Against, Against the

Gods
A Rational Response to Stefan Molyneuxs arguments
that God does not exist in Against the Gods

By: A Young Aspiring Christian Apologist

Often when an atheist goes about to prove the non-existence of God, or gods they
generally go about it by about it the wrong way, by trying to show that a particular
belief about god is strange or seemingly absurd.
Atheists often try to disprove the existence of a God by making him sound
strange or absurd.
However in my opinion Stefan Molyneux for the most part goes about it in the most
efficient and rational way, by showing that God is a logical contradiction.
Stefan Molyneux approaches the question in an efficient and rational way,
by arguing that God is a logical contradiction.
As Stefan Explains correctly and succinctly at the beginning of his book,
anything that is a logical contradiction cannot exist, period.
Anything that is a logical contradiction cannot exist, as Stefan so correctly
and succinctly explains.
He gives several examples of this, the best one probably being that of the square
circle. By its very definition a square circle cannot exist because what it means to
be a square ( is defined as having four equal sides, with four 90 degree corners.)
and what it means to be A circle is a round plane figure whose boundary (the
circumference) consists of points equidistant from a fixed point. A square
and a circle are contradictory to one another and so something defined as having
the quality of being a square circle cannot exist. This is simply the application of
one, if not the most basic rule in all of logic: the Law of Non-Contradiction. The Law
of Non-Contradiction states that two ideas which are that contradict each other
cannot both be true. Another good example of this is the example of the proposition
that married bachelors exist. By definition being a bachelor means that you are not
married. We are logically forced to the conclusion that married bachelors cannot
exist.
To his end Stefan offers several arguments of why, by definition, God himself
is a self-contradiction, and therefore cannot exist.

Stefan offers several arguments why God is a self-contradiction by

definition, and therefore cannot exist.
However having read through his book it is my contention that every one of his
arguments are flawed, and fail to show that God is self-contradictory.
It is my contention that every one of his arguments are flawed, failing to
show that God is self-contradictory.
It has been rightly said that any argument can be compared to building a
house: the premises are the walls, the conclusion is the roof.
With the premises being its walls and the conclusion being the roof.
We build arguments from the ground up, starting on the basis of having correct
premises, which when strong can support the weight of the conclusion. If in any
case a premise in an argument, that is central to holding up the roof, is shown to be
faulty, the arguments conclusion then can be reasonably rejected, as it tumbles to
the ground.
As I am ready to begin my refutation, having laid its groundwork, I see it also
very important beforehand to state that I completely agree with how he defines God
immediately following the heading
Stefan gives a definition of God that I completely agree with on page 15 of
Why are Gods Self-Contradictory.
Why Are Gods Self-Contradictory on page 15.
He Says:
At the very minimum, a god is defined as an eternal being which exists
independent of material form and detectable energy, and which usually possesses
the rather enviable attributes of omniscience and omnipotence.
All efforts then on Stefans part ought to fall into the range of showing show
why these qualities or attributes of God are contradictory to one another.
Let us begin.

The first argument

Now we begin the real meat of the matter. Starting in the second paragraph
of page 15 of his book, Stefan begins to give his first reason why God is selfcontradictory.
Stefan:
First of all, we know from biology that even if an eternal being could exist, it would
be the simplest being conceivable. An eternal being could never have evolved,
since it does not die and reproduce, and therefore biological evolution could never
have layered levels of increasing complexity over its initial simplicity. We all
understand that the human eye did not pop into existence without any prior
development; and the human eye is infinitely less complex than an omniscient and
omnipotent god. Since gods are portrayed as the most complex beings imaginable,
they may well be many things, but eternal cannot be one of them.
This paragraph boiled down into syllogistic form goes something like this:
1. God is defined as the most complex being.
2. God is defined as eternal
3. Complex beings only arise through biological evolution.
4. An eternal being could never have evolved because it does not die and reproduce
and so does not increase in complexity.
5. Therefore Gods complexity contradicts his eternality.
6. Therefore God does not exist
The argument in effect, is attempting to prove that God being eternal, is in
contradiction to his complexity, and therefore he cannot exist. The argument might
appear to make good sense at first, but when we begin to investigate this argument

closer a problem begins to emerge. By complex, Stefan means the level of physical
complexity in biological organisms, his example? The human eye. However if we are
speaking of this sort of physical complexity, then it is wrong to attribute this kind of
complexity to God. Because he is defined an immaterial being and therefore has no
physical components at all. He is in this sense of the word complex the simplest
possible being, having no physical parts. The argument then, as we discover is
based on its faulty use of the word complex. This is a prime example of a fallacy
called the fallacy of equivocation. This fallacy lies in the use of a word throughout
an argument, but the word is used to mean more than one thing.
Take this argument for example:
1. Muhammad is Arabic
2. Arabic is a language
3. Therefore Muhammad is a language.
The arguments obviously absurd conclusion follows only due to this fallacy
being employed in the arguments two premises through the use of the word
Arabic. In the first premise it is used to denote an ethnicity, but in the second to
denote a language.
Stefan is guilty of the same sort of reasoning, because implicitly stated by the
use of the word complex in the third premise, Stefan means physical complexity.
However in defining God in the first premise as complex, Stefan is certainly not
referring to Physical complexity, because he himself defines God as existing apart
from matter and energy, hence the fallacy of equivocation. Understanding this
furthermore goes on to show that it does not follow then that Gods complexity in
whatever sense that he is complex, and his eternality are contradictory. The
conclusions charge of Gods self-contradiction as posed by this argument, falls
immediately to the ground.

The second argument

The next argument proposed by Stefan is clearly stated in the very next paragraph.
Stefan:
Secondly, we also know that consciousness is an effect of matter specifically
biological matter, in the form of a brain. Believing that consciousness can exist in
the absence of matter is like believing that gravity can be present in the absence of
mass, or that light can exist in the absence of a light source, or that electricity can
exist in the absence of energy. Consciousness is an effect of matter, and thus to
postulate the existence of consciousness without is to create an insurmountable
paradox, which only proves the nonexistence of what is being proposed.
In argument form it looks like this:
1. God is defined as not made of matter or energy (immaterial)
2. God is defined as having consciousness
3. Consciousness is only an effect of biological matter (brains)
4. Therefore God having both consciousness and immateriality is a self-contradiction
5. Therefore God does not exist

In my opinion probably the strongest argument for atheism that Stefan gives
in his book, but only due to the seemingly intuitive nature of the third premise,
which the entire argument hinges on. So intuitive in fact that in the book Stefan
merely asserts it without giving any justification or warrant for accepting it as true.
Stefan would most likely respond to this by stating that the burden of proof is on
me, because believing that our minds are just our brain is the default position. I
dont necessarily agree with this, but I am willing to accept the burden of proof for
the sake of argument, because even with the burden on me I think that we have
plenty sufficient reasons why it is false that minds do not exist independent of
matter.
The first reason why I think that minds exist independent of matter has to do
with the nature of free will. If free will can be shown to exist then this on its own
merits is enough to show naturalism must be false, as well as show that our minds,
or at least the part that thinks and makes decisions, cannot be the brain, but
instead has to exist in a non-material state or immaterially. The contradiction
between believing in both free will and being a naturalist can be easily
substantiated by a simple argument. But firstly, let us acquire a proper definition of
free will:
Free will: (dictionary.com)
The doctrine that the conduct of human beings expresses
personal choice and is not simply determined by physical or divine forces.

And now for the argument:

1. All natural processes are determined
2. On naturalism, our brains are completely governed by natural processes
3. Therefore, on naturalism our brains are determined.

The argument, in effect demonstrates that if naturalism is true, then free will
cannot exist, because our brains, being governed by natural processes must be
determined. They are, in effect, logically contradictory to one another. If the two
premises are true than the conclusion follows logically and inescapably. Are the
premises true however? As for the first premise, especially to any naturalist like
Stefan Molyneux they would adamantly affirm this, aside from one exception which I
will address in a further down. The main supporting argument for why the first
premise is true is that if it were false, the scientific method would be useless. The
reason being because when scientists study natural processes such as gravity,
electromagnetism, or chemical reactions their postulations carry with it the weight
of being repeatable and therefore testable. And so for any accepted scientific theory
of gravity, electricity or chemistry to be accepted as scientific fact, in a controlled
experiment demonstrating them, with all the conditions being the same, it will have
the exact same outcome one hundred percent of the time. This therefore means
then that all natural processes which scientists study are totally determined. For
example, knowing and understanding how gravity effects falling rocks, any scientist
now can predict with perfect accuracy the rate at which it will fall, it is therefore
determined. Take another example of something seemingly random, a throw of the
dice. By this scientific principle if you could know the initial conditions of a dice
throw, and all the conditions of its surroundings such as the conditions of the air
around it and the details of the surface upon which it lands, we could calculate
exactly how the dice would land without actually observing it. This principle
expands to all natural processes which we observe. And so we come into conclusion
that the first premise must therefore be true, all natural processes are determined.
Now for the second premise: By definition naturalism means that all things
that exist are made of matter and energy and are completely natural. This however
must include humans and their minds. If it were to exclude them then it would
cease to be naturalism, because they would then have to be supernatural. And so
the second premise is easily shown to be true.
Having shown that both the first and second premise to be true, any
naturalist then like Stefan is now logically committed to the conclusion that we dont

actually have free will, unless he gives up the worldview of naturalism. Now we
have a dichotomy presented to us, either you can chose to believe in free will and
oust naturalism, or you can bite the bullet of naturalism and accept that you dont
actually have free will.
I think that if we were to give up one over the other, the clear choice would
be to continue in the belief that free will exists, and reject naturalism. Why should
we favor free will over naturalism? I have a few reasons.
Firstly, for me and many others the existence of free will is more intuitively
obvious than even the fact that even our senses are accurate. It is what is called a
priori knowledge, which means that it is knowledge derived about our existence
without appealing to sensory experience. And since because understanding the
deterministic natural processes can only come through observation by our senses of
the physical world then the existence of our free will is more foundational of a belief
then the belief that all natural processes are determined. It therefore becomes my
position that we ought to throw out naturalism rather than free will.
The second and probably strongest reason that we have of disposing of
naturalism in favor of free will is that if we were to accept naturalism, and therefore
determinism, then not only would judgements of moral or aesthetic worth be totally
useless as Stefan often points out, but the acceptance of determinism would also be
logically incompatible with our notions of reasoning and logic. But why is this? If
determinism is true, than this includes as determined what our very beliefs are.
However logic would tell us this, that if somebody believes something, not through
choosing the best possible view through reason and evidence, but instead simply
because they are predisposed to by happenstance of their stimuli and genetics,
then we have strong warrant to reject them and believe that they are false. On
determinism however everybodys views are this way, because all are determined.
And so in following determinism to its conclusion we see that we have strong reason
to reject every single view of every human ever. This becomes a massive problem
on a great many levels, but primarily this is a problem because then the determinist
should then reject their own views as true, including determinism, and even the
belief that logic is valid! The view of which creates an impassable paradox, because
the only way that the naturalist has reached this conclusion in the first place is by

logical deduction. And so to conclude this argument we see that because

naturalism entails determinism, which entails the rejection of all beliefs, naturalism
is self-refuting, hence, we ought to give it up in favor of free will.

There is one principle objection which I hinted at earlier which almost

certainly will be the first to be posed to my argument. That is the idea that because
of scientific advancements in understanding the world of quantum mechanics we do
actually have warrant to reject the first premise. The reasoning in rejecting the
premise that all natural processes are determined is this, that many examples of the
sub-atomic, or quantum level can be shown to not be determined. I have two
responses to this objection.
Firstly, the underlying assumption presented in the objection that is notably
faulty is the idea that just because some things in nature are not determined,
means that free will has a possibility of existing. In terms of things such as quantum
mechanics however this is not the case. Some things, apart from being determined
or freely willed, are in a third category, that of being totally random. Now because
some natural things can be shown to be truly random does not mean however that
there is room for free will now. It simply means that instead of two options to choose
from we have three. Taking this into account we can easily amend my argument to
prove the same point. It would go like this:
1. All natural processes are either determined or random
2. On naturalism, our brains are completely governed by natural processes
3. Therefore, on naturalism our brains are either determined or random
So with the introduction of random causes from quantum mechanics into our
argument we still see that there is still no room for free will, being in itself in a
separate category from determined or random processes.
Besides, even if the quantum mechanics response logically allowed free will
to exist, which I just disproved, then why should we think that the utterly minute

spaces in which these random actions happen have any effect on the comparatively
gigantic neurons in our brains?
And so to sum all of this argument up, because we know that we have free
will, our minds cannot be made of matter or energy, because if they were they
would be determined. Our ego In conclusion must exist apart from matter or energy,
ergo, it is immaterial. Therefore we have very strong reason to accept that minds
can and do exist immaterially, contrary to Stefans argument.

Apart from having purely rational basis for believing our minds are immaterial
we also actually have empirical evidence that minds can and do exist immaterially.
This evidence comes to us in the form of what are called Out of Body Experiences.
These Out of Body Experiences (OBEs) are closely linked to a more widely known
term called Near Death Experiences, or NDEs. Out of body experiences are defined
exactly as the name entails, it is an experience where a person when they die,
claims to have left their body and reentered into it upon resuscitation. Such as the
example of the famous boy that recently acquired fame through the book his father
wrote entitled heaven is for real, many OBErs claim to experience a large range of
different things which occurred to them in the afterlife, from experiences of god and
religious figures, heaven and angles, seeing dead relatives, all down to the much
less common freaky depictions of hell and demons. Near death experiences are
claimed by people of every walk of life, every ethnic group, and every religious
background. Even some atheists have claimed to have experienced these such as
the famous atheist philosopher A.J. Ayer. His account about which he wrote an
interesting article entitled, What I saw when I was dead.
Most people who are very skeptical of the afterlife rightly say that these are
merely anecdotal, and so do not constitute an empirical verification of the existence
that the mind is independent of the body, as I claimed that they could in the
opening sentence introducing OBEs. I am in complete agreement with them on this,
however the real proof of their validity comes in rare cases of OBEs, where a person,
while lying clinically dead in their hospital room can correctly tell of events that
happened in the room while they were dead, as well as events that take place in
other rooms, and even things that take place miles away.

Lets look at some examples:

The third Argument

The next argument appears in true rapid fire form immediately following the last, in
the very next paragraph.
Stefan:
Thirdly, omniscience cannot coexist with omnipotence, since if a god knows what
will happen tomorrow, said god will be unable to change it without invalidating its
knowledge. If this god retains the power to change what will happen tomorrow, then
it cannot know with exact certainty what will happen tomorrow.
This argument is quite simple, and formed into a proper syllogism goes like this:
1. God is defined as Omnipotent
2. God is defined as Omniscient

3. If God is omniscient then he knows with certainty what he is going to do

tomorrow.
4. If God knows what he will do tomorrow with certainty then he cannot change it.
5. If God cannot change what he will do tomorrow then he is not omnipotent.
6. Therefore Gods Omnipotency and his Omniscience are contradictory
7. Therefore God does not exist
There are two responses that I think sufficiently defeat this argument.

The first is to simply correct Stefans definition of what it means to be

Omnipotent. Normally theologians arent arguing against philosophically minded
atheists, and so in defining God as all-powerful usually dont fully explain fully what
they mean. A more kosher definition of Gods omnipotency should include the
proposition that God cannot do things that contradict his own nature. A powerful
example of what I mean is the response to the argument that the Christian God
cannot be omnibenevolent based on the doctrine of hell. The answer to this is that
God, although all-loving, is also perfectly just, and because he cannot contradict his
own nature he is forced of necessity of his own nature to condemn evildoers to
punishment, even though he loves them. In the same way, changing something in
the future without being able to foretell it is an act that causes Gods two natures
here to contradict, meaning that this is something that God cannot do. Is Stefan
right however is claiming that he cannot be all-powerful then? Not if we accept its
more proper definition. Another prime example of this type of argument that you
probably have heard is the infamous short quip, can God make a rock so big he
cannot lift it, which attempts to pitch the idea of omnipotency as self-contradictory

in the same fashion. The answer however is this. No he cannot, and for the exact
same reason.

The second response to this argument, as Stefan Molyneux correctly

anticipates is the assertion on my part that God exists outside time, in a timeless,
eternal state. So I am going to analyze his response and respond to it.
Stefan Says:
The usual response from theists it is impossible to use the word answer is to
place their god outside of time, but this is pure nonsense. When an entity is
proven to be self-contradictory, creating a realm wherein self-contradictions are
valid does not solve the problem. If you tell me that a square circle cannot exist,
and I then create an imaginary realm called square circles can exist, we are not
at an impasse; I have just abandoned reality, rationality and quite possibly my
sanity. Theists who try this particular con should at least be consistent, and not pay
their taxes, and then, when said taxes are demanded, say to the tax collector that
they have created a universe called I paid my taxes, and slam the door in his
face.
When I first read this my first reaction was that this paragraph is very
uninformed, and silly. It appears as if Stefan believes that theists just sort of made
up the proposition that God exists in a timeless state simply to explain away
supposed contradictions. This however is not true, theists came to accept the idea
of Gods timelessness for another reason. Namely, if God created the universe and
time itself a construct of the universe, then God himself cannot be subject to it,
being its creator. No theist here is guilty of conjuring up alternate dimensions or
universes to solve away this supposed contradiction.
This begs the question however of what the nature of things is in a timeless
state, if it is even possible. Stefan clearly believes that it is impossible for something
to exist timelessly. My simple question in response would be, Why not? In fact it
would be my supposition that any rational person is logically committed to the idea

that at least something must exist timelessly. For if nothing does, then there is
nothing to give rise to time and space, which we know had an absolute beginning.

The fourth argument

Now having dismantled the third argument, we shall proceed to the fourth.
Stefan:
The fourth objection to the existence of deities is that an object can only rationally
be defined as existing when it can be detected in some manner, either directly, in
the form of matter and/or energy, or indirectly, based upon its effects on the objects
around it, such as a black hole.
Spinning these words into a formal argument, it appears like this.
1. Existence is defined as that which can be detected, or its effects observed
2. God cannot be detected, or his effects observed

3. Therefore God cannot be defined as existing

4. Therefore God does not exist
Two responses I have for this argument, both of which on its own will easily
dismantle the argument. The first response that I, as well as any professional
philosopher would give is that Stefan has a clearly false definition of what it means
to exist. Existence is not defined as that which can be detected, or its effects
observed. The proper definition of existence as defined by dictionary.com is: to
have actual being. But what really does it mean to have actual being? What it
means to have actual being, is not to have the property of having material being,
but to have properties in general. Bringing this back to the argument then we can
clearly see that God can be defined as existing, because although he lacks the
properties of being made of matter or energy, he does have other properties, such
as being a mind, omniscience, omnipotentcy, among others.

However, I dont think that we even need to amend Stefans definition in

order to show that God exists. Because his definition includes the proposition that
something can still be defined as existing if we can observe its effects. Stefan here
gives the example of a black hole, the singularity of which we cannot observe, but
its effects. It would be my contention though that Gods effects can and are already
observed. Many defenders of belief in God will point to many different examples.
The fine tuning of the universe for life, the existence of objective morals, the
existence of logic and the effectiveness of mathematics, the specified complexity of
DNA, the existence of consciousness and free will, the existence of evil, evolution,
the very existence of the universe itself, and for Christians like me, the resurrection
of Jesus. All good, defendable reasons to believe we can see Gods effects I would
say, however I am only going to focus in on one other, which to me is by far the
most compelling.
The existence of miracles done in the name of Jesus to me are the most
compelling reason to believe that God, namely the Christian Gods effects can
clearly be seen. Let me give you three examples.

My Pastor was healed:

One of my best friends was healed:
Linda:
These are only three examples, the most powerful that have happened
immediately around me. However even just expanding my miracle story request
circle out to other people and churches a little bit immediately reveals a world of
other examples of how God has intervened in somebodies life to save them from a
sickness, emotional hurt, and a whole host of other things. Now I am not sure who
all is going to read this, but if you are some atheist across the internet it is likely
that you have already disregarded my stories as being embellished, or perhaps
completely fabricated. Before you do however it should be strongly noted that as a
Christian, I am committed to telling you the truth as accurately and reliably as I can.

Thankfully however you dont even need to rely on my testimony. A

New Testimate scholar by the name of Craig Keener has done a lengthy
investigation into the world of miracles. And he published a gigantic two
volume work on them titled Miracles: The Credibility of the New Testament
Accounts, where he addresses arguments posed against the credibility of the new
testament which say that they are non-credible simply because they contain miracle
stories. The way he does this is by documenting hundreds of miracle accounts,
many of them with pre and post cat scans, MRI scans and with the testimony of eye
witnesses and doctors. He also gave several presentations on these, where he
presents many of the miracle accounts he documented in his book. And so in the
case that you arent in the mood to spend the money for the book, you can just look
up his name on YouTube.

Now in returning to Stefans argument we now see that there is good warrant
to reject its second premise, even without addressing any of the ten other
commonly defended examples of seeing Gods effects that I mentioned earlier. And
in so doing, this charge of Gods nonexistence, promptly dissipates.

Other Arguments:
Stefan it appears is naught to four in having valid arguments of why God
cannot exist. After he purports these four in the book however he seems to just
consider it a settled issue that God does not exist and goes on for the most of the
rest of the book to work on dismantling agnosticism. However skipping further down
in his book on page thirty-nine he quickly lists a few arguments of why specifically
the Christian God cannot exist. Being a Christian myself I should like to quickly
respond to them as well.
1. That which exists must have been created, but God, who exists, was never
created.
The first part of this statement is flatly false. Something only must have been
created, not if it exists, but if it begins to exist. If something therefore such as God
exists eternally it could never have been created, because although it does exist, it
never began to do so at some point.
2. God is all-knowing and all-powerful, which are both impossible.
This is the only argument here that Stefan gives which is one of the four
arguments that he gave towards the beginning of his book, and so I have already
responded to it. Unless he has another, unmentioned reason why these two
attributes are incompatible.
3. God punishes a man for actions which are predetermined.

I really do wish that Stefan had taken time to give justification for these
arguments rather than just sort of spit them out. It leaves anyone trying to
understand or respond to what he is arguing to try and piece what he was thinking
when he gave the argument. The principle confusion I have over this argument is
that only possible formulation of this argument that actually works against my view,
only works if determinism is presupposed. This argument states that God, in
creating the universe knew and understand how everything initially will act and how
it will influence everything after it, which in the infinite mind of God is extrapolated
down through time to understand, based off of the initial conditions, exactly how to
universe and everything in it will act indefinitely into the future. And so the
argument presupposes determinism, which aside from being absurd according to
Stefan, is also not even true on a Christian worldview. So you cannot even in
principle show that belief in the Christian God is inconsistent from this argument.
4. God punishes rebellious angels, although their rebellion was completely
predetermined.
The response to this argument is the same as the response for the one
above. You cannot give the argument without presupposing determinism.
5. God claims to be morally perfect, although God fails the test of most of his 10
Commandments.
Stefan fails to give examples of this. I considered writing a response to the
most common examples from the overabundance that atheists typically give as to
show where God fails in his moral impunity. However, this is a response to Stefan
Molyneuxs book, and instead of guessing as to what he is specifically talking about
and therefore chasing after straw men it would be more appropriate to not offer a
response until he makes known what he is talking about here.