou M. Cleofas of the Civil Aviation Training
Center (CATC) to the Office of DOTC Undersecretary Primitivo C. Cal. After

Page 29 of 94
the lapse of 90 days, petitioner failed and refused to reinstate respondents
to their mother unit. Without acting on respondents request for
reconsideration, petitioner issued a memorandum on 19 July 1995
addressed to Abarca placing him under preventive suspension
for 90 days without pay pending investigation for alleged grave
misconduct.
On 10 August 1995, respondents requested Secretary Garcia to lift
the detail order and to order their return to their mother unit
since more than 90 days had already lapsed. Respondents also
sought the intervention of the Ombudsman in their case. As a result, the
Ombudsman inquired from Secretary Garcia the action taken on
respondents request for reconsideration of the detail order. Secretary
Garcia replied to the Ombudsman that he had issued a memorandum
dated 9 November 1995 directing petitioner to recall respondents to their
mother unit
Despite repeated demands by respondents, petitioner failed and
refused to reinstate respondents to their mother unit.
On 24 January 1996, respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus and
Damages with Prayer for a Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against
petOn 23 February 1996, the trial court granted respondents prayer for a
preliminary mandatory injunction. The trial court issued a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction ordering petitioner to comply
with the 9 November 1995 order of Secretary Garcia directing
petitioner to recall respondents to their mother unit until further
orders by the trial court. For petitioners continued failure to comply
with the writ of preliminary injunction, respondents moved to cite
petitioner in contempt. Respondents also moved to declare petitioner in
default for not filing an answer within the period prescribed in the trial
courts order of 26 January 1996.
On 28 May 1996, the trial court granted the motion and declared
petitioner guilty of indirect contempt. The trial court issued a bench
warrant against petitioner.P etitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals[7] assailing the trial courts order finding petitioner guilty of indirect
contempt. Meanwhile, the trial court declared petitioner in default for his
failure to file an answer to the petition for mandamus and
damages.

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Page 30 of 94
Aggrieved, petitioner, represented by the OSG, appealed to the Court

of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the OSG a non-extendible
extension until 13 December 1996 within which to file petitioners
memorandum. However, the OSG failed to file the memorandum. On 17
February 1998, petitioner, through his new counsel, [10] filed a Motion to
Quash the Writ of Execution and to Suspend Sheriffs Sale. In his motion,
petitioner alleged that the trial courts decision never became
final and executory as the trial court deprived him of his right to due
process. Petitioner claimed that the OSG failed to file petitioners
memorandum in CA-G.R. SP No. 42447 resulting in the dismissal of his
appeal. Furthermore, petitioner alleged that the OSG failed to inform
him of the dismissal of his appeal and of the trial courts order
granting respondents motion for execution. Petitioner further
asserted that the Resolution of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM 0-960090[11] superseded the decision of the trial court. (The Ombudsmans
Resolution approved the following recommendation of the reviewing
Assistant Ombudsman:PREMISES CONSIDERED, respondent MODESTO
ABARCA, JR., is hereby found GUILTY of violation of Section 7(d) of Republic
Act 6713, for which the penalty of Suspension Without Pay for Six (6)
Months is hereby )
1.
CA ruling:
the Court of Appeals ruled that the negligence of the OSG could not
relieve petitioner of the effects of such negligence and prevent the
decision of the trial court from becoming final and executory. In short, the
OSGs negligence binds petitioner.
A party litigant bears the responsibility of contacting his lawyer
periodically to apprise himself of the progress of the case. A lawyers
negligence binds a party litigant who must suffer the consequences of such
negligence. The Court of Appeals further held that there was no proof that
the OSG failed to inform petitioner of the dismissal of his appeal.
the Court of Appeals concurred with the trial courts ruling that the
nature of the case before the Ombudsman is different from the case before
the trial court. The former deals with a violation of Republic Act No. 6713
(RA 6713)[15] punished with suspension from office while the latter deals
with an ultra vires act punished with damages. The appellate court ruled
that the findings of the Ombudsman had nothing to do with the findings of
the trial court, as the two forums are separate and distinct from each other.
2.
whether the trial court denied petitioner of his right to due

process ?NO
whether the Ombudsmans resolution rendered the execution of
the trial courts decision unjust and inequitable?NO
HELD:
1.
Petitioner essentially contends that the judgment of the trial court

in Civil Case No. 96-0139 is void for lack of due process.
Petitioner alleges that the trial court never gave him the
chance to be heard and to submit his evidence.. Petitioner
argues that the inexcusable negligence of the OSG did not bind
him and prevented the decision of the trial court from becoming
final and executory.
We do not agree.
Due process, in essence, is simply an opportunity to be

heard[19] and
this
opportunity
was
not
denied
petitioner. Throughout the proceedings in the trial court as
well as in the Court of Appeals, petitioner had the opportunity
to present his side but he failed to do so. Clearly, petitioners
former counsel, the OSG, was negligent. This negligence,
however, binds petitioner. The trial and appellate courts
correctly ruled that the negligence of the OSG could not
relieve petitioner of the effects such negligence [20] and prevent
the decision of the trial court from becoming final and
executory.
As a general rule, a client is bound by the mistakes of his
counsel. Only when the application of the general rule would
result in serious injustice should an exception thereto be called
for.
In the present case, there was no proof that petitioner suffered serious
injustice to exempt him from the general rule that the negligence of the
counsel binds the client. Petitioner did not even attempt to refute the
respondents allegations in the petition for mandamus and damages.
Moreover, petitioner is not entirely blameless for the dismissal of his
appeal. After the OSGs failure to file the answer to the petition for
mandamus and damages and to have the order declaring petitioner in
default lifted, petitioner should have already replaced the OSG with
another lawyer. However, petitioner still retained the services of the OSG,
ISSUE:

Case Digests
despite its apparent lack of interest in petitioners case, until the trial
courts decision became final
Furthermore, petitioner cannot now complain of the OSGs errors.
Petitioner should have taken the initiative of making periodic inquiries from
the OSG and the appellate court about the status of his case
2.
Petitioner contends that the Ombudsmans Resolution finding

Abarca guilty of violating Section 7(d) of RA 6713 superseded the
trial
courts
decision
finding
petitioner
liable
for
damages. Petitioner insists that the Ombudsmans resolution
rendered the execution of the trial courts decision unjust and
inequitable.

Page 31 of 94
WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 48233 dated 30 September 1998 and
the Resolution dated 3 December 1998 are AFFIRMED. No costs.
CASE 19:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Vs. ANTONIO BARAOIL
G.R. No. 194608, July 09, 2012.
Facts:
We are not persuaded.

Settled is the rule that a judgment that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect
except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes. [27] True, this rule admits of
certain exceptions. One of these exceptions is whenever circumstances
transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust
and inequitable.[28] This, however, is not the case here. In the present
case, the Ombudsman issued his Resolution prior to the finality of the
trial courts decision. The Ombudsman issued his Resolution on 22
January 1997 while the trial courts decision became final and executory on
14 June 1997. Therefore, the resolution of the Ombudsman is not a
supervening event to warrant the stay of the execution of the decision of
the trial court.
Furthermore, the resolution of the Ombudsman finding Abarca guilty
of violating Section 7(d) of RA 6713 did not and could not supersede the
decision of the trial court holding petitioner liable for damages. The action
filed by the petitioner before the Ombudsman is completely different
from the action instituted by respondents before the trial
court. The two actions, which are clearly separate and distinct
from
each
other,
presented
two
different
causes
of
action. Petitioners cause of action arose from respondents alleged
violation of certain provisions of RA 6713 whereas respondents cause of
action resulted from petitioners refusal to recall respondents to their
mother unit at CATC. In the administrative case before the Ombudsman,
the issue was whether respondents were guilty of violating RA 6713. In
contrast, the issue in the civil action before the trial court was whether
respondents were entitled to the issuance of the writ of mandamus and
damages.
Antonio Baraoil was charged with two counts of rape. Both rapes
happened on the 8th of July 2004 in the comfort room adjacent to the Apo
Rice Mill in Natividad, Pangasinan. The first was committed at 2pm through
insertion of the penis and the finger into the vagina of AAA (Statutory
Rape), a 5 year old minor, while the second happened at 2:30pm by
sucking the vagina of AAA (Sexuall Assault).
Baraoil pleaded not guilty during arraignment for both charges.
During the trial, AAA narrated the facts that (1) while walking near
the house of Baraoil, who was a honorary uncle for her family, the latter
invited her to ride with him in his bicycle (2) Baraoil drove her towards the
rice mill and was seen by her elder sister (3) after parking his bicycle on
the wall of the mill, accused pulled AAA into the comfort room, sat on the
toilet, pulled her pants off as she has no underpants, unzipped his pants
and lifted the girl to insert his penis into her vagina and later inserted a
finger into her vagina.
The three sisters of the victim heard thumping sounds coming from
the comfort room then the accused went out and was followed by AAA.
AAAs sister told the accused that she will take AAA home but he replied
that he will bring her home after buying slippers. The accused and AAA
took off and after 30 minutes went back to the same comfort room where
the accused undressed AAA again and sucked her vagina.
The next day, AAAs sister asked her about what happened and
she did not answer but after it she cried to her mom and told everything
that transpired.

Case Digests
Baraoil, told the court that he was out at the fish pond with his
friend during 7:30-10am and drank gin at 3pm and went home at 4pm. He
also added that the accusations against him were due to revenge for the
disconnection of AAAs familys jumper.
The trial court sentenced Baraoil to:
6 years indeterminate (PC max) sentence to 10 years (PM max) as
maximum for the charge of sexual assault and
Reclusion perpetua for statutory rape [with aggravating circumstance less
than 7 yo]
The court of appeals modified the sentence of the direct assault to Acts of
lasciviousness for imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to fifteen 15 years, 6 months and 20 days of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. (based on RA 7610 and Revised Penal
Code)
Issue:
In the case for rape, is the testimony of the child sufficient to
overturn the accuseds right to be presumed innocent?
Held:
The CA sustained the conviction of the accused-appellant after
finding that the testimony of AAA was credible, natural, convincing and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. There was
no reason to overturn the accused-appellants conviction under Criminal
Case No. T-3682 for the crime of statutory rape considering that AAA was
undeniably under 12 years old and that the accused-appellant had carnal
knowledge with her.
The law presumes that an accused in a criminal prosecution is
innocent until the contrary is proven. This basic constitutional principle is
fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden
of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Whether the degree of proof has been met is largely left
to the trial courts to determine.

Page 32 of 94
Courts use the following principles in deciding rape cases: (1) an
accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but
more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) due
to the nature of the crime of rape in which only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or
fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense. Due to the nature of this crime,
conviction for rape may be solely based on the complainants testimony
provided it is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things.
A young girl would not usually concoct a tale of defloration; publicly admit
having been ravished and her honor tainted; allow the examination of her
private parts; and undergo all the trouble and inconvenience, not to
mention the trauma and scandal of a public trial, had she not in fact been
raped and been truly moved to protect and preserve her honor, and
motivated by the desire to obtain justice for the wicked acts committed
against her.
NOTE:
Due to the fact that the act of sucking the vagina is in no way
considered as insertion of an object or instrument in the female organ, the
SC upheld the CAs decision to modify the penalty for Sexual Assault and
changed it to Acts of Lasciviousness (Art. 336 of RPC + RA 7610 - increases
the penalty imposed by RPC by one degree) which became more
burdensome than the original sexual assault charge.
(LOL.. Nadehado pa sya sa appeal kahit hindi naman tama yung
information sakanya.. Pinalitan ng CA yung kaso nya ng walang paapaalam)
CASE 20:
G.R. No. 192108. November 21, 2012
SPOUSES SY v. ANDOK'S LITSON CORPORATION
FACTS:

Case Digests

Page 33 of 94
Petitioner Cely Sy (Sy) is the registered owner of a 316 square-meter lot

located at Sta. Cruz, Manila. Respondent Andok's Litson Corporation
(Andok's) is engaged in the business of selling grilled chicken and pork
with outlets all over the Philippines. On 5 July 2005, Sy and Andok's
entered into a 5-year lease contract covering the parcel of land owned by
Sy. Accordingly, Andok's issued a check to Sy for P480,000.00.
On appeal, Sy decried deprivation of her right to present evidence resulting

in a default judgment against her. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal and affirmed that the trial court correctly allowed the presentation
of evidence ex-parte as there was no valid reason for the urgent motion for
postponement of the pre-trial filed by Sy. The appellate court found that Sy
repeatedly failed to comply with her obligation under the lease contract
despite repeated demands. The appellate court awarded damages for
breach of contract.
Andok's alleged that while in the process of applying for electrical

connection, it was discovered that Sy has unpaid (MERALCO) bill
amounting to P400,000.00. Andok's further complained that construction
for the improvement it intended for the leased premises could not proceed
because another tenant, Mediapool, Inc. incurred delay in the construction
of a billboard structure also within the leased premises. In its letter dated
25 August 2005, Andok's first informed Sy about the delay in the
construction of the billboard structure on a portion of its leased property.
Three more letters of the same tenor were sent to Sy but the demands fell
on deaf ears. Consequently, Andok's suffered damages in the total amount
of P627,000.00 which comprises the advance rental and deposit, cost of
money, mobilization cost for the construction of improvement over leased
premises, and unrealized income. The complaint for rescission was filed on
13 February 2008, three years after continued inaction on the request to
have the billboard construction expedited.
ISSUE:
In her Answer, Sy stated that she has faithfully complied with all the terms
and conditions of the lease contract and denied incurring an outstanding
electricity bill. Andok's filed a motion to set the case for pre-trial. Pre-trial
Conference was set on 26 May 2008. But on 23 May 2008, an Urgent
Motion to Reset Pre-Trial Conference was filed by Sy's counsel on the
allegation that on the pre-trial date, he has to attend a hearing on another
branch of the RTC in Manila. During the pre-trial conference, Sy and her
counsel failed to appear. Sy's urgent motion was denied, and the RTC
allowed Andok's to present its evidence ex-parte. No motion for
reconsideration was filed on the trial court's order allowing ex-parte
presentation of evidence. Thus, on the 2 June 2008 hearing, Andok's
presented ex-parte the testimony of its General Manager, Teodoro
Calaunan, detailing the breach of contract committed by Sy. On 24 July
2008, the trial court rendered a decision favoring Andok's.
WON the default judgment of the RTC as affirmed by the CA amounted to

an infringement of the right to due process of the spouses.
HELD: No. The affirmance by the Court of Appeals of the judgment of the
trial court is correct.
Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court requires the parties and their
counsel to appear at pre-trial. Section 5 of the same rule states the
consequences of failure to appear during pre-trial, thus: failure on the
part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his
evidence ex-parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.
What constitutes a valid ground to excuse litigants and their counsels from
appearing at the pre-trial under Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court is
subject to the sound discretion of a judge. Such discretion was shown by
the trial court, which was correct in putting into effect the consequence of
petitioners' non-appearance at the pre-trial. While Sy filed an Urgent
Motion to Reset Pre-trial, she cannot assume that her motion would be
automatically granted. As found by the Court of Appeals, the denial of
petitioners' motion for postponement is dictated by the motion itself. A
perusal of the Urgent Motion to Reset Pre-Trial Conference discloses that
other than the allegation that counsel will attend a hearing in another
branch of the same court in Manila, yet, it failed to substantiate its claim. It
did not state the case number nor attach the Calendar of Hearing or such
other pertinent proof to appraise the court that indeed counsel was
predisposed.
We cannot allow Spouses Sy to argue that their right to due process has
been infringed.

Case Digests
In The Philippine American Life & General Insurance Company v. Enario,
the essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to
be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of one's
defense. Where the opportunity to be heard, either through verbal
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, and the party can present its side or
defend its interest in due course, there is no denial of procedural due
process.
CASE 21:
Sajot v CA
Facts: On April 23, 1991, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 118, Pasay City,
convicted petitioner and Antonio Tobias in Criminal Case NO. 97-12635, of
estafa. The court sentenced each of them to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years of prision correctional to thirteen (13) years
of prision mayor, and to reimburse Father Modesto Teston in the amount
of P75,000.00,
as
actual
damages, P50,000.00,
as
moral
damages,P10,000.00, as attorney's fees and to pay the costs of the suit.
Antonio Tobias appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. On February
21, 1992, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a "Petition for Extension
of Time to File Brief," asking for an additional thirty-day period to file
appellant's brief, which the court granted. ] On March 20, 1992, petitioner
filed a "Petition for Second Extension of Time to File Brief", which the court
likewise granted. Again, on May 14, 1992, he filed a "petition for Third
Extension of Time to File Brief." The court granted the motion. On
November 27, 1992, the Court of Appeals resolved to dismiss petitioner's
appeal for failure to file his brief within the third extension granted by the
court. Petitioner contended that he only learned about the dismissal
through a friend. When confronted, his counsel could not give any
plausible explanation for his failure to file brief. Petitioner alleged further
that his counsel, Attorney Mariano H. G. Cervo, never submitted the brief
because of "utter and gross ignorance of procedure and/or negligence or
omission, intentional or otherwise, in the performance of his avowed
professional duty.

Page 34 of 94
that he relied on the services of his counsel and that he was busy is
"flimsy". Equally busy people have in one way or the other learned how to
cope with the same problem he had. Were we to accept his excuse,
this Court would have to open cases dismissed many years ago on the
ground of counsel's neglect. In many cases, the fact is that counsel's
negligence is matched by his client's own negligence. Petitioner's lack of
vigilance as found by the trial court in its decision is emphasized when his
counsel in the instant petition filed a motion to withdraw primarily on the
ground of irreconcilable professional relationship between Attorney
Florentino Temporal and petitioner. Despite petitioner's repeated
assurances relayed by phone, letters and telegrams that he will meet with
Atty. Temporal to formulate the appellant's brief, he never did
so. Moreover, petitioner paid Atty. Temporal's professional fees with checks
drawn against closed accounts
CASE 22.
ROQUE vs. OMBUDSMAN
May 12, 1999
Ponente: Justice Panganiban
DOCTRINE:Consistent with the rights of all persons to due process of law
and to speedy trial, the Constitution commands the Office of the
Ombudsman to act promptly on complaints filed against public
officials. Thus, the failure of said office to resolve a complaint that has
been pending for six years is clearly violative of this mandate and the
public officials rights. In such event, the aggrieved party is entitled to the
dismissal of the complaint.
FACTS OF THE CASE:

Two Petitioners:
Issue: whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in
dismissing petitioner's appeal for failure to file appellant's brief
1.
Held: NO. Petitioner was himself guilty of neglect. He was aware of his
conviction and of the requirement of filing an appellant's brief. His excuse
2.
FelicidadRoque- was a Schools Division Superintendent of DECS

assigned in Koronadal, South Cotabato, until her compulsory
retirement on May 17, 1991
PrudencioMabanglo- was a Schools Division Superintendent of
DECS assigned in Tagum, Davao Province, until her compulsory
retirement on May 8, 1997

Case Digests
On Januery 14, 1991, Soriano and Enriquez of COA conducted an audit on

the Php9.36 M allotment released by the DECS Regional Office No. 11 to its
division offices (pursuant to COA Regional Office Assignment Order No. 91174 dated January 8, 1991). The auditors found major deficiencies
and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
auditors filed before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao against
several persons, including two petitioners on May 7, 1991. On June 11,
1991, the Office of Ombudsman- Mindanao found the complaints proper for
a preliminary investigation. After which, the petitioners filed their
respective counter-affidavits.
On March 18, 1997, Office of the Ombudsman- Mindanao issued a
resolution, findingthat all the respondents were probably guilty of violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. It was also approved by
respondent Ombudsman Desierto on September 19, 1997.
On August 14, 1997, petitioners instituted the instant petition for
mandamus premised on the allegation that it has been more than 6 years
and no resolution and no case has been filed with the appropriate court
against them. On November 24, 1997, this Honorable Court issued a TRO
directing respondents to cease and desist from further proceeding with the
cases filed against petitioners. On August 21, 1998, petitioners asked the
Court to cite respondents in contempt contending that a criminal
information was filed despite the issuance of the TROrespondents filed
their coment to the petition for contempt.
ISSUES:
WON there was undue and unjustifiable delay in resolving the complaints
against the petitioners which violated their constitutional right to due
process and speedy disposition of cases
HELD:

Page 35 of 94
speedy disposition of the cases against him, thus warranting the dismissal
of said criminal cases...
>cited are the cases of *TatadvsSandiganbayan (3yrs before submitted for
disposition)
xxx the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary
investigation and filing the information in the instant case is
violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner
to due process and the speedy disposition of cases against
him. Accordingly, the informations x xx should be dismissed
*although petitioner prayed only for the issuance of a ruling DIRECTING the
ombudsman to dismiss the casethe Court DIRECTLY resolves to dismiss
the case directly. >following the Angchangco case in which the Court
dismissed the complaints outright although the petitioner only sought
merely to compel the ombudsman to do so.
>No Contempt of Court
>issue on Mandamus: Generally, the performance of an official act or
duty, which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion or judgment,
cannot be compelled by mandamus. However, the court held that as an
exception, the general rule does not apply in cases where there is
gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of
authority.
CASE 23.
ANG TIBAY, rep by TORIBIO TEODORO, and NATIONAL WORKERS'
BROTHERHOOD, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC
TOPIC: ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS
G.R. No. 46496. February 27, 1940,
LAUREL, J:
After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of the present case,
the Court finds the inordinate delay of more than six years by the
Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints against petitioner to be
violative of his constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and a
Facts: The Solicitor General in behalf of the CIR filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on the decision of the Supreme Court while the NATIONAL
LABOR UNION (NLU) prays for a new trial and alleges that the supposed

Case Digests
lack of leather material claimed by ToribioTeodoro was a scheme to
discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. Also NLU alleges that
National Worker's Brotherhood Union of AngTibay is a company or
employer union dominated by ToribioTeodoro, is an illegal one. AngTibay
filed an opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration of the CIR and the
motion for new trial was raised by the NLU.
Issue: Whether or not the motion for new trial should be granted?
Held: YES
The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law
of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103. It is more an
administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the
nation. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its
functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. CIR is not narrowly
constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial
merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall
not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its
mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.
The fact that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases
coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which
must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's
cause and submit evidence in support thereof; In the language of
Chief Hughes: the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by
the rudimentary requirements of fair play.
2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3) The decision must have something to support itself; This
principle emanates from the more fundamental principle that the genius of
constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power
anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
4) The evidence must be substantial;

Page 36 of 94
5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the
hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected;
6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy,
and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render
its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision
rendered.
Except as to the alleged agreement between the AngTibay and the
National Workers' Brotherhood there is no factual basis to support a
conclusion of law. The interest of justice is better served if there is an
opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in the
motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue
involved. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IS GRANTED, case remanded to
CIR.
CASE 24
- PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN,
JR., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-52245. January 22, 1980
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
FACTS:Patricio Dumlao is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He filed his
certificate of candidacy for the same position for the January 30, 1980
elections. Dumlaoquestions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas
PambansaBlg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection
and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:
"Sec. 4.Special Disqualification. In addition to
violation of section 10 of Art. XII-C of the
Constitution and disqualification mentioned in
existing laws, which are hereby declared as
disqualification for any of the elective officials
enumerated in section 1 hereof.

Case Digests
Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal
official who has received payment of the
retirement benefits to which he is entitled under
the law and who shall have been 65 years of age
at the commencement of the term of office to
which he seeks to be elected, shall not be
qualified to run for the same elective local office
from which he has retired."
Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against

him, and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely
arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether there is an actual case and controversy for judicial review
to be proper.
2.) Whether or not section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against him
personally.
HELD:
1.) NO ACTUAL CASE AND CONTROVERSY.It is basic that the power of
judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and
controversies.
Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of
section 4 of Batas PambansaBlg. 52, quoted earlier, as being contrary to
the equal protection clause guaranteed by the Constitution, and seeks to
prohibit respondent COMELEC from implementing said provision. Yet,
Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of that
provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed
before the COMELEC. There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the
matter, which this Court is being asked to review on Certiorari. His is a
question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical issue, and in effect, a
petition for an advisory opinion from this Court to be "rendered without the
benefit of a detailed factual record." Petitioner Dumlao's case is clearly
within the primary jurisdiction (see concurring Opinion of now Chief Justice
Fernando in Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30, 96 [1978]) of respondent

Page 37 of 94
COMELEC as provided for in section 2, Art. XII-C, for the Constitution the
pertinent portion of which reads:
"Section 2.The Commission on Elections shall have
the following power and functions.
1). . .
2)Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of all members
of the National Assembly and elective provincial
and city officials."
2.) NO.Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory

against him personally is belied by the fact that several petitions for the
disqualification of other candidates for local positions based on the
challenged provision have already been filed with the COMELEC.
The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safeguard of
equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of
equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the
groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can
be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of
public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified
differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are
subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so
compulsorily retirable.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid
all legal classification. What is proscribed is a classification which is
arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated
by a reasonable classification which is germane to the purpose of the law
and applies to all those belonging to the same class. The purpose of the
law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The
classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be
considered invalid even if at times, it may be susceptible to the objection
that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies.
Separate Opinions

Case Digests
BARREDO,J .,concurring:
I concur. But as regards the matter of equal protection, I reiterate my view
for Peralta that Sec. 9(1) Art. XII is more expensive than the equal
protection clause.
AQUINO,J .,concurring:
I concur in the result as to paragraph 1 of the dispositive part of the
decision. I dissent as to paragraph 2. In my opinion, paragraph 2, section 4
of Batas PambansaBilang 52 is valid, being similar to certain presumptions
in Articles 217 and 315 of the Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
4885. See U.S. v. Luling, 34 Phil. 725 and People v. Mingoa, 92 Phil. 856.
ABAD SANTOS,J .,concurring:
I concur but wish to add that a judgment of conviction as provided in Sec.
4, par. 2 of Batas PambansaBlg. 52 should be one which is final and
unappealable.
FERNANDO,C .J .,concurring:
It is particularly gratifying that the reiteration in the ably-written and
scholarly opinion of the Court, penned by Justice Melencio-Herrera, of the
standard that must be met before the power of judicial review may be
availed of, set forth with such lucidity and force by Justice Laurel in the two
leading cases of Angara v. Electoral Commission and People v. Vera, did not
constitute an obstacle to this Court ruling on the crucial constitutional
issues raised. It was a cause for concern, for me at least, that counsel of
private parties in not a few cases in the recent past had shown less than
full awareness of the doctrines, procedural in character, that call for
application whenever the exercise of this awesome and delicate
responsibility of adjudging the validity of a statute or presidential decree is
invoked. While this Court cannot be accused of being bound by the fetters
of judicial timidity, it remains true that no cavalier disregard of tried and
tested concepts should be given encouragement. A petitioner who bases
his claim for relief on asserted constitutional deficiencies deserves to be
heard. That goes without saying. For the judiciary must ever endeavor to
vindicate rights safeguarded by the fundamental law. In that sense, this
Tribunal is not susceptible to the reproach that it has imprisoned itself in its

Page 38 of 94
allegiance to the philosophy of judicial self-restraint. There are, however,
limits to judicial activism. It cannot be too strongly stressed that a petition
of this character must ever remain an orderly proceeding that cannot be
oblivious of the requisites to be complied with to justify a pronouncement
on constitutional issues. Where there is exuberance in the exercise of
judicial power, the forms of litigation are but slight retaining walls. It is
right and proper that the voice of the Solicitor General should be heard in
protest against such neglect of rudimentary precepts. Necessarily then,
whenever objections based on refusal to abide by the procedural principles
are presented, this Court must rule. It would suffice if thereby the petition
is dismissed for non-observance of the controlling doctrines. There are
times, however, when the controversy is of such a character that to resolve
doubts, erase uncertainty, and assure respect for constitutional limitations,
this Tribunal must pass on the merits. This is one such case. I therefore
concur with the opinion of the Court.
It may be a task of superfluity then to write a concurring opinion.
Nonetheless, a few words may not be amiss on what for me is the proper
approach to take as to the lack of power of this Court to pass on the
motives of the legislative body, on the lack of persuasiveness of
petitioner's argument based on the equal protection guarantee, and on the
fundamental concept of fairness of which the due process clause is an
embodiment, thus calling for the nullification of the disqualification of a
candidate upon the mere filing of charges against him.
1.The challenge to the provision in question is predicated on what was
referred to as "a known fact in the province of Nueva Vizcaya that the
aforesaid provision was concocted and designed precisely to frustrate any
bid of herein petitioner to make a political come back [sic] as governor of
Nueva Vizcaya. The wordings [sic] of the law is so peculiarly attuned to
discriminate against herein petitioner because every condition imposed as
disqualification grounds are known to be possessed by him because he was
a former elective provincial official who has received his retirements
benefits, he desires to run for the same elective office and at the
commencement of the term of office to which he now seeks to be elected,
he shall have reached 65 years of age." Clearly then, the plea for
invalidating such provision is the motive attributed to the Interim
BatasangPambansa. For petitioner, it amounted to a constitutional infirmity
fatal in character. The weakness of the petition is thus apparent. No
decision of this Tribunal can be cited in support of such a proposition. It
would be to extend unduly the concept of judicial review if a court can

Case Digests
roam far and wide and range at will over the variety and diversity of the
reasons, the promptings that may lead a legislator to cast his vote for or
against a proposed legislation. It is not what inspired the introduction of a
bill but the effect thereof if duly enacted that is decisive. That would be the
test for its validity or lack of it. there is this relevant excerpt from McCray v.
United States: "The decisions of this Court [Supreme Court of the United
States] from the beginning lend no support whatever to the assumption
that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the
assumption that a wrongful purpose of motive has caused the power to be
exerted." The late Chief Justice Warren, who penned the opinion in United
States v. O'Brien, put the matter thus: "Inquiries into congressional motives
or purposes are a hazardous matter. When the issue is simply the
interpretation of legislation, the Court will look to statements by legislators
for guidance as to the purpose of the legislature, because the benefit to
sound decision-making in this circumstance is thought sufficient to risk the
possibility of misreading Congress' purpose. It is entirely a different matter
when we are asked to void a statute that is, under well-settled criteria,
constitutional on its face, on the basis of what fewer than a handful of
Congressmen said about it. What motivates one legislator to make a
speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others
to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork.
We decline to void essentially on the ground that it is unwise legislation
which Congress had the undoubted power to enact and which could be
reenacted in its exact form if the same or another legislator made a 'wiser'
speech about it."
2.If, however, the provision in question is susceptible to the reproach that
it amounts to a denial of equal protection, then his plea for nullification
should be accorded a sympathetic response. As the opinion of the Court
makes a clear, such imputation is not deserving of credence. The
classification cannot be stigmatized as lacking in rationality. It is germane
to the subject. Age, as well as the fact of retirement and the receipt of
retirement benefits are factors that can enter into any legislative
determination of what disqualifications to impose. As was pointed out in
J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration: "It suffices then
that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar
circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the
conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the
liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For
the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every
person under circumstances, which if not identical, are analogous. If law be

Page 39 of 94
looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class
should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some
in the group equally binding on the rest." It cannot be denied that others
similarly fall under the same ban. It was not directed at petitioner solely.
The most that can be said is that he falls within the proscribed class. The
point was likewise raised as to why should national officials be excluded in
the above provision. The answer is simple. There is nothing to prevent the
legislative body from following a system of priorities. This it did under the
challenged legislative provision. In its opinion, what called for such a
measure is the propensity of the local officials having reached the
retirement age and having received retirement benefits once again running
for public office. Accordingly, the provision in question was enacted. A
portion of the opinion in the aforesaid J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc.finds
relevance: "It was confronted with a situation that called for correction, and
the legislation that was the result of its deliberation sought to apply the
necessary palliative. That it stopped short of possibly attaining the cure of
other analogous ills certainly does not stigmatize its effort as a denial of
equal protection. We have given our sanction to the principle underlying
the exercise of police power and taxation, but certainly not excluding
eminent domain, that 'the legislature is not required by the Constitution to
adhere to the policy of all "or none." Thus, to reiterate, the invocation by
petitioner of the equal protection clause is futile and unavailing."
3.That brings us to the assailed provision as to the sufficiency of the filing
of charges for the commission of such crimes as subversion, insurrection,
rebellion or others of similar nature before a civil court or military tribunal
after preliminary investigation, being a prima facie evidence of such fact
and therefore justifying the disqualification of a candidate. The opinion of
the Court invoked the constitutional presumption of innocence as a basis
for its being annulled. That conclusion is well-founded. Such being the
case, I am in full agreement. I would add that such a provision is moreover
tainted with arbitrariness and therefore is violative of the due process
clause. Such a constitutional right, to quote from Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v.
Beson, is "not a mere formality that may be dispensed with at will. Its
disregard is a matter of serious concern. It is a constitutional safeguard of
the highest order. It is a response to man's innate sense of justice." As
rightfully stressed in the opinion of the Court, the time element may
invariably preclude a full hearing on the charge against him and thus
effectively negate the opportunity of an individual to present himself as a
candidate. If, as has been invariably the case, a prosecutor, whether in a
civil court or in a military tribunal, saddled as he is with so many

Case Digests
complaints filed on his desk would give in to the all-too-human propensity
to take the easy way out and to file charges, then a candidate would be
hard put to destroy the presumption. A sense of realism for me compels a
declaration of nullity of a provision which on its face is patently offensive to
the Constitution.
Hence my concurrence.
TEEHANKEE,J .,dissenting:
Files a separate opinion dissenting from the adverse ruling on Dumlao's
candidacy and declining to rule on the invalidity of the first part of Section
4 of the questioned Law; and concurs with the pronouncement that the
mere filing of charges shall be prima facie cause for disqualification is void.
I.I dissent from the majority's dismissal of the petition insofar as it upholds
the discriminatory and arbitrary provision of Sec. 4 of Batas PambansaBlg.
52 which would impose a special disqualification on petitioner Patricio
Dumlao from running for the elective local office of governor of his home
province of Nueva Vizcaya and would in effect bar the electors of his
province from electing him to said office in the January 30 elections, simply
because he is a retired provincial governor of said province "who has
received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under
the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of
the term of office to which he seeks to be elected."
To specially and peculiarly ban a 65-year old previously retired elective
local official from running for the same elective office (of governor, in this
case) previously held by him and from which he has retired is arbitrary,
oppressive and unreasonable. Persons similarly situated are not similarly
treated, e.g. a retired vice-governor, mayor or councilor of 65 is entitled to
run for governor (because the disqualification is for the retiree of 65 to run
for the same elective office from which he retired) but petitioner is barred
from doing so (although he may run for any other lesser office). Both are
65 and are retirees, yet one is barred from running for the office of
governor. What is the valid distinction? Is this not an arbitrary
discrimination against petitioner who has cause to complain that "the
aforesaid provision was concocted and designed precisely to frustrate any
bid of herein petitioner to make a political comeback as governor of Nueva
Vizcaya (since no other case of a former governor similarly barred by
virtue of said provision can ever be cited). Is there not here, therefore, a

Page 40 of 94
gross denial of the cardinal constitutional guarantee that equal protection
and security shall be given under the law to every person, under analogous
if not identical circumstances?
Respondent's claim, as accepted by the majority, is that the purpose of the
special disqualification is "to infuse new blood in local governments" but
the classification (that would bar 65-year old retirees from running for the
same elective local office) is not rational nor reasonable. It is not germane
nor relevant to the alleged purpose of "infusing new blood" because such
"old blood" retirees may continue in local governments since they are not
disqualified at all to run for any other local elective office such as from
provincial governor, vice-governor, city, municipal or district mayor and
vice-mayor
to
member
of
the
SangguniangPanlalawigan,
SangguniangPanglunsod and SangguniangBayan, other than the local
elective office from which they retired.
Furthermore, other 65-year olds who have likewise retired from the
judiciary and other branches of government are not in any manner
disqualified to run for any local elective office, as in the case of retired
Court of First Instance Judge (former Congressman) Alberto S. Ubay who
retired with full substantial retirement benefits as such judge in 1978 at
age 70 and now at past 71 years of age, is running as the official KBL
candidate for governor of his province. And even in the case of 65-year old
local elective officials, they are disqualified only when they have received
payment of the retirement benefits to which they are entitled under the
law (which amount to very little, compared to retirement benefits of other
executive officials and members of the judiciary). If they have not received
such retirement benefits, they are not disqualified. Certainly, their
disqualification or non-disqualification and consequent classification as "old
blood" or "new blood" cannot hinge on such an irrelevant question or
whether or not they have received their retirement benefits.
The classification is patently arbitrary and unreasonable and is not based
on substantial distinction which make for real differences that would justify
the special disqualification of petitioner, which, it is claimed, "is based on a
presumption that elective local officials who have retired and are of
advanced age cannot discharge the functions of the office they seek as
those who are differently situated." Such presumption is sheer conjecture.
The mere fact that a candidate is less than 65 or has "young or new blood"
does not mean that he would be more efficient, effective and competent
than a mature 65-year old like petitioner who has had experience on the

Case Digests
job and who was observed at the hearing to appear to be most physically
fit. Suffice it to cite the outstanding case of the incumbent ebullient
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gen. Carlos P. Romulo, who was elected at 80 as
a member of the Interim BatasanPambansa and who has just this month
completed 81 years of age and has been hailed by the President himself as
"the best foreign minister the Republic has ever had."
Age has simply just never been a yardstick for qualification or
disqualification. At the most, a minimum age to hold public office has been
required as a qualification to insure a modicum of maturity (now reduced
to 21 years in the present batas), but no maximum age has ever been
imposed as a disqualification for elective public office since the right and
will of the people to elect the candidate of their choice for any elective
office, no matter his age, has always been recognized as supreme.
The disqualification in question therefore is grossly violative of the equal
protection clause which mandates that all persons subjected to legislation
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the
privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed. The guarantee is meant
to proscribe undue favor and individual or class privilege on the one hand
and hostile discrimination and the oppression of inequality on the other.
The questioned provision should therefore at the least be declared invalid
in its application insofar as it would disqualify petitioner from running for
the office of governor of his province.
As aptly restated by the Chief Justice, "Persons similarly situated should be
similarly treated. Where no valid distinction could be made as to the
relevant conditions that call for consideration, there should be none as to
the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. There can be no undue
favoritism or partiality on the one hand or hostility on the other. Arbitrary
selection and discrimination against persons in thus ruled out. For the
principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every
person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be
looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that full within a class
should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some
in the group equally binding on the rest."
Finally, this arbitrary disqualification is likewise grossly violative of Article
XII, sub-article C, section 9(1) of the 1973 Constitution that "Bona fide
candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment
and discrimination."

Page 41 of 94
II.I concur with the majority's declaration of invalidity of the portion of the
second paragraph of section 4 of Batas PambansaBlg. 52 which would
make the mere filing of charges of subversion, insurrection, rebellion or
other similar crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after
preliminary investigation prima facie evidence of the fact of commission of
an act of disloyalty to the State on the part of the candidate and disqualify
him from his candidacy. Such a provision could be the most insidious
weapon to disqualify bona fide candidates who seem to be headed for
election and places in the hands of the military and civil prosecutors a
dangerous and devastating weapon of cutting off any candidate who may
not be to their liking through the filing of last-hour charges against him.
I also concur with the pronouncement made in the majority decision that in
order that a judgment of conviction may be deemed "as conclusive
evidence" of the candidate's disloyalty to the State and of his
disqualification from office, such judgment of conviction must be final and
unappealable. This is so specifically provided in Section 22 of the 1978
Election Code. 5 Otherwise, the questioned provision would deny the bona
fide candidate substantive due process and would be grossly violative of
his constitutional right of presumption of innocence and of the abovequoted provision of the 1973 Constitution protecting candidates for public
office from any form of harassment and discrimination.
CASE 25:
Conference of Maritime Manning
Employment Administration (POEA)
Agencies
vs.
Philippine
Overseas
[GR 114714, 21 April 1995]

First Division, Davide Jr. (J): 4 concur
Facts: Governing Board Resolution 1, issued on 14 January 1994, amended
and increased the compensation and other benefits as specified under
Part. II, Section C, paragraph 1 and Section L, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Standard
Employment Contract for Seafarers, providing therein that "In case of
death of the seamen during the term of his Contract, the employer shall
pay his beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of
US$50,000 and an additional amount of US$7,000 to each child under the

Case Digests
age of 21 but not exceeding four children at the exchange rate prevailing
during the time of payment. Where the death is caused by warlike activity
while sailing within a declared warzone or war risk area, the compensation
payable shall be doubled. The employer shall undertake appropriate
warzone insurance coverage for this purpose." It also provided that "The
maximum rate provided under Appendix I-A shall likewise be adjusted to
US$50,000 regardless of rank and position of the seafarer"; that "Upon
effectivity, the new compensation and other benefits herein provided shall
apply to any Filipino seafarer on board any vessel, provided, that the cause
of action occurs after this Resolution takes effect"; and that the "Resolution
shall take effect after sixty (60) days from publication in a newspaper of
general circulation." Memorandum Circular 5, issued on 19 January 1994,
by POEA Administrator Felicisimo Joson and addressed to all Filipino
seafarers, manning agencies, shipowners, managers and principals hiring
Filipino seafarers, informed them that Governing Board Resolution 1
adjusted the rates of compensation and other benefits in Part II, Section C,
paragraph 1; Section L, paragraphs 1 and 2; and Appendix 1-A of the POEA
Standard Employment Contracts for Seafarers, which adjustments took
effect on 20 March 1994, and that "Upon effectivity, the new compensation
and other benefits . . . shall apply to any Filipino seafarer already on-board
any vessel, provided, that the cause of action occurs after the said
compensation and benefits take effect." The Tripartite Technical Working
Group mentioned in the Resolution, was convened on 7 January 1994. The
Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., and incorporated
association of licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all
licensed manning agencies which hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and
in behalf of their respective foreign shipowner-principals, filed the petition
to annul Resolution 1, series of 1994, of the Governing Board of the POEA
Memorandum Circular 5, series of 1994, on the grounds that: (1) The POEA
does not have the power and authority to fix and promulgate rates
affecting death and workmen's compensation of Filipino seamen working in
ocean-going vessels; only Congress can; (2) Even granting that the POEA
has that power, it, nevertheless, violated the standards for its exercise; (3)
The resolution and the memorandum circular are unconstitutional
because they violate the equal protection and non-impairment of
obligation of contracts clauses of the Constitution; and (4) The
resolution and the memorandum circular are not valid acts of the
Governing Board because the private sector representative mandated by
the law has not been appointed by the President since the creation of the
POEA.

Page 42 of 94
Issue: Whether the issuance of the challenged resolution and
memorandum circular violate the equal protection and non-impairment of
obligation of contracts clauses of the Constitution
Held: There is no merit to the claim that the assailed resolution and
memorandum circular violate the equal protection and contract clauses of
the Constitution. To support its contention of in equality, the petitioners
claim discrimination against foreign shipowners and principals employing
Filipino seamen and in favor of foreign employers employing overseas
Filipinos who are not seamen. It is an established principle of constitutional
law that the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not violated by
legislation based on reasonable classification. And for the classification to
be reasonable, it (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same
class. There can be no dispute about the dissimilarities between landbased and sea-based Filipino overseas workers in terms of, among other
things, work environment, safety, dangers and risks to life and limb, and
accessibility to social, civic, and spiritual activities.
Nor is there-merit; in the claim that the resolution and memorandum
circular violate the contract clause of the Bill of Rights.
The executive order creating the POEA was enacted to further implement
the social justice provisions of the 1973. Constitution, which have been
greatly enhanced and expanded in the 1987 Constitution by placing them
under a separate Article. The Article on Social Justice was aptly described
as the "heart of the new Charter" by the President of the 1986 Constitution
Commission, retired Justice-Cecilia Muoz-Palma. Social justice is identified
with the broad scope of the police power of the state and requires the
extensive use of such power. In Calalang vs. Williams, this. Court,
speaking through Justice Jose P. Laurel, expounded on social justice thus:
Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor
atomism, nor anarchy," but the Humanization of laws and
the equalization of social and economic forces by the
State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice
means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic
and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members
of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption
of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally,

Case Digests
through the exercise of powers underlying the existence
of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus
populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the
recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection
that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups
as a combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective
of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of
all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to
the greatest number."
The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is
not absolute and is not to be read with literal exactness . It is restricted to
contracts with respect to property or some object of value and which
confer rights that maybe asserted in a court of justice; it has no application
to statutes relating to public subjects within the domain of the general
legislative powers of the State and involving the public rights and public
welfare of the entire community affected by it. It does not prevent a proper
exercise by the State of its police power by enacting regulations
reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals; comfort, or
general welfare of the community, even though contracts may thereby be
affected, for such matters cannot be placed by contract beyond the power
of the State to regulate and control them.
Verily, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights
are subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations
which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations
must be subject to change from time to time, as the general, well-being of
the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as
experience may demonstrate the necessity. And under the Civil Code,
contracts of labor are explicitly subject to the police power of the State
because they are not ordinary contracts but are impresses with public
interest. Article 1700 thereof expressly provides:
Art. 1700. The relations between capital and labor
are not merely contractual. They are so impressed
with public interest that labor contracts lust yield to
the common good. Therefore, such contracts are
subject to the special laws on labor unions,
collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed
shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor
and similar subjects.

Page 43 of 94
The challenged resolution and memorandum circular being valid
implementations of E.O. No. 797, which was enacted under the police
power of the State, they cannot be struck down on the ground that they
violate the contract clause. To hold otherwise is to alter long-established
constitutional doctrine and to subordinate the police power to the contract
clause.
CASE 26:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs., ROMEO G. JALOSJOS
G.R. Nos. 132875-76. November 16, 200
FACTS:
Maria Rosilyn Delantar was a slim, eleven-year old lass with long,
straight black hair and almond-shaped black eyes. She grew up in a twostorey apartment in Pasay City under the care of Simplicio Delantar, whom
she treated as her own father. Simplicio was a fifty-six year old
homosexual whose ostensible source of income was selling longganiza and
tocino and accepting boarders at his house. On the side, he was also
engaged in the skin trade as a pimp.
Rosilyn first met accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, sometime in
February 1996 at his office located near Robinsons Galleria. Rosilyn and
Simplicio were brought there and introduced by a talent manager by the
name of Eduardo Suarez. Accused-appellant promised to help Rosilyn
become an actress. When he saw Rosilyn, accused-appellant asked how
old she was. Simplicio answered, 10. She is going to be 11 on May 11.
Accused-appellant inquired if Rosilyn knows how to sing. Simplicio told
Rosilyn to sing, so she sang the song, Tell Me You Love Me.
Accused-appellant then asked if Rosilyn has nice legs and then
raised her skirt up to the mid-thighs. He asked if she was already
menstruating, and Simplicio said yes. Accused-appellant further inquired if
Rosilyn already had breasts. When nobody answered, accused-appellant
cupped Rosilyns left breast. Thereafter, accused-appellant assured them
that he would help Rosilyn become an actress as he was one of the
producers of the TV programs, Valiente and Eat Bulaga.
Simplicio and Suarez then discussed the execution of a contract for
Rosilyns movie career. Accused-appellant, on the other hand, said that he
would adopt Rosilyn and that the latter would have to live with him in his
condominium at the Ritz Towers. Before Simplicio and Rosilyn went home,
accused-appellant gave Rosilyn P2,000.00
n June 14, 1996, at about 8:30 to 9:00 p.m., Simplicio and Rosilyn returned
to accused-appellants condominium unit at Ritz Towers. When accused-

Case Digests

Page 44 of 94
appellant came out of his bedroom, Simplicio told Rosilyn to go inside the
bedroom, while he and accused-appellant stayed outside. After a while,
accused-appellant entered the bedroom and found Rosilyn watching
television. He walked towards Rosilyn and kissed her on the lips, then left
the room again. Simplicio came in and bid her goodbye. Rosilyn told
Simplicio that accused-appellant kissed her to which Simplicio replied,
Halik lang naman.
Rosilyn was left alone in the bedroom watching television. After some
time, accused-appellant came in and entered the bathroom. He came out
clad in a long white T-shirt on which was printed the word, Dakak. In his
hand was a plain white T-shirt. Accused-appellant told Rosilyn that he
wanted to change her clothes. Rosilyn protested and told accusedappellant that she can do it herself, but accused-appellant answered,
Daddy mo naman ako. Accused-appellant then took off Rosilyns blouse
and skirt. When he was about to take off her panties, Rosilyn said, Huwag
po. Again, accused-appellant told her, After all, I am your Daddy.
Accused-appellant then removed her panties and dressed her with the long
white T-shirt. The two of them watched television in bed. After sometime,
accused-appellant turned off the lamp and the television. He turned to
Rosilyn and kissed her lips. He then raised her shirt, touched her breasts
and inserted his finger into her vagina. Rosilyn felt pain and cried out,
Tama na po. Accused-appellant stopped. He continued to kiss her lips
and fondle her breasts. Later, accused-appellant told Rosilyn to sleep.
(The same scenario happened again for several times. I will

no longer include lahat ng details since pareho-pareho naman, the
only added scene was that Jalosjos placed his penies in between
her thighs and made thrusting motions. important poi to kasi ang
nakalagay lang sa affidavit ng victim ay the penis was placed in
between her thighs and the accused made thrusting motions. )
The following morning, Rosilyn was awakened by accused-appellant whom

she found bent over and kissing her. He told her to get up, took her hand
and led her to the bathroom. He removed Rosilyns shirt and gave her a
bath. While accused-appellant rubbed soap all over Rosilyns body, he
caressed her breasts and inserted his finger into her vagina. After that, he
rinsed her body, dried her with a towel and applied lotion on her arms and
legs. Then, he dried her hair and told her to dress up. Rosilyn put on her
clothes and went out of the bathroom, while accused-appellant took a
shower.
The medical examination revealed that Subject is in non-virgin

state physically and There are no external signs of application of any form
of violence.
Accused-appellant ate breakfast while Rosilyn stayed in the bedroom

watching television. When accused-appellant entered the room, he knelt
in front of her, removed her panties and placed her legs on his shoulders.
Then, he placed his tongue on her vagina. Thereafter, he gave Rosilyn
P10,000.00 and told his housemaid to take her shopping at Shoemart.
When she returned to the Ritz Towers, Simplicio was waiting for her. The
two of them went home. Rosilyn narrated to Simplicio what accusedappellant did to her, and pleaded for him not to bring her back to the Ritz
Towers. Simplicio told her that everything was alright as long as accusedappellant does not have sexual intercourse with her.
On July 20, 1996, Simplicio again brought Rosilyn to the Ritz Towers
and same thing happened again. In the early morning of July 21, 1996,
Rosilyn felt somebody touching her sex organ, but she did not wake up.
When she woke up later, she found P5,000.00 on the table, and she gave
this to Simplicio when he came to fetch her.On August 15, 1996, Rosilyn
and Simplicio went to the Ritz Towers at around 7:00 p.m. Accusedappellant was about to leave, so he told them to come back later that
evening. The two did not return.
The following, Rosilyn ran away from home with the help of Yamie
Estreta, one of their boarders. Yamie accompanied Rosilyn to the Pasay
City Police, where she executed a sworn statement against Simplicio
Delantar. Rosilyn was thereafter taken to the custody of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). The National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) conducted an investigation, which day eventually led to
the filing of criminal charges against accused-appellant.
Jalosjos Contention: He claimed that it was his brother, Dominador Jun

Jalosjos, whom Rosilyn had met, once at accused-appellants Dakak office
and twice at the Ritz Towers. Accused-appellant insisted that he was in the
province on the dates Rosilyn claimed to have been sexually abused. He
attributed the filing of the charges against him to a small group of
blackmailers who wanted to extort money from him, and to his political
opponents, particularly Ex-Congressman Artemio Adaza, who are allegedly
determined to destroy his political career and boost their personal agenda.
The defense contends that the testimony of Rosilyn that accused-appellant
ejaculated on her thighs and not in her vagina, only proves that there was
no rape
ISSUES:
1.) Whether there was consummated rape. YES
2.) (BILL of RIGHTS-related)Whether there are alleged inconsistencies
in the statement of the victim regarding the insertion of the
penis which would prove that she was lying. NO

Case Digests
RULING:
1.) Excerpts from the trial records:
Q. And, when you said idinidiin po niya; to which you are referring?
What is this idinidiin niya?
A. Idinidiin niya ang ari niya sa ari ko.
Q. And what did you feel when you said: he was idinidiin niya ang ari
niya sa ari ko?
A. Masakit po.
Even the July 20, 1996 encounter between Rosilyn and accusedappellant would not tax the sketchy visualization of the nave and
uninitiated to conclude that there was indeed penile invasion by accusedappellant of Rosilyns labia. On that occasion, accused-appellant was
similarly ensconced between the parted legs of Rosilyn, except that, this
time, Rosilyn was conveniently rested on, and elevated with a pillow on her
back while accused-appellant was touching, poking and pressing his penis
against her vagina. Topped with the thrusting motions employed by
accused-appellant, the resulting pain felt by Rosilyn in her sex organ was
no doubt a consequence of consummated rape.
The childs narration of the rape sequence is revealing. The act of
idinikit-dikit niya was followed by itinutok niya xxx at idiniin-diin niya.
The idiniin-diin niya was succeeded by Masakit po. Pain inside her ari
is indicative of consummated penetration.
The environmental circumstances displayed by the graphic
narration of what took place at the appellants room from June 14 to June
16 and June 21 to June 22, 1996 are consistent with the complainants
testimony which shows that rape was legally consummated.
Nevertheless, accused-appellant may not have fully and for a
longer period penetrated Rosilyn for fear of perpetrating his name through
a child from the womb of a minor; or because of his previous agreement
with his suking bugaw, Simplicio Delantar, that there would be no
penetration, otherwise the latter would demand a higher price. This may
be the reason why Simplicio Delantar gave his mocking fatherly advice to
Rosilyn that it is bad if accused-appellant inserts his penis into her sex
organ, while at the same time ordering her to call him if accused-appellant
would penetrate her. Such instance of penile invasion would prompt
Simplicio to demand a higher price, which is, after all, as the Solicitor
General calls it, the peculiarity of prostitution.
2.) The defense contends that the testimony of Rosilyn that accusedappellant ejaculated on her thighs and not in her vagina, only proves that
there was no rape. It should be noted that this portion of Rosilyns

Page 45 of 94
testimony refers to the June 15 and 21, 1996 charges of acts of
lasciviousness, and not the rape charges. In any event, granting that it
occurred during the twin instances of rape on June 18 and July 20, 1996,
the ejaculation on the victims thighs would not preclude the fact of rape.
There is no truth to the contention of the defense that Rosilyn did
not see the penis of accused-appellant. As can be gleaned from the abovequoted portions of the transcripts, Rosilyn unequivocally testified that
accused-appellant held his penis then poked her vagina with it. And even
if she did not actually see accused-appellants penis go inside her, surely
she could have felt whether it was his penis or just his finger.
In this jurisdiction, the testimony of the private
complainant in rape cases is scrutinized with utmost caution. The
constitutional presumption of innocence requires no less than
moral certainty beyond any scintilla of doubt. This applies with
more vigor in rape cases where the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits and is not allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. As an
inevitable consequence, it is the rape victim herself that is
actually put on trial. The case at bar is no exception.
Accused-appellant makes much of his acquittal in Criminal Case
Nos. 96-1991, 96-1994, 96-1995, 96-1996, 96-1997, and 96-1998, for acts
of lasciviousness. According to him, the fact that the trial court sustained
his defense of alibi in the said cases only shows that Rosilyn concocted her
stories and the rest of her testimony ought not to be believed. Stated
differently, accused-appellant urges the application of the doctrine of
"falsus in uno falsus in omnibus (false in part, false in everything).
The contention is without merit. Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is
not an absolute rule of law and is in fact rarely applied in modern
jurisprudence. Thus, in People v. Yanson-Dumancas, citing People v. Li Bun
Juan, this Court held that:
... In this connection it must be borne in mind that the principle falsus in
uno falsus in omnibus is not an absolute one, and that it is perfectly
reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts
and disbelieve it with respect to other facts. In People vs. Keller, 46 O.G.
No. 7, pp. 3222-3223, the following was quoted with approval by the Court
of Appeals from 1 Moore on Facts, p. 23:
18. Testimony may be partly credited and partly rejected. --- Trier of
facts are not bound to believe all that any witness has said; they may
accept some portions of his testimony and reject other portions, according
to what seems to them, upon other facts and circumstances to be the
truth Even when witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified in
some material particulars, the jury are not required to reject the whole of

Case Digests
their uncorroborated testimony, but may credit such portions as they deem
worthy of belief. (p. 945)
Being in the best position to discriminate between the
truth and the falsehood, the trial court's assignment of values and
weight on the testimony of Rosilyn should be given credence.
Significantly, it should be borne in mind that the issue at hand
hinges on credibility, the assessment of which, as oft-repeated, is
best made by the trial court because of its untrammeled
opportunity to observe her demeanor on the witness stand.

Page 46 of 94
At any rate, even assuming that Rosilyn, during her lengthy ordeals on the
witness stand, may have given some ambiguous answers, they refer
merely to minor and peripheral details which do not in any way detract
from her firm and straightforward declaration that she had been molested
and subjected to lascivious conduct by accused-appellant. Moreover, it
should be borne in mind that even the most candid witness
oftentimes makes mistakes and confused statements. At times,
far from eroding the effectiveness of the evidence, such lapses
could, indeed, constitute signs of veracity.
On the demeanor and manner of testifying shown by the complainant, the

trial court stated:
CASE 27:
Guided by the foregoing principles, this court found no reason why it

should not believe Rosilyn when she claimed she was raped.
Testimonies of rape victims especially those who are young and
immature deserve full credence (People v. Liquiran, 228 SCRA 62
(1993) considering that no woman would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and
thereafter allow herself to be perverted in a public trial if she was
not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit
apprehended and punished. (People v. Buyok, 235 SCRA 622
[1996]).
Stonehill Vs. Diokno 20 SCRA 383 L-19550
When asked to describe what had been done to her, Rosilyn was
able to narrate spontaneously in detail how she was sexually abused. Her
testimony in this regard was firm, candid, clear and straightforward, and it
remained to be so even during the intense and rigid cross-examination
made by the defense counsel.
peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of
Accused-appellant next argues that Rosilyns direct and redirect

testimonies were rehearsed and lacking in candidness. He points to the
supposed hesitant and even idiotic answers of Rosilyn on cross and recross examinations. He added that she was trained to give answers such
as, Ano po?, Parang po, Medyo po, and Sa tingin ko po.
receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and
Accused-appellants arguments are far from persuasive. A reading

of the pertinent transcript of stenographic notes reveals that Rosilyn was in
fact firm and consistent on the fact of rape and lascivious conduct
committed on her by accused-appellant. She answered in clear, simple
and natural words customary of children of her age. The above phrases
quoted by accused-appellant as uttered by Rosilyn are, as correctly pointed
out by the Solicitor General, typical answers of child witnesses like her.
June 19, 1967

Facts: Upon application of the officers of the government named on the
margin hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors several
judges hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges issued, on
different dates, a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein
and/or the corporations of which they were officers, directed to the any
their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take
possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence,
other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits
of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of
committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to
above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."

Case Digests

Page 47 of 94
Petitioners contentions are:
Whether or not those found and seized in the residences of petitioners

herein are obtained legally.
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things
to be seized;
Held: The petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;
contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned
simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities,
petitioners in deportation cases filed against them;
separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it
the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with
is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the
law
party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to
an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of
Respondents-prosecutors contentions
by third parties.
(1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences
accordance with law;
of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted
(2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners'
the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, thereby,
consent; and
in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in
(3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against
evidence against petitioners herein.
herein
petitioners,
regardless
of
the
alleged
illegality
of
the
aforementioned searches and seizures.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional

mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of
to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision;
the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely:
and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned

corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested
petitioners herein.
warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the
natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of
Issue:
Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Whether or not those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned
Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged
corporations are obtained legally.
in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense

committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the

Case Digests
judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable
cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal
laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not
allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the
legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications
without reference to any determinate provision of said laws.
CASE 28: (LIRIO MUNOZ)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REYNALDO

BELOCURA y PEREZ, accused-appellant.
TOPIC: ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE IN THE ABSENCE OF VALID

SEARCH WARRANT.
Reynaldo Belocura y Perez, a police officer charged with illegal possession

of marijuana in violation of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, was found guilty of the crime
charged on April 22, 2003 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Manila, and
he was sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction
on January 23, 2006. Hence, this final appeal for his acquittal.
The State's Evidence
According to Chief Insp. Divina he was in his office in the headquarters of
the Western Police District (WPD) in Manila when he received a tip about a
robbery to be staged along Lopez Street, Tondo, Manila.
When PO2 Santos searched Belocura's jeep, and recovered a red plastic
bag under the driver's seat. Chief Insp. Divina directed PO2 Santos to
inspect the contents of the red plastic bag, which turned out to be two
bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper.

Page 48 of 94
Afterwards, the team returned with Belocura to the WPD Headquarters on
board the Tamaraw FX. The team turned over the jeep and the red plastic
bag with its contents to the General Assignment Section for proper
disposition.
Forensic Chemist Insp. Coronel attested that her office received from the
General Assignment Section of the WPD one red plastic bag labeled "SHIN
TON YON" containing two bricks of dried suspected marijuana fruiting tops
individually wrapped in newspaper at about 12:30 pm of March 23, 1999.
The first brick bore the marking "RB-1" and weighed 830.532 grams while
the other bore the marking "RB-2" and weighed 959.291 grams, for a total
weight of 1,789.823 grams. She conducted a chemical examination of the
marijuana bricks pursuant to the request for laboratory examination from
Chief Insp. Nelson Yabut of the WPD; and concluded as the result of three
qualitative examinations that the submitted specimen tested positive for
marijuana, a prohibited drug.
Evidence of the Defense
Belocura denied owning or possessing the bricks of marijuana, saying that
he saw the bricks of marijuana for the first time only in court. He insisted
that it was physically impossible for the bricks of marijuana to be found
under the driver's seat of his jeep on account of the clearance from the
flooring being only about three inches.
Belocura said that his arrest was effected possibly because he had incurred
the ire of a superior; that it was not unusual for a policeman like him to
incur the ire of a superior officer or a fellow policeman; that he had
arrested a suspect for drug pushing and had detained him in Police Precinct
2, but the suspect turned out to be the nephew of Captain Sukila of
Precinct 2 who admitted to him that Captain Sukila owned the drugs; that
on the day following the arrest of the suspect, Captain Sukila called
Belocura to request the release of the suspect (ina-arbor ang huli ko); that
he told Captain Sukila that they should meet the next day so that he could
turn over the suspect; and that on the next day, he was surprised to learn
that the suspect had already been released.
RTC: convicted Belocura of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer
reclusion perpetua and to pay the fine of P500,000.00.

Case Digests
In convicting Belocura as charged, the RTC relied on the testimonies of
Chief Insp. Divina and SPO1 Rojas to establish the fact of possession of the
marijuana bricks.
PARTIES CONTENTIONS:
Belocura argues that the Prosecution did not establish his guilt for the
crime charged beyond reasonable doubt; that his warrantless arrest was
unlawful considering that his only violation was only a breach of traffic
rules and regulations involving the illegal use of a government plate on his
newly-assembled jeep; that the warrantless search of his jeep was contrary
to law for violating his right against illegal search and seizure protected
under Section 17, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution; and
that the bricks of marijuana supposedly seized from him, being the fruit of
a poisonous tree, were inadmissible against him.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that Belocura's arrest
and the ensuing search of the jeep were valid, the search being incidental
to a valid, albeit warrantless, arrest; that the arresting policemen had a
reasonable ground to effect his warrantless arrest; that it became their
duty following the lawful arrest to conduct the warrantless search not only
of the person of Belocura as the arrestee but also of the areas within his
reach, which then resulted in the recovery of the dried bricks of marijuana
from under the driver's seat; and that any irregularity attendant to the
arrest was cured by Belocura's failure to object to the validity of his arrest
before entering his plea and by his submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC
when he entered his plea and participated in the trial.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE OF THE MARIJUANA DESPITE THE
ILLEGALITY OF ITS SEIZURE DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A VALID
SEARCH WARRANT? YES! with conviction!
HELD: No arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant
issued by a competent judicial authority. So sacred are the right of
personal security and privacy and the right from unreasonable searches
and seizures that no less than the Constitution ordains in Section 2 of its
Article III, viz.:
Section 2.The right of the people to be secure in their
persons,
houses,
papers
and
effects
against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon

Page 49 of 94
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
The consequence of a violation of the guarantees against a violation of
personal security and privacy and against unreasonable searches and
seizures is the exclusion of the evidence thereby obtained. This rule of
exclusion is set down in Section 3 (2), Article III of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 3. . . .
(2)Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding.
Even so, the right against warrantless arrest, and the right against
warrantless search and seizure are not absolute. There are circumstances
in which the arrest, or search and seizure, although warrantless, are
nonetheless valid or reasonable. Among the circumstances are those
mentioned in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which lists down
when a warrantless arrest may be lawfully made by a peace officer or a
private person, namely:
(a)When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b)When an offense has in fact just been committed, and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and C
(c)When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
On the other hand, the constitutional proscription against warrantless
searches and seizures admits of the following exceptions, namely:
(a) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under
Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court;

Case Digests
(b) seizure of evidence under plain view;

Page 50 of 94
thereto. This is the reason why authentication and laying a foundation for
the introduction of evidence are important.
(c) search of a moving vehicle;

(d) consented warrantless search;
(e) customs search;
(f) stop-and-frisk situations (Terry search); and
(g) exigent and emergency circumstances.
NOTE: In these exceptional situations, the necessity for a search warrant

is dispensed with.
According to the court an evaluation of the totality of the evidence on
record indicates, however, that the corpus delicti of the crime charged was
not established beyond reasonable doubt. The Prosecution presented no
other witnesses to establish the seizure of the marijuana bricks from
Belocura.
Based on the foregoing, Chief Insp. Divina and SPO1 Rojas' declarations
were insufficient to incriminate Belocura, much less to convict him. If
neither of them was personally competent to be an eyewitness regarding
the seizure of the marijuana bricks from Belocura, their testimonies could
not be accorded probative value, considering that the Rules of Court
requires that a witness could testify only to facts that he knew of his own
knowledge, that is, only to those facts derived from his own perception.
The Prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drug that
constituted the corpus delicti itself. The omission naturally raises grave
doubt about any search being actually conducted and warrants the
suspicion that the prohibited drugs were planted evidence.
In every criminal prosecution for possession of illegal drugs, the
Prosecution must account for the custody of the incriminating evidence
from the moment of seizure and confiscation until the moment it is offered
in evidence. That account goes to the weight of evidence. It is not enough
that the evidence offered has probative value on the issues, for the
evidence must also be sufficiently connected to and tied with the facts in
issue. The evidence is not relevant merely because it is available but that it
has an actual connection with the transaction involved and with the parties
The Prosecution thereby failed to establish the linkage between the bricks
of marijuana supposedly seized by PO2 Santos from Belocura's jeep
following his arrest and the bricks of marijuana that the Prosecution later
presented as evidence in court. That linkage was not dispensable, because
the failure to prove that the specimens of marijuana submitted to the
forensic chemist for examination were the same marijuana allegedly seized
from Belocura irreparably broke the chain of custody that linked the
confiscated marijuana to the marijuana ultimately presented as evidence
against Belocura during the trial. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
demanded that unwavering exactitude must be observed in establishing
the corpus delicti the body of the crime whose core was the confiscated
prohibited substances. Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime
must be established.
The chain-of-custody requirement ensures that all doubts concerning the
identity of the evidence are removed. The chain of custody is essential in
establishing the link between the article confiscated from the accused to
the evidence that is ultimately presented to the court for its appreciation.
The Court holds that the guilt of Belocura for the crime charged was not
proved beyond reasonable doubt. Mere suspicion of his guilt, no matter
how strong, should not sway judgment against him. Every evidence
favoring him must be duly considered. Indeed, the presumption of
innocence in his favor was not overcome. Hence, his acquittal should
follow.
In sum the court said that: in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution
bears the burden to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecution's duty is to prove each
and every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a
finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included
therein. The Prosecution must further prove the participation of the
accused in the commission of the offense. In doing all these, the
Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and not anchor
its success upon the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The burden
of proof placed on the Prosecution arises from the presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused that no less than the Constitution has
guaranteed. Conversely, as to his innocence, the accused has no burden of
proof, that he must then be acquitted and set free should the Prosecution
not overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor. In other words,
the weakness of the defense put up by the accused is inconsequential in

Case Digests
the proceedings for as long as the Prosecution has not discharged its
burden of proof in establishing the commission of the crime charged and in
identifying the accused as the malefactor responsible for it.
RTC DECISION was REVERSED and SET ASIDE the decision
promulgated on January 23, 2006; ACQUIT accused REYNALDO
BELOCURA y PEREZ for failure of the Prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt; DIRECT the immediate release from
detention of REYNALDO BELOCURA y PEREZ, unless he is also
detained for some other lawful cause; and ORDER the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections to forthwith implement this decision
upon receipt, and to report his action hereon to this Court within
10 days from receipt.
CASE 29:
Gamboa vs. Chan
G.R. No. 193636 July 24, 2012
Facts:
Petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa (Gamboa) was the Mayor of
Dingras, Ilocos Norte. Meanwhile, respondent Police Senior Superintendent
(P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was the Officer-in-Charge, of the Ilocos Norte
Police Provincial Office.
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), Creating an Independent
Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the
Country. The body, which was later on referred to as the Zearosa
Commission,was formed to investigate the existence of private army
groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them before the
10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them permanently in the future.
Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the Zearosa Commission
released and submitted to the Office of the President a confidential report
entitled A Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission Against
Private Armies Report to the President (the Report).
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte
(PNPIlocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations against
her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a

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PAG.Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP
Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the
Zearosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Reports
enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news
program the portion of the Report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians
alleged to be maintaining a PAG. Gamboa averred that her association with
a PAG also appeared on print media. Thus, she was publicly tagged as
someone who maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified information
that the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded to the Zearosa
Commission.As a result, she claimed that her malicious or reckless
inclusion in the enumeration of personalities maintaining a PAG as
published in the Report also made her, as well as her supporters and
otherpeople identified with her, susceptible to harassment and police
surveillance operations.
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her
reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July
2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas dataagainst respondents in
their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner Gamboas right to privacy was violated.
Held:
The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long
been recognized as a constitutional right. It is expressly recognized in
section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall
be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public
safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that
must be protected from intrusion or constraint. Howeverthis Court
underscored that the right to privacy is not absolute.
In the case at bar, The Constitution explicitly mandates the
dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not

Case Digests
recognized by the duly constituted authority. It also provides for the
establishment of one police force that is national in scope and civilian in
character, and is controlled and administered by a national police
commission.Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that
the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which
is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective
of dismantling them permanently.
Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the
foregoing powers and functions accorded to the Zearosa Commission and
the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected of
maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities. One
of those individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa.
Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of
information by the PNP to the Zearosa Commission was not an unlawful
act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or
security.The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence
regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of
investigating the existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the
Zearosa Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the
police force in the fulfillment of the formers mandate, and thus
had the power to request assistance from the latter.
The fact that the PNP released information to the Zearosa
Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording
her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation
or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and
crucial component of intelligence- gathering and investigation.
In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but
emphasized its confidential nature. That it was leaked to third parties and
the media was regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be
stressed that Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were responsible
for this unintended disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs
available to her to address the purported damage to her reputation,
making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas
data unnecessary and improper.
CASE 30:

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CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO, et al. vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO,
Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, et al.
G.R. No. L-69803 October 8, 1985
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
FACTS: The case at bar is a question on the validity of the search warrant
and arrest of the petitioner charged for the crime of rebellion.
Prior to August 6, 1984, AGUILAR-ROQUE was one of the accused of
Rebellion. She was then still at large.
On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the
CSG, applied for a Search Warrant from respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Pao,
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, to be served at
No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined tyo be the leased
residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a month of "round the clock
surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected underground house of the
CPP/NPA." On the same day at 11:30 A.M., AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO
were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the intersection
of Mayon Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon City. No warrant of arrest
had previously been issued against NOLASCO. Elements of the CSG
searched the premises at 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City "late on the
same day". 428 documents, a portable typewriter and 2 boxes were seized.
On the basis of the documents seized, charges of subversion and rebellion
were filed but the fiscal's office merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal
possession of subversive materials.
ISSUE: Whether the Search Warrant is void because it is a general warrant
since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject
of the search and seizure, and that probable cause has not been properly
established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant's
witness.
HELD: We find merit in the Petition.
Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose. It also specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized

Case Digests
The disputed Search Warrant (No. 80-84) describes the personalities to be
seized as follows: Documents, papers and other records of the Communist
Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army and/or the National Democratic
Front, such as Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these groups,
Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive books and instructions,
manuals not otherwise available to the public, and support money from
foreign or local sources.
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the
seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not particularized. It
is an all-embracing description, which includes everything conceivable
regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National
Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive books and
instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to the public
contain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the
crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the
searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus
giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles
they should seize. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and
infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular
description of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this
Court, search warrants of similar description were considered null and void
for being too general.
The lack of particularization is also evident in the examination of the
witness presented by the applicant for Search Warrant. The "probable
cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant comprehends
such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon
them and act in pursuant thereof. The examination conducted was
general in nature and merely repetitious of the deposition of said
witness. Mere generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy
the requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant may
issue.
Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and although,
ordinarily, the articles seized under an invalid search warrant should be
returned, they cannot be ordered returned in the case at bar to AGUILARROQUE. Some searches may be made without a warrant. It is also a
general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the place or premises where
the arrest was made can also be search without a search warrant.
Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion, which
is a crime against public order; that the warrant for her arrest has not been
served for a considerable period of time; that she was arrested within the
general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of her dwelling was

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made within a half hour of her arrest, we are of the opinion that in her
respect, the search at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need a
search warrant; this, for possible effective results in the interest of public
order.
Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained by CSG, for
possible introduction as evidence in the Rebellion Case, leaving it to
AGUILAR-ROQUE to object to their relevance and to ask Special Military
Commission No.1 to return to her any and all irrelevant documents and
articles.
CASE 31:
Garcia v. Executive Secretary
677 SCRA 750 2012
G.R. No. 198554
Facts: Major General Carlos Garcia was charged with Failure to disclose his
assets on his SALN (statement of assets and liabilities), stating/making
untruthful statements with regard his assets and bank deposits on banks
which resulted to the conduct unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman
by maintaining an immigrant/permanent residence in the U.S.A. He was
tried under the jurisdiction of the General Court Martial (GCM) on violations
of the articles of war, he was also arraigned while being detained in a
military facility of the AFP, then after the petitioner turned 56 years old and
had retired from service while his case pending. After sentence was
rendered upon him by the military board review finding him guilty of all
charges. Petitioner served 6 years in detention in the PNP facility in quezon
city. Then after President Aquino acting as Commander in Chief of the AFP
confirmed the sentence of the Military board review of discharge from duty
without any retirement benefit dishonorably and a term of imprisonment of
2 years not to be deducted from his 6 years of detention, with this
petitioner filed for certiorari and petition for habeas corpus with this court/
Issue: WoN the GCM lost its jurisdiction on the petitioner upon his
retirement from duty under the law?
WoN Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code is inapplicable to petitioner
since his violation is with the articles of war and he is a military
person?

Case Digests
WoN the Office of the President commited Grave abuse of discretion
in confirming the sentence of the petitioner?
Held: it is a settled in law that jurisdiction once acquired cannot be lost
until a case ceases or judgment is rendered. where the person's discharge
or other separation does not interrupt his status as a person belonging to
the general category of persons subject to military law, court-martial
jurisdiction does not terminate. Thus, where an officer holding a reserve
commission is discharged from said commission by reason of acceptance
of a commission in the Regular Force, there being no interval between
services under the respective commissions, there is no terminating of the
officer's military status, but merely the accomplishment of a change in his
status from that of a reserve to that of a regular officer, and that courtmartial jurisdiction to try him for an offense (striking enlisted men for
example) committed prior to the discharge is not terminated by the
discharge. So also, where a dishonorable discharged general prisoner is
tried for an offense committed while a soldier and prior to his dishonorable
discharge, such discharge does not terminate his amenability to trial for
the offense. The GCM has jurisdiction upon petitioner because the offense
was committed prior his discharge. As for the second issue the OSG relying
on the Olaguer v. Military commission the court ruled in that case that the
MC has a separate jurisdiction over civil courts during the time of Marcos
thats why the court struck down that commission in that case. The GCM
has exclusive jurisdiction over military persons which is also cognizable by
the civil courts which means the GCM is like any other court exercising the
same plenary power under the Law. Being a court this court finds that
since the 2 years penalty is a punitive in character it cannot see why
Article 29 of Revised Penal Code cannot apply on this case because the
GCM is a criminal court in accordance with the constitution. Nevertheless,
the application of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code in the Articles of
War is in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987
Constitution. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public
bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by
its improper execution through the state's duly-constituted authorities. In
other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state
to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals

Page 54 of 94
solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental
objective. It, however, does not require the universal application of the
laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness.
The test has four requisites: (1) the classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited
to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to all members of the
same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification. In the present case, petitioner belongs to the class of those
who have been convicted by any court, thus, he is entitled to the rights
accorded to them. Clearly, there is no substantial distinction between
those who are convicted of offenses which are criminal in nature under
military courts and the civil courts. Furthermore, following the same
reasoning, petitioner is also entitled to the basic and time-honored
principle that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused. It must be remembered that the provisions
of the Articles of War which the petitioner violated are penal in nature.
Finally Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion, as when the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Thus, applying, the earlier
disquisitions, this Court finds that the Office of the President did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Confirmation of
Sentence in question.
CASE 32:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
FOURTH DIVISION and .JULIETA G. ANDO
REYES, J.:
G.R. No. 198589

Case Digests
July 25, 2012
FACTS:
Respondent Julieta G. Ando (Ando) was convicted by the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC), Branch 26 of three (3) counts of
Falsification of Public Documents under Article 172(1) in relation to Article
171(2) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). In a Decision 3 rendered on May 2,
2008, the MeTC found Ando guilty beyond reasonable doubt of making it
appear that Tees father, Tee Ong, who was the owner of To Suy Hardware,
signed, executed and sworn a Deed of Sale, an Affidavit, and a Transfer of
Rights on January 31, 1996.
Andos conviction was premised on the following factual findings:
(i) Tee Ong was already dead at the time the allegedly falsified documents
were executed and notarized on January 31, 1996; (ii) Ando was in
possession of the allegedly falsified documents, giving rise to the
presumption that she was responsible therefor; and (iii) Ando used the
allegedly falsified documents to cause the transfer in her favor of the rights
to the business name "TO SUY HARDWARE". On appeal, Branch 34 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila affirmed the MeTCs findings.

Page 55 of 94
death and not the impossibility of Tee Ongs voluntary execution thereof
before his death. Accordingly, it is the notary public who notarized the
subject documents, not Ando, who should be held liable for any
irregularities that may have attended the notarization. The execution and
notarization of the subject documents are two (2) different acts and the
irregularities attending their notarization do not necessarily affect the
validity of their execution.
In this petition, Tee attributes grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the CA, alleging that the latter has no reason to reverse the MeTCs and
RTCs finding of guilt as the inconsistencies in Andos statements and her
possession and use of the subject documents prove beyond reasonable
doubt that she was the one who forged Tee Ongs thumb mark and
signature. There was likewise no necessity to produce an expert witness to
determine if Tee Ongs thumb mark and signature were forged. That Tee
Ong was already dead at the time the subject documents were executed
and notarized coupled with Andos use thereof to her benefit sufficed to
conclude that there was forgery and that Ando was responsible therefor.
Hence, the appeal from the petitioner.
ISSUE:
The CA gave due course to Andos appeal and reversed the RTC
Decision dated November 6, 2008.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTCs

decision and acquitting the petitioner herein?
According to the Court of Appeals, Ando deserves to be acquitted

of the charges against her in view of the prosecutions failure to prove that
the subject documents were indeed falsified. Specifically, the prosecution
did not present any expert witness or caused the examination of the
subject documents to determine whether Tee Ongs thumb mark and
signature were indeed forged. The CA found the lower courts to have erred
in sweepingly concluding that the signatures on the Deed of Sale, Affidavit,
and Transfer of Rights were forged on the basis of the undisputed fact that
Tee Ong was already dead at the time that such documents were notarized
on January 31, 1996.
HELD:
According to the CA the prosecution did not eliminate the

possibility that Tee Ong may have signed the said documents before he
died on December 15, 1995, thus, clouding Andos supposed guilt with
moral uncertainty. What the CA found as certain from the evidence of the
prosecution is the notarization of the subject documents after Tee Ongs
The petition cannot be given due course, thus dismissed.

Dismissal of this petition is inevitable in view of the principle of
double jeopardy, making it unnecessary to address and extrapolate on the
numerous factual issues raised by Tee against the CAs Decision dated July
28, 2011 and the procedural lapses Ando attributes to Tee. The mere fact
that the decision being brought for this Courts review is one for acquittal
alerts ones attention to a possible violation of the rule against double
jeopardy.
Although the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable
but only through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. For the writ
to issue, the trial court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of

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Page 56 of 94
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the

prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the
trial was a sham thus rendering the assailed judgment void. The burden is
on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly
abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to
dispense justice.
The petition is bereft of any allegation, much less, evidence that the
prosecutions right to due process was violated or the proceedings before
the CA were a mockery such that Andos acquittal was a foregone
conclusion. Accordingly, notwithstanding the alleged errors in the
interpretation of the applicable law or appreciation of evidence that the CA
may have committed in ordering Andos acquittal, absent any showing that
the CA acted with caprice or without regard to the rudiments of due
process, the CAs findings can no longer be reversed, disturbed and set
aside without violating the rule against double jeopardy.
CASE 33:
DR. ERNESTO I. MAQUILING vs.
SOCIETY, INC.
G.R. No. 143384 February 4, 2005
PHILIPPINE
TUBERCULOSIS
FACTS:
Dr. Maquiling was employed by respondent Philippine Tuberculosis Society,
Inc. (PTS). On 8 June 1991, he was dismissed from service as Deputy
Executive Director after serving PTS for twenty-three (23) years.
The records disclose that Dr. Maquiling received a memo dated 2 April
1991 from the PTS OIC-Executive Director Andres B. Soriano (Soriano)
directing him to submit within five (5) days from notice a written
explanation on the following matters:
1. The delayed GSIS remittances;
2. The reported deficit of P7.3 million appearing in our
financial statement for 1990;
3. The expenses you approved and incurred in connection
with the Dale Carnegie and Silva Mind Control Seminar;
4. The P3.7 million miscellaneous expenses appearing in our
financial statement; and
5. Your reasons for renewing our service contract with Ultra.
Dr. Maquiling submitted his explanatory letter. On 15 April 1991, Dr.
Maquiling had a thirty (30) minute conversation with Soriano at the latters
instance. No further related proceedings were undertaken before Dr.
Maquiling received a letter-notice informing him of his dismissal effective

immediately, without any retirement benefits.
Dr. Maquiling continued to report for work. In the meantime, he elevated
his case to the PTS Board of Directors through a memorandum.
Dr. Maquiling wrote the President of PTS a letter. Receiving no response, Dr.
Maquiling stopped reporting for work at the PTS in the last week of
September 1991.
On 10 October 1991, Dr. Maquiling filed his complaint with the Labor
Arbiter for reinstatement or, in the alternative, for payment of full
backwages and separation pay in accordance with Article 279 of the Labor
Code, as well as moral damages in the amount of five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00) and exemplary damages in the amount of one
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00).
Labor Arbiter rendered a decision ordering PTS to immediately reinstate Dr.
Maquiling and to pay Dr. Maquiling backwages, moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorneys fees. Upon appeal by PTS to the NLRC, the
Commission upheld the decision of the labor arbiter and dismissed the
appeal. PTS appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which reversed
the decisions of the NLRC and Labor Arbiter by ordering the dismissal of
the complaint and declaring that his dismissal from employment as legal
and valid. It, however, ordered PTS to pay Dr. Maquiling damages or
indemnity for violation of his right to procedural due process and
separation pay in the interest of social justice.
ISSUE: Was there a violation of his right to procedural due process and
thus is he entitled to reinstatement according to the ruling in Serrano?
HELD:
We agree with the appellate court that Dr. Maquiling was
dismissed from employment for just cause consisting of loss of
trust and confidence.
The unnecessary expending of funds in the administration and operation of
PTS is evidently an act of mismanagement which could bring PTS to severe
financial distress. These acts if committed by a responsible officer wither
the trust and confidence lodged in him by his superior and may serve as a
valid and sufficient basis to impose disciplinary sanctions to an erring
employee which may even result to dismissal from employment if the
gravity of the offense warrants as in the instant case.

Case Digests
Recent decisions of this Court distinguish the treatment of managerial from
that of rank-and-file personnel insofar as the application of the doctrine of
loss of trust and confidence is concerned. Thus, with respect to rank-andfile personnel, loss of trust and confidence as ground for valid dismissal
requires proof of involvement in the alleged events in question and that
mere uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer will not
suffice. But as regards a managerial employee, mere existence of a
basis for believing that such employee has breached the trust of
his employer would suffice for his dismissal.
However, PTS was remiss in its duty to observe procedural due
process in effecting the dismissal of Dr. Maquiling.
Under this second requirement, two notices must be sent to the employee
who is the subject of an investigation for acts which may warrant his
eventual dismissal from employment. The notices required before an
employee may be validly dismissed are: (a) a written notice served on the
employee specifying the grounds for termination and giving the employee
reasonable opportunity to explain his/her side; (b) a hearing or conference
wherein the employee, with the assistance of counsel if so desired, is given
opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut
evidence presented against him/her; and (c) written notice of termination
served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the
circumstances, grounds have been established to justify termination.
The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute elements
of due process in cases of employees dismissal; the requirement of
notice is intended to inform the employee concerned of the employers
intent to dismiss and the reason for the proposed dismissal; upon the other
hand the requirement of hearing affords the employee an opportunity to
answer his employers charges against him and accordingly to defend
himself therefrom before dismissal is effected.
Clearly, the first notice must inform outright the employee that an
investigation will be conducted on the charges particularized therein which,
if proven, will result to his dismissal. Such notice must not only contain a
plain statement of the charges of malfeasance or misfeasance but must
categorically state the effect on his employment if the charges are proven
to be true. Absent such statement, the first notice falls short of the
requirement of due process.
It must be noted that the first notice (confidential memo) dated 2 April
1991 is a mere instruction to explain the matters enumerated therein. It
did not apprise Dr. Maquiling of any investigation to be conducted or being
conducted that will warrant his dismissal from service if found guilty of

Page 57 of 94
charges specified therein. Thus, such notice fell short of the requirement of
law that an employee must be afforded.
Dr. Maquiling invokes our ruling in Serrano as basis for appropriate relief.
The Serrano ruling awarded full backwages and separation pay to the
employee who was dismissed for just cause but without the observance of
the procedural due process requirement. However, in Agabon v. NLRC, this
Court modified the Serrano ruling and awarded nominal damages in the
amount of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) including holiday pay,
service incentive leave and thirteenth month pay to the petitioners in the
said case. This case clarified the criticisms and answered the questions
created by the Serrano ruling.
The Agabon doctrine enunciates the rule that if the dismissal is for
just cause but statutory due process was not observed, the
dismissal should be upheld. While the procedural infirmity cannot
be cured, it should not invalidate the dismissal. However, the
employer should be held liable for non-compliance with the
procedural requirements of due process.
Where the dismissal is for just cause, as in the instant case, the
lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or
render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should
indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights.
The indemnity to be imposed should be stiffer to discourage the abhorrent
practice of "dismiss now, pay later," which we sought to deter in the
Serrano ruling. The sanction should be in the nature of indemnification or
penalty and should depend on the facts of each case, taking into special
consideration the gravity of the due process violation of the employer.
The violation of the petitioners right to statutory due process by the
private respondent warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of
nominal damages as a vindication or recognition of this right granted to
employees under the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.
In the instant case, the records fail to show that Dr. Maquiling suffered
pecuniary loss by reason of his dismissal from service. Any such loss must
be proved by Dr. Maquiling to be entitled to an award for actual damages.
Besides, the two-notice rule was not at all disregarded although it was
observed defectively by PTS. Thus, actual damages may not be awarded.
Neither will an award for moral damages nor exemplary damages prosper.
The instant controversy fails to show that the dismissal of the employee
was attended by bad faith, fraud, or was done in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy, or that the employer committed an
act oppressive to labor to warrant an award for moral damages. Exemplary

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damages may avail if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or
malevolent manner to warrant an award for exemplary damages. Hence,
Dr. Maquiling shall only be entitled to an award for nominal
damages.

Page 58 of 94
owners (now the defendants), and contained the statements set out in the
information as libelous. Briefly stated the specific charges against the
justice of the peace were.
1. That Francisca Polintan, desiring to make complaint against
Mariano de los Reyes, visited the justice of the peace, who first
told her that he would draw up complaint for P5;
afterwards he said he would take P3 which she paid; also
kept her in the house for four days as a servant and took
from her two chickens and twelve "gandus;"
NO. 34 CASE.
BILL OF RIGHTS Digest cases..
G.R. No. L-12592
March 8, 1918
THE
UNITED
STATES,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELIPE BUSTOS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
2. That Valentin Sunga being interested in a case regarding land

which was on trial before the justice of the peace, went to see the
justice of the peace to ascertain the result of the trial, and was
told by the justice of the peace that if he wished to win he
must give him P50. Not having this amount, Sunga gave the
justice nothing, and a few days later was informed that he had
lost the case. Returning again to the office of the justice of the
peace in order to appeal, the justice told him that he could still
win if he would pay P50;
3. That Leoncio Quiambao, having filed a complaint for assault

against four persons, on the day of the trial the justice called him
over to his house, where he secretly gave him (Quiambao)
P30; and the complaint was thereupon shelved.
MALCOLM, J.:
FACTS
In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of
Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive
Secretary through the law office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five
individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the
peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office
and asking for his removal. Crossfield and O'Brien submitted this petition
and these affidavits with a complaint to the Executive Secretary. The
petition transmitted by these attorneys was signed by thirty-four citizens
apparently of considerable standing, including councilors and property
The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the judge of first

instance for the Seventh Judicial District requesting investigation,
proper action, and report. The justice of the peace was notified
and denied the charges. The judge of first instance found the first
count not proved and counts 2 and 3 established. In view of this
result, the judge, the Honorable Percy M. Moir, was of the opinion
"that it must be, and it is hereby, recommended to the GovernorGeneral that the respondent be removed from his position as
justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of
Pampanga, and it is ordered that the proceedings had in this case
be transmitted to the Executive Secretary."

Case Digests
Later the justice of the peace filled a motion for a new trial; the judge
of first instance granted the motion and reopened the hearing; documents
were introduced, including a letter sent by the municipal president and six
councilors of Masantol, Pampanga, asserting that the justice of the peace
was the victim of prosecution, and that one Agustin Jaime, the auxiliary
justice of the peace, had instituted the charges for personal reasons; and
the judge of first instance ordered a suppression of the charges against
Punsalan and acquitted him the same. Attorneys for complainants
thereupon appealed to the Governor-General, but whether the papers were
forwarded to the Governor-General as requested the record does not
disclose.
Criminal action against the petitioners, now become the defendants,

was instituted on October 12, 1916.
ISSUE: WON the defendant-appellants are guilty of libel for filing a petition
for malfeasance against the justice of the peace to the Executive
Secretary?
HELD:
NO, defendants-appellant are not guilty of libel ACQUITTED.
Complaint was filed in GOOD FAITH and WITHOUT MALICE by the
defendants-appellants,
and
such
is
guranteed
by
the
constitutional right of free speech. The guaranties of a free
speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial
conduct. Moreover, the complaint was filed before the proper
authority and thus, such statements against the justice is covered
by PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government

demand a full discussion of public affairs. Completely liberty to comment

Page 59 of 94
on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The
sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in
public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound
can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must
not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts.
Only thus can the intelligence and the dignity of the individual be exalted.
Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as the
individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the
common good. Rising superior to any official or set of officials, to the Chief
of Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary to any or all the
agencies of Government public opinion should be the constant source of
liberty and democracy.
The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include

the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a
matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced
is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize
a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer,
public opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public
opinion on the part of the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort.
The sword of Damocles in the hands of a judge does not hang suspended
over the individual who dares to assert his prerogative as a citizen and to
stand up bravely before any official. On the contrary, it is a duty which
every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the
investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all
who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the
wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those
whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them. In the words of Mr. Justice
Gayner, who contributed so largely to the law of libel. "The people are not
obliged to speak of the conduct of their officials in whispers or with bated
breath in a free government, but only in a despotism."
Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of

government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable
and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the
doctrine of privilege.

Case Digests
The doctrine of privileged communications rests upon

public policy, 'which looks to the free and unfettered
administration of justice, though, as an incidental result, it may in
some instances afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and
malignant slanderer.' (Abbott vs. National Bank of Commerce,
Tacoma [1899], 175 U. S., 409, 411.)
Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. With the first, we

are not concerned. As to qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest a
prima facie privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. The rule is thus
stated by Lord Campbell, C. J.
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in

which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to
which has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a
corresponding interest or duty, although it contained criminatory
matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and
actionable. (Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. and B., 344; 1 Jur.[N. S.], 846;
25 L. J. Q. B., 25; 3 W. R., 474; 85 E. C. L., 344.)
A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege

is a complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to the
character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or a
board having some interest or duty in the matter. Even when the
statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in
their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of
privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. But the statements
must be made under an honest sense of duty; a self-seeking motive is
destructive. Personal injury is not necessary. All persons have an interest in
the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The
duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in
its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance
thereof although in fact he is mistaken. The privilege is not defeated by the
mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms.

Page 60 of 94
A further element of the law of privilege concerns the person to whom

the complaint should be made. The rule is that if a party applies to the
wrong person through some natural and honest mistake as to the
respective functions of various officials such unintentional error will not
take the case out of the privilege.
It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a
private person, might well be considered libelous per se. The charges
might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of a
government official. As a general rule words imputing to a judge or a
justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct
touching him in his office are actionable. But as suggested in the
beginning we do not have present a simple case of direct and
vicious accusations published in the press, but of charges
predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus
qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the
prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably not true as to the
justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good
faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that
malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the
motives of these citizens to secure the removal from office of a person
thought to be venal were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the
privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize on a frivolous
matter but on instances which not only seemed to them of a grave
character, but which were sufficient in an investigation by a judge of first
instance to convince him of their seriousness. No undue publicity was
given to the petition. The manner of commenting on the conduct of the
justice of the peace was proper. And finally the charges and the petition
were submitted through reputable attorneys to the proper functionary, the
Executive Secretary. In this connection it is sufficient to note that justices
of the peace are appointed by the Governor-General, that they may be
removed by the Governor-General upon the recommendation of a Judge of
First Instance, or on the Governor-General's own motion, and that at the
time this action took place the Executive Bureau was the office through
which the Governor-General acted in such matter.

Case Digests
The Attorney-General bases his recommendation for confirmation on
the case of the United States vs. Julio Bustos ([1909], 13 Phil., 690). The
Julio Bustos case, the Attorney-General says, is identical with the Felipe
Bustos case, with the exception that there has been more publicity in the
present instance and that the person to whom the charge was made had
less jurisdiction than had the Secretary of Justice in the Julio Bustos case.
Publicity is immaterial if the charge against Punsalan is in fact a privileged
communication. Moreover, in the Julio Bustos case we find wild statements,
with no basis in fact, made against reputable members of the judiciary, "to
persons who could not furnish protection." Malicious and untrue
communications are not privileged. A later case and one more directly in
point to which we invite especial attention is United States vs. Galeza
([1915], 31 Phil., 365). (Note also Yancey vs. Commonwealth [1909], 122
So. W., 123.)
We find the defendants and appellants entitled to the protection of the

rules concerning qualified privilege, growing out of constitutional
guaranties in our bill of rights. Instead of punishing citizens for an honest
endeavor to improve the public service, we should rather commend them
for their good citizenship. The defendants and appellants are acquitted
END.
(2 pages lang ang digest pero ito additional lang, History ng freedom of
speech in the Philippines from pre-1900s to American period, for
discussion purposes Pati na rin ang Concurring Opinion, para sure lang
):
With these facts pleading justification, before testing them by
certain principles which make up the law of libel and slander, we feel
warranted in seizing the opportunity to intrude an introductory and general
discussion of freedom of speech and press and assembly and petition in
the Philippine Islands. We conceive that the time is ripe thus to clear up
certain misapprehensions on the subject and to place these basic rights in
their proper light.

Page 61 of 94
Turning to the pages of history, we state nothing new when we set
down that freedom of speech as cherished in democratic countries was
unknown in the Philippine Islands before 1900. A prime cause for revolt
was consequently ready made. Jose Rizal in "Filipinas Despues de Cien
Aos" (The Philippines a Century Hence, pages 62 et seq.) describing "the
reforms sine quibus non," which the Filipinos insist upon, said: "
The minister, . . . who wants his reforms to be
reforms, must begin by declaring the press in the Philippines
free and by instituting Filipinos delegates.
The Filipino patriots in Spain, through the columns of "La

Solidaridad" and by other means invariably in exposing the wants of the
Filipino people demanded "liberty of the press, of cults, and associations."
(See Mabini, La Revolucion Filipina.) The Malolos Constitution, the work of
the Revolutionary Congress, in its Bill of Rights, zealously guarded freedom
of speech and press and assembly and petition.
Mention is made of the foregoing data only to deduce the

proposition that a reform so sacred to the people of these Islands and won
at so dear a cost, should now be protected and carried forward as one
would protect and preserve the covenant of liberty itself.
Next comes the period of American-Filipino cooperative effort. The

Constitution of the United States and the State constitutions guarantee to
the right of freedom of speech and press and the right of assembly and
petition. We are therefore, not surprised to find President McKinley in that
Magna Charta of Philippine Liberty, the Instructions to the Second
Philippine Commission, of April 7, 1900, laying down the inviolable rule
"That no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the
Government for a redress of grievances."

Case Digests
The Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and the
Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, in the nature of organic
acts for the Philippines, continued this guaranty. The words quoted are not
unfamiliar to students of Constitutional Law, for they are the counterpart of
the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which the
American people demanded before giving their approval to the
Constitution.
We mention the foregoing facts only to deduce the position never

to be forgotten for an instant that the guaranties mentioned are part and
parcel of the Organic Law of the Constitution of the Philippine Islands.
These paragraphs found in the Philippine Bill of Rights are not
threadbare verbiage. The language carries with all the applicable
jurisprudence of great English and American Constitutional cases. (Kepner
vs. U. S. [1904], 195 U. S., 100; Serra vs. Mortiga [1907],
CARSON, J., concurring:

I concur. I think it proper to observe, however, that in my opinion the
Attorney-General is entirely correct when he says that this case is
substantially identical with the former "Bustos case (The United States vs.
Bustos, 13 Phil. Rep., 690). I believe that a careful reading of our decisions
in these cases is sufficient to demonstrate that fact. The truth is that the
doctrine of the prevailing opinion in the former Bustos case has long since
been abandoned by this court; and in my opinion it would make for the
more efficient administration of the Libel Law in these Islands to say so, in
so many words. (Cf. U. S. vs. Sedano, [1909], 14 Phil. Rep., 338, 339; U. S.
vs. Contreras [1912], 23 Phil. Rep., 513; U. S. vs. Montalvo [1915], 29 Phil.
Rep., 595; and U. S. vs. Galeza [1915], 31 Phil. Rep., 365.)

Page 62 of 94
Facts:
The accused Rodel Luz was flagged down and was apprehended by Police
Officers Alteza and Brillante for violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012, an
ordinance requiring the use of helmet by motorcycles and riders in the City
of Naga. The Police Officers noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept
on getting something from his jacket. The police officers required the
accused to take off all the contents of his jacket which were found as
follows: (1) nickle like tin container contained 4 sachets of suspected
shabu; (2) 2 cellphones; (3) 1 pair of scissors; (4) 1 swiss knife. As a
result thereof, the accused was arrested for illegal possession of
Dangerous Drugs. The RTC convicted the accused which was affirmed by
the CA.
Issue:
(1)WON the accused was validly arrested
(2)WON the warrantless arrest was likewise illegal
Held:
(1)NO. There was no valid arrest of the accused in this case. When the
accused was flagged down for the commission of an offense for vioaltion of
a traafic oridinace, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason
arrested.
It appears that, according to the City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was
violated by the accused, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a
motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as corollary that
neither can the warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that the accused was
deemed arrested upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and
while awaiting for the issuance of a traffic ticket, then the requirements for
a valid arrest were not complied with
(2)YES. There being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted
from it was likewise illegal.
CASE 35:
Luz vs. People
G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012
667 SCRA 421
Sereno, J:
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (1) a
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) search of evidence in
plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless
search; (5) custom search; (6) a stop and frisk search; (7) exigent and
emergency circumstance. Non of the above mentioned instances,

Case Digests
especially a search incident to a lawful arrest are applicable to this case.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
person, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizure. Any evidence obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible as evidence for any purpose and for any proceeding.
Petition was granted, the decision of the RTC and the CA convicting the
accused was REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused Rodel Luz was
ACQUITTED.
CASE 36:
BALDOZA v. DIMAANO
71 SCRA 14
FACTS: The Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charges Municipal Judge
Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of the same municipality, with abuse of authority in
refusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the
criminal docket records of the Municipal Court to secure data in connection
with their contemplated report on the peace and order conditions of the
said municipality.
Respondent, in answer to the complaint, stated that there has never been
an intention to refuse access to official court records; that although court
records are among public documents open to inspection not only by the
parties directly involved but also by other persons who have legitimate
interest to such inspection, yet the same is always subject to reasonable
regulation as to who, when, where and how they may be inspected. He
further asserted that a court has unquestionably the power to prevent an
improper use or inspection of its records and the furnishing of copies
therefrom may be refused where the person requesting is not motivated by
a serious and legitimate interest but acts out of whim or fancy or mere
curiosity or to gratify private spite or to promote public scandal.
Respondent significantly observed that under the circumstances, to allow
an indiscriminate and unlimited exercise of the right to free access, might
do more harm than good to the citizenry of Taal. Disorder and chaos might
result defeating the very essence of their request.
Taal Mayor Corazon A. Caniza filed a motion to dismiss the complaint to
preserve harmony and cooperation among officers in the same

Page 63 of 94
municipality. This motion was denied by the Investigating Judge, but after
formal investigation, he recommended the exoneration of respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge denied the petitioners right to
access on matters of public concern.
HELD: No.As found by the Investigating Judge, the respondent allowed the
complainant to open and view the docket books of respondent certain
conditions and under his control and supervision. It has not been shown
that the rules and conditions imposed by the respondent were
unreasonable. The access to public records predicated on the right of the
people to acquire information on matters of public concern. Undoubtedly in
a democracy, the public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and
political significance.
The New Constitution expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to
information on matters of public concern and thus are expressly granted
access to official records, as well as documents of official acts, or
transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by law. The
incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the
fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There
can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a
meaningful democratic decision making if they are denied access to
information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the
members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been
aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information depends on
protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either
process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases."However, restrictions on
access to certain records may be imposed by law. Thus, access restrictions
imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted upon a showing
of immediate and impending danger that renders ordinary means of
control inadequate to maintain order.
CASE 37:
G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989
SSS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION et. al. vs. CA, SSS et. al.
FACTS:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed w/ the RTC of QC a complaint for
damages w/ a prayer for a writ of prelim injunction against petitioners,
alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged
an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building,

Case Digests
preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS
members from transacting business w/ the SSS. And notwithstanding the
Public Sector Labor-Management Councils order for strikers to return to
work, they refused to return to work.
As such, SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act
on the union's demands, which included:
1. implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA CBA on
check-off of union dues;
2. payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and
holiday pay;
3. conversion of temporary or contractual employees w/ six (6)
months or more of service into regular and permanent employees
and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits
given to other regular employees of the SSS;
4. and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the
SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees
and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and ULP.
On June 11, 1987, the trial court issued a TRO pending resolution of
the application for a writ of prelim injunction. In the meantime, petitioners
filed a motion to dismiss alleging the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter as the RTC had no jurisdiction to hear the case initiated
by the SSS and to issue the restraining order and the writ of prelim
injunction, as jurisdiction lay w/ the Department of Labor and Employment
or the National Labor Relations Commission, since the case involves a labor
dispute.
Trial Court (and CA on appeal) denied the MTD and converted the
restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond, and affirming
the contention of SSS that the strike was illegal since the employees of the
SSS, are government employees, they are not allowed to strike, and may
be enjoined by the RTC, which had jurisdiction over the SSS' complaint for
damages, from continuing with their strike.
ISSUES:
1. WON the employees of the SSS have the right to strike?
2. WON the RTC have jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and
to enjoin the strikers from continuing w/ the strike and to order them to
return to work?
HELD:
1. The employees of SSS, being those subjected to Civil Service Law, are
prohibited to stage strike.
Although the 1987 Constitution, provides that the State "shall
guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including
the right to strike in accordance w/ law", the President on June 1, 1987

Page 64 of 94
issued EO No. 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to
organize of Govt employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is provided that the
Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the
Govt service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be
enacted by Congress." The President was apparently referring to
Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission under
date April 21, 1987 which, "prior to the enactment by Congress of
applicable laws concerning strike by Govt employees enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all Govt officers and employees from staging
strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass
action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public
service."
But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against
strikes? The Court is of the considered view that they are. Considering that
under the Constitution the civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Govt, including GOCCs
w/ original charters", therefore they are covered by the Civil Service
Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the
strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
2. RTC as court of general jurisdication, has the authority of law for the
issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike.
The Labor Code itself provides that terms and conditions of
employment of government employees shall be governed by the Civil
Service Law, rules and regulations. More importantly, E.O. No. 180 vests
the Public Sector Labor - Management Council with jurisdiction over
unresolved labor disputes involving government employees. Clearly, the
NLRC has no jurisdiction over the dispute.
This being the case, the RTC was not precluded, in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, from assuming
jurisdiction over the SSS's complaint for damages and issuing the
injunctive writ prayed for therein. Unlike the NLRC, the Public Sector Labor
- Management Council has not been granted by law authority to issue writs
of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the
Council, and not the NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the instant labor
dispute, resort to the general courts of law for the issuance of a writ of
injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.
Case 38:
G.R. No. 78508 March 21, 1994
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
FILEMON REMIGIO and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Case Digests
FACTS:
(1)
On 25 August 1967, private respondent obtained from petitioner a
P65,000.00 loan secured by a real estate mortgage covering five (5)
parcels of land in Isabela described in and embraced by Transfer
Certificates of Title ("TCT") No. T-11326, T-681, T-100, and T-27 and Original
Certificate of Title No. I-1673.

Page 65 of 94
(8)
On 19 March 1980, while the case was yet pending with the trial
court, petitioner bank additionally received from the Land Bank of the
Philippines P26,348.12 in cash and P160,000.00 worth of Land Bank Bonds
in payment of the foreclosed parcels covered by TCT No. T-100, T-11326,
and T-681.
The Court of Appeals adjudged, as follows:
(2)
Private respondent defaulted; hence on 17 November 1970,
petitioner bank extrajudicially foreclosed on the mortgage, and it acquired
the encumbered assets for the sum of P87,082.00. The sheriff's sale was
registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Isabela only on 11
October 1972.
(3)
In its letter-offer of 15 February 1971, petitioner bank
invited private respondent to repurchase the foreclosed property
for P87,082.00 plus interest and other charges. Before that, or on 18
November 1970 (or one day after the foreclosure sale), private respondent
already had paid an initial P10,000.00 to redeem the property.
Subsequently, additional payments were made by private respondent, i.e.,
P10,000.00 on 26 April 1971 and another P20,000.00 on 17 May 1971.
WHEREFORE, the court declares the foreclosure of the mortgaged

properties to be without force and effect; ordering the defendant bank to
release the properties and the plaintiff to transfer the rights to the tenantsbeneficiaries in favor of the Land Bank of the Philippines; declaring the
deed of promise to sell executed by the plaintiff and the defendant bank
rescinded; ordering the defendant bank and the Land Bank of the
Philippines to recalculate the amounts of payments due for the transfer of
the subject properties in accordance with this Decision subject to the
provisions of P.D. No. 27 and in accordance with the mechanics of the
Operation Land Transfer; and annulling the order of the lower court for the
plaintiff to pay the defendant the expenses of litigation and attorney's fees.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
(4)
On 21 October 1972, Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 27 was
enacted into law that mandated an agrarian reform. Pursuant thereto, an
"Operation Land Transfer Program" was launched; among the areas it
covered were the parcels of land under TCT No. T-100, T-11326 and T-681.
(5)
On 17 April 1974, private respondent offered to buy the
foreclosed property for P284,000.00 which was the market and
appraised value thereof fixed by petitioner bank. On 24 December
1974, the Deed of Promise to Sell was executed between petitioner bank
and private respondent.
(6)
In a letter, dated 25 August 1978, sent to and received by
petitioner bank on even date, private respondent, through counsel,
inquired why he was still being made to buy the property for P284,000.00
when, in truth, he had already paid P40,000.00 of the P87,082.00
previously offered by petitioner for the redemption of the property. There
was no reply or response from petitioner. As of 02 November 1977, private
respondent had paid petitioner the total sum of P207,243.85.
(7)
Private respondent, on 20 September 1978, instituted an action for
"Annulment of Foreclosure Deed, Breach of Contract, Sum of
Money and Damages" at the CFI, Echague, Isabela, against petitioner
bank and its Branch Manager Leuterio Genato.
ISSUE: Whethere the foreclosure may still be given effect by the petitioner
bank.
HELD: NO. In passing, the Secretary of the Department of Justice has
himself opined thus:
I am aware that a ruling that lands covered by P.D. No. 27 may not be the
object of the foreclosure proceedings after the promulgation of said decree
on October 21, 1972, would concede that P.D. No. 27 had the effect of
impairing the obligation of the duly executed mortgage contracts affecting
said lands. There is no question, however, that the land reform program of
the government as accelerated under P.D. No. 27 and mandated by the
Constitution itself (Art. XIV, Sec. 12), was undertaken in the exercise of the
police power of the state. It is settled in a long line of decisions of the
Supreme Court that the Constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of
obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police
power of the state. One limitation on the contract clause arises
from the police power, the reason being that public welfare is
superior to private rights. The situation here, is like that in
eminent domain proceedings, where the state expropriates
private property for public use, and the only condition to be
complied with is the payment of just compensation. Technically,
the condemnation proceedings do not impair the contract to
destroy its obligations, but merely appropriate or take for public

Case Digests
use. As the Land Bank is obliged to settle the obligations secured by the
mortgage, the mortgagee is not left without any compensation.
The opinion deserves respect. This Court, likewise, in a number of cases
has expressed the dictum that police power subordinates the nonimpairment clause of the Constitution.
CASE 39:
G.R. No. 85215
July 7, 1989
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON, Presiding over Branch 6, Regional Trial
Court, First Judicial Region, Baguio City, and FELIPE RAMOS,
respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
FACTS: Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the
Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station. It having
allegedly come to light that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of
plane tickets, the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be
conducted into the matter of February 9, 1986. On the day before the
investigation, February 8,1986, Ramos gave to his superiors a handwritten
notes reading as follows:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THE UNDERSIGNED WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT HE IS WILLING TO SETTLE
IRREGULARITIES ALLEGEDLY CHARGED VS. HIM IN THE AMT. OF P 76,000
(APPROX.) SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AS MAY BE IMPOSED BY PAL ON OR
BEFORE 1700/9 FEB 86.
(s) Felipe Ramos
At the investigation of February 9, 1986, conducted by the PAL Branch
Manager in Baguio City, Edgardo R. Cruz, in the presence of Station Agent
Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA Shop
Steward Cristeta Domingo, Felipe Ramos was informed "of the finding of
the Audit Team." Thereafter, his answers in response to questions by Cruz,
were taken down in writing. Ramos' answers were to the effect inter alia
that he had not indeed made disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the
Audit Team's findings, that the proceeds had been "misused" by him, that
although he had planned on paying back the money, he had been

Page 66 of 94
prevented from doing so, "perhaps (by) shame," that he was still willing to
settle his obligation, and proferred a "compromise x x to pay on staggered
basis, (and) the amount would be known in the next investigation;" that he
desired the next investigation to be at the same place, "Baguio CTO," and
that he should be represented therein by "Shop stewardees ITR Nieves
Blanco;" and that he was willing to sign his statement (as he in fact
afterwards did). No compromise agreement was reached much less
consummated.
About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos
charging him with the crime of estafa allegedly committed in Baguio City
during the period from March 12, 1986 to January 29, 1987. In that place
and during that time, according to the indictment, he (Ramos) with
unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully ...
defraud the Philippine Airlines, Inc., Baguio Branch, ... in the following
manner, to wit: said accused ... having been entrusted with and received in
trust fare tickets of passengers for one-way trip and round-trip in the total
amount of P76,700.65, with the express obligation to remit all the proceeds
of the sale, account for it and/or to return those unsold, ... once in
possession thereof and instead of complying with his obligation, with intent
to defraud, did then and there ... misappropriate, misapply and convert the
value of the tickets in the sum of P76,700.65 and in spite of repeated
demands, ... failed and refused to make good his obligation, to the damage
and prejudice of the offended party .. On arraignment on this charge,
Felipe Ramos entered a plea of "Not Guilty," and trial thereafter ensued.
At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a written
offer of evidence dated June 21, 1988, which included "the (above
mentioned) statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos taken on February 9,
1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office," which had been marked as Exhibit
A, as well as his "handwritten admission x x given on February 8, 1986,"
also above referred to, which had been marked as Exhibit K.
The defendant's attorneys filed "Objections/Comments to Plaintiffs
Evidence." Particularly as regards the peoples' Exhibit A, the objection was
that "said document, which appears to be a confession, was taken without
the accused being represented by a lawyer." Exhibit K was objected to "for
the same reasons interposed under Exhibits 'A'.
By Order dated August 9, 1988, the respondent judge admitted all the
exhibits "as part of the testimony of the witnesses who testified in
connection therewith and for whatever they are worth," except Exhibits A
and K, which it rejected. His Honor declared Exhibit A "inadmissible in
evidence, it appearing that it is the statement of accused Felipe Ramos
taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office, in an
investigation conducted by the Branch Manager x x since it does not

Case Digests
appear that the accused was reminded of this constitutional rights to
remain silent and to have counsel, and that when he waived the same and
gave his statement, it was with the assistance actually of a counsel." He
also declared inadmissible "Exhibit K, the handwritten admission made by
accused Felipe J. Ramos, given on February 8, 1986 x x for the same
reason stated in the exclusion of Exhibit 'A' since it does not appear that
the accused was assisted by counsel when he made said admission."
Respondent Judge pointed out that the investigation of Felipe Ramos at the
PAL Baguio Station was one "for the offense of allegedly misappropriating
the proceeds of the tickets issued to him' and therefore clearly fell "within
the coverage of the constitutional provisions;" and the fact that Ramos was
not detained at the time, or the investigation was administrative in
character could not operate to except the case "from the ambit of the
constitutional provision cited."
ISSUE: WON it was grave abuse of discretion for respondent Judge to have
excluded the People's Exhibits A and K. It will now proceed to resolve it
HELD: YES. At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, to which respondent Judge has given a construction that
is disputed by the People. The section reads as follows:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the
free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of
this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights,
dealt with in the section, namely:
1) the right against self-incrimination i.e., the right of a person not to be
compelled to be a witness against himself set out in the first sentence,
which is a verbatim reproduction of Section 18, Article III of the 1935
Constitution, and is similar to that accorded by the Fifth Amendment of the
American Constitution, 12 and
2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights of every
suspect "under investigation for the commission of an offense."
Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the
individuality and disparateness of these rights. It has placed the rights in
separate sections. The right against self- incrimination, "No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself," is now embodied in Section 17,

Page 67 of 94
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The lights of a person in custodial
interrogation, which have been made more explicit, are now contained in
Section 12 of the same Article III. 13
Right Against Self-Incrimination
The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution, is accorded to every person who gives
evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any
civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is NOT to "be
compelled to be a witness against himself"
The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning. It simply
secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refuse to
answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which
has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can
be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is
actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does
not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear
before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether.
The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take
the stand, be sworn and answer questions.
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does
not impose on the judge, or other officer presiding over a trial, hearing or
investigation, any affirmative obligation to advise a witness of his right
against self-incrimination. It is a right that a witness knows or should know,
in accordance with the well known axiom that every one is presumed to
know the law, that ignorance of the law excuses no one. Furthermore, in
the very nature of things, neither the judge nor the witness can be
expected to know in advance the character or effect of a question to be
put to the latter.
Rights in Custodial Interrogation
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a second right,
or better said, group of rights. These rights apply to persons "under
investigation for the commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects" under
investigation by police authorities; and this is what makes these rights
different from that embodied in the first sentence, that against selfincrimination which, as aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any person
testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or administrative.
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards
laid down for a person in police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being

Case Digests
regarded as the commencement of an adversary proceeding against the
suspect.
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain
silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that
he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford
an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him
throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such
opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently
waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless
and until such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution
at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used
against him.
Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in some
crime is within the scope of the constitutional protection. If not made
"under custodial interrogation," or "under investigation for the commission
of an offense," the statement is not protected.
Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case
As Regards Giving of Testimony
It is pertinent at this point to inquire whether the rights just discussed, i.e.,
(1) that against self-incrimination and (2) those during custodial
interrogation apply to persons under preliminary investigation or already
charged in court for a crime.
A person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently
charged with its commission in court, has the following rights in the matter
of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit:
1)
BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public
prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but after having been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on
being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and
to counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force,
violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free
will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected;
and
2)
AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT 37
a)
to refuse to be a witness;

Page 68 of 94
b)
not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;
c)
to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the
prosecution;
d)
WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which
tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is
then prosecuted.
It should by now be abundantly apparent that respondent Judge has
misapprehended the nature and import of the disparate rights set forth in
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has taken them as
applying to the same juridical situation, equating one with the other. In so
doing, he has grossly erred. To be sure, His Honor sought to substantiate
his thesis by arguments he took to be cogent and logical. The thesis was
however so far divorced from the actual and correct state of the
constitutional and legal principles involved as to make application of said
thesis to the case before him tantamount to totally unfounded, whimsical
or capricious exercise of power. His Orders were thus rendered with grave
abuse of discretion. They should be as they are hereby, annulled and set
aside.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not
in any sense under custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly
understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the
discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a
hand. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation
under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore
come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that
Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of
the administrative investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the
proceedings should be recorded, the record having thereafter been marked
during the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed against him as
Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit K) that
he sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the day before the
investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged
irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may
not be excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not
been accorded to Ramos.
His Honor adverts to what he perceives to be the "greater danger x x (of)
the violation of the right of any person against self-incrimination when the
investigation is conducted by the complaining parties, complaining
companies, or complaining employers because being interested parties,
unlike the police agencies who have no propriety or pecuniary interest to
protect, they may in their over-eagerness or zealousness bear heavily on

Case Digests
their hapless suspects, whether employees or not, to give statements
under an atmosphere of moral coercion, undue ascendancy and undue
influence." It suffices to draw attention to the specific and peremptory
requirement of the law that disciplinary sanctions may not be imposed on
any employee by his employer until and unless the employee has been
accorded due process, by which is meant that the latter must be informed
of the offenses ascribed to him and afforded adequate time and
opportunity to explain his side. The requirement entails the making of
statements, oral or written, by the employee under such administrative
investigation in his defense, with opportunity to solicit the assistance of
counsel, or his colleagues and friends. The employee may, of course,
refuse to submit any statement at the investigation, that is his privilege.
But if he should opt to do so, in his defense to the accusation against him,
it would be absurd to reject his statements, whether at the administrative
investigation, or at a subsequent criminal action brought against him,
because he had not been accorded, prior to his making and presenting
them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and to be informed
thereof, etc.) which, to repeat, are relevant only in custodial investigations.
Indeed, it is self-evident that the employee's statements, whether called
"position paper," "answer," etc., are submitted by him precisely so that
they may be admitted and duly considered by the investigating officer or
committee, in negation or mitigation of his liability.
CASE 40:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BENITO BRAVO,
accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 135562. November 22, 1999
GONZAGA-REYES, J:
Facts: On January 15, 1994 the decomposing body of nine year old girl
Juanita Antolin (Len-len) was found in a vacant lot along the road leading to
Patul, Rosario Santiago City. Her body was found between two concrete
fences half naked, shirtless and skirt pulled up, her panty stuffed in her
mouth. Her body was found about 700 meters from her house. The scalp
on the left side of her head was detached exposing a fracture on the left
temporal lobe of her skull. Vaginal examination showed fresh laceration at
2:30 o'clock and old lacerations at 5:00 and 7:00 o'clock and easily accepts
two fingers. The cause of death was cerebral hemorrhage.
On May 25, 1994 an Information for rape with homicide was filed against
herein accused-appellant. On September 26, 1994 the accused was
arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Evelyn San Mateo an eight year old second grader and neighbor and
cousin of the victim testified that she was with the deceased the night

Page 69 of 94
before she disappeared. She stated that while they stood on the roadside
watching "Home Along Da Riles" from an open window of a neighbor's
house the appellant approached them and asked Len-Len to come with him
to a birthday party and then he will buy her Coke and balut. Len-Len asked
her to go with them but she did not want to because she was watching
television. Len-Len went alone with the accused. The following morning
Len-Len's mother told Evelyn and her mother that Len-Len was missing. In
court, Evelyn positively identified the appellant as the person last seen
with Len-len before she was found dead.
The owner of the house where Len-len and Evelyn watched television,
Gracia Monahan, corroborated Evelyn's testimony that on the evening of
January 12, 1994 she saw the appellant talking to Len-len while the two
girls were watching television from her open window and that when she
looked again towards the end of the program to the direction where the
girls were situated, only Evelyn was left watching television. Monahan
testified that she is familiar with the appellant and the two children
because they are neighbors.
The Chief of the Intelligence Section of the Santiago Police Department,
Alexander Mico, testified that on January 15, 1994 his office received a
report that a dead body was found in a vacant lot. The body was later
identified as Juanita Antolin. Mico stated that he interviewed San Mateo
who pointed to the appellant as the man last seen with the deceased. Mico
found the appellant at his place of work at the Spring Garden Resort at
Sinsayon, Santiago City. Upon seeing Bravo, Mico informed him that he is a
suspect in the killing of a girl in Rosario, Santiago City and asked him to
come with him for questioning. The appellant agreed. Mico further narrated
in court that at the police station the appellant admitted he was with the
girl and he carried her on his shoulder but he was so drunk that night that
he does not remember what he did to her. On cross-examination Mico
admitted that he did not inform the appellant of his constitutional rights to
remain silent, to counsel and of his right against self-incrimination before
the appellant made the said admission because according to Mico he was
only informally interviewing the accused when he made the admission and
that custodial interrogation proper was conducted by the assigned
investigator.
The appellant Benito Bravo testified in court that on his way home after
work at around five o'clock in the afternoon of January 12, 1994 he was
invited to go on a drinking spree at Purok 1, Rosario, Santiago City where
he and four other men consumed five round bottles of gin until 7:30 that
evening. He then headed for home. Appellant admitted in court that he
passed by the house of Gracia Monahan but stated that he did not see the
two girls watching television along the road. At home, he found his mother
very sick and so he decided to stay home all night. He woke up the

Case Digests
following morning at around 4:30 a.m. and prepared to go to work. On
January 15, 1994 a policeman came to his place of work and apprehended
him without a warrant of arrest and at the police station he was forced to
admit commission of the crime of rape with homicide of Juanita Antolin.
The appellant denied the accusation and stated that the deceased was his
godchild and that he has known Fely Handoc, the mother of the child, for
three years prior to this proceedings.

Page 70 of 94
This case is before us on automatic review in view of the penalty imposed

by the trial court.
Held: YES. We resolve to acquit Benito Bravo. Section 12 of Article III of

the 1987 Constitution embodies the mandatory protection afforded a
person under investigation for the commission of a crime and the
correlative duty of the State and its agencies to enforce such mandate. The
mantle of protection under this constitutional provision covers the period
from the time a person is taken into custody for investigation of his
possible participation in the commission of a crime or from the time he is
singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime although not yet in
custody. The exclusionary rule sprang from a recognition that police
interrogatory procedures lay fertile grounds for coercion, physical and
psychological, of the suspect to admit responsibility for the crime under
investigation. It was not intended as a deterrent to the accused from
confessing guilt, if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires but to protect
the accused from admitting what he is coerced to admit although untrue.
Law enforcement agencies are required to effectively communicate the
rights of a person under investigation and to insure that it is fully
understood. Any measure short of this requirement is considered a denial
of such right. Courts are not allowed to distinguish between preliminary
questioning and custodial investigation proper when applying the
exclusionary rule. Any information or admission given by a person while in
custody which may appear harmless or innocuous at the time without the
competent assistance of an independent counsel should be struck down as
inadmissible. It has been held, however, that an admission made to news
reporters or to a confidant of the accused is not covered by the
exclusionary rule.
Both counsels for the accused-appellant and the appellee plead for the
acquittal of the accused. Both the accused-appellant and the appellee
invoke the constitutionally guarded presumption of innocence in favor of
the accused and the latter's right to remain silent and to counsel. The
testimony of the policeman that the accused admitted he was with the
victim on the evening of January 12, 1994 but the latter was too drunk to
remember what happened should have been held inadmissible by the trial
court in view of the policeman's own admission in court that although he
informed the accused that he is a suspect in the rape and killing of one
Juanita Antolin he did not inform the accused of his constitutional rights
before he asked him of his participation in the crime under investigation.
Both the appellant and the appellee are in agreement that the trial court
grievously erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
based on the sole circumstantial evidence that the victim was last seen by
her cousin in the company of the accused.
The accused was under arrest for the rape and killing of Juanita Antolin and
any statement allegedly made by him pertaining to his possible complicity
in the crime without prior notification of his constitutional rights is
inadmissible in evidence. The policeman's apparent attempt to circumvent
the rule by insisting that the admission was made during an "informal talk"
prior to custodial investigation proper is not tenable. The appellant was not
invited to the police station as part of a general inquiry for any possible
lead to the perpetrators of the crime under investigation. At the time the
alleged admission was made the appellant was in custody and had been
arrested as the prime suspect in the rape and killing of Juanita Antolin. The
exclusionary rule presumes that the alleged admission was coerced, the
very evil the rule stands to avoid. Supportive of such presumption is the
absence of a written extra-judicial confession to that effect and the
appellant's denial in court of the alleged oral admission. The alleged
admission should be struck down as inadmissible.
Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of accused's constitutional

rights.
CASE 41:
Juanito Bravo, the brother of the appellant testified that the appellant
stayed home on the night of January 12, 1994 to take care of their sick
mother who died a few days thereafter.
Ernesto Pastor, the foreman at the Spring Garden Resort where the
appellant was employed, testified that he has known the appellant for a
long time and that he knows him to be hardworking and of good moral
character. Pastor corroborated the appellant's testimony that police
investigator Mico came to the Spring Garden Resort and arrested Bravo
without a warrant.
On August 25, 1998 the trial court rendered judgment finding the accused
guilty of the crime charged and held that abuse of confidence and
treachery attended the commission of the crime.

Case Digests
CRISTOPHER GAMBOA, petitioner, vs. HON. ALFREDO CRUZ, JUDGE of the
Court
of
First
Instance
of
Manila,
Br.
XXIX,
respondent.
Facts:
On 19 July 1979, Gamboa was arrested for vagrancy, without a warrant of

arrest by Patrolman Arturo Palencia. Thereafter, petitioner was brought to
Precinct 2, Manila, where he was booked for vagrancy and then detained
therein together with several others. During investigation among the
lineup of five (5) detainees, including petitioner,on the following day,
complainant Erlinda B. Bernal pointed to petitioner and said, "that one is a
companion. On 23 July 1979, an information for robbery was filed against
the petitioner.On 22 August 1979, petitioner was arraigned. Thereafter,
hearings were held. On 2 April 1980, the prosecution formally offered its
evidence and then rested its case. On 14 July 1980, petitioner, by counsel,
instead of presenting his defense, manifested in open court that he was
filing a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer to Evidence. On 13 August 1980,
petitioner filed said Motion predicated on the ground that the conduct of
the line-up, without notice to, and in the absence of, his counsel violated
his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process.
Ruling of the respondent court: denied the Motion to Acquit: Hence, the
instant petition. Petitioner contends that the order denying his Motion To
Acquit, is null and void for being violative of his rights to counsel and to
due
process.
Issues:
1. W/N the petitioner's right to counsel has been violated?
2. W/N the petitioner' s right to due process has been violated
Held:
The court finds no merit in the contentions of petitioner. The instant
petition is one for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the respondent judge in issuing the
questioned order. It is basic, however, that for certiorari to lie, there must
be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very

Page 71 of 94
antithesis of judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil
law and common law traditions. To warrant the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, the alleged lack of jurisdiction, excess
thereof, or abuse of discretion must be so gross or grave, as when power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice or personal hostility, or the abuse must be so patent as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all, in contemplation of law.
This is not the situation in the case at bar.
The respondent court considered petitioner's arguments as well as the
prosecution's evidence against him, and required him to present his
evidence. The rights to counsel and to due process of law are indeed two
(2) of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, whether it be
the 1973 or 1987 Constitution. In a democratic society, like ours, every
person is entitled to the full enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an
investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to
elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the
respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated
must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting
false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person
undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an
offense.
Any person under investigation must, among other things, be assisted by

counsel. As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the police
line-up (at least, in this case) was not part of the custodial inquest, hence,
petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel.
On the right to due process, the Court finds that petitioner was not, in any
way, deprived of this substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly
represented by a member of the Bar. He was accorded all the opportunities
to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that
he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the
prosecution had rested its case. What due process abhors is the absolute
lack
of
opportunity
to
be
heard

Case Digests
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
CASE 42 :
G.R. No. 199877
August 13, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ARTURO LARA y
ORBISTA, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS:
On June 14, 2001, an Information 3 charging Lara with robbery with
homicide was filed with the RTC, stating that on or about May 31, 2001, in
Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused,
armed with a gun, conspiring and confederating together with one
unidentified person who is still at-large, and both of them mutually helping
and aiding one another, with intent to gain, and by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and divest from Joselito M. Bautista cash money
amounting to P230,000.00 more or less and belonging to San Sebastian
Allied Services, Inc. represented by Enrique Sumulong; that on the
occasion of said robbery, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot said
Joselito M. Bautista with the said gun, thereby inflicting upon the latter
mortal wounds which directly caused his death.
The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses: Enrique Sumulong
(Sumulong), SPO1 Bernard Cruz (SPO1 Cruz) and PO3 Efren Calix (PO3
Calix).
Sumulong testified that: (a) he was an accounting staff of San Sebastian
Allied Services, Inc. (San Sebastian); (b) on May 31, 2001 and at around
9:00 in the morning, he withdrew the amount of P230,000.00 from the
Metrobank-Mabini Branch, Pasig City to defray the salaries of the
employees of San Sebastian; (c) in going to the bank, he rode a pick-up
and was accompanied by Virgilio Manacob (Manacob), Jeff Atie (Atie) and
Joselito Bautista (Bautista); (d) he placed the amount withdrawn in a black
bag and immediately left the bank; (e) at around 10:30 in the morning,
while they were at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig
City, Lara suddenly appeared at the front passenger side of the pick-up
and pointed a gun at him stating, "Akin na ang pera, iyong bag, nasaan?";
(f) Bautista, who was seated at the back, shouted, "Wag mong ibigay"; (g)
heeding Bautistas advice, he threw the bag in Bautistas direction; (h)
after getting hold of the bag, Bautista alighted from the pick-up and ran; (i)
seein Bautista, Lara ran after him while firing his gun; (j) when he had the

Page 72 of 94
chance to get out of the pick-up, he ran towards Mercedes Plaza and called
up the office of San Sebastian to relay the incident; (k) when he went back
to where the pick-up was parked, he went to the rear portion of the vehicle
and saw blood on the ground; (l) he was informed by one bystander that
Bautista was shot and the bag was taken away from him; (m) when
barangay officials and the police arrived, he and his two (2) other
companions were brought to the police station for investigation; (n) on
June 7, 2001, while on his way to Barangay Maybunga, Pasig City, he saw
Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay San Miguel, Pasig City; (o)
he alerted the police and Lara was thereafter arrested; and (p) at the
police station, he, Atie and Manacob identified Lara as the one who shot
and robbed them of San Sebastians money.
SPO1 Cruz testified that: (a) he was assigned at the Follow-Up Unit of the
Pasig City Police Station; (b) at around 7:55 in the evening of June 7, 2001,
Sumulong went to the police station and informed him that he saw Lara
walking along Dr. Pilapil Street; (c) four (4) police officers and Sumulong
went to Dr. Pilapil Street where they saw Lara, who Sumulong identified; (d)
they then approached Lara and invited him for questioning; (e) at the
police station, Lara was placed in a line-up where he was positively
identified by Sumulong, Manacob and Atie; and (f) after being identified,
Lara was informed of his rights and subsequently detained.
PO3 Calix testified that: (a) he was a member of the Criminal Investigation
Unit of the Pasig City Police Station; (b) on May 31, 2001, he was informed
of a robbery that took place at the corner of Mercedes and Market
Avenues, Pasig City; (c) he, together with three (3) other police officers,
proceeded to the crime scene; (d) upon arriving thereat, one of the police
officers who were able to respond ahead of them, handed to him eleven
(11) pieces of empty shells and six (6) deformed slugs of a 9mm pistol; (e)
as part of his investigation, he interviewed Sumulong, Atie, Manacob at the
police station; and (f) before Bautista died, he was able to interview
Bautista at the hospital where the latter was brought after the incident.
In his defense, Lara testified that: (a) he was a plumber who resided at Dr.
Pilapil Street, San Miguel, Pasig City; (b) on May 31, 2001, he was at his
house, digging a sewer trench while his brother, Wilfredo, was constructing
a comfort room; (c) they were working from 8:00 in the morning until 3:00
in the afternoon; (d) on June 7, 2001 and at around 7:00 in the evening,
while he was at the house of one of his cousins, police officers arrived and
asked him if he was Arturo Lara; (e) after confirming that he was Arturo
Lara, the police officers asked him to go with them to the Barangay Hall; (f)
he voluntarily went with them and while inside the patrol car, one of the
policemen said, "You are lucky, we were able to caught you in your house,
if in another place we will kill you" (sic); (g) he was brought to the police

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Page 73 of 94
station and not the barangay hall as he was earlier told where he was
investigated for robbery with homicide; (h) when he told the police that he
was at home when the subject incident took place, the police challenged
him to produce witnesses; (i) when his witnesses arrived at the station, one
of the police officers told them to come back the following day; (j) while he
was at the police line-up holding a name plate, a police officer told
Sumulong and Atie, "Ituru nyo na yan at uuwi na tayo"; and (k) when his
witnesses arrived the following day, they were told that he will be
subjected to an inquest.
b.
To corroborate his testimony, Lara presented one of his neighbors,

Simplicia Delos Reyes. She testified that on May 31, 2001, while she was
manning her store, she saw Lara working on a sewer trench from 9:00 in
the morning to 5:00 in the afternoon. 9 Lara also presented his sister, Edjosa
Manalo, who testified that he was working on a sewer line the whole day of
May 31, 2001
On appeal, Lara pointed out several errors that supposedly attended his
conviction. First, that he was arrested without a warrant under
circumstances that do not justify a warrantless arrest rendered void all
proceedings including those that led to his conviction. Second, he was not
assisted by counsel when the police placed him in a line-up to be identified
by the witnesses for the prosecution in violation of Section 12, Article III of
the Constitution. The police line-up is part of custodial investigation and his
right to counsel had already attached. Third, the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the prosecution
failed to present a witness who actually saw him commit the alleged acts.
Sumulong merely presumed that he was the one who shot Bautista and
who took the bag of money from him. The physical description of Lara that
Sumulong gave to the police was different from the one he gave during the
trial, indicating that he did not have a fair glimpse of the perpetrator.
Moreover, this gives rise to the possibility that it was his unidentified
companion who shot Bautista and took possession of the money. Hence, it
cannot be reasonably claimed that his conviction was attended with moral
certainty. Fourth, the trial court erred in discounting the testimony of his
witnesses. Without any showing that they were impelled by improper
motives in testifying in his favor, their testimonies should have been given
the credence they deserve. While his two (2) witnesses were his sister and
neighbor, this does not by itself suggest the existence of bias or impair
their credibility.
ISSUES:
a.
Whether or not the identification made by Sumulong, Atie and

Manacob in the police line-up is inadmissible because Lara stood
therein without the assistance of counsel
c.
d.
Whether or not Laras supposedly illegal arrest may be raised for

the first time on appeal for the purpose of nullifying his conviction
Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to convict Lara
Whether or not Laras alibi can be given credence so as to
exonerate him from the crime charged
HELD:
a) No, it is not inadmissible. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused
may be acquired through compulsory process such as a warrant of arrest
or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the
police or to the court. Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters
his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. An accused submits to
the jurisdiction of the trial court upon entering a plea and participating
actively in the trial and this precludes him invoking any irregularities that
may have attended his arrest.
Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient ground to
reverse and set aside a conviction that was arrived upon a complaint duly
filed and a trial conducted without error.
b) No. Contrary to Laras claim, that he was not provided with counsel
when he was placed in a police line-up did not invalidate the proceedings
leading to his conviction. That he stood at the police line-up without the
assistance of counsel did not render Sumulongs identification of Lara
inadmissible. The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise
moment custodial investigation begins and being made to stand in a police
line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodial investigation.
The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the socalled Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under
custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police
who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to
elicit incriminating statements. Police line-up is not part of the custodial
investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot yet be invoked at this stage.
c.) Yes. It is apparent from the assailed decision of the CA that the finding
of guilt against Lara is based on circumstantial evidence. The CA allegedly
erred in this wise considering that only direct and not circumstantial
evidence can overcome the presumption of innocence.

Case Digests
In this case, Laras intent to gain is proven by Sumulongs positive
narration that it was Lara who pointed the gun at him and demanded that
the bag containing the money be turned over to him. That Lara resorted to
violence in order to actualize his intent to gain is proven by Sumulongs
testimony that he saw Lara fire the gun at the direction of Bautista, who
was running away from the pick-up in order to prevent Lara from taking
possession of the money.
Lara did not allege, much less, convincingly demonstrate that Sumulong
was impelled by improper or malicious motives to impute upon him,
however perjurious, such a serious charge. Thus, his testimony, which the
trial court found to be forthright and credible, is worthy of full faith and
credit and should not be disturbed. If an accused had nothing to do with
the crime, it is against the natural order of events and of human nature
and against the presumption of good faith that a prosecution witness
would falsely testify against the former.
d.) In view of Sumulongs positive identification of Lara, the CA was correct
in denying Laras alibi outright. It is well-settled that positive identification
prevails over alibi, which is inherently a weak defense. Such is the rule, for
as a defense, alibi is easy to concoct, and difficult to disapprove
In this case, the proximity of Laras house at the scene of the crime wholly
negates his alibi. Assuming as true Laras claim and that of his witnesses
that he was digging a sewer trench on the day of the incident, it is possible
that his witnesses may not have noticed him leaving and returning given
that the distance between his house and the place where the subject
incident took place can be negotiated, even by walking, in just a matter of
minutes. Simply put, Lara and his witnesses failed to prove that it is wellnigh impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
CASE 43:
PEOPLE vs. BANDULA
G.R. No. 89223 May 27, 1994
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS:

Page 74 of 94
After he and his wife were individually hog-tied and their house ransacked,
Juanito Garay, a lawyer, was found dead with three gunshot wounds. For
his death and the loss of their things on the occasion thereof, Aurelio
Bandula, Pantaleon Segudo, Teofilo Dananao and Victoriano Ejan were
haled to court for robbery with homicide. On 5 May 1989, after hearing
twelve prosecution and nine defense witnesses, the trial court rendered
judgment finding accused Aurelio Bandula guilty of the crime charged.
However, his three co-accused were acquitted "for insufficiency of
evidence." Thus the trial court disregarded the following defenses of the
four accused. Appellant Bandula argues that the extrajudicial confessions
he and accused Dionanao executed suffer from constitutional infirmities,
hence, inadmissible in evidence considering that they were extracted
under duress and intimidation, and were merely countersigned later by the
municipal attorney who, by the nature of his position, was not entirely an
independent counsel nor counsel of their choice. Consequently, without the
extrajudicial confessions, the prosecution is left without sufficient evidence
to convict him of the crime charged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there were violations of the constitutional rights of the
accused.
HELD:
YES. From the records, it can be gleaned that when accused-appellant
Bandula and accused Dionanao were investigated immediately after their
arrest, they had no counsel present. If at all, counsel came in only a day
after the custodial investigation with respect to accused Dionanao, and two
weeks later with respect to appellant Bandula. And, counsel who
supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Ruben Zerna, the Municipal
Attorney of Tanjay. On top of this, there are tell tale signs that violence was
used against the accused. Certainly, these are blatant violations of the
Constitution. In several cases promulgated even before the effectivity of
the 1987 Constitution, we laid down the procedure for peace officers to
follow when making an arrest and conducting a custodial investigation. At
the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant

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Page 75 of 94
of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain

silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be
used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate
with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient
means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be
the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is
accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in
the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on
his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee
himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but
the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel.
Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence. We further said in Gamboa v. Judge Cruz that
"[t]he right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e.,
when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information
and/or confessions or admissions from respondent/accused. At such point
or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to
avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or
confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for the
commission of the offense." Hence, if there is no counsel at the start of the
custodial investigation, any statement elicited from the accused is
inadmissible in evidence against him. Custodial investigation is the stage
where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has began to focus on a particular suspect who had
been taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of
interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is when
questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.
Dionanao and Bandula when they
Indeed, the instant case is analogous to the more recent case of People v.
De Jesus where we said that admissions obtained during custodial
interrogations without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to
writing and signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the
Constitution. The Constitution also requires that counsel be independent.
Obviously, he cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor,
counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly
adverse to the accused. Granting that Atty. Zerna assisted accused
CASE 44:
executed their respective extrajudicial confessions, still their confessions

are inadmissible in evidence considering that Atty. Zerna does not qualify
as an independent counsel. As a legal officer of the municipality, he
provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in
carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people, including the
maintenance of peace and order. It is thus seriously doubted whether he
can effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running into
conflict of interests. He is no better than a fiscal or prosecutor who cannot
represent the accused during custodial investigations.
What is most upsetting however is the allegation of the four (4) accused
that they were mauled into owning the crime. Based on the records, we are
strongly drawn to the belief that violence indeed attended the extraction of
statements from the accused. For, why did the investigators not inform the
accused of their right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel, preferably of their own choice, even before
attempting to elicit statements that would incriminate them? Why did the
investigators not advise the accused that if they could not afford the
services of counsel they could be provided with counsel free of charge
before conducting any investigation? Why did the investigators
continuously disregard the repeated requests of the accused for medical
assistance? How did accused Sedigo get his "black eye" which even Pat.
Baldejera admitted? How and why did accused-appellant Bandula suffer a
fractured rib? We cannot close our eyes to these unanswered questions.
This Court is greatly disturbed with the way the accused were treated or
maltreated. In fine, we cannot accept the extrajudicial confessions of the
accused and use the same against them or any of them. Where there is
doubt as to their voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto.
ROGELIO ABERCA, et al. vs. FABIAN VER, et al. GR No. L-69866, April 15,
1988
FACTS: Sometime in the early 1980s, various Intelligence units of the AFP
known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) were ordered by respondents then
Maj. Gen. Fabian Ver to conduct preemptive strikes against known
communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports

Case Digests
about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila. In compliance
thereof, the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases
defectively issued judicial search warrants. During these raids, certain
members of the raiding TFM confiscated a number of purely personal items
belonging to the 20 petitioners. Petitioners were arrested without proper
arrest warrants issued by the courts. For some period after their arrest,
they were arrested without denied visits of relatives and lawyers;
interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel, through
threats, torture and other forms of violence in order to obtain incriminatory
information or confessions and in order to punish them.
Plaintiffs then filed an action for damages before the RTC of Quezon City
against respondents-officers of the AFP headed by Ver. Respondents, in
their motion to dismiss, claimed that (1) the wrti of habeas corpus was
suspended, thus giving credence to petitioners detention; (2) respondents
were immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official
duties, and that (3) the complaint did not state a cause of action against
respondents.
On November 8, 1983, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss the case. A
motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint, and a
supplemental motion for reconsideration were filed by petitioners. On May
11, 1984, the trial court, without acting on the motion to set aside the
Order of Nov. 8, 1983, declared the finality of said Order against
petitioners. After their motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC,
petitioners then filed the instant petition for certiorari, on March 15, 1985,
seeking to annul and set aside the respondent courts resolutions and
order.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches
conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties
guaranteed under the Constitution; (2) Whether or not respondents may
invoke state immunity from suit for acts done in the performance of official
duties and functions;
(3) Whether or not a superior officer, under the notion of respondeat
superior, be answerable for damages jointly and severally with his
subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have
been violated.

Page 76 of 94
HELD: (1) The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
(PWHC) does not destroy petitioners right and cause of action for damages
for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional
rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or
detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek
release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy
means of obtaining his liberty.
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for
damages are explicitly recognized in PD 1755 which amended Art. 1146 of
the Civil Code by adding the following text: However, when the action (for
injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for quasi-delict) arises from or out of
any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of
powers or authority arising from martial law including the arrest, detention
and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one year.
Even assuming that the suspension of the PWHC suspends petitioners
right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and
cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered
because of respondents confiscation of their private belongings, the
violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture
and other cruel and inhuman treatment.
The question became moot and academic since the suspension of the
PWHC had been lifted with the issuance of then Pres. Corazon Aquino of
Proclamation No. 2 on March 25, 1986.
(2) It may be that the respondents, as members of the AFP, were merely
responding to their duties, as they claim, to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion in accordance with
Proclamation No. 2054 of Pres. Marcos, despite the lifting of Martial Law on
January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch preemptive strikes against alleged CT underground houses. But this cannot be
construed as a blanket license or roving commission untrammeled by any
constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and
liberties of the individual citizen enshrined and protected by the
Constitution.
Article 32 of the Civil Code, which renders any public officer or employees,
or any private individual, liable in damages for violating the constitutional

Case Digests
rights and liberties of another, does not exempt the respondents from
responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said
article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the
Revised Penal Code or other penal statute.
This is not say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their
assigned task or carrying out their mission with vigor, to protect the
Philippines from its enemies, whether of the left or of the right, or from
within or without, seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic institutions
and imperil their very existence. What is meant is that in carrying out their
task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed;
otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start to unravel. In the battle of
competing ideologies, the struggle of mind is just as vital as the struggle of
arms. The linchpin in that psychological struggle is faith in the rule of law.
Once that faith is lost or compromised, the struggle may well be
abandoned.
(3) The doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable in this case. It
has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to
master and servant relationships. No such relationship exists superiors of
the military and their subordinates. However, the decisive factor in this
case is the language of Art. 32, Civil Code; the law speaks of an officer or
employee or person directly or indirectly responsible for the violation
of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor
alone who must answer for damages under Art. 32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the
aggrieved party. Art. 32 makes the persons who are directly as well as
indirectly responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors
CASE 45:
Javier v. COMELEC
FACTS:
Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to
be members of the Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier
complained of massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying,
fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat
and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men
of Pacificador. COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the

Page 77 of 94
same complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed
the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass
but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further
orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board to
immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the
outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC,
the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as
premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of
appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the
irregularities of the election must first be resolved before proclaiming a
winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself
as he was a former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was
made by only the 2nd Division but the Constitute requires that it be
proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency, Javier
was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition
close it being moot and academic by virtue of Javiers death.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of
Pacificador.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gens
tenor. The SC has repeatedly and consistently demanded the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge as the indispensable imperative of due
process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not
only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are
entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are
violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must
trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe
in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without
such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the
justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance
with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls
for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches
a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already
made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have
undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial)
proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed

Case Digests
to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared
script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his
conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed,
on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
GACAD v. CLAPIS
FACTS:
Criselda C. Gacad (Gacad) filed a Verified Complaint 1 dated 9 June 2010
against Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr. (Judge Clapis), Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, for
Grave Misconduct and Corrupt Practices, Grave Abuse of Discretion, Gross
Ignorance of the Law, and violations of Canon 1 (Rule 1.01, 1.02), Canon 2
(Rule 2.01), and Canon 3 (Rule 3.05) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. They
met provincial prosecutor GracianoArafol, Jr. (Arafol), who advised them
not to hire a private counsel.
The following day, Arafol informed Gacad that he filed a complaint for
murder against the suspect but the Provincial Governor kept on pressuring
him about her brothers case. Arafol suggested that they see Judge Clapis
so he would deny the Motion for Reinvestigation to be filed by the accused
Rodolfo Comania (accused). Arafol, further, told Gacad to prepare an
amount of P50,000 for Judge Clapis.
On the second week of January 2010, Arafol showed to Gacad a copy of
Judge Clapis Order dated 4 January 2010 denying the Motion for
Reinvestigation filed by the accused. Subsequently, Arafol told Gacad that
Judge Clapis was borrowing P50,000 from her for his mothers
hospitalization. Arafol handed to Gacad a postdated BPI check allegedly
issued by Judge Clapis as assurance of payment. However, Gacad failed to
produce the P50,000.
Gacad alleged that, from then on, Arafol and Judge Clapis began to "play
different hideous schemes" to prejudice their case. 2 Judge Clapis set
hearings on 4 February 2010, 8 February 2010, and 1 March 2010.
However, the Notices for Hearings were mailed only on 1 March 2010 and
were received by Gacad only on 3 March 2010.
Thereafter, Judge Clapis set a hearing for a petition for bail on 29 March

Page 78 of 94
2010, which Gacad came to know only inadvertently since she received no
notice for the hearing. During the 29 March 2010 hearing, Public
Prosecutor AlonaLabtic moved that the petition for bail be put in writing.
However, the counsel for the accused manifested that he was not prepared
for a written petition because it was only right before the hearing that the
accused informed him of Arafols agreement to bail. Thus, Judge Clapis
calendared the case for speedy trial. He set a continuous hearing for the
petition for bail on 12 April 2010, 13 April 2010, and 14 April 2010.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT CLAPIS IS LIABLE.
HELD:
We, however, find Judge Clapis liable for gross misconduct. In Kaw v.
Osorio,8 the Court held that while the respondent judge, in that case, may
not be held liable for extortion and corruption as it was not substantially
proven, he should be made accountable for gross misconduct. It is an
ironclad principle that a judge must not only be impartial; he must also
appear to be impartial at all times. 16 Being in constant scrutiny by the
public, his language, both written and spoken, must be guarded and
measured lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. 17 Needless to state,
any gross misconduct seriously undermines the faith and confidence of the
people in the judiciary.The SC dismissed Judge CLapis from service.
CASE 46:
Narciso vs. Cruz
Facts:
After conducting a preliminary investigation on the death of Corazon Sta.
Romana-Narciso, wife of JoselitoNarciso, Asst. City Prosecutor Myrna
Dimaranan Vidal of Quezon City recommended and thereafter filed, the

Case Digests
information for parricide against JoselitoNarciso. He was thereby detained. He
then filed a motion for reinvestigation and to lift warrant of arrest.Also,On August 3, 1992,
accused filed an Urgent Ex-Parte (Ex AbundantiCautela) to Allow
Accused JoselitoNarciso to Post Bail. The Public Prosecutor registered no
objection and said motion was granted on the same day, allowing accused
to post bail at P150,000.00.Flor Cruz, sister of the deceased wife, filed a Motion to lift
order allowing accused to post bail.

Page 79 of 94
CASE 47.
Govt of Hong Kong vs. Olalia, G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007
Issue
This case discusses whether the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of
Rights extends to a prospective extradite in an extradition 1 proceeding.
Is the grant of bail valid?
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British
Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of
Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997.
Ruling:
No. Cruz was charged with parricide which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. When the
penalty prescribed by law is reclusion perpetua, a hearing must be conducted by the trial judge
before the bail can be granted. Without such hearing, the order granting bail is void for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion. In the case, there was no basis for the granting of
the bail. No hearing was conducted on the application for bail summary or otherwise. The CA
even found that only 10 minutes had elapsed between the filing of the Motion and the granting
of bail. Such lapse of time could not be deemed sufficient for the trial court to receive and
evaluate any evidence. Even if the prosecutor did not object to the motion, the judge still had no
basis to grant the bail. The judge had no reason to presume that that prosecutor knew what he
was doing. It is the judges duty first to determine if evidence of guilt is strong before bail is
granted.
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to conduct the
required hearings in bail applications, in which the accused stands charged
with a capital offense. The absence of objection from the prosecution is
never a basis for the grant of bail in such cases, for the judge has no right
to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of
familiarity with the case. "Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the
prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether
the guilt of the accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the
judge before whom the petition for provisional liberty will be decided. The
mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed upon the
prosecutor.
The Petitioner is the Government of Hong Kong Special

Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine Department of
Justice
The Respondents are Judge Felix Olalia and Juan Antonio Muoz
Facts: Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong
Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage
as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery
Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the
offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong
Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a
jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition
Law) defines "extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with
the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the
requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him
under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government."

Case Digests
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department
of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent.
The RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private
respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained
him.
Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was opposed by
petitioner. After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying
the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail
in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk."
Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing the case, it was
then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his
application for bail and this was granted by respondent judge.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was
denied by respondent judge. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no
provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
Held: No. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the
premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary
detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is
based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from
justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears
the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should
be granted bail.
Ratio:
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations,
committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value
the worth and dignity of every person. Clearly, the right of a prospective
extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the
light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines
concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human
rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human
liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of
every individual is not impaired.

Page 80 of 94
Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the
potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is
merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the
escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his
return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or
punishment. It does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its
treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential
extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where
these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by
international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should
not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided
that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice Puno, proposed
that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing
evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition
cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond
reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The
potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence"
that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and
processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented
evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case
should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing
evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the
trial court to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on
the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should
order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and
thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.
CASE 48:
Briccio Ricky A. Pollo v. Karina Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881,
October 18, 2011
DECISION
(En Banc)
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Case Digests
FACTS: This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a
government employee who was then charged administratively and was
eventually dismissed from the service. The employees personal files
stored in the computer were used by the government employer as
evidence of his misconduct.
On January 3, 2007, an anonymous letter-complaint was received
by the respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC) Chairperson alleging
that the chief of the Mamamayan muna hindi mamaya na division of Civil
Service Commission Regional Office No. IV (CSC-ROIV) has been lawyering
for public officials with pending cases in the CSC. Chairperson David
immediately formed a team with background in information technology
and issued a memorandum directing them to back up all the files in the
computers found in the [CSC-ROIV] Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal
divisions.
The team proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV office and backed
up all files in the hard disk of computers at the Public Assistance and
Liaison Division (PALD) and the Legal Services Division. This was witnessed
by several employees. At around 10:00 p.m. of the same day, the
investigating team finished their task. The next day, all the computers in
the PALD were sealed and secured. The diskettes containing the back-up
files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers were then
turned over to Chairperson David. It was found that most of the files in the
17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to and
being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were
draft pleadings or letters in connection with administrative cases in the
CSC and other tribunals. Chairperson David thus issued a Show-Cause
Order requiring the petitioner to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit
within five days from notice.
Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred
to in the anonymous letter-complaint. He asserted that he had protested
the unlawful taking of his computer done while he was on leave, citing the
letter dated January 8, 2007 in which he informed Director Castillo of CSCROIV that the files in his computer were his personal files and those of his
sister, relatives, friends and some associates and that he is not authorizing
their sealing, copying, duplicating and printing as these would violate his
constitutional right to privacy and protection against self-incrimination and
warrantless search and seizure. He pointed out that though government
property, the temporary use and ownership of the computer issued under a
Memorandum of Receipt is ceded to the employee who may exercise all
attributes of ownership, including its use for personal purposes. In view of
the illegal search, the files/documents copied from his computer without

Page 81 of 94
his consent [are] thus inadmissible as evidence, being fruits of a
poisonous tree.
The CSC found prima facie case against the petitioner and charged
him withDishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of
Conduct
and
Ethical
Standards
for
Public
Officials
and
Employees). Petitioner then filed an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration,
to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis
having proceeded from an illegal search, which is beyond the authority of
the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court. The CSC
denied this omnibus motion.
On March 14, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent Petition before the
Court of Appeals (CA) assailing both the January 11, 2007 Show-Cause
Order and February 26, 2007 Resolution as having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or total absence of jurisdiction.
On July
24,
2007,
the
CSC
issued
a
Resolution
finding
petitioner GUILTY of Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of
Republic Act 6713. He is meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE
SERVICE with all its accessory penalties. This Resolution was also brought
to the CA by herein petitioner.
By a Decision dated October 11, 2007, the CA dismissed the
petitioners petition for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion
committed by respondents CSC officials. His motion for reconsideration
having been denied by the CA, petitioner brought this appeal before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not article III section 2 of the 1987 constitution was violated
HELD: The supreme court held in the negative stating that Squarely raised by
the petitioner is the legality of the
search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files
without his knowledge and consent, alleged
as a transgression on his constitutional right to privacy. The right to privacy has
been accorded recognition in this
jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon

Case Digests
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but
only of unreasonable searches and
seizures
That the Fourth Amendment [of the U.S. Constitution] equally
applies to a government workplace was addressed in the 1987 case
of OConnor v. Ortega.In OConnor the [U.S. Supreme] Court recognized
that special needs authorize warrantless searches involving public
employees for work-related reasons. The [U.S. Supreme] Court thus laid
down a balancing test under which government interests are weighed
against the employees reasonable expectation of privacy. This
reasonableness test implicates neither probable cause nor the warrant
requirement, which are related to law enforcement.
OConnor was applied in subsequent cases raising issues on
employees privacy rights in the workplace. One of these cases involved a
government employers search of an office computer, United States v.
Mark L. Simons where the defendant Simons, an employee of a division of
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was convicted of receiving and
possessing materials containing child pornography. In this case, the US
Supreme
Court
held
that
the
search
remains
valid
under
the OConnor exception to the warrant requirement because evidence of
the crime was discovered in the course of an otherwise proper
administrative inspection. Simons violation of the agencys Internet policy
happened also to be a violation of criminal law; this does not mean that
said employer lost the capacity and interests of an employer. The
warrantless entry into Simons office was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment standard announced in OConnor because at the inception of
the search, the employer had reasonable grounds for suspecting that the
hard drive would yield evidence of misconduct, as the employer was
already aware that Simons had misused his Internet access to download
over a thousand pornographic images. The retrieval of the hard drive was
reasonably related to the objective of the search, and the search was not
excessively intrusive. Thus, while Simons had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his office, he did not have such legitimate expectation of privacy
with regard to the files in his computer.]

Page 82 of 94
Applying
the
analysis
and
principles
announced
in OConnor and Simons to the case at bar, we now address the
following questions: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his office and computer files?; and (2)
Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair, [which involved] the
copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioners computer,
reasonable in its inception and scope?
(1) NO, the petitioner had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his office and computer files.
Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued computer
which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a
separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his
office was always locked and not open to other employees or
visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any
means to prevent other employees from accessing his computer files. On
the contrary, he submits that being in the public assistance office of the
CSC-ROIV, he normally would have visitors in his office like friends,
associates and even unknown people, whom he even allowed to use his
computer which to him seemed a trivial request. He described his office as
full of people, his friends, unknown people and that in the past 22 years
he had been discharging his functions at the PALD, he is personally
assisting incoming clients, receiving documents, drafting cases on appeals,
in charge of accomplishment report, Mamamayan Muna Program, Public
Sector Unionism, Correction of name, accreditation of service, and hardly
had any time for himself alone, that in fact he stays in the office as a
paying customer. Under this scenario, it can hardly be deduced that
petitioner had such expectation of privacy that society would recognize as
reasonable.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation or
proof of the aforementioned factual circumstances, that petitioner had at
least a subjective expectation of privacy in his computer as he claims, such
is negated by the presence of policy regulating the use of office computers
[CSC Office Memorandum No. 10, S. 2002 Computer Use Policy (CUP)], as
in Simons. The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its
employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy
in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and
that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both
automated or human means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections
may be done to ensure that the computer resources were used only for
such legitimate business purposes.

Case Digests
(2) YES, the search authorized by the respondent CSC Chair,
which involved the copying of the contents of the hard drive on
petitioners computer, was reasonable in its inception and scope.
The search of petitioners computer files was conducted in
connection with investigation of work-related misconduct prompted by an
anonymous letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson David regarding
anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where the head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi
Mamaya Na division is supposedly lawyering for individuals with pending
cases in the CSC. A search by a government employer of an employees
office is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of workrelated misconduct.
Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioners
computer was justified at its inception and scope. We quote with approval
the CSCs discussion on the reasonableness of its actions, consistent as it
were with the guidelines established by OConnor:
Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative
policy, there is no doubt in the mind of the Commission that the search of
Pollos computer has successfully passed the test of reasonableness for
warrantless searches in the workplace as enunciated in the abovediscussed American authorities. It bears emphasis that the Commission
pursued the search in its capacity as a government employer and that it
was undertaken in connection with an investigation involving a workrelated misconduct, one of the circumstances exempted from the warrant
requirement. At the inception of the search, a complaint was received
recounting that a certain division chief in the CSCRO No. IV was
lawyering for parties having pending cases with the said regional office
or in the Commission. The nature of the imputation was serious, as it was
grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be furtively
engaged in the practice of lawyering for parties with pending cases
before the Commission would be a highly repugnant scenario, then such a
case would have shattering repercussions. It would undeniably cast clouds
of doubt upon the institutional integrity of the Commission as a quasijudicial agency, and in the process, render it less effective in fulfilling its
mandate as an impartial and objective dispenser of administrative
justice. It is settled that a court or an administrative tribunal must not only
be actually impartial but must be seen to be so, otherwise the general
public would not have any trust and confidence in it.
Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the
Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or limit any possible adverse
consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date that the complaint was
received, a search was forthwith conducted involving the computer

Page 83 of 94
resources in the concerned regional office. That it was the computers that
were subjected to the search was justified since these furnished the easiest
means for an employee to encode and store documents. Indeed, the
computers would be a likely starting point in ferreting out incriminating
evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of computer files, that is,
they could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic
and immediate action. Pointedly, to impose the need to comply with the
probable cause requirement would invariably defeat the purpose of the
wok-related investigation.
Thus, petitioners claim of violation of his constitutional right to
privacy must necessarily fail. His other argument invoking the privacy of
communication and correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III of
the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition
accorded to certain legitimate intrusions into the privacy of employees in
the government workplace under the aforecited authorities. We likewise
find no merit in his contention that OConnor and Simons are not relevant
because the present case does not involve a criminal offense like child
pornography. As already mentioned, the search of petitioners computer
was justified there being reasonable ground for suspecting that the files
stored therein would yield incriminating evidence relevant to the
investigation being conducted by CSC as government employer of such
misconduct subject of the anonymous complaint. This situation clearly
falls under the exception to the warrantless requirement in administrative
searches defined in OConnor.
ETO UNG DISCUSSION SA ORIGINAL, IF YOU HAVE TIME OK DIN

BASAHIN TO.
But to fully understand this concept and application for the purpose of
resolving the issue at hand, it is essential that we examine the doctrine in
the light of pronouncements in another jurisdiction. As the Court declared
in People v. Marti[29]:
Our present constitutional provision on the
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its
origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows:
The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated, and no

Case Digests
warrants
shall
issue
but
upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized. (Sec.
1[3], Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. As such,
the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United
States Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts
which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.[30]
In the 1967 case of Katz v. United States,[31] the US Supreme Court

held that the act of FBI agents in electronically recording a conversation
made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth violated his
right to privacy and constituted a search and seizure. Because the
petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in using the enclosed
booth to make a personal telephone call, the protection of the Fourth
Amendment extends to such area. In the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Harlan, it was further noted that the existence of privacy right under prior
decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable
(objective).[32]
In Mancusi
v.
DeForte[33] which
addressed
the
reasonable
expectations of private employees in the workplace, the US Supreme Court
held that a union employee had Fourth Amendment rights with regard to
an office at union headquarters that he shared with other union officials,
even as the latter or their guests could enter the office. The Court thus
recognized that employees may have a reasonable expectation of privacy
against intrusions by police.
That the Fourth Amendment equally applies to a government
workplace was addressed in the 1987 case of OConnor v. Ortega[34] where
a physician, Dr. Magno Ortega, who was employed by a state hospital,

Page 84 of 94
claimed a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights when hospital officials
investigating charges of mismanagement of the psychiatric residency
program, sexual harassment of female hospital employees and other
irregularities involving his private patients under the state medical aid
program, searched his office and seized personal items from his desk and
filing cabinets. In that case, the Court categorically declared that
[i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they
work for the government instead of a private employer. [35] A plurality of
four Justices concurred that the correct analysis has two steps: first,
because some government offices may be so open to fellow employees or
the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable, a court must
consider [t]he operational realities of the workplace in order to
determine whether an employees Fourth Amendment rights are
implicated; and next, where an employee has a legitimate privacy
expectation, an employers intrusion on that expectation for
noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of
work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of
reasonableness under all the circumstances. [36]
On the matter of government employees reasonable expectations of
privacy in their workplace, OConnor teaches:
x x x Public employees expectations of privacy in
their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar
expectations of employees in the private sector, may be
reduced by virtue of actual office practices and procedures,
or by legitimate regulation. x x x The employees
expectation of privacy must be assessed in the context of
the employment relation. An office is seldom a private
enclave free from entry by supervisors, other employees,
and business and personal invitees. Instead, in many
cases offices are continually entered by fellow employees
and other visitors during the workday for conferences,
consultations, and other work-related visits. Simply put, it
is the nature of government offices that others such as
fellow employees, supervisors, consensual visitors, and the
general public may have frequent access to an
individuals office. We agree with JUSTICE SCALIA that
[c]onstitutional protection against unreasonable searches
by the government does not disappear merely because the
government has the right to make reasonable intrusions in

Case Digests
its capacity as employer, x x x but some government
offices may be so open to fellow employees or the
public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable. x
x x Given the great variety of work environments in
the public sector, the question of whether an
employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy
must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.
[37]
(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
On the basis of the established rule in previous cases, the US

Supreme Court declared that Dr. Ortegas Fourth Amendment rights are
implicated only if the conduct of the hospital officials infringed an
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider as
reasonable. Given the undisputed evidence that respondent Dr. Ortega
did not share his desk or file cabinets with any other employees, kept
personal correspondence and other private items in his own office while
those work-related files (on physicians in residency training) were stored
outside his office, and there being no evidence that the hospital had
established any reasonable regulation or policy discouraging employees
from storing personal papers and effects in their desks or file cabinets
(although the absence of such a policy does not create any expectation of
privacy where it would not otherwise exist), the Court concluded that Dr.
Ortega has a reasonable expectation of privacy at least in his desk and file
cabinets.[38]
Proceeding to the next inquiry as to whether the search conducted
by hospital officials was reasonable, the OConnor plurality decision
discussed the following principles:
Having determined that Dr. Ortega had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, the Court of
Appeals simply concluded without discussion that the
searchwas not a reasonable search under the fourth
amendment. x x x [t]o hold that the Fourth Amendment
applies to searches conducted by [public employers] is
only to begin the inquiry into the standards governing such
searches[W]hat is reasonable depends on the context
within which a search takes place. x x x Thus, we must
determine the appropriate standard of reasonableness
applicable to the search. A determination of the standard

Page 85 of 94
of reasonableness applicable to a particular class of
searches requires balanc[ing] the nature and quality of
the intrusion on the individuals Fourth Amendment
interests against the importance of the governmental
interests alleged to justify the intrusion. x x x In the
case of searches conducted by a public employer, we
must balance the invasion of the employees
legitimate expectations of privacy against the
governments need for supervision, control, and the
efficient operation of the workplace.
xxxx
In our view, requiring an employer to obtain a
warrant whenever the employer wished to enter an
employees office, desk, or file cabinets for a work-related
purpose would seriously disrupt the routine conduct of
business and would be unduly burdensome. Imposing
unwieldy warrant procedures in such cases upon
supervisors, who would otherwise have no reason to be
familiar with such procedures, is simply unreasonable. In
contrast to other circumstances in which we have required
warrants, supervisors in offices such as at the Hospital are
hardly in the business of investigating the violation of
criminal laws. Rather, work-related searches are merely
incident to the primary business of the agency. Under
these circumstances, the imposition of a warrant
requirement would conflict with the common-sense
realization that government offices could not function if
every employment decision became a constitutional
matter. x x x
xxxx
The governmental interest justifying work-related
intrusions by public employers is the efficient and proper
operation of the workplace. Government agencies provide
myriad services to the public, and the work of these
agencies would suffer if employers were required to have
probable cause before they entered an employees desk for
the purpose of finding a file or piece of office
correspondence. Indeed, it is difficult to give the concept of
probable cause, rooted as it is in the criminal investigatory
context, much meaning when the purpose of a search is to
retrieve a file for work-related reasons. Similarly, the
concept of probable cause has little meaning for a routine

Case Digests
inventory conducted by public employers for the purpose
of securing state property. x x x To ensure the efficient and
proper operation of the agency, therefore, public
employers must be given wide latitude to enter employee
offices for work-related, noninvestigatory reasons.
We come to a similar conclusion for searches
conducted pursuant to an investigation of work-related
employee misconduct. Even when employers conduct an
investigation, they have an interest substantially different
from the normal need for law enforcement. x x x Public
employers have an interest in ensuring that their agencies
operate in an effective and efficient manner, and the work
of these agencies inevitably suffers from the inefficiency,
incompetence, mismanagement, or other work-related
misfeasance of its employees. Indeed, in many cases,
public employees are entrusted with tremendous
responsibility, and the consequences of their misconduct or
incompetence to both the agency and the public interest
can be severe. In contrast to law enforcement officials,
therefore, public employers are not enforcers of the
criminal law; instead, public employers have a direct and
overriding interest in ensuring that the work of the agency
is conducted in a proper and efficient manner. In our view,
therefore,a probable cause requirement for searches
of the type at issue here would impose intolerable
burdens
on public employers. The delay in
correcting the employee misconduct caused by the
need for probable cause rather than reasonable
suspicion will be translated into tangible and often
irreparable damage to the agencys work, and
ultimately to the public interest. x x x
xxxx
In sum, we conclude that the special needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement make
theprobable-cause requirement impracticable, x x
x for legitimate, work-related noninvestigatory
intrusions as well as investigations of work-related
misconduct. A standard of reasonableness will neither
unduly burden the efforts of government employers to
ensure the efficient and proper operation of the workplace,
nor authorize arbitrary intrusions upon the privacy of public
employees. We hold, therefore, that public employer
intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy

Page 86 of 94
interests
of
government
employees
for
noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as
for investigations
of
work-related
misconduct, should be judged by the standard of
reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under
this reasonableness standard, both the inception and
the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable:
Determining the reasonableness of any
search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one
must consider whether theaction was
justified at its inception, x x x ; second,
one must determine whether the search as
actually conducted was reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place,
xxx
Ordinarily, a search of an employees office by
a supervisor will be justified at its inception when
there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that
the search will turn up evidence that the employee
is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the
search is necessary for a noninvestigatory workrelated purpose such as to retrieve a needed file. x x
x The search will be permissible in its scope when
the measures adopted are reasonably related to
the objectives of the search and not excessively
intrusive
in
light
of
the
nature
of
the
[misconduct]. x x x[39] (Citations omitted; emphasis
supplied.)
Since the District Court granted summary judgment without a

hearing on the factual dispute as to the character of the search and neither
was there any finding made as to the scope of the search that was
undertaken, the case was remanded to said court for the determination of
the justification for the search and seizure, and evaluation of the
reasonableness of both the inception of the search and its scope.
In OConnor the Court recognized that special needs authorize
warrantless searches involving public employees for work-related reasons.
The Court thus laid down a balancing test under which government

Case Digests
interests are weighed against the employees reasonable expectation of
privacy. This reasonableness test implicates neither probable cause nor
the warrant requirement, which are related to law enforcement. [40]
OConnor was applied in subsequent cases raising issues on
employees privacy rights in the workplace. One of these cases involved a
government employers search of an office computer, United States v.
Mark L. Simons[41] where the defendant Simons, an employee of a division
of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was convicted of receiving and
possessing materials containing child pornography. Simons was provided
with an office which he did not share with anyone, and a computer with
Internet access. The agency had instituted a policy on computer use
stating that employees were to use the Internet for official government
business only and that accessing unlawful material was specifically
prohibited. The policy also stated that users shall understand that the
agency will periodically audit, inspect, and/or monitor the users Internet
access as deemed appropriate. CIA agents instructed its contractor for the
management of the agencys computer network, upon initial discovery of
prohibited internet activity originating from Simons computer, to conduct
a remote monitoring and examination of Simons computer. After
confirming that Simons had indeed downloaded pictures that were
pornographic in nature, all the files on the hard drive of Simons computer
were copied from a remote work station. Days later, the contractors
representative finally entered Simons office, removed the original hard
drive on Simons computer, replaced it with a copy, and gave the original
to the agency security officer. Thereafter, the agency secured warrants
and searched Simons office in the evening when Simons was not
around. The search team copied the contents of Simons computer;
computer diskettes found in Simons desk drawer; computer files stored on
the zip drive or on zip drive diskettes; videotapes; and various documents,
including personal correspondence. At his trial, Simons moved to suppress
these evidence, arguing that the searches of his office and computer
violated his Fourth Amendment rights. After a hearing, the district court
denied the motion and Simons was found guilty as charged.
Simons appealed his convictions. The US Supreme Court ruled that
the searches of Simons computer and office did not violate his Fourth

Page 87 of 94
Amendment rights and the first search warrant was valid. It held that the
search remains valid under the OConnor exception to the warrant
requirement because evidence of the crime was discovered in the course
of an otherwise proper administrative inspection. Simons violation of the
agencys Internet policy happened also to be a violation of criminal law;
this does not mean that said employer lost the capacity and interests of an
employer. The warrantless entry into Simons office was reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment standard announced inOConnor because at the
inception of the search, the employer had reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the hard drive would yield evidence of misconduct, as the
employer was already aware that Simons had misused his Internet access
to download over a thousand pornographic images. The retrieval of the
hard drive was reasonably related to the objective of the search, and the
search was not excessively intrusive. Thus, while Simons had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his office, he did not have such legitimate
expectation of privacy with regard to the files in his computer.
x x x To establish a violation of his rights under the
Fourth Amendment, Simons must first prove that he had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched or
the item seized. x x x And, in order to prove a legitimate
expectation of privacy, Simons must show that his
subjective expectation of privacy is one that society is
prepared to accept as objectively reasonable. x x x
xxxx
x x x We conclude that the remote searches of
Simons computer did not violate his Fourth Amendment
rights because, in light of the Internet policy, Simons
lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the files
downloaded from the Internet. Additionally, we conclude
that Simons Fourth Amendment rights were not violated
by FBIS retrieval of Simons hard drive from his office.
Simons did not have a legitimate expectation
of privacy with regard to the record or fruits of his
Internet use in light of the FBIS Internet policy. The
policy clearly stated that FBIS would audit, inspect,
and/or monitor employees use of the Internet,
including all file transfers, all websites visited, and
all e-mail messages, as deemed appropriate. x x

Case Digests
x This policy placed employees on notice that they could
not reasonably expect that their Internet activity would be
private. Therefore,
regardless
of
whether
Simons
subjectively believed that the files he transferred from the
Internet were private, such a belief was not objectively
reasonable after FBIS notified him that it would be
overseeing his Internet use. x x x Accordingly, FBIS
actions in remotely searching and seizing the computer
files Simons downloaded from the Internet did not violate
the Fourth Amendment.
xxxx
The burden is on Simons to prove that he had
a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office. x x
x Here, Simons has shown that he had an office that he
did not share. As noted above, the operational realities of
Simons workplace may have diminished his legitimate
privacy expectations. However, there is no evidence in the
record of any workplace practices, procedures, or
regulations that had such an effect. We therefore conclude
that, on this record, Simons possessed a legitimate
expectation of privacy in his office.

Page 88 of 94
requiring mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students
of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and
private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with
certain offenses, have also recognized the fact that there may be such
legitimate intrusion of privacy in the workplace.
The first factor to consider in the matter of
reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon
which the drug testing, which effects a search within the
meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In
this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop
for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the
employees and the reasonableness of drug testing
requirement. The employees privacy interest in an
office is to a large extent circumscribed by the
companys work policies, the collective bargaining
agreement, if any, entered into by management and
the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the
employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the
workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office
environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of
impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.
(Emphasis supplied.)
xxxx
In the final analysis, this case involves an
employees
supervisor
entering
the
employees
government office and retrieving a piece of government
equipment in which the employee had absolutely no
expectation of privacy equipment that the employer
knew contained evidence of crimes committed by the
employee in the employees office. This situation may be
contrasted with one in which the criminal acts of a
government
employee
were
unrelated
to
his
employment. Here, there was a conjunction of the conduct
that violated the employers policy and the conduct that
violated the criminal law. We consider that FBIS intrusion
into Simons office to retrieve the hard drive is one in which
a reasonable employer might engage. x x x[42] (Citations
omitted; emphasis supplied.)
This Court, in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs

Board[43] which involved the constitutionality of a provision in R.A. No. 9165
Applying
the
analysis
and
principles
announced
in OConnor and Simons to the case at bar, we now address the following
questions: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his office and computer files?; and (2) Was the search authorized by the
CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioners
computer reasonable in its inception and scope?
In this inquiry, the relevant surrounding circumstances to consider
include (1) the employees relationship to the item seized; (2) whether the
item was in the immediate control of the employee when it was seized;
and (3) whether the employee took actions to maintain his privacy in the
item. These factors are relevant to both the subjective and objective
prongs of the reasonableness inquiry, and we consider the two questions
together.[44] Thus, where the employee used a password on his computer,
did not share his office with co-workers and kept the same locked, he had a

Case Digests
legitimate expectation of privacy and any search of that space and items
located therein must comply with the Fourth Amendment.[45]
We answer the first in the negative. Petitioner failed to prove that
he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or
government-issued computer which contained his personal files. Petitioner
did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not
share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to
other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords
or adopted any means to prevent other employees from accessing his
computer files. On the contrary, he submits that being in the public
assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would have visitors in his
office like friends, associates and even unknown people, whom he even
allowed to use his computer which to him seemed a trivial request. He
described his office as full of people, his friends, unknown people and
that in the past 22 years he had been discharging his functions at the
PALD, he is personally assisting incoming clients, receiving documents,
drafting
cases
on
appeals,
in
charge
of
accomplishment
report, Mamamayan Muna Program, Public Sector Unionism, Correction of
name, accreditation of service, and hardly had anytime for himself alone,
that in fact he stays in the office as a paying customer. [46] Under this
scenario, it can hardly be deduced that petitioner had such expectation of
privacy that society would recognize as reasonable.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation or

proof of the aforementioned factual circumstances, that petitioner had at
least a subjective expectation of privacy in his computer as he claims, such
is negated by the presence of policy regulating the use of office computers,
as in Simons.
Office Memorandum No. 10, S. 2002 Computer Use Policy (CUP)
explicitly provides:

Page 89 of 94
1.
The Computer Resources are the property of the Civil

Service Commission and may be used only for
legitimate business purposes.
2.
Users shall be permitted access to Computer

Resources to assist them in the performance of their
respective jobs.
3.
Use of the Computer Resources is a privilege that

may be revoked at any given time.
xxxx
No Expectation of Privacy
4.
No expectation of privacy. Users except the Members

of the Commission shall not have an expectation of
privacy in anything they create, store, send, or
receive on the computer system.
The Head of the Office for Recruitment, Examination
and Placement shall select and assign Users to
handle the confidential examination data and
processes.
5.
Waiver of privacy rights. Users expressly waive any

right to privacy in anything they create, store, send,
or receive on the computer through the Internet or
any other computer network. Usersunderstand that
the CSC may use human or automated means to
monitor the use of its Computer Resources.
6.
Non-exclusivity of Computer Resources. A computer

resource is not a personal property or for the
exclusive use of a User to whom a memorandum of
receipt (MR) has been issued. It can be shared or
operated by other users. However, he is accountable
therefor and must insure its care and maintenance.
xxxx
POLICY
Passwords

Case Digests
12.
Responsibility
for
passwords. Users shall
be
responsible for safeguarding their passwords for
access
to
the
computer
system. Individual
passwords shall not be printed, stored online, or
given to others. Users shall be responsible for all
transactions made using their passwords. No User
may access the computer system with another
Users password or account.
13.
Passwords do not imply privacy. Use of passwords to

gain access to the computer system or to encode
particular files or messages does not imply
that Users have an expectation of privacy in the
material they create or receive on the computer
system. The Civil Service Commission has global
passwords that permit access to all materials stored
on its networked computer system regardless of
whether those materials have been encoded with a
particular Users password. Only members of the
Commission shall authorize the application of the
said global passwords.

Page 90 of 94
computer files, including e-mail, can be searched when the university is
responding to a discovery request in the course of litigation. Petitioner
employee thus cannot claim a violation of Fourth Amendment rights when
university officials conducted a warrantless search of his computer for
work-related materials.[49]
As to the second point of inquiry on the reasonableness of the
search conducted on petitioners computer, we answer in the affirmative.
The search of petitioners computer files was conducted in
connection with investigation of work-related misconduct prompted by an
anonymous letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson David regarding
anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where the head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi
Mamaya Na division is supposedly lawyering for individuals with pending
cases in the CSC. Chairperson David stated in her sworn affidavit:
8.
That prior to this, as early as 2006, the undersigned

has received several text messages from unknown
sources adverting to certain anomalies in Civil
Service Commission Regional Office IV (CSCRO IV)
such as, staff working in another government
agency, selling cases and aiding parties with
pending cases, all done during office hours and
involved the use of government properties;
9.
That said text messages were not investigated for

lack of any verifiable leads and details sufficient to
warrant an investigation;
10.
That the anonymous letter provided the lead and

details as it pinpointed the persons and divisions
involved in the alleged irregularities happening in
CSCRO IV;
11.
That in view of the seriousness of the allegations of

irregularities happening in CSCRO IV and its effect on
the integrity of the Commission, I decided to form a
team of Central Office staff to back up the files in the
computers of the Public Assistance and Liaison
Division (PALD) and Legal Division;
x x x x[47] (Emphasis supplied.)
The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its
employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy
in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers,
and that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using
both automated or human means. This implies that on-the-spot
inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources were used
only for such legitimate business purposes.
One of the factors stated in OConnor which are relevant in
determining whether an employees expectation of privacy in the
workplace is reasonable is the existence of a workplace privacy policy.
[48]
In one case, the US Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit held that a state
university employee has not shown that he had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in his computer files where the universitys computer policy, the
computer user is informed not to expect privacy if the university has a
legitimate reason to conduct a search. The user is specifically told that

Case Digests
x x x x[50]
A search by a government employer of an employees office is

justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting
that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related
misconduct.[51] Thus, in the 2004 case decided by the US Court of Appeals
Eighth Circuit, it was held that where a government agencys computer use
policy prohibited electronic messages with pornographic content and in
addition expressly provided that employees do not have any personal
privacy rights regarding their use of the agency information systems and
technology, the government employee had no legitimate expectation of
privacy as to the use and contents of his office computer, and therefore
evidence found during warrantless search of the computer was admissible
in prosecution for child pornography. In that case, the defendant
employees computer hard drive was first remotely examined by a
computer information technician after his supervisor received complaints
that he was inaccessible and had copied and distributed non-work-related
e-mail messages throughout the office. When the supervisor confirmed
that defendant had used his computer to access the prohibited websites, in
contravention of the express policy of the agency, his computer tower and
floppy disks were taken and examined. A formal administrative
investigation ensued and later search warrants were secured by the police
department. The initial remote search of the hard drive of petitioners
computer, as well as the subsequent warrantless searches was held as
valid under the OConnor ruling that a public employer can investigate
work-related misconduct so long as any search is justified at inception and
is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified it in the
first place.[52]
Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioners
computer was justified at its inception and scope. We quote with approval
the CSCs discussion on the reasonableness of its actions, consistent as it
were with the guidelines established by OConnor:
Even conceding for a moment that there is no such
administrative policy, there is no doubt in the mind of the
Commission that the search of Pollos computer has

Page 91 of 94
successfully passed the test of reasonableness for
warrantless searches in the workplace as enunciated in the
above-discussed
American
authorities. It
bears
emphasis that the Commission pursued the search in
its capacity as a government employer and that it
was undertaken in connection with an investigation
involving a work-related misconduct, one of the
circumstances exempted from the warrant requirement. At
the inception of the search, a complaint was received
recounting that a certain division chief in the CSCRO No. IV
was lawyering for parties having pending cases with the
said regional office or in the Commission. The nature of
the imputation was serious, as it was grievously
disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be
furtively engaged in the practice of lawyering for parties
with pending cases before the Commission would be a
highly repugnant scenario, then such a case would have
shattering repercussions. It would undeniably cast clouds
of doubt upon the institutional integrity of the Commission
as a quasi-judicial agency, and in the process, render it less
effective in fulfilling its mandate as an impartial and
objective dispenser of administrative justice. It is settled
that a court or an administrative tribunal must not only be
actually impartial but must be seen to be so, otherwise the
general public would not have any trust and confidence in
it.
Considering the damaging nature of the
accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to
arrest or limit any possible adverse consequence or fallout. Thus, on the same date that the complaint was
received, a search was forthwith conducted involving the
computer resources in the concerned regional office. That
it was the computers that were subjected to the
search was justified since these furnished the
easiest means for an employee to encode and store
documents. Indeed, the computers would be a likely
starting point in ferreting out incriminating
evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of
computer files, that is, they could easily be
destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic
and immediate action. Pointedly, to impose the need to
comply with the probable cause requirement would
invariably defeat the purpose of the wok-related
investigation.

Case Digests
Worthy to mention, too, is the fact that the
Commission effected the warrantless search in an open
and transparent manner. Officials and some employees of
the regional office, who happened to be in the vicinity,
were on hand to observe the process until its
completion. In addition, the respondent himself was duly
notified, through text messaging, of the search and the
concomitant retrieval of files from his computer.
All in all, the Commission is convinced that the
warrantless search done on computer assigned to Pollo was
not, in any way, vitiated with unconstitutionality. It was a
reasonable exercise of the managerial prerogative of the
Commission as an employer aimed at ensuring its
operational effectiveness and efficiency by going after the
work-related misfeasance of its employees. Consequently,
the evidence derived from the questioned search are
deemed admissible.[53]
Petitioners claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy

must necessarily fail. His other argument invoking the privacy of
communication and correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III of
the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition
accorded to certain legitimate intrusions into the privacy of employees in
the government workplace under the aforecited authorities. We likewise
find no merit in his contention that OConnor and Simons are not relevant
because the present case does not involve a criminal offense like child
pornography. As already mentioned, the search of petitioners computer
was justified there being reasonable ground for suspecting that the files
stored therein would yield incriminating evidence relevant to the
investigation being conducted by CSC as government employer of such
misconduct subject of the anonymous complaint. This situation clearly
falls under the exception to the warrantless requirement in administrative
searches defined in OConnor.
The Court is not unaware of our decision in Anonymous LetterComplaint against Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila[54]involving a branch clerk (Atty. Morales) who was
investigated on the basis of an anonymous letter alleging that he was
consuming his working hours filing and attending to personal cases, using

Page 92 of 94
office supplies, equipment and utilities. The OCA conducted a spot
investigation aided by NBI agents. The team was able to access Atty.
Morales personal computer and print two documents stored in its hard
drive, which turned out to be two pleadings, one filed in the CA and
another in the RTC of Manila, both in the name of another lawyer. Atty.
Morales computer was seized and taken in custody of the OCA but was
later ordered released on his motion, but with order to the MISO to first
retrieve the files stored therein. The OCA disagreed with the report of the
Investigating Judge that there was no evidence to support the charge
against Atty. Morales as no one from the OCC personnel who were
interviewed would give a categorical and positive statement affirming the
charges against Atty. Morales, along with other court personnel also
charged in the same case. The OCA recommended that Atty. Morales
should be found guilty of gross misconduct. The Court En Banc held that
while Atty. Morales may have fallen short of the exacting standards
required of every court employee, the Court cannot use the evidence
obtained from his personal computer against him for it violated his
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court
found no evidence to support the claim of OCA that they were able to
obtain the subject pleadings with the consent of Atty. Morales, as in fact
the latter immediately filed an administrative case against the persons
who conducted the spot investigation, questioning the validity of the
investigation and specifically invoking his constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure. And as there is no other evidence, apart
from the pleadings, retrieved from the unduly confiscated personal
computer of Atty. Morales, to hold him administratively liable, the Court
had no choice but to dismiss the charges against him for insufficiency of
evidence.
The above case is to be distinguished from the case at bar
because, unlike the former which involved a personal computer of a court
employee, the computer from which the personal files of herein petitioner
were retrieved is a government-issued computer, hence government
property the use of which the CSC has absolute right to regulate and
monitor. Such relationship of the petitioner with the item seized (office
computer) and other relevant factors and circumstances under American
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, notably the existence of CSC MO 10, S.

Case Digests

Page 93 of 94
2007 on Computer Use Policy, failed to establish that petitioner had a

reasonable expectation of privacy in the office computer assigned to him.
Having determined that the personal files copied from the office
computer of petitioner are admissible in the administrative case against
him, we now proceed to the issue of whether the CSC was correct in finding
the petitioner guilty of the charges and dismissing him from the service.
i
ii
iii
iv
v
vi

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW

BILL OF RIGHTS (PART 8)

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July 24, 2012

PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR., Petitioner,

BILL OF RIGHTS (PART 8)

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW

BILL OF RIGHTS (PART 8)

G.R. No. 78508 March 21, 1994

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ORQUIOLA vs TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT

b) Whether petitioners were innocent purchasers for value and builders in

G.R. No. 141463. August 6, 2002

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WON CA COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT DECIDED CA-G.R.

Petitioner contends that he was deprived of the right to be heard and

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More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of

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The Heirs of JOLLY R. BUGARIN, namely MA. AILEEN H. BUGARIN,

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In the case of Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. v. COMELEC, 43 this

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ADDITIONAL INFO NG CASE

C.Manila Polo Club [Membership

D.Baguio Country Club

A.Philippine Columbian Club

Honorable Supreme Courts Decision dated January 30, 2002

1.Residential lot in Damarinas