BILL OF RIGHTS

G.R. No. L-29646 November 10, 1978

MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, petitioner,
vs. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA, respondents.
This is a petition for certiorari to review tile decision dated September 17, 1968 of respondent Judge
Francisco Arca of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, in Civil Case No. 72797, the
dispositive portion of winch reads.
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the respondents,
declaring Ordinance No. 6 37 of the City of Manila null and void. The preliminary injunction is made
permanent. No pronouncement as to cost. SO ORDERED.Manila, Philippines, September 17, 1968.
The controverted Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22,
1968 and signed by the herein petitioner Mayor Antonio J. Villegas of Manila on March 27, 1968. 2
City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled:
AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO BE EMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE ENGAGED IN
ANY KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION WITHIN THE CITY OF MANILA WITHOUT
FIRST SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM THE MAYOR OF MANILA; AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES. 3
Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 4 prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or
participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent,
temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and
paying the permit fee of P50.00 except persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of
foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any
foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and members of religious
orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind.
Violations of this ordinance is punishable by an imprisonment of not less than three (3) months to six
(6) months or fine of not less than P100.00 but not more than P200.00 or both such fine and
imprisonment, upon conviction. 5
On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a
petition with the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, denominated as Civil Case No. 72797,
praying for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the
enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537 as well as for a judgment declaring said Ordinance No. 6537 null
and void. 6
In this petition, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho assigned the following as his grounds for wanting the
ordinance declared null and void:
1. As a revenue measure imposed on aliens employed in the City of Manila, Ordinance No.
6537 is discriminatory and violative of the rule of the uniformity in taxation;
2. As a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful
occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the
cost of registration and that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the action
of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative
powers:
3. It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus,
deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. 7
On May 24, 1968, respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on September 17,
1968 rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void and making permanent the writ
of preliminary injunction. 8
Contesting the aforecited decision of respondent Judge, then Mayor Antonio J. Villegas filed the
present petition on March 27, 1969. Petitioner assigned the following as errors allegedly committed
by respondent Judge in the latter's decision of September 17,1968: 9

I.

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN

RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE CARDINAL RULE OF
UNIFORMITY OF TAXATION.
II.
RESPONDENT JUDGE LIKEWISE COMMITTED A GRAVE AND PATENT ERROR OF
LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLE AGAINST
UNDUE DESIGNATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
III.
RESPONDENT JUDGE FURTHER COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF
LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION.
Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No. 6537 cannot be declared null and void on the
ground that it violated the rule on uniformity of taxation because the rule on uniformity of taxation
applies only to purely tax or revenue measures and that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue
measure but is an exercise of the police power of the state, it being principally a regulatory measure
in nature.
The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure because its principal
purpose is regulatory in nature has no merit. While it is true that the first part which requires that the
alien shall secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and
judgment in the processing and approval or disapproval of applications for employment permits and
therefore is regulatory in character the second part which requires the payment of P50.00 as
employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no logic or justification in exacting
P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. It is obvious that the purpose of the
ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation.
The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid
substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the
equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the
classification should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the
subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every
employed alien whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly
employee or a highly paid executive
Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of
his discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to
set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action, expresses no purpose to be attained by
requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus
conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building
permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or
prevent an activity per se lawful. 10
In Chinese Flour Importers Association vs. Price Stabilization Board, 11 where a law granted a
government agency power to determine the allocation of wheat flour among importers, the Supreme
Court ruled against the interpretation of uncontrolled power as it vested in the administrative officer an
arbitrary discretion to be exercised without a policy, rule, or standard from which it can be measured
or controlled.
It was also held in Primicias vs. Fugoso 12 that the authority and discretion to grant and refuse permits
of all classes conferred upon the Mayor of Manila by the Revised Charter of Manila is not
uncontrolled discretion but legal discretion to be exercised within the limits of the law.
Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to guide
the mayor in the exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the ordinance.
The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the
Constitution.
Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who
may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the
Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not
obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life
without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection
under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens. 13

The trial court did not commit the errors assigned.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Fernandez which affirms the lower court's judgment declaring
Ordinance No. 6537 of the City of Manila null and void for the reason that the employment of aliens within the
country is a matter of national policy and regulation, which properly pertain to the national government officials and
agencies concerned and not to local governments, such as the City of Manila, which after all are mere creations of
the national government.
The national policy on the matter has been determined in the statutes enacted by the legislature, viz, the various
Philippine nationalization laws which on the whole recognize the right of aliens to obtain gainful employment in the
country with the exception of certain specific fields and areas. Such national policies may not be interfered with,
thwarted or in any manner negated by any local government or its officials since they are not separate from and
independent of the national government.
As stated by the Court in the early case of Phil. Coop. Livestock Ass'n. vs. Earnshaw, 59 Phil. 129: "The City of
Manila is a subordinate body to the Insular (National Government ...). When the Insular (National) Government
adopts a policy, a municipality is without legal authority to nullify and set at naught the action of the superior
authority." Indeed, "not only must all municipal powers be exercised within the limits of the organic laws, but they
must be consistent with the general law and public policy of the particular state ..." (I McQuillin, Municipal
Corporations, 2nd sec. 367, P. 1011).
With more reason are such national policies binding on local governments when they involve our foreign relations
with other countries and their nationals who have been lawfully admitted here, since in such matters the views and
decisions of the Chief of State and of the legislature must prevail over those of subordinate and local governments
and officials who have no authority whatever to take official acts to the contrary.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Fernandez which affirms the lower court's judgment declaring
Ordinance No. 6537 of the City of Manila null and void for the reason that the employment of aliens within the
country is a matter of national policy and regulation, which properly pertain to the national government officials and
agencies concerned and not to local governments, such as the City of Manila, which after all are mere creations of
the national government.
The national policy on the matter has been determined in the statutes enacted by the legislature, viz, the various
Philippine nationalization laws which on the whole recognize the right of aliens to obtain gainful employment in the
country with the exception of certain specific fields and areas. Such national policies may not be interfered with,
thwarted or in any manner negated by any local government or its officials since they are not separate from and
independent of the national government.
As stated by the Court in the early case of Phil. Coop. Livestock Ass'n. vs. Earnshaw, 59 Phil. 129: "The City of
Manila is a subordinate body to the Insular (National Government ...). When the Insular (National) Government
adopts a policy, a municipality is without legal authority to nullify and set at naught the action of the superior
authority." Indeed, "not only must all municipal powers be exercised within the limits of the organic laws, but they
must be consistent with the general law and public policy of the particular state ..." (I McQuillin, Municipal
Corporations, 2nd sec. 367, P. 1011).
With more reason are such national policies binding on local governments when they involve our foreign relations
with other countries and their nationals who have been lawfully admitted here, since in such matters the views and
decisions of the Chief of State and of the legislature must prevail over those of subordinate and local governments
and officials who have no authority whatever to take official acts to the contrary.

G.R. No. L-24693

July 31, 1967
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR
INC. and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees, vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is
whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause. The lower
court held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void." For reasons to be
more specifically set forth, such judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite
showing to sustain an attack against its validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners,
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a
certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of the second petitioner" against the
respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the
general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders
for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the
petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its
eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly
licensed by both national and city authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood
to not less than 2,500 person and representing an investment of more than P3 million."1 (par. 2). It
was then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance
No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time
acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the
assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar
as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any
other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is
unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would
impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; that
the provision in the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest
or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the
prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname,
given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality,
the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age
and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport
number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has personally filled it up
and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative, with such registration forms and records kept and bound together, it also being
provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for
inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is
unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or
oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of
the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged
ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring the maintenance of certain minimum
facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and
laundry similarly offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and
oppressive, a conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels
to have a dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person

less than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common
inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner,
manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or
portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of
certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty
provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would, cause the
automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the
business and loss of its investments, there is once again a transgression of the due process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the
above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of
preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760
from and after July 8, 1963.
In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal circumstances
regarding the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or
motel business in the City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged
nullity, whether on statutory or constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to
state a cause of action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a proper
purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power and that only the
guests or customers not before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy
and the guaranty against self incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary
injunction ex parte was contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the dismissal
of the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of facts dated
September 28, 1964, which reads:
1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar Inc. are duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines, both with offices in the City of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chin is the president and
general manager of Hotel del Mar Inc., and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue
and be sued;
2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief executive of the City of Manila charged with
the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution
and enforcement of such ordinances;
3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and motels in Malate and Ermita districts in
Manila;
4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, which was approved on June 14,
1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the respondent regular City Mayor,
amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila besides inserting
therein three new sections. This ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in
its 4th Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);
5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted with the proposed ordinance (now Ordinance
4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex C;
6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from license fees paid by the 105 hotels and motels
(including herein petitioners) operating in the City of Manila.1wph1.t

Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on the
presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of conformity
to the Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise
applicable American authorities. Such a memorandum likewise refuted point by point the arguments
advanced by petitioners against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the
memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the petition, with
citations of what they considered to be applicable American authorities and praying for a judgment
declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ
of preliminary injunction issued.
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association, and
referring to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party, the lower court observed: "The
only remaining issue here being purely a question of law, the parties, with the nod of the Court,
agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to submit the case for decision of the Court." It does appear
obvious then that without any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision passed upon the
alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly
right and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila to
regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of

Manila, would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void." It made permanent the preliminary
injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from enforcing the
ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of
a fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping
condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with
what has hitherto been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and
substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed
categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the
elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very
nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts
and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by
enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being
of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a
clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.2
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to
rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here.
The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v.
Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,3 where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely
and succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly
within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific
method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of
law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character,
the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for
overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court
deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must
prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as being
repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with the
due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power
measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of
nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise
would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly
characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,4 extending as it does
"to all the great public needs."5 It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the
very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to
promote public health, public morals, public safety and the genera welfare.6 Negatively put, police
power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to
the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.7
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included as
annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery
and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a
necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for
prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine
harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests
to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and
by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that
characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees
was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal"
and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government." It would appear therefore that

the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues
eloquently for it.
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its approval, ordinances
punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant;8 provide a license tax for and
regulating the maintenance or operation of public dance halls;9 prohibiting gambling;10 prohibiting
jueteng;11 and monte;12prohibiting playing of panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal
holidays;13 prohibiting the operation of pinball machines;14 and prohibiting any person from keeping,
conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where opium is smoked or otherwise
used,15 all of which are intended to protect public morals.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the exercise of
the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of
the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties
however, the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any
person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either
capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other
applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.
We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is raised to the
question of due process.16 There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes
though a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life,
liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which
must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any
governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It
is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put,
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official
action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression.
Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has
been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.17 It
exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in
the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal
and political thought."18 It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time,
place and circumstances,"19 decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive
inquiry into fundamental principles of our society."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated
narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.21
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a
municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious
exercise of authority. It would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable and what would
amount to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of
the state of public morals. To be more specific, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need
for a remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment of the challenged ordinance. A strong case
must be found in the records, and, as has been set forth, none is even attempted here to attach to an
ordinance of such character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process
requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment
of Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such features as the increased fees for
motels and hotels, the curtailment of the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its
alleged vagueness. Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for
by the challenged ordinance for hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter,
first-class motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly.
It has been the settled law however, as far back as 1922 that municipal license fees could be
classified into those imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or
restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only.22 As was
explained more in detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are
also incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to

license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a
much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the wellknown legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical,
courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing
restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of
course, generally an important factor in the determination of the amount of this kind of license fee.
Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld,
especially in of licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been
declared unreasonable.23 Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24 this Court affirmed
the doctrine earlier announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to
implement the state's police power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to affirm that the
broad taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities is
sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is
for public purposes, just and uniform.25 As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude
enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case
that "much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the license
fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power
measure.26 The discussion of this particular matter may fitly close with this pertinent citation from
another decision of significance: "It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement
of the ordinance could deprive them of their lawful occupation and means of livelihood because they
cannot rent stalls in the public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or
cold storage meat, the sale of which outside the city markets under certain conditions is permitted x x
x . And surely, the mere fact, that some individuals in the community may be deprived of their present
business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. As
was said in a case, persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest
be affected by the exercise of the police power embark in these occupations subject to the
disadvantages which may result from the legal exercise of that power." 27
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it
unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging
house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent room or portion thereof more than twice every
24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, call for a different conclusion.
Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. It
is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral
or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to the explanatory note, are being
devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there appears a correspondence between
the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction.
Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of
liberty which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus: "One thought which runs
through all these different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in
democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the
good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general wellbeing. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right
of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good x x
x The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order
and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power." 28
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the state x x x To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to
prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to
prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the

required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that
there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for
all.29 It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of undue
deprivation of freedom to contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer "retains its virtuality as a living
principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the
government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public
interest.31 What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or
the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but
where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
measure is wider.32 How justify then the allegation of a denial of due process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by invoking the
principles of vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the petition itself that what
seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed and specific
rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners, however, point to the requirement that a guest should give
the name, relationship, age and sex of the companion or companions as indefinite and uncertain in
view of the necessity for determining whether the companion or companions referred to are those
arriving with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room With him at about
the same time or coming at any indefinite time later to join him; a proviso in one of its sections which
cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the discretion
of its owners or operators; another proviso which from their standpoint would require a guess as to
whether the "full rate of payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means a full day's or
merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked, do these allegations suffice to render the ordinance void on
its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it. From Connally v.
General Construction Co.33 toAdderley v. Florida,34 the principle has been consistently upheld that
what makes a statute susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the
doing of an act that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application. Is this the situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove
illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit
but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously
mean."35
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the arguments pressed
with such vigor and determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged ordinance cannot
be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for constitutional law principles so uniformly held and
so uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted forthwith. With
costs.

G.R. No. L-14078

March 7, 1919
RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,
vs. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.
In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History
(Worcester vs. Georgia [1832], 6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall, the first luminary of American
jurisprudence, began his opinion (relating to the status of an Indian) with words which, with a slight
change in phraseology, can be made to introduce the present opinion This cause, in every point of
view in which it can be placed, is of the deepest interest. The legislative power of state, the controlling
power of the constitution and laws, the rights if they have any, the political existence of a people, the
personal liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to be considered.
To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and proceed first, to
introduce the facts and the issues, next to give a history of the so called "non-Christians," next to
compare the status of the "non-Christians" with that of the American Indians, and, lastly, to resolve
the constitutional questions presented.
I. INTRODUCTION.

This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of
Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established
at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the
provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.
The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:
1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25
which is as follows:
The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the following resolution:
"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the advancement of the non-Christian people of
Mindoro, which were all a failure,
"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other measure is taken for the Mangyan work of
this province, no successful result will be obtained toward educating these people.
"Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one place in order to make a permanent settlement,
"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized,
when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up
their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.
"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place most
convenient for the Mangyanes to live on, Now, therefore be it
"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of
Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro
subject to the approval of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and
"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said
homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor."
2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro was approved by the
Secretary of the Interior of February 21, 1917.
3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2 which
says:
"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current series, has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on
Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.
"Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the Honorable, the Secretary of the Interior, on February 21,
1917.
"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of Mindoro, pursuant to the provisions of section 2145 of
the revised Administrative Code, do hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and
the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to
take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than December 31, 1917.
"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be
imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised
Administrative Code."
4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the executive order of
the governor of the same province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the protection of
the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to
introduce civilized customs among them.
5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of
Tigbao and are liable to be punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711.
6. That the undersigned has not information that Doroteo Dabalos is being detained by the sheriff of
Mindoro but if he is so detained it must be by virtue of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and 2759 of
Act No. 2711.

It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the
Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan,
selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in
accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the
Secretary of the Interior as required by said action. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this
section of the Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the paramount question which the court
is called upon the decide.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows: SEC. 2145. Establishment of nonChristina upon sites selected by provincial governor. With the prior approval of the Department
Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is
authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such

inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an
approved by the provincial board.
In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted section 2759 of the same
Code, which read as follows: SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation.
Any non-Christian who shall refuse to comply with the directions lawfully given by a provincial
governor, pursuant to section two thousand one hundred and forty-five of this Code, to take up
habitation upon a site designated by said governor shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period
not exceeding sixty days.
The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to Philippine law. The
genealogical tree of this section, if we may be permitted to use such terminology, would read: Section
2077, Administrative Code of 1916; section 62, Act No. 1397; section 2 of various special provincial
laws, notably of Act No. 547, specifically relating to the Manguianes; section 69, Act No. 387.
Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians." This word, as will later
be disclosed, is also found in varying forms in other laws of the Philippine Islands. In order to put the
phrase in its proper category, and in order to understand the policy of the Government of the
Philippine Islands with reference to the uncivilized elements of the Islands, it is well first of all to set
down a skeleton history of the attitude assumed by the authorities towards these "non-Christians,"
with particular regard for the legislation on the subject.
II. HISTORY.
A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED STATES.
The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at hand are compiled in
Book VI, Title III, in the following language.
The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21, 1551. Philip II at Toledo,
on February 19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on September 13, 1565. In the Escorial on November
10, 1568. Ordinance 149 of the poblaciones of 1573. In San Lorenzo, on May 20, 1578,
THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES" COMMUNITIES). In order that
the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and the evangelical law, and in order that
they may forget the blunders of their ancient rites and ceremonies to the end that they may live in
harmony and in a civilized manner, it has always been endeavored, with great care and special
attention, to use all the means most convenient to the attainment of these purposes. To carry out this
work with success, our Council of the Indies and other religious persons met at various times; the
prelates of new Spain assembled by order of Emperor Charles V of glorious memory in the year one
thousand five hundred and forty-six all of which meetings were actuated with a desire to serve God
an our Kingdom. At these meetings it was resolved that indios be made to live in communities, and
not to live in places divided and separated from one another by sierras and mountains, wherein they
are deprived of all spiritual and temporal benefits and wherein they cannot profit from the aid of our
ministers and from that which gives rise to those human necessities which men are obliged to give
one another. Having realized that convenience of this resolution, our kings, our predecessors, by
different orders, have entrusted and ordered the viceroys, presidents, and governors to execute with
great care and moderation the concentration of the indios intoreducciones; and to deal with their
doctrine with such forbearance and gentleness, without causing inconveniences, so that those who
would not presently settle and who would see the good treatment and the protection of those already
in settlements would, of their own accord, present themselves, and it is ordained that they be not
required to pay taxes more than what is ordered. Because the above has been executed in the
greater part of our Indies, we hereby order and decree that the same be complied with in all the
remaining parts of the Indies, and the encomederos shall entreat compliance thereof in the manner
and form prescribed by the laws of this title.
Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10, 1618.
THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW. The
places where in the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should have the facilities of waters.
lands, and mountains, ingress and egress, husbandry and passageway of one league long, wherein
the indios can have their live stock that they may not be mixed with those of the Spaniards.
THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE LANDS PREVIOUSLY
HELD BY THEM. With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated

in reducciones. Provided they shall not be deprived of the lands and granaries which they may have
in the places left by them. We hereby order that no change shall be made in this respect, and that
they be allowed to retain the lands held by them previously so that they may cultivate them and profit
therefrom.
THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING, VICEROY, OR
COURT. No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the right to alter or to
remove thepueblos or the reducciones once constituted and founded, without our express order or
that of the viceroy, president, or the royal district court, provided, however, that the encomenderos,
priests, or indios request such a change or consent to it by offering or giving information to that en.
And, because these claims are often made for private interests and not for those of the indios, we
hereby order that this law be always complied with, otherwise the change will be considered
fraudulently obtained. The penalty of one thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the judge
or encomendero who should violate this
THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES," WHO SHALL BE "INDIOS."
We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who should be an indio of the
same reduccion; if there be more than eighty houses, there should be two mayors and two aldermen,
also indios; and, even if the town be a big one, there should, nevertheless, be more than two mayors
and four aldermen, If there be less than eighty indios but not less than forty, there should be not more
than one mayor and one alderman, who should annually elect nine others, in the presence of the
priests , as is the practice in town inhabited by Spaniards and indios.
THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO SPANIARDS, NEGROES,
"MESTIZOS," AND MULATTOES. We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattores,
or mestizos to live to live in the reduccionesand towns and towns of the indios, because it has been
found that some Spaniards who deal, trade, live, and associate with the indios are men of
troublesome nature, of dirty ways of living; robbers, gamblers, and vicious and useless men; and, to
avoid the wrongs done them, the indios would leave their towns and provinces; and the
negroes, mestizos, and mulattoes, besides maltreating them and utilizing their services, contaminate
them with their bad customs, idleness, and also some of their blunders and vices which may corrupt
and pervert the goal which we desire to reach with regard to their salvation, increase, and tranquillity.
We hereby order the imposition of grave penalties upon the commission of the acts above-mentioned
which should not be tolerated in the towns, and that the viceroys, presidents, governors, and courts
take great care in executing the law within their powers and avail themselves of the cooperation of the
ministers who are truly honest. As regards the mestizos and Indian and Chinese half-breeds
(zambaigos), who are children of indias and born among them, and who are to inherit their houses
andhaciendas, they all not be affected by this law, it appearing to be a harsh thing to separate them
from their parents
A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to improve the condition of
the less advanced inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them in "reducciones," is found in the
Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881, reading as follows: It is
a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a territory recognized as an integral
part of a nation should respect and obey the laws in force therein; while, on other hand, it is the duty
to conscience and to humanity for all governments to civilize those backward races that might exist in
the nation, and which living in the obscurity of ignorance, lack of all the nations which enable them to
grasp the moral and material advantages that may be acquired in those towns under the protection
and vigilance afforded them by the same laws. It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to
tolerate any longer the separation and isolation of the non-Christian races from the social life of the
civilized and Christian towns; to allow any longer the commission of depredations, precisely in the
Island of Luzon wherein is located the seat of the representative of the Government of the,
metropolis. It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied themselves with this
most important question, and that much has been heretofore accomplished with the help and selfdenial of the missionary fathers who have even sacrificed their lives to the end that those degenerate
races might be brought to the principles of Christianity, but the means and the preaching employed to
allure them have been insufficient to complete the work undertaken. Neither have the punishments

imposed been sufficient in certain cases and in those which have not been guarded against, thus
giving and customs of isolation. As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable
state of things, taking into account the prestige which the country demands and the inevitable duty
which every government has in enforcing respect and obedience to the national laws on the part of all
who reside within the territory under its control, I have proceeded in the premises by giving the most
careful study of this serious question which involves important interests for civilization, from the moral
and material as well as the political standpoints. After hearing the illustrious opinions of all the local
authorities, ecclesiastics, and missionaries of the provinces of Northern Luzon, and also after finding
the unanimous conformity of the meeting held with the Archbishop of Manila, the Bishops of Jaro and
Cebu, and the provincial prelates of the orders of the Dominicans, Agustinians, Recoletos,
Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the meeting of the Council of Authorities, held for the object so
indicated, I have arrived at an intimate conviction of the inevitable necessity of proceeding in a
practical manner for the submission of the said pagan and isolated races, as well as of the manner
and the only form of accomplishing such a task.
For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these objects, I hereby promulgate
the following: DECREE.
1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Islands of Luzon are, from this date, to be governed by the common law,
save those exceptions prescribed in this decree which are bases upon the differences of instructions, of the
customs, and of the necessities of the different pagan races which occupy a part of its territory.
2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races which may be divided into three classes;
one, which comprises those which live isolated and roaming about without forming a town nor a home; another,
made up of those subdued pagans who have not as yet entered completely the social life; and the third, of those
mountain and rebellious pagans shall be published in their respective dialects, and the officials, priests, and
missionaries of the provinces wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in the work of having these races
learn these rules. These rules shall have executive character, beginning with the first day of next April, and, as to
their compliance, they must be observed in the manner prescribed below.
3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed, from now on, with all the means which their
zeal may suggest to them, to the taking of the census of the inhabitants of the towns or settlement already
subdued, and shall adopt the necessary regulations for the appointment of local authorities, if there be none as
yet; for the construction of courts and schools, and for the opening or fixing up of means of communication,
endeavoring, as regards the administrative organization of the said towns or settlements, that this be finished
before the first day of next July, so that at the beginning of the fiscal year they shall have the same rights and
obligations which affect the remaining towns of the archipelago, with the only exception that in the first two years
they shall not be obliged to render personal services other than those previously indicated.
4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located infertile lands appropriate for cultivation, the inhabitants
thereof shall not be obliged to move their dwelling-houses; and only in case of absolute necessity shall a new
residence be fixed for them, choosing for this purpose the place most convenient for them and which prejudices
the least their interest; and, in either of these cases, an effort must be made to establish their homes with the
reach of the sound of the bell.
5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be established an armed force composed precisely
of native Christian, the organization and service of which shall be determined in a regulations based upon that of
the abolished Tercios de Policia (division of the Guardia Civil).
6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns understand all the rights and duties affecting
them and the liberty which they have as to where and now they shall till their lands and sell the products thereof,
with the only exception of the tobacco which shall be bought by the Hacienda at the same price and conditions
allowed other producers, and with the prohibition against these new towns as well as the others from engaging in
commerce of any other transaction with the rebellious indios, the violation of which shall be punished with
deportation.
7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the territory of the rebellious indiosshall be fixed;
and whoever should go beyond the said limits shall be detained and assigned governmentally wherever
convenient.
8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the fraternity of the Catholic Church, all by this fact
along be exempt for eight years from rendering personal labor.
9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not subdued (aetas and mountains igorrots the
following advantages in returns for their voluntary submission: to live in towns; unity among their families;
concession of good lands and the right to cultivate them in the manner they wish and in the way them deem most
productive; support during a year, and clothes upon effecting submission; respect for their habits and customs in
so far as the same are not opposed to natural law; freedom to decide of their own accord as to whether they want
to be Christians or not; the establishment of missions and families of recognized honesty who shall teach, direct,
protect, and give them security and trust them; the purchase or facility of the sale of their harvests; the exemption

10.

11.

12.

13.
14.

15.

from contributions and tributes for ten years and from thequintas (a kind of tax) for twenty years; and lastly, that
those who are governed by the local authorities as the ones who elect such officials under the direct charge of
the authorities of the province or district.
The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the advantages offered, shall, in return, have
the obligation of constituting their new towns, of constructing their town hall, schools, and country roads which
place them in communication with one another and with the Christians; provided, the location of these towns be
distant from their actual residences, when the latter do not have the good conditions of location and cultivations,
and provided further the putting of families in a place so selected by them be authorized in the towns already
constituted.
The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the tribes, that, disregarding the peace,
protection, and advantages offered them, continue in their rebellious attitude on the first of next April, committing
from now on the crimes and vexations against the Christian towns; and for the this purposes, the Captain
General's Office shall proceed with the organization of the divisions of the Army which, in conjunction with the
rural guards (cuadrilleros), shall have to enter the territory of such tribes. On the expiration of the term, they shall
destroy their dwelling-houses, labors, and implements, and confiscate their products and cattle. Such a
punishment shall necessarily be repeated twice a year, and for this purpose the military headquarters shall
immediately order a detachment of the military staff to study the zones where such operations shall take place
and everything conducive to the successful accomplishment of the same.
The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missioners, local authorities, and other subordinates to my authorities, local
authorities, and other subordinates to may authority, civil as well as military authorities, shall give the most
effective aid and cooperation to the said forces in all that is within the attributes and the scope of the authority of
each.
With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the provinces in the southern part of the
Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the preceding provisions shall conveniently be applied to them.
There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, Vice-Royal Patron, a council or permanent
commission which shall attend to and decide all the questions relative to the application of the foregoing
regulations that may be brought to it for consultations by the chiefs of provinces and priests and missionaries.
The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to the foregoing, in brining about due
compliance with this decree, shall be promulgated by the respective official centers within their respective
jurisdictions.

B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.

Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question as to the best
method for dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing one.
1. ORGANIC LAW.
The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American Government in the
Philippines was President McKinley's Instructions to the Commission of April 7, 1900, later expressly
approved and ratified by section 1 of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Portions
of these instructions have remained undisturbed by subsequent congressional legislation. One
paragraph of particular interest should here be quoted, namely: In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of
the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course followed by Congress in permitting the
tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government and under
which many of these tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to
which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal governments should, however, be
subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active
effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs.
Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the nature of an Organic Act for
the Philippines. The purpose of section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to provide for a legislative body
and, with this end in view, to name the prerequisites for the organization of the Philippine Assembly.
The Philippine Legislature, composed of the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly, was
to have jurisdiction over the Christian portion of the Islands. The Philippine Commission was to retain
exclusive jurisdiction of that part of said Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law. This transferred the exclusive legislative
jurisdiction and authority theretofore exercised by the Philippine Commission, to the Philippine
Legislature (sec. 12). It divided the Philippine Islands into twelve senatorial districts, the twelfth district
to be composed of the Mountain Province, Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and the Department of Mindanao
and Sulu. The Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was authorized to appoint senators and
representatives for the territory which, at the time of the passage of the Jones Law, was not

represented in the Philippine Assembly, that is, for the twelfth district (sec. 16). The law establish a
bureau to be known as the "Bureau of non-Christian Tribes" which shall have general supervision
over the public affairs of the inhabitants which are represented in the Legislature by appointed
senators and representatives( sec. 22).
Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognized a dividing line between the territory not
inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which Moros or other non-Christian
tribes, and the territory which is inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
2. STATUTE LAW.
Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of the Philippine
Commission and Legislature. The most notable are Acts Nos. 48 and 49 concerning the Province of
Benguet and the Igorots; Act NO. 82, the Municipal Code; ;Act no. 83, the Provincial Government Act;
Act No. 183, the Character of the city of Manila; Act No. 7887, providing for the organization and
government of the Moro Province; Act No. 1396, the Special Provincial Government Act; Act No.
1397, the Township Government Act; Act No. 1667, relating to the organization of settlements; Act No.
1963, the Baguio charger; and Act No. 2408, the Organic Act of the Department of Mindanao and
Sulu. The major portion of these laws have been carried forward into the Administrative Codes of
1916 an d1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of the primitive
peoples. Beginning with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, enacted on April 9, 1902, by the United States
Philippine Commission, having reference to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 4111, 422, 445,
500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145, 4568, 1306 were enacted for the provinces of
Abra, Antique, Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela. Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva
Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. As an example of these
laws, because referring to the Manguianes, we insert Act No. 547:
No. 547. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL CIVIL
GOVERNMENTS FOR THE MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE OF MINDORO.
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Commission, that:
SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro have not progressed sufficiently in
civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government, the provincial
governor is authorized, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, in dealing with these
Manguianes to appoint officers from among them, to fix their designations and badges of office, and to
prescribe their powers and duties: Provided, That the powers and duties thus prescribed shall not be in
excess of those conferred upon township officers by Act Numbered Three hundred and eighty-seven
entitled "An Act providing for the establishment of local civil Governments in the townships and
settlements of Nueva Vizcaya."
SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial governor is further
authorized, when he deems such a course necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
Manguianes to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and
approved by the provincial board. Manguianes who refuse to comply with such directions shall upon
conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.
SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of his province to acquire the
knowledge and experience necessary for successful local popular government, and his supervision and
control over them shall be exercised to this end, an to the end that law and order and individual freedom
shall be maintained.
SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any settlement of Manguianes has
advanced sufficiently to make such a course practicable, it may be organized under the provisions of
sections one to sixty-seven, inclusive, of Act Numbered three hundred and eighty-seven, as a township,
and the geographical limits of such township shall be fixed by the provincial board.
SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the passage of the same is hereby
expedited in accordance with section two of 'An Act prescribing the order of procedure by the
Commission in the enactment of laws,' passed September twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred.
SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.

All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by Act No. 1396 and
1397. The last named Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in general language. In turn, Act
No. 1397 was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916. The two Administrative Codes retained
the provisions in questions.
These different laws, if they of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and
consistent practice with reference to the methods to be followed for their advancement.

C. TERMINOLOGY.
The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in varying forms.
"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instruction to the Commission.
The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian tribes." These words are
to be found in section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in section 22 of the Jones Law. They are also to be
found in Act No. 253 of the Philippines Commission, establishing a Bureau of non-Christian Tribes
and in Act No. 2674 of the Philippine Legislature, carried forward into sections 701-705 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, reestablishing this Bureau. Among other laws which contain the phrase,
there can be mentioned Acts Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550, 1397, 1639, and 2551.
"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos" have been the
favorite nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since the coming into being of a
Filipinized legislature. These terms can be found in sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394, Administrative
Code of 1916; sections 701-705, 2145, 2422, 2426, Administrative Code of 1917; and in Acts Nos.
2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the Philippine Legislatures, as well as in Act No. 1667 of the Philippine
Commission.
The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian" shall include
Mohammedans and pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of 1917; sec. 2561, Administrative
Code of 1916, taken from Act No. 2408, sec. 3.)
D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."
If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of course result in giving
to it a religious signification. Obviously, Christian would be those who profess the Christian religion,
and non-Christians, would be those who do not profess the Christian religion. In partial corroboration
of this view, there could also be cited section 2576 of the last Administrative Code and certain wellknown authorities, as Zuiga, "Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt,
"Philippine Tribes and Languages," and Dr. N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of Malayan Filipinos." (See
Blair & Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898, vol. III, p. 300, note; Craig-Benitez,
"Philippine Progress prior to 1898," vol. I. p. 107.)
Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate further to ascertain what is
its true meaning.
In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to be seen by the
provisions of many laws. Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the authority of the Philippine
Assembly was recognized in the "territory" of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or other nonChristian tribes. Again, the Jones Law confers similar recognition in the authorization of the twelfth
senatorial district for the "territory not now represented in the Philippine Assembly." The Philippines
Legislature has, time and again, adopted acts making certain other acts applicable to that "part" of the
Philippine Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative Code. The first section
of this article, preceding section 2145, makes the provisions of the article applicable only in specially
organized provinces. The specially organized provinces are the Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya,
Mindoro, Batanes, and Palawan. These are the provinces to which the Philippine Legislature has
never seen fit to give all the powers of local self-government. They do not, however, exactly coincide
with the portion of the Philippines which is not granted popular representation. Nevertheless, it is still
a geographical description.
It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live persons some of who are
Christians and some of whom are not Christians. In fact, the law specifically recognizes this. ( Sec.
2422, Administrative Code of 1917, etc.)
If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so against the geographical conception is likewise
inadquate. The reason it that the motive of the law relates not to a particular people, because of their
religion, or to a particular province because of its location, but the whole intent of the law is predicated
n the civilization or lack of civilization of the inhabitants.
At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic words usually introduce
the term. "The so-called non-Christian" is a favorite expression. The Secretary of the Interior who for
so many years had these people under his jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact
designation, speaks of the "backward Philippine peoples, commonly known as the 'non-Christian
tribes."' (See Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-third

Congress, third session on H.R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose of the People of the United
States as to the future political status of the Philippine Islands and to provide a more autonomous
government for the Islands, pp. 346, 351; letter of the Secretary of the Interior of June 30, 1906,
circulated by the Executive Secretary.)
The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization, is substantiated
by reference to legislative, judicial, and executive authority.
The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674, and sections 701 et
seq, and sections 2422 et seq, of the Administrative Code of 1917. For instance, Act No. 253 charged
the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to conduct "systematic investigations with reference to nonChristian tribes . . . with special view to determining the most practicable means for bringing about
their advancement in civilization and material property prosperity."
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United
States vs. Tubban [Kalinga] ([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The question here arose as to the effect of a tribal
marriage in connection with article 423 of the Penal code concerning the husband who surprises his
wife in the act of adultery. In discussing the point, the court makes use of the following language:we
are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a tribal marriage of so-called nonChristians or members of uncivilized tribes, celebrated within that province without compliance with
the requisites prescribed by General Orders no. 68. . . . We hold also that the fact that the accused is
shown to be a member of an uncivilized tribe, of a low order of intelligence, uncultured and
uneducated, should be taken into consideration as a second marked extenuating circumstance.
Of much more moment is the uniform construction of execution officials who have been called upon
to interpret and enforce the law. The official who, as a member of the Philippine Commission, drafted
much of the legislation relating to the so-called Christians and who had these people under his
authority, was the former Secretary of the Interior. Under date of June 30, 1906, this official
addressed a letter to all governor of provinces, organized under the Special Provincial Government
Act, a letter which later received recognition by the Governor-General and was circulated by the
Executive Secretary, reading as follows:
Sir: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether people who were originally
non-Christian but have recently been baptized or who are children of persons who have been
recently baptized are, for the purposes of Act 1396 and 1397, to be considered Christian or nonChristians.
It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in these islands which are not
advanced far in civilization, to hit upon any suitable designation which will fit all cases. The number
of individual tribes is so great that it is almost out of the question to enumerate all of them in an
Act. It was finally decided to adopt the designation 'non-Christians' as the one most satisfactory,
but the real purpose of the Commission was not so much to legislate for people having any
particular religious belief as for those lacking sufficient advancement so that they could, to their
own advantage, be brought under the Provincial Government Act and the Municipal Code.
The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of civilization to which the
person baptized has attained at the time the act of baptism is performed. For practical purposes,
therefore, you will give the member of so-called "wild tribes" of your province the benefit of the
doubt even though they may recently have embraced Christianity.
The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain under the jurisdiction
of regularly organized municipalities or what form of government shall be afforded to them should
be the degree of civilization to which they have attained and you are requested to govern yourself
accordingly.
I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who concurs in the opinion
above expressed and who will have the necessary instructions given to the governors of the
provinces organized under the Provincial Government Act.
The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of this court, has the
following to say on the subject:
As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate, but while no other better
classification has as yet been made the present classification should be allowed to stand . . . I
believe the term carries the same meaning as the expressed in the letter of the Secretary of the

Interior (of June 30, 1906, herein quoted). It is indicative of the degree of civilization rather than of
religious denomination, for the hold that it is indicative of religious denomination will make the law
invalid as against that Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom.
Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was the Collector of Internal
Revenue. The question arose for ruling relatives to the cedula taxation of the Manobos and the Aetas.
Thereupon, the view of the Secretary of the Interior was requested on the point, who, by return
indorsement, agreed with the interpretation of the Collector of Internal Revenue. This Construction of
the Collector of Internal Revenue can be found in circular letter No. 188 of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, dated June 11, 1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214):
The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes" from the payment of cedula
taxes. The Collector of Internal Revenue has interpreted this provision of law to mean not that
persons who profess some form of Christian worship are alone subject to the cedula tax, and that
all other person are exempt; he has interpreted it to mean that all persons preserving tribal
relations with the so-called non-Christian tribes are exempt from the cedula tax, and that all others,
including Jews, Mohammedans, Confucians, Buddists, etc., are subject to said tax so long as they
live in cities or towns, or in the country in a civilized condition. In other words, it is not so much a
matter of a man's form of religious worship or profession that decides whether or not he is subject
to the cedula tax; it is more dependent on whether he is living in a civilized manner or is associated
with the mountain tribes, either as a member thereof or as a recruit. So far, this question has not
come up as to whether a Christian, maintaining his religious belief, but throwing his lot and living
with a non-Christian tribe, would or would not be subject to the cedula tax. On one occasion a
prominent Hebrew of Manila claimed to this office that he was exempt from the cedula tax,
inasmuch as he was not a Christian. This Office, however, continued to collect cedula taxes from
all the Jews, East Indians, Arabs, Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large proportion of the
cedula taxes paid in this city are paid by men belonging to the nationalities mentioned. Chinamen,
Arabs and other s are quite widely scattered throughout the Islands, and a condition similar to that
which exist in Manila also exists in most of the large provincial towns. Cedula taxes are therefore
being collected by this Office in all parts of these Islands on the broad ground that civilized people
are subject to such taxes, and non-civilized people preserving their tribal relations are not subject
thereto.
On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular letter No. 327,
approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice, to all provincial treasurers. This letter in part
reads:
In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers regarding cedula
taxes due from members of non-Christian tribes when they come in from the hills for the purposes
of settling down and becoming members of the body politic of the Philippine Islands, the following
clarification of the laws governing such questions and digest of rulings thereunder is hereby
published for the information of all concerned:
Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by reason of the fact that
they do not profess Christianity, but because of their uncivilized mode of life and low state of
development. All inhabitants of the Philippine Islands classed as members of non-Christian tribes
may be divided into three classes in so far as the cedula tax law is concerned . . .
Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and uncivilized mode of life, severs
whatever tribal relations he may have had and attaches himself civilized community, belonging a
member of the body politic, he thereby makes himself subject to precisely the same law that
governs the other members of that community and from and after the date when he so attaches
himself to the community the same cedula and other taxes are due from him as from other
members thereof. If he comes in after the expiration of the delinquency period the same rule
should apply to him as to persons arriving from foreign countries or reaching the age of eighteen
subsequent to the expiration of such period, and a regular class A, D, F, or H cedula, as the case
may be, should be furnished him without penalty and without requiring him to pay the tax for former
years.
In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in determining whether or not a man is
subject to the regular cedula tax is not the circumstance that he does or does not profess Christianity,

nor even his maintenance of or failure to maintain tribal relations with some of the well known wild
tribes, but his mode of life, degree of advancement in civilization and connection or lack of connection
with some civilized community. For this reason so called "Remontados" and "Montescos" will be
classed by this office as members of non-Christian tribes in so far as the application of the Internal
Revenue Law is concerned, since, even though they belong to no well recognized tribe, their mode of
life, degree of advancement and so forth are practically the same as those of the Igorrots and
members of other recognized non-Christina tribes.
The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal Revenue Regulations
No. 1, promulgated by Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector of Internal Revenue, and approved on
April 16, 1915, by Honorable Victorino Mapa, Secretary of Finance and Justice. Section 30 of the
regulations is practically a transcript of Circular Letter No. 327.
The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief of Constabulary
request the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the status of a non-Christian who has been baptized
by a minister of the Gospel. The precise questions were these: "Does he remain non-Christian or is
he entitled to the privileges of a Christian? By purchasing intoxicating liquors, does he commit an
infraction of the law and does the person selling same lay himself liable under the provision of Act No.
1639?" The opinion of Attorney-General Avancea, after quoting the same authorities hereinbefore
set out, concludes:
In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that is probable that the person in
question remains a non-Christian, so that, in purchasing intoxicating liquors both he and the person
selling the same make themselves liable to prosecution under the provisions of Act No. 1639. At
least, I advise you that these should be the constructions place upon the law until a court shall hold
otherwise.
Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:
With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants has in the provisions of the
Administrative code which we are studying, we submit that said phrase does not have its natural
meaning which would include all non-Christian inhabitants of the Islands, whether Filipino or
strangers, civilized or uncivilized, but simply refers to those uncivilized members of the nonChristian tribes of the Philippines who, living without home or fixed residence, roam in the
mountains, beyond the reach of law and order . . .
The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the inhabitants of the
Philippines which live in tribes as non-Christian tribes, as distinguished from the common Filipinos
which carry on a social and civilized life, did not intended to establish a distinction based on the
religious beliefs of the individual, but, without dwelling on the difficulties which later would be
occasioned by the phrase, adopted the expression which the Spanish legislation employed to
designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines.
The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077 and 2741 of Act No.
2657 (articles 2145 and 2759) should be understood as equivalent to members of uncivilized tribes
of the Philippines, not only because this is the evident intention of the law, but because to give it its
lateral meaning would make the law null and unconstitutional as making distinctions base the
religion of the individual.
The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than De. David P. Barrows,
then "Chief of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes," divides the population in the Christian or Civilized
Tribes, and non-Christian or Wild Tribes. (Census of the Philippine Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et
seq). The present Director of the Census, Hon. Ignacio Villamor, writes that the classification likely to
be used in the Census now being taken is: "Filipinos and Primitive Filipinos." In a Pronouncing
Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, prepared in the Bureau of Insular
Affairs, War Department, a sub-division under the title non-Christian tribes is, "Physical and Political
Characteristics of the non-Christian Tribes," which sufficiently shows that the terms refers to culture
and not to religion.
In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and different executive officials,
specifically, join in the proposition that the term "non-Christian" refers, not to religious belief, but, in a
way , to geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a law grade of
civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.

E. THE MANGUIANES.
The so-called non-Christians are in various state approaching civilization. The Philippine Census of
1903 divided them into four classes. Of the third class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of
Mindoro.
Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimilogia de los nombres
de Rozas de Filipinas, says: In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies "savage,"
"mountainer," "pagan," "negro." It may be that the use of this word is applicable to a great number of
Filipinos, but nevertheless it has been applied only to certain inhabitants of Mindoro. Even in primitive
times without doubt this name was given to those of that island who bear it to-day, but its employed in
three Filipino languages shows that the radical ngian had in all these languages a sense to-day
forgotten. In Pampango this ending still exists and signifies "ancient," from which we can deduce that
the name was applied to men considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that these men were
pushed back into the interior by the modern invaders, in whose language they were called the
"ancients."
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not
advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic
people. They number approximately 15,000. The manguianes have shown no desire for community
life, and, as indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to
make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government. (See Census of the
Philippine (Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23, 460.)
III. COMPARATIVE THE AMERICAN INDIANS.
Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the
United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippines
Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically
identical with that followed by the United States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes.
Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a
state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the
Indians may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and
how the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of
the United States.
Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore mentioned, tells how the
Congress passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting those humane designs of civilizing the neighboring
Indians." After quoting the Act, the opinion goes on "This act avowedly contemplates the
preservation of the Indian nations as an object sought by the United States, and proposes to effect
this object by civilizing and converting them from hunters into agriculturists."
A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United States vs. Kagama
([1886], 118 U.S., 375). Reference is herein made to the clause of the United States Constitution
which gives Congress "power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian tribes." The court then proceeds to indicate a brief history of the position of
the Indians in the United States (a more extended account of which can be found in Marshall's
opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as follows:
The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States, both before and since
the Revolution, to the people of the United States, has always been an anomalous one and of a
complex character.
Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of American towards the
Indians who were found here, the colonies before the Revolution and the States and the United
States since, have recognized in the Indians a possessory right to the soil over which they roamed
and hunted and established occasional villages. But they asserted an ultimate title in the land itself,
by which the Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or transfer it to other nations or peoples without
the consent of this paramount authority. When a tribe wished to dispose of its lands, or any part of
it, or the State or the United States wished to purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was the only mode
in which this could be done. The United States recognized no right in private persons, or in other
nations, to make such a purchase by treaty or otherwise. With the Indians themselves these

relation are equally difficult to define. They were, and always have been, regarded as having a
semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not as nation
not a possessed of the fall attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of
regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or
of the State within whose limits they resided.
The opinion then continues: It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of
Congress. These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. The are communities dependent on the
United States. dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no
allegiance to the States, and receive from the no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the
people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very
weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with
them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arise the duty of protection, and with it the
power. This has always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this court,
whenever the question has arisen . . . The power of the General Government over these remnants of
race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as
to the safety of those among whom they dwell. it must exist in that government, because it never has
existed anywhere else, because the theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the
United States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the
tribes.
In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U.S., 28) the question to be considered
was whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands was such that Congress could prohibit
the introduction of intoxicating liquor into those lands notwithstanding the admission of New Mexico to
statehood. The court looked to the reports of the different superintendent charged with guarding their
interests and founds that these Indians are dependent upon the fostering care and protection of the
government "like reservation Indians in general." Continuing, the court said "that during the Spanish
dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were treated as wards requiring special protection, where
subjected to restraints and official supervisions in the alienation of their property." And finally, we not
the following: "Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate commerce
with the Indians tribes, but long-continued legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of
judicial decisions have attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized nation the power and
the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian communities within its
borders, whether within its original territory or territory subsequently acquired, and whether within or
without the limits of a state."
With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within the power of the
courts to overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good reason, the subject has always been
deemed political in nature, not subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial department of the government.
Whenever, therefore, the United States sets apart any public land as an Indian reservation, it has full
authority to pass such laws and authorize such measures as may be necessary to give to the Indians
thereon full protection in their persons and property. (U.S. vs. Thomas [1894], 151 U.S., 577.)
All this borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an unbroken line of judicial
decisions.
The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally, might result in the
issuance of habeas corpus, is that of United States vs. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This
was a hearing upon return to a writ of habeas corpus issued against Brigadier General George Crook
at the relation of Standing Bear and other Indians, formerly belonging to the Ponca Tribe of Indians.
The petition alleged in substance that the relators are Indians who have formerly belonged to the
Ponca tribe of Indians, now located in the Indian Territory; that they had some time previously
withdrawn from the tribe, and completely severed their tribal relations therewith, and had adopted the
general habits of the whites, and were then endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own
exertions, and without aid or assistance from the general government; that whilst they were thus
engaged, and without being guilty of violating any of the laws of the United States, they were arrested
and restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent, George Crook. The substance of the return
to the writ was that the relators are individual members of, and connected with, the Ponca tribe of
Indians; that they had fled or escaped form a reservation situated some place within the limits of the

Indian Territory had departed therefrom without permission from the Government; and, at the
request of the Secretary of the Interior, the General of the Army had issued an order which required
the respondent to arrest and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant
to the said order, he had caused the relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian Territory.
The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal imprisonment by habeas
corpus. The second question, of much greater importance, related to the right of the Government to
arrest and hold the relators for a time, for the purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory from
which it was alleged the Indian escaped. In discussing this question, the court reviewed the policy the
Government had adopted in its dealing with the friendly tribe of Poncase. Then, continuing, the court
said: "Laws passed for the government of the Indian country, and for the purpose of regulating trade
and intercourse with the Indian tribes, confer upon certain officers of the Government almost
unlimited power over the persons who go upon the reservations without lawful authority . . . Whether
such an extensive discretionary power is wisely vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs or not ,
need not be questioned. It is enough to know that the power rightfully exists, and, where existing, the
exercise of the power must be upheld." The decision concluded as follows: The reasoning advanced
in support of my views, leads me to conclude:
1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United States, and has, therefore, the
right to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court, or before a federal judge, in all cases
where he may be confined or in custody under color of authority of the United States or where he is
restrained of liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States.
2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the military department of the
Platte, has the custody of the relators, under color of authority of the United States, and in violation
of the laws therefore.
3. That n rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to the Indian Territory, as the
respondent has been directed to do.
4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the more fortunate white race,
and have the inalienable right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," so long as they obey
the laws and do not trespass on forbidden ground. And,
5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the laws
thereof, the relators must be discharged from custody, and it is so ordered.
As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as authority to determine
that Rubi, the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of the Philippine Islands, is a "person"
within the meaning of theHabeas Corpus Act, and as such, entitled to sue out a writ in the Philippine
courts. (See also In re Race Horse [1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We so decide.
As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case an the Rubi case are not exactly identical.
But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the
United States, that Indians have been taken from different parts of the country and placed on these
reservation, without any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so
located, they have been made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general
good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn form the Indian policy of the United States, it is that
the determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of the government and
that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned
governmental system. Perhaps, just as may forceful reasons exists for the segregation as existed for
the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United States.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not delegate this
power to provincial authorities. In so attempting, it is contended, the Philippine Legislature has
abdicated its authority and avoided its full responsibility.
That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be
zealously protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule will, however, disclose that it has not bee
violated in his instance.
The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and
since followed in a multitude of case, namely: "The true distinction therefore is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,

and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z.
R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio S.t, 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice
Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an
executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of
subordinate official thereof, to whom t has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions
of fact. (U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decision is to give
prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the enactment of section
21454 of the Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial
governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority
as to the execution of the law? Is not this "necessary"?
The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80) was a petition for mandamus to require the
Secretary of the Interior to approve the selection and taking of one hundred and sixty acres by the
relator out of the lands ceded to the United States by the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians.
Section 463 of the United States Revised Statutes provided: "The Commissioner of Indian Affairs
shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the
President may prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs, and of all matters arising out to
the Indian relations." Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate a good deal, especially in view of the
long established practice of the Department, before saying that this language was not broad enough
to warrant a regulation obviously made for the welfare of the rather helpless people concerned. The
power of Congress is not doubted. The Indians have been treated as wards of the nation. Some such
supervision was necessary, and has been exercised. In the absence of special provisions naturally it
would be exercised by the Indian Department." (See also as corroborative authority, it any is needed,
Union Bridge Co. vs. U.S. [1907], 204 U.S.., 364, reviewing the previous decisions of the United
States Supreme Court: U.S. vs. Lane [1914], 232 U.S., 598.)
There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An exception to the
general rule. sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate
legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon
the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the
province, are better qualified to judge "when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of
law and order?" As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its
inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for
improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state?
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by
the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.
B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on behalf of his unknown
clients, says that "The statute is perfectly clear and unambiguous. In limpid English, and in words
as plain and unequivocal as language can express, it provides for the segregation of 'non-Christians'
and none other." The inevitable result, them, is that the law "constitutes an attempt by the Legislature
to discriminate between individuals because of their religious beliefs, and is, consequently,
unconstitutional."
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his arguments is answerable the Legislature must be
understood to mean what it has plainly expressed; judicial construction is then excluded; religious
equality is demanded by the Organic Law; the statute has violated this constitutional guaranty, and Q.
E. D. is invalid. But, as hereinbefore stated, we do not feel free to discard the long continued meaning
given to a common expression, especially as classification of inhabitants according to religious belief
leads the court to what it should avoid, the nullification of legislative action. We hold that the term
"non-Christian" refers to natives of the Philippines Islands of a low grade of civilization, and that
section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, does not discriminate between individuals an
account of religious differences.
C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.

The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the President's instructions of to
the Commission, the Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing "That no law shall be enacted in
said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or
deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." This constitutional limitation is derived
from the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and these provisions, it has
been said "are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality." (Yick Wo vs.Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S.,
356.) The protection afforded the individual is then as much for the non-Christian as for the Christian.
The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:
Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible with the possession of
like liberty by every other. (Spencer, Social Statistics, p. 94.)
Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized licentiousness that
trespasses on right. That authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal and a
refined idea, the offspring of high civilization, which the savage never understood, and never can
understand. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint; the more restraint on others to
keep off from us, the more liberty we have . . . that man is free who is protected from injury. (II
Webster's Works, p. 393.)
Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in not being forced to do what
one ought not do desire. (Montesque, spirit of the Laws.)
Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted license to ac according to one's own
will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same
right by others. (Field, J., in Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U.S., 86.)
Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all
circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is
necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis, organized society could not exist
with safety to its members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law unto himself would
soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under the
operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own,
whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others
. . . There is, of course, a sphere with which the individual may asserts the supremacy of his own
will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any human government especially of any free
government existing under a written Constitution to interfere with the exercise of that will. But it
is equally true that in very well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its
members, the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of
great dangers, be subjected to such restraint to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the
safety of the general public may demand." (Harlan, J., In Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905] 197
U.S., 11.)
Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the upright and
honorable conscience of the individual. (Apolinario Mabini.)
Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized
community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to Liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary
personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint
of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with
which he has been endowed by this Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the
common welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-making decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, Liberty includes the right of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in
all lawful ways; to live an work where he will; to earn his livelihood by an lawful calling; to pursue any
avocations, an for that purpose. to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and
essential to his carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion. The chief elements of the
guaranty are the right to contract, the right to choose one's employment, the right to labor, and the
right of locomotion.
In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily
done by free men. (There can be noted Cummings vs. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall, 277;

Wilkinson vs. Leland [1829], 2 Pet., 627; Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179 U.S., 274;
Allgeyer vs. Louisiana [1896], 165, U.S., 578; State vs. Kreutzberg [1902], 114 Wis., 530. See 6
R.C.L., 258, 261.)
One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is plainly apparent. It is this:
"Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it is "Liberty regulated by law." Implied in the
term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order
of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must
renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by
general law for the common good. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizen would, if
exercises without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally natural, such
assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law. The Liberty of the citizens may be restrained in the
interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of
the police power. (See Hall vs. Geiger-Jones [1916], 242 U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing
Co. vs.Cruz [1914], 189 Al., 66.)
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Daniel Webster, in
the course of the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United States Supreme Court,
since a classic in forensic literature, said that the meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every
citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, an immunities under the protection of the general rules
which govern society." To constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial
proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a
rule which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in
applying a law to particular cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is due
process a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority,
whether sanctioned by age and customs, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in
furtherance of the public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice,
must be held to be due process of law." (Hurtado vs. California [1883], 110, U.S., 516.) "Due process
of law" means simply . . . "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general
powers of the legislative department of the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in
its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed;
and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class."
(U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme
Court. 1) "What is due process of law depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter
and necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs. Peablody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.)
The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a
statute which is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and
cannot be purely arbitrary in nature.
We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the logical deductions to be made later on.
D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.
The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen Amendment to the United
States Constitution particularly as found in those portions of Philippine Organic Law providing "That
slavery shall not exist in said Islands; nor shall involuntary servitude exist except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." It is quite possible that the Thirteenth
Amendment, since reaching to "any place subject to" the "jurisdiction" of the United States, has force
in the Philippine. However this may be, the Philippine Legislature has, by adoption, with necessary
modifications, of sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United States Criminal Code, prescribed the
punishment for these crimes. Slavery and involuntary servitude, together wit their corollary, peonage,
all denote "a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906],
203 U.S., 1.) The term of broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It has been applied to any
servitude in fact involuntary, no matter under what form such servitude may have been disguised.
(Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219 U.S., 219.)
So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely for their freedom.
Next must come a description of the police power under which the State must act if section 2145 is to
be held valid.
E. THE POLICE POWER.

Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to note at this moment is
the farreaching scope of the power, that it has become almost possible to limit its weep, and that
among its purposes is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals,
education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State,
develop its resources and add to is wealth and prosperity. (See Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S.,
27.) What we are not interested in is the right of the government to restrain liberty by the exercise of
the police power.
"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power coextensive with self-protection,
and is not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and
plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and
welfare of society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill., 191.) Carried onward by the
current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempt to dam the on rushing power of legislative discretion,
provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the
public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.
The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to exercise the
sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. "There can be
not doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the
Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamental
principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government." (Churchill and
Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580; U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.)
With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us, before finally deciding
whether any constitutional provision has indeed been violated by section 2145 of the Administrative
Code, we should endeavor to ascertain the intention of the Legislature in enacting this section. If
legally possible, such legislative intention should be effectuated.
F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT. The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set
apart the Tigbao reservation, it will be remembered, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following:
(1) The failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province;
and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a
permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the
Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of
introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the motives for its
selection, the following:
To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken together to Tigbao, the
Secretary of the Interior on June 10 to 13, 1918, made a trip to the place. There he found that the
site selected is a good one; that creditable progress has been made in the clearing of forests,
construction of buildings, etc., that there appears to be encouraging reaction by the boys to the
work of the school the requirements of which they appear to meet with enthusiastic interest after
the first weeks which are necessarily a somewhat trying period for children wholly unaccustomed to
orderly behaviour and habit of life. He also gathered the impression that the results obtained during
the period of less than one year since the beginning of the institution definitely justify its
continuance and development.
Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation. Such was naturally to
be expected. But the Secretary of the Interior, upon his return to Manila, made the following
statement to the press:
"It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those who prefer to live a nomadic life
and evade the influence of civilization. The Government will follow its policy to organize them into
political communities and to educate their children with the object of making them useful citizens of
this country. To permit them to live a wayfaring life will ultimately result in a burden to the state and
on account of their ignorance, they will commit crimes and make depredation, or if not they will be
subject to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them."
The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all the non-Christian
people, has adopted as the polaris of his administration "the advancement of the non-Christian

elements of our population to equality and unification with the highly civilized Christian inhabitants."
This is carried on by the adoption of the following measures:
(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of seminomadic race are induced to
leave their wild habitat and settle in organized communities.
(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public health throughout the
regions inhabited by the non-Christian people.
(c) The extention of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to facilitate their
development and the extention of government control.
(d) Construction of roads and trials between one place and another among non-Christians, to
promote social and commercial intercourse and maintain amicable relations among them and with
the Christian people.
(e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially agriculture.
( f ) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private capital in, the fertile
regions of Mindanao and Sulu.
The Secretary adds: To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been continued
among the non-Christian people. These people are being taught and guided to improve their living
conditions in order that they may fully appreciate the benefits of civilization. Those of them who are
still given to nomadic habits are being persuaded to abandon their wild habitat and settle in organized
settlements. They are being made to understand that it is the purpose of the Government to organize
them politically into fixed and per manent communities, thus bringing them under the control of the
Government, to aid them to live and work, protect them from involuntary servitude and abuse,
educate their children, and show them the advantages of leading a civilized life with their civilized
brothers. In short, they are being impressed with the purposes and objectives of the Government of
leading them to economic, social, and political equality, and unification with the more highly civilized
inhabitants of the country. (See Report of the Department for 1917.)
The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-called
non-Christians, and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic development
and advancement in civilization. (Note Acts Nos. 2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674 in reestablishing
the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes, defines the aim of the Government towards the non-Christian
people in the following unequivocal terms:
It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the work for
advancement and liberty in favor of the region inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and
foster by all adequate means and in a systematical, rapid, and complete manner the moral,
material, economic, social, and political development of those regions, always having in
view the aim of rendering permanent the mutual intelligence between, and complete fusion
of, all the Christian and non-Christian elements populating the provinces of the Archipelago.
(Sec. 3.)
May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United States, proper wards of the
Filipino people? By the fostering care of a wise Government, may not these unfortunates advance in
the "habits and arts of civilization?" Would it be advisable for the courts to intrude upon a plan,
carefully formulated, and apparently working out for the ultimate good of these people?
In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the Government is evident.
Here, we have on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making
depredations on their more fortunate neighbors, uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing
nothing for the advancement of the Philippine Islands. What the Government wished to do by bringing
than into a reservation was to gather together the children for educational purposes, and to improve
the health and morals was in fine, to begin the process of civilization. this method was termed in
Spanish times, "bringing under the bells." The same idea adapted to the existing situation, has been
followed with reference to the Manguianes and other peoples of the same class, because it required,
if they are to be improved, that they be gathered together. On these few reservations there live under
restraint in some cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few thousands of the uncivilized people.
Segregation really constitutes protection for the manguianes.
Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically, we know that the
axiom is not precisely accurate. The Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as civilized men are free,

and they are not the equals of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are citizens, with
many but not all the rights which citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as
surely, the Manguianes are citizens of a low degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag upon
the progress of the State.
In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature
in enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are again plain. Settlers in Mindoro
must have their crops and persons protected from predatory men, or they will leave the country. It is
no argument to say that such crimes are punished by the Penal Code, because these penalties are
imposed after commission of the offense and not before. If immigrants are to be encouraged to
develop the resources of the great Islands of Mindoro, and its, as yet, unproductive regions, the
Government must be in a position to guarantee peace and order.
Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of the State. Illiteracy
and thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. The State to protect itself from destruction must
prod on the laggard and the sluggard. The great law of overwhelming necessity is all convincing.
To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior:
Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they (the
manguianes) are engaged in the works of destruction burning and destroying the forests and
making illegal caigins thereon. Not bringing any benefit to the State but instead injuring and
damaging its interests, what will ultimately become of these people with the sort of liberty they wish
to preserve and for which they are now fighting in court? They will ultimately become a heavy
burden to the State and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make
depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to
abuse them.
There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of liberty and does not practice
liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will going from
one place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal caigins
thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they allege that they
are being deprived thereof without due process of law?
But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due
process of law' apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do
not practise liberty in a rightful way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of persons as
to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should not adopt any
measures looking to the welfare and advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean
that this people should be let along in the mountains and in a permanent state of savagery without
even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and noble sense.
In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been placed in
the alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter
measure was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and with national conscience.
The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and more towards
the education and civilization of such people and fitting them to be citizens. The progress of those
people under the tutelage of the Government is indeed encouraging and the signs of the times
point to a day which is not far distant when they will become useful citizens. In the light of what has
already been accomplished which has been winning the gratitude of most of the backward people,
shall we give up the noble work simply because a certain element, believing that their personal
interests would be injured by such a measure has come forward and challenged the authority of
the Government to lead this people in the pat of civilization? Shall we, after expending sweat,
treasure, and even blood only to redeem this people from the claws of ignorance and superstition,
now willingly retire because there has been erroneously invoked in their favor that Constitutional
guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law? To allow them
to successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the Government without
recourse to pursue the works of civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They will thus left

in a permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable point to attack by those who doubt, nay
challenge, the ability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers.
The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao. There they are being
taught and guided to improve their living conditions. They are being made to understand that they
object of the government is to organize them politically into fixed and permanent communities.
They are being aided to live and work. Their children are being educated in a school especially
established for them. In short, everything is being done from them in order that their advancement
in civilization and material prosperity may be assured. Certainly their living together in Tigbao does
not make them slaves or put them in a condition compelled to do services for another. They do not
work for anybody but for themselves. There is, therefore, no involuntary servitude.
But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some other places under
penalty of imprisonment. Attention in this connection is invited to the fact that this people, living a
nomadic and wayfaring life, do not have permanent individual property. They move from one place
to another as the conditions of living warrants, and the entire space where they are roving about is
the property of the nation, the greater part being lands of public domain. Wandering from one place
to another on the public lands, why can not the government adopt a measure to concentrate them
in a certain fixed place on the public lands, instead of permitting them to roam all over the entire
territory? This measure is necessary both in the interest of the public as owner of the lands about
which they are roving and for the proper accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of the
government. For as people accustomed to nomadic habit, they will always long to return to the
mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is provinced for, you can not make
them live together and the noble intention of the Government of organizing them politically will
come to naught.
G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.
Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific objections and to reach a
general conclusion. In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking, to
go where he pleases. Could be not, however, be kept away from certain localities ? To furnish an
example from the Indian legislation. The early Act of Congress of 1802 (2 U.S. Stat. at L., p. 141)
Indian reservation. Those citizens certainly did not possess absolute freedom of locomotion. Again
the same law provided for the apprehension of marauding Indians. Without any doubt, this law and
other similar were accepted and followed time and again without question.
It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak and defenseless people
confined as in a prison at the mercy of unscrupulous official. What, it is asked, would be the remedy
of any oppressed Manguian? The answer would naturally be that the official into whose hands are
given the enforcement of the law would have little or not motive to oppress these people; on the
contrary, the presumption would all be that they would endeavor to carry out the purposes of the law
intelligently and patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus confined, there always exists
the power of removal in the hands of superior officers, and the courts are always open for a redress
of grievances. When, however, only the validity of the law is generally challenged and no particular
case of oppression is called to the attention of the courts, it would seems that the Judiciary should not
unnecessarily hamper the Government in the accomplishment of its laudable purpose.
The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom, may the right and
liberties of the individual members of society be subordinated to the will of the Government? It is a
question which has assailed the very existence of government from the beginning of time. Now purely
an ethical or philosophical subject, nor now to be decided by force, it has been transferred to the
peaceful forum of the Judiciary. In resolving such an issue, the Judiciary must realize that the very
existence of government renders imperatives a power to restrain the individual to some extent,
dependent, of course, on the necessities of the class attempted to be benefited. As to the particular
degree to which the Legislature and the Executive can go in interfering with the rights of the citizen,
this is, and for a along time to come will be, impossible for the courts to determine.
The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economics
and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown as widespread belief in the
amplest possible demonstration of governmental activity. The courts unfortunately have sometimes
seemed to trial after the other two branches of the government in this progressive march.

Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the
Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. it is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a
great malady requires an equally drastic remedy.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general
good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back
to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the law, there exists a law ; the law
seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and
it applies alike to all of a class.
As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of doubt, would lead to
the determination that section 2145 is valid. it the attitude which the courts should assume towards
the settled policy of the Government. In a late decision with which we are in full accord,
Gambles vs. Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:
We can seen objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new
question that comes before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not
determined by differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies
furnished by such prior case. In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales
which the court believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general
rule or principle. But public policy is not a thing inflexible. No court is wise enough to forecast its
influence in all possible contingencies. Distinctions must be made from time to time as sound reason
and a true sense of justice may dictate."
Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-called non-Christians
has been in vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent governmental policy has been effective in the
Philippines from early days to the present. The idea to unify the people of the Philippines so that they
may approach the highest conception of nationality. If all are to be equal before the law, all must be
approximately equal in intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a rich and powerful country, Mindoro
must be populated, and its fertile regions must be developed. The public policy of the Government of
the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The
Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said,
for their own good and the good of the country.
Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the Philippine Legislature, a
coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole tendency of the best considered case is toward noninterference on the part of the courts whenever political ideas are the moving consideration. Justice
Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he is justly famous, said that "constitutional law, like other
mortal contrivances, has to take some chances." If in the final decision of the many grave questions
which this case presents, the courts must take "a chance," it should be with a view to upholding the
law, with a view to the effectuation of the general governmental policy, and with a view to the court's
performing its duty in no narrow and bigoted sense, but with that broad conception which will make
the courts as progressive and effective a force as are the other departments of the Government.
We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not
deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal
protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not
constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that section 2145 of the
Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian
policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore,
not issue. This is the true ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes against petitioners. So ordered.

G.R. No. 86899-903 May 15, 1989

GOVERNOR AMOR D. DELOSO, petitioner,
vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, respondents.
This petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated
February 10, 1989 in Criminal Cases Nos. 9200 to 9204 which preventively suspended petitioner
Amor D. Deloso (accused in the criminal cases) pendente lite from his position as provincial governor
of Zambales and from any office that he may be holding.
The petitioner was the duly elected mayor of Botolan, Zambales in the local elections of November
1971. While he occupied the position of mayor, a certain Juan Villanueva filed a letter complaint with
the Tanodbayan accusing him of having committed acts in violation of the Anti-Graft Law (Republic
Act 3019) in relation to the award of licenses to operate fish corrals in the municipal waters of
Botolan, Zambales during the period 1976 to 1978 and the issuance of five (5) tractors of the
municipality to certain individuals allegedly without any agreement as to the payment of rentals.
The complaint with respect to the award of licenses to operate fish corrals was dismissed. As regards
the other complaint, the Tanodbayan filed five (5) separate informations, all dated May 30, 1984
accusing the petitioner of violation of Section 3(e), of the Anti-Graft Law with the Sandiganbayan. The
cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 9200-9204. Except for the names of the individuals
who were allegedly favored by the petitioner and the dates when these favors were made, the
informations uniformly alleged:
That on or about 3 February 1978 in the Municipality of Botolan, Zambales, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, accused AMOR D. DELOSO, a public officer being then the Municipal Mayor of the
Municipality of Botolan, Zambales, taking advantage of his public and official position, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously give unwarranted benefits to Daniel Ferrer thru manifest partiality and evident bad faith
in the discharge of his official functions by issuing to him a tractor purchased by the Municipality of Botolan thru a
loan financed by the Land Bank of the Philippines for lease to local farmers at reasonable cost, without any
agreement as to the payment of rentals for the use of tractor by Daniel Ferrer thereby causing undue injury to the
Municipality of Botolan.

A motion to quash the informations was denied by the Sandiganbayan. A motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied.
The petitioner then filed a petition before us (G.R. Nos. 69963-67) to annul the Sandiganbayan's
resolutions denying the petitioner's motion to quash and motion for reconsideration.
In a resolution dated July 28,1988, we dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The resolution became
final and executory on October 17, 1988.
The petitioner was arraigned on January 6, 1989 before the Sandiganbayan. He pleaded NOT
GUILTY to the charges against him.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor then filed a motion to suspend the petitioner pendente
lite pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019.
On February 10, 1989, the Sandiganbayan issued the questioned resolution, the dispositive portion of
which reads: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the accused Amor D. Deloso is suspended pendente
lite from his position as Provincial Governor of Zambales and from any other office that he may now
be holding. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Secretary of the Department of Local
Government for implementation and for him to inform this Court of the action he has taken thereon
within five (5) days from receipt hereof. (Rollo, p. 94)
The day following his receipt of the resolution, or on February 16, 1989, the petitioner filed the instant
petition. On February 17, 1989, the petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Sandiganbayan
requesting that the execution and implementation of the February 10, 1989 suspension order be held
in abeyance pending determination of the merits of the petition. The motion was denied prompting the
petitioner to ask the Court for an earlier setting of the trial of the cases which was denied in an order
dated February 22, 1989.
In denying the plea for an earlier schedule of the trial of the cases, the Sandiganbayan said: The
Court notes that these cases have already been set for May 15, 16 and 17 as well as June 5, 6 and 7,

1989 at 8:00 o'clock in the morning and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. While the accused claims that
this period is ordinately far, the Court must also be contend with its own calendar. It will be easy
enough for this Court to give the accused an earlier setting. However, such a setting will be best a
pretence since other cases have already been set between now and May 15 where in many
instances the accused themselves are also under suspension by reason of the same provision of law.
Under the above circumstances, no other earlier setting can be granted to the accused without
making that setting merely a sham since other cases which have been set earlier will naturally have a
right to expect priority. (Rollo, p. 135)
In view of this development, the petitioner filed an urgent supplemental application for temporary
restraining order and/ or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the Sandiganbayan, the Secretary of
Local Government and Community Development, and all those acting in their behalf from executing
and implementing the February 10, 1989 resolution of the Sandiganbayan.
We treat the respondent's Comment as an answer and decide this petition on its merits.
The petitioner questions the constitutionality of the suspension provision of Section 13 of the AntiGraft Law (Republic Act No. 3019).
This same issue was raised in the case of Layno v. Sandiganbayan (136 SCRA 536 [1985]). After
considering the facts as well as the merits of the case, the Court ruled that the petition need not be
resolved through a ruling on the validity of the provision on mandatory suspension. We instead,
decided the case in relation to the principles of due process and equal protection of the law.
Faced with similar factual circumstances in the instant petition, we apply anew the ruling in
the Layno case and decide the instant petition in relation to the principles of due process and equal
protection without having to declare categorically whether or not the suspension provision of Republic
Act 3019 should be struck down as invalid. We limit ourselves to ascertaining whether or not, under
the circumstances of this case, an indefinite suspension becomes unreasonable.
As early as 1974, then Justice Fred Ruiz Castro expressed in a separate opinion the mischief which
would result if the Court allows the indefinite suspension of elective local officials charged with
violations of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act:
The central point of Senator Padilla's position is that the penalty of suspension is definitely much
lower than that of removal and it would be incongruous if we give to the penalty of suspension
more serious consequences than are attached to the penalty of removal. Senator Padilla opted for
the immediate restoration of the respondent to his position once the favorable result of the election
is known.
Parenthetically, it must be stated that while there was an exchange of views between Senator
Ganzon and Senator Manglapus on the Anti-Graft Law, the exchange was limited to the matter of
the commencement of the investigation of the charges, which, according to Senator Ganzon,
cannot be made within one year prior to an election.
And so it is that, on the basis of my discussion above, I bewail the apathy of the majority of the
Court toward efforts to seek enlightenment on legal issues of grave importance from the
deliberations of Congress upon the said issues. It is not quite becoming of judicial magistrates to
shunt aside a suggestion that the interplay of legal provisions be carefully studied and analyzed.
In the deliberations of the Court on this case, I suggested that we examine the possible delimiting
effects of the provisions of the first sentence of section 5 of the Decentralization Act on the
provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act insofar as the suspension from office of an
elective local official is concerned. In no uncertain words did I focus the attention of the Court on
the serious ever-present possibility of harassment of an elective local official taking the form of the
filing of a valid information against him under the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act after his exoneration in an administrative case involving the same offense.
I also pointedly brought out the matter of the notorious delay in the courts of justice which could
effectively frustrate an elected or re-elected local official from discharging the duties of his office for
the entire term of his office, and thus nullify the will of the people who elected him. I likewise asked
the Court to consider the situation where an elective local official runs for the National Assembly
and is elected despite the fact that he is under suspension under the authority of the provisions of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and sought a definitive answer to the question. What then

would happen to the suspension meted out to him since it is the National Assembly that determines
whether he should assume and continue in office?
All these and other germane questions were brushed aside by the majority of the Court with the
sweeping statement that the provisions of the Decentralization Act apply only to administrative
cases. It is the ex cathedra attitude, this kind of slothful thinking, that I find abhorrent and therefore
deplore "
Petitioner Deloso was elected governor of the Province of Zambales in the January 18, 1988 local
elections. The regular term of a governor is only 3 years although he shall serve until noon of June
30, 1992 by special provision of the Constitution. (Section 8, Article X, Section 2, Article XVIII,
Constitution). He was, however, ordered suspended from performing his duties as governor by the
Sandiganbayan pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 by virtue of the criminal charges
filed against him. The order of suspension does not have a definite period so that the petitioner may
be suspended for the rest of his term of office unless his case is terminated sooner. An extended
suspension is a distinct possibility considering that the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner's plea for
earlier dates of trial of his cases on the ground that there are other cases set earlier which have a
right to expect priority.
Under these circumstances the preventive suspension which initially may be justified becomes
unreasonable thus raising a due process question. As we ruled in Layno, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan,
(supra):
Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office does not
expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the
Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this
while in the full discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do
so. As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. It is a basic assumption of the electoral process
implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their
choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against
administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In either case, his culpability must be established.
Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence.
A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of
time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his
right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by
him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. They
were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to
paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun
the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite
manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be
lifted.
Moreover, in the earlier case of Garcia v. The Executive Secretary, (6 SCRA 1 [1962]) we ruled on the
issue as to whether the preventive suspension beyond the maximum period of 60 days, provided in
Section 35 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Republic Act 2260) is illegal and void. Paulino Garcia, the
petitioner in the cited case was the Chairman of the National Science Development Board appointed
by the President of the Philippines. He was charged with electioneering and dishonesty in office.
Pending investigation of the administrative charges against him, he was suspended by the Executive
Secretary by authority of the President. In view of his indefinite suspension, he filed a petition praying
in effect that the 60-day period prescribed in the Civil Service Law for preventive suspension having
already expired, he be reinstated in the service pursuant to Section 35 of the said Act. The
respondents opposed the petition on the ground that the petitioner was a presidential appointee and
therefore not covered by the 60-day preventive suspension limit under Section 35 of the then Civil
Service Act. The respondents maintained that the petitioner could be indefinitely suspended. In ruling
in favor of the petitioner, the Court stated:
To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed by the President, facing administrative
charges can be preventively suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a situation where the
preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due
hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution (No officer or employee in the Civil

Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law. [Art. XII, Sec. 4,
Constitution of the Philippines]) and the Civil Service Law (No officer or employee in the Civil
Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law and after due
process). ... In the guise of a preventive suspension, his term of office could be shortened and he
could, in effect, be removed without a finding of a cause duly established after due hearing, in
violation of the Constitution
The question that now arises is whether or not the ruling in the Garcia case where the suspension
was ordered by no less than the President of the Philippines is applicable to an elective official facing
criminal charges under the Anti-Graft Law and suspended under Section 13, thereof.
The guarantee to an equal protection of the law necessitates the application of the ruling in
the Garcia v. Executive Secretary. Thus, we explained in the Layno case, to wit: If the case against
petitioner Layno were administrative in character the Local Government Code would be applicable. It
is therein clearly provided that while preventive suspension is allowable for the causes therein
enumerated, there is this emphatic limitation on the duration thereof; 'In all cases, preventive
suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.' (Batas Pambansa
Blg. 337, Section 63 (2), last sentence. The first sentence reads as follows: 'Preventive suspension
may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe
that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is
strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the
respondent influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and
other evidence'). It may be recalled that the principle against indefinite suspension applies equally to
national government officials. So it was held in the leading case of Garcia v. Hon. Secretary (116 Phil.
348 [1962]). According to the opinion of Justice Barrera: 'To adopt the theory of respondents that an
officer appointed by the President, facing administrative charges, can be preventively suspended
indefinitely, would be to countenance a situation where the preventive suspension can, in effect, be
the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the
Constitution and the Civil Service Law.' (Ibid. 351-352) Further: 'In the guise of a preventive
suspension, his term of office could be shortened and he could in effect, be removed without a finding
of a cause duly established after due hearing, in violation of the Constitution.' (Ibid. 352) Clearly then,
the policy of the law mandated by the Constitution frowns at a suspension of indefinite duration. In
this particular case, the mere fact that petitioner is facing a charge under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act does not justify a different rule of law. To do so would be to negate the safeguard of the
equal protection guarantee. (at p. 542)
The application of the Garcia injunction against preventive suspensions for an unreasonable period of
time applies with greater force to elective officials and especially to the petitioner whose term is a
relatively short one. The interests of the sovereign electorate and the province of Zambales cannot be
subordinated to the heavy case load of the Sandiganbayan and of this Court.
It would be most unfair to the people of Zambales who elected the petitioner to the highest provincial
office in their command if they are deprived of his services for an indefinite period with the termination
of his case possibly extending beyond his entire term simply because the big number of
sequestration, ill-gotten wealth, murder, malversation of public finds and other more serious offenses
plus incidents and resolutions that may be brought to the Supreme Court prevents the expedited
determination of his innocence or guilt.
The order dated February 10, 1989 suspending the petitioner without a definite period can not be
sanctioned. We rule that henceforth a preventive suspension of an elective public officer under
Section 13 of Republic Act 3019 should be limited to the ninety (90) days under Section 42 of
Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil Service Decree, which period also appears reasonable and
appropriate under the circumstances of this case.
The petitioner also questions the applicability of Section 13 of Republic Act 3019 as amended by
Batasan Pambansa Blg. 192 to him. He opines that the suspension provision as amended which
qualifies the public officer as incumbent does not apply to him since he is now occupying the position
of governor and not mayor, the position wherein he was charged under the Anti-Graft Law.
This argument is untenable. The issue was settled in the case of Bayot v. Sandiganbayan (128 SCRA
383 (1984), in this wise:

Further, the claim of petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is presently occupying a
position different from that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision
clearly states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under Republic Act 3019 or for any offense involving fraud upon the government
or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage or
execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Thus, by
the use of the word office the same applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding,
and not only the particular office under which he was charged.
One last point. Should the purposes behind preventive suspensions such as preventing the abuse of
the prerogatives of the office, intimidation of witnesses, etc., become manifest, the respondent court
is not bereft of remedies or sanctions. The petitioner may still be suspended but for specifically
expressed reasons and not from an automatic application of Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The preventive suspension imposed on petitioner
Amor D. Deloso by virtue of the February 10, 1989 resolution of the Sandiganbayan should be limited
to only ninety (90) days after which Deloso will assume once again the functions of governor of
Zambales, without prejudice to the continuation of the trial of the pending cases against him in the
Sandiganbayan. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 111624-25 March 9, 1995

ALFONSO C. BINCE, JR., petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF PANGASINAN,
MUNICIPAL BOARDS OF CANVASSERS OF TAYUG AND SAN MANUEL, PANGASINAN AND
EMILIANO MICU, respondents.
Petitioner Alfonso C. Bince, Jr. and private respondent Emiliano S. Micu were among the candidates
in the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992 for a seat in the Sanguniang Panlalawigan of the
Province of Pangasinan allotted to its Sixth Legislative District.
Ten (10) municipalities, including San Quintin, Tayug and San Manuel, comprise the said district.
During the canvassing of the Certificates of Canvass (COC's) for these ten (10) municipalities by
respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) on May 20, 1992, private respondent Micu
objected to the inclusion of the COC for San Quintin on the ground that it contained false statements.
Accordingly, the COCs for the remaining nine (9) municipalities were included in the canvass. On May
21, 1992, the PBC rules against the objection of private respondent. 1 From the said ruling, private
respondent Micu appealed to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which docketed the case as
SPC No. 92-208.
On June 6, 1992, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution which reads:
Acting on the appeal filed by petitioner-appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu to the ruling of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan, dated May 21, 1992, the Commission en
banc tabulated the votes obtained by candidates Atty. Emiliano S. Micu and Atty. Alfonso C. Bince
for the position of Sangguniang Panlalawigan member of the province of Pangasinan, using as
basis thereof the statement of votes by precinct submitted by the municipality of San Quintin,
Pangasinan, as (sic) a result of said examination, the Commission rules, as follows:nThat the
actual number of votes obtained by candidate Alfonso C. Bince in the municipality of San Quintin,
Pangasinan is 1,055 votes whereas petitioner/appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu obtained 1,535
votes for the same municipality.

Twenty-one (21) days after the canvass of the COCs for the nine (9) municipalities was completed on
May 20, 1992, private respondent Micu together with the Municipal Boards of Canvassers (MBCs) of
Tayug and San Manuel filed with the PBC petitions for correction of the Statements of Votes (SOVs)
earlier prepared for alledged manifest errors committed in the computation thereof.
In view of the motion of herein petitioner to implement the Resolution of June 6, 1992 which was
alleged to have become final, the PBC, on June 18, 1992, credited in favor of the petitioner and
private respondent the votes for each as indicated in the said resolution and on the basis of the COCs
for San Quintin and the other nine (9) municipalities, petitioner had a total of 27,370 votes while the
private respondent had 27,369 votes. Petitioner who won by a margin of 1 vote was not, however,
proclaimed winner because of the absence of authority from the COMELEC.
Accordingly, petitioner filed a formal motion for such authority.
On June 29, 1992, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a Supplemental Order 3 directing the PBC "to
reconvene, continue with the provincial canvass and proclaim the winning candidates for
Sangguniang Panlalawigan for the Province of Pangasinan, and other candidates for provincial
offices who have not been proclaimed 4 as of that date.
In the meantime, on June 24, 1992, the PBC, acting on the petitions for correction of the SOVs of
Tayug and San Manuel filed by private respondent and the MBCs of the said municipalities, rules "to
allow the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of the municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel,
Pangasinan to correct the Statement of Votes and Certificates of Canvass and on the basis of the
corrected documents, the Board (PBC) will continue the canvass and thereafter proclaim the winning
candidate. On June 25, 1992, petitioner Bince appealed from the above ruling allowing the correction
alleging that the PBC had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The appeal was docketed as SPC
No. 92-384. On July 8, 1992, private respondent Micu filed before the COMELEC an urgent motion
for the issuance of an order directing the PBC to reconvene and proceed with the canvass. He
alleged that the promulgation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2489 on June 29, 1992 affirmed the ruling
of the PBC dated June 24, 1992. Similarly, petitioner Bince filed an urgent petition to cite Atty. Felimon
Asperin and Supt. Primo. A. Mina, Chairman and Member, respectively, of the PBC, for Contempt
with alternative prayer for proclamation as winner and Injunction with prayer for the issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).
On July 9, 1992, the PBC Chairman, Atty. Felimon Asperin, filed a petition with the COMELEC
seeking a "definitive ruling and a clear directive or order as to who of the two (2) contending parties
should be proclaimed" 6 averring that "there were corrections already made in a separate sheet of
paper of the Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan
which corrections if to be considered by the Board in its canvass and proclamation, candidate
Emiliano will win by 72 votes. On the other hand, if these corrections will not be considered,
candidate Alfonso Bince, Jr. will win by one (1) vote. 7 On even date, the COMELEC promulgated its
resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
(1) To RECONVENE immediately and complete the canvass of the Certificates of Votes, as corrected, of the
municipalities comprising the 6th District of Pangasinan;
(2) To PROCLAIM the winning candidate for Member of the provincial Board, 6th District of Pangasinan, on the
basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of Canvass, aforesaid; in accordance with the law, the rules
and guidelines on canvassing and proclamation. 8

As directed therein, the PBC on July 21, 1992, by a vote of 2-1 with its Chairman Atty. Felimon
Asperin dissenting, proclaimed candidate Bince as the duly elected member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Pangasinan. Assailing the proclamation of Bince, private respondent Micu filed an
Urgent Motion for Contempt and to Annul Proclamation and Amended Urgent Petition for Contempt
and Annul Proclamation on July 22 and 29, 1992, respectively, alleging that the PBC defied the
directive of the COMELEC in its resolution of July 9, 1992. Acting thereon, the COMELEC
promulgated a resolution on July 29, 1992, the decretal portion of which reads:
The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES:
1. To direct Prosecutor Jose Antonio Guillermo and Supt. Primo Mina, vice-chairman and secretayr, respectively,
of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan, to show cause why they should not be declared in
contempt of defying and disobeying the Resolution of this Commission dated 09 July 1992, directing them to
RECOVENE immediately and complete the canvass of the Certificates of Votes as corrected, of the Municipal
Boards of Canvassers of the Municipalities comprising the 6th District of Pangasinan; and to PROCLAIM the
winning candidate of the Provincial Board, 6th District of Pangasinan, on the basis of the completed and

corrected Certificates of Canvass, aforesaid; instead they excluded the corrected Certificated of Canvass of the
Municipal Boards of Canvassers of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan;
2. To ANNUL the proclamation dated 21 July 1992, by the said Provincial Board of Canvassers (dissented by
Chairman Felimon Asperin), of candidate Alfonso Bince;
3. To DIRECT the Provincial Board of Canvassers to recovene immediately and proclaim the winning candidate
for the second position of the Provincial Board, 6th District of Pangasinan, on the basis of the completed and
corrected Certificates of Canvass submitted by the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of all the municipalities in the
6th District of Pangasinan, in accordance with law. 9

Consequently, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari before this Court seeking to set aside
the foregoing resolution of the COMELEC, contending that the same was promulgated without prior
notice and hearing with respect to SPC No. 92-208 and SPC No. 92-384. The case was docketed as
G.R. No. 106291.
On February 9, 1993, the Court en banc 10 granted the petition ratiocinating that:
Respondent COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in annulling the petitioner's
proclamation without the requisite due notice and hearing, thereby depriving the latter of due process. Moreover,
there was no valid correction of the SOVs and COCs for the municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel to warrant
the annullment of the petitioner's proclamation.
1. Petitioner had been proclaimed, had taken his oath of office and had assumed the position of the second
elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan for its Sixth Legislative District.
Such proclamation enjoys the presumption of regularly and validity. The ruling of the majority of the PBC to
proclaim the petitioner is based on its interpretation of the 9 July 1992 Resolution of respondent COMELEC
which does not expressly single out the corrected COCs of Tayug and San Manuel; since, as of that time, the
only corrected COC which existed was that for San Quintin, which was made by the PBC on 18 June 1992, the
majority of the PBC cannot be faulted for ruling the way it did. the 9 July 1992 Resolution (Rollo, p. 51) merely
directed it:
(1) To RECOVENE immediately and complete the canvass of the Certificates of Votes, as corrected, of the
Municipal Boards of Canvassers of the municipalities comprising the 6th District of Pangasinan;
(2) To PROCLAIM the winning candidate for Member of the Provincial Board, 6th District of Pangasinan, on the
basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of Canvass, aforesaid; in accordance with the law, the rules
and guideline on canvassing and proclamation. (Emphasis supplied)

The PBC thus had every reason to believe that the phrase "completed and corrected" COCs could
only refer to the nine 99) COCs for the nine municipalities, canvass for which was completed on 21
May 1992, and that of San Quintin, respectively. Verily, the above resolution is vague and
ambiguous.
Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office without due process of law. Although public office is
notproperty under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution (Article III, 1987 Constitution),
and one cannot acquire a vested right to public office (CRUZ, I.A., Constitutional Law, 1991 ed.,
101), it is, nevertheless, a protected right (BERNAS J., The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, vol. I, 1987 ed., 40, citing Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phil. 543 [1925] and Borja vs. Agoncillo,
46 Phil. 432 [1924]). Due process in proceedings before the respondent COMELEC, exercising its
quasi-judicial functions, requires due notice and hearing, among others. Thus, although the
COMELEC possesses, in appropriate cases, the power to annul or suspend the proclamation of
any candidate (Section 248, Omnibus Election Code [B.P. Blg. 881]), We had ruled in Farinas
vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 81763, 3 March 1988), Reyes vs. Commission on
Elections G.R. No. 81856, 3 March 1988) andGallardo vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No.
85974, 2 May 1989) that the COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation
or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing.
Furthermore, the said motion to annul proclamation was treated by the respondent COMELEC as a
Special Case (SPC) because its ruling therein was made in connection with SPC No. 92-208 and
SPC No. 92-384. Special Cases under the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE involve the preproclamation controversies (Rule 27 in relation to Section 4(h)l Rule 1, and Section 4, Rule 7). We
have categorically declared in Sarmiento vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 105628, and
companion cases, 6 August 1992) that pursuant to Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution, . . . the commission en banc does not have jurisdiction to hear and decide preproclamation cases at the first instance. Such cases should first be referred to a division
Hence, the COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to decide on the aforesaid to annul the
proclamation; consequently, its 29 July 1992 Resolution is motion is null and void. For this reason

too, the COMELEC en banc Resolution of 6 June 1992 in SPC No. 92-2()8 resolving the private
respondent's appeal from the ruling of the PBC with respect to the COC of San Quintin is similarly
void.
2. It is to be noted, as correctly stressed by the petitioner, that there are no valid corrected
Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass for Tayug and San Manuel; thus, any reference to
such would be clearly unfounded. While it may be true that on 24 June 1992, the PBC, acting on
simultaneous petitions to correct the SOVs and COCs for Tayug and San Manuel ordered the
MBCs for these two (2) municipalities to make the appropriate corrections in the said SOVs and
their corresponding COCs, none of said Boards convened to the members of actually implement
the order. Such failure could have been due to the appeal seasonably interposed by the petitioner
to the COMELEC or the fact that said members simply chose not to act thereon. As already
adverted to the so-called "corrected" Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass consist of
sheets of paper signed by the respective Election Registrars of Tayug (Annex "F-l" of Comment of
private respondent; Annex "A" of Consolidated Reply of petitioner) and San Manuel (Annex "F2, Id.; Annex "B", Id.). These are not valid corrections because the Election Registrars, as
Chairmen of the MBCs cannot, by themselves, act for their Section 225 of the respective Board.
Section 225 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) provides that "[A] majority vote of all the
members of the board of canvassers shall be necessary to render a decision." That majority means
at least two (2) of the three (3) members constituting the Board (Section 20(c) of the Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646) provides that the "municipal board of canvassers shall be
composed of the election registrar or a representative of the Commission, as chairman, the
municipal treasurer, as vice-chairman, and the most senior district school supervisor or in his
absence a principal of the school district or the elementary school, as members"). As to why the
Election Registrars, in their capacities as Chairmen, were 7th only ones who prepared the socalled correction sheets, is beyond Us. There is no showing that the other members of the Boards
were no longer available. Since they are from the Province of Pangasinan, they could have been
easily summoned by the PBC to appear before it and effect the corrections on the Statements of
Votes and Certificates of Canvass.
Besides, by no stretch of the imagination can these sheets of paper be considered as the corrected
SOVs and COCs. Corrections in a Statement of Vote and a Certificate of Canvass could only be
accomplished either by inserting the authorized corrections into the SOV and COC which were
originally prepared and submitted by the MBC or by preparing a new SOV and COC incorporating
therein the authorized corrections. Thus, the statement in the 29 July 1992 Resolution of the
COMELEC referring to "the Certificates of Canvass of the municipal Boards of Canvassers of
Tayug and San Manuel" (Last clause, paragraph 1 of the dispositive portion, Annex "A" of
Petition: Rollo 15), is palpably unfounded. The Commission could have 7 been misled by Atty.
Asperin's ambiguous reference to "corrections already made in separate sheets of paper of the
Statements of Votes and Certificate of Canvass of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan" (Quoted in
the Resolution of 9 July 1992; Id., 50-51), in his petition asking the COMELEC to rule on who shall
be proclaimed. However, if it only took the trouble to carefully examine what was held out to be as
the corrected documents, respondent COMELEC should not have been misled.
Even if We are to assume for the sake of argument that these sheets of paper constitute sufficient
corrections, they are, nevertheless, void and of no effect. At the time the Election Registrars
prepared them on 6 July 1992 respondent COMELEC had not yet acted on the petitioner's
appeal (SPC No. 92-384) from the 24 June 1992 ruling of the PBC authorizing the corrections.
Petitioner maintains that until now, his appeal has not been resolved. The public respondent, on
the other hand, through the Office of the Solicitor General, claims that the same had been:
. . . resolved in the questioned resolution of July 29, 1992, where COMELEC affirmed respondents
(sic) Board's correction that petitioner only received 2,415 votes in Tayug and 2,179 in San Manuel
(see p. 2, Annex "A", Petition) (Rollo, p. 71)
On the same matter, the private respondent asserts that:
This SPC-92-384, is however, deemed terminated and the ruling of the PBC is likewise deemed
affirmed by virtue of the 2nd par., Sec. 16, R.A. No. 7166, supra and Comelecen banc Resolution
No. 2489, supra, dated June 29, 1992 (Id., 36);

If We follow the respondent COMELEC's contention to its logical conclusion, it was only on 29 July
1992 that SPC No. 92-384 was resolved; consequently, the so-called "correction sheets" were still
prematurely prepared. In any event, the COMELEC could not have validly ruled on such appeal in
its 29 July 1992 Resolution because the same was promulgated to resolve the Urgent Motion For
Contempt and to Annul Proclamation filed by the private respondent. Furthermore, before the
resolution of SPC No. 92-384 on the abovementioned date, no hearing was set or conducted to
resolve the pending motion. Therefore, on this ground alone, the 29 July 1992 Resolution, even if it
was meant to resolve the appeal, is a patent nullity for having been issued in gross violation of the
requirement of notice and hearing mandated by Section 246 of the Omnibus Election Code, in
relation to Section 18 of R.A. No. 7166 and Section 6, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, and for having been resolved by the COMELEC en banc at the first instance. The case
should have been referred first to a division pursuant to Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987
constitution and Our ruling in Sarmiento vs. Commission on Elections. Moreover, the COMELEC's
claim that the questioned resolution affirmed the correction made by the Board is totally baseless.
The PBC did not make any corrections. It merely ordered the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of
Tayug and San Manuel to make such corrections. As earlier stated, however, the said MBCs did
not convene to make these corrections. It was the Chairmen alone who signed the sheets of paper
purporting to be corrections.
For being clearly inconsistent with the intention and official stand of respondent COMELEC, private
respondent COMELEC private respondent's theory of termination under the second paragraph of
Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166, and the consequent affirmance of the ruling of the PBC ordering the
correction of the number of votes, must necessarily fail.
The foregoing considered, the proclamation of the private respondent on, 13 August 1992 by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan is null and void.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolution of the respondent
Commission on Elections of 29 July 1992 and the proclamation of the private respondent on 13
August 1992 as the second Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Pangasinan, representing its Sixth Legislative District ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and respondent
Commission on Elections is DIRECTED to resolve the pending incidents conformably with the
foregoing disquisitions and pronouncements.
No costs.
SO ORDERED. 11
On February 23, 1993, private respondent Micu filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion before the
COMELEC praying that the latter hear and resolve the pending incidents referred to by this Court.
Private respondent was obviously referring to SPC No. 92-208 and SPC No. 92-384, both cases left
unresolved by the COMELEC.
Consequently, the First Division of the COMELEC set the cases for hearing on March 8, 1993. During
the hearing, both Micu and Bince orally manifested the withdrawal of their respective appeals. Also
withdrawn were the petitions to disqualify Atty. Asperin and to cite the Board for contempt. The parties
agreed to file their respective memoranda/position papers by March 15, 1993.
Petitioner Bince filed his Position Paper on March 12, 1993 arguing that the withdrawal of SPC No.
92-208 affirmed the ruling of the PBC dated May 21, 1992 and even if it were not withdrawn, Section
16 of R.A. 7166 would have worked to terminate the appeal. Bince likewise asserts that his appeal in
SPC No. 92-384 became moot and academic in view of this Court's ruling nullifying the June 24,
1992 order of the PBC granting the petitions for correction of the SOVs and COCs of Tayug and San
Manuel aside from being superseded by the PBC ruling proclaiming him on July 21, 1992.
On the other hand, private respondent Micu, in his Position Paper filed on March 15, 1993 postulated
that the petitions filed on June 11, 1992 for the correction of the SOVs and COCs of Tayug and San
Manuel under Section 6 of Rule 27 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, as well as the ruling of the
PBC of June 24, 1992 granting the same were valid so that the withdrawal of Bince's appeal in SPC
No. 92-384 firmly affirmed the PBC ruling of June 24, 1992 allowing the corrections.
On July 15, 1993, the First Division of the COMELEC promulgated a Resolution, the dispositive
portion of which reads:Viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Commission (First Division)
holds that the petitioner Alfonso C. Bince Jr. is entitled to sit as member of the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan, Sixth District of Pangasinan. ACCORDINGLY, the Commission (First Division)

RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to AFFIRM the proclamation of petitioner Alfonso C. Bince, Jr.
by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan on 21 July 1992 as the duly elected member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Sixth District of the Province of Pangasinan. 12
On July 20, 1993, private respondent Micu filed a Motion for reconsideration of the above-quoted
resolution.
On September 9, 1993, the COMELEC en banc granted the private respondentls motion for
reconsideration in a resolution which dispositively reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Emiliano
S. Micu is granted. The Resolution of the Commission First Division is hereby SET ASIDE. The
proclamation of petitioner Alfonso Bince, Jr. on July 21, 1992 is hereby declared null and void.
Accordingly, the Provincial Board of Canvassers is hereby directed to reconvene, with proper
notices, and to order the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Manuel and Tayug to make the
necessary corrections in the SOVs and COCs in the said municipalities. Thereafter, the Provincial
Board of Canvassers is directed to include the results in the said municipalities in its canvass.
The PBC is likewise ordered to proclaim the second elected member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Sixth Legislative District of Pangasinan.
SO ORDERED. 13
This is the resolution assailed in the instant petition for certiorari.
We do not find merit in this petition and accordingly rule against petitioner.
Respondent COMELEC did not act without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in annulling
the proclamation of petitioner Alfonso Bince, Jr. and in directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Pangasinan to order the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of Tayug and San Manuel to make the
necessary corrections in the SOVs and COCs in said municipalities and to proclaim the winner in the
sixth legislative district of Pangasinan.
At the outset, it is worthy to observe that no error was committed by respondent COMELEC when it
resolved the "pending incidents" of the instant case pursuant to the decision of this Court in the
aforesaid case of Bince, Jr. v.COMELEC on February 9, 1993 Petitioner's contention that his
proclamation has long been affirmed and confirmed by this Court in the aforesaid case is baseless.
In Bince, we nullified the proclamation of private respondent because the same was done without the
requisite due notice and hearing, thereby depriving the petitioner of his right to due process. In so
doing, however, we did not affirm nor confirm the proclamation of petitioner, hence, our directive to
respondent COMELEC to resolve the pending incidents of the case so as to ascertain the true and
lawful winner of the said elections. In effect, petitioner's proclamation only enjoyed the presumption of
regularity and validity of an official act. It was not categorically declared valid.
Neither can the COMELEC be faulted for subsequently annulling the proclamation of petitioner Bince
on account of a mathematical error in addition committed by respondent MBCs in the computation of
the votes received by both petitioner and private respondent.
The petitions to correct manifest errors were filed on time, that is, before the petitioner's proclamation
on July 21, 1992. The petition of the MBC of San Manuel was filed on June 4, 1992 while that of still,
the MBC of Tayug was filed on June 5, 1992. Still, private respondent's petition was filed with the
MBCs of Tayug and San Manuel on June 10, 1992 and June 11, 1992, respectively, definitely well
within the period required by Section 6 (now Section 7), Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. Section 6 clearly provides that the petition for correction may be filed at any time before
proclamation of a winner, thus:
Sec. 6. Correction of errors in tabulation or tallying of results by the board of canvassers. (a) Where it is clearly
shown before proclamation that manifest errors were committed in the tabulation or tallying of election returns, or
certificates of canvass, during the canvassing as where (1) a copy of the election returns of one precinct or two or
more copies of a certificate of canvass was tabulated more than once, (2) two copies of the election returns or
certificate of canvass were tabulated separately, (3) there had been a mistake in the adding or copying of the
figures into the certificate of canvass or into the statement of votes, or (4) so-called election returns from nonexistent precincts were included in the canvass, the board may, motu propio, or upon verified petition by any
candidate, political party, organization or coalition of political parties, after due notice and hearing, correct the
errors committed.
(b) The order for correction must be in writing and must be promulgated.

(c) Any candidate, political party, organization or coalition of political parties aggrieved by said order may appeal
therefrom to the Commission within twenty-four (24) hours from the promulgation.
(d) Once an appeal is made, the board of canvassers shall not proclaim the winning candidates, unless their
votes are not affected by the appeal.
(e) The appeal must implead as respondents all parties who may be adversely affected thereby.
(f) Upon receipt of the appeal, the Clerk of Court concerned shall forthwith issue summons, together with a copy
of the appeal, to the respondents.
(g) The Clerk of Court concerned shall immediately set the appeal for hearing.
(h) The appeal shall be heard an decided by he Commission en banc (Emphasis ours).

The rule is plain and simple. It needs no other interpretation contrary to petitioner's protestation.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the petition was filed out of time, this incident alone will not
thwart the proper determination and resolution of the instant case on substantial grounds. Adherence
to a technicality that would put a stamp of validity on a palpably void proclamation, with the inevitable
result of frustrating the people's will cannot be countenanced. In Benito v. COMELEC, 14 categorically
declared that: Adjudication of cases on substantive merits and not on technicalities has been
consistently observed by this Court. In the case of Juliano vs. Court of Appeals (20 SCRA 808) cited
in Duremdes vs. Commission on Elections (178 SCRA 746), this Court had the occasion to declare
that:
Well-settled is the doctrine that election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and
procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. And also
settled is the rule that laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that
the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical
objections (Gardiner v. Romulo, 26 Phil. 521; Galang v. Miranda, 35 Phil. 269; Jalandoni
v. Sarcon, In an election case the court has an imperative duty to ascertain all means within its
command who is the real candidate elected by the electorate (Ibasco v. Ilao, G.R. No. L-17512,
December 29, 1960). . . . (Juliano vs. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 818-819). (Emphasis ours) In
the later case of Rodriguez vs. Commission on Elections (119 SCRA 465), this doctrine was
reiterated and the Court went on to state that: Since the early case of Gardiner v. Romulo (26 Phil.
521), this Court has made it clear that it frowns upon any interpretation of the law or the rules that
would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also

the correct ascertainment of the results, This bent or disposition continues to the present. (Id., at p.
474). he same principle still holds true today. Technicalities of the legal rules enunciated in the
election laws should not frustrate the determination of the popular will.
Undoubtedly therefore, the only issue that remains unresolved is the allowance of the correction of
what are purely mathematical and/or mechanical errors in the addition of the votes received by both
candidates. It does not involve the opening of ballot boxes; neither does it involve the examination
and/or appreciation of ballots. The correction sought by private respondent and respondent MBCs of
Tayug and San Manuel is correction of manifest mistakesin mathematical addition. Certainly, this only
calls for a mere clerical act of reflecting the true and correct votes received by the candidates by the
MBCs involved. In this case, the manifest errors sought to be corrected involve the proper and
diligent addition of the votes in the municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan.
In Tayug, the total votes received by petitioner Bince was erroneously recorded as 2,486 when it
should only have been 2,415. Petitioner Bince, in effect, was credited by 71 votes more.
In San Manuel, petitioner Bince received 2,179 votes but was credited with 6 votes more, hence, the
SOV reflected the total number of votes as 2,185. On the other hand, the same SOV indicated that
private respondent Micu garnered 2,892 votes but he actually received only 2,888, hence was
credited in excess of 4 votes.
Consequently, by margin of 72 votes, private respondent indisputably won the challenged seat in the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the sixth district of Pangasinan. Petitioner's proclamation and
assumption into public office was therefore flawed from the beginning, the same having been based
on a faulty tabulation. Hence, respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
setting aside the illegal proclamation.
As a parting note, we reiterate' our concern with respect to insignificant disputes plaguing this Court.
Trifles such as the one at issue should not, as much as possible, reach this Court, clog its docket,
demand precious judicial time and waste valuable taxpayers' money, if they can be settled below
without prejudice to any party or to the ends of justice.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.