G.R. No.

L-69866 April 15, 1988

ROGELIO ABERCA, RODOLFO BENOSA, NESTOR BODINO NOEL ETABAG DANILO DE LA
FUENTE, BELEN DIAZ-FLORES, MANUEL MARIO GUZMAN, ALAN JAZMINEZ, EDWIN LOPEZ,
ALFREDO MANSOS, ALEX MARCELINO, ELIZABETH PROTACIO-MARCELINO, JOSEPH OLAYER,
CARLOS PALMA, MARCO PALO, ROLANDO SALUTIN, BENJAMIN SESGUNDO, ARTURO
TABARA, EDWIN TULALIAN and REBECCA TULALIAN
versus
MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, COL. FIDEL SINGSON, COL. ROLANDO ABADILLA, COL. GERARDO B.
LANTORIA, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, 1ST LT. COL. PANFILO M. LACSON, MAJ. RODOLFO
AGUINALDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, 1ST LT. PEDRO TANGO, 1ST LT. ROMEO RICARDO, 1ST
LT. RAUL BACALSO, MSGT BIENVENIDO BALABA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch XCV (95), Quezon City

YAP, J.:

FACTS:
Various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM)
were ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist
(CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro
Manila."
Complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases
defectively issued judicial search warrants. During these raids, certain members of the raiding party
confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs and conducted an arrest without
proper warrants issued by the courts.
For some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; interrogated in
violation of their rights to silence and counsel, employing threats, tortures and other forms of violence on
them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them.
Plaintiffs thereafter went to the RTC to claim for damages, alleging that all violations of plaintiffs
constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and
incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being
previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.
A motion to dismiss was filed, alleging (a) no judicial inquiry may be made regarding the detention since
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (b) immunity of defendants from liability for acts
done in the pursuit of their official duties; and (c) lack of cause of action.
The RTC dismissed the action. A motion to set aside was filed, but without acting on the said motion, the
RTC ruled that the decision is final. A motion to reconsider the said final order is denied (except for Maj.
Aguinaldo and MSgt.Balaba). Hence the Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court should continue trial for damages on the ground that (a) Judicial inquiry
may be made in spite of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, (b) non-immunity of
defendants from suit, and (c) the presence of a cause of action.
HELD:

Yes, the lower court should continue trial for damages because a Judicial Inquiry may be made in spite of
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus.
Art. 32 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
[Bill of Rights]
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or
omission constitutes a criminal offense, the against grieved party has a right to
commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be
instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or
omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply
cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to
violate those sacred rights with impunity.
Here, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners'
right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their
constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What
is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of
habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
Even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends
petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot suspend
their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents' confiscation of their private
belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.
Nevertheless, the issue became moot because Pres. Corazon Aquino had already lifted the
suspension in 1986.
Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit does not apply
Defendants allege that as agents of the State, acts done by officers in the performance of official
duties written the ambit of their powers. Since the President ordered the AFP to prevent or supress
lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, and thru Gen. Ver,
ordered to launch pre-emptive strikes against Communist Terrorist forces, the TFM merely acted within
the scope of their powers.
Nevertheless, the said orders cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission
untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the
individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme
law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all
times.

The Complaint States a Cause of Action

The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply here. The doctrine of respondeat superior has
been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and
employee) relationship. No such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their
subordinates.
Still, Article 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or
impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties enumerated therein The decisive factor in this case,
in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person
'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of
another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages
under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to
the aggrieved party.
The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and details, how
plaintiffs' constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and
impaired by defendants. The complaint speaks of, among others,
searches made without search warrants or based on irregularly issued or substantially
defective warrants;
seizures and confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash and personal effects
belonging to plaintiffs and other items of property which were not subversive and illegal
nor covered by the search warrants;
arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under irregular, improper and illegal
circumstances;
detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of 'safehouses" where they were kept
incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological torture and other inhuman,
degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory statements.
The complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative of their
constitutional rights.
Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be
held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as
well as indirectly, responsible for its violation.
The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the complaint. It is well
established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states
no cause of action must be based on what appears on the face of the complaint