1.

Ty vs CA (2000)
Facts:
Private respondent herein had a prior marriage. During the subsistence of a prior
marriage, he contracted a subsequent marriage to herein petitioner. All of these marriages
were contracted prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. After the subsequent
marriage, the court declared the private respondents prior marriage as null and void
having no marriage license. Private respondent petitioned to declare his subsequent
marriage as null and void ab initio for having contracted without a judicial declaration of
nullity of his prior marriage. It was granted by the court. It was appealed, but was denied.
Hence, this petition before the Supreme Court, with the prayer of the petitioner for moral
and exemplary damages against the private respondent for filing baseless complaint for
the annulment of their marriage.
Issue:
WON the subsequent marriage is void for lack of a judicial declaration of nullity of the
prior marriage.
WON the herein petitioner can be granted award for damages.
Ruling:
Since the prior and subsequent marriage was contracted before the Family Code took
effect, the Civil Code is to be considered. In the Civil Code, it is silent as to whether or
not there is a need for judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is needed
before contracting into a subsequent marriage. Jurisprudence at that time seems to be
conflicting also. But, since the subsequent marriage took effect in 1979, the Odayat,
Mendoza, and Aragon was the prevailing rule, and thus, should be applied in the present
case. Therefore, there was no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a prior void
marriage, before contracting a subsequent marriage. Moreover, the Family Code cannot
be applied retroactively since it will impair the rights of the wife and their children. Thus,
the marriage of herein petitioner and private respondent was valid.
While the petitioner herein wants her marriage to the private respondent be held valid and
subsisting, she, at the same time, asks for damages against her husband. Should we grant
her prayer, we would have a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from
conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd.
Moreover, our laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife
merely because of breach of a marital obligations. There are other remedies.
Therefore, their marriage was held valid and private respondent was ordered to support
their children.

2. Arcaba vs Tabancura Vda De Batocael (2001)

Facts:
Francisco Comille and his wife became the registered owners of a lot. Later on, the latter
died. Few months before the death of Francisco, he executed a document donating
portion of the said land to Cirila, his alleged househelper, who was accepted by the latter
in the same document. Later on, Francisco died. Respondents (nephews, nieces, and heirs
of the Francisco) herein questioned the validity of the said donation and petitioned to
declare it as void based on the evidences provided: (1) that Cirila and Francisco were
living together under one roof and that they cohabited; (2) there was a document signed
by Cirila with the usage of the surname of Francisco, which is a clear manifestation that
the former saw herself as the latters common-law wife; (3) that there was a civil case
filed referring Cirila as the common-law spouse of Francisco; and (4) the fact that Cirila
did not demand from Francisco a regular cash wage is an indication that she was not just
an employee of the latter, but a common-law spouse of him. Trial court granted the
petition by herein respondents. Petitioner herein petitioned for a reconsideration before
Court of Appeal, but was denied applying Article 87 of the Family Code. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
WON Cirila was a common-law spouse of Francisco.
WON the donation made by Francisco to Cirila was valid.
Ruling:
Yes, Cirila was a common-law spouse of Francisco based on the evidences that was
presented by the respondents.
No, the donation made by Francisco to Cirila was not valid. Under Article 87 of the
Family Code, it provides that:
Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses
during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each
other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to
persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.
Since Cirila was a common-law spouse of Francisco, and that both of them were living
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the donation made by by the latter
to the former was not valid, thus, a void donation.

3. Ayala vs CA (1998)
Facts:
PBM (to where the herein private respondent-husband is employed) obtained a loan from
the herein petitioner. As added security, private respondent-husband herein executed
security agreements making him jointly and severally liable to the loan of the company.
PBM failed to pay the loan. The petitioner herein petitioned before a court and an order
was issued requiring the PBM private respondent-husband to pay for the loan. Private
respondent-husband appealed the said decision, but while pending, the lower court issued
for the execution of the latters property. The private respondent herein petitioned for
injunction on the ground that the petitioner cannot enforce the judgment against the
conjugal partnership since the loan did not redound to the benefit of it, and then a
temporary restraining order of the said execution was issued. Petitioner acquired a TRO
against the TRO that was acquired by the respondent, thus, the auction sale took place.
Petitioner, being the only bidder, was issued the Certificate of Sale, and upon the
expiration of the redemption period, issued the final deed of sale. Then through a prior
petition of herein respondent, the sale was declared null and void. Petitioner herein
appealed before the CA, but the latter affirmed the decision of the lower court. He filed
for a reconsideration, but was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON the conjugal partnership of the respondents are liable for the obligation by the
respondent-husband.
WON said obligation redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Ruling:
No, the conjugal partnership of gains of the respondents is not liable for the obligation
since it did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Article 122 of the
Family Code applies.
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the
money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that
contract falls within the term "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
Here, no actual benefit may be proved. Simply stated, where the husband contracts
obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such
obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only
as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling
within the context of "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." The
contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for
the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters

into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is "for the benefit of the

conjugal partnership." Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the
conjugal partnership.
The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the sole advancement and
benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
of petitioners-appellees. The debt is clearly a corporate debt and respondent-appellant's
right of recourse against appellee-husband as surety is only to the extent of his corporate
stockholdings. It does not extend to the conjugal partnership of gains of the family of
petitioners-appellees.
Petitioner suggests, that even in such kind of contract of accommodation, a benefit for the
family may also result, when the guarantee is in favor of the husband's employer.
However, these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the Civil Code. The
benefits must be one directly resulting from the loan. It cannot merely be a by-product or
a spin-off of the loan itself.
Appellee-husband derives salaries, dividends benefits from Philippine Blooming Mills
(the debtor corporation), only because said husband is an employee of said PBM. These
salaries and benefits, are not the 'benefits' contemplated by Articles 121 and 122 of the
Family Code. The 'benefits' contemplated by the exception in Article 122 (Family
Code) is that benefit derived directly from the use of the loan. In the case at bar, the
loan is a corporate loan extended to PBM and used by PBM itself, not by petitionerappellee-husband or his family.
Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession. Signing
as a surety is not embarking in a business. Here, the property in dispute also involves
the family home. The loan is a corporate loan not a personal one. Signing as a surety is
certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of administration for the
benefit of the family.

4. Go vs CA (1997)
Facts:
Private respondents herein got married. Prior to the marriage, they contracted the herein
petitioner-wife to record a video of their wedding. When they claimed it, the petitioner
failed to give it since the tape was not yet processed. Then the parties agreed upon that
the tape would be ready upon the the private-respondents return from the USA. But still,
the petitioner-wife failed since she deleted it already. Because of this, the private
respondents filed a complaint with prayers for damages against the petitioner. The court
granted the petition, and held both the herein petitioner-husband and wife jointly liable
for the damages. Petitioner-husband contended that he should not be held liable jointly
with his wife for the damages, since when the wife entered into a contract with the private
respondent, she was acting alone for her sole interest.
Issue:
WON the husband can also be held liable jointly with his wife, for the damages incurred
from the contract entered into solely by the latter.
Ruling:
No, the husband cannot be held liable jointly with his wife for the damages incurred from
the contract entered into solely by the latter.
We find merit in this contention. Under Article 117 of the Civil Code (now Article 73 of
the Family Code), the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in
business without the consent of the husband. In the instant case, we are convinced that it
was only petitioner Nancy Go who entered into the contract with private respondent.
Consequently, we rule that she is solely liable to private respondents for the damages
awarded below, pursuant to the principle that contracts produce effect only as between the
parties who execute them.

5. Zulueta vs Pan American World Airways (1973)

Facts:
Petitioner-spouses, together with their child, was was on their trip to Manila from Hawaii.
During their stopover, due to a call of nature by the petitioner-husband, and finding the
toilet at the terminal full, went to the beach to answer a call of nature. Upon returning to
the plane, he almost missed the flight, in which he, and the agent of the respondent
herein, had an altercation, where the latter ordered to off-load all the Zuluetas and their
luggage. Petitioner-husband was left on the island, and the other Zuluetas was still able to
remain on the plane. During the case, Petitioner-wife and the respondent had a
compromise agreement, in which the latter awarded him a sum of money. Petitioner-wife
move to dismiss the case in so far as she is concerned, contending that she already have
settled all her differences with the respondent, but it was denied by the court. The
respondent contended that the damages involved in the case at bar are not among those
forming part of the conjugal partnership pursuant to Article 153 of the Civil Code.
Issue:
WON the damages involved form part of the conjugal partnership.
Ruling:
Yes, the damages involved form part of the conjugal partnership.
The payment is effective, insofar as it is deductible from the award. What is ineffective is
the compromise agreement, insofar as the conjugal partnership is concerned. The
petitioner-husband is the main party in interest, both as the person principally aggrieved
and as administrator of the conjugal partnership, he having acted in this capacity in
entering into the contract of carriage with PANAM and paid the amount due to the latter,
under the contract, with funds of the conjugal partnership, to which the amounts
recoverable for breach of said contract, accordingly, belong. The damages suffered by
petitioner-wife were mainly an incident of the humiliation to which her husband had been
subjected. The Court ordered that said sum of money paid by respondent to petitionerwife be deducted from the aggregate award in favor of the plaintiffs herein for the simple
reason that upon liquidation of the conjugal partnership, said amount would have to be
reckoned with, either as part of her share in the partnership, or as part of the support
which might have been or may be due to her. The award was made in their favor
collectively. In the absence of proof to the contrary, the presumption is that the purpose of
the trip was for the common benefit of the plaintiffs and that the money had come from
the conjugal funds, for, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that things
have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
Considering that the damages in question have arisen from breach of petitioners contract
of carriage with the respondent, for which petitioners paid their fare with funds
presumably belonging to the conjugal partnership, we hold that said damages fall under
paragraph (1) of said Article 153, the right thereto having been "acquired by onerous title

during the marriage . . ." In the present case, the contract of carriage was concededly
entered into, and the damages claimed by the plaintiffs were incurred, during marriage.
Hence, the rights accruing from said contract, including those resulting from breach
thereof by the defendant, are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of Mr. and
Mrs. Zulueta.

6. Wong vs IAC and Henson

Facts:
Private-respondent and his wife was legally married, but they were, most of the time
separated in fact. The former , during their marriage, bought a parcel of land. On the other
hand, his wife became indebted with the petitioner-spouses herein, and failed to pay the
same. Thus, the petitioner-spouses petitioned for the collection of the debt, which was
granted by the court. Then a writ of execution was issued. Levied upon were the
properties in the name of the private-respondent, married to the wife, which he acquired
during their marriage. It was sold to the two another petitioners herein. Privaterespondent petitioned for its nullification contending that it was his exclusive properties
and that he had nothing to do with the debt of his wife since he did not authorized such. It
was granted by the court. Petitioner appealed, but the previous decision was affirmed in
toto. They moved for reconsideration, but was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON said properties were exclusive properties of the private respondent.
WON the debt of the private-respondents wife can be charged against their conjugal
property.
Ruling:
NO, said properties were not exclusive properties of the private respondent, but was of
conjugal property, and NO, the debt of his wife cannot be charged against their conjugal
property.
The said properties, having been acquired during the marriage, are still presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership even though the respondent spouses had been living
separately. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in the
absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or
to prove that the properties are exclusively owned by respondent. While there is proof
that latter acquired the properties with money he had borrowed from an officemate, it is
unclear where he obtained the money to repay the loan. If he paid it out of his salaries,
then the money is part of the conjugal assets and not exclusively his. Proof on this matter
is of paramount importance considering that in the determination of the nature of a
property acquired by a person during coverture, the controlling factor is the source of the

money utilized in the purchase. The conjugal nature of the properties notwithstanding, the
wifes indebtedness may not be paid for with them her obligation not having been shown
by the petitioners to be one of the charges against the conjugal partnership. In addition to
the fact that her rights over the properties are merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership, the consent of her husband and her authority to incur such
indebtedness had not been alleged in the complaint and proven at the trial. Furthermore,
under the Civil Code (before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988), a
wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the
support of the family or when she borrows money for the purpose of purchasing things
necessary for the support of the family if the husband fails to deliver the proper sum;
when the administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the
courts or by the husband, and when the wife gives moderate donations for charity. Having
failed to establish that any of these circumstances occurred, the petitioner-spouses may
not bind the conjugal assets to answer for the personal obligation to the by the
respondents wife.

7. Go vs Servacio (2011)
Facts:
Go Jr. bought two parcel of lands, but later on executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and
Waiver affirming that it was his father, Go Sr. who purchased the said properties. Later
on, the latters wife, the formers mother, died. Go Sr. then sold the properties to the
respondent herein. Petitioner then petitioned for the annulment of said property
contending that said properties were the conjugal properties of Go Sr. and their deceased
mother, and that the sale without a prior liquidation between the spouses is null and void
pursuant to Article 130 of the Family Code. The court recognized that it was of conjugal
property but nevertheless, affirmed the validity of the sale. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON the sale of a conjugal property after the death of the wife, without a prior
liquidation, is void ab initio.
Ruling:
No, the sale of a conjugal property after the death of the wife, without a prior liquidation,
is not necessarily void ab initio, but merely voidable.
Upon the death of the wife, Go Sr. and the heirs of the wife automatically become coowner of the conjugal properties. Nontheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided
interest, hence, Go Sr. has the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but
not the interest of his co-owner. Therefore, the appropriate recourse to bring about is to
commence an action for judicial partition, and not the nullity of the sale. Thus, the

appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were not secured in a sale
of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the
co-owners is an action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. If it
turns out that the property alienated or mortgaged really would pertain to the share of
the surviving spouse, then said transaction is valid. If it turns out that there really would
be, after liquidation, no more conjugal assets then the whole transaction is null and void.
But if it turns out that half of the property thus alienated or mortgaged belongs to the
husband as his share in the conjugal partnership, and half should go to the estate of the
wife, then that corresponding to the husband is valid, and that corresponding to the other
is not. Since all these can be determined only at the time the liquidation is over, it follows
logically that a disposal made by the surviving spouse is not void ab initio. Thus, it has
been held that the sale of conjugal properties cannot be made by the surviving spouse
without the legal requirements. The sale is void as to the share of the deceased spouse
(except of course as to that portion of the husband's share inherited by her as the
surviving spouse). The buyers of the property that could not be validly sold become
trustees of said portion for the benefit of the husband's other heirs.

8. Carino vs Carino (2001)

Facts:
SPO4 Carino had two marriages: first was with the petitioner herein to whom he had 2
children, and the second was with the respondent herein, without children. The
subsequent marriage was contracted without a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage. Subsequently, SPO4 Carino died. Both petitioner and respondent filed
claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from
various government agencies. Petitioner was able to collect a bigger amount compared to
the respondent. Respondent herein petitioned for the collection of the sum of money
against the petitioner herein, praying that the latter return to her half of what she
collected. Respondent even contended that the deceaseds first marriage was void for
having been contracted without a marriage license. Trial court ruled in favor of
respondent. On appeal by the petitioner, it affirmed the lower courts decision. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is entitled to the properties of the deceased.
Ruling:
No, she is not entitled to the properties of the deceased.
Although the first marriage was void, a judicial declaration of nullity against it was not
obtained prior to the subsequent marriage, thus, making the latter also a void marriage.

Since there was no valid marriage, Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code will govern.
As to the first marriage, Article 147 will apply since both of them where legally
capacitated to contract marriage, but they dont have the benefit of a marriage. Since both
of them acted in good faith, therefore, all the properties, wages and salaries obtained
during their cohabitation, belong to the co-ownership. Thus, one-half of the subject death
benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and
the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal
heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
As to the subsequent marriage, considering that the marriage of respondent and the
deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a
previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the
application of Article 148 is therefore in order. In this property regime, the properties
acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the coownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively.
Since the death benefits was earned by the deceased as a police officer, hence, they are
not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone
and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same.
THEREFORE, respondent is not entitled to the properties of the deceased.

9. Lilius vs Manila Railroad

Facts:
Lilius was driving with his family. It was his first time in the area and he was entirely
unacquainted with the conditions of the road and had no knowledge of the existence of a
railroad crossing. Before reaching the crossing in question, there was nothing to indicate
its existence and, it was impossible to see an approaching train. Petitioner saw an
autotruck parked on the left side of the road. Several people, who seemed to have alighted
from the said truck, were walking on the opposite side. He slowed down and sounded his
horn for the people to get out of the way. With his attention thus occupied, he did not see
the crossing but he heard two short whistles. Immediately afterwards, he saw a huge
black mass fling itself upon him, which turned out to be locomotive No. 713 of the
MRCs train. The locomotive struck the plaintiffs car right in the center. The 3 victims
were injured and were hospitalized.
Lilius filed a case against MRC in the CFI. Answering the complaint, it denies each and
every allegation thereof and, by way of special defense, alleges that Lilius, with the
cooperation of his wife and coplaintiff, negligently and recklessly drove his car, and prays
that it be absolved from the complaint.
The CFI decided in favor of Lilius. The 2 parties appealed said decision, each assigning
errors on said judgment.

Issue:
WON petitioner can claim damages for loss of domestic service of his wife to him.
Ruling:
No, the petitioner cant claim damages for loss of domestic service of his wife to him.
The plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius also seeks to recover the sum of P2,500 for the loss of what
is called Anglo-Saxon common law "consortium" of his wife, that is, "her services,
society and conjugal companionship", as a result of personal injuries which she had
received from the accident now under consideration. Under the law and the doctrine of
this court, one of the husband's rights is to count on his wife's assistance. In the case
under consideration, apart from the services of his wife Sonja Maria Lilius as translator
and secretary, the value of which has not been proven, the plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius has
not presented any evidence showing the existence of domestic services and their nature,
rendered by her prior to the accident in order that it may serve as a basis in estimating
their value. Furthermore, inasmuch as a wife's domestic assistance and conjugal
companionship are purely personal and voluntary acts which neither of the spouses may
be compelled to render , it is necessary for the party claiming indemnity for the loss of
such services to prove that the person obliged to render them had done so before he was
injured and that he would be willing to continue rendering them had he not been
prevented from so doing.

10. Go vs Yamane (2006)

Facts:
Involved in the suit is a 750 square meters (sic) parcel of lot registered in the name of
Muriel Pucay Yamane, wife of Leonardo Yamane, respondent herein. The subject
property was levied to satisfy the lien for attorney's fees. The said property was scheduled
to be sold at public auction. Prior to the auction sale, respondent filed a Third-Party
Claim with the Office of the Provincial Sheriff to stop the public auction on the ground
that the subject property is conjugal property and, therefore, should not be held
answerable for the personal obligation of the Pucay sisters. However, the Sheriff
proceeded with the auction sale. The subject property was sold to petitioner-spouses. No
redemption having been made during the one-year period, a Final Sheriff's Certificate of
Sale was eventually issued. Being unsatisfied with the decision of the lower court,
respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. Respondents claim was granted,
and the sale was declared null and void. Hence this petition.
Issue:
WON the subject property is a conjugal property.

WON it can be held liable for the payment of attorneys fees incurred by the Pucay
sisters.
Ruling:
Yes, the subject property is a conjugal property, thus it cant be held liable for the
payment of attorneys fees incurred by the Pucay sisters.
The purchase of the property had been concluded in 1967, before the Family Code took
effect on August 3, 1988. 20 Accordingly, the transaction was aptly covered by the then
governing provisions of the New Civil Code. On the latter basis, therefore, we shall
resolve the issue of the nature of the contested property. Article 160 of the New Civil
Code provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
The subject property was acquired during the respondents marriage, therefore, it is clear
enough that the subject pertains to the conjugal partnership. The nature of a property,
whether conjugal or paraphernal, is determined by law and not by the will of one of the
spouses. Thus, no unilateral declaration by one spouse can change the character of a
conjugal property. The mere registration of a property in the name of one spouse does not
destroy its conjugal nature. Hence, it cannot be contended in the present case that, simply
because the title and the Deed of Sale covering the parcel of land were in the name of
Muriel alone, it was therefore her personal and exclusive property. The presumption not
having been overthrown, the conclusion is that the contested land is conjugal property.
The lawyer's legal services were engaged to recover the balance of the purchase price of
the sale of the exclusive property of Muriel and her sisters. The contract or transaction
between the attorney and the Pucay sisters appears to have been incurred for the
exclusive interest of the latter. Muriel was acting privately for her exclusive interest when
she joined her two sisters in hiring the services of attorney. Accordingly, whatever
expenses were incurred by Muriel in the litigation for her and her sisters' private and
exclusive interests, are her exclusive responsibility and certainly cannot be charged
against the contested conjugal property. Before a conjugal property could be held liable
for the obligation contracted by a spouse, there must be a showing of some advantage or
benefit that accrued to the conjugal partnership.

11. Pana vs Heirs of Juanite (2012)

Facts:
Petitioner herein with his wife and others were accused of murder. The court rendered its
decision only convicting the wife and others and ordering them to pay damages. The heirs
of the deceased petitioned for the execution of such, thus, the court ordered the issuance
of the writ, resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of the petitioner
and his wife. Petitioner contended that it cannot be levied on such properties since it is of
conjugal partnership of gains, and not the exclusive property of his wife. The respondent
herein contended that they are governed by absolute community since they did not have a
prenuptial agreement.
Issue:
WON the petitioner and his wife is governed by conjugal partnership of gains.
If yes, WON the civil liabilities of the petitioners wife can be levied on their conjugal
partnership of gains.
Ruling:
Yes, the petitioner and his wife is governed by conjugal partnership of gains, and, the
civil liabilities of the wife can be levied on their conjugal property.
Since the petitioners marriage to his wife was celebrated prior to the enactment of the
Family Code, and that they did not have a prenuptial agreement, their regime shall be
governed by Civil Code, and that the default property regime at that time was conjugal
partnership of gains. Further, it cannot be changed to absolute community after the
enactment of the Family Code since it will impair the vested rights of the spouses of their
right to their exclusive property, and applying Article 76 of the Family Code, no
modification in the marriage settlements can be made after the celebration of marriage
except on some circumstances in which the present case does not fall under.
The Court must refer to the Family Code in deciding whether or not the civil liabilities of
the wife may be levied on their conjugal properties. Since petitioner does not dispute that
his wife has no exclusive property of his own, Article 122 applies, where in the case of
absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property, the conjugal property may be held
liable to answer the liabilities incurred by either spouse, subject to deduction for what has
been paid for, during the liquidation of the partnership. But, this can only be enforced if
all the obligations falling under Article 121 have been covered already.

12. Carlos vs Abelardo (2002)

Facts:
Respondent with his wife, loaned an amount from the petitioner for the purchase of their
house and lot for their establishment of family. The former have failed to pay, thus the
petitioner filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of money and damages against the
respondent and his wife. Living separately, the spouses filed their separate answers. Court
granted in favor of the petitioner. Respondent filed a motion contending that the amount
was not a loan, but was his share to from the company. The court reversed the lower
courts decision, and ruled in favor of the respondent herein. The petitioner appealed,
where the court found out that the amount was a loan, and not a share of the respondent
from the company. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON the loan is a liability of the conjugal partnership of gains of the respondent and his
wife.
Ruling:
Yes, the loan is a liability of the conjugal partnership of gains of the respondent and his
wife pursuant to Article 121 of the Family Code, which provides that debts and
obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that
the family may have been benefited.
In the present case, though while respondent did not and refused to sign the
acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the
benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the house and lot which became the
conjugal home of respondent and his family. Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of
consent of respondent, under Art. 21 of the Family Code, he shall be solidarily liable for
such loan together with his wife.

13. Guiang vs CA (1998)

Facts:
Respondents herein sold, jointly, one-half of their lot to the petitioners. After the
respondent-wife went to Manila to look for work abroad, respondent-husband herein sold,
without the consent of the former, the remaining half of the said lot, together with the
house situated therein, to the petitioners. When the respondent-wife returned, she
resumed living in their house with her children. But the petitioner petitioned for the
eviction of the latter, thus, an amicable settlement was made, but the consent of the
respondent-wife to such settlement was obtained through fraud, since the barangay
authorities made her sign said document through misrepresentation and coercion. The
Trial Court and Court of Appeals all rendered decision in favor of the respondent-wife.
The petitioners contended that though the deed of sale was contracted without the consent
of the respondent-wife, it was ratified through the amicable settlement, thus, applying
Articile 124 of the Family Code. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON the deed of sale, having no consent of the respondent-wife, was ratified through the
amicable settlement, applying the last paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
No, the deed of sale was not ratified.
Applying Article 124 of the Family Code, the absence of authority or consent in the
disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal properties, shall render it void. In the present
case, since no consent was given by the respondent-wife on the sale of the said property
by the respondent-husband, the deed of sale, thus, is void. Such contract cannot be
ratified for only those voidable contracts can be ratified. Further, the amicable settlement
cannot be considered as those mentioned in the last paragraph of Article 124, to be a
means of ratification since it did not mention a continuing offer to sell the property or an
acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that private respondent
would vacate the property.
Therefore, the deed of sale of the remaining half of the property entered into the
respondent-husband and the petitioner-spouses are void, for the absence of the
respondent-wifes consent.

14. Jader-Manalo vs Camaisa (2002)

Facts:
Petitioner came across the property that is being sold by the respondent-spouses. The
petitioner and the respondent-husband entered into agreement to sell the property to the
former, but, the respondent wife refused to affixed her signature for not agreeing with the
contents of the contract. Petitioner then filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages to compel the respondent-wife to sign the contract. A motion to dismiss such
was denied, then the respondent-wife filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which was
granted by the court. Petitioner alleges that the contract was perfected already and that the
court can issue authorization on such, applying Article 124 of the Family Code.
Issue:
WON the respondent-husband can dispose conjugal property without the written consent
of respondent-wife.
Ruling:
No, the respondent-husband cannot dispose conjugal property without the written consent
of respondent-wife.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides that such disposition can only be valid if both
the spouses have affixed their written consent in the contract. Further, the court can only
give its authorization to the contract if the other spouse is incapacitated or unable to
participate.
In the present case, there is no question that said property is a conjugal property,
therefore, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of the husband and the wife
must concur. Further, the petitioner failed to allege and prove that respondent-wife was
incapacitated to give her consent to the contracts.
Therefore, the respondent-husband cannot dispose conjugal property without the written
consent of respondent-wife.

15. Homeowners Savings vs Dailo (2005)

Facts:
During the marriage of the respondent and her husband, they bought a house and lot. The
property was, however, named only on the husband. Later on, the husband with a special
power of attorney, authorized a third party to obtain a loan from the petitioner, making the
said house and lot a security of the loan, without the consent of the respondent. Upon the
failure to pay the said loan, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure on the
mortgaged property, where they acquire the said property for being the highest bidder.
After the husband died, the respondent discovered the said event, then she petitioned for
the nullification of the Mortgage and Certificate of Sale and the Reconveyance of the said
property to her, on the ground that there was no consent from her over the said
transactions done by her husband to their conjugal property. The court granted her
petition. The petitioner elevated it to the Court of Appeals but he was not favored. The
petitioner argued that the framers of the law could not have intended to curtail the right
of a spouse from exercising full ownership over the portion of the conjugal property
pertaining to him under the concept of co-ownership. He also argued that the liability of
the deceased husband can be imposed upon their conjugal property since it redounded to
the benefit of the family. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON the husband can dispose or encumber the conjugal property without the written
consent of the respondent.
WON the loan redounded to the benefit of the family.
Ruling:
On both issue, the answer is No.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides that the administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal property shall belong to both the spouses. Further, conjugal property cannot be
dispose or encumber without the written consent of both spouses. In the present case, the
basic and established fact is that during the lifetime of the husband, without the
knowledge and consent of his wife(respondent), constituted a real estate mortgage on the
subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of
Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of court authority or written consent of the
other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.
Since the burden of proving lies on the party alleging it, the petitioner have the duty to
show evidences proving that the loan redounded to the benefit of the family, in which
case, he failed to do so. Thus, the conjugal property cannot be held liable for the contract
entered into alone by the deceased husband, without the consent of the respondent.
Therefore, the husband cannot dispose or encumber the conjugal property without the
consent of the respondent, and the conjugal property cannot be held liable for the contract
entered into by the husband without the consent of the respondent since it did not
redounded to the benefit of the family.

16. Sps. Lita De Leon & Felic Tarrosa vs Anita De Leon, et. al. (2009)
Facts:
The deceased husband of the respondent, while the former was single, entered into a
conditional contract to sell of a land, where the full ownership of which shall be vested
only to the latter upon the full payment. He later on got married to the respondent and had
two children. During their marriage, the full ownership of the said property was vested on
the deceased husband and was issued in the name of the latter as single. He later on sold
the said property to the petitioners, without a written consent of the respondent-wife.
Later on, the husband died. The respondent, to protect their rights over said property,
petitioned for the reconveyance of which to them. The Trial Court rendered decision in
favor of herein respondent ruling that said property partakes that of a conjugal.
Petitioners appealed, but the previous decision was just affirmed. The latter petitioned for
reconsideration, contending that said property was an exclusive property since it was
acquired during the time where the deceased was still single, but was denied. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
WON the said property is conjugal.
Ruling:
Yes, the said property is conjugal.
Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing provision in effect at the time the
deceased and respondent-wife contracted marriage, provides that all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife. Such is the situation obtaining in the
instant case. The conditional contract to sell executed by and between the deceased and
the vendor provided that ownership over and title to the property will vest on the
deceased only upon execution of the final deed of sale which, in turn, will be effected
upon payment of the full purchase price. Evidently, title to the property in question only
passed to the deceased after he had fully paid the purchase price. This full payment was
made during the marriage. In net effect, the property was acquired during the existence of
the marriage; as such, ownership to the property is, by law, presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership. As a final consideration, the Court agrees with the CA that the sale
of one-half of the conjugal property without liquidation of the partnership is void. The
interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder or "remanente liquido" (haber
ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its
dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does
not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after
dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal
obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their
respective heirs.

17. Dino vs Dino (2011)

Facts:
Petitioner and respondent were childhood sweethearts, and were living together for
sometime, until they decided to get married. Few years after the marriage, petitioner
petitioned for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, which was granted by the court with the condition that said decree shall only
be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code. Petitioner
petitioned for reconsideration questioning the said condition. The trial then partially
granted the petition modifying it, ruling that said decree shall only be issued after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code. Petitioner argued that the Rules on Declaration of Nullity of Null
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages does not apply to Article 147 of the
Family Code. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of
the Family Code shall be complied first before a declaration of nullity of marriage can be
issued on the ground of psychological incapacity, Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
No, there is no need for it.
A void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the
period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage
is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court. For
Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present: (1)The
man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other; (2)They live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife; and (3)Their union is without the benefit of
marriage, or their marriage is void. All these elements are present in this case and there is
no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between
petitioner and respondent. The ruling has no basis because Section 19 (1) of the Rule
does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code, since it
only covers Articles 50 and 51. It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section
19 (1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled
by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the
Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article
36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation
of the properties of the parties. Since the property relations of the parties is governed by
absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to
liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be

issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership. What
governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are
the rules on co-ownership. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the
spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on
coownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, "partition may be made by agreement
between the parties or by judicial proceedings. . . . ." It is not necessary to liquidate the
properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.

18. Valdes vs RTC of QC and Gomez-Valdes (1996)

Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent got married. Later on, petitioner sought the declaration
of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
Family Code. The petition was granted with the decision that the petitioner and
respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties
as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of
Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code. Respondent sought a clarification of that

portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the
Family Code. The court then omitted the compliance to Arts. 50, 51 and 52, but
affirmed that the liquidation and partition shall be governed by co-ownership in
pursuance to Article 147 of the FC. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration, but
was denied. He argued that Arts. 50, 51 and 52 of the FC should be held
controlling and that Art. 147 does not apply to cases where the parties are
psychologically incapacitated. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON Art. 147 does not apply to cases of psychological incapacity, thus, Arts. 50,
51 and 52 should apply.
Ruling:
No, Arts. 50, 51 and 52 should not apply, hence, it is Art. 147 that should be held
controlling since it apply to cases of psychological incapacity.
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause
thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family
Code. The term capacitated in Art. 147 refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract

marriage, i.e., any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any
of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38 of the Code. Under this property
regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the
Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by its
explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article
40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a
spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. It must be
stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the
Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the
Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses.
(See Dino vs Dino)

19. Francisco vs Master Iron Works (2005)

Facts:
Petitioner and Eduardo got married. During their marriage, a deed of absolute sale over
two properties were issued to the petitioner. The husband executed an Affidavit of Waiver
that the said properties were bought by the petitioner before their marriage and with the
use of her own savings. He further waived whatever claims he had over the property.
Petitioner mortgaged the said property with the written consent of the husband. The
husband bought cements from the respondent where he failed to pay. The respondent
petitioned for the return of the commodities or their amount, which was later granted by
the court.
The court subjected the property of the petitioner for execution for the remaining unpaid
balance by the husband. Josefina executed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim over the two
parcels of land in which she claimed that they were her paraphernal property, and that her
husband Eduardo had no proprietary right or interest over them as evidenced by his
affidavit of waiver, to cause for the cancellation of the execution. The respondent became
the highest bidder of the property.
The court issued TOR on the sale over the property. Respondent contended that the said
property belong to the conjugal property of the spouses since it was bought during their
marriage.
Meanwhile, petitioner petitioned for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the
ground that it is bigamous, and was granted by the court. Then, the court ruled in favor of
the petitioner finding the levy on the subject property and its sale to be null and void,
since the said property was an exclusive property of the petitioner. Respondent appealed,
and was granted, therefore reversing the decision of the trial court, ruling that said

property was conjugal. Hence this petition.

Issue:
WON said properties were conjugal, thus, may be held to answer for the personal
obligations of the husband.
Ruling:
The petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her personal funds
before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she is the sole owner of the property. The
evidence on record shows that a deed of absolute sale over the property to the petitioner
and titles over the property were, thereafter, issued to the latter after her marriage to
Eduardo. Indeed, the Family Code has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the New Civil
Code by expressly regulating in Article 148 the property relations of couples living in a
state of adultery or concubinage. Under Article 256 of the Family Code, the law can be
applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested or acquired rights. The petitioner
failed to prove that she had any vested right over the property in question. Since the
subject property was acquired during the subsistence of the marriage of Eduardo and
Carmelita, under normal circumstances, the same should be presumed to be conjugal
property of the husband and previous wife. Article 148 of the Family Code also
debilitates against the petitioner's claim since, according to the said article, a coownership may ensue in case of cohabitation where, for instance, one party has a
preexisting valid marriage provided that the parents prove their actual joint contribution
of money, property or industry and only to the extent of their proportionate interest
thereon.

20. Abrenica vs Abrenica (2012)

Facts:
Respondents filed two cases against the petitioner-husband for the collection of the
profits which was not remitted to the firm. It was granted by the court and a writ of
execution was order. Levy upon the properties of the petitioner-husband was ordered by
the sheriff. Petitioner-wife contended that the properties levied upon belong to her and
her step-children, and to the absolute community. It is to be noted that petitioner-husband
had a previous marriage, which was later on dissolved, to whom the step-children
belongs. The marriage of the herein petitioner-wife was solemnized after the filing of the
complaint by the respondents on the recovery of the sum of money from the petitionerhusband.
Issue:
WON the properties belong to the absolute community of the petitioner spouses, thus,

petitioner-wife has a claim.

Ruling:
No, the properties do not belong to the absolute community of the petitioner-spouses,
thus, petitioner-wife does not have a claim.
After the dissolution of the first marriage of petitioner-husband, he and herein petitionerwife got married on after the complaint against the former was filed on the recovery of a
sum of money. Petitioner-wife alleged that she represented her stepchildren, that the
levied personal properties were owned by the latter. We note that two of these
stepchildren were already of legal age when petitioner-wife filed her Affidavit. As to the
other stepchildren, parental authority over him belongs to his parents. Absent any special
power of attorney authorizing petitioner-wife to represent petitioner-husbands children,
her claim cannot be sustained. Petitioner-wife also asserted that the two other properties
purchased prior to their marriage, as well as the house and lot, formed part of the absolute
community regime. However, Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the
community property the property acquired before the marriage of a spouse who has
legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits and the income, if any, of that
property. Neither these two vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the second marriage.
Thus, petition by the petitioner-wife was denied.

21. Quiao vs Quiao (2012)

Facts:
Respondent (wife) filed a legal separation against the petitioner (husband), and was
granted by the court. The court ordered for the liquidation and the distribution of the
properties and the net profits, but, the guilty spouses share of the net profits shall be
forfeited in favor of their common children. Petitioner petitioned for a review.
Issue:
WON Article 129 of the Family Code is applicable in the case at bar.
WON the vested rights of the petitioner have been impaired.
Ruling:
Yes, Art. 129 of the FC is applicable in the case at bar, and rights of the petitioner have
not been impaired.
Since at the time of the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code
and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations between the

petitioner and the respondent is the system of relative conjugal partnership of gains. Since
at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's marriage the operative
law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable
law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is
concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63 (2) of the Family
Code. The latter provision is applicable because according to Article 256 of the Family
Code provides that it shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other law. While
one may not be deprived of his vested right, he may lose the same if there is due process
and such deprivation is founded in law and Jurisprudence. The petitioner was accorded
his right to due process. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to
due process. Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the petitioner's
vested right is one founded, not only in the provisions of the Family Code, but in Article
176 of the Civil Code. It provides that in case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall
forfeit his or her share of the conjugal partnership profits, which shall be awarded to the
children of both, and the children of the guilty spouse had by a prior marriage. From the
foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis considering that even under
Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the conjugal partnership profits may be
forfeited if he is the guilty party in a legal separation case. And since he was found to be
the guilty spouse for cohabiting with another woman not his wife, this law shall apply.
PETITIONER WAS DENIED.

22. Beumer vs Amores (2012)

Facts:
Petitioner and respondent got married, but was later on declared as null and void on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner petitioned for the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership to the properties that were claimed to have been acquired during the
marriage. Respondent contended that with the exception of the two properties, all other
properties were acquired with her own personal money and by way of her inheritance.
Trial court ruled in favor of the respondent herein, with the two properties to be of coownership. It ruled that, regardless of the source of funds for the acquisition of the
properties, petitioner could not have acquired any right whatsoever over these properties
as petitioner still attempted to acquire them notwithstanding his knowledge of the
constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of private lands. Petitioner appealed,
contending that he is entitled to reimbursement of the half of the value which he used to
purchase such properties. It was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON the petitioner is entitled to the value of the purchased price of the real properties in
this case.

Ruling:
No, the petitioner is not entitled, whether half or whole, of the value of the purchased
price of the real properties in this case.
The issue to be resolved is not of first impression. In In Re: Petition for Separation of
Property-Elena Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller the Court had already denied a
claim for reimbursement of the value of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by
a foreigner, against his former Filipina spouse. It held that foreigners cannot seek
reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly
bought the property despite the prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine land
1987 Philippine Constitution. Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well
aware of the constitutional prohibition" and even asseverated that, because of such
prohibition, he and respondent registered the subject properties in the latter's name.
Clearly, petitioner's actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional
prohibition. On the basis of such admission, the Court finds no reason why it should not
apply the Muller ruling and accordingly, and deny petitioner's claim for reimbursement.
As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must
do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Neither can the
Court grant petitioner's claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust Enrichment. As
held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking monetary
reimbursement for money spent on purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust
enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution. This provision
does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the
application of the pari delicto doctrine. Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an
injustice based on his foreign citizenship. Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which
demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To be sure,
the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land and
not to the improvements built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and
2142 which were properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition.
Needless to state, the purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national patrimony and
it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound to protect.

23. Fuentes vs Roca (2010)

Facts:
Father of the respondent herein executed a deed of absolute sale of a property in favor of
the petitioners herein. The former later on died. The children of the latter, who are the
respondents herein, petitioned for the annulment of the sale and the reconveyance to them

of the said property since no written consent was given by their mother since it was just
forged. The petitioners pointed out that the claim of forgery was personal to their mother
and she alone could invoke it. Besides, the four-year prescriptive period for nullifying the
sale on ground of fraud had already lapsed. Court ruled in favor of herein petitioner on
the ground that the action had already prescribed. On appeal, the CA reversed the said
decision, finding that the signature of the mother was forged. Since the respondets
parents were married in 1950, the CA concluded that their property relations were
governed by the Civil Code under which an action for annulment of sale on the ground of
lack of spousal consent may be brought by the wife during the marriage within 10 years
from the transaction. Consequently, the action that the respondents brought fell within 10
years. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON the respondets action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the petitioners
already prescribed.
WON only their mother whose consent was not had, could bring the action to annul that
sale.
Ruling:
No, the respondents action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the petitioners did
not yet prescribed.
Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not
the Civil Code. The father sold the conjugal property to the petitioners after the Family
Code took effect. When respondets parents got married, the Civil Code put in place the
system of conjugal partnership of gains on their property relations. While its Article 165
made their father the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article 166
prohibited him from selling commonly owned real property without his wife's consent.
Still, if he sold the same without his wife's consent, the sale is not void but merely
voidable. Article 173 gave their mother the right to have the sale annulled during the
marriage within ten years from the date of the sale. Failing in that, she or her heirs may
demand, after dissolution of the marriage, only the value of the property that their father
fraudulently sold. In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family
Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail
her husband's sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouse's
written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. Under the
provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has no
force and effect from the very beginning. But, although a void contract has no legal
effects even if no action is taken to set it aside, when any of its terms have been
performed, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what
has been given under it. Here, the respondents filed an action against the petitioner in
1997 for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the real property that their father sold
without their mother's written consent. The passage of time did not erode the right to
bring such an action. Art. 1410. The action or defense for the declaration of the

inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.

No, not only their mother can bring an action to annul the sale.
As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained
the property of their parents despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the
ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the respondents. As lawful owners, the
latter had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person from its
enjoyment and disposal.

24. Ravina vs Abrille (2009)

Facts:
Respondent-wife got married to Pedro. They bought a land (Land A), and through their
joint efforts and of a loan, they have built a house thereon and on the exclusive lot of the
husband (Land B) which is adjacent to it, and continued to make some improvements.
The husband got a mistress and failed to support his family. Respondent, in order to
support their children, was forced to sell or mortgaged their properties. Husband sold the
house and the two lots to herein petitioner, with the respondent-wife objecting and not
signing the contract. The latter petitioned for the annulment of the same, and was granted.
Husband contended that the house was built through his exclusive money. On appeal, the
CA modified the decision ruling that the sale of the land B was valid, but the house and
the land A as null and void. Petitioner herein move for reconsideration but was denied.
Petitioner contended that they bought the properties in good faith. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON the sale of the house and Land A was valid.
Ruling:
No, the sale of the house and Land A was not valid.
Considering that the property was acquired before the effectivity of the Family Code,
Article 160 of the New Civil Code will govern, thus it provides, "All property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife". Land A was acquired during the
marriage of husband and respondent-wife. No evidence was adduced to show that the
subject property was acquired through exchange or barter. The presumption of the
conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and

convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the subject property
is exclusively owned by the husband. Significantly, the sale of said properties concluded
after the effectivity of the Family Code, thus, governed by Article 124 of the same Code
that now treats such a disposition to be void if done (a) without the consent of both the
husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouse's inability, the authority of the court. It
is thus clear that alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property by the
husband without the consent of the wife is null and void. If the sale was with the
knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such
sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five 5 years from the date the
contract implementing the decision of the husband to institute the case. Here, respondentwife timely filed the action for annulment of sale within 5 years from the date of sale and
execution of the deed.
As correctly held by the CA, a purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of
another without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property
and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has
notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. In the present case,
the property is registered in the name of the spouses, Mary Ann. Petitioners cannot deny
knowledge that during the time of the sale, husband was married to respondent-wife.
However, the latters conformity did not appear in the Deed. Thus, at the time of sale,
petitioners knew that respondent-wife has a right to or interest in the subject properties
and yet they failed to obtain her conformity to the deed of sale.

25. Borromeo vs Descaller (2009)

Facts:
A foreigner and the respondent cohabited without the benefit of a marriage. The foreigner
had a well established living, while the respondent was working as a waitress who barely
support her children. They bought a property which was named in favor to both of them,
but only registered the property in the name of the respondent due to the prohibition that
foreigners cannot own private lands. Later on, they went their separate ways. The
foreigner became indebted with herein petitioner. To pay his debt, he sold the said
property in favor of the petitioner. Upon registration, the latter discovered that the
properties was transferred in the name of the respondent and that said properties has
already been mortgaged. Petitioner petitioned for the recovery of the said properties, and
was granted by the court. On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:

WON the foreigner owns the property or WON the contract of sale was valid.
Ruling:
The evidence clearly shows that foreigner possesses the financial capacity to acquire the
properties in dispute. Thus, the latter has all authority to transfer all his rights, interests
and participation over the subject properties to petitioner. The rule that co-ownership
applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry each other, does
not apply. In the instant case, respondent was still legally married to another when she
and the foreigner lived together. In such an adulterous relationship, no co-ownership
exists between the parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her
actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any
portion of it. Respondent did not contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the
properties. She had no income of her own at that time, nor did she have any savings. She
and her two sons were then fully supported by the foreigner.
Respondent argued that aliens are prohibited from acquiring private land. But while the
acquisition and the purchase by the foreigner of the properties under litigation were void
ab initio since it is contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner,
yet, the acquisition of these properties by petitioner, who is a Filipino citizen, from him,
has cured the flaw in the original transaction, and the title of the transfer is valid. As the
property in dispute is already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there
would be no more public policy to be protected. The objective of the constitutional
provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

26. Villanueva vs CA (2004)

Facts:
Eusebia (legal wife) and Nicolas, petitioner-husband herein, got married. During their
marriage, they acquire real properties and have made improvements therein. Petitionerhusband later on cohabited with petitioner-mistress herein, and they had a child, who is
the petitioner-illegitimate son herein. Petitioner-husband then was the only one who was
receiving income from the said properties. During their cohabitation, petitioner-mistress
had no occupation and properties in which she can derive income. Petitioner-husband
became physically incapacitated, so the petitioner-illegitimate son assumed on receiving
the income. The legal wife then petitioned for the recovery of the income and the sole
administration of the properties. Court granted the petition. Petitioners herein appealed.
The legal wife died, so the heirs substituted her. The court upheld the previous decision.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
WON said properties are the conjugal properties of the legal wife and the petitionerhusband.
Ruling:
Yes, the properties are the conjugal properties of the legal wife and the petitionerhusband.
As stated in the complaint, the legal wife and petitioner-husband are conjugal owners of
real properties and all improvements thereon situated in Mandaue City and Consolacion,
Cebu. The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations
between them even if they were married before the effectivity of Family Code. Article
105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to conjugal
partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the
properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal.
The burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counterbalanced by the requirement that the properties must first be proven to have been
acquired during the marriage before they are presumed Conjugal. All property acquired
by the spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose name the property is registered,
is presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise. The presumption is not rebutted by the
mere fact that the certificate of title of the property or the tax declaration is in the name of
one of the spouses only. Article 116 of the Family Code expressly provides that the
presumption remains even if the property is registered in the name of one or both of the
spouses. Whether a property is conjugal or not is determined by law and not by the will
of one of the spouses. No unilateral declaration by one spouse can change the character of
conjugal property. The cohabitation of a spouse with another person, even for a long
period, does not sever the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Otherwise, the law would
be giving a stamp of approval to an act that is both illegal and immoral. Petitioners
cohabitation cannot work to the detriment of the legal wife. The marriage of petitionerhusband and the legal wife continued to exist regardless of the fact that the former was
already living with petitioner-mistress. Hence, all property acquired from the date of
husband and legal wifes marriage, the date of the latters death, are still presumed
conjugal. Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that any of the subject properties
was acquired outside or beyond this period. Petitioners failed to show proof of actual
contribution by petitioner-mistress in the acquisition of the property. In short, petitioners
failed to prove that she bought said property with her own money, or that she actually
contributed her own money to acquire it.

27. Buado vs CA and Nicol (2009)

Facts:
Petitioner-spouses herein petitioned for the payment of civil liabilities against the privaterespondents wife, which was granted by the court. Court issued an execution, and
finding that the private-respondents wifes personal properties were insufficient to satisfy
the judgment, levy on real properties was issued. Certificate of sale was issued in favor of
the petitioner-spouses. Private-respondent herein petitioned for the annulment of such,
alleging that petitioners directly levied upon and execute his real property without
exhausting the personal properties of his wife. Petitioner petitioned for its dismissal on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the respondents petition was filed from another
branch. Court dismissed respondents complaint, ruling that any flaw in the
implementation of the writ of execution by the implementing sheriff must be brought
before the court issuing the writ of execution. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the decision.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but was denied. Petitioner contended that the
branch where the respondent filed his complaint was not the proper authority, and that
respondent, who is the husband of the judgment debtor, is not the third party
contemplated by law, hence, a separate action need not be filed. Petitioners assert that the
obligation of the wife redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
WON the husband of the judgment debtor may file an independent action to protect the
conjugal property subject to execution.
Ruling:
Yes, the husband of the judgment debtor may file an independent action to protect the
conjugal property subject to execution.
The law provides Nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third
person from vindicating his claim to the property in a separate action, or prevent the
judgment obligee from claiming damages in the same or a separate action against a thirdparty claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim. Apart from the remedy of
terceria available to a third-party claimant or to a stranger to the foreclosure suit against
the sheriff or officer effecting the writ by serving on him an affidavit of his title and a
copy thereof upon the judgment creditor, a third-party claimant may also resort to an
independent separate action, the object of which is the recovery of ownership or
possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages arising from wrongful
seizure and detention of the property.
Is the private-respondent, who was not a party to the suit but whose conjugal property is
being executed on account of the other spouse being the judgment obligor, considered a
"stranger?"
In determining whether the private-respondent is a stranger to the suit, the character of

the property must be taken into account. In Mariano v. Court of Appeals, which was later
adopted in Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the husband of the
judgment debtor cannot be deemed a "stranger" to the case prosecuted and adjudged
against his wife for an obligation that has redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. On the other hand, in Naguit v. Court of Appeals and Sy v. Discaya, the
Court stated that a spouse is deemed a stranger to the action wherein the writ of execution
was issued and is therefore justified in bringing an independent action to vindicate her
right of ownership over his exclusive or paraphernal property.
Pursuant to Mariano however, it must further be settled whether the obligation of the
judgment debtor redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership or not. Petitioners
argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the
conjugal partnership. We do not agree. There is no dispute that contested property is
conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of
personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall
not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit
of the family. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments
for the liability of the debtor spouse. Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it
be concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by
private-respondents wife redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Hence, the filing of a separate action by private-respondent is proper and jurisdiction is
thus vested on Branch 21.

28. Veloso vs Martinez (1914)

Facts:
Petitioner herein petitioned for the recovery of a parcel of land from the respondent,
which was granted by the court. The respondent claimed to recover a certain jewelry in
the possession of the petitioner. The said jewelry was used, without the consent of the
respondent, by the deceased husband of the respondent as security to the loan he
acquired. The latter contended that said jewelry was inherited by her from her mother.
Issue:
WON or not the respondent is entitled to the recovery of the said jewelry.
Ruling:
Yes, the respondent is entitled to the recovery of the said jewelry.

The record shows that the jewels were the sole and separate property of the respondent,
acquired from her mother, and in the absence of further proof, we must presume that they
constituted a part of her paraphernal property. As such paraphernal property she exercised
dominion over the same. (Article 1382, Civil Code.) She had the exclusive control and
management of the same, until and unless she had delivered it to her husband, before
a notary public, with the intent that her husband might administer it properly.
(Article 1384, Civil Code.) There is no proof in the record that she had ever delivered the
same to her husband, in any manner, or for any purpose. That being true, she could not be
deprived of the same by any act of her husband, without her consent, and without
compliance with the provisions of the Civil Code above cited.

29. G-Tractors, Inc. Vs CA and Spouses Narciso (1985)

Facts:
Respondent-husband herein was a businessman who is engaged in business as a producer
and exporter of mahogany logs and operates logging concession. He was legally married
to herein respondent-wife. The former hired heavy equipment from the petitioner, for the
purpose in line with his profession. The former failed to pay the rentals. Thus, the
petitioner petitioned for the collection of sum of the rentals, but they both entered into a
compromised agreement. The respondent-husband failed to comply with it, thus, the
petitioner petitioned for an execution, which was granted by court. Levy was accordingly
made on the certain personal properties of the respondent-husband and on the conjugal
properties of the respondent-spouses. Then a deed of sale was given to the highest bidder.
The respondent-spouses petitioned for its nullity, contending that their conjugal property
could not be held liable to satisfy said judgment considering that the obligation did not
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal property or the family. Court granted the
respondent-spouses. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON the debt of the respondent-husband is a conjugal debt for
property may be held answerable.

which

the

conjugal

Ruling:
Yes, the debt of the respondent-husband is a conjugal debt for which the conjugal
property may be held answerable.
Article 161 of the New Civil Code provides that the conjugal partnership shall be liable
for all the debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal

partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases
where she may legally bind the partnership. The record shows that respondent-husband is
a producer and exporter of Philippine mahogany logs and that the bulldozers leased to
him was used for the construction of switchroads for logging. It is very clear, therefore,
that the obligations were contracted in connection with his legitimate business as a
producer and exporter in mahogany logs and certainly benefited the conjugal partnership.
The phrase all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership" do not require that actual profit or benefit must accrue to the
conjugal partnership from the husband's transaction, but it suffices that the transaction
should be one that normally would produce such benefit for the partnership. So that, if he
incurs an indebtedness in the legitimate pursuit of his career or profession or suffers
losses in a legitimate business, the conjugal partnership must equally bear the
indebtedness and the losses, unless he deliberately acted to the prejudice of his family.
Such is the nature of the judgment debt of respondent-husband to petitioner.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of respondent-spouses, must answer for
the same.