ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC II

A COMMENTARY

. William M. A. Grimaldi, S.].

+t
~
++
+ +

NBW YORK

FORDHAM UNIVERSITY PRESS

1988

CI Copyright 1988 by FORD.." .. UmVUstTY

AlI,lghts.......J.
LC

79-53373

ISBN 0-8332--1049-9

PrinId ..
CULTURA PRESS

Wctte=, Bdgium

CONTENTS

SIGLA

VII

PREfACE

IX

Chapter I
77b 16 - 78a ]0

Chapter 2

19

78a 31 - 80a4
CHAPTER 3
Boa 5 - 80b 33

49

CHAPTER 4
80b 34 - 82a 19

65

CHAPTER 5
82a 20 - 83b II

87

CHAPTER 6
83b I2 - 8sa IS

105

CHAPTER 7
8sa IS -

127

8sb

10

CHAPTER 8
8sb II - 86b 8

1]5

CHAPTER 9
86b 9 - 87b 20

151

CHAPTER 10
87b 21 - 88a 30

165

CHAPTER II
88a 31 - 88b 30

173

CHAPTER I2
8sb 30 - 89b 13

183

CHAPTER 13
89b 13 - 90a 28

WI

CHAPTER 14
90a 29 - 90b 14

209

CHAPTER IS
90b 14 - 90b 31

21 3

ARISTOTLB. 'RHETORIC' II

VI

CHAPTI!R 16
90b 32 - 91. 19

217

CHAPTER 17
91. 20 - 9 I b 7

221

CHAPTER 18
91b 8-92a7
CBAPTBR 19
92.8 - 93' 21

23S

CHAPTI!R 20
93' 23 - 94a 19
CHAPTBR 21
940 19 - 9Sb 20

2S9

CHAPTI!R 22

27S

9sb 20 - 97' 6

CHAPTBR 23
970 7-oob 34

291

CHAPTER 24
oob 3S - 02. 30

337

CHAPTER 2S
02a 30 - 03' IS

3SS

CHAPTI!R 26
, 03' 17-03b 2
BIBUOGRAPHY

371

SIGLA

A.
Anaximenes
Bonitz, Ind."
COMMBNTAllY

Cope
Cope. Imrod.

edd.

LS
OCD

pw
S.

"1:",,...'0."
Spengd
Stutlits

77b 16

77b 16
Texts

Aristotle.
M. Fuhrmann', Teubner edition (Leipzig 1966).
H. Bonitz, I"d." Aristot.lieus (BeIlin 1870).
W. M. A. Grimaldi, '.J., Aristotle, RHETORIC I: A Comm.ntary
(New York 1980).
E. M. Cope, The RHETORIC ofAristotle, rev. and cd. J. E. Sandys,
3 vols. (Cambridge 1877); except where otherwise designated,
the citation is to Volume II.
E. M. Cope. An Introduction to Aristotle's RHETORIC (Cambridge
1867).
The editors of the five recent critical texts of the Rhetoric: A.
Roemer. TeubneI, 2nd ed. (Leipzig 1898/1923); M. Dufour,
Los Belles Lettres, 2nd ed. (I'ari. Io); A. Tovar, Instituto de
Estudios Polltieos (Madrid 1953); W. D. Ross, Scriptorum
Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis (Oxford 1959) = OCT;
R. lWsd, De Gmytcr (BeIJln 1976).
A Gree1<-English Laicon, edd. H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, H. S.
Jones, and R. McKenzie, and ed. (Oxford 1948).
Th. Ox/or. Classical Dictionary, edd. N. G. L. Hammond and H.
H. ScuIlard, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1970).
A. F. von Paal}', Real-EncyclopiJie der classisthen Akertumswissen.<haft, rev. and ed. G. Wissowa, W. Kroll, et a1. (Stuttgart
1894-1972).
H. W. Smyth, Gruk Gramm., (Cambridge, Mass. 1956).
W. M. A. Grimaldi, S.J., "1:"'1'8'0', TB"I'~e'" el"tI, in Aristotle's Rhetoric," American Journal of Philology 191 (lgS0) 383""i18.
L. Spengd, Aristoklis Ars rh.torica, 2 voIs. (Leipzig 1867); except where otherwise designated, the citation is to Volume II.
W. M. A. Grimaldi, S.J., Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotlls
RHETORIC (Wiesbaden 1972).

All text references to the Rh.toric are thus abbreviated; e.g.,

77b 16 = I377b 16, etc.; A,
= Book: I, 3 usually with cbapru
alld text ref=, e.g., A I, 54a I, r I, 03b 10. The Greek: of
the text is essentially that of Roemer's Teubner edition.
Citations in bold face designate cross-references.
All references to cIas.sicaI authon are to the Teubner or Oxford
editions. Where these editions are IlOt used, the edition and editor
are identified.

r,

Complete references to all the soorce material, cited throughout this book: in brief
fashiOn, will be found in the Bibliography.

PREFACE

UNDER ORDINAIIY CmCUMsrANCES this volwne would have appeared a

number of years back. The ordinary did not prevail. The approach to the
text is the same as that in Volume I: all observations are directed to the reading
of the codices accepted by the editors of the five critical editions and by
Speoge!, Cope, unless there is a reason not to do so; the lineation is that of
Roemer's Teubner text; when understanding appears to eall for it, grammar
notes, or a translation, or a completion of dliptica1 Greek is given. On the
other hand there is less effort to restrict supporting references to the literature
in English.
The strUCtUre of Book 2 is relatively simple. The opening chapter is
transitional with a reference back to the discussion of the eotecbnic pistis,
lOro" of Book 1 and then a brief statement on the remaining two pisteis,
>TOo" :rulOo" by way of introduction to chapters 2-17 of which they form the
subject. It is worth noting that both unfortunately receive relatively passing
attention in the commentaries and critica1literature. This reflects, it would
appear, an established attitude that both were non-logical in character, constituting what has been called "indirect proof," and so were clearly extrinsic
to the proper purpose of discourse for Aristode (e.g., 54" 15-31) which was
asswned to be exclusively logical proof by way of enthymeme. With 2.17
the analysis begun at 1.4 of the entecbnic pisteis (lOro" "d80, >TOo,) by
way of the particular topics is concluded. Before moving on to the common
topics, AriStode in chapters 18-22 reviews and enlarges upon a number of
key concepts mentioned in 1.1-3, e.g., the koina (possibk-impossible, etc.),
the two common ways of demonstrating (eothymeme.example) the enthyrneme
as syllogism. In 2.23 he presents the common topics for inference by enthymeme followed by a chapter (24) on common topics for apparent (fallacious)
enthymemes, and one (25) on ways to refute inference by eothymeme. The
concluding chapter (26) mentions some further observations on the nature of
the ent:l:tymeme.
For support of the work on this volume I am grateful to my own University
for a Faculty Fellowship, to the Classics Departments of Princeton and Stanford for Visiting Fellowships, and to the National Endowment for the Humanities for a Senior Fellowship and a Summer Stipend. I would like to thank
the Princeton University Library and its staff where a substantial part of the
work on both volumes was done and also the Fordham University Library
and its staff for their many courtesies. In the course of the work on both

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

vollllD.CS some people have taken the time to discuss a problem or a matter of
inteIp1'etation with me; the following come readily to mind: Professors
GeoIgc Glanzman, s.]. (t), Harold Chemiss (t), Elmer Henderson, s.]. (t),
Thomas Bermingham, s.]., Thomas Conley, Joseph Dolan, s.]., Gerald
McCool, s.]., Antoni Raubitschek. Finally my thanks go to the editor who
worked with much care on both volumes of the commentary, Mary Beatrice
Schulte, and to the Director of the Fordham University Press, H. George

Flctdtcr.
ForJIram University

WILUAM

M. A.

GRIMALDI,

s.].

CHAPTERr

I Introduction: 77b 16 - 20

a transitional synopsis of Book A

II . Development: 77b 21 - 78a 28

1.

77b 21 -78a 6

general introduction to chaps. 2-17;

since rhetoric is concerned with judgment on the part of the auditors, not
only must there be a logical explanation (Adyo,) of the subject matter
(given in Al, but the speaker must
appear to 6. disposed toward the
auditors and thus wortby of belief,
and the auditon in tum must be
disposed toward the speaker (thus the
need for iJSo, awl ,..,so,)
qualities re~uired in the speaker for
his iJSo, to be acceptable to the audience and thus worthy of belief
role of the "d8.J in affecting the judgment of the auditors

III Conclusion: 78a 28 - 30

Clearly this refers to the contents of thefirst book

77b r6 : J 'Ex ...LYfdV
in which A. has placed before us the special topics (srd7j, see SBa 17, a 26-35,
a 27-28, S9b 25-32), or the material element of discourse for the three
kinds of rhetoric. So obvious is the reference that it has been the occasion
for lengthy discussion on the unity and coherence of our traditional text on
the grounds that A., having presented a part of the first ,.la~" '.~.X"o, (Myo,: rational explanation) in Book A, should now continue it with the
second part as found in B 18-26, and then take up his presentation of the
other two ",In." lvr8X"01, our ",dBo" >l80, of B 2-17; see Studi.., pp. 28-49
and also COMMBNTAIlY I 34M6, and the notes to A I, 2. However, at
A 2, 58a 29-33 A. stated that he would first cliscuss the special topics, and he
proceeded to do this in the first book for the ",I~" , .....
which he
calls Myo" or what reason can tell US about the subject. Chapter IS, granting

X"0,

AlUSTOTIJ!, 'nHETOllIC' II

77b 16

."".Z...

the stated differences between "[an,,

and IJ.TBZ'.' (55b 35-39),
also belongs to this analysis. See COMMBNTAll.Y I 354. 7sa 22 : 2, a 23. There
still remain the other two ,,[aTS., l.TS;!; which must be analyzed by the
methodology of the special topics. The varied ways in which these two
,,[a.,..., can be of help must be placed before us so that we may funnulate
intelligent opinions and statements fur use in deductive (enthymernatic) and
inductive (paradeigmatic) argument. A. proceeds, therefore, to study both
and ~O.,. It is only when he has completed this study that he toms
at B IS, 91 b sf[ to a general summary of the major concepts of his theory first
enunciated in A 1-3; see Studies, pp. 33-34. Only at the conclusion of this
review does A. sum up in a sentence what he has achieved in Books I and
2. (96b 28-34) and continue with a transitional sentence (96b 34 - 97a 6)
to the second fonn of topical analysis, that of the general topics. This analysis
occupies the final section of B. Dionysius of Halicamassus, De compo I.]-4.
speaks of two parts of rhetoric, the
"eaypaT",d, and the
A. has been and will continue to be occupied with the first part until the
end of Book 2. It is this
which Dionysius says demands mature understanding, extended investigation, and large experience, an observation certainly in accord with A.'s detailed study of the theoretical side of the discipline.
This study, as far as we know, is unique in the history of the discipline.
The use of the preposition i" once again indicates the fact that these special
topics (eld,,) for each of the three "taTS', ''''''Z'.' provide us with the substantive material for argument in each of the three kinds of rhetoric. See
COMMENTARY I 354-56, A 2., S7a 32, 58a 26-30; 6, 63b 4; 7, 6sb I9; S, 66a
18; 9, 68a 33; S9b 25-32.; Raphael, 162-<'13. As soon as he begins his analysis
'of
in chap. 2, it is obvious that A. is offering an analysis of the
emotions by means of the particnlar topics (.rd,,) and that the methodology
differs in no way from that seen in Book I. Dufour, II 20-21, for example,
speaking of A.'s handling of the emotions acknowledges this: "n suit la
.mSme methode que dans la dc!tennination des lieux specifiques qui alimentent
chaque genre oratoire." In this respect I would disagree with Fortenbaugh,
"Aristotle's Rhetoric on Emotions," 49n24- All three ,,1m.., ."".Z'.' are
essentially critical for rhetorical argUDIent, and it is A.'s analysis by particular topics of each one which demonstrates how and why this can be so.
As a matter of fact, to use the emotions in a way which does not arise directly
out of the argument of the discourse is to use them not as ,,[m, e.TSZ'.t,
but as "taT", BTBZ'.'. Direct appeals to the emotions which have no intrinsic relation to the matter of the discourse are as separated from rhetoric
as ..-iX''! as are witnesses, torture, oaths, etc. (A I, SSb 35-37). A. says as
much at 543 I,]-I8: such appeals are not ".el .,.06 "edrpaT., (c S4a IS : 2,
S4a I7); see also A 2, 560 14-15 (dod 6... ne.axOwaw); they ... extraneous
material, digressions intended to do the very thing which A. criticizes at

,,&0.,

TO".,

Td".,

,,&0.,

TO"., 1,,,,,,,,,o,.

COMMBNTAllY

54a 24-26: namely, to warp the judgment of the person addressed. Cicero,
De ortlt. I.U.53-55, makes an unspecified reference to chaps. 1-17 of this
book; Quintilian, Ins!. orat. pO.I7, refers specifically to chaps. 12-17, but
his comments cannot be reconciled with A.'s text; c 88b 30-3I.
z p.e...mv 55" 19 : l.

b 16-17 "po..pme,v ... 6:nol.oyeicr8c"

the three kinds of rhetoric;
c 58b 8-29. For each of them he has developed by way of the special topics
the ",1.n",I'T87,Vo, called 101'0' (rational explanation).
b 18 : 1 "oiG, 6cili..' "cd "pOTcicre,~ This is not the first time we have
met adE& in this sense of "idea," "opinion,1t "viewlt ; seeA 10, 69a 22. For
neOTaae", see A 2, 58a 18ff., 35; 3, 59a 7-10, 15, 24, 27, etc., and also s8a
18, 59" 8, 6Iia 3 I : 4. As rhetorical statements, or propositions about the
subject matter in question, statements derived by the methodology of the
erd'l, such neOTaae" assume the form of ebeoTa, or 11'I1'.'a which are the
probable statements, or TBHI'>1e,a which are the necessary ones. They are
then used in rhetorical argument by induction or deduction; see COMMBNTARY I 3SS-56. For this reason I would interpret the "at as altereative (Denniston, p. 292): "what kind of opinions or statements." See, e.g., Top. I05a
34 - b I, 104" 12-15; see also Cope, p. I. When A. finishes the topical analysis
of ,,&.80, and ~Oo" he repeats our statement here at 77b 16-20 but now
extends it to include ~Oo, and most probably "dOo, (c 9xb 8-23) at 9Ib
24-29. The d&~a, and neOTaae" are formed on the basis of the analysis via
the particular topics (ex Tl.",., a 16). In the first book it was the particular
topics for Myo, in each of the three kinds of discourse. The opinions and
propositional statements so derived articulare the subject matter in the three
geeera ("eel TOVT"'.) and are the source material (... TOVTOJ of the argumentation, as A. says at a 19-20 (",eel yae . .. My",. See, for example,

78a 28-29.
i.e., the three kinds of rhetoric.
b 19 : 1 "lcrT'~
i.e., most probably in its meaning which denotes the
two instruments of demonstration: enthymerne and paradeigma; see 550 4-7,
Studks, p. 59.
z ..uG..' l ....lv
Cope, p. I, is not happy with the grammar of the
sentence, but see A 9, 68a 33-36.
J "epl .......u....... "..Ii" ....u.......
i.e., the MEa, Hal neOTaae"
which in this phrase are both the subject matter and the source material of
theenthymemes.
See 5"" 15 : 1, 55a 4-7, 55a 8, S6a 36 - 56b 4,
4 lveu ..i1p.......
COMMBNTARY I 352-56, Studks, pp. 55-68.

AIUSTOTLlI, 'RRBTORIC' II

20 ':'~ . AOY"'"
On My.,. c 96b 3: "to speak, as it were, about
each kind of discourse by itself"; C S9a 28. The passage, read by the edd.,

Spenge!, Cope, is questioned by Spenge!, p. 2<y], Cope, p. 2, Richards,

p. I<Y]. It appears to be the absolute infinitive, S. 2012, KUhner, Blass, &
Gerth, 112.585.3. Neither grammar olfers examples of the adverb placed
after the infinitive but C A I, 55a 7, Eucken, "Ueber den Gebrauch," 818,
820. As seen above, I take both "eel /!"aen and ldl'1 with yiv., and meant to
indicate that the discussion of "clO." >TO., will diJfer in this respect; see, e.g.,
77b 24. In Book I the particular topics for logical "len" were specified
for each genus (e.g., A 2, 58a 31 and C Spenge!, p. 2<Y7). This is not done
for "clO." ijO.,. On the meaning of My.,., see S9b 16.
b 21 : J "pl"....~
See sSa 37: J ; SSb 2. In connection with the
comment at sSb 2, I have recently noted that Else, pp. 436-39, who is formally
concerned with the "spectator," speaks of him as 'Judge" and as exercising
judgment; and that Cope, pp. 120, 224, says correctly: .. {Hel.... applicable
to all three branches of Rhetoric)." See also S'78 2. : " S7'L 23. The ideas
here are resumed at 9Ib 8--29; for the nexus of this passage with what pIeced..
and follows, see Studies, pp. 33-34.
z 'IJ P'I'<op"''IJ A.'s ordinary way of referring to the TiXV'/. See A
I, 54" I; c Ssb 25 : 1.

b 21-22 (x.d .........lv)

The edd., Cope read the parentheses. The
inclusion of ouly two kinds of rhetoric (see A I, 54b 6-8; 2, 58b 2-6; B 18,
9Ib 16-20) is not critical; see SSb 2. Spenge!, Cope concur in the inclusion
here of epideictic

.b 23 : 1

3,,,..~ ... I .......,

S. 221D-22II.
i.e., .. explanatory and credible." M.d.,,,T'''., is a reference to the ,,[cner; loT.XV.' called logical "laTl, - see,
e.g., A 2, 56a 3-4, 19-20, S6a 3 : z - the explanation of the intelligibility
of the subject matter as the mind grasps it. In support of the explanation
of aVTq; Tq; .:tOy,!, at S6a 3 : Z 1 have since noticed Ross's comment in a note
to 1095a 10 in his translation of the EN: "... it is, 1 think, quite clear that
nonnally My., in Aristotle does not stand for the faculty of reason, but
for something grasped by reason, or perhaps sometimes for an operation of
reason." There is a similar use of our phrase at A 8, 66a 9 where it is contrasted with 7jO",d, My.,. A My., M.d..
as I understand it, is well
expressed by Antisthen.. who defined it according to Diogenes Laertius
5.l.3: .lOy., iaTi. 6 TO TI ij. ~ ;cn, d~J.aj 1 would think that at 94h 8-10
this is the fundamental meaning of M.d.l.". On the range of the word
M.d .."T'''., in A., see Barnes, 138--39 and Cope, p. 2<Y]. On ""en., C
A 2, 56b 29; IS, 76a 34, 76b 1,2,5, where the meaning is, as here, "believable,
acceptable on reasonable grounds"; C S6a 5 : z.
Z

tb;OaLX"LXO~ ",,,,<6~

"T"'."

COMMBNTAlt.y

..6..ov ... x ......""mol!;.'" On ""T"axsvdC..., S9b 14 and cpo A :.,

SSb 38; IS, 76b 3. It should be noted that A. mentions here both speaker

b 24-

and auditor and appears to be saying in what follows that the speaker most
do two things: establish his own 1180'; attend to the psychological attitude
of the auditor which would be his "dfhI and his 118o,. Cope, IntroJ., pp. 10913, 24-8-49, argues on the contiary that 1180, in this chapter refers only to the
1180, TO;; u,-O.TO, of A 2, S6a 2 which is spoken of there as one of the three
"taTS', ""'S%"O~ Brandis,s, would agree. This of course would mean that
1i80, as one of the three artistic proofS is restricted solely to 1i80, TO;; UYO.TO"
an interpretation subject to a number of problems. Spengcl, "Ueber der
Rhetorik," pp. 481-83, finds no difference between the meaning of 1i80, in
this chapter and that of chaps. 12-17. However, he has his own views on
the second two "ta ..". Since he looks upon logical proof as the only "taT',
1",%"o" he considers 1i80, and "dB., as effective instruments of rhetorical
argument not so much in themselves but as helpful means when f..ed with
the stupidity of the auditors! DufOur, II 18, sees our present chapter as
exclusively concerned with the speaker's 1i80, and presumably forming
together with chaps. 12-17 on the auditors 1i8 A.'s discussion of the "ttIT"
called 1i8.,.
The question before os, therefore, is whether the meaning of 1i8., here,
which is clearly (see below) one of the three entechnic "taT.", is restric;ted
to the speaker (Cope, Brandis) or includes the auditors as well and thos is
related to chaps. 12-17 (Spengcl, Dufour). Perhaps the most direct way
toward an answer is the review of the chapter proposed in the outline given
at the beginning, which notes that we have in this chapter not a discussion of
1i8., alone but a general introduction to the two "ltIT, bTSZ'." >l8.,
and "d8, which fonn the subject of B 1-17. In other words, with the
completion of the specialtopics for logical proof (My.,), A., as he is about
to present the special topics for psychological proof ("dB." >l8.,), gives us an
introductory chapter to the material. As has been said (548 IS : 2, 57& 2 : 1),
in rhetorical discourse, as far as A. is concerned, person speaks to person in
the dfurt to communicate, and this means the whole person: cognitiveaffective - volitive. He has given us the cognitive and now moves to the
affective - volitive. Since these two aspects are common to all three k:inds of
discourse, he can discuss "dB., and >l8., by themselves without any need
to distinguish them for each kind of discourse. On the meaning of "common"
here, see 9Ib 8-23.
Returning, then, to the question: does >l8., here (or even in A 2) refer
only to the >l80, T.;; u,-..T." a position of Cope's somewhat underlined
by Maykowsh, who speaks of the major importance in the minds of all
in the fourth century B. c. of the speaker's >l80, in discourse? Or does it
include the >l8., T.v. dxe.aTru. met in B I2-I7? Limiting >l80. here to the

""'6%".'

ARISTOTLB, 'IBBTOBlC t 11

speaker (even while granting the importance of this proof to A.) encounte..
probl<IDS such as the following. If it is correct, then we have in B I (77b
The
24-29, 78a 7-20) the only fonnal explanation of >l80, as
effort by Cope and Brandis (c also Buchheit, p. 130) to assignA 9 and B 4 as
additional explanation does not work since the remarks there can apply as
readily to another's >l80,. On the mce of it, in the light of the extended
treatmmt given to the other two
(Myo" A 4-14; ",6.Bo" B 2-Il),
this is odd. Again, as A. has used >lBo, thus &r in the text, he clearly refers
to this limited sense only at A 2, 560 2/f., and 56a 8-I3 suggests this may
have hem occasioned by a problem at the time (c S4& I5 : z). Further
reflection on this last passage (560 4-I3) makes it clear that the speaker's >lBo,
is not something which can be totally divorced from a knowledge of the
>lBo, of the audience. This app.... in the crucial words dE,o,,'l1To. and
l:!...",ia.. Both these qualities of the speaker's >l80, must be established
by the language employed (a 8-10). This would mean that they are nec....
sarily determined in large part by the speaker's understanding of the >l80,
of the audience. for that which would make one in one's discourse dE.O""a~0"ln'6t"'1" toyoungpeoplc(B I2) is not that which would produce the
same effect among the mature (B I4). This view is supported at A 8, 66a
8-I6 where we meet the >lBo, TO;; Aiyo.~o, again. But essential to what
he has to say of it is the met that the speaker must know the 7IB'I of the varied
kinds of government, in which concept government is viewed as a moral
person (66& I2, 66a 10-12). It is obvious from this that evm when the term
>lBo, is used of the speaker more than his own >l8., is at issue. Relative and
important to it is the .peaker'. understanding of the >l8., of those addressed.
further, the discussion of 718'1 at AID, 69a I8-3 I underlines this extension
in A. of >lB., as the ",lant bT6X".t. Here he speaks of 7I87J in general and
their role in men's actions. Aware, as we should be, of the importance of
action on the part of the audito.. to the rhetorical art, one can dismiss only
with difficulty the speaker's need for such knowledge of >l80, TOW c!Heoa~a;.
in presenting his own >lB.,. In fact, to interpret chaps. I2-I7 with Cope
(p. 158, and [ntrod., p. no) to mean that the speaker must adapt his >l80,
to that of the auditor's is to acknowledge that an understanding of the auditor', >l8., is critical to the speaker's >l8., and, consequendy, that the 7}B.,
TW'V dxe'oaTwv is also ,,[an, 1'JI1:6%,,0,. Finally, returning to A 2, S6a 22-23,
A. explicidy remarks that if we are to use the ",tI1TBI, m6X"0' correcdy
(S6o 2O/f.) we must, inter alia, make a study of the types of human character,
a study found in the discipline of ethics, as Cope, I 33 acknowledges. In
short. it is not at all clear from the use of >lB., up to this point in our text
that A. is using it in Cope's restricted sense; sec, e.g., S60 2.
In actual fact, coming back to our present text, one may well ask how a
speaker can Td. "eml' (01 .0. Twa) XQTQU"""dC.w (77b 24) without a knowl-

"',aT" .'T6%,","

",iaT",

COMMBNTARY

edge of the auditor's ,y80~. Or, again, how he can make the auditors well
disposed or dispose them at all (77b 28 - 78a 6) without such knowledge.
Such an effort sounds unpleasandy like that of Gorgias in his reply to Socrates' questions at Gorg. 458e - 46oe. For a further discussion of ,y80~, C
88b 30--31.

b 25 : 1 &'Clcpip..

what make the difference are the character of the

speaker and the way it is perceived by the auditors (b 26-28: TO TO ... a~T.':
subject to d,acpses), as well as the attitude and disposition of the auditors
(b 28-29: lciv . . TVYX""a>q,., protasi. to d.acpl.e). This last is explained
at b 30 - 78a 6 in terms of an emotional disposition ("d80~) but does not absolutely preclude, as explained, the role of the general character and set disposition (,y80~) of the auditors; c 77b 27-28, aab 30--31.
2 ,.(o"<.v
i.e., belief; c A 9, 67b 29; see Studies, p. 59; 55a 4;
67b 29: 2.

b 25-26 GUI'PouACliS .. &lxClLS

i.e., deliberative (A 3, 58b 8IE) and
judicial (58b IOIE) rhetoric are particularly sensitive to ,yBo~ in the speaker
as well as to the mood and general disposition of the auditors; see 77b 29-31
and note.
is read by the edd. except Dufour who reads without it as do
Specgel, Cope. With "al it joins together the articular infinitives, a usage
not uncommon in A.; see Bonicz, Index. Eucken (De Arislotelis dicendi
ratione) in his discussion of Ti says little about TI. - "al.

b 26"I:E

b 26-29
that

,.0.0,. . AyOV..-a

See A 2, 56a IotE where it is quite clear

8, 66a 10--12; cf. 77b 24.

"01.' TI,,, refers to ,y80~, as it does at A

,.p6~
C 15, C.I1I.I.
6",oAClI'~<iV.'v.
The subject is the auditors understood from
nqO~ aVTov~; Bywater ("Aristotelia V," n6) is not happy with an understood

b 27 :

subject. This verb governs the following infinitive with the subject accusa-

tive.
b 27-28 ""'~ &."".i0811.
the reading of the edd., Spengel. Cope
reads
"a>~. The adverb means: "in certain way." As we see the verb
at A 10, 68b 4, it would appear to decote a more established state or attitude
(see also A 6, 62a 26, b 3) which would be more typical of what A. understands by ,y80~ (see 69a 18 : 3) than the transient and more ephemeral "atlo~.
Part of the problem in this introductoty section of chapter I is that ,y8o~
and "a80~ are not at all totally separate within the human person, insofar
a .,yOo~ represects the dominant disposition in a man with respect to the
appetitive part of his soul, one of whose elements is the "dO'l (6.:2b 13 : 2),
and being a donlinant disposition it in/j.uences and typifies his usual way of
responding emotionally.

.X'"

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBI'ORIC' II

b 28

xu,

b 28-29

Dtensive.

O!""' ... 'tUyyci;"",,,,v

possibly taken more precisely as a future

more vivid COldition; for tense of 6.arpie.', S. 2326b.

b 2!f-3 I

-.:0 ... 61x",.

read by the edd. (save Kassel), Spengel, Cope.
Kassel, with TIurot ("Observations critiques [IJ," 302-303), brackets it as a
possible additim of A.'s and would puoctuate with a colon after the secluded
passage to main.in the thought connecrion between 77b 25-29 .nd 3If[;
see Der Text, I\'. 13 If[ It is possible. I do not see it as necessary since the
restatenJ.ell t he.: does introduce a specifIcation of the inunediately preceding
statement whici is then developed (b 3I - 78a 6) with respect to the auditor.

b 3' lib.",.
C A.'s comments on contemporary tecbnographers in
A I, 54'1 11-21, 54b 19 - 55a I, 55a I!f-20; 2, 56. 16-17.
b 31-32 06 yip ... lxoucr,v
Cpo .4 2, 56a 15-19. The parallelism in
statement betw.en our passage and that at 560 15-19 suggests that A. is
speaking here ""'ut the nd01J, the more transient feelings and emotions of
the auditors taiba than their more permanent and established dispositions,
their i!lI7j. FrilOdship, anger, and mildness or patience are discussed in
B 4, 2, 3 respeuively.
78a I : I ..0 ""pci;,..."
i.e., "absolutely different"; different, as Cope,
Cicero, De orat. 2.42.178,
p. 4, suggests, in kind, e.g., 78a 2: otl~
presents a rather vivid description of the element of uoreason which can be
introduced in" !he auditor by an irresponsible appeal to the emotions.
z ><II"~ pky80.
is the reading of four edd., Spengel. Cope and
Kassel read "aTo TO ,..iy.Oo,. A difference in magnitude here would mean a
difference in degree of the thing being judged, e.g., 780. 3: ,..'''ea. ... Q.6"'.".

d6,,,.'"

'KGU;:L"C'(lL

'riJv Xp{O'LV

uHe passes jud.gment"; see LS,

;fOliO):

A.II.S.

a 3-6 x.d... ~IIV'<!OV

The future tenses in the passage, whiclr
are usually a sign (A 3, 58b 14) of deliberative discourse, would indicate
that A. is most I"obably speaking of this geore as he does of the judicial in 78a
1-3
a 4 : I bu9upoilV'L', "",t {'V.",Ii,
i.e., to the man of strong desires
and of good hq>e. Such a sanguine person would respond quite readily to
an attractive pmposal set down for his deliberation (TO ~C1",..
>l6V); and
the reason is indicated primarily by .,,,Ov,..o;;'m, which is that element in
the appetitive soul which does not act under the immediate guide of reason.
See 6!)a I : " f9a 2-3, and Met. 10720. 27-28: .,,,OVP'1T1,. pe.
Td rpa..",..00 "aA , {IoVA1JTO> 6. neWTO. TO "alo..

..O'

rae

78a 9

COMMENTARY

2
The present general condition reinforces this characteristic
response of the optimistic man, i.e., "any time the prospective matter is
attractive, then. etc,"

.,,,,&..,

as: I x,d
sc. TO <1161'..0. as subject here and in the following instance: "then, it appears to him that the proposal will eventuate
and will be gllod."
2 ,b,..e.i xal &UIJJ(.P"(~o~""
is the reading of four edd., Spengel,
Cope. Ross conjectures an i) after anaBei following Richards, p. 107,
who argues that the same man cannot be both. I do not find the conjecture
necessary. A. proposes not alternatives but two diametrically opposed and
contrasting attitudes, both of which work against the speaker: anaB7j~ denotes
the listless person, without any desire; 6uI1XBqai .,., a person negatively
disposed, "annoyed, disgusted at." The contrast of both with b"OvpoVlm
... tiih..6, is patent.

h,..

...0. ..
We come now to the explanation (a 7-20) of the
way one establishes a credible >iBo~ TOU UYO'TO~. From what is said, these
are the only causes (78a IS), and each of them must of necessity be present.
The absence of anyone of them, if it is apparent to the auditor, will either
diminish or destroy the speaker's credibility.
2
",,,...EUOfLEV
This is the state of mind we call conviction, belief
which is ordinarily effected in us by the competent use of the three ,!,lrfTBI'
I.TBX'O'. This meaning for "irfT'~ usually appears in a verb form (e.g.,
A I, ssa 5; 2, 56a 6, 19; 8, 66a II); but we also find the noun (e.g., A 9,
67b 29; B I, 77b 25).
3 ~... &"0&&[1;...."
i.e, apart from some kind of logical proof
in the sense of A 2, s6a 3-40 19-20, or demonstration in the stricter sense
by way of deduction or induction. As the word is used in the Rhetoric, it
submits to either meaning. See, e.g., A I, 55a 5-<5; 9, 68a 32; B 20, 94"- 10;
2I,94b 8; 25, 03a 15; r 13, 140- 35f[; '7, 17b 23-24, 18a 5, 17 (which echoes
our passage), 27, 38.

a 8: I

The idea here is rather closely

a 9 : I cppclv'l"'~ x,d eXpo,", x ..1 olivo,..
paralleled in a number of authors, as the conunentators have noted. ThCl!e
is the passage in Thucydides 2.60.5-<5 where Pericles (for Socrates' estimate
ofhim as a speaker, see Phaedrns 269e-f) defends himself and his policy before
the people at a rather trying time in 430 B.C. His comment, as given by
Thucydides, is quite similar to the one here - so much so that it suggests
to Cope, p. 5.. that A. possibly borrowed it not only for the Rhetoric (see
also Spongel, p. 209) but also for the Politics 1309a 33-39. In Plato's Gorgia.
487a-b (and see the rest of the number) Socrates says that he would consider
himself fortunate were he to engage in a discussion with Callicles, a man

10

ARISTOTLB, ~RHBTORIC' II

who possesses the three qualities of h"anjp1J. ef1.o,a. "aee1Jaia. See also
Cicero. De officiis. 2.9.33-34. who mentions prudenli iustiti inlellegenli.
The three qualities which A. mentions constitute for him an estimable >}Oo,
in the speaker; expressed another way: they constitute what is called the
speaker'. .uctorilas. the intellectual competence as well as the moral and
personal integrity he conveys to his listeners. As Laches says in Plato's dialogue
of that name (188c-d). "whenever I hear man discouning on excellence
or some phase of wisdom, one who is truly a man and worthy of the words he
'peaks. I experience a very deep joy as I perceive that both the speaker and
his words become each other and are in tune with each other." Plutarch
notes the importance of >}Oo, when. in speaking of the elfectiveness ofPhocion
as a speak:er (Lives: Phodon 744"). he remarks that "perhaps it [his effectiveness] should be referred to his >}Oo,. since merdy the word or command of a
good man carries a conviction outweighing endless arguments and periodic
sentences." And A. in EN 1172b 15-18 attributes the success of Eudoxus'
explanation of pleasure to his ~Oo~ which caused people to accept his theory.
We have seen in the filSt book: two of the qualities mentioned: 'PeOV1}a"
(A 7. 63b 14. 64b 14f[; 8. 66b 3. 20) and de .....j (A I. ssb s; S. 60b 14. 23.
35. 62a 13; 7. 64a 32; 9. 660 28. 3Sff.. 67b 26-27; IS. 77" 18). The former
is intellectual in character. combining intelligence and prudence. It is a
virtue of the intellect. and its inIportance for ddiberation and good moral
action is discussed in EN; see 66b 20-22. The latter is defined for us at A 9.
66a 36 - 66b 1 (see 66a 36 : 1) as moral excellence. the source of man's
good action an excellence identiral with the habit of making good moral
choices (neoil'eea.. ,). As A. says at EN lloob 36 - IIQ7a 2. "virtue is a
habit of choosing [E<., neoa<e"'''~; in 1l06a 12 he called the virtnes I ,]
residing in a mean relative to onrsdves. a mean determined by reason. such
as the man of practical wisdom [d 'Peapo,] would determine it." The man
of good will (.g.o,a, c Demosthenes. On the Crown 281) is the one who is
well intentioned toward his hearer. The importance of good will is recognized
in the casual remark: of Socrates in the Ph""Jrus. 260c 3-4. In the one place
where a form of eiJ.o,a appealS in Book: I (i.e. silvo", at A 8. 600 I1-I2).
it is joined. as here. with moral goodness as the criterion of the .peakers
credibility. Apart from 78. 19 where we are told that it will be discussed
with rpcAia in chap. 4. we do not meet the word again. In the EN it is discussed in connection with friendship (e.g. IIssb 33/[. IIS7b 17-19). and
we are told at II66b 30 - u67a 21 that while it is lik:e a friendly feeling it
is not friendship but appealS to be the beginoing of friendship.
i.e.. are deceived. mistaken; this is its ordinary
6.Il'jIEIl6ov..,..
meaning in the middle voice. and A. frequently uses it this way. In this sense.
as Cope. p. 5. says. the mistake in the statements made and the advice given
(a 10) would be unintentioual. Such is snrdy the fact in the first instance

78a 18

II

COMMBNTAlIY

(-II ya@ . aoodeo.....,

a II-12); possibly (but slightly) the fact in the third

the fact in the second instance
(-IIdoode....., .. Aiyo.".., a 12-13) since the motive, poxOwia, implies a
voluntary action grounded in deliberate choice - ,ee A 10, 68b 10-18; 13,
74a 9-17, b 4-17, 74b 9-10. The second instance is not at all in accord
with the way A. views the purpose of rhetoriC:li discourse. See, e.g., A I,
s4b 10, ssa IS-I8, 29-33, ssb 17-21; see also ssa 23.
(." 'P@o><po, sJ.o~ a 13); but questionably

'P@o"'l""

a II-I4 ;j yup .. YLY''':'''''''''"<''~

In the first instance
is
missing; in the second, dean!; in the third, siJ.o,a. Since knowledge is
clearly present in all but the first, the clause at a 14, 6,o"se ... r,yvw""o.ra"
would apply strictly to the second and the third, and it states the possibility
of misstatement deliberately or inadvertently.
a II : 1 ci'PPOaUv'J'l
We have not seen this word in A, but its cognate
Htpe"" gives us the idea contained in it; see 68b 22, and A II, 7Ia 13.
2
&o;cil;oua,v
"form, hold, an opinion on a thing." On its
dilference from l"iuraaOa" see An. Post. 89a II - b 6. From A 2, S70 1-'7
it is clear that rhetoric treating, for the most part, with material not absolutely certain must engage in this kind of intellectual activity.

a 12-13:
a 13 :

II &o;cil;ov"<E<; Myoucnv

C Oem., On the Crown 282.

'Ppavlp.GL

See Ci4b 12.

2 cl""E,,,d~
i.e., "good," "reasonable," "fair"; the meaning of the
word must frequently come from the context; see Stla 6, 61b 38. For some
idea of what the word carries within itself, see 74& 26 : I; see also 80a 30 : I,
and the discussion in de Romilly, pp. S3-<53.
1

a IS-I6 a"'..v"<..... ....;;"<' lXElv

See A 8, 66a IG-U (rq;"... tip'll"')
where good" will and virtue are mentioned as the source of the speaker's
credibility, and knowledge is definitely implied, as 66a 8-9, 12 indicate.

a 16-17 'PpOvlp.Gl " ..t '"'....&..io'

O"Ko.6aio, characterizes the man possessing c1qsn!; cf. 67b 21 : 2 and Cat. lob S-II; on rhe word see 6Ia 2S : 2,
80a 30: I.

a ...

a 17
&'llPIJI'clvc.>v
i.e., the determinations made in A 9, the
analysis of the particular topics of epideictic rhetoric which concentrated on
virtue and the honorable.
Four of the edd., Spenge! read I" rde;
a r8-I9 a yup .. "<Ol..u-.a..
Cope, Kassel (who cites Pol. 1320b 19) read lK reV. avreV' yde. At the
beginning of A 9, 660 25-28, A. made the same observation: namely, that in
developing propositional statements on virtue and the honorable for another
the speaker simultaneously reveals his own it0o,. "a. is crasis for xa! a.;

12

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

78a 20

in general on the matter of the repetition of II. in A., see VahIen, Beitrage,
pp. 3S3-54. For the mood of "a-raa"sv&a... see S. I824/; on the meaning
in the word, see beginning and end of 77b 24a I9 eWo~ XCIi q..A(CI~
",'lla is taken up specifically in chap. 4Mo,a is not mentioned again; c 78a 9 : 1. Whether we are to assume
(see, e.g., Cope, Introd., p. 246, Brandis,s, Fantham, pp. 269-70) that B 4
on ""Ala is also A.'s analysis of .v.o,a is questionable to me; c liN II66b
30 - II67" 2I. Certainly there are b -ro'~ "eel Ta ,,0.071 (78a 20) other
emotions beside ""Ala which indicate e6vo,a, e.g., ,,<le'~, v..o~.
a 20 : I lv ....~ ... 11:ciO'l
On -ro'~ "eel c S. IISlc; the ,,0.971 are discwsed in chaps. 2--1I.
Z "rei nliOlJ
There is ample evidence for the knowledge among
the Greeks before A. of the practical utility of the emotions, and it is seen
in the poets, prose writers, orators, and the technographers, as A. takes note
in A 2, s6a IS-I9; I, S40 I6-26. It is not usually remarked, however, that
with the Rl~toric we come to the first theoretieal and formal analysis
known to us of "d90~ and its importance in discourse. Indeed, it is to the
Rhetoric among the works of the corpus to which we must tum for A.' s
treatment of the emotions, a point [requeedy made; see, e.g., Gautlrier &
Jolif (Ill, p. 201) on the causes of anger: "Aristote les c!tudie dans la
RMtoriqlle 112"; Hicks, p. I98, referring to "d971 as specific emotions "deined
and enumerated by Aristode, Eth. Nic. IIosb 20 sqq., and described in detail,
Rhet II. cc. 2--u." Despite the effort of Fillion-lahille I am not persuaded
that there c:xisted an earlier "eel "d8.,. of A. One can search among the
earlier technographers without much success for anything remotely resembling A.'s study of the ,,~ and their role in the rhetorieal dXV71. There
are hints of some awareness of the emotions, but nothing more. The following from Radermacher are typieal of the kind of passing reference made
to them: B.II.23 (Corax), B.VII.39.8-ro, I3-I4 (Gargias), B.VllI.8 (prodicw), B.IX.6, II (Thrasymachus), B.X.IO (Antiphon), B. XXII.rj.22 (Alcidamas). At 040 r4-rsA. mentions Thrasymachus. Prodicus and Thrasymachus are mentioned together with Hippias and Protagoras by Quintilian
(IIISt. or.~ 3.1. r2) as early writers who discussed the emotions. There is one
fairly detailed TiM in our possession, the Rhetoric to Alexander by Anaximenes (which from internal evidence I would consider prior to our Rhetoric;
c Studies, pp. 7Sff.). It contains but a few casual remarks on the ,,&871, e.g.,
r428. 36, b 2, 3, S; I429a I7; ?I440b 28. Apart from these loci, six of A.'s
"d871 (om, ",tAla, ""ao~, ,,<le.~, .A.o~, ",80.o~) appear a number of times
where their meaning is assumed, but the kind of statement which will evoke
them or the circumstances in which they should be used is presented. A
study of these passages strengthens an earlier view that A. seems to be aware

78a

20

COMMBNT AllY

13

of the wOI:k of Anaximenes; c Sb/ai", p. 76nn33, 34. When we tum to

plato and to the Phaetlro. in 'particular, we are made aware of the importance
of the affective part ofman to discourse, but of no more (e.g., Phaear. 26']c-d,
27Ib, 277b-<:). I would consider sound the statement of Ringeltanbe, p. I,
to the effect that among the pre-Aristotelian philosophers "quamquarn multi
fuerunt ... nemo tamen quantum scimus affectuum in origine natura commodis vd incommodis explicandis operam posuit." Further, if Philodernus
is correct, the rhetOricians who followed A., while taking other thing. from
Iris Rhetoric, disnrissed his analysis of the nd97J (On Rhetoric, col. Ixxxviii;
Hubbell, p. 338). The continued disregard can be seen in the work of modern
commentators, as Conley, "Ud97J,"h3OQ-30Z,ln0tes. All of which is somewhat
.tartling in the light of. comment (exaggerated, one hopes) of. prominent
Supreme Court jurist, Charles Evans Hughes: "Ninety percent of any decision
is emotional" (cited in Douglas, p. 8). withour dismissing the critical importance of the intellect, it is certainly necessary to recognize that man does
not move toward the real or the true or the probable by intellect alone.
In man the presence of ideas carries with it the presence of emotions. Similarly, some form of emotional...commitment..accompanies intellectual conviction. In fact, Bailey commenting (ILIOU) on Lucretius 3.136-160 (the
mind as a special part of the soul and as the seat of thought and emotion) uses
Homer by way of illustration and remarks that the .eparation of thought and
emotion .eemed unnatural to the Greeks. We are often given to understand
that the only access to reality is via the intellect. Yet the very fact that we
move toward reality at all is the desire to understand. The constant correction, refinement, rejection by the understanding of our finding. is the
result of dissatisfaction, distress, unhappiness with or fear about the coherence
of our intellect with reality. In short, feclings and emotions are not idle
appendages. purdy subjective and private, but pervasive instruments which
together with the intellect constitute the means whereby man comes to
know the world. .As far as deliberation and human action are concernedwhich are the more proximate interest of the rhetorical discipline - the
n&97J are of critical importance, as A. has noted in his analysis of human
action in A 10. There he said, in part, that while they are not the causes of
action they do enter somehow into human action; see, e.g., 69a 15-24: cIll'
01 phi 6.4 l}97J :cal "d97J xeiicn:a, 01 dA d.1I ...d.a....la lne&<ova.]. In the
psychology of A., the intelligible object and reason itself can move to action
only when joined to Ife."~ (De an. 3.10), and the "d97J, while they are not
desire (6e"'~) (see, for example, Kenny, Actio", pp. lOOf!:) are "commo des
esp~ces du d6ir .. maio elles en diJf~t en ce que les passions sont toutes
accompagnecs d'unmouvement corpord, sont Iices a I'organisme" (Chaignet,
p. 436; and c De an. 403a 16f!:).

14

AIUSTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

78a 20

The word "dOa, has a number of meanings in A .. e.g., attribute, quality,

property (De .,.. 403 b 10K., Met. 1Q04a sff.), accident, feeling, affection
(see, for example, Hicks or Hamlyn on De an. 403a 16), sensation, thought,
emotion. In general it denotes some change Of modification in an entity.
The definition given in Met. 1022b 1S-2f conveys the central idea that dOa,
denotes change - either the change and alteration itself, or the effect of the
alteration, i.e., the quality resulting from the change: ",,000, in one sense is
the quality [na<onl'] in respect of which a thing can be altered, for example,
white and black, sweet and bitter, heavy and light, and all such others; "dOa,
in another sense is the actualizations [bBey.,a<l of these qualities, the actual
changing processes [.LUa,cbas" "-6'!1." In Cal. 9a 2Sff. there is substantially
the same statement. In chap. S (sb 2Sff.) of the Categories he discusses "o<&T,!' : that in virtue of which men are said to be "such and such" ("a,al TW.,).
In the Ilktorie we meet "dOo, as emotion, and therefore in the more restricted sense in which we find it in the EN nosb 19ff. as part of man's moral
nature. In this respect I would consider RUSIO, p. S3, quite right in his ....
sessment of the ndO,! in the Rhetoric. In the EN "clOa, is one of the three
elements ("dO,!, 6""0.,...." l~.,,) found in t\le soul. The 6""cip.s" are explained not in the general sense of the word, but in an applied and specific
sense as powers, faculties, whereby we are said (nosb 24-2S) to be able to
experience the "dO,! named at nosb 21-23. Since A.'s major concern is to
identify nom among these three related elements the one which makes for
moral excellence, deenl, it would seem clear that "dOa, as we are now
meeting it has something to do with man', moral nature, the nature whereby
man realizes himself fully as man, as a moral being tending toward genuine
human good; see EN 1097b 22 - 1098a 20, and cpo Plato, Rep. 42720 - 434>.
From among the three ("dO,! dvvcip..", l~..,) A. identifies moral goodness or
badness (demj, "a"ta) with the l~s", habits. The relation of the "dOf]
and the clvvcip..., as parts of this deenl (or "a"la) would appear to be this:
the dO,! and d""d,.. .., are in SC! morally neutral capacities (Hosb 31-32 we are neither praised nor blamed for our "dO,!) with which man is naturally
endowed. To the extent that they are subject to control by a man', dominant
habits (6:&b 13 : 2), the "dO,! form a part of his moral nature. For. U" can
shape a d~.....", and so in turn a ,,000,. A habit is an acquired, stable disposition which (nosb 2S-26) controls the dwa,.." to the extent that the 6wa,.."
reacts in a certain way (w 11 "aHcii,). Thus we speak realistically of an irascible, or envious, or friendly person. The emotions as we meet them in the
EN are described primarily as psychic phenomena (Tci'. Tjj 'I"'xii y,.o,...va,
nosb 19-20). In the De anima we find that the emotions (403a 16-2-7) are
also corporeal, inseparable from the body. Since the opening chapters of the
De an. make it clear that A. is aware of the dual activity of body and soul,
particularly in the emotions (403' Sf[), there is no reason to think that this

IS

COMMBNTAIIY

understanding is absent from the Rhetoric; cf. 898 I~2.0. Indeed, from EN
1I2sb 26 - rr26b 10 and the language used there, or from rr28b 14-IS
where A. speaks of the emotions, it appears clear that the idea of bodily
activity is present. On this point, see the interesting but not necessarily
conclusive article of Duprat, and for the Ethics, see Hardie, pp. 68-93.
While recognizing that the extenSive treatment of the nd67J in the Rheloric
has a specific objective in mind, and is not a forrnaI study of the nature of the
emotions, there is no reason to think that we should approach A.'S statements
with trepidation. I do not agree with those who believe that we should not
expect precision of statement in the Rheloric; cf. 60b 14: z,lS9b 31. Indeed, it
is pleasant to read in a recentstudy of emotion (Lyons, p. 34) that A.'s "picture
of the emotions ... is by and large the correct one," an observation which
echoes that of Bacon (Cope, p. 8): de iis quanlum Ian. paucis fieri pOluil, acute el
bene disseruil; see Fortenbaugh, "Aristotle'sRhetoric on Emotions," 4Off.; and 69b
33 : 1 on A.'s statement on pleasure. On the other hand, in what fonows I
shaD work from the perspective A. adopts in the Rhetoric with respect to the
emotions, adding, where necessary and possible, furtl,er statements from his
other works. In conclusion, then, we can say of the emotions that it is ordinarily accepted that there are two kinds of aff"ective phenomena: the feelings
and the emotions. AU emotions are feelings, but aD feelings are not emotions.
Fedings are dementary aJfective states (pleasure, pain) which fairly wen
defy further analysis beyond saying that they
be viscetal (pain in the
stomach) or mental (pleasure in an idea) and do not appear to require antecedent mental activity. Emotions are more complex alfective states of stronger
intensity occasioned by a stimulus which cawes a psychic state accompanied
by physiological changes in the body (the effect of seeing a crazed man approaching with a loaded shotgun). In order for the stimulus (object or
situation) to arouse an emotion, it must be seen by the person as beneficial
or harmful; thus some kind of knowledge is prerequisite for an emotion.
An emotion calls for cognition - appetency - organic disturbance: the stimulus is seen as good or bad for the person, and this perception is fonowed by
the impulse to acquire or avoid, together with a bodily reaction.

em

",p.p"",,,

"aD these modifications because of which

a 20-21 Ii,' ... Ii ..
men undergoing a change [,...Tapdllo....., is intransitive] diJfer in respect to the
judgments they malte." This is to say that an emotion introduces an alteration
within the person which alfects the critical &culty of the judgment, as Parmeno
says in the Eunuchus of Terence, 22S: "di bani, quid hoc morbist? adean
homines immutarier ex. amore ut non cognoscas eundum esse (" See A.'s
comment, A S6a IS-16. There is no reason at all to think (Cope, p. 7) that
A. is speaking particularly of deliberative or judicial rhetoric because of the
use of "eia..~; see 77b ZI : 1.

16

ARISTOTLE, 'RHB'IORIC' II

78a 23

a 21-22
O[~ oJjSoviJ
See also EN IIosb 23, EE 1220b 13-14; the
presence of pi:asure and pain is a specification for A. of the kind of change
in the penon with which he identifies ndOo,. The pain and pleasure are
not simulcmeous; the "al is altemative (Dennistan, p. 292). As Vater, P.76,
says of the phrase: "significat A*"1 11 ljdo.1i." The statements at 78b 1-2 and
82. 13 with mpect to der>i are in no way at odds with the above, as an analysis
of each passage will reveal. On tn .... a., see.4. 7, 63 b 28-29, 62a 29 : Z, 63b
28 : z; in our case here pleasure or pain follows sinrultaneously on the "dOo,.
a 22 or_ cinil I<TA.
a specification of the kind of physiological and
psychic changes he has in mind, and their opposites. A. will discuss the
emotions in claps. 2 through II as pain of contraries. He engages in an extdlSive aDaly" of the contraries with der>i, 2, "ea0'"l" 3 (however, cf.
80a S : :I); [;'0" 8, "pBaa.., 9; ",60'0', la, Clj'AO', II. With the other
emotions the contrary is discussed more briefly, or not at all, e.g., d.a.aX""Tia,
6, 8sa 14-17; in 7 dxae.ar1a is mentioned in the devdopment of Xlle", and
whether (seeahove) ",00'0,,10, and Clj'AO" II, are to be considered contraries
is questionable in the light of 88b 22-23. A. places before us in the Rheto,ic
14 "dO.". In the EN nosb 21-23 we are given II, to which are added at
noBa 30 - b 10 alaeb, and .ipea.,. Each list duplicates the other for the
most part: if we accept (and there seems no reason not ta) an equivalence
between alazlvtl (Rhetoric) and alaeb, (EN), "pBaa. (Rhetoric), '.pea"
(EN). The =options in each list are: "eao'"l' and Xlle" exclusive to the
Rhetoric, and h,/rol'ia, xdea, and ,,000, exclusive to EN. Four ndO'7 are also
given in the EE I220b 12-14; all (except Oupo,) are included in the EN
list, but two (0.,.." '",Oupla) are not in the Rhetoric. In the MM n86a 12-14
six "dO'7 are named, all of which are present in the EN and also (except "000')
in the Rhetori, The list in the De an. 403a 16-19 contains eight ,,0.8'7, of
which all but two (0"1'0" xdea) are found in the Rheto,ic, and all but two
(0..1'0', n/lao'"i') in the EN. In view of the common presence of these emotions in the orber works I am not sure that the "dO'7 of the Rhetoric were
sdected because they "essentially involve some kind of thought, or bdief, or
imagination" (Fortenbaugh, "Aristade's Rhetoric on Emotions," 64). On
the other hand I agree with Fortenbaugh's thesis on the role of coguition in
these Aristotdim emotions (see his Aristotle on Emotion), and view it as further
confumation that in the Rhetoric A. is analyzing the fundamental nature of
human discowse as reasoned and reasonable; cf. COMMBNTaRY I, Appendix.
a 23 KEpi ha<m>V
i.e., with respect to each "dO." we must mue a
division into (61QI(ler~ Bk) three subject areas. The division is observed in the
following chapters in varying degrees: more completdy for some emotions
than for others. In this triple division, A. introduces without formally saying
so an analysis of the emotions by causes. Causal analysis is an effective tech-

COMMENTARY

17

nique of inqniry opening a subject to a thorough examination from all possible

aspeets. Used correcdy it is invaluable for revealing the nature of the subject
of investigation. With the emotions, for e.."""'ple, it can break down the
complexiry of the subject without destroying the personal and subjective
quality of emotional experience.. Such refleetive analysis can hdp more
toward understanding the emotion than a merdy phenomenological presentation. And understanding is the objeet of A.'s study in the Rhetoric. A.
does not speak of the four causes, i.e., formal (what sort of thing the emotion
is), material (what it is made out of, i.e., in the case of emotion, what condition. constitute it), efficient (what brings it into existence), finaI (what is its
purpose). Thi. is not surprising since specific, absolute, and detailed answers
for such a complex experience as an emotion are not easily come upon, considering that an emotion involves body and psyche, appetitive and cognitive
faculties, sense knowledge and rational knowledge, habits, dispositions,
attitudes internal to the person as well as people, things, conditions external
to him, along with the interaction of many of these dements in varied ways.
At the same time when A. decides to study the emotions under these three
aspeets, he is engaged with the causality of the emotions and with varying
aspects of the four causes. For example, when he considers the disposition
of the person experiencing the emotion, he is in effect taking up an analysis
which can be specific only by way of determining in this particular instance
material, efficient, formal, and final causes of the emotion. In the same way,
when he considers the persons toward whom one experiences the emotion,
he is coping with efficient and final causes, and again with efficient causes
when he takes up the things which bring about the emotion.
a 24

or""

The adverb; LS, V.

i.e., the disposition of the individual exa 2.4--25 m;;~ T "olo.~

periencing the emotion, the persons who are the objects of the emotion,
those things which occasion the emotion.
o... slul, for the force
of the periphrasis see S. 1857, 1961. hi nolo." sc. .iO>Oauw clerIC.uOa.;
on hI, see LS, B.III.3. This same division is set down for the analysis
of wrongdoing (A 10-12) in the diseussion of judicial rhetoric; see, e.g.,
68b 3-5.

d.a".',....

a 27 !'-"o.""
EN II25b 30-3I.

"to cause anger in another"; cpo 78b 9 (i"",o"i); C

1 i>.Awv
i.e.., all the other emotions.
z C"...op oW x.d
on the use of "al here, and with oJ..., (a 29),
in a comparative statement, see Bonitz, Index: ><al, 357.24-31.
i.e., the material of the first book; on
3 b,t ... "p p'!!'-"...,.
the meaning of hi here and at a 27 see LS, A.I.,,'

a 28 :

18

AlUSTOTLE, 'RHBTOlUC' II

a 28-29 liLypliljl""EV "'..~ "'pO"'IiO'L~

"We drew up a list of propositions"; see A :>, s8. 17-:>S and sSa 18, sSa :>6-35; 3, 59a 6-8 and s9b 25-32;
9, 66a 31-32. The statement at 66a 31-32 speaks in a way similar to our
passage, and both passages clearly indicate what A. thinks he has been doing
in the first book and now intends to do ("eel TOUT.,. "O'fJaw!,,,,,,, a 29) down
to the end of B 17: namdy, p.....ent an analysis of eaclr of the three "ll1Te,~
.....""0' - .a6yo~, "d80" fi80' - by way of the particular topics; see sSa
:>, sSa 35. Suclr an analysis provides the speaker (writer) with a wealth of
possible statements for intelligent discourse in any of the genera of rhetoric.
The analysis, furthermore. like that in the Topics, is meant to instruct one
in the way to proceed in making one's own analysis of any specific subject
for discourse. As has been said before. e.g., S9b 16, A.'. objective in the
Rhetoric is in no way different from that put forth in the phdrus 25ge 1-3:
good speaking (writing). In presenting these neoTdae" for "d80, and
fi8o" there is no need to discriminate the "eDTaa.., according to the three
genera since the speaker and the auditor, as persons, are in no way essentially
different whether the discourse be deliberative, judicial, or epideictic; see
77b 24. init.
a 29 1tO.'iJ'"""EV ""I &.D.w"EV
There are two statements here: the first
was spoken to in 78a 28-29; the second ("let us analyze the emotions in the
manner mentioned") refers to the method to be followed in B 2-II and
indicated at 78a 23-25. TeO"O. is an adverbial accusative. An approximate idea
as to how ordinary Greeks of the time might have viewed some of the concepts
behind the emotions can be found passim. in the references from the fifth and
fourth centuries cited in Dover.

CHAPTER

definition of anger

I . Introduction: 78. 31 - 33
II . Development: 78. 33 - 80.
I.

78. 33 - 79' 10
(.) ,8. II - ,8b 9

(6) ,8b 10 - 790 8

(e) 790 9-10

explanation

of de6mtion

anger cIi=d tOWard an individual and

accompanied by a c:ert2in pleasure
meaning of dil&"Q)Qta.
conclusion and transition

2. 793 10-27

the disposition, attitude, of the angry;

this is explained via II.I; the subjective
aspect of the emotion

3. 790 28 - 80a I

the persons with whom men get angry,

and the things which occasion anger;
this is explained via II.I; the objective
aspect of the emotion

III . Conclusion: 80a :>-4

78a 31-33 l .......... ,.pocrq"ov"o~

It should be noted at the outset

that A. studies the emotions in the Rhetoric empirically: as he finds them in
man, their extemal causes, and their effect upon man's rclations to other men.
He takes the emotions for granted and looks at them in the concrete modes
in which he finds them among men, i.e., as affective modifications men experience and as they experience them in everyday living. He asks what is
the emotion in itself; what is man's disposition under the emotion: namely,
his mental, psychic, physical disposition; and finally what persons, things
cause the emotion. Along the way A. uses his philosophy of man to explain
why emotion modifies the person as it does. He is aware of the non-corporeal
as well as the corporeal character of emotion and of the complexity of factors
(motives, instinctual drives, intdlectual and personal valuations and convictions) which structure the emotional response. Together with this phenomenological analysis A. sees the emotions (which are exclusively personal)
in a social context, that is, interpersonally, as they are occasioned by and
directed toward the other person. In fact, in each of the following emotions
this bipolarity enters into the definition of the emotion: der>i, 'P.lla, ""ao~,
alaxVv,!, xde'~' lleo~, Td v."..aav, 'POdvo~, C;jlo~. In the case of neaoT'7~,

ARISTOTLE,

RHETORIC' II

78. 31

rpd(Jo" 9deao, the bipolar aspect does not appear directly in the definition,
but the ""-planation of each consrantly assumes its rdation to another person.
The two emotions not formally analyzed, m.a'O'%""Tia and dxae'O'Tla, are
ele.e1y bipolar from the character of their opposites. The resultant anthropology, despite its brevity and its more immediate purpose (i.e., the important role of emotion in human discourse), is remarkably adequate. This
judgment is sound despite the aspects of emotion not handled by the
author, e.g., the physiology of the emotions, their teleology, their difference from fedings Uoy), attitudes (basbfuhIess), virtues (collrage), character traits (shyness). On the definition given here, see EN II35b 28-29
where dd,,,la takes the place of our .1'ywela. Yet 79b 10-17 would indicate that d1,ywe1a is seen by the angry man as an dd,,,la. There is
some discwsion of anger at EN IU5b 26 - rr:z.6b 10 helpful toward an
understanding of our chapter. Also consonant with our definition in
part is Pol. I3XZb 32-34. We are told there that anger is more powerful
than hatred since anger is accompanied by 1v",/ which makes it difficult to
allow reason (calculation) to operate. Our Rhetoric definition is given in a
slightly abbreviated form in Topics 1560 32-33 as an example of the correct
way in which to define, and at I5Ia 14-19 the explanation of anger shows
that the pain is caused by the slight (our 6.; ... d1.ywe1a.). At Top. USb
28-34 and 127b 26-32 A. examines the nature of two elements in our definition: 1~ and d1,ywe1a. At De an. 403a 29 - b 2, in the course of introducing problems connected with the study of the soul, he illustrates the
various kinds of definitions with definitions of anger by the dialectician and
by the natural philosopher (d tpVO''''.'), both of which in his words are inadequate. The definition of anger by the dialectician (lIeB.', avn1tnnjO'B.",
403a 30-31) is the relevant one. This is the definition of anger apparently
referred to by Plutarch (De vir/utt morali wb) and Seneca (De ira 1.3.3) as
A.'s definition of anger. Our Rhetoric definition was apparently the one
adopted by the Stoics; see, e.g., Cicero, Tusc. DiS['. 4.9.21: "libido poeniendi
eius qui videatur laesisse iniuria." Cicero repeats this at 4.19.44 as .leiseendi
libido which to me sounds suspiciously like Ges." avT.1tnnjas.". If so,
there would be, as far as I can see, small diJference in Cicero's mind between
the definitions of anger in the Rhetoric and in the De anima. In this matter
Hicks, on 403a 26, would agree with Cicero, calling the De anima definition
(lie ', m.nAtnnjO'.w,) "a condensed form" of the Rhetoric definition. Aubenque, 3II, does the same. We also find the Rhetoric definition in Stobaeus,
Ethic. 176: deyoi tdY oW laTl. hnO",..la T',..Wet/O'arsOa, T,w o."oVvTa >}6,,,'7"ba. "ae'; Ttl. "eoatj"o.; and in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers:
Zeno 7.13: deYoi d' In,Ov,..la n,..we1a, TO;; do"rriino, >!6''''1'''.a, 0'; ne0O"7".'Tm,.

78a 31

COMMBNTAllY

:>r

Certainly the definition of the Riletoric is a good working definition with

a genus (lfe.E I'eTa .t~"'1.). a differentia (T'w"e1a.). and a cause (dl.yme1a).
Fortenbaugh. "Aristotle's Rhetoric on Emotions." So-SI. considers the definition inadequate (eE De an. 403 b 7-9) because of the absence of a reference
to the matter of the emotion. i.e.. what happens in the body. Aubenqne,
313-17. argues for its validity as it stands. On anger. see also FiIlion-l2hilIe;
on anger as found in the philosophers after A.. see Ringe/taube. pp. 3:>-90.

l......., &1\
C 60b 14: 2 on definitions in the Rhetoric. See
also Fottenbaugh. "Aristotle's Riletoric on Emotions." 4S-48. 4:>n6.
z 6py/j ap~l~
At A 10. 6ga 4- oeY>1 and br.O"I'l.. were called
4101'.' dei~..>= those movements in the appetitive soul not under the direction
of reason; see 69" I : z. AtA roo 69b II-I2. we were told that oeYlf. together
with 0"1'0. (but see 6gb II). was the motive (for the seven motives see 6ga
:>-'7) for acts of revenge (Ta nl'me7)T<"d). This was explained briefly at
69b 12-1 S with a reference forward to our present chapter. At EN II49a
24 - II49b 3 A. modifies somewhat the idea of unreason in anger when be
tells us that it seems somehow to listen to reason; and see Plutarch. De vin.
morali W1>-<: on this. From the analysis of the components of the de"''''''o,
element in the soul - namely. " ..0"1'7)..",6. and My.v I'.T6'l..... 68b 32 6ga :> (with the references there and also 69" I : 2. 7Da I7-r8. 7Da 22.)we can see that A. does allow for this play of reason. In the inal analysis.
lfeBE,. in man is the response of the organism to sensed lack. need. Cope.
pp. 9-10. olfers an extensive consideration of the place of lfe.E" among the
nntritive. sensitive. appetitive. locomotive. intellective faculties. See also
Chaignet. pp. 3I9-S71.
3 '!:l",",pl...; <p",,.OP.EvlJ~
nl'''ela here signifies revenge as at A 10.
68b 21 and elsewhere (see 74b ]I). not penalty as at A 6. 63a 26. Taking
revenge carries with it the idea of satisfying the self in the action; eE 69b I:> : 1
and 2. 63a 20 : 3. As A. says at EN rraOO 22-2S. ""I'''eta pnts an end to
anger; he also interestingly observes (a 30) that "revenge is more hUDWl."
In our own phrase this self-gratification is emphasized by the public character
of the revenge - rpa ...I'iv7).: manifest revenge - which itself is a response
to what was in its own turn manifest disregard. The fundamental reason
for this reaction is given in the next note: by the act of retaliation the person
asserts his personal value and his right to e.1Cstence. Ross (alone of the edd.)
and Spengel seclude rpaIVol'I:v7J.. The latter is not happy with it althongh it
is well attested and carries the meaning:of that which is manifest to the senses;
see Ssb IS : 3. We find it used in this sense at EN 1I3Sb 28. rII3b 19. and
in our own text at B 10. 87b 22-23 (with which cpo Top. I09b 36-37). A 6.
63a 8. and II. 70b 13 where we are told that "no one is angry with one
manifestly beyond the reach of receiving vengeance."
a 3r : 1

AllISTOTLB, IRHETORIC' II

78a 32

Anax. I440a 32-34 notes that we can incite anger if we

a 32 o).'y"'pICIY
show persons that they are napa TO npoa>j"o).'YOJp~piv01J'. .).'YOJpia is a
voluntary act (B 3, 80. 9), and, .s such, is done with knowledge. Whetheritis
done with deliberate choice is another question; see 68b Io-n, 68b 32 -69& 2,
73b 28 : 1, Z, 77b S : 1. As we find the word atA la, 68b 23, B 3, Soa IS-2I,
6, S3b 12-IS, it is used to make specific the meaning of shamelessness which
is an artitude of disregard for those things which bring dishonor either to
the ,elf or to another. Thus it would seem that this sense of being dishonored
by the act of ci).,YOJpla enters into the reaction which is anger; see, Or example, Soa rS-2I: afno... a!axvvop80a. The attitude of the person who
does the slighting is well desctibed at A II, 7Ta 14-17, and it is one of no
regard for the other person as person. In effect, d).,ywpia denies basic
quest in man for T'P>!, e.lteern in the eyes of another. It denies what Ricoeur
(Fallible Man, p. I2o) calls basic desire in man "to exist, not through. vital
affirmation of oneself, but through the favor of another's recognition."
Aubenque, 30S, in similar vein remarks th.t anger is "I. reaction d'un
ette dont I'existence a ere injustement contestee...." .A,ywe1a will be
defined and further specified at 7sb 10 - 79a S, in the course of which it
becomes clear th.t the person slighted considers his honor - namely, how
he is valued by others - to be involved. In fact, .t Sob I6-1S A. remarks
that a person is not angry if he h.s done wrong and suffers for it justly since
he considers this but right. Here, again (see 78a 31-33 init.), anger implies a
sense of unjust treatment from another in the act of .).')lOlpia, and, in fact,
.t EN II3Sb 2S-29 A. says as much: 1,,1 rpatvopivrI yae d6",1~ oj .py>! IUTtv.
a 32-33 ",,<iN.1t; ..6-rov lj ...<iN "",...oil, ,<oil o).'Y"'p.iv I'IJ "pocnj"ov..o~
This is the reading of Roemer, Dufour, Tovar, Cope. Spengel, Ross, Kassel
read diflerently. Our reading bas good tradition, but the difficulty found
with the passage is reflected in the cadd. What is intended seems clear rom the
context of the whole passage: anger .gainst slight offered by one unfit so to
.ct either against oneself or against those close to one. Cope attempts to
interpret the passage by filling out the phrase: .:l'YOJe1a. Tcii. (d~,~8ivTOl')
el, ""TO. " (el, .....a) TOO' aVToV. As he interprets it, p. II, TOO. (d6,,,~8"TW')
is governed by dlt.yweiv; e.g., a ucontem.ptuous indifference oj, i.e., shewn in,
evidenced by, offences, &c." The next phrase which he rightly calls a part of
the definition becomes a genitive absolute and is so interpreted by Jebb &
Sandys: when such slighting is unmeet." As a genitive absolute it expresses
at most a circumstance accompanying the action. The question, however, is:
Wh.t constitutes o).",wel - the insult to oneself or to those close to one, or
an insult from one who is not qualified to act in such a w.y? If anger is occasioned by the latter, one should """'Peet that specification in the definition.
Further, anger arouses in the subjeet a desire for Tlpweia, an action directed

78 33

2.3

COMMBNTARY

against someone, and we should be told its object. From all that A. will
say in the chapter it is clear that the dl',,"'e1a he is speaking .bout is a certain
kind of dl',,"'e1a; namely, an act committed by one who should not, in the
angry man's mind, commit such an act: see 78b IOJ[, 79b IOJ[ The one
who commits the act is one acting ,..1) "I!oa"l"o,~"", which is to say that he
is acting "'aea "I!0afj"o., Le., in a way which is over and beyond what is
fitting, seemly, to such a person (c 67b IS : 2). Kassel, who ~writes the
text at a 33: dl',,"'ee,.,..7) "I!o~"o..",., sees the problem, I believe, fot
he offers this explanation of his text: "intellege ~OW ,..7) "I!o~"Ov''''' 01.".,..
eel. eI, av.d. 11 (ok) ~OW 00.06 (.wa), o I379b II dl',,"'ee" BI, ut
I379b 2.8s." This does answet the problems posed. But I believe dut they
can be answered by the text as we have it if we take a 33 (TOO "'eotnf"ov~o" and see 79b 12) as a subjective genitive with 01',,"'e1a. at a 32 and,
in tum, governing the phrase at a 32. (.w . .. aVroii): e.g., "anger is the
impulse for manifest retaliatinn attended by pain because of manifest disdain
on the part of one who is unfit to treat with disdain anything concerning
oneself or those close to one." This interpretation is confirmed by the statement at 79b II-I2.: 1!n""...a, ... "I!otnf"...a,. The phrase .W. BI, av.d.1}
TW. av.06 presents a problem: AIe we to take TOW av.oii as dIe use of the
article with a~.'" (e.g., A I, S4b 33; 9, 66b 9, II, 7Ib 22.) in a parallel construction with the article and the prepositional phrase (0 Gildersleeve, II S77)
TW. 01, aVTo. as I have done? Or are we (still keeping the phrase a. the
object of dl',,"'eB") to complete the second member of the phnse, e.g.,
1/ (..wo,) .ow av.oii? & we meet the phrase elsewhere, either it is completed by .k (79a 8, 8sb IS, 8Sb 18), or it is assumed that it must be completed. Spenge!, for example, on 800 2-3, 1} ~OW av.oii says (p. 234): "Hoc
Kassel, however,
graece probari non potest," and conjectures 11 (...,)
at 78a 32. ~arks that there is no need for the indefinite pronoun hete or at
78a 3S - b I. 800 2.-3. 16a I.

.w..

a 33 .,.pocn\xov",o~
Cope. p. IIn2. discusses the four different word.
for obligation: "eotnf".,. obligation imposed by nature (cf. A 9. 67b I4-2o;
67b IS : 2; 68a 13 : 2); de obligation imposed by morality; xe>i. obligation
imposed by utility. expediency; nerne~ obligation imposed by fitness.
propriety. The distinction possesses some validity for differentiating the
words. However (cf. 86b 13 : I). in the fifth century dB. began to replace xeof
to denote need in general and eventually it became dominant; see Goodell.
And yet even this statement requires qualification. as a glance at the extensive
use of the words in the opening passages of Demosthenes. Phil. 1 reveals: e.g.
de, (I. 2. 7. 9, I3, 14, 16. '7. 18, 19, 20); "eoa>1"" (2.. 3. 13. 19); xe>j (3, 7. 10
where it is explained by <h>d",,"I). If one examines the instances given by A.
in this chapter of those with whom one becomes angry. it becomes clear

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

78b

that the one who causes anger is not necesoarily an "inferior." but rather
someone who should not by all that is right (or with Cope's explanation of
"eoa>i"": by all that is naturally proper) show disdain to the other. For
this reason I do not see Cope's objection. p. u. that according to A. one
cannot become angry with one'uperiors. Certainly 70b 14-15 leave that
possibility open. and a1.o offer reason to believe that A. could agree with
Seneca. De ira 1.3.2: "Deinde nemo tam humilis est. qui poenam vel sumrui
hominis sperare non possit.... " If we insist that A. considered inferiority
an essential element in ol'y"eia. we are faced with a further problem at
78b 31-34 where Achilles is angered at the slight from Agamemnon. who
was certainly not an inferior.
We are given the necessary consequents of this
a 34 : 1 ilva.YXlI
definition: the object of the anger (TOW ... a.Be"''''!'. a 34-35). the cause
for the anger ("al (fT lI,..ll.,.. a 35-36). an accompanying condition
("al "dan ... n,,"e>iaaoBa~ a 36-37).
2 -n;;" " ..8' j!"........v
i.e. individuals; see 59b 2. The individual.
here a Cleon. is opposed to the general cl.... e.g. a.Be"''''!' (and see s. II29).
In this respect .. A. points out later. 82a 5-<5. anger differs from hatred;
see also 80b 21-22. Insofar as it involves n,,"e1a (giving evil for evil).
anger cannot ordinarily be directed against cl..ses or generic groups and
achieve its objective. For example. Demosthenes in his effort to rouse the
Athenians to the dangers from Macedon constandy speaks of Philip. not the
Macedonian peoples. So. too. atA II. 70b 13. anger clearly has theindividuaI .. its object. Furthermore. anger .. defined (tpa o,.ivr! n","e1a. tpa<dl."we1a) ordinarily has its cause (oA'y"e1a) in an act that can
be committed only by a penon. for actions are done by individuals; secondly.
its effect (T'","elll) i. action directed against a person. I have .ince noticed
that Aubenque. 306. says in effect the same thing. Whether we can become
angry with inanimate or animate things .. well .. per.ons is not something
A. formally considers in the definition given. But he appears to admit the
possibility at EN I12Sb 31. I126a 4-6. In suclr instances anger is purely a
sense reaction whose source is sense not reason. But it is not anger .. defined
in the Rhetoric which is in part response to an act by a person.

.0,...."

is the reading of the edd.. Spengel.

a 3S -78b I ..u,,"1w II .....", ..uT.U T'
Cope reods: n.d n with cod. C. With our reading this Twa would be
understood with TOW aVToii. and is the alternative to aVT6. : atlTo. " TOW at!ToV (Twa) T'. For the use of the reflexive pronoun. see S. I22S.
78b I II ilp.EAAev
or an intended action.

$C.

"0";;'.

Anger is caused by d,e actual action

C'OMMBNTARY

b 1-2 ,.creext "LVII iI&ovYjv

See ?Sa 21-2.2. The word lneuIJao denotes the invariable attendance of one thing upon another; here the necessary
presence of pleasure of some kind with the emotion of anger, a pleasure
occasioned by the expectation of ..0.uwe1a. If anger is an lIe.~o, n!,weia"
then the nature of retaliation (see 7Sa 3I ; J) implies pleasure in the action.
At. was said at 7Sa 21-22, AV"'7 (78a 31) and ojdovol are not present simultaneously. The feeling dominallt in tbe emotion anger is ojdoVlj, as should
be clear from 70b Io-lS, and pleasure occasioned by the idea of retaliation,
as we see at EN 1126a :1.I-22. See also A II, 70b 30-32. Since the pleasant
is good, A 6, 62b S-6, revenge is seen by the angry person as the good which
will restore hinr to bimself, just as the one who caused the anger is seen as the
evil which brought about the disruption in him.
b 2 ilW
predicate adjective qualifying the statement in the articular
infinitive. As we are told at A II, 70a 16-17, everything for which we have
a desire within us is pleasant. Further, acts of revenge (A ro, 69b 13-14) are
done for the satisfaction of the agent (Iva dnonA'IeWOtfj, and all action of a
voluntary character is done for the good or the apparent gnod, or the plea.lant
or the apparently pleasant (69b 18-20). The discussion in A II of what
constitutes pleasure and what kind of actiolll" gives pleasure should assist
toward understanding the statement here.
To the extent that the .clearly impossible is
b 3-4 cN&l~ ... "':''<Cj>
seen as beyond attainment it is not seen as a good for the person (0 88b 2)
and so is not the o~ject of any appetitive impulse; see B 19, 92a 24-2S, Pol.
1314" 23-24; see also Alexander on Top. II6b 26 (CG, lb.). While anger
may be ''blind and unreasonable" (Cope, p. 12), a possibility A. admits when
he places it among the 4-10)100 /Jei~.., (see 7Sa 31 ; 2), A. raises the desire
for revenge above a blind response by the preceding phrase; "it is pleasant
to think that you will get what you desire" (b 2). The definition given at
78a 31-33 entails a desired action on the part of the angry person, and as no
one desires to.do what is seen as impossible, I fmd no difficulty with " dA .
erpie:rao d~.aTQW aVTtji. TIns is the kind of clarification A. has engaged in,
e.g., atA 6, 6za 24-2S. Here he is explaining the preceding clause. However,
see Bottin, pp. 17-24.
is the reading of four edd., Cope. Spengd
b 4-S .. &~ "':'"t<i>
reads it but thinks it is not A.'s observation. Kassd, following Spengel,
secludes it. C comment in preceding note. Spengers objection focuses
on the do. a..,", aUTtji, and he argues that what is to be proven is that tire
angry man led on by the hope of revenge is filled with pleasure. But it
would appear that this is exactly what the clause demonstrates; if tire act
of vengeance is seen as possible (d~.aT<ii. a"Ttji), the angry man knows

AlUSTOTLB,

RHETORIC' II

78b 10

that he can commit it and so is pleased. & anger is defined at 78a 31-33,
the angry person has the impulse to an act of vengeance, something he thinks
that he can do. If retaliation is not possible and is seen as such, there is no
anger; see, e.g., A II, 70b 13: "no one is angry with one clearly beyond the
reach of vengeance." Since the act of retaliation is seen as possible, the angry
person is pleased (78b ""3: ljdtl ... t'P18Ta.). If the angry person is to have
the pleasure of his anger (namely, the possibility of r<:taliation), he has to
/mow within himself (C A 4, S9a 38 - S9b I) that the act of retaliation desired
is possible. This whole idea is emphasized by the triple repetition of .'PI.Ta.
b 5 8u,,"oii

a synonym for oer~; see 6\)b II.

b 6 3~ '" ... mE~E'"''

70b II-IS.

Iliad I8.IO!}-IIO; see also I07If.; C A II,

b 7: 1 ooAw8" yap x ..1

On w.oAovS.i see 62a 29 : z; see also
Brandon. The
is explanatory; the "ai, intensive: "this is so because a
certain pleasure actually is attendant upon anger for the reason given and
because ... '
z 8ui '<6 ,<oi;"'o
the reason just given at 78b 1-5. To this a second
reason is added in the following clause, "al a.OT... a.a.ol~: "and because
they spend their time mentally on [a.aT~lfJ... h) exacting vengeance."

yae

"and so the image which occurs at that

b 8-9 "IJ oW ... 'P ...'<....,..
moment [i.e., b Tcp T&pwee'iaBa, Tfi dtaJlolt:l] creates pleasure." tpaJlT:aala was
defined at A II, 70a 28-29 as a "kind of weak perception." & A. uses it at
70b 33, 7Ia 9, 19, this explanation is borne out. The imagination, or the
presentative faculty, works in such a way that the image is made real and
affects the appetitive system as it does in oUt passage; see ']Oa 28. We will
find the word entering into the explanation of fear (823 21), courage (83a 17),
and shame (84a 24) with much the same understanding. Speaking of imagination, Ricoeur (Freedom and Nature, p. 258), says: "But an image does more
than intend the absent object or value generally - it endows it with a quasi
presence. . .. The absent manifests itself to me in its affective and kine...
thetic presence: the aifect and the movement are the matter, the kyle, of the
image. The relation of knowledge and affect in the image remains one of
fonn and matter."
b Ie-IS beet 8 ... G(jPU;
This is one statement. The clause in.1 6
. . (,noAa,..fJa.o,.. .. (b Ie-I3) is the procasis whose conclusion is given
at b 13-15: Tela d' ... ilfJe'" "Seeing that oA'Yo>eia is ... , there are
three kinds of oA'Yo>ela." Spengel and Cope would agree with this but
have reservations about apodatic aI. at 78b 13 (Spengel denies it; Cope is
uncertain); on .podatic 6. see 6.ta 8-9, Cope, 120. The text between b 10 and

COMMENTARY

b IS is read by all the edd., but punctuated diJferently in one place (see ?lib
II-I3). Thurot "ObsetVations critiques [II," 303 does not agree that the
conclusion is found beginning at b 13. For him the logical apodosis to the
in.. clause is at 79'l 9 (cpa.Bed'.). I see no failure in logical sequence in A.'s
arguing that "since dA<Y"'ela is X, and X is 3Y, it follows that oAcx"'ela
is 3Y." I do find a difficulty in waiting thirty lines for a conclusion. The
two instances which I find similar to our sentence (A I, ssa 3-14; A II, 700
27-32) draw the conclusion at onco; c ']CIa 27-32. An examination of 78b
IS-26 (8 TO "ae ... TCI'WeOv.TaC) shows that the three specifications are
explained in tertns of X: namdy, Mea nee! 1'116..", 4Eco.

'0"

b 10 lvip'Y"l4 50~'1~
See 6xa 24, and note " lvie"..a TOO' TOCOWW
a&Ea here is the opinion, conjecture, idea which, previously present only in
potency (lv ""'("')' has been actualized by the individual. The result is an
act of oAc"we1a: "seeing that dAcywela is an actual expression of an opinion
about something as apparently of no account." In oAc"weta (disdain) we
have the fonnal cause of anger: an act done against one which is seen as
undeserved and unjust. On 1'116..", ~co. cpo o~a..", aEca at b 13, and
see ?lib 18 : z.
b II-I3 (I<cd yckp . (,m>Alll'-l!civ0I'-EV),
Tovar, Ross, Kassd alone place
this in parentheses. The statement in parentheses is an explanation in more
precise form of what has just been said, and the parenilieses hdp to clarify
this. There should be a comma (Tovar, Ross, Kassd), or possibly a colon
(Roemer, Dufour, Spengel), not a period (Cope, Freese) after ,jnoAap(3&'o1''' in b 13.
b I2 : I cmou8ij~
i.e., serious attention, esteem, as it is used at A 9,
660 29, Met. IOoca 19, Plato, ph""tirus 276e.
z ..u """TelV"""'1l
The word was seen at A s, 60b 9 used of
things which tend toward, contribute toward, something, and so are closely
related to the thing. Cope, p. 60, has a brief comment on the word.
3 1'-'18tv TL . U"OAIlI'-I!!iVDI'-EV
"But all those things that are
(considered to be) a mere nothing, or quite insignificant, we assume to be of
(actually) 110 account." The distinction between 1'1Ia.t, (that merely thought
of as of no account) and oVa.t, (that actually of no account) may be at work
here, but c ?lib 18 : z.
b 13 Tplll 8'

a.

is read by the edd. (except Ross), Spongel, Cope.

TC _l ... 61!p~
On ..~ - "at, see S.
2974- There are three kinds of goods proper to man: intellectual, moral,
material. All of them in diJferent ways are subject to attack by the tluee
kinds of oA.ywela which A. names here. A. says very little about contempt,

b 14-15 :

I<ClTCl<ppOv.JGI~

ARISTOTLE, 'llRETORIC' II

apart from what we meet here in chap. 2. and at 80a 19-21. 88b 22-28.
When he uses the verb form (e.g. A II. 7Ia IS; 6. Il4b 23) it is with the meaning set forth in 78b 15-17.
.""'lPE-..o~
Again. the meaning of this word is fairly well
determined by what we meet here (b 17-22); it is used again at 82a 2. The
more common form. lmie ..a. is used once by A.; the verb ""'Ie.a!;....
is found in Herodotus. Lysias. Antiphon. Xenophon. Demosthenes. and A.
in the sense of acting spitefully toward. From Cope', note on the word.
p. 16. '=Ie.a"p&~ emerges fairly much as A. describes it at b 17-32: a kind
of malicious and gratuitous vexation of another by simply frustrating his
plans and intentions.
3 {lf3PL~
This is defined for us at b 23-25 in what Cope. p. 17.
calls the locus cl4ssicus for the concept. The power of ;;Pe'~ in arousing
anger is noted at Pol. 13ub 29-32. In a discussion of wrongdoing in A 13.
73b 38 - 74" 17. A. says that since wrong actions are often admitted but
their wrongness denied, we must define wrong action; and he proceeds to do
so by showing that it is the moral purpose of the agent which determines
wrongness. See 748 I I : 2. If the action is done knowingly and voluntarily.
the neoa1ee,,'f: of the agent is actively engaged. and it is in the neoa[e''''~
that the wrongness lies. Applying this to 6Pe'~. he says that "if someone
strikes another. he. assuredly. has not committed an act of 6Pe'~; but if he
does so for some purpose - for example. to dishonor the other person. or
for his own gratification - he commits an act of fJPe'f:." From this it would
appear that hybris is an act, and, specifically. a gratuitous insult, which in this
instance involves a further act of physical violence as well; see also EE I221b
18-26. But hybris does not have to include personal assault, as should be
clear from the distinction implied between 1JPe" and alHla (personal assault
and battery) at A 12. 73a 13; see also 011 Ihe Virtues and Vices I251a 30-35.
b 22-240 The idea of physical action in hybris comes from the definition
at 78b 23 and is found in the examples in the Politics where the idea ofhybris
is somewhat amplliied; at 13ua 23ff.. we are told that it has many parts.
each of which gives rise to anger. In the narrative which follows. while
iJPe" is shown frequendy in one's actions. it would appear that it is the oer>i.
not necessarily the iJPe'~. which engages in physical violence. On the other
hand. O2a 1-3 certainly implies that physical violence on the person of another
can be called iJPe'~; but this in tum. is called into question by 78b 25-26.
Harrison. speaking of law (a 168). says: "The concept of JPe'~ was rather
indeterminate. . .. Here it will suffice to. say that not all physical assault was
necessarily {JPe" and, on the other hand. it might include actions which
did not amount to physical assault...." See also MacDowell. "Hybris in
Athens" and Law ill Classi&JJ1 Athens. pp. 129-32; and Gagarin. Cope, I
239-40. refines the idea of IJPe" as e.g. d,' alaXeoverla,. dId mwciW.

a,,,

78b 18

COMMBNTAllY

29

MyaIV, but his source for these three kinds is unclear. I do not believe that
the PolitiJ:s passages at I3IIa 23 - I3I3a 16 or 13Isa 14-31 submit to these
distinctions. On the other hand, Cope's description (I 239) of hybris fits
the idea well: "a violation of the feeling of personal dignity and sense of
honour [and c my comment at 7Sa 32], humiliating, degrading, scornful,
wanton language or acts...." On the nse of the verb llPelCew, see 78b
23. Granted the validity of the above, there is still another aspect of hybris,
and this is discnssed at 8Sb 21.

b 15-17 a ...... (a"", ... 6).'Y"'poii,nv)

This is the reading of all
the edd. who also use the parentheses. Spengd and Cope are in agreement
with the edd. in the reading and punctuation, save that Spengd does not
use the parentheses and would read <UlalV ("aTacpeO.Ow....') while Cope
reads ~aTacpeO.OVl-'...,. with Bekker for I-''1dB1lo, MI.IV at b 16. The argunrent in the text as accepted is: "a-r;acpe"V'I'J'''' is slighting (dA'y"'eBi)
since people "aTacpeOVOVu" all thOlie things they coDSider of no value; but
men d.uy"'eoVuw (slight) things of no value, and, so, dismissing something
as of no value. which is contempt, is a form of slighting.
lm)p.ci~ [rp"'(v....... x ...."'Ppov.iv]
"So, too, the spiteful
person." The edd. (except ROllS, Dufour) read and punctuate in this way.
Cope does the same but reads a period after "aTacpeOvew; Ross, Dufour
omit the brackets (so, too. Spengd) and punctuate with a period (Spengd
punctuates with a semicolon; Roemer mistakenly prints a colon inside the
bracket); I would agree with the seclusion. A.'s objective is to demonstrate
that lmJeeau,..'" is a form of dA'Y"'ela (e.g. b 13-14, 17-20). and the structure of the argwnent is parallel, as each of the three kinds i. explained as an
action of dA'Y"'ee,v - see. e.g., b IS, 19, 23: dA'y"eB" Vahlen ("Kritik:
d. Rhelorik," 560-61) suggested the seclusion and noted inler .li. that the
TO - "al of b 15 and b 17 suggests that both ~aTacpeovciiv and d lmJe.dC.,.
are the subject of dA'Y"'e.' at b 15.

b 17 x",1 0

b 18 : J iP.1C08.""o; ....i; ~ouA";......v

As we saw the verb at A 5.
60b 13, i,..1<od,,,,..,,, is an effective hindering. a shaclcling-here. in particular,
of the plans and intentions of another. On povA'1uc" see 64b 32 : 4, Ci9a 2-3.

"" [VIZ ...

.c. l"YV'l'JTac here and at b 19; C b 24. The interchange of the negatives 0'; and ,..">1 is somewhat disconcerting; see, e.g., A
10. 68b 33-34; 78b 10. 13, 16; 8Ia 5 with 81b 37; 83b 22-23; 85" 18. On
this matter Bonitz, Intltx 538b 50-51. remarks: "oV et ,..">1 interdwn ita promiscue usurpantur, ut discrimen animadverti nequeat"; see also Cope, p. 73.
b 18-19 [VIZ ... ' IZ6'Rj1
This presumably is the reading of the codd.;
e.g., Ross: "avTeji scripsi." It is the re.ding accepted by the edd. (save Ross,
Kassd), Spengel, Cope. On the interchange between the definite and re-

30

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

78b 23

flexive pronouns. see 60a I : 1. Ross and Kassd read avTfij which makes
the meaning in the next sentence clearer. and I would prefer it. But. if it i.
read here. it makes equally good sense to read it at b 25. as Ross does. Kassd
gives no reason for his reading at b 19. and he follows the codd. at b 25.
b 19 : 1 b..t oW o6X '1v
again the strange negative (c ']lib 18 : .).
but if we understand i"""dt,... or ~e.aC... the o~ is correct.
6).'Y"'pEi
& the conclusion to the immediatdy preceding
reason. this states that ~e.ao,...r; is dl.ywe1a. The grounds for the identity
between the two is that spite is doing deliberate harm to another with DO
other purpose than doing the harm. such action signifies in the agent with
respect to the other person a dO~a nBel TO ,..flawor;
'Pa ...,....o 78b 10.
and so dl.yweta. That such is the dOea is explained in the reason given at
78b 20-32: d~lo... sI.a~

11.,.0.

mcPjl.,v

b 20
!C. i".i... (from h.t"'!'. b 19) as subject, i.e. the person
treated spitefully. An act of spite assumes no injury nom the other person
or benefit &om him. Cope's interpretation of b 18-22 is quite diJfcrent
(see pp. 15-16) and. I bdieve. mistaken.
b 20-21 hpo~.''''O... clJ)" yWp.'
past potentials indicating here probability (S. 1784). Both verbs have as their understood object the person
spited. Haydnek:. 46!r70. considers "at otl" cll."weB' an intrusion.

av 06&~ sc. oi!T' (v".la,..pd ~o.) cb'Pel~"a.;

the potential infinitive to exprcss a likdihood or probability: "that he would
tender any benefit worthy of notice."

b 21 011..- clJ<po).jjaCl'

"for then he would take thought so as to

b 22 hppclv'l",~ ... av CoG....
be his friend." Interestingly in the Pol. 1261b 33-38. 1330a 18-20 'PeontC ...
is set in opposition to al,yweBi.. 'Ptl.r; refers to the person who shows
spite; hence the case (S. 1973).

)..Y"'''

b 23 ...0 npa......",v XClt

is the reading of the edd. Cope. Spengd.
although a number of good codd. read TO PldnT... "allu"." which seem
to be specifications of the more generic neaTn.. "all.,..... The latter
represent morc fundamentally what A. generally has in mind when he uses
iJPe.r; or "PeIC... in our text; sec, e.g. 73a 13; 74" 3. 14; 79a 29-32; 98a
25-26; 022 1-]. In these instances the action implied or stated in the word
is generally of the chatacter expressed at 79a 30-]1 - mocking. scoffing.
jeering at; and this can be done by word or action, nea..... "al
Our phrase appears to be more properly descriptive of what is meant by
hybri.s; but there is also the possibility of physical action (c 78b 14-15 : 3)
against another. for which PldnT...-lvn would be more appropriate.

1.,.....

COMMBNTAllY

31

b 24 bpi

ol~
lion account of which," i.e., nean:up Hal Aiy.!,,,; for the
meaning of J"I c ~b 22: 2, and see A 14, 7Sa 13.

"not in order that some advantage or other

b 24-2S p.i) .v.>.o
may come to the agent." On aUTq; read by the odd. (=ept Ross), Spengel,
Cope, see 711 18-19.
b 2S il a.. lyoN ..-O
"nor because something happened to him." This
is the second reason given and denied as the cause of hybris. From the very
next clause (01 rde ... ",..weOVvTa<), it is clear that the motive for the
;)/ie<~ is not retaliation, but rather the sheer delight found in the action (II""~
7juOti); cf., for example, 79a 32-33 or A 13, 74'1 I3-IS. There is another
way to interpret our phrase (b 24-'S:,..1) ... Jy"STO) mentioned byVictorius
and taken by Cope (p. 17); Freese follows it in his translation: "not to obtain
any other advantage for oneself besides the performance of the act."
b 26 "-ll""po\iV"-"1

C 78a 3I : 3.

b 27 cN"-oU~
the reading of the codd., three of the edd., Spenge!.
Cope. As such, it is the object of the participle. Ross, Kassel read aVTo[
with Richards, p. 107, who says: "aiJTo.~ has nothing to refer to." Richards
is correct, but surely the tenor of the passage pencits a constructio ad sensum
in which our word would refer to the unstated object of v/ieiCovuw.
b.8 : 1 6"'.ptX"v
The word as we have seen in its use rom A 7
on (e.g., 63b 20; 6.ja 27, b 3'; 6sa II; 71b I) denotes superiority, and often
superiority as a mark of excellence - e.g., virtue atA 9, 68a'S-26. Further,
this superiority is something all desire more or less (A II, 70b 34). In itself,
being superior does not denote excess. The insolent, however, confuse
excess, e.g., ;)/ie<~, which 'is a vice, with pre-eminence.
2 8", ... ';l3pt~ov....~
Ross alone includes this within parentheses and joins it to the preceding sentence. The other edd., Spenge!, Cope
read it as an independent sentence. From what A. says of the young (B 12)
and the wealthy (B 16) there can be seen in eacIr a drive toward a kind of
superiority (v".ellx.w) which, as it seeks to realize itself, results in what we
are told here: v/ieICoY<s~.
3 01 vEol . 7U.oUGIO'
As Plato says of Ctesippus: 8C10. /A1)
v/ieU1T1)~ d<d TO O~ BI.a<, Euthyd. 273a. As.illustrative of the following clause
in the text (b 28-29, Unseixsw ....1.) see B 12, 890 9-14. At B S, 83a 1-3
we are told that wealth is one of the things that makes one a v/ie'O"T7j~; see
B 16, 90b 32-34 and 9Ia r8-19 where the wrongdoing of wealthy men,
like that of the young (89b 7-8), is directed not by petty malice but by ins0lence, arrogance (Bi~ ii/iew). Cope's discussion, pp. 18-19, of "" .v.ClOa.,
'B""",6~ as characterizing two contrasting aspects of youthful character is

32

ARISTOTLE, ~RHBTORIC' II

78b 34

generally valid, but the rdevance to our p.....ge of Pol. 6. I I and his explanation is questionable.
b 29 G(3p""~ &. ciT."I,.
See Plato, Definitions 4100: .fI{J~.~ dd."ta ,,~o~
dnp'<Z1I cp.~'vl1a. The idea in dnp'a here must come from ciT.pac.,. (to
hold in no honor, to dishonor, i.e., not to recognize the other's honor).
In this sense it is an explanation of ol'l'w~ta as it is defined at 78b IO-13. Thus
A. is able to state at 78b 2l}-30: cl oA'yQJ~.i. Bock discusses this passage.
wishing to read it as .fI{Jesw~ ""'Ipsi D.npla. There is no need to do so.
This use of the partitive genitive is not unusual; see Bonitz, Index 149a 49,
orWaitz on Top. 121b 36. Bock's further criticism, p. 205, of his own conjecture is a misunderstanding of ""'Ipsi.o: "nonne e contrario .fIfJe'~ dTtpla~
est ""'Ip.io., quia .fI{Je'~ ex fonte dT'pta, nascitur, non dnpla" lJ{Je .,d"
b 30 ....0 yup ... ali .".

"since that which is worth nothing."

011........ KaKoG
This phrase is taken by some as specifying
,..~6.,.o~ liE ; e.g., the Roberts translation: "the unimportant for good or
evil." Others interpret it as modifying .v6.pta. 1x.. np">!_; e.g., Cooper:
"is not esteemed either for good or evil." In the context it is more correctly
taken in the second way: "that which is worth nothing receives no esteem
either for good or for evil. "

b 30-31

m.d

b 32 -1)....1"11"." ... cr(j""O~

1.356; see 9.367-369. A l'iea~ was a
mark of honor, as we saw at A 5, 61a 35. Achilles came down in history
as a man ofmany qualities, but in particular a honor.tus, as Horace, ATs poetic.
12.0-22, notes.
b 33 ~ ... p.E""<ClVa"""J'l
niad 9.648, and spoken again by Achilles at
16.59. Kassel, Freese print the first words: W"8t, the usual form found in
Homer. Cope, p. 19, refers to Pol. 1278a 34-40 where, in speaking about
the kinds of citizens, A. repeats our line and re=ks by way of explanation
that one who does not share in the honors of the State is like a metic.
"as one angered for these reasons":
b 34 : 1 cl>~ 6py.~6"",,o~
namely, the dishonor shown by Agamemnon's actions as they are cited
from Homer. Ricceur's observation (Freedom and Nature, p. 278) is to the
point: "I do Il?,t cure myself of anger without curing mysdf of excessive
self-esteem....
Z npoU1\K.'V S. olov...-a.
a general statement: "people think ...n;
on neo<1">j", see 78a 33.
3 ruMu"'p.i"S,..
It is of interest (see, e.g., the comment at 66b
7 : 1) that the instances of this word and its cognates date, apart from A.,
from the third century l!. c. on.

79a4

b 3S :

COMMENTARY
J

'IJ'n'Ovc.w

33

i.e., those who are "inferior," as the context demands;

however, see 78a 33.

2 66v.. ","
The meaning is unclear; it could mean "natural capability" as at A 6, 63a 29 or the individual's position, power, in the social,
civil structure as at A 5, 60b 27.
.... q; av ..~ . . o~ ,,,,ptxn
is the reading of Ross, Kassel. The
other edd., Spengd read: b <Ii d. Tawa; Spengel notes the acceptability of
aUro" but conjectures T"; Cope reads: b <Ii II. TaUrep. The codd. are
unclear. I prefer the above reading because it continues in a clear way the
argument from superiority begun at 78b 26 and continued to 79a 6 (~"'I!0X'f').
I cannot see, as Cope, p. 20, does (and some of the translations; e.g., Roberts,
Cooper) that the genitives in 79a 2-4 (""'ITO" c!d""aTo~, c!e"o"...o~, c!Elo~)
are governed by an understood olona, ,,0.tVWeB'C76a, ;;"0 (78b 34). It is
more obvious that they are governed by an understood ;;"'I!II".. both from
the sense of the passage and &om the close articulation between
;;"sesX1J and oZov b (793 rfE). I have since noticed that Vahlen (Schriften,
II 626), although speaking of something clse, understands ,J"ses"s, here.
It is the sense of superiority which will not tolerate the slight, and so
demands respect and honor. In short, "ai 6.tw, b <Ii .. dEto~ is a clause
subordinate to a repetition of the main statement: ne0<N7"'" olOVTa, "o.tv ....
e"<l6a, (78b 34): in whatever one is markedly superior one thinks it naturally
proper to be held in esteem; e.g., "and in general men think it proper that
they be held in high esteem in whatever they are distinctly superior, as, for
example, in wealth the rich man is superior to the poor man, in speaking
the fluent speaker to the one unable ..."

79'1 I

s. .;;

a 2 Pll"OP'xo~
set in opposition to d6vvaTov ;. "one skilled in speaking"
as we see the word used by Plato in the PhaeJrus 2.39a, 260" 272.d, or (as
Victorius notes) by Isocrates in To Nicocles, or the Cyprians 8: TO'k S, Tep
n.lojOs, My ... 6""a".i.o~,. The article is omitted in this enumeration save
in the mt and last instances (6 ".lovalO'; TOO dEto~) where the generic
article gives the classification for all the abstracts; on the generic article, see
Gildersleeve, II 565-,]0.
a 3 ot6","o~
read by the edd., Spengel, Cope but secluded by Ross.
The construction: 016".,,0, (sl.a,) M'o, de"..' (;;"sesx") TOO dElo~ de"s<lBa,.
a 4 8u"o~ ... ~a'"A>'I'''''
Iliad 2.196. The reading of our text is that
found in the OCT edition of Munro and Allen where our Rhetoric text is
cited as one of the authorities for the line, together with the edition of Zenodotus. This is of interest since in the past the genuineness of Aristotelian
authorship of the passage has been questioned on the basis of our citation,

ARISTOTLE, '::aBETORIC' II

34
e.g., Roemer, Marx.
editions of Homer.

79a

10

The singular, d.OTee'l'io, pac").;;o,, i$ found in many

Iliad I.8a. We find 8I-8a cited by Diogenes

a 5 cUM ... XoKOV
Laert:ius in his life of Zeno tht SI!Jic 7.II4 to exemplify the meaning of 1';;..,.
Both citations from the Iliad read in their context indicate in Agamemnon,
the",!gry ont,_a sense,ofboing highly superior (e.g., 1.91) or, as A. says at
a 6: ayavmeTova& . .. vneeomv.

.r....

a 6 l .., u'P'
It seems more reasonable to take this as. further reason
why men "!!0cn1"'" OrO>Ta. "0).UOle"a8a, (78b 34). The first reason is
their .ense of being superior; the second, their sense of justice, of what is
owed to them. When either is denied they fed slighted, and so become angry.
Thus I would read it: in ("eocn1"'" oio.Ta. "O).VOle aBa. v"d TO.lT.,.) V'I"
eli. "d.: "Further, men think that they should be treated with attention
by those at whose hands one thinks one deserves good treatment." There is
possibility of repeating dyaoa><Toiia., or understanding dtn'ICO>Ta, : in (dl'a.a><Toiial T.a,) tlrp' "d. But I find it difficult insofar as we are talking about
forms of d).'l'we1a (which occasion anger), not about anger.

.u

a7
"d"X~,v &.iv
On this and the following, CA II, 71. 35 -7Ib 2;
14, 75' 14-15. These passages help one to understand the force of our aei.
Conferring a benefit on someone as is the case here (79& 7-8: oJTO .. lpou).+
0.,,) gives the donor a sense of superiority (CA II, 71b I: Td 6l ... v"'eix''')'
This places the recipient in the class of those mentioned at 78b 34-35 (~T
TO .,.) who should in this instance at least return a good for good. Further,
as the note at 6sa 37 - 6Sh 8 indicates, ij "olEi. requires some effort on the
part of the agent, and so once again the agent would justifiably expect esteem
not disregard.
a 8:

mOi

is the reading of four edd., Cope. Spengd, Kassd read

II amo,; it is found in a good cod. and I see no reason against it.

2 &,' ClUTOv
ie., at his instigation, and so he is the ultimate cause

of the good.
3 1\ [3Wl....Cl' . . o[3ou}.1\8'1
a continuation of the rdative clause
oJ, .J, and so understand eO
"intends or has intended to ... " While
intention is not the same as act, it reveals the attitude of bellBvo!entia in the
person.

"0'.'>:

a 9-10 CPUVEPc.v... TCoill

a 9 ij&'1

c 78a 23-25.

"now"; on meaning, see 54b 7.

a 10 Clu'1:01
We begin here an analysis of ".;;, Telxovn" 9 (see outline
of chapter). The first characteristic of the angry person is that he is in pain
of some sort (Ge'." I'e.al';"."" 78. 31). Pain is present with anger, but it

7~ II

COMMENTARY

3S

is not anger (e.g., Top. 126a 6-12). From the analysis which follows in our
text the pain meant is that which accompanies personal deprivation or the
frustration of one's desires.
a II bpI....., ... ).u"cNl-''''o~
Some sense of the fOrce in IrpleTa, here
can be found in A S, 6ra 2S-27, 37-39, 6Ib 1-2: lIlIDlOly, the desire for that
which is seen as a good fOr the person. The concern in our passage, ~ IO-27,
is to determine the disposition of those who become angry. We are told that
the disposition is one of pain, distress (lvn.;ma,), along with which there
is the presence of desire (IrpleTa, d A_OUP"'O;); see Top. 126a !rIO. At B
7, 8sa 21-22 A. says appetites are wants, and particularly appetites accompanied by pain for what is absent. Pain is seen as something evil and so to
be avoided, evil either absolutely, or in some respect as an impediment to
one's activity (EN IIS3b 1-3; and cf. De .n. 43Ia 8-14). Since one desires
not evil but the good (A 6, 62a 21-29; EN II72b 36), and since pain is seen
as evil, the person must be desiring its opposite, which is pleasure (A II,
69b 35, 70a 17) and a good (62b 6). Descartes observes, in article 87 of his
"Treatise on the Passions": "[Desire] is always an identical movement which
malees fOr the search atter good, and at the same time for the avoidance of the
evil which is contrary to it," and A. in effect says the same thing atA Io,69b 2328. And so if there is pain present accompanied by a desire for the good (and
desire bas to do with the pleasant and painful, EN IIub I6-r7), then the
disposition of the angry man is that of someone not obtaining a good which
he desires and consequently experiencing pain, as A. says well at 8ra 6-8.
That which frustrates the desire, as we see, is external, and can be intentional
or accidental (79" U-2S). This frustrated desire brings on the anger; see,
fOr- example, Top. usb 28-34 where in part A. says: ''The angry man experiences pain because the pain occun within him prior to the anger; for the
anger is not the cause of the pain, but the pain is the cause of the anger, and
so anger quite simply is not pain." Since the original desire is not realized,
the 1Wnj remains and is present with the new desire for retaliation, which
is called the state of anger, 78a 31: GeB.'; peTa. 1u"'1; np"'eiar; rpawopi"'1;.
Since 1u"'1, which is a concomitant of anger, is important to what follows
and also to anger, some understanding of it is necessary and may be found in
what A. has already told us of its opposite, pleasure, atA II, 69b33 -7O"Sa statement I find acceptable, as noted in 6!1b 33- At 69b 331. we find a relation
between man's natural state and pleasure: lIlIDlOly, what is productive of
man's natural state produces pleasure, and any activity by man in accord
with the natural state is pleasant. Pleasure is somehow related to activity
in accord with, leading to, the natural state. We were already told that
pleasure is a good and that all men desire the good (A 6, 62b 6, 62a 21-26),
and so we know that its opposite, pain, is an evil and something man desires

79a 13

AB,ISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' [[

to flee from; i.e. it is not desired. a point which he makes at 8ra c5-8. From
what A. tells us in our present passage (790 10-25) pain accompanies the
disposition to anger because the penon is desiring something. a desire which
he immediately goes on to say at 79' II-IS is being frustrated. When we look
at the desires A. sets down in 79' I2r-I7. we find that they are desires for
what would restore the individual to his natural state; cpo II II. 70a 18-27.
The objects. then. of these desires are good. or are seen as good for himself by
the individual. and each is being thwarted. The frustration of the desire
results in 16m/ and with it a desire for retaliation - or what A. calls anger and it is directed at those who block the desire (e.g. 79a IS: ",ja deriCBTa.).
a II-IS
olav ... eM. "d.
The connection develops out of ltpiBTai
T'V." the person has a desire for something that is not being realized since
he is experiencing A';"'1. "Consequently if anyone places any direct obstacle
in any respeet to a thirsty man. for example, with ""'peet to drink. or thwarts
him indirectly - and in doing this he appears to engage in exactly the same
kind of action - or if he opposes him or does not cooperate with him or
causes him any other annoyance when he is in such a state. the individual is
angry with all such persons."
a u a... ,oGv
Cpo a 14 (<fAA. TI). This is the reading of the edd. Spengel.
Cope. Kassel conjectures <ned,> 0......... and we find it in the next clause:
.l.v . . ",e'.. It is possible; I do not see it as necessary. On "iv.,. see 70b
18: 3.
a 12r-I3 4av "' IL-q
sc. ,;aT' efJO"eiav dVT'''eO';''11. Cope. p. 2.1. has a
note on HaT' e!lO"eiav explaining its meaning and illustrating its use in A.
The Greek commentator Anonymus takes ,;,.,.illl' with itlv Te ,.,.q. I follow
the punctuation of the edd.; c below. The methodology of analysis which
begins here and is continued with all the emotions i, that of the 'pecial topics
(on which see 58a 17 : '. 59b 25-32. COMMENTARY I 354-55) proper to
each emotion and viewed usually under the threefold division set out at
78a 23-25.
a 13 61L0[c"S ... 7COL'V
"He appears to be doing exactly the same
thing"; i.e.. to one in such a condition even indirect opposition is viewed
simply a' opposition. Kassel alone of the edd. secludes the clause as a "verkehrtes Interpretament" (Der Text. p. 132); 0,.,0/." with Tml...O could. but
need not, be considered redundant.

",d

a 13-14
olciv lvOX>.jj
There.are two kinds of opposition, direct
and indirect. The indirect is shown by failing to cooperate with. by disregarding or dismissing the other penon', desire
avp"eaTTTI). or by
being a source of annoyance or trouble (~v.X1tfJ. Both are typical of the
forms of dA'r"ela at 78b 10-2.8; see A.'s comment at 790 1']-18. The reaction

"'Ii

79a 17

COMMENTARY

37

of the Pompeians to the Romans who showed such indirect opposition to

them by remaining in Rome is clear: "numero hostium habebantur," Cicero,
Epp. ad Alt. II.6.6.
a 14-15

oG_~ lxov",..

"one so disposed," i.e.,Il'l'.eI'." n.o~;C 79" II.

a IS < ....)"Ep.oiiv'<E~>
a conjecture of Bekker's accepted by four edd.,
Spengd, Cope; see 79a 19. Kassd secludes the whole passage a IS-I8 (do.
oAoy"e06'Ta~); see Der Text, p. 132. Schneider, p. 56, would agree with him.
I find the articulation of the whole reasonable, and the form it takes is found
elsewhere (e.g., 73b 18-24), e.g., (a) statement (a 10-15), (b) general illustration introduced by 60. (a 15-18), (c) followed by a particular illustration
(a 18-23: ala... "d.6ou~~

...),

a 16 : 1 6""'~ b,,8up.oUvd~ "" "in a word everyone desiring"; cpo A

12, 73a 17 ("I 8A"~ ne.~
79b 18 and note. T' is read by the edd. except
Ross; Spengd reads it, Cope does not.
2
p.iJ " ....op8oGv"'.~ Whether it is taken transitivdy or intransitivdy,
we must understand IlnrIJul'la with this verb. Par example, transitivdy:
"and not bringing it [1,,060I'lo.] to a successful issue."
a 17 : 1 cipy[)"o, ... " ..t
As we see from EN IIa8a 4--9, II2sb 29 11260 21, and A 9, 67a 37 (deytAov Hal TO. pav,....) and A la, 69a 9, the
dey tAo, is easily angered. Thus I would interpret the "at as linking the
two as in apposition: "are irascible, that is, easily angered"; see Bonitz, Index
3S?b 131[, S. 2869a.
2 [p.tv]
Roemer (but see his appar. erit., s. 21, for his reasons),
Dufour, Tovar, Ross read the word. Kassd, Spengd, Cope do not. It
has good text evidence, but I would prefer not to read it. Certainly, as
pda"na has been used in the first book, its presence by itsdf would be quite
justifiable here, namdy, to single out some one thing. See, e.g., A 9 66b
8 (typical of the usage between 54" and 66b), 68a II, 32; II, 70" 4. 7Ib 18;
12, 72a II. If the particle is read, I would not take it as tying our clause to
79" 21-22 (d 6A . .. n,) as Roemer suggests. In the first place, the paralld
passages of Roemer indicate a much closer conjunction of pd.}.,cna pA..1 1'>1 in the text than we have here. Secondly, if we read the <.1 ...
n,> clause at 79a 21-22, we find that &I'0t." 6. Hat at 79a 20 introduces
either redundancy or confusion. Finally, reading the <Bi ......,~> clause
brings to the fore an idea (i.e., daoycoeta) which is subordinate to the thought
devdopment here; C 79" 18. At ItlO5t I would take the particle as pi-. solitarium (S. 2896) in which the contrast is understood: e.g., those who are in any
way in pain ate easily roused to anger, particularly so if one makes little
of their present condition; [but even without that] the sick man, for example,
is easily roused to anger, etc.

a.

ARISTOTLE, 'llBBTORlC' II

3S

79'l 22

otov xp.,,,.,,, ,...1.

Cpo A 10, 6sb 16-1S
This is commonly interpreted (Cope, the translators) to mean: (Oer/AO' 6,"1) T01, (aolTOV OA'l''''eOVCTL) "ed, nlv vOct... If this
is so, then the interpretation of 79'l 20-:U, &,.0/"" . . ruo., - e.g., Cope,
p. 22: "and so for all the rest") - must mean: men are angry in all other
instances in which they are slighted. There are some difficulties with such an
interpretation. (a) It assumes that the particularizing phrase (,.aA.I1Ta
OA'l''''eoiivTa" a 17-1S) is the substantive idea in this section, 79a 9-2.7, which
it is not. 11,e main idea is stated at 79a to-II (aolTol ,.A ... AtmO",.o,),
and has to do with conditions in which men experience A1lm1 and thus anger;
c "d/Jov" 79a 23 (misfortune, disaster). (b) The interpretation must find its
support in a clause whicl, is duhious, 79a 21-2.2 <61 dA n,>, and which
.ppears to be a gloss made to explain such an interpretation. More correctly,
TO" "eo' (for parallel usage see 6sb 1 : 1: Ta ned, dl'!O.tav TOW ned, M~a.)
is to be interpreted, I believe. as a dative of cause in each instance, i.e., ofo.
"ap'JIllJv lIB'll (SOTt. o(rylloc) Tot, ne~' "TA.: "as, for example, the sick man is
angered because of m.tters related to his sickness, the poor man because of
matters rel.ted to his poverty, the military man because of matters related to
war, the lover because of matters related to love, and similarly in other misfortunes." The whole passage then, 79' 15-21 (610 ...LUol,), relates
directly and reasonably to 79' 22.-23 ("eo",dO"O/'!TRI .. "d80v,): "for each
individual has been predisposed to his personal anger by the misfortune
present to him at the moment." Kassel, Der Text, pp. 132, interprets the
passage clliferently but is aware, it would seem, of the difficulties in the common interpretation.
a IS :

..oie; "'PD~

a 20-21 bp.ou..~ tiE "",[

"and sirnilarly also in other misfortunes" (c
"d/J.I1~ 23); the phrase has been used in various ways but with the same
basic meaning found .t 68a IS : 2; c SSb 30, 5Sb 3S, 59' 25, 6,. 7, 6Sa IS,
6sb 23, 69a 15-16, 7<P '7.
a 21-22 [EI 6......,~)
read by four of the edd.; Roemer brought it
into the text from the Vetus Translatio. Kassel, Spengel, Cope do not read it.
I believe that it should be secluded or dropped for the reason given in 79B IS.
Schneider, p. 56, suspects that its appearance in the Vetus Translatio and
in the Arabic version of the Rhetoric derives from a marginal comment.
The dause is translated in the Roberts translation as "any other sort of slight
being enougb if special slights are wanting." 11,e same addition in the Arabic
version is translated by Margoliouth, p. 3 So, as "And if there be none of this,
then some other things sudI as anyone [literally, "the despiser") despises."
a 22 "'po...~o"'ol'l ....,
read by Spenge~ Cope, and the edd., except
Ross, who reads neOOdOnOl6rTal for our perfect middle passive, variant

COMMBNTARY

39

which, as Kassel remarks, is found in De part. an. 6sob 28, 6sIb 10, De gen.
an. :nob 3. The metaphor vividly captures the way in which the feelings
in each instance (sickness, poverty, etc.) prepare the way for anger; see S4& 8.
a 22.-2S l-<, &' &!tv . a lloUl.E'tIl'
I would agree with Spengel that
this refers back to ']9a Io-II and is a further explanation (i.e., 79a 22.-2S with
']9a II-IS) for the statement there (and see ']9a 6). "Further, if a man happened to expect the opposite"; "the expectation of something else" would
seem to be a mark that in the man's MEa there is also present an affective
element of desiring something else. This appears to be the point of the following clause (<Il''''.e .. povABTa.) in which A. explains what he means
by "aea MEa>. See 81a 6Jf.
a 23-24 d "oAu "lIpci &6~lIv
what one expected.

i.e., what is sub.tantially contrary to

a 2S-26 "'PII' ... ~A'X[II'.

Cpo A 7, 6sa 20-21; 9, 68a 12.-13. <Ilea
usually, and also in A., means one of the seasons of the year. It also came to
mean the fittiog time or period (somewhat like "a'eo,; c 6sa 20 : J), which
would be attractive here. A a,,16.al, (c Cill. 8b 27 - 9a 13, 64& 32) signifies
disposition, which in contrast to lEI" is changeable, impermanent: "And so,
then, it is clear from the above of what sort are the right moments, the times,
the dispositions, the conditions of age which easily yield to anger, and under
what conditions, and when." Spengel, p. 214, interpretll the lines differendy,
taking ",oLal with ljA,,</al alone, ",ov as referring to ala6ia" "on to
cLeal, xeo.o.. But it does appear that all three apply to each of the nouns.
As for the general validity of a 2S-27, we can say from what has preceded
in the chapter that this large statement is realized in a general way for each
of the instances mentioned, but not in the specific detail to which we have
been accustomed from the fdth chapter of the first book on when such a
sentence of summation is used. Seneca, De ira 3.9.4-S rcJIectlI A.'s analysis:
" ... for the same reason to be sure those overcome with bad health or age
are more irascible. Hunger and thirst are to be avoided for the same reasons:
they provoke and irritate the mind. An old saying has it that a tired man
picks a quarrel; the same is also true of the hungry and the thirsty man and
of everyone irritated by something or other. For just as bodily sores grow
painful at the slightest touch, and then even at the suggestion of a touch, so,
too, the troubled mind is distressed by the slightest of things so that a greetiog,
a letter, a speeel>, a query provokes a dispute: sore spots are never disturbed
without grumbling."
is the reading of foor edd., Spengel. Kassel, Cope
a 27 : J XIII k.
read "al OTI IITS. The evidence for both readings is good.

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

2 ~ov... lI-ii>.J.ov

",d

79a 33

probably understand TO;; dio .....o, with

dIe first !',UAov: "when they are more caught up in these conditions than
is needful they are even more easily moved to anger."
J lv '<OUTO'~
i.e., the instances just mentioned at a 25-27 which
in turn refer to the body of the analysis which precedes, i.e., 79a IOIE
oG"nd~ ExOVT.~
responds to 79a 9, neil. TB 'xo.Te'; we now take
up the second division of 79a 10: Ti<1" dI!Y1C OVTa.

a 28

a 29-31 6pyll;ov.... , ... yelp

The first persons mentioned are those
...bose actions are acts of ~Pe'.; cf. 78b 23-26. The three verbs are more
or less synonymous in their general significance: to laugh scornfully at,
mock, deride, jeer at another. The sense of superiority which they convey
can be seen in Plato, Euthyphro 3c ("aT..,.e"ci')' The.ga I2se (<1"OO=e ..),
Demosthenes, On the False Embassy 23 (xAevdCe ..). Apart from the statement
at Top. 144" 6-8 that xAeva<1ta is a species of IJPe'" and the indication at
.EN I128a 4-30 that <1"OO=e.. can be used in a good and bad sense, and in
the bad sense causes pain and is a "o,dOe'1!,d n, A. does not discriminate among
the meanings. Cope, p. 28, makes an effort to do so. From his comment on
the charges of Meletus (Apol. 260) Socrates saw them as acts of hybris.

Ross alone includes this in parentheses and

a 3I : 1 6j!p(~oucr, yelp.
punctuates with a comma after it. The other edd., Spengel, Cope omit the
parentheses and punctuate with a period. They also end the next sentence
with a period after <1'1!,e'a (Ross, a colon). I consider the punctuation of the
edd. more Correct and the reason is given in 79a 32 : 2.
2 ..o;:~ ... j!AcI"..oucr,v
"at th",e who commit the kind of injuries as are, each and everyone [U<1a], the signs of wiI1fu1 insult"; this is another
class at whom anger is directed.
I
'"111-;:"
C 57b I : 2; "E'1!"'''''' 390.
2 TO'CIlk...tv.. ,
To,aVTa would appear to refer to a 31-32 ("al
TO'. <1'1!,B,a), and to explain (''1lut it is necessary that sncb acts be th",e
which .. .'1 when sncb actions constitute {JPe'" i.e., when they have no
purpose save the gratification of the doer. See, e.g., 78b 23-25.
J a
sc. I<1Tt: "which are neither retaliatory nor useful to those
who do them [ToE, notovaw]."

a 32 :

a 33 i\6'1 ... Gj!p'v

This is commonly taken to mean: "for only
then will they be felt to be due to insolence" (Roberts translation) or "for
when this is the case ... , then (and not till then) are they thought to be due
to a wanton ... intention to offend" (Cope, p. 25). I believe that it would
be more correct to interpret: "For, in fact, actions of this sort are held to
be done [do" elva.] from hybris." A. has just told us that the actions he

COMMENTARY

41

has put forward must have the qualities which are identified with hybris in
his defmition (eE 7')a 32 : a), and in OUI sentence he draws the conclusion:
for such are held to be hybristic acts; on ild'l, see 541> 7.
a 34 nit; ... XClTtUppOVOUaL
se. oeylCov-r:a, (79a 29)i another class
of people with whom men grow angry. On "aTa'l'eoPBiv, see 7sb IS-I6,
78& I4-1S : I.
Air." is to speak ill of, to revile. The understood
object (TaVTa) of the verbs is the antecedent of the following relative clause,
nse1 0011.

"a,,';;,

a 3S : 1 crn""6ci~auc,,v
as osed at A II, 7ra 3; see also Soa 2S-27.
It indicates, as does the following 'l'IloTl,..ov,.. ..ol (eager for honor), the
serious concern of the individuals for the objects mentioned as things of
major importance to them.
2 t ..l <pt>.o""'l'I~
'l'Ilon,...iu6al int = to take glory in, pride
oneself for.
3 ickv ... <pt>.O""'l'I..v
The condition is present general, e.g.,
ea. TI, '"',,,,,;;, Ail'T/, ""Ta9'e6"l1); el" "with reference to, with respect to,
in regard to"; LS, .1" N; eE also 7')a 36; 81, ... Idea.
a 36 160'1'
In A. the word commonly means form, shape, figure. It is
not unusual to interpret it as beauty; see, e.g., Plato, Protag. 3Ise. Thus
Dufout, Tovar translate Out passage; in the English translations it becomes
"their appearance."
a37: 1 inl....."
4, 64b 16-17.
2

of ,..71

il....

....

"in the case of"; eE LS, b,t, A.i.2; cpo A 9, 6Sa IS-I9;

refen to the qualities just mentioned ana is the subject

1lnciex...
3

..o)J.ij> p.iiAlov

sc. OertCOVTal of a 29-30.

the reading of the codd., three edd., Spenge!, Cope.

a 3S : 1 "U"D~
Ross and Kasse! read atlToi,; on the interchange of the personal and reflexive pronouns, cf. 60a I : 1.
2 i\ 6Aw~ ... SOX.LV
i.e., if they suspect that the qualities are
not in their possession: "either in general, or in any effective way, or do not
appear (to others) to be present."
79h I : 1

D<pop6.. or.""....,

whenever men "are of the very firm

conviction. n
2 un.pix.'v
is the reading of the edd. with Roemer whose
conjecture makes sense. Spenge!, Cope have the reading of all the codd.,
1lnciex'''' which has created difficulty; see, e.g., Cope, p. 26.

& 2 "DL~ <p().D'~

another group with whom men grow angry. On
'l'tlo" see A s, 6Ib 35-37 andB 4 which explain why men consider it neo<1-

AllISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

01""7 to fare wdl at the hands of friends. A friend is clearly of the class
TOV ol',,"'e8i. "'", neOm/"O.TO" 78a 33. A. puts the idea in another way
at Pol. 1327b 40 - 1328a 16 in a reference to Plato's TO Ov",oB.Mr;, the
part of the soul that is the seat of indignation, resentment, and anger, among
other feelings. There he suggests the possibility that Ov",o, is the faculty
of the soul by which we love because it is aroused more readily against those
who are loved, i.e., friends, than against those we do not know: "when one
thinks himsdf slighted his 8v",o, is more aroused against acquaintances
and friends than against strangers"; see also Pl.to, Laws 717d.
The word, as we saw it atA II, 7Da 6--9, indicates
b 4 ""oil; EI8".fLEv0'~
that which is an habitual way of .cting on the part of an individual, his typical.
characteristic way. Change in such a manner of acting toward another is
sufficient in itsdf to raise questions as to the reasons why. and A. says as
much at 79b 5--6: unless there was a reason such. person would presumably
act as always: l'aVTa &11 no,er" (oio"Tat), b 6.
6Ib 2;

II.

T,,,,ii..

Ii <ppov""I~.'"
On the ide. in
see A 5. 6,. 287Ia 8-17; tp(}onlCe1l, as at 79b 2, i.e., have a care for, give thought

b 4-5 ""'fLiiv

to. pay .ttention to.

b 5 iv ... 0fLw;,<n"
"if, reversing themselves. they do not deal
with them in the same way"; the idea in ,,&l.. of turning back on. going
contrariwise. is experienced partly in d,e verb, e.g., dealing with them in the
opposite way.
b 6 : 1 oiov"".. , K""<CZ<ppovEiae."
The reason for this is given indirectly at 78b 29-3 I: the absence of the u.ual honorable regard is interpreted
to mean a positive act of dishonor which is a form of slighting and specifically
here "a.Ta'Peo,,,,,,,; thus. the anger. Because one has been honored regularly,
and is honored no longer. the cessation is viewed as i<aTa.'PeO.""" since it is
valid to say of men in general: 6,,11. "ae olo.Ta. ",,,6.,,0, ~,a, TOOT... "aTa'Peo,OV"", 78b 15-16.
..
""~~, ycip
sc.. (olo.Ta. aVToor;) d. "0"'>; explanatory "fie:
for otherwise ; see Denmston. p. 62..
b 7 : 1 cl.""",,,,o....ua,,, a;
Le., confer benefits in return. We saw the
verb at 78b 25. W "01S'" "&"X'" has been seen a number of times in the
fust book. e.g. atA 7. 65b 2-5; 14. 75a 14-15. etc. In fact, in the last passage,
speaking of injustice (d6",.a) A. says that not to return a good to a benefactor
is a form of injustice; see also 79a 6-8 (In ... dpovlf}o,,). In the Gorgias
5200 7-10 Soctates says that certain good deeds inspire a desire on the part
of the beneficiary to make a return (a'T' tV ,.olSi.) so that it is fairly sure
that if one does such good deed he will in tum receive back good deed.
On this topic. see 79b 30.

79b 14

COMMBNTAB,Y

43

T'l)v ('"I"
Cope, p. 1.7, suggests that poieav is understood and
gives evidence for his reason. Granted that A. uses the neuter when he uses
the word alone, e.g., at 84" I1., I do not see why the foIUl here cannot stand
alone to signify equality; see, e.g., Demosthenes, On the Peace 17: ow.
tixe' ri'j, 1'"1" The kind of equality would come from the sentence, e.g.,
"those who do not repay \vith a comparable benefit." If the word is used
adjectivally it would seem that x~" (79b 30), W"(!y""tav, rather than
p0ieav, would be understood.
2

If this passage is to be interpreted

as it generally is, and as was first mentioned by the scholiast, then the punctuation must be watched. The scholiast's interpretation makes sense since
a reason for the anger experienced has been given in each instance from
79a 30 on; our sentence gives a reason for the anger fdt in the two instances
at 79b 6-JJ (xal TO" ... dVTanod,do;;"..) and 79b 7-8 (xul TO', .
Therefore a colon after both w",v, b 8, and dVTtmod.do;;".., b 7, makes
more sense if we are to extend the reason -at 79b 8-IO to both sentences, as
everyone does.
oC TO.OWO. (79b 9) refers then to those who do not
return benefits, or who do so inadequately, as well as to those who, though
inferiors, oppose one. The form their xaTa<peWrJ"" takes is that the latter
(DC p"", b 9) in opposing others appear to look down on them as inferiors,
while the former (oC di, b 9) in making no return ofbencfits appear to despise
as inferiors their benefactors (on the usc of oC
oC 6i here see 62a 36-37).
A reIIection on the actions in each instance will reveal that the interpretation
given to them by the angered person is reasonable and justified.
b 8-ro " ...."'Ppoviv .. -Ij....av...v

w"..).

,.".Te,

p"" -

rpeopel" rpal1l0'PTa&.
2 AOy",
"of no account"; LS, lOyo" 1.4sc. deytCO.Ta,; c 79b '-7.
e.g., 78a 31-33; "for the anger caused by slight is,
in our assumption, directed against those who do not properly have the right
to slight."
3 OA'Y"'pU.~
an objective genitive: "anger caused by slight";
c S. 1331..

II : 1

p.iiAAov

6,,01,,......

1 p.-li "pocnj"ov..~
sc. &l'YWeB'v; c 78a 32.-33.
n:poa'lj"., ... 6A'Y"'pe'iv.
There should b. a period after &l,"wee,v (see Spengel, Cope, Kassd), not a colon as read by the edd. It should
be clear from the explanation of dl.yweta at 7sb 10-13 that, naturally speaking, one is not entitled to demean someone better endowed than oneself in
the very thing which is attacked.

I1. :

b 14 "f1ivllvd..

sc.

Ail'''''''' ij no"ii" ...

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTOR1C' II

44

b IS c.......p ... Mu.....yp'l'

The story to which A. probably refers is
told by Diodorus Siculus 4.34.1-6 and Ovid in Metam. 8.420-444, and given
more briefly by the schoJiast: Plexippus, the maternal uncle of Meleager,
remonstrated with the young mao for giving his trophy, the skin of the
Calydonian boar which he had killed, to Atalanta with whom he was in
love. Meleager, insensible, apparendy, to what his uncle considered his
rightful claims, aroused the anger of Plexippus (llAoioumo, [cleylCsTa,] T.p
MeA.dYe'!'). On Meleager, a subject in both epic and drama, see OeD, PW.
The identity of the playwright, Antiphon, is another matter. Athenaeus,
Deipnosophist.. I S.673e-f speaks of Antiphon, 0 Teay,!,d,ono,." and of a
character in his play called Plexippus. This is identified by Nauck & Snell,
p. 79Z, as the play Meleager, and they refer both to our passage and to a later
reference in the Rhetoric, B 99b 2S-28 as instances from the play. Meineke,
I ]I S- r6, in his discussion of the comic poet Antiphanes (see OCD) to
whom Pollux, IO.73 acribes a play Mele.ger, also considers both the Aristode
and the Athenaeus citations to refer to the tragic poet Antiphon. It is most
likely this poet who lived at the court of Dionysius the Elder (ca. 43<>-367
B.C.) and was put to death by the tyrant (Plutarch, De Stoic. repugn. IOSld;
Philostratus, Lives of the Sophists, 499-S00; PW, "Antiphon" 12 and "Meleagros" 4SS.63). At 8sa 9-13 there is a mention of the death of an Antiphon;
see 8sa 9 : z.
b 16 6)',Y"'p{~", '"I....iov
If a friend is defined as "one who for
the sake of the other brings about that good which he considers to be good
for the other," A s, 61b 36-37 (and see 80b 3S - 81a I, and 6Ib 37 : I), it is
clear that such neglect (T~ p;, al..M.B..Ba,) is in itself an indication of ciA.y.,.
ela. 10 fact, in the very next clause, A. underlines this sign character of such
neglect by saying that "the needs of those for whom we have regard [i.e.,
even those who are not necessarily our' friends] do not escape our notice."
I interpret an understood Ta a.oplrlla TOVTO,. as the subject of o~ Aav9d
at b 17 since this seems to be clearly the thought A. is developing in b 14-17.
6A .., (0 A 6, 62b 34; 7, 63b 2S; 9,
b 18 "IIEl ilAw~ E68up.oup.E"o~
68a 26; cpo 79R 16 : 1) sums up this whole class as any and all who remain
cheerfu at another's misfOrtunes.

.Ii"

b 20
)'umj""'Ir'V
The unconcern in this regard (which is an active
disposition, e.g., p;, 'Peo.TlCov ....) on the part of those who cause the pain
is an affront, and an indication of their. dA.ymeia. The illustration of this
which follows (a.d ... cleyiCo.Ta.) would be true only where the bringer
of bad news manifests the same disposition. 10 other words, if the anger is
to be justifiable, there must be an element of dA.yweia in the action, as the
analysis of each class with whom men become angry indicates; see, e.g.,

COMMENTARY

4S

79a 3Ion. Thus I believe that the illustration is memt to say that men spontaneously assume such disregard when anyone causes them plrin. For the
individual consciously or otherwise associates the pm with deliberate intent
to fruslr.lte, and so an attitude of o).'YOJela on the other person's part; c
79a la-IS (aVToi ... deyiCeTa.). Thus anything, even the conveyance of bad
news (which in the best of circumstances is usually TO "o).,} naea MEa.,
79a 23-24), triggers anger. On the idea in a ... deylCona., c Sophocles,
Antig. 277 (tn'eye. yae otldel~ ayyeAov "a"Oi. mOi.), Aeschylus, Perr. 2S3,
Demosthenes, 01. 3.21.

b 21 aXOUOUGL . OECi) ....iv(u'it

i.e., lito listen toU; lito look at as at a
spectacle." The implication in the context (e.g., b 22: o).,y"'eo;;u" II '%8eoi~;
and b 23-24, see note) is that both are done maliciously and with pleasure.
That which is 'Pavlov is generally in A. anything opposed to what is good,
reputable, worthy of attention, signUicant. Here it seems best taken as "weaknesses, faults, wrongs"; see, for example, 8Ib 29. The object of both verb. is
Ta tpavla; nee;' aVTow = "concerning them.JI
h 22-23 ot yl&p ... CNvllAyoiio,v
is the explanation of why they
are like A:c8eoi; see, for example, 8Ib 7-<).

a.

b 23-24 8..:.",",,0' &l ... c!<Jo.yoiio,v

The
is resumptive. The point
of this general reflection seems to be to confirm. the hostile nature of the
action of b 21: the instinctive reaction of any person to his own personal
faults, failures, wrongs is one of pain. and so those who are activdy concerned
with the failings of another as objects of curiosity are acting unn.tura1ly
and reveaIing themsdves as ill-disposed to that person.
"in the presence of five class.. of people." It is
b 24 : J "po~ "tv....
more reasonable to take ne&~ as "in the presence of" (LS, C.I.7) than "with
reference to, in respect O" Aside from the fact that it is difficult to grasp
how one "slights someone in respect of any person," A. makes his point at
b 27 by the phrase b TOUTO., alLY"'eii.
2 ",po~ 06~ <pu.....,fLo\iv.".. ,
C 84" 28, 32, 88a 8 (bis), Plato,
Symp. I78e where the expression "ed~ ... 'PMOT''''''u8a. means to "be a
rival of someone." Taken in this sense, with "ed, "ins (T'vci~) as the general
antecedent, the four rdative clauses have their own rdative pronoun introduced by the second ne&~, and at b 2S [ne6~1 is rightly bracketed by the
edd. (Cope alone reads it): "further, they are angered at those who slight
them in the presence of five groups of people: in the presence of those whose
rivals they are, whom they admire, whose admiration they wish, or whom
they respect, or among those who respect them." Cpo 'PLlon,..ov,..evo. mi,
79' 3S

79b 31

.ARISTOTLE, IRHB'I'ORIC ' II

b 26 : J otl~ "lCJ)(Uvouv'r'"
LS, alax"" B.IL3: "to feel shame in the
presence of a person," ie., U to stand in awe of, to reverence, the person."
We see this use at Soa 32, Sob I (and in the noun at sob 3" where it carries
the meaning of al~w" reverence, awe, respect). See Euripides, Ion 1074I07S, 934. Sophocles, philoctetes I3S", and Cope, p. 30, for further instances.
This is not a meaning we find in the word when we meet it in the first book
or, for the most part, in B 6 whete he discusses alaxUv.j; but cf. S43 27.
2 ij Ev 'ro;:~ "tCJ)(UV0l'EYO'~
The constroction is suddenly changed;
the relative clause is put aside for a prepositional phrase; see 79b "4 : 2 for
the translation. If anything is to be undetstood with this phrase, it is what
Cope suggests: i.e., " (... dl,,,we06a. av....;;., b "4) tv ... "d.

0.,

b "7 6pyl~ov'r'" I'iU.Aov

from b "4-26.

0.,

The reason for the greater anget is obvious

The use of eI, here parallels that of "'eo' at

b 2S : J .~ 'rit 'ro,,,il..,,
b "4, and it means "with reference to," a common meaning; LS (dl'l''''e~w)
and Kassd (appar. crit. 7Sa 33) take it in close connection with dl."we~w;
more instances of such usage (dl',,"'ee" el,) would be helpful. On the use
of ...o.aiiTa, which points forward here, see 6xa 5; for its more common usage
to refer to what has preceded and to instances similar to them, see 66b "7 : 2,
and Beare. This is an instance of who the .;;. cnJ...06 at 7S, 3" are.
2 "tCJ)(polv
sc. ia.... ; on the sense of alaXeo, cf. A 3, sSb 2S, "S; 9,
660 "4.

b "9 yov.;:~
b 30 XUp'Y I'ij 4",o516ou""y
lu Spengel, p. "IS, notes, this is substantially a repetition of 79b 7. It is, save that a different and more natural and
commonly a=pted explanation is given for the anger, e.g., "'aea ...
"wela: it is contrary to all that is naturally fitting (cf. 67b IS : 2, or A I, 55a
zz); cf. Xenophon, An.b. 7.7.46: "I think that all men consider it an obligation
to show good will to the one from whom they have received gifts." Spengel
finds similar repetitions at SIa 9 (presumably 01
aVTo" ex8eot) and a T6,
and also at SIa 31 (plj .ll.",. ...."ol ...Iii. 6.,..ae . .a.opSv",), SIb 2.

"l.-

"'0"

b 3I

'roi~ d"..."EUO"",,O'~ ",po~ cmou5cii;0V'r"~

See Plato, Crolyl. 3S43,

sle.,'''...a. "eo, ,..e: "he speaks ironicalIy to me," with the idea of dissembling,

i.e., purposefully affecting ignorance. This is the way we find its cognates
used at 8"b 21, osb "0, I9b S-IO, 20a "; cf. EN IIoSa 19-23, II24b 29-3T,
EE 12343 I. At EN II27a 18 A. begins .. division of the trnthful, the boastful, and the ironical man, in the course of which (at II27b 22-32.) he sets
down the characteristics of the sie.,pe,. Working, as he does, from the
idea 01 d~ ,......e'.,' zew,....o. Tfi slew'.'9, he gives a generally favorable and
somewhat benign meaning to .Iew.eta; the mention of Socrates as being

COMMENTARY

47

ironic is similar. Compare Cicero, Bru/IIS 292, De orat. 2.67.269-270. In

irony, however, there are dements of ridicule in the affectation, pretense,
evasiveness, which (though the ridicule may be partly of oneself, cf. r 18,
19b 8-10) reveal a certain disregard or disdain for the other person, as A.
notes here at 79b 31-32: "aTa'l'eOPT/T,,,dp "de. Socratic irony has been
much discwsed, and there is dispute about the meaning of the word when
used of Socrates. See, e.g., Friedlander I, chap. 7; Gulley, pp. 62ff.; Guthrie,
Socrates, pp. 126ff.; and Boder, pp. 14-36. Though Socrates i. not the ironic
man as seen in Theophrastus' Characters: Irony, aspectS of mockery or disdain
are not always absent Om his remarks. On cmovdclCoVTa" cf. 798 35 : 1.

b 32 : 1 U_l1J"'""'Di~
C A 9, 66b 16; II, 7Tb 3; for the force of the
ending, see 5gb 32 : 1, 81a 20.
2 Uv ... eN";;'"
sc. lap JA~ (dia. e~"o''1T.''ol) "al ~o;P.
b 33-34 ..10 fl.iI ... cN..Ov
The articular infinitive with its relative clause
is in apposition with and explanatory of ,O';TO: "al "de ,o6T& (laTl) "aTa<peOP'1T'''&', TO JA~ dE.o;;" ;cal ~oP (TOV."",) dip (M.06a.) "d....a': "for, in
fact, this is a sign of contempt: namdy, the fact that they do not deem even
him worthy of the esteem which they consider worthily given to all men."
b 34 : 1 .... l'l..XOv
as we saw it used frequendy in .4, 6-J7, e.g., at
62a 27, 32, 62b 4, 63b 35-36.
2 XlZl iI }.ij8'1
The ;cai is intensive; it is repeated at b 35, 36.
b 35 oG....>~ .roalZ
"for example, forgetting names, though it has to do
with such a trivial matter."
b 36 "'Ifl.oiov
C "1:1I1'8'OP," 391; Spengd, pp. 215, has a long
note to the eJfcct that ;1>16'1 i. an example (in the threefold division at
78. 24-25, or here at 79b 36), not of the persons with whom one is angered
(inl -ria..), but of one of the reasons why (i"l "oio.,). But, as he righdy
corrects hirnsdf, A. could just as readily have said: "and men are angered
with those who are forgetful." The point of calling attention to this comment is to note something already indicated in the outline to this chapter:
narndy, that the threefold division is not stricdy followed in the analysis
of the emotions, i.e., divison by division. See, for example. the very next
emotion in B 3, where the third divison (inl "oio.,) appears intermingled
with the second division (inl Tia.) and the first (,,0;, n lxopn,), 80a
30-31; see also the concluding statement at 80b 30-33 which mentions ouly
the first two divisions. In B 4 the major subject of consideration is the
second division (inl Tia..), and the first ("o;,lxop..,) and third (inl ,,"oio.,)
are practically dismissed. This analytical procedure, occasioned quite clearly
by the close interaction of the concepts in each division, is stated by A. .t
79b 3?: 01, . IJ.JAa el"e'1Ta.; see also 87b 3S - 88. 6. C Boa 6 : 2.

AlUSTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' II

80a 4

See A II, 700 IS where the idea behind forgetfulnessb 37 4"0..,,,,,,

here, namdy, indiff"erence (dl dpJ.l...a ... l'i""eTa., 79h 36-37) is brought
out clearly as it is set in contrast to l""pi.l.e,a; c 708. 14 : 2.
Boa " : 1 6o, iiy x ....'.."'''''cil;.'y
is the reading of three edd., Spengd,
Cope. Tovar, Kassd read Q~T6. before "QTQ""""dC... from a good tradition. Spengd, pointing to 83a 8-9, 8sa 3<>-31 (where a~.6., a.lToo" or
1Jpii., is omitted) decided against it here and was followed by Roemer. I
:un reading without it (cp. our passage, for example, with 77b 22-"4, 19b
17-18), but can see no reason against it. On "aTa"".vdC... c S9b 142 ..cjI 1.0Yf!J
See S6a I : 2 and in particular the use of the word in
s6a 4-19 (d,d pw .. .l.iy",p.,,).
a 3 : 1 0[0' lxoucrty
"to make the auditors such that they are
~~tua}ly irate." Fo~, the adver~. with exOJ, ~; 1438. The adverb can mean
inclined to anger, but also to be angry ; see, e.g., Demosthenes, Ag.
~iJi", 21S.
2 V""'..!OU~ ..o6'ro,~ lvDxou~
boxo, in its technical meaning is
found atA 13, 74a 36; TOOTO., would represent the d.d ,"oia, the reasons why
we become angered with people: "(to establish) their opponents as subject
to those things."

a 4 "D'oU"OU~
i.e., Toll, bavTlov" the opponents who are to be presented
as "the kind of pCISon with whom men are angry."

CHAPTER 3

definition of mildness (almness, gen-

I . Introduction: 80a S-8

tleness, patience, good temper)

II . Development: 80. 8 - 80b 29
I.

80a 8 - 80b

2.

80b

the penons toward whom men experience mildness, calmness (80a 30-31
:ilso refers in passing to the division d,1I
Tl"",v, 80a 7); the objective aspect of
the emotion

2-29

the disposition, attitode, of those who

are aim, and under what conditions
they are so (80a 7); the subjective

aspect
III . Conclusion: 80b 30-33

80a S : J -njI 6pyl!;Ecr8clL 1:/0 n:p..GvEcrllclL

is the reading of four
edel., Spenge!. Cope and Ross read Td derlCeaOa, . TIP neailv.aOa,. We
have a parallel to our construction at 88b 3. In general A.'s srudy of the
emotions by contrasting them is an eJfort to see them more fully by viewing
them from diffetent perspectives, e.g., 77b 31 -78a 6. The same is done
with characters, e.g., young, old, prime of life. From his explanation of
mildness there can be litde question that it is the contrary to anger. Further,
its opposition is of the same character as the opposition found between
pity and indignation, fear and confid=, shame and shanrelessness, kindness
and unkindness. There would be no reason to question this save that SI.
Thomas Aquinas in his extended study of the emotions (in which he indicates
his awareness of A.) remarks, Summa Theologiae Ia II.., q. 23, art. 3, q. 46,
art. I, that anger alone of the emotions b.s no contrary. The opposition
A. speaks about in all the .bove is contrary opposition, i.e., two positive
terms denoting extremes of difference within the same genus, each excluding
the other from the same subject. If the form (to use A.'s terms) which constitutes anger, shame, pity, etc. is changed so that the new form constitotes
the opposite of the original emotion, the entity which results is the contrary
of the original; and SO we have: mildness, indignation, confidence, etc. There
is, however, a possible diffetence between anger and other emotions, and
Thomas is correct in saying that anger as an emotion b.s no contrary. In

50

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' II

80a 6

the other emotions the contrary is usually a possibility toward which a person
can move. Por an individual subject to fear (pain caused by the image of
impending and destructive evil), confidence (hope accompanied by the image
of safety and the absence or remoteness of the terrifYing) is a possible alternative. But this is not true of anger. In anger the move toward the contrary
is dfectively blocked since the evil which causes the anger is actually present
in the individual, i.e., he is experiencing or has experienced rhe act of disdain.
The only alternatives open to him are to .ccept this evil and so experience
the concomitant pain and distress, or to reject the evil and so become angry.
2 npczGvG8'lL
is the process of growing or becoming milder,
appeased, becoming tractable.
All was mentioned earlier, at 78a 22, this emotion
a 6: 1 "pexO'n)T'
together with xOe" is peculiar to the Rhetoric Uust as xaed i. found only
in EN, 0"",0' in EE, noOo, only in EN and MM, '",O"",ia only in EN
and EE). Cope, pp. 35, 42, does not accept it a. a true emotion. It is, however, included among the "dO~ in De an. 403a r6-18 (along with 0"",0" 'Popo" IlBo" Odeao" xoea, 'P.lia, and ",iao" which, with the exception of
0"", , are also found in the Rhetoric and EN). Hicks, s. 403a 16, views
these "d~ of De an. 403a r6-lS in the wider sense of "attributes" of the soul
conjoined with the body, rather than as emotions. Hamlyn, s. 403a 16,
leans toward "affi:ctions" (which is not excluded by Hicks) with the further
possibility of "emotions"; certainly emotions are used by way of illustration
at 403' 17f[ There can be no question that A. understands "eaoT1J' in the
Rloetoric as an emotion, as he does also in part in EE 1231b 5-2.6 and EN
II03b 17-25, 112Sb 26 - 1126b 9 (on this last, see also IIogb 14-26). It is
in the l.tter works, however, that he speaks of "eao,,}, as E~." and l~., is
not a "elOo,. Por example, studying in EN the nature of c!esnj and using
his doctrine of the mean (noSa 3-9), he speaks of neaoT1J' as a l~., (see,
e.g., 1I03b 21-2S, II09b r8-26, ru6b 4-9), and specifically as one of the
virtues, which it would be as the mean state between the extremes oel',MT1J'
and d.all'~aia as they are named .t EE II20b 3S. It is this understanding
of neaoT1J' which is found in On the Virtues and the Vices 1250a 4-6, 39-44;
see also Top. 12sb 2(>-2.7. AtA 9, 66b 2. it is spoken of as a virtue (see 6Cib2),
although in the same chapter, at 67a 3 S, the idea of an emotion is present.
However, even though an ijOo. (69a IS : 3) is determined by its dominant
habits (Us.,), it should be clear that there is no conflict or contradiction in
A.'s mind between a habit and an emotion since in discussing the different
kinds of ij90. in B la-17 he speaks freely of the emotions (for example, cowardice, courage, anger, etc.). From what A. tells us, a person's ijOo. emerges
in part as he establishes a formed pattern of response to the feelings or emotions frequently experienced. This set way of responding is called.

U',

80a 8

COMMBNTAlI.Y

51

(see 62h 13 : 2, 69& 8 : 2), and while it is true that the "&6,, are not i!E.. ~,
it is also true that in the moral (>j6."'1) sphere the i!Ee.~ are concerned with
the ,,&67]; see EN II06b 16-17, Physics 245b 3 - 247a 19, especially 247a 3-9.
In the case before us, a person by responding to or encouraging feelings or
emotions of mildness, good temper, placidity ("eaoT7J')' or by countering
anger with such affective responses, can fonn the 6t;.~ also called "eaoT7J~,
just as a certain kind of response to del'>1 can develop the iE.~ deyWiT7J~.
In the Topics passage cited above (I2sb 24-26), A. admits the possibility that
a MJfJa,..~ accompanies the ll;.~ which is "ea6T7J~ such that if a .person
experiences the ernotion of anger he is in control of it. See 80h 30 : 1. c
Chantraine. A recent discussion of the word can be found in Nikolaidis;
see also de Romilly, pp. 37""43. Gauthier &: JoliE, II 301, translate "ea&T7J~
as "Ia placidite," admitting that "Ia douceur" is "une praotes, mais c'est la
praotes biblique, . . . une vertu essentiellement religiouse, tout afait dilferente
de Ia placidit" aristotCIicienne." But cf. de Romilly, pp. 19sns, 97-196,
who presents the concept as she understands its development in the fourth
century.
2 ""'~ .XOV'<O<;
Kassel alone reads Te after "W~; on the triple
division see 78a 23-2S. It is of interest to note that when A. considers the
various virtues in EN, among which nea6T7J~ appears, he proposes (JIIsa
4-5) to study them from a threefold viewpoint, which effectively reduces
itself to two (see comment at 7lIb 36 and the outline of this chapter): an
objective aspect (What is the object of the virtue ?), and a subjective (What is
the attitude of the person with the virtue?); see Gauthier &: JoliE, II 221.
a7 .......

&..;

See 60h 14:

2.

a 8 : 1 ",pcillval~
We have here in a 7-8 A.'s understanding of this
word. Why he uses it instead of "eaoT7J~, which is the emotion under
consideration, is a question. It may be, as Cope urges, that he is thinking of
"eaOT7]~ as a 61;., (cf. Boa 6 : 1) of which he has said (Top. I2Sb 23, 26-27)
that "eiio~ 6 clna61\~ Ul'BTa.. But if this is so, his language at 80a 6 is
careless in correlating it as an emotion to oer>i which is an emotion. The
word itself is rare, and I find no evidence for its use in A., Plato, or other
writers of the fourth century. It appears to be an Aristotelian construct to
'ignify the modification itself. the movement within the self experienced by
those who undergo a change away from anger.
2 _'<clG'<Cla,~ xed iJp'I''''1a,~ We have seen "aT&cnaue~ at 69b 34
and 703 2; at 69b 34 it appears best taken as "a settling down," a meaning
which it seems to have in the alternate version of ttle disputed Book 7 of the
Physics, 2.47b 26-30: HaA sl, ~es~lap ual "aTaaTaaw Blf}ovO'1]r; -rijr; c)'Il'J'olaC'
. . . 1iee,.la T<~ "at "aT&Taa,~ (". . . and when thinking comes to a rest
and a setding down . .. for [thinking) L a kind of a rest and se!ding

80a 10

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' II

51

down from disturbance"). Plato, Definitions 4ud, also conveys this meaning:
"I!aoT7J' "aTtl"Ta".,
Tii' ,m' deYii" We also meet ~ei"'1J"" in ,he
Physics where the rneming "coming to rest" or, on occasion, "being at rest"
best fits the sense of the text; see, e.g., 22.6a 7, 230a 4-5 ("movement toward
that in which a subject is stable is rather coming to rest"), 238a 18, 25Ia 26-27
("coming to rest is the privation of motion'). In our definition, then, A. is
saying that
is an emotion which consists in the experience of feelings
within the self of a settling down and a coming to rest of anger, Le., feelings
of calmness, gentleness, good temper, feelings opposite to angry feelings.

,,,.,j,,e..,,

"etliJ'''"'

a 9 : 1 ...oiS 6A'yc.>poGcr.1I
We begin at a 8 the discussion hd TI"w.
We have already seen the place of dA.y"'ela in anger (c 78b 32.), and its
meaning for A. (c 78b IOff.). It is worth our notice that the concept is
used frequently in this chapter as a critical principle to assist in determining
the nature of "I!aOT'I'; see, e.g., 80a 13, 20, 23, 27 ("aTIl'l'eeiu8a.), 29,
35, 36.
z 6' Qc..u,nOll is the reading of four edd., Spengel. Cope and
Kassel read ai lUT.. il<ool,,,,,.. On the meal1ing of voluntary, see 68b Io-II,
where we find that
is wider in its extension than neoalee".,which is to say that an act can be done voluntarily but not necessarily intentionally, an idea caught by Kenny when he notes (Theory, p. 25) that not everything that is voluntary is something that is willed, nor indeed is everything
that is willed purposefully chosen. On the other band, it does appear that we
are concerned here in dAIy"'eia (and see ?Sa ]2.) with deliberately intended
acts if A.'s explanation of dA'y"'e'a at 78b 10-31 (and see notes thereto)
makes any sense. There is clear voluntariness and intention in each of the
kinds of dA'y"e'a analyzed. There is also in c!"o.".."
(Soa 10)
a clear indication by contrast that such acts are intended, as there is as well in
{lo.Ao,.. ...I, at a I I (on this see 80a I I : z). Further, there is present in the
mind of the angered person that a slight is an unjust action (see ,8a ]2.), and
the attitude of those who commit wrong is described at 6sb \r-I2 as one in
which the wrongdoer deliberately wills his action. Thus,
here
means not only voluntary but also intended action. There is a further hint
at this in Soa 35 - b I (o'Mel, . .. Avnii'); c 80a 36. On i"ov".o. see also
73b 28 : " z; 73b 30; 73b 36 : 1.

."OV""O.

"O.OV"w

."oV,,"O.

10 : 1

"'C'oU"fWV

cbcouau..s
etc.; c EN 3.1-3.
Z

i.e., the various kinds of dAIy"'e'a; see, e.g., 7sb I3ff.

if, for example, done under constraint or deception,

a Io-II CP"'"Op..IO'~ ...o,oG...o,~

"those who appear to be that sort
of person"; on TO.OVTO, referring to what precedes, c 66b 27 : Z; see also
79b 28 : 1. TOIOVTO.,: i.e., "'1J~l ... 11 cl"o."I." ".IoVa ...

80a IS

COMM]!NT AllY

53

a II : 1 x,d TOi~ ,..,..t

sc. "eliot .10"" both here and in the like instances of the datives which follow.
z j30uJ.0p.6vo,~
The verb appears at 63a 25 in a passage on the
neoalqeTa of men as generally draM. and it clearly means "wish" or
"will" in the sense of "intend"; on the meaning in the text there. see 63a 25 :
1; see also 7fJa 8. 2.5. So. too. here, the meaning indicates the intention of
the agent: ..they are "eli [they experience neadT11~l toward those who
intended actions contnry to what they did." ie..
actiOIlS or words
("ecinew "al .ti" 7sb 23) were acadentally the occasion of slight. The
only difference discernible between this class and the a...vatw~ ".,oJa.~ of
Soa 10 is that those now uruler discussion intended what they did. but did
not intend them as slighting actions. The results of such action are what A.
at A 13. 74b 6. has called clwX'l/laT.. (ODe of the three kinds of (JU{Ja. me!>
do. EN II35b IIfE). on which see 74b 6 : z.

!"'eir

This is another topic. and I would

a 12-13 x,xI 31J0,. , . 6",ywpiv.
punctuate with period after o.h"wq.i. as Cope. Spengel. Ross. and Kassel
do. not with a colon. The main idea is in OA."wqerv. ie. this group can
be presumed not to slight others for the reasons given: no one is thought to
slight himself, and this class treats others as they treat themselves. Since
T.'O;;T., must have a point of reference. it should come from the sentence
itself, ie.. "al (T.VTO'~) 6ao, (el~ 4Uov~) "al ... TO'O;;TO': "and with all
those who indeed with respect to others are such as they are with respect
to themselves," Since the action of OA'''Wela is the issue. we can translate: "and
with all those who indeed act toward others as they do toward themselves."
a 13

SaHeL

as at 7fJa 33: "is thought to."

This forms one idea with '/lOAO"o;;a.: they

a 13-14 1'-E'\"1I1'-"'0l'-ivo,~
confess and repent. As can be seen at EN IIIOb 18-2.4. repentance is considered to be a sign of an involuntary act: "everything done through ignorance is not voluntary. and that action accompanied by pain and repentance
is involuntary"; see also IIlIa 19-21. This class. then. is comparable to 80a 10
d"ovalw~ "olO;;a... A . however. gives a diffi:rent reason for the presence
of "qadT11~ toward them: namely. that the pain experienced by the agent
removes any desire for retaliation (lIeeE'~ T'/lOJqta,).
a 14 c:.~ yckp lxov...~ ,
"For considering that they have (their) recompense in the pain experienced at what has been done. they cease to be
angry." On tb, see S. 2OS6; at..'1v i. in explanatory apposition to Td AVneiafJar..

a IS '"II'-iov . i.e.. what follows at Soa 16-1S (TOU, /lA 8V/lOV/lBVO.)

is a confumation of the correctness of Soa 13-15 (.oa! TOr, .. oeJrii')'
C ..E'1/1sro.... 3S3ff.

80a 24

ARIStOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

54
a 16 xoAci...... ~

Sec 6l1b IZ : 1, 2.

a 17: 1 0l'oAOyoilv<...;

Cope, p. 34., cites Schrader's illustration 60m

Terence, Andria 621-624.

2 l'iiA).ov xo).cil;0I'EV

Sec, for example, the action taken by

Theseus against Hippolytus whom he assumed to be contradicting and d....

nying the charge made in Phaedra's note, in Euripides, Hipp. 992.-1089.
a 18

8ul'oUI'EVO'

As a synonym of Oel"7, see 6911 4 :

2.

a 19 ckv.llUXW"'l..
predicate noun to an understood brrt whose
su1!ject is the articular infinitive (TO ae,oia6a.). As we saw at 78a 32,
shamelessn..s is an indifIerence to any evil which brings dishonor (see 68b 23
and note). The effrontery shown in such baldfaced lying reveals complete
disregard of the other person and disdain for any honor or respect owing to
him. It is, as A. says, oA',,"'eta Hal HaTa'l'eri'P71a.~ (see also 83b 15-16). A
clear idea of what A. has in mind in the word is seen in 79b 26 (and see note)
in the use of a!a;t6Yoa6a.. As an example of the general idea in cl.a.axwda ... cle.o'a6a~ sec Aristophan.., Knights 296-298. C 8sa 14-'5.
a 20 6).'ywplCl x ..l x .....a<ppOv"l.,,~
"at = namely (S. 2869');
is the whole of which "aTatperi'P71"" is a part; c 78b '3-15.

oA',,"'eia

a 21 : 1 tllax,UVOPOE84

SC. TOVTOtl" antecedent to cL)' (a 20): CCwe feel

no shame before those we deeply d..pise."
'tCl7tE'VOUI'OvO'~ 7tpO~ ..lhoU~
The middle force of the verb
is pr..ent: e.g., "humble themselv.... ; cWT06, refers, of course, to those who
are "I!lio. (8oa II). Cope, p. 34, wish.. to take a 21-25 as a development
of the preceding topic, specifically a 17-r8. I do not sec this as possible and
certainly not for the reason he gives: "the mitigation of the penalty consequent upon the admission of the offender." There is no question here of
any offense admitted or penalty remitted. It is another and separate special
topic in the analysis of "eariT~'.

with the meaning found at 78b 35 :

1,

but sec 7Sa 33.

<pO~OUI'EVO~ . 6).'YWPEi

Cpo 80a 35-36: 0';6ol, ... oAc,,"'eor. A. bas already sugg..ted this at 78b 20-21 wbere he giv.. the reason
for such fear: the possibility of being hurt by the one whom you slight.
3"<1
"and the fact that. . .... The clause is governed by ~Ao;;"
"LV (a 24) and is a substantive object clause in indirect statement; sec KUhner,
BIas., & Gerth, II 355.
.
a 23 : 1

a 24-25 xCll 01 .. XCl8[l;ov....~

The "at is intensive; "a611;0VTa~ means
simply "sitting." Whether there is in the word itself without some further
specification (e.g., Thucyd. 1.126.IO, Soph., Oed. T. 2-3, Lysias, Ag. Agora/us

80a 29

COMMENTARY

ss

24. Oem.. On the Crown LI7) the idea of humble supplication is questionable.

Animals were not infrequently used as examples of natural behavior; see.

e.g. Plato. Laws 690b. Arisrophanes. C/o,"ls 1427-1429. The point here is
that even angry dogs do not attack: those who appear T"",..."o since
their posture signifies no threat. This is the kind of action to which Odysseus
resorts (ad. 14-29-38) when threatened by Eumaeus' dogs. an action which.
as Homer's text makes clear. helped for just a moment.
a 25

.....ou&ci~ouc"

See

7')a

35 :

1.

a 26 : 1 ...pO~ ToU~ c".oulci~aYT~

is the reading of the codd.. three
of the edd.. Spengel. Cope. Ross. Kassel bracket ti,e T06, (cp. 79b 31) with
Bonitz, whiclt is more usual Greek (S. LI30). There is no reason. however.
why the particular article is not possible here (S. II20b). referring to the
individuals who are nelio. and who have been the subject of discussion from
80a 8. i.e. "and men are good-tempered with those who treat seriously
with them when they are serious."
Z IOKe'
This appears to be impersonal. and a~Tol, to be understood with it. dll' ot! = "and not rather" (S. 278Ib): "it seeUlS to them
that they are receiving serious attention and not rather utter disregard."
a 27 p.d~", Kex"p'Gp.EvO'~
The perfect middle is used actively here:
"with those who have shown greater favors" - "greater" (i.e.. ,...ICw.
cognate accusative. S. I 572). presumably. than those who experience the
neaOT'7' have shown. This is generaUy true. but not as absolute as Cope
would make it. the most obvious exception being found among those who are
the recipients of extensive largesse and generosity. It is in fact the sense of
debt and obligation of which Cope speaks (p. 35) whiclt often embitters.
a point A. discusses at EN II67b 17 - II68. 18. What is a more likely understanding of this p..sage is that this is the positive side of what was seen negatively at 79b 6-7: "al Toi, ,..i1 ... <i.Tanod.60;;a...
a 28 : 1 leop.Evo~ Kill .....p...TOUP.EvO.~
The proper meaning of Mohere (beg a favor. beg something. of another person) as opposed to
79b 14 is reinforced by its close conjunction with naeam!o,..a. ("tum ..ide
anger by entreaty." LS. II). Both actions indicate a form of Ta".....
and so 80a 21-22. comes into play.
a TCI.....YO-'.pa. ycip.
A period should be read after yde. as three
edd. Spenge!. Cope read. and not the colon of Roemer. Dufour. We begin
another topic in the next sentence. See also 80a 30 : a. 80a 30-3 I.

,..a.

'7'.

a 29 :

6f3P'GT..i~

XAUClGT..i~

See 78b 23-26. 78b 14-15 : ,.

C 79a 30. 7')a 29 - 31.

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' 11

Soa 30

3 a).Lycl>pOL~
See 7Sb 10-13, 78a 3Z; the word appears again
at S3a 2 together with vPe"nal. It is probably righdy interpreted: "with
those who act disparagingly."
i.e., those who are morally good. In this moral
a 30 : 1 XP'lcncN~
sense Vablen (Beitriige, pp. 266-6S) discusses the similarity, if not the idenxeijaTo" a"ovdaio, to denote the morally
tity, in the Poetics of h....
good, and citeS a number of instances as proof, concluding that in the larger
sense anovaaio. is a paronym for deSToj, as are 1"",,4, and x:e;;UTO. although
less frequendy used. And see my comment at 6ra 25 : z; also ?Sa X3 : z.
sc. .ia.. There should be a colon, as Ross punctuateS,
z mol'
not a period, after aVToi. The other edd., Spengd, Cope read a period. With
the colon the following sentence (oAw, ... "eal1.o.Ta) read by all, but
bracketed (as Aristotelian, however) by Kassd with Buhle, is part of this
particular topic. such a close connection is quite correct as Vater also saw
(p. S3), particularly because Aristotle in this topic specifically refers to prominendy critical causes of anger mentioned in chap. 2 (VPe'UTai" aA."rheo,,),
and he has told us at Soa 5 that Tcp aeriC.aUa. i.avTlo. TO "ea11vsu8a.
Consequently, in a form of shorthand he draws the general conclusion that
the topics which produce the feeling of good temper must be sought from
among the oppositeS, namdy, those which produce anger.

,,*,

"eal1.ona is the reading of four edd.,

a 30-3 I /I).w~... n:p ..Gv..".....
Spengel. Cope, Kassd read neaVvn"d. The neuter plural in our reading
is used to refer to the general idea of persons (Tiu ..) and things (inl "oio.,)
which evoke good temper, mildness. On "ea!1vovTa covering the division
in! "oio., C 79b 36, Spengd, p. 21S, and cpo 82b 22-27. This clause has
caused commentators since Buhle a number of problems (e.g., Spengd,
Cope). Buhle looked upon it as an interpolation because it interrupts the
Sow of the topical analysis. This criticism can be questioned for we have
been receiving a series of specific topics by means of which one can devdop
in the auditor the emotion of good temper. The statement here is simply
another topic which by way of general summation says that from the very
nature of "eaoT'1,' anything (person or thing) which is the opposite of
anger is likdy to stir within one a feeling of good temper. It should also
be noted that the topics presented are not, as Cope bdieves (p. 36), "going
over very nearly the same growld as the topics of the last chapter." This
should be clear by now from the present chapter itsel The 8Aw, clause is
not a digression better placed dsewhere (see, e.g., Spengel, p. 2IS), but a
summary conclusion to the topic at 80. 2S-30 ("al Tol, ... aVTol) by way
of a generally valid principle. As such it is quite similar to that at Sob 4
and those found at A 9, 6S. 26; II, 70b 9.

80a 36

COMMENTARY

57

a 3 I XIX' oiI~
The antecedent of the relative is in an understood TOVTO',
with otl" aeytCoyra, (a 33).

a 32 : 1 "lcrxUvCN'I""
,..,~

C 79b 26: 1.

av ... Ox",a,,,.

the reading of cod. A and four of the

edd., Spengel. Cope, Kassel read 2w, yae dy with a good MS tradition.
r can see no reason to change, particularly since a reason is given in the next
sentence, daV.aTOY rQq. On the mood of 'xwaw, see S. 2423 b.
2

a 33 ciw"IX"'." "d.
The reasons for this statement must be derived
from the analysis of anger in chap. 2 and the understanding of fear in chap. 5.
Briefly: if fear is the distress experienced at impending painful, destructive
h2rm from someone, it cannot coexist (/J.p.a) with a desire to take revenge
upon that person, revenge which one sees as possible ot the moment of QIIger
(78b 2-9). The very feeling of fear indicates that the fearful person is in
the presence of someone in whose regard there is simply no posSibility for
anger as it was defined.
a 34 ..oi~ &,' opy/r.l 1I:ol1ja"a,,,
As a commentary on 80a 34 - b I,
one should read A 10, 68b 37 - 69a 19 and 13, 73b 25 -74b 22 and the notes
thereto in COMMENTARY I, where the dift'erence between the deliberately
intended voluntary act and rhe act which is voluntary but not deliberately
intended (as an act done in anger can be) is discussed; see 73b 35 : J, 73b 36 : 1.
The statement is clear if aA,ywela is action
deliberately intended (see, e.g., 80a 9 and Boa 9 : z) and if the influence of
anger and other emotions (73b 36 : 1) diminishes or removes in our actions
the element of neoate"'" (deliberate intent in the action); see EN IlIlb
18--19 - "i"'aTa rae Ta aid 8vp.d. "aTa neoatesc", oZ.a, do" - and Il35b
19-27

a 35 06 yo!.p . "'pi!;",

Cpo 80a 23. In the first place, such action

a 36 opy,~op.E\lo~ o}.'Y"'pei
would be a contradiction. Anger by its definition desires an act of retaliation,
not any other act. If the angry person acts, the act is ordinarily an act of
anger, an act seeking retaliatioll. Furthermore, the reason for the statement
comes in the following clause: an act of oA'rweta is free of pain for the agent;
an act of anger is not. The angry person experiences pain caused by the
one with whom he is angry and who i. frustrating his realization of what
he desires (79a II). The whole dlAolwa" in the angry person has its cause
in the act of another person. An act of aA,yweta i. a voluntary act deliberately intended and realized, the cause of which resides in the person acting.
His desire is in no way frustrated and so no pain is experienced in the act.
Unless we are to demand the presence or co-presence of opposed modifications
in one and the sasne person at the sasne moment, A's statement stands. On

58

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

Soh 5

the other hand, when the angry person places the act of retaliation (and his
anger ceases; c 7Sa 31 : .3). his retaliatory act may assume any form including o.l,,,we1a.
Sob I CZ'crxUVOp.-.oOU;
C 79b 26 : , for the meaning. such respect
is a recognition of worth. value. in the person. the denial of which is the
very thing which causes anger; c 7Ila 32.
b 2 ""I Ixov'<oc; 841
lxo'Te~ b ...TI.,~ = "are exactly opposed." We
begin here the exposition not only of the way persons whd are experiencing
good temper feel ("Iii~ Te Hxo'Te~). but also under what conditions they fed
this way (d,,; -r1.0) e.g. b 3/[. Sob 6-7).
b 3 :, "cz.8.~, yD.c.n.
C 7Ib 340 35. 70b 35 : 2.
2 tro'l",.p{'!'
This is used metaphorically (however. see Cope,
p. 37). i.e. prosperiry. health and wealth. honor and glory, sOOl as we find
it at EN I099b 7. or Plutarch, Demosthelles 5.4. 29.2, Cicero Bpp. ad All.
521.2.

cr..

b 4 xcz"'"pe....... ~'1p..
The first word is seen at 63a 33. 36 in the
meaning found here (see 68a 14). The idea in ".l~e.,O"~ - namdy, a satisfaction, gratification. of the person (usually of the senses. e.g. Plato. Philebus.
3Ie. 35a-<o) - is found at 69h 14; see note.
b 4-$ n...~ ... '"x.i
Agajn a brief clause of summation (see
Boa 30 : 2, 80a 30--31). the point of which seems to be that if people are
in a generally good mood. their response to others is one of "eadTrJ~. For
example. if they are free from distress (dAvnla) as that has been understood in
chaps. 2 and 3. they are without anger. If the pleasure they experience is not
the result of {JPe'~ (see SSb 31) - namely, the pleasure occasioned by
causing hurt to others (7Sb 24; and see ,sb 14 - 15 : .3) - but pleasure
in general. they presumably are in a good temper ("elio,); b Unld, b...," i.e., their expectations are good, justifiable, reasonable. This last could
mean that their condition is such that they can look to good from others in
the sense that i.lnl~ a"a81j w.o'ov8.. Tfj de.Tfj (On the Virtues and Viles
I2SIb 33-34). On 1",.." see 7Sa 13 : 2. Boa 30 : ,.
b 5 xoxpav.xo,<.~ ... ':'n:oyn.o.
Both should be taken together since
they are set in contrast: "When they have expended time on their anger and
are not in the first stage of it," i.e. time has passed. and with it the anger.
On the idea. see Antiphon. On the Murder of Hero des 71-72; Thucyd. 3-3S.I
(Cieon objecting to delay on Mytilene); Dem.. Proerni. 6. In contrast to
those whose anger abates in time is the vindictive man (see 68b 21 : 2). On
vndyvlO'. LS, III.2. and cpo 54b 3 : l.

80b 8

CO,MMBNTAlty

S9

n.

b 6 "ClU"' ... 0 Xp6vo~

e.g., Eustathius on
24.139: "and consider ...
how the intervention of time softens the harshness in those who are angry
so that the one who said 'time is a god who makes gentle' [i.e., Sophocles,
Blear. 179] spoke the truth" (ed. Stallbaum, p. 1342).

b 7 : 1 6. XCI!
See 6sa 16 : I. What begins here and continues to 80b 13
(8C11'aTo.) is a discussion of d,d Tl.w. (8oa 7), the means which produce
neaoT7/~ in a person.
2 E'1'EpOU ... aAl.ou
C LS, 1-r:6(!O~, 1.2, "one . .. the other," i.e.,
"vengeance taken first on one person diminishes a stronger anger against
another." The reason which explains such a reaction on the part of an angry
person is actually given by Aristotle in his definition of anger at 78a 31-33,
and in particular in Tpwela~ <pa,.opWq~ (manifest retaliation); see"]8a
3 I : 3. Once the desire for retaliation is exercised, the anger is fully or par-

tially diminished.
3 opyiJv ,.d~...

-11
js the reading of the codd., four edd., Spenge!,
Cope. With our text we interpret as in the preceding note. Kassd reads
with Madvig: OIlY!} p.ICw. TJ.

b8:

6,0...

Kassd alone secludes (but as Aristotdian) b 8-ro

[d,... d",p.pl1/pbo.] as interrupting the close cohesion between b 6-8

(,,!We, ... "eOTBea.) and b IO-I3 (nelia, . . . 8a.aTa.). While b 10-13
may seem a more pointed illustration of b 6-8 than is b 8-ro, I am not
sure that it is meant to explain b 6-8 at all. The sequence of ideas is:
b 6-8, the topic proper; b 8-ro, an exemplification of b 6-8; b 10-13, the
e.'<planation of why Philocrates did what he did - an explanation (b la-II)
(nelia, rae . .. a.aM{,uwuw) in terms of the topic itsdf (b 6-8), then by way
of an actual instance (possibly known by Philocrates). And so we have:
"Also vengeance taken fint on one person diminishes greater anger against
another [b 6-8]; and so Philocrates on the occasion of someones asking
at a time when the people were angry 'Why do you not defend yoursdf?'
answered wisdy: 'Not yet.' 'But when?' 'When I see someone dse
slandered' [b 8-10]. For men become good-tempered whenever they have
expended their wrath on another as happened in the case of Ergophilus
(b Io-II); for although the people were more angry with him than with
Callisthenes they acquitted him because they had passed sentence of death on
Callisthenes the day before" (b 12-13).
2 .u.oxpci'"l~
C OeD, CAR, VI, passim, PW XIX, S.
A well-known orator and statesman of the fourth century frequently mentioned by Demosthenes and Aeshines, he is the author of the so-called Peace
of philocrates between Athens and Philip in 346 B.C.

60

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC'

[1

80b I3

3 .t,,6v..a~. opy.1;OP.o!vDU
two genitive absolutes in which the first
expresses the occasion ("on the occasion of someone's asking'), the second, the
time ("when the people .. .').
b 9 "..I aUx cb.al.ayEl"
The quotation marks are correctly read by
Tovar, Ross, Kassel, Cope. Roemer, Dufour omit them here; Spengel uses
none in the whole passage.
b 10 : 1 &'I1~.~).'1P.o!v""
c 54& I6 : 2. Isocrates, Antido.is I8-I9, is
a good example of what is meant by the kind of calumniation which philocrates has in mind as well as the rash, harsh, and all too soon regretted action
which it called forth from the Athenians. philocrates' hope was to benefit
when the anger of the people had been expended on someone else brought
to trial first. Indeed, Demosthenes, Ep. 2.I4-IS, says that his condemnation
in the Harpalus afWr was due to the fact that he was tried first. See also
Lysias, On the Monies of Aristophanes 6: "those brought to trial last are acquitted because you, your anger at an end, give tliem a hearing and willingly
admit their refutations." The explanation of such inconsistency in action on
the part of those who are angry was suggested at 80b 4-8.
See Sob 8 : 1. The important point here is th2t
2 yIYV"""II'
having satisfied their anger against one person they beco... good-tempered
tow.,d another Of others with whom they were angry.
See PW. An Athenian general active in the Helb II 'EpyocplAou
lespont in the years 363/362, he took part in Athens' campaigns in the area
(e.g., the Propontis, Hellespont, Chersonese) prior to the revolt of Millocythcs against Cotys in 36I. Removed from command (Dem., Against
Amloeralts 104), he was tried at Athens and apparently, from what A. says
here, fined; see Dem., On Ihe False Embassy 180. C 98b 26 : 1.

b 13-14 xIIl o!civ nc..c"v

sc. "'eliol <Ia.. (80b 2) which is the primary idea
of the whole section, not nelio. ylyvovTa. (80b IO; on which see 80b 6-10).
This reading is that of the edd. and of good codd. If it is read, the only
punctuation which makes sense is a period after IAOla .., as read by four of
the edd., e.g., "and if they convict the person, they are good-tempered."
Kassel punctuate. with a comma, thus making the statement not an individual topic but parr of the next one. This is difficult to understand. For, then,
the reason given at 80b IS for the whole topic makes no sense; e.g., if they
convict the person, they have had their T'/Awe1a and there can be no question
of their "thinking th2t they have, as it were, taken their T'/AOle1a." This is
also the reason why I find lAma.. odd. To convict someone is certainly to
exercise what can be called T'/AOJeia .,a"o/A"'1I. The direct effect in the

80b 18

61

COMMENTARY

person should be that he no longer is angry, not that he experiences good

feelings toward the convicted penon. Can we press the definition .t 80. 7-8
this far? There is another reading which I consider preferable, a correction
of ilsova.. in cod. A., i.e., Us,"aw. It is read by Spengd, Cope, and, I
note, Freese. Taken in conjunction with what follows ("ai Am. ''',,"al',
"ai ia ... ldeaaa. &lanse . .. ,pOJe1ao), it makes, for me, eminent sense
of 80b 13-16 (keeping the second "alla. where Spengd would drop "at or
U.). A. then sa}s: "And men are good-tempered if they pity the offendexs,
especially if they (the offendexs) have suffered a greater misfortune than they,
the angty persons, would bave infficted. For they think that they bave, as it
were, received their vengeance." This makes sense in itsdf, in the light of
the comment on the angry man at 82a 14 ("a! ... 1lJ."'a....), and of that
on pity at 8Sb 13-14 (laTa> .. "'l'Xd....). Pity means that the other
person has suffered serious and unmerited harm, and so harm greater than
any T'!'"'eta desired. As a consequence one will well fed "I11io, toward
such a person.

b 14 il 01 opy.!;6P.6V0'
is the reading of three edd., Spengd, Cope.
Ross reads 11 8; Kassd reads without 01 from a good tradition.
b 16

XIII icky . 1I:ci"l(E'V

se. neaol .!law.

b 17 eN y'yve:"L"'IL Six.."",
"anger does not arise with regard
to justice." This phrase is secluded by four of the edd. Ross reads it (secluding '"Ii, as do Spengd and Cope; Cope and Tovar read o~
Those
who seclude the phrase follow Vahlen ("Kritik arist. Schriften," 1I2). I
cannot be as certain as Vahlen that b 17-18 are twO coequal reasons and that
our phrase is that of an interpolator. The conclusion to b 16 is an undexstood
"'eliot ela ... We must first know why they are so disposed. We are told
this in the sentence before us: anger and justice cannot coexist since (as we
are assumed to know) justice is the only virtue that is considered to be "another's good" insofar as it "does what is advantageous for the other" (EN 1130a
3-S). We are then (b 17-18) given the reason why men in this instance are
"'elio&: the presence of justice makes it impossible for them to consider
themsdves treated improperly (see .,sa 32-33).

rae.

See 63a 9 :
b 18 ~
.d "'e0afj"o. aspect.

1.

The point of the de6nition is to emphasize the

b 18-20
S.D . SoiI),o.
This is an observation which is really directed by the intent of the analysis of the ",dB'I in this book, an intent which
can be lost .long the way. A.'s objective in the extensive analysis of the
particular topics of Myo" "dBo" ijBo, inA and B is to make these constitutive
elements of the TiM understandable so that they can be used correctly;

62

ARlSTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

80b 23

on this particular emotion, c 80b 30--3]. Their correct use is quite simply
to enable the person to whom the spoken or wrirten word is addressed to
make a judgment (see COMMENTARY I 349-50). In the present passage A.
calls our artention to such a practical application of a special topic - namdy,
that at 80b 16-18 - for eJfecting "I!aOT11'. The idea bdrind "chastising
befordrand in word" is to make the other aware of the claims of justice
against him with the expectation that when the claims are recognized any
anger will be removed or lessened (I\"TTO. dy""""Tova..). On ".laa., c
80a 16-18.
The ordinary interpretation of this stateb 2Q--21 x.d ic10v 11<..8011
ment and quite possibly the correct one if we are to avoid unnecessary complications is: "And people are good-tempered if they think that those who
offend will not perceive that they suffer at their bands in return for what
they themse1ves suffered nom them." There are three difficulties: the subject
of h<a6ov; the subject of ala67ja.a6a.; and the referent in cWToV,. The first
subject of h<a60. is "the offenders": "that they [the offenders) suHCr at
their [the offended's) hands." The second subject is "the offended": "in return for what they [the offended) suHCred rom them." The subject of oreo.Ta. is "the offended," who are also the referents in cWTov,. The subject of ala6fjaBa6a. is "the offenders." As the reason for the statement of this topic A.
oHCrs the fact that anger must have an object (80b 21-22; cf. 78a 33-35), i.e.,
that it must be directed against an individual (see also 82a 3~, 78a 34 : .).
But if this reason carries any weight here, it is precisdy because it is only a
person who can perceive (ala6fja.a6a.) both the ...peo~ta and the reason for
it. This is borne out by the example and its explanation at 80b 22-29.
Kassd secludes the sentence. Without more
b 21-2.2 iI yc!tp ia-.lv
evidence I do not see the seclusion although I could see a reason (c preceding note) for someone to consider it.
b 2.2 op.crp.<N

C 78a 33-35.

b 22-29 6.0... I'VE"!VCoIV

In this passage we have a further explanation and some consequences of this topic (80b 2Q--21). At the end of it
he draws the conclusion to the chapter.

n.""[1)....

"Wherefore the poet has rightly written 'Say that

b2.2
Odysseus, sacker of cities,' on the assumption that [Odysseus) has not been
avenged if [the Cyclops) did not perceive both by whom and for what reason
(he was blinded)."

OJ 9.504; the rdevance of the paob 23 'Pa8...... ",,<>A.nope.OII

sage becomes clear by starting at line 500.

80b 30

COMMBNTARY

b 25 : 1 &.au. e.cr...
The semicolon, used, I notice, by Ross, seems
the ooly reasonable punctuation since the following lines are closely linked
to the preceding idea. All the other edd., Spengd, Cope punctuate with
period. dl<JT6 with the indicative to stress the actual filet (S. 2257).
z ..oi~ .nAO'~
i.e., "all the rest," who are then specified in the
remainder of the sentence.
3 ,dcr8mvov.... '
This is used in prerudy the same way as it was
used in the topic (80b 20), which it reaffirms in this further explanation (c
80b 22-29), i.e., "all thole who do not perceive the vengence." To the angry
man alaB"a., on the part of the other person is critical; see 82. 8-9. Cope,
p. 40, seems to have missed the point of the passage.

b 26 oG..c ... for,

sc. deyiC.""a. (b 25): "nor are they angered besides"; this is the second alternative. nBwaw is explained by "" ...
alaB"l1.p""" in which the ideas are c10sdy connected by the coordination:
they have ,utfered the ultimate misfortune and are not about to fed pain
or to perceive anything.
b 27 GiS bplov....,
Anger, at 78a 31, is defined as Se'." npwela,
",a, piP'!,. The participles cUy>!aova.., ala~a.pb.., contain what is in fact
the antecedent idea to which oJ refers, and express this !JeBE', of the angry
man insofar as cUY>la.~a.. i, the T,p"ela, the pain aspect, and alaB"a.p ,
is the ",a",p.'1/ dement.

b 28 "O''1...q~
sc. .:tty...
b 29 : I ..c8vcW"o~
an objective genitive modifying oeYii"
2 """PiJv, .. p.EVE.. I""",
II. 24-504; they are the final words
of Apollo in hi, appeal to the gods to permit burial of Hector', body. The
key word in the citation as an example of the topic is " ..~, "dumb," i.e.,
without senses.
After the above quotation Roemer, Dufour assume a lacuna in the text;
Tovar, Ross, Kassd, Spengd, Cope do not, and I agree. Roemer's reason
for the lacuna is that there is no consideration of d,d Ti .,. "I!ailP.PTa,
(8oa 7). In the first place this is not, strictly speaking, correct; see Boa 30-31,
80b 6-7. Further, see the comments at 7!lb 36 and at 80a 6: 2.

b 30 : I x ......"p"OV.'v
i.e., to soften, appease; Isocrates, Panegyricus
13, expresles the idea intended here: "aTanea6....a, T'~' d"e.aTll,. A
moment'l reflection on the use of this verb form and its cognates in this
chapter ("eaila8a~ 80a S, 7, 3I; "ea6Pa", 80a 8) should make it clear
that A. is talking about "eaoT'7" not as a virtue here, but as an emotion;
see, for example, Boa 6 : I with Cope's reservations (pp. 35, 42). The actionreaction projected by the verb is tranlitory and passing - see, e.g., Euripides'
oeY!j. "eailPovaa (Nauck & Snell, frag. 822) - and as A. use. it, further

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

80b 31

supposes an action between agent and patient. Both these ideas ate in direct
contradiction to everything A. says about a virtue in the EN and BE. Certainly it is quite incorrect once again (see 66a 36 : 2, 60b 14 : z) to say, as
Cope does, that the view of nea/5T"1~ as an emotion "is adopted in the Rhetoric merdy for convenience, philosophical accuracy not being required"
(p. 42); see, however, his subsequent comment (p. 42) on the de6nition of
""l/a. It would seem that the most telling observation against Cope's criticism
on the matter is A.'s statement in the EN, a work to which Cope (e.g., I
159-00) usually refers on occasions such as this: namely, 1094b II-I3, 19-25.
z b:... """,dov
These are the .r6"1, special topics, and the
methodology is exacdy the same as that in A; see COMMBNTAIlY 1354-55,
58a 17 : 1, 7tia 32 : 1, and cpo A 2, 58. 31-32, B I, 77b 16-20,78. 16-19,
27-30.

b 31 ll.nw~!Ltv
namdy, the auditors; cf. 77b 24 (Tdv Hem)V HaTa-"HBvaC...). Set in contrast to b 31, cnJTO~~ ,.tv, are those with whom they
are angry, or~ d'.... We s.w naea"H.vaC, .. at 60b II, on which see the
note. Ross reads aVToV,.
o~ Ii' 6pyl~ov......
sc. (lH.tvov~) oC, 6' oerICo....a' (naea<THsvaCov",). Each of the following accusatives refers back to the special topics
discussed in the body of the chapter: e.g., ",oP.eo6~: 80a 31-33 (Hal oD~
... oertC.cr8a.); al":rlV"l~ Mtov~: 80. 31-33; "'xae'''pivov" 80a 27
("al ... ".xae,,,pi.o,~); ~o'Ta" 80a 8-12 (,I 01l'. povAopivo,~); !In'e<&Aroii....a~ TO'~ ",""o'''1pivo,,, 80a 13-15 ("al TO'~ oeriM.

b 31-33

CHAPTER 4

I . Introduction: Sob 34 - SIa S

definition of friendship

II . Development: Sra S - S2a Ij

I. Bra B - BIb 34
2.

8Ib 35-37

the persons toward whom men experience friendship: objective aspect

the things which cawe the emotion
of friendship: objective aspect

3. 80a I-IS

the opposite of friendship: enmity and

hatred

III . Conclusion: S2a 16-I9

Sob 34 .r[,,1O<; 8E . 8.....r[

followed by a comma and no lacuna is the
reading of Tovar, Ross, Ka.!sd, Spengd, Cope, and is correct; Roemer,
Dufour indicate a lacuna because of the absence of the third division: "W~ TB
lxov..,. This problem has already been discussed; see Sob 29 : 2, and references there.
b 35 : I ""," '1"l.{.." " ..l ..II <pIAC;"
See 6xb 37 : I for the reference
to the discussion of this idea in the EN. Spengd alone reads the indicative:

Uyo,...,.
2 I",""
On the quality of the definitions in the Rhetoric, see 6Gb
14 : 2. The definition given here (Sob 35 - SIa 2) is essentially that given
at 6Ib 35-37, and can be found in substance at EN II56b <)-17, or, again.
at IIssb 31-34 and in the discussion on friendship throughout Books Sand
9. Friendly feeIing rather than friendship is perhaps a more accurate interpretatinn of '1'01.1" since as an emotinn it is a transitory, psycho-physical
experience rather than what is implied 'in English by friendship, i.e., a more
permanent disposition or state. As such an experience it is both a liking for
and a wishing well to another for his own sake, a feeling engendered in parI
by the bdief that the other person is so disposed toward you; see 8ra 1-2.
We must remember that emotion is an integral dement in virtue as we have
already seen and as A. indicates with respect to friendship itself at EN II26b
22-28 (d''''I'ie.' .. . ).""), IIssb <)-10 (6"" ... "d8'l). In fact, Grant, II,
VIILS.S, discussing IIS7b 2S-31 ('1'01.1" as U,~), refers to 1I26b 22--28 and
remarks: "the present passage does not in the least contradict this, as U'~,
or a settled disposition of mind, is merely the result of regulated emotions

66

ARISTOTlE, 'RHETORIC' II

80b 36

and the tendency to produce them." Consequently, it would seem. that in

the effort to determine the meaning of 'P,Ua as emotion a careful use of
what is said about 'P,Ua as the virtue of friendship in the ethical works is
legitimate. In a recent study on the use of the emotions in Greek tragedy,
stanford cites most of the emotions found in the Rhetoric, including 'PIlla.
h 36 :, ,<,0 pOllA..8."
This is a critical dement in this emotion, and
it points to the intdlectual aspect of the emotions as A. understood them.
We have seen this often-overlooked aspect in the emotions already studied.
In fact, it is disappointing to fu,d that the commentaries on B (apparendy
conditioned by the view that the "dO'I are not a proper part of A.'s theory
of rhetoric; cf. 54& IS : , and .) treat the ,,~ in a casual and cursory manner.
We have seen povl'luI~ in A where we futd it as rational desire for the good
(64b 32 : 4, 6l)a 2-3), an act which intplies that what is willed is under the
control of reason. Or, as A. says in the Top. u6a 12-t3: sllj 'P'lla h TOP
hrdlv,..."n"op, o~" a. ehJ povA'Iul~ n, . "ijua rae POVA'IU" l. Top AOYlun"op.
The idea in our definition here is seen at EN IIS6a 9-10; that it is rational
desire would seem clear from the clause in our own definition (80b 36),
Ii o,eTal ayaO&, as well as from the starernent at EN on the three kinds of
friendship (ns6a 7'-19) whicll reveal purposefulness in 'PIAla. Cope's stress
(p. 43) on the purely appetitive aspect of 'PlAia is misplaced, and his description of ,'Ala as an "emotion" is strange: "the desire . . . which is naturally,
or has become by habit, instinctive, and therefore a "dOo~." Once again
the transitory cb.racter of emotion is lost, as is the difference between "dOfJ
and U.,'; see, e.g., EN nosb 2S-26: 6(;.It; ~. "aO' a, "eot; Ta ,,010'1 Ixo,.... eJ ~ "a><w~. Lost as wdl is a distinction A. makes, at EN IIssb 10, on
'P ..1.a as it pertains to Ta i/O'l Ita! Ta ,,&0'1. It seems that the reason why it is
lost (see, for example, Cope's difficulties with "eaOT'I~ as a virtue and not
an emotion) is that A.'s objective in the analysis of these emotions has been
forgotten. Since the fIrst book, he has clearly been concerned with the
part played by reason, emotion, and ciIaracter (the three "lanl') in the
spoken (and written) word when it is used to communicate with another
with a view toward enabling the other to make a judgment. Recognizing
from the outset that judgments are made by individuals, persons who constitute a totality of intellect, fedings, and ciIaracter, A. has tried to analyze
eaciI of these three "lumt; by way of the special topics so that they may be
used intelligently and effectivdy in discourse. He is quite aware of what
happens when .ny one of the three "IUTe't; is wrongly used - for example,
the " ..8'!, S4& 24-26, with whiciI cpo Isocrates Antid. 31. We have seen
A. analyze ;;Oyo~ (rational explanation) by means of the special topics in the
fIrst book. He is now doing it for the ,,&0'1, here specifIcally for 'P ..la. His
concern with 'PlAia, and this is what is forgotten, is to set forth by the method-

81a 4

COMMENTAlIY

ology of the particular topics the kinds of people (this is his primary concern
in the chapter) who evoke the emotion oflove (friendship). Further, he has
told us in A why this is necessary and has done so once again at the beginning
of this book, B I, 77b 21 - 78a 5. At the very end of the preceding chapter,
he states once more the purpose of this study of the "dB" (Sob 30-34), and
at the end of the present chapter, S2a 16-19, docs so again. The purpose is
to enable the speaker (writer) to make an intelligent use of the emotions in
his effort to communicate the truth to another as far as it can be known in the
generally contingent siruation in which rhetoric works (ssa 23). WhUe
the purpose is practical, the theoretical analysis of the "dB" is soundly
grounded in what he says in other works about the "aB". But to lose sight
of the .ua. of the analysis is to misunderstand it.

Sla I :

1 Io'ij ."hw
e.g., EN u67" 17'-lS, and Cicero, De nat. dear.
1.44.122, and particularly: "Prata et arva et pecudum greges diligunrur isto
modo, quod fructus ex iis capiunrur, hominum caritas et amicitia grntuita
est. ..."
2 ..0 x",.. 1l ... dy""
On "ea ...".6v C 6Ih 37 : 2, 6zb 4 (and
MM II97a 3ff.); Had dwllp<V = within one's power. The whole clause
is similar to the common Aristotelian expression: "eaH"".' .iiiv J<p' fJpiv
8v.wv as seen in MM II97a 14-15. We might translate: "and to be inclined
to bring about d,ese goods as far as one can." The infinitive is articular with
subject accusative.

Kassel alone secludes this (but as arisa 1-2 <piAo~ .. lly"'<plAoUp.YO~

totelian). In me light of EN II5Sb 31 - IIs6a 5, the sentence would appear
necessary to indicate the reciprocity of the feeling required if the word <ptla.
is to be employed as it is in me following sentence. The question as to whether
the term <plla. can be righdy used if mis mutuality of feeling is not present
is discussed at length in Plato's dialogue on friendship, the Lysis 212a - 21!)a.
a 2 oloy..." 5.1
The de here where Spengd (p. 2aI) would want rde
acrua11y submits to the latter meaning (cp. 64" ~; Denniston, p. 169).
Preferably, it should carry me force of aJv (Denniston, p. 169): "and so mey
consider themselves to be friends .... " The subject of the verb is the participial construction at a 3: "those who think mernselves to be so disposed
toward each other."
a 3 l)'KOX'Io'iv<dv
taken for granted."

used as it is at 69b 33, 79b II: "with mese principles

Briefly, me argument in a 3-S is: if me princirles are

a 4 CI!Y"yx1)
valid, it follows of necessity mat the friend rejoices in me omer's good and
grieves at his evU because me friend is one who fJovl ..al ..., a aZ..a, draBa
(Sob 36), and pleasure is a mark that good has happened to one, as pain is

68

AllISTOTLE, 'RBBTODJC J II

8Ia 10

that evil has happened. I would take this section to be an integral part of
what precedes as a further explanation of the definition. And so. contrary
to Cope. pp. 43-44. I consider the topical analysis to begin at 8Ia 8 where
we find the first mention of those toward whom (TI.a,. a 34) men experience
friendship.
a 5~ !'-II &0& mc.'vov
In other words. a friend is another self; see.
e.g. EN n66a 31-]:'. II70b 6-7. There exists berween the rwo the "I'0.ola
attributed to ",IUa in Plato. Dejiflitions. 413a-b. or as Zeno in reply to the
question Ti, 'UTI ",iAo,; answered: ci.l.Io, lya. (Diog. Laertius. Lives of the
Philosophers: Zeno 23). This ide> will be exemplified in the very first topic
8ra 8-II.

a 7:

1
Z

(3ouAi) .....,S
See Bob 36 : 1.
'"I!,lov
See 57b I : Z; and ..1:'11'....... 391.

a 8-9. ....lois &-11 .. ex8pol

sc. "al (",D.OI ./,,1. TOVTOI,) or,: "And
(they are friends to those) to whom in fact the same things are good and
bad and (who) are the friends and enemies of the same people (as they)."
The logic of what is being explained. e.g. Tl.a, \l'IAOV", (a 34). calls for
but does not absolutely demand the rdative pronoun (who). The lines
describe a single class toward whom men experience the emotion of friendliness. i.e. those who have the same id... as they of what is good and bad and
so like and dislike the same people as they. This seOInS to follow from the
reason given at a 9-"0: TaVTa .. dvdy"'!. Spengd (p. :0:01) is not happy
with the norninztive case since he believes that all the accusatives (presumably
betWeen 81a 14 and 8Ib 34) depend upon the construction at 8ra 4 (dvdy",!
",i).o. Bl.a.) but he =pts our text on a parallel with A 9. 66b 25-:06 eventually followal by 67a 16Jf. (his reference to A 5 is uncleor). But there are
some problems with Spengel's position: first of all. the accusatives from 8la "4
on ("al Toll,) make more sense in e>ch instance as the objects of a ",lAov""
understood from a IZ (and cf. ",lAoVa.. at 8lb :02.. :06. 28) than they do as
part of the 8la 4 construction; secondly. the cases at 8ra 34-35 ("al o! b"M..
~101). 8Ib 23 ("al 01,). b 24 ("al TO.,) must also be explained by Spengd.
Cope's problem (p. 44) with dlj (he would read IId'l) seems to be answered
by 61 b 37 (q; d>j) and see Bucken. De Aristotelis diandi ,alio... p. 43.

a 9 x,d 01 ... q>IAo, ... ex8pol

read by four edd. Cope; Kassel alone
secludes it. but as Aristotelian. Spengd reads the rdative o! for the articles.
"for of necessity they [TOVTO.,] wish the same things."
a 10 : 1 """.ens
TOOT..,. indirect object with d.d)''''!. refers to those just described, i.e..
those who fed friendly toward and those who are the objeclll of their friendliness_ For. as they are presented, they must enjoy the unity of mind and
wish proper to friends (d"'Ddo~ta "Bel "I!DQ'I!A"B"". Plato. Definitions 4I3a).

8Ia IS

COMMBNTAIIY

i.e., wan po.lD,..."o~ "al cY,u<p Ilnse

"d.: "so that the one who wishes also for another
whatever he wishes for himsdf is manifesdy the friend of that other." The
"al in xal W<p is intensive; wan with the indicative states the actual
fact. For w...... Kassel conjectures 8 n, but I cannot see what the point of
the change is. While the result dause of the codd. is somewhat redundant,
it is direcdy rdevant to the conteXt.
2

a.nq;

Coer......

(lcn>A6p.vo~

(po~).BTa,) TO~T<P

II-12

",d "oU~ . cplAoUer,v

Cpo 79b 2-4, 13-17.

a 12 : 1 ij cn."oU~ .. ,,1j&ov.... ,
Cpo A 12, 72a 9, 73" 3. a,jTo~~ and
the understood antecedent of dip are the object of "",o''1''OTa~ sJ.
2 ,,1j&ov.... , ij . . .
A colon is the punctuation of four edd.,
Spengd, Cope; Ross reads " comma.
The verb understood with this and the fullowing
3 eI P.&yci>...
procases is sJ ,..,.o.ljxaa,; ,..."dJ.a is a cognate accusative: "if they have
done thern substantial benefit. "
a 13 : 1 ..o,..u..o,~ " ..,poi~
On "a'eo" see 6sa 20: 1; considering
the use of TO'OV"<O, (as we have seen it in B, c 80a Io-II, 79b 28 : 1) to
refer to what precedes, Cope (p. 45) is correct in re6:rring it to the two
preceding hypotheses, e.g., "in critical moments such as these," i.e., crises
that called for substantial aid or wholehearted assistance.
2 " ..l ..imi'>v "'.....
The a.n.;;. refers to the subject of 'P"
)..va.., a 12. The phrase is to be taken with each of the procases. Four cdd.
punctuate with a comma after Iv ...a; Kassel, Cope with a colon, which
appears more reason.ble.

1 de; ...

1I:OLCLV ~

$C. (fPM.O;;ct,,, ''OU1;'Ol1') ofJ, . ..

oM
Cpo 79" ~.
3 " .. I "oU~ ..;;", cpo.wv
For the accusative see 8Ia 8-9. TWv
'PI),,,,. = "their friends" (S. II:I.I), "their" referring to those who are the
subject of 'P,).ova .., a IS: "they are friendly to tho.e who are friends of
their friends."

14 :

0"""....' .

"al here introduces another group: namely, "and

a IS " ..I cplAOUV....~
those who like the people whom they themsdves like." It is not explanatory
"al (as Cope, p. 45, takes it) explaining what is meant by TOll~ 'Pl)'o.~
inunediatdy preceding. A moment's reJlection will indicate that this is so.
There is no reason to think from 8Ia 14-20 that mutuality ('P').';;' - d....
'P,).o~,...o~, 81a 2-3) is present in each of the topics mentioned. It is assumed,
all things being equal, to be present - e.g., SIa 19: 'Pal'.Ta, sI.a, - and
thus it is ground for the emotional response ('P&Ao6vT'~) they experience
(see EN IIS90 "7 - b I).

81a 20

ARISTOTLB. IRHBTORIC' 11

For a fuller discussion of the

a 15-16 '<oU~ <Pu.ou",tvou~ .. aN'<D(~
problem of detemrining whether a friend is one who is ""Aw, or ",IAo61'."0,, see Plato, Lysis, :012-213.
a

16

'<D'(~ aN'<Di~

sc. oC, <xBeol slao: "to the same people to whom

they are enemies."

a 17-18 xlll '<oU~ ",uroup.tvwv
What appears to be at work in
these topics in 81a 14-20 is the principle of likeness in general as the basis
of ",';'la, and Cope, p. 45, is correct, I bdieve, in pointing in that direction.
It certainly makes the kind of ""Ala whieh appears to be the subject of discussion (see 81a 15) more reasonable. A. first broached the idea of likeness
as the ground of ""Ala and then put it aside at EN IIssa ]I - IISSb 16
(and C 71b 12-:OS). He returned to it at IIS9b Z-4 in saying that equality
and likeness are ""UT'II" and, particularly so, among men of virtue (whieh,
while not stated, seems to be the assumption of our passage). He then went
on to devdop this idea in a specific way (n59b Z4 - nOOa 30) by showing
that xO""OJvla CCcommon association," which, as it is devdoped, means
community of purpose, or of physical rdationship, or of ideals) is the base
of friendship - e.g., i, Ho,o."I'1l'ae oj ""Ala (lIS9b 31-3:0) - concluding
at IIOOa 29-30 that the various kinds of ",';'la, correspond to the vatious
kinds of "o,o.,ola,. C 8J:b IS : 1.
18 '<oU'<o~
i.e., all the preceding accusatives in 81a 14-18, namely,
the persons who are the objects of the ",';'/a experienced: "for the same
things appear to be good to all these people as (appear to be good) to them."
19 :1 Kill aN'<O'(~
i.e., "as to them," namely, the subject of ""Ao;;a ..;
c LS, "at, A.III.
c.O"<e (3oUl.ecr81l'
sc. wan TOUTOV,; i.e., the subject of the
infinitive is the same gtoup as that mentioned in TOUTO', in a 18. The understanding on the part of those experiencing the emotion (the ""Aoii" .. of.
12) is that these persons wish them good just as they desire good for these
persons; see !socrates, PatltJth. 54.
zo : 1 ~v
See 63' 9: 1. The article (TO;;) is generic (S. II22);
cpo 79a 36 (Tfi Me'1). The genitive is possessive (S. 1304).
3 eU1tO''1''''XDU~ in the sense of S9b 3:0 : " "able to and disposed to
do good"; el, xe>ll'aTa: "with regard to money"; on this use of see Bonitz,
Index, :O:02.5Sf[ Cope, p. 46. speaks here of "the utilitatian view of virtue, ...
already prominendy brought forward in 1.9." First of all ""Ala as a virtue
is not the issue, but ""Ala as a "dBo,. Secondly, on this "utilitatian view"
of virtue, see 66b 4. and EN II56a I#. where the utilitatian view of IIS6a
lo-U is put aside.

.1"

8ra 24

COMMENTARY

71

1 ToU~ D..EU9ptou~
See A 9, 66b 16-17, and 66b 7 : 1. From
66b I6-r7 it becomes clear that they feel friendly toward "the generous"
because they are evmwrrr:ueo el, Xe7}IICTQ (a 20); see EN Il20a 21-23.
2 ToU~ olv6plou~
See A 9,66b II-I3 and 661> 12: 1, from which
the same inference a. that of the preceding note must be drawn with respect
to the avb(!io, who are v";077,,'''0 el, uW"CTJ(liap.
3 T.""",,,, xcd ToU~ 6.x .. lou~
Apart from the colon (Roemer,
Dufour, Tovar use a period), this is the way the text is read by four edd.,
Spengel, Cope. I accept it but punctuate with a colon after ~,,,alov, as do
Ross, Spengel. It is preferable to the period since we have in 8ra 20-24
one topic naming three lrinds of people who are d,e objects of 'P"Ua. Kassel
collocates di1ferendy and not unattractively by using a period after T"PW""
and thus beginning a new topic with "al TO~' ~I"alov, ... pcUI"Ta - in
which case al"alov, would be the object of 'PIlov" .. undmtood (a 12). On
amalov, see A 9, 66b 9-II.

a 21 :

a 22 : 1 TO'oU-rOU~
From what A. says in what follows and from his
statement in A 9, 66b 9- II, this would refer to Toll, ~I"alov,. With v"olappa,ov,," undmtand el.ao: "they assume such to he those who ...";
cf. 7!lb 28 : 1.
2 ToU~ ~';;VTCl~
As we saw at A 9, 66b 9-10 (66b 10),
justice is the virtue whereby men possess what is their own and as the law
commands. The just man, then, is one who respects the rights of another, or
as we read in EN II30a 3-5: 'Justice alone of the virtUes is thought to be the
. good of the other since it looks to d,e other" (see also II34b 5-6). In these
termS the just man is correcdy assumed to be one who does not use others
(d'P' 'TieOJ' CW'Ta,) but to belong, on the contrary, to the class of 8Ia
18-20 ("iia ... .. 'Pao.).

Ii""

1 01
Toil .pyci~Ecr9...
sc. 01 COl .... , ';"0 ... : "those who
live by their own labor." eeraCeaOal refers particularly to agricultural
work (e.g., see Thucyd. 2.72.3) which seems to be its primary meaning here.
However, we saw it at A 9, 67a 31 where it refers to manual labor.
2 ~cni'fWV . yECdpylCl~
TOVTWV is a partitive genitive; the
phrase refers to those who live by their own labor. Farming and agriculture
(e.g., husbandry in general) are also given high praise in the Oeamomica 1343a
25 - 1343b 6, a work, if not by A. (? Theophrastus), is considered to be
(in its first two books) by very early Peripatetics with a base in A.'s Politics
and Xenophon's O.tonomit"s. Xenophon, of COUIse, holds farming in high
esteem in the State; Barker, p. 263112, speaks of the "agrarian trend in Aristotle's thought" seen in Pol. I.9-II. Cp., however, Freese, p. 194a.

a 23 :

Tcdv oiAAb>v 01 "~TOUPYO(

clAAOJ. (for its meaning, see S. 1273)
is partitive genitive with pcJ..!'aTa: "and beyond all the rest (of those

a 24

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

8ra 32

who live by their own labor)." We saw aUTOVerol at 73a 8 : 2; they are,
as defined by Hesychius: oE d,' eavTcii. ~eraCop.o, and so they are not
the workers of 67a 31.
a 25 : I "'DU~ G':'CPPDV~ .. ci6",o!
The reason for feelings of rprJ.la
toward this class is dependent upon what is said about the just in a 22, and
cf. 8Ia 22 : 2. On ao>rpeoaVVT/, see 66b 13.
2
ciftpciyl'ov,,~
i.e., those who mind their own business; the
reason here is the same as in the preceding note, preswnably on the ground
that these, too, exercise self-restraint regarding others. There is an interesting
conjunction of the aUTOVerol and the d3tedrp.o~ who constitute the
demos in Socrates' discussion of the democratic State in Rep. 565a.
a 26 : I "Cll ot~
,e. "al (T06rOV~ rprJ.oiialV; cf. 8Ia 8--9) ol~. However,
note that in the relative clause A. clranges from the generic plural which
he has been using (at, e.g., 8Ia 14, 15, etc.) to the first person plural.
a 'P"Lv"",,,,,,.
i.e., "are manifestly (clearly) willing"; cf. 78a 31 : 3.
a'7 ciYCl8ol"..",' cip.~
i.e., morally good; as he says in EN 10960
23-29, the good has many meanings; moral goodness, clem) >10,,,>1, is set
out for us at n05b IS - no6a 12.
a .8 :

See A 5, 6ra 25-27, together with 6zb 20 : a;

660"'1'0'

and cf. A 12, 72b 21.

i.e., "or among those who
2 8C1.UI'''~o""ivo.~ ... 9"u ....cil;ou.rLV
are admired by us, or among those who admire us"; the verb has the
meaning found' at 79b 25 where it is also used to denote the subject's admiration for another, or the admiration of another with respect to the subject.
The TO'~ in TO'~ 8avp.dCovalV is a conjecture of Victorius' read by the edd.
for the ol~ of the codd., and I would accept it. If ol~ is read, a different
meaning emerges and it was indicated by the ancient commentator Anonymus: "and those who are hdd in honor in all things, or in the best things,
or in those things which they admire, or in which othm admire them."

".d

a 30 CJUVll",yuy.iv
CJUVll.'IJ .....pEiiG...
The infinitives define the
meaning of >id.'~' In EN Il57b 19-24 A. says that there is nothing more
clraracteristic of mends than being together, that even those supremely
happy desire to spend the day with each other. Cope, pp. 47-48, has a long
note on the verb forms.
a 31 c!t ......p"'ClVOp.&vc..v
the verb is seen at 74b 7.

"of them when they are at fault"; the idea in

a 32 'PLAOv.XD.
the reading of Dufour, Ross, Kassel rather than
rprJ.6
(read by Roemer, Tovar, Spengd, Cope); on the form, see LS,
rp'A6v",o~: 2, and 63b I, 6sb 21, ?Db 3].

,,0.

Sra 34

COMMENTARY

73

a ]>-33 1tclV'<.~ ... ~ouA.,,8 .. ,

Ross alone encloses this in parentheses. On l'amTl><o/ (inclined to be contentious) see 72b 31; at 7Ia I : 1
I would find an applied meaning for the word. <p ..i.o..... (1061.,,0 ... =
"manifestly desire," as would be revealed by their quarreling and contentiousness.
a 34 : 1 ot l:1'n&E~tol .. . OrcOPOELVClL
se. ,l1o, eierl", On the construction which is changed here, see 8xa S-9. Because of the nominative,
Spengel. p. 223, considers this, not a new topic, but an addition to the topic
at SIa 30-33 (.O.OVTO ... (10111.,,0 ...). In view of the fact thatthe",,,ai~.o.
are in exactly the same class as all the others in SIa 8-33 (as well as the class
of those who follow), I do not understand Cope's explanation, p. 4S, since
there is no change here "from the objects to the subjects of liking." &< to
his distinction between "liking" and "loving," it is no more applicable to
this group than to any other mentioned. For an understanding of what is
meant by Sra 34-36, EN II27b 33 - lusb 4 should be read. Among other
things we find there is the comment that in humor the "",ai~,o~ man represents the mean between the (1OJ/Jo16"o~ (buffoon) and the lJ:ye'o~ (boor).
Cope has a note (pp. 48-49) on "",6.~<o~ and other adjectives compounded

with. ent.
2 xcii. 'Ra)8ciaa.l XIXl UX0I'-ELVClL
This is a confl1sed passage in the
codd. The reading given is that of two codd., Kassel (cf. Der Text, pp. 133-34),
Cope (c. pp. 49-50), Freese; Ross reads )Gal -rep 'f(lJOdaat xal 'rrp vnoperval.
Other codd. suggest the possibility of TOJ9&".. ,. Cod. A, Roemer, Dufour,
Tovar, Spenge! and possibly (but not certainly) the Anonymus Commentator read Na, rq; naiaa, )Gal 't"qi vnope'i'JIQt, Those who read with. cod.
A find no difficulty in the dative of the articular infinitive with l",a.~,o~.
Whereas A. rarely uscs TOJOdCs .. (it is more common ill Plato), " ...6Ia, " ..iC... is quite frequent in passages similar to ours; see, e.g., EN II27b 33 lusb 4, Rhetoric 70a IS, b 3S, 7" 4, b 34, Sob 3. Furthermore, the tenor
of the passage, which must be kept in mind, seems at first view to imply the
kind of witty repartee and pleasantries more identified with "aIC ..., .s
does the use of
o~ as a synonym for .VT~dnelo~ at EN IuBa 33.
For this reason .,8d".. , Ueer, taunt, mock, scolf at) might seem too strong
and, in the light of 79a 29-30, more likely to cause feelings of anger not
friendliness. On the other hand, the use of {mOl"""', and of
at a 3S-3 6, suggests that A. has in mind temperaments able to handle something stronger than mere good-natured joking.
3 U'KOf'ELV(lL
sc. nalCeaBal., i.e., as explained at 81a 35-36, those
who are skilled, dextrous, in the give and take ofbanter.

.".a

",,,h,,nw

cmwden' ml = press on toward.

a 34-36 E1'tl 'l:'w"to ... aXW'M'OV"l:'E~
strive eagerly for: "for both have the same objective in mind [i.e., a pleasant

74

ARISTOTLB, IRHBTORIC' II

8rb

time] as the other ~iterally: their neighbor] since they are able to take a jest,
and to return it gracefully"; but see 8ra 3S : 1.
1 a.!'-'Po...po.
is the reading of the codd., of three edd., Spengel,
Cope. Ross, Kassel read d"''PoTie'''~, a conjecture of Roemer's. There may
be a point in Roemer's conjecture, or Thurot's df'fPtiTef!ov ("0bservations
critiques [I]," 304-305) - namely, to take "a! 01 h,,6ie,0 ... "no""'.a, as
a single class: those able to make and take a joke. On the other hand, our
d"''PoTseo, indicates that there are two classes: (a) those able to make a joke,
(b) those able to take one. This distinction must be kept in mind at du.d,..e.01 ... O'"cimTov,,~. In this sense a!-"PoTBeO' makes a totally acceptable
reading in accord with EE 1234" 4-23, where we learn that wit is of two
kinds - (a) a delight in the truly comic even if it is directed against oneself,
and (b) a gift for producing the comic - and that tbe two are different
(a 14-18). C dfJ'Poneo" 8Ib J.
z '<ij> w.>\a.OII
dependent upon TavTo; see 62a 9.

a 35 :

is the reading of Ross, Kassel, Cope

a 37 : 1 K,d ..aU","", !,-a,a.... Ii
from a good tradition; d,e other edd., Spenge! read "a! TOVT"'P a,..dJ.'aTa.
In our reading TOUT"" is clearly a partitive genitive with ,..dl'O'Ta referring
back to Tel .. dyaM. These aya6d, in the light of the praise given to
them, are probably their virtues; cf. 63a 10, 67a 29 : " 67b 27-33.
z !'-iI ~"cipX"v
Ricllards, p. 107, calls attention to the unusual
(and it is) infinitive construction in place of the ordinary relative clause. Once
again, however, we seem to have a constructio ad sensum since tpo{1oiJ-II'ra"
"which they fear" carries the idea: "which they clearly think [oloPTa,]
they do not possess."
8Ib I _e ..polO\)~
i.e., "those who are respectable in appearance, dress,
and their whole manner of living." Our reading is that of Tovar, Ross,
Kassel with cod. F and other codd. The odler edd. Spenge!. Cope read
"a6a.eiou~. On the various uses of the word. see Cope. p. 51. It is nnderstandable that such people migbt easily inspire feelings of 'PLAia in others.
b 2 !'-iI OVE'&"'''ci~
See 8Ib 3. AA we know from 74a 22 (and see
74" 22 : I). ""do~ is the opposite of praise. Insofar as these persons do
not resort to such 8...60~. either because of faults committed against them
or because of their own (unacknowledged) kindnesses. they reveal a good
will which possesses all the marks of one who is a friend, e.g. 80b 3S - 8ra 1.
and particularly of one who treats them well. 81a nf. These people are
in = y ways like those described at 8ra 31.
b 2-3 ck!'-..p..'1!'-ci.....". ~EpyE..'1!'-ci....",
For the meaning of the first
see 74b 7; of the second. 67a 6 : 1. Since both nouns signify action toward
another, the first. the action of the 'PLAOii"B~. the second. the action of the

SIb 9

75

COMMBNTARY

'P,lov",."o" this elliptical expression has to be filled out: "they experience

feelings of friendliness toward those who do not reproach them because
of their [the 'P'Ao;;"TE~l failings in their regard or because of their own
[the 'P,lov"".o,] kindnesses toward them [the 'P';'06'TE~]."

b 3 a.fUponpoL
It is clear that A. has in mind two different classes
in fJ~ o...o,..~d~, either one of which is a likely object of 'P'lla: (a) those
who do not censure others for faults committed against themselves, and (b)
those who do not reproach others with the kindnesses they have done them; c
8Ia35 : 1.
1'-"'IaL"""";;"'<"~
Aeschines, Again.!l Ctesiphon 20S (see also
On the Embassy 176), says that if the Athenians who helped restore the democracy (4<>4/403 B.C.) had been like Demosthenes, there would have been no
restoration. However, they were men "who gave voice to the finest words of
a coltiv.ted mind, 'forget and forgive.''' This sentiment is repeated by

b4: 1

Cicero, Phil. I.I.I.

2 rpU).IIX'<L"OU~ ......" Oyx).'Il'-ci........

On 'Pvl"'m"ov~ c 60b 17;

in the light of the context, i.e., those who remember past injuries, the adjective here would mean: "those inclined to cherish [LS, 'Pvlti ....co: B.3],
nurse, grievancrs." The technical meaning of i""J..7Jpa was seen at A 12,
72a 22, and 7Jb 33.

b 5 eU_,<m).)'ciX't"ou~
67b 17.
otou~

b 5-6

... ot......... ,

The idea in the word was seen at A 9, 67a 19-20,

On "ai, see Sra 19 :

1.

The subject of the

main verb (oiona,) is those who experience the emotion of 'P'lla, and
we are given the reason why they so react to this particular class: "for of
such disposition as they accept these persons to be to the rest of men, so

they think they will be to themselves." Understood with oiovTa, is ~o'ov

TDU"

elval.. Cope, p. 51, is confusing.

b 7 : 1 " .."o).oyou~

See 79a 34, S4b S.

"nor even .cquaint themselves with
either the evil in their neighbor or the evil in them," as Socrates, Thea.retus
173 d, says of the philosopher: no more does he know evil of anyone than he
knows the number of pints in the ocean. This topic should be compared
with 79b 20-24.
2

1'-'1&. et&O,<..~ .....6.........

b 8-9 (I ya.p ... 5p~

As he says at EN 1099a 17-18: the good man
finds his delight in noble actions; or at n66a 15-16: the good man is the
one who struggles to do the good.
b 9 a"ou&ci~ouaL" Cf. 79& 35 :

1.

ARISTOTLE. 'RHBTORIC' II

b 10 :

"'''XYJ''''XO(

",po~ cN"'oU~

8Ib 19

as e."Plained at 80a 32-33.

i.e.. those who experience ""Ata.

b II : J ,",ou6 .. u..~ ""'~ IxOYT"~

"those who are somewhat seriously disposed toward them"; c S. 1709b.
2 811N",cil;""",~
On the meaning c 81a 28 : 2; it modifies and
species <lnoudai." ,... , l%ov~a,. as do vnol"l'{idvovTa,. %ai~oVT~. and
nBn..6dTa,. each of which has its own object.
3 ""ou5,dou~
sc. a,;~oo, elva,; on the word see 78a It>-I7.
Boa 30 : J.
b 12 X,dp""",..~ cN",oi~

"find pleasure in them."

Il"'.....

b 12-13 "'..
(3""""""''''
"and in particular have had these
feelings about qualities for which they particularly wish ..." TriTa is an
internal accusative with nm0v8dTa, (S. 1573); cpo 7Ib 19.
b "4 60x.iv

as used.t 80a "3. 79' 33: "to be thought to be."

C Sla 17-18; cpo A II. 7Ib 12-23 on the pleasure

b 15 : J bfLO(OU~
found in likeness to another; see also EN II59b 2-3. & A. qualifies the
general principle here (lav pi! ... (iio,). so he qualifies it in the earlier
passage. e.g.t 7Ib 14 (.. , ... ,..lu').
2 TeN"'cIt ...,"'1J6.uov ..... ~
"and engage in the same pursuits."
3 ....pEVOXAcdcr'
Cpo 79' 14; the verb in composition would
indicate here th.t some annoyance is toler.ble. but not an excess.
J ,; (3(o~'
ie.. livdihood; there should be colon after it.
2 oil........o x.p .. ",.u~ x'p .. ",.i
is the reading of a good tradition
and is accepted by Dufour. Ross. IUssd. and Cope. The other edd. and
Spengd read with cod. A: oiIT., Hal "Bf!apB1l, HB~"I'B'. thus giving the phrase
as direct citation from Hesiod as it is found in the codd. at 88. 16. For
the citation (Works and Days 25-26). see 71b 14; see also Pol. I3I2b 5. EE
1235" 18; on Hesiod (fJ.. 700 B.C.?) c OeD.

b 16 :

Ellii "'''
for the us.ge see LS. e!: B.VIL3.b.
TeNW . era",(3"!""
"the same thing simply takes place":
namdy. that which Hesiod said (potter grumbles at potter. etc.) which. of
course. expresses feelings of dislike not ""lla.

b 18 :

J
2

b 18-19 x ..1..po~ . . .

sc. "al (""lo;;O'w ToVToo,) ~., 00,. ...

b I!r20 ",cit ..po~ 561;1111

This is ordinarily and attractivdy interpreted
to mean "the unconventional": "so that they are not ashamed of their unconventional actions." This is possibly done under the influence of 84b 22-26.
There. however. the corresponding phrase is not Ta n~o, dd~av but Ta
..... vopov do"oma. On the meaning of MEa as "what one expects" and so

"'e.'

81b 24

COMMENTARY

77

"what is established and likdy" in the interpretation above, see 79a 23-2S
(In ... (Jo1l).ua.) and 7l)a 23-2S. However. because of the contrast between
Ta "eo~ doEa. and Ta "eo~ d).-.jge,a., it seems that we have the distinction
operativeherewhichappearedatA 7, 6sb 1-8 (see6sb I : z; see aha EN II2.8b
23-24): namely, that between that which is thought to be and the truly real;
cpo Top. losb 30-]4. Since both phrases are the object of a form of al..xV.opa., their meaning in part should be specified by the action denoted in the verb.
We know ttom 83b 13-IS thauhame is occasioned by evil or bad things which
appear to bring the person dishonor, or, as A. states it more simply at EN
II28b 22, "shame is consequent upon bad actions." Therefore. Ta "ecl~ MEa.
would be actions or things which are thought to be, i.e., are apparently,
wrong (cf. SIb 31-32); Ta "'ecl~ cU-.j9 a., those truly wrong. And so I would
interpret b 18-20: "And (they like those) toward whom their attitude is
such that, provided there is no contempt, they are not ashamed of their
own apparently wrong actions." In other words, the actions are not truly
bad (though open to such an interpretation) and are seen as not bad and
thus are tolerated by the other person; further, the actions in no way imply
disregard (d).'YOJeta, 1Sa 32.) for the other person. Many of the liberties taken
among those who are ttiends presume their understanding, and fall into this
category. 84b 22-2.6 should be compared with the present passage; we
find there an interesting collocation of d)'~9.", and do" : Tli "eo,
cU-.jge.a. dO"oV.Ta.
b

20 : J

p.iJ

X ....ll<PpovoGvoro<;

"aTllIPed"" ..,~ cf. 18b 14-IS :

On the force of p-.j cf. s. 213 I; on

J.

Z XCII ..po<; 06<;

This is another topic designating another class
toward whom men experience 'PMta. such persons, with respect to whom
they are ashamed of their really bad actions (Tli neo~ d).-.j9.....), can be found
at 843 2S1

We have seen the word at 79b 24- See 79b 24 : z.

b 2.2 : J 1;7JAO;;"OCl' rpOov'''O.. ,
On Cjj).o, see chap. II; on 'P90.."
chap. 10. The nature of the emotions explains the choice made here.
z ..011..",,<;
either their rivals or those they desire to have emulate
them.
b 23 ClUP...p........... 'v
We saw the word at 7l)a 14; on the mood, see
S. 2S4SC. Here, governing the dative and the accusative, it means: "those
whom they assist in procuring good." Such cooperation is more substantial
than e1'h>ola (EN u67a 1-2) which is like li:iendlincss, but is not 'PM1a, as
we see at EN u66b 301
b 24 : J p.Elln
The apodesis to this protasis (cf. S. 23351) is the
onderstood 'PMoii ... (see 8u 11-9), Le., "al (aIlTotl, 'PM06 ..,) of, a.....

AlIISTOTLB, 'amrrORIC' II

2 "cd Ta;:~
is the reading of all the codd., the edd. (save Ross,
Kassel), Spenge! (but with doubt), Cope. It is explained by introducing

the words 'PIAO' slul suggested by 81b 23 ('PIAoI eloa,) and on a parallel
with 81a 8-9, and 81a 34. on which see notes. Bonitz (Studi"', pp. 8889) objects strongly to this as contrary to A.'s usual style. He finds the
dative even more unusual in that A. continues with accusatives which
have appeared since 81a '4 (all of which I have taken as the object of an
understood 'PIAO;;u<v; c 8Ia 8-9, and with which Bonitz would agree).
He suggests that we read (as Ross and Kassel do) with the Basel edition of
ISSO "al oi, sc. "al ('P1A0;;0" TOV~) oi. Bonitz may be correct, but then
we may ask his explanation for the change in construction at 8Ia 34- Further,
if a choice is to be made the leetio diffi,;lior of the codd. in which 'PIAO';u..
(b 25) is the present participle (not the more expected present indicative)
seems preferable; and so I have retained the reading of the codd.
b 25-26 "cd Tau~ . TaLC.uTou~
The "al is intensive; the article
designates the more definite class of those mentioned in 81a 25; c Kiihner,
Blass, & Gerth, II.I.46S.S: "wherefore all men are friendly particularly to
those who are so devoted [ToIWrov~l to dead friends."
b 27 rpu-arplAou~
"fond of friends"; see 6]b I : 2 on the use of the
compound 'PIlo-. The reason for aJfection toward such persons is set forth
at EN IIssa 2!r-3 r: such men are thought to be good men; and more specifically at IIS9a 33 - IIs9b 1 where we find that such people have the quality
of friends: namely, the ability to love. There is a fragment from Apollodorus
of Carystus, a new comedy poet (? 300-285 B.C.), The Epidikazomenon,
which speaks to the idea: /Jooo~ <rae> b.to'TaTQI 'PlAeio 'PI.:tov" see Edmonds, III a, 194.19. We find it translated by Terence in Phormio 562:
"solus est homo amica amicus," Terence mentions an EpidiCllZomenon in his
prologue, and Donatus on Phormio 48 tells us that Terence is following
Apollodorus.
b 28 : 1 ....... <ly..o..y
partitive genitive with /Jo.A'o'Ta: "of good
men most of all they like .. "
2 rpU-ELY
an infinitive specifying T~ dya6oo" "those who are
good at being friends."
J .u."'M'a".you~
We see the same metaphorical meaning in
Plato, Apol. 17C, "forge, fabricate, concoct." Here the force of the middle is
on hand: "those who do not falsify themselves to them," which is another way
of saying: "those who are honest with them."
b 29 : I TOloUTOl 50 01 x ..!
those ... "

"to this class

La>! "AaTTo/J,oov~l also belong

81b 33

COMMBNTARY

79

In the light of the argument which follows at 81b

30--32 and the statement at 81b 19-20 this must be interpreted as "their own
faults, mistakes," i.e., things relatively petty; trivial, thoughdess wrongs.
Taken as a substantial and real wrong it renders the statement at 81b 30--32
2 TO. <pczGAcz

meaningless; see, e.g., BIb 31.

3 icz","""
Tovar alone reads a1lT1lW with cod. A.
b 30--31 dpl)TCZ' yo.p .. czl"ltw6l'c8cz
e.g., 8Ib 19-20. A. once
again (see 8Ia 26, pouM,..JJa) changes from the third person plural to the
first person. The argument in b 28-]2 is: those who are honest with others
are the recipients of <p<Ala; among such persons are those who speak of the
other's trivial faults. But, as haS been said, among friends such talk is not a
cause of shame, and so these people who experience no shame in such selfrevelation are treating the recipient of their talk as a friend and that is why
they receive <p<Ala in return.
czl"lt"V0I'EVO~ l'iI <pU.CL
This is true only of one who in the
presence of "friends" is ashamed of his app.rent wrongs, for we know from
8Ib 20 that men are ashamed of their ,e.1 wrongs before those they hold as
friends. The point here is that a sense of shame for apparent wrongs indicates
that such a person does not view the other as friend.

b 31 6

b 32 <pO(iEPoU~
b 33 : 1
2

i.e., in the active sense: those who cause fear.

ofI~ 8CZppoGI'EV
oU&E~...

<pu...

"of whom we have no fear."

as should be clear from the de6nition of

<po(lo, at 82a 21-22.

b 33-34 d&l) U ... TOl";;"CZ

If anything, A.'s objective in this statement SeemJl to be to poirit to the ground of all <ptAla, and so (as far as the
Rhetoric is concerned) to the ground for the feelings, d,e emotion, of <p<AIa.
This foundation is enunciated at EN II6Ib II, h "owowla,..h1 oJ. naaa
'I"lla. lent'll, and at II59h 29-30, Ho.8' DaDV dB KO"'QJ'Po6al." ... 8"' f~la.
I say this for two reasons: (a) the presence of !faa To,a;;Ta in our text; (b)
the fact that although A. speaks of three kinds of <p<Ala (namely, feelings of
<p<Ala) here in the Rhetoric, they are not at all formally the three kinds of
friendship he speaks about in the EN. In the EN he remarks at IIS6a 7,
and again at u62a 34. that there are three kinds (Tela e'lMI) of friendship. But the three kinds he has in mind in the EN are not forma1ly those
we meet in the Rhetoric although the essential reqlrirement for friendship
is present in both the .id'! of dIe Rhetori& and those of dIe EN: namely,
some kind of shared relationship. The three kinds of friendship we meet
in dIe EN are dIe friendship of utility (dtd TO xll'la',.... <p<Ao;;1'TB', IIS6a
10), dIe friendship of pleasure (dI ~do.>iv, IIs6a 12), the friendship of

80

AllISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' II

81b 3S

men good and alike in virtue (-ruBta 'Pula, IIS6b 7). When A. comes
to analyze these three types in some deWl together with other aspects
of 'P,Ata in the rest of Books 8 and 9 he mentions the Bfcl7j of the Rhetoric
in different contexts, contexts which imply that they may submit to one
or the other of the three types he presents in the EN. Finally, in this whole
. matter we must not forget that in the Rhetoric we are con=ed with "dlhJ
not U .." emotions not virtues, and that A.'s intention here as it is in
the rest of this chapter (as also in all of B :>-II) is to analyze the disposition
of those who experience feelings of 'Pula, the kind of persons who cause
such feelings in them, and the reason for such feelings, e.g., 78a 2.3-2S. See
Gauthier & JaM, Ib, 6SS-S9 for a good introduction on mendship; the
chzrt on p. 688 indicates the kind of problem which can be met in seeking
correspondences between the three kinds of mendship in the Rhetoric and
the doctrine of the EN.
b 34 : 1 l .....pEI..
In general the word ka'eo, as used by Homer of
Achilles and Patroclus would describe this rdationship. At first glance
there seems to be an ascending order of more intimate rdationship in ka'eela,
ol"..6~7J~, ""1'"lo..a, and superficially such may be intended. Schrader's distinction, p. 2.340 is quite appealing, e.g., sodalitas, necmitudo, cognatio. But
statements in the EN make one hesitate to assert this. For example, EN
!Is8a 18-20 would seem to describe .~a'e.la as one would naturally understand it. There is a further description of it at n6ra 2.S-2.7; but here it is
used of a mendship more properly called .."""io..a. At EN IIS9b 3S II60a 8 the order of importance would appear to be oZ,...6~~, ka<e,la,
OlJ)?'s,..sca.
,

2 OlXEL6'r'l~
This would be some general kind of kinship of
association which is what A. seenu to have in mind at EN n61b 1:>-16 when
he sets it off from what he calls njo 'P,liao ..v""ev-lv Hal njo iTa<e'H1jo.
It would appear to be the 'Puta set down at IIS9b 27-3S, n60a 9-30: that
occasioned by any form of societal bond.
3 lNYTYEL..
This is some kind of blood rdationship, at least
as it is described at EN n61b 16 - n62a 29, IIS8b II-23. As was said in the
preceding note, it is set apart (together with comradeship) from other rdations of friendship, and at lIS9b 3S - IIooa 8 it appears as the highest of the
mendships in the obligations imposed. In the division of 'P,Ata attributed
to A. by Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers: Aristotle S.31, this type
is the ouly one which appears: e.g., ~7} ""rr"'~, njv 8. leom",p.,
-ni- d. Eev'H1jo.

b 3S : 1 "oLlJ'rLXci
"things which tend to produce" (6200 27 : .) the
emotion, the feelings, of 'P,lia (see comment toward end of 8Ib 33-34).
Cope, p. 56, points out that the plural fonn is meant to include xde" and

8:!.a 2

COMMENTARY

81

the two specifications. We see this again at 82a a. In this short passage
we are given the l,,1 "oto,~ of the triple division (78a 23-2S). There has
been no formal discussion of nw, T8 du".ai",...o..
z Xcip.~
The meaning in this word as well as in the two qualifications of it is to be found in B 7 where the ",'8o~ is defined; see the commena at 8sa IS, 8sa 17.
J ",d "';, . . . " ..I "';, . . .
''both doing a favor though not asked
and doing it without advertising it."
4 fL-li 5'7Jatv",o~
For this form of the genitive absolute, see S.
:ul72; it is concessive here.
b 36 ..6-.oii
i.e., the person who, as the object of the action, experiences
as a consequence the feelings and emotion of ,!><Ala.
82a I : 1 ....pl 5' IXap .. ~ " ..1 ",OG fL'"O'''
For the prepositional phrase
instead of the direct object, see 66b Z4 : J. From the argllll1ent in 8aa 1-19
enmity and hatred are taken as one, and so I would interpret "at as alternative: "Enmity or hatred can be studied." Certainly 'If,8ea is the opposite
of'l").[a, as ia expression "''''w. is the opposite of 'I',Aw.. Apart from what
is said in this section there is little to be found on ",iao~ in A. In Pol. I3I2b
25-34 we are told that from the sirnilarity of eJfeca hate must include anger;
and that while anger is frequently a more eJfective stimulus than hate, it
cannot stop to reason but hate can. Plutarch has a small treatise On Envy
and Hate. The Loeb edition of Delacy and Einarson is competently annotated. The treatise, which complemena A.'s remarks here, begins with a
brief introduction stating that envy and hatred are the same in intent in that
they are opposed to 'I',Ala, and then engages in a contrast of the two (536fS38e), the conclusion of which is that the intent of each is different: hatred
is to injure; envy does not go to this extreme.
3 tv.."",I..."
i.e., the various particular topics for 'I',Ala just presented in the chapter. Love as the opposite of hatred has been stated a number
of times in the Rhetoric, e.g., at 80b 34. 78a 1-3, 77b 31-32; A 2, s6a IS-16;
I, s4b 8-9; and see Top. l06b 2-3.

See 8Ib 35 : 1. There is a point of some importance,

a 2 : 1 ",o'7J""Xci
it appears, to be kept in mind here and in what follows: here, that both
l"'1e.aa",o~ and ~,afJoA.q cause Oel'7/; and in what follows, 82a 3-19, that
any attention given them would be that of their rdation to oel'.q, which is
the primary concept A. uses to define and delimit ",;;ao, - llf,8ea as an emotion.
Z opy/I
See chap. 2, and 78a 31-33 through 78a 33.
J m7JP"'''fL6~
See 78b 14-15 : z.
4 8 ...~ol.i)
See S~ 16: z. Anaximenes treW the idea at much
length, at I436b 38 - 1437b 33 and again at IWa aI - I442b a8. The kind

82

ARISTOTLE, 'rumrOnIC' II

82a 8

of hatred occasioned by this sort of action is frighteningly exemplified in

its consequences for Socrates; see Plato, Apology. lsocrates. Amidosis 30,
speaks of the same kind of slander directed against himsel
"arises from conduct directed against oneself,"
" 3 : 1 Ilx ... @TOV
i.e.. personal offenses against one; e.g.. 78. 32.. Cope. K.ssd read eaVTO.
here and in ti,e phrase inlmedi.tdy following, and "dv (for "-". in a 4); each
is from a good tradition.
2 S. ",d
"but enmity even without the personal aspect." n,e "al
is intensive: "even"; c 85" 34. There is no need for any personal offense for
one to experience hate (e.g. 82a 7); robbery victims are not the only people
who can hate thieves. Further, because personal offense is not in question,
Plutarch's observation at 82a 8 : 1 is valid.
"of a certain sort." i.e., rnerdy a certain type of charhas or has not offended one. Beginning here we are given
the differences between anger and hatred, e.g., hatred is not necessarily personal (a 3-S), is directed against a dass as well as an individual (a S-?). is not
healed with time (a 7-8). ainu at (desires) positive harm (a 8), is not accompanied by personal pain (a 12r-13), is without compassion (a 14). All this
brings out rather dearly the rational and calculating character of hatred
mentioned at Pol. 13I2b 32-34 (,LlAd "ii.Uo...d.).
a4

To,0,,5

acter, whether he

a 5 TOt " ..8' bo""TIl

"with particulars." and specifically, as he goes
on to say. with individuals; see 78a 33-35. In this and the following sentences
the verb understood is AUTI.
a 6 KCIllillv;j l:c.>xpci'n)V
is the reading of the edd., except Kassel.
Spengd. Cope reads the dative, on which see his note. p. s6; Kassd reads
without 11 and gives the ordinary accusative form E"'''I!UT'1/ (our form is
a common variant in Plato, Xenophon); from the codd., as I understand
them, there may be a point in omitting the 11. We have the same conjunction
of these two men at A 2, s6b 3I and CalIias is most Iikdy the Athenian nobleIlWl (ca. 4S0-370 B.C.) whom we meet in Plato's Protagoras and Xenophon's

Symposium.
a 7 CNxCKpciv'n)V
Together with the thief he exemplifies the statement at
a 6 ("",'1/); on syncophants, see Bonner & Smith. 1139-'74; Harrison, 116o-62.
219-20.

a 8 : 1 dvlllTOII
But, as the seboliasc says. death or something dse
may well cure it. and Plutarch, On Envy and Hate 538c. says that men give
up enmity or hate when convinced that they have not been unjustly treated,
on taking the position that those hated as evil are good, or when they are
benefited by those they hate. Pericles (Thueyd. 2.64.S) also argued that
hatred does noC last long.

82a

COMMENTARY

II

:2 BpEaLt;
lithe aiming at, desire for," as we see it at EN I I 14b 6.
Cope, p. 56112, has a brief comment on dIe word in which he also mentions
its legal meaning (appeal); for this meaning see Bonner & Smith, 1160, 104,
166; Harrison, II I90ff. The ).""'11 ().""1I' I'P""') would be the TlpOJe1a
(mentioned at 78a 3I; see ,sa 3 I : 3) inflicted on the person who causes the
anger, as is said at 82. IS. Anger and hatred here, in contrast to 82a 12-13
(Hal T~ p,ati,. oil.), are being analyzed in terms of their specifying differences.
3 x"xoU
i... , positive harm, or, as Plutarch (On Envy and Hal<
S38e) expresses it: the deliberate intent of the one who hates is to do harm
("aHa;, no'iiaa,). & 'P,).[a was defined at 80b 36 we could, although A.
never does so, define ",'lao, as: TO {JovA,sa(Jal rwl. a oina, Ha"ci.

a 8-9 ,derO.erO .. , ... 6py,~.".vos

"for dIe angry man wishes the
object ofhis anger to be. aware ofhis revenge"; see, e.g., T'p"'Q!a, 'Pawoph""
at 78a 3I, with which cpo 80b 20-29 and the notes thereto.
a 9 'j\ 5

i.e.,

"00

the other" - namely, the hater.

a 9-I2 I .... , ... xCllxl ..S

I would be inclined to agree with Vater
(pp. 87-88) that this passage is parenthetical and intended to make a distinction
between Ta ).tm1lea. the effects proper to anger, and Ta "a"Il, the effects
proper 00 hatred. The desire of the angry person is to inflict retaliation experienced as pain upon the one who has slighted, to strike back and cause
pain for the pain caused. The specifying diffete1ltia of anger is Tlp"'e!a which
carries with it )."""1/. The specifying differentia of hatred is "ax!.. (e.g., piao,
is an oeBE" "a,,/a,). A "a,,/a can be a Ha,,/a for another without causing
pain. Hatred desires evil for the one hated, but this evil does not have to be
recognized by the one hated and so be a source of pain to him in order for
the emotion of hate to ""Press itsel The one hating is llot concerned whether
or not the evil desired is experienced as evil by the one hated, but simply
that evil be done to the person. Furthermore, A.'s argamont is not undermined
if we say that the angry persoll can actually place an act of T'pOJe/a, which
is in fact an injustice and so an evil, because the primary intent of the angry
person as angry is to retaliate by giving pain; it is not his intent to do evil qua

tale.
a 10 AU"'IP . nciv.....
Pain, like pleasure, by its very notion, is
something which is sensed (De an. 413 b 23: ihr:ov ptv rae aia811a", "al ).""'1
TB Hal 7j60v>1); as a "sensation" it convey> meaning to the mind only as
something that can be experienced (ala8'f/TIf, 10).
a II ci6L><l.. " ..1 ,bppo",""
"the greatest evils - for example, injustice, folly - are least of all objects of perception." These are best taken, I

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTOIUC' II

8"" 17

believe, simply as examples of evils that are not all1lh}Td and so are different
from .l0m).
a II-I2 oU&v . XIlX[Il~
Here we have the reason for the preceding
statement: namely, that the presence of evil does not at all (of necessity) cause
pain, and since it does not, it is not an alaSl1To11.

"'0' "'"

a 12-13 xIII '1:'10

In contrast to a 8, anger and hatred are
being analyzed with respect to their genus: both are 0lli..." but one is
~e<a 1,)"'1' (as a specifYing differentia), the other is <iv." .l,)"'1"
a 14 : 1 1tQ).).w" yevo"......v
What A. has in mind here in saying
that the angry man would turn rom anger to pity "when any number of
things has occurred" (i.e., the situation has changed) is exemplified in part at
Bob 14-16 ("al lav ... n~OJeiav). On the ending 1.187jI1.... see 58b
32: 2.
2 oU&evcl~
sc. ,.evo~ivo,,; this genitive absolute in a rather strange
expression really obtains its meaning through its contrast with nolA,;;,
""o~"OJV: e.g., the occurrence of any number of things would make the
angry man show pity, the occurrence of nothing would make the hater
show pity - "under no circumstances would the other show pity." Plutarch,
On Envy and Hare n8b: men hate even their humbled enemies.
a IS : 1

civ-rL1tCl8ci'V

SC. T01STOJI.

78a 31-332 "iJ .Ivll.

i.e.,

antecedent to the rdative clause; on

the idea see

the complete destruction of the hated person.

Tovar, Ross, Kassel, Spenge!, Cope read correctly

a 16 : 1 'PIlVEP6v
by not indicating any lacuna before this word (Roemer, Dufour mark a
lacuna). To argue for a lacuna because a discussion of l"'1e.al1~o, d.a/1o.l>i
(82a 2) is absent would be to miss the point made at 82a 2 : 1; see also Sob 34We begin a concluding section here which can readily be misinterpreted if
we lose sight of what A. is doing in this analysis. And so I would refer to
my com:ments at 7sa 22 : 2 (see also 7Sb 11 : 2) and call to mind that the
purpose of this topical analysis of the emotions is to enable one to make
an intelligent use of them in forwarding the objective of the TiX""I: namely,
to get at truth as far as it is possible (see 55a 22 : I, 55a 29-38), the truth
which is so easily obscured by the wrong emotional reactions, as A. says at
A I, 54b 8-II.
z tx 'l:'oU......v
i.e., the preceding special topics; see COMMBNTAlty
I 354-55.

xcii h'C'cxC; ci.1tO&ELKWVCl.L . &LCIAUIL'V

anods"cMa, is a synonym for d..l<V1lva., on which see 54' 27 : 3: "explain, point out, prove
by argument." It would appear that the "ai is meant to be jo4led to the

a 17-18

82a 20

COMMENTARY

85

following "Ill p~ o.TIl, and to coordinate the verbs: "it is possible both
to point out those who are friends or enemies and to make friends or enemies
of those who are not, and to refute those who assert that they are frieuds or

enenries."
a 17 'R'OIELV This is often taken to mean "to represent them as" - e.g., by
Richards, p. 108, Cope, p. 58, etc. This reliects the kind of interpretation
about which the caution was given in 82a 16: 1. I believe that the verb
means quite simply "to make, render" (eE LS, A.III), i.e., to make those who
are not friends, friends, or those who are not enemies, enemies.

a 18 : 1 """".....,,~ &1e&AUEIV

"to refute those who assert that they

are friends, or enemies." The verb dial';... is used with the force of lAirx."
here (see Bonitz, Ina.", 5 ), as it is at A IS, 77a 2 (on which see na 2 : 1).
Richards, p. 108, notes (correctly I believe for its ordinary use) that "dlllA1S...
refute cannot take an accusative of the person but only of the statement or
argument refuted."
"Ill... ciI"l'Lcr~'1..oGV"II~
The verb is to be interpreted as it
is at 76a Z4 (see also 77" r): "to bring those who because of anger or hatred
are our opponents to."

a 19 ~'6n6...p' av
is the reading of four edd., Spenge\, Cope.
Ross reads ."oTie"" 11. with Roberts (Oxford translation. note ad locum).
I understand the reading of the codd. to mean: "to whichever attitude one
chooses," i.e. if anger, to anger or its opposite; if hatred, to hatred or its
opposite. On our reading see Jebb's remark Oebb & Sandys, p. 80nz). a"...
is used as it is at A 9, 67b II.
a

20-21

'Koiu ... 'PClVEPOv

See next chapter.

CHAPTERS

I . Discussion of fear: 82a

20 -

83a

12.

I.

Baa 20-27

transition with division; definition of

fear

2..

8.22. 27 - 83a 12

development of fear
things which cawe fear: objective aspeet

(a) 830>1- 8.b 4

(b) 82b 4-22
(e) 8.b 22-'7
(d) bb.8 - 8l' 12

people who cawe fear: objective aspeer

brief summary on the really fcadUl, be they
penona or things
the disposition, attitude, of fearful people:
subjective aspect

II . Discussion of confidence: 83a 13 - 83 b 10

I. 83a I3-I9

transIlton to, with division and definition of, confidence

2. 83a 19 - 83 b IO

development of confidence
thlng. aod persons whichin general occuion

(a) 8l' I9-'S

(b) 8la.s - Slb

10

confidence: objective aspect

the .mpesition, attitudco~ ocmlidcnt people:
subjective aspect

III . Conclusion: 83b IO-II

82a 20 : J 1<oi..
Despite the difference found in the texts, this appears
to be the likely beginning of this chapter. It is clearly accepted as such
by Dufour, Roo., Cope. Roemer, Tovar, Kassel, Spengel begin the chapter,
it appears, at 21, i<1TOJ alj. Once .gain we h.ve the triple division (78. 23-25)
but see 79b 36.
2 .r.&'
See LS, 3: "from wkt follows."

a 21 :

ifcr'no)

<pupa,

C 78a 31 : I.
At EN IlIsa sif. in speaking of courage as the mean
between fear and confidence (see also II07" 33), A. considers fear in passing
as he does also in EE 1228b 4If. He remarks th.t some define it as "!!ouao,,tav
"""oG, as Plato in fact did in ProliJgora, 3S8d; .nd then mentions some of
these evils: disgrace, poverty, sickness, lack of friends, death. Some, but
not all, evils, he continues, .re correctly feared (the man of courage, for ex-

88

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

ample, fears correctly, EE l229a 4-6). Elsewhere in the EN in passing observations, A. takes note of fear as an emotion and part of the definition of
shame (II28b nff.), of the relation of fear to human action, e.g., voluntary
action (I IIoa 41f.), or again to action objectively good but placed under the
constraint of fear (uI6a 3IJf., II21b 28ff., II3Sb ~, II79b uff.). In passages closely connected to EN IIIsa sf. and EE 1228b ~, A. discusses the
meaning of th2t which is feared, TO 'P0P-ed. The meaning of this term
obviously will be determined by the definition of fear itself and so we will
look at those passages when we meet 'P0Psed at 82a 28.
3 >.0.....
i\ ....p..X>\
Kassel alone reads "at for II with some
justification; C 823 28 s.f. The same two classifying nouns are found again
at 86b 23-24. They express, not two separate possibilities, but two closely
connected specifications of fear as "a painful disturbance," as A. says at
EE 12293 33-34: 'fJOPSea Aiy ....a' Ta "o''Im,a <pdpov. TOtauTa .. "0''1T",a A~, <pOaeT"'ii'. The pain and the agitation experienced should be
obvious since the reaction in the person is to something (a 22: "a'<OU <pOneT"'OO 11 A""'1eov) which seriously threatens the person, something which is
dva'l1BTt"~ TOU Cfiv, EE 12290- 40.
4 <p""......[..S
See ,sh 8-9.

"'s

a 22 I'ro""...S AU1nJpoii
"impending (coming) destructive or painful evil." Though the evil is in the future, still its character is such that it
appears imminent; see, e.g., 82a 24-2S. The adjectives qualifying evil are
also important. It is not simply the proximity of the evil but its substantial
threat to the person (e.g., 823 23-24: /Jaa . d.n.aTa,) which causes the
fear. This is made rather clear at EE 1229b 10-12: "for as a matter of fact
danger is spoken of only in such instances of fear when th2t which is capable
of causing such destruction is near." The word <p0aeTl"oii was met at A II,
70a 2 (passim) and it is that which is capable of, tends to, destroy (5gb 32 : I).
On asssessment, the definition of fear in the Rhetoric is rather satisfying.
It is more specific than what we find in the EN or EE (e.g., IIIsa 7-9; 1229a
33-3S) and quite similar to but more correctly psycho-physical in its expression than that found in Plato's Definitions 4Ise: <po{lo, '""A'I'" 'PVxii' i"l
"""00 "eoudo,,{a, or Cicero's Tusc. 4.7.14: "metus opinio impendentis mali,
quod intolerabile esse videatur." It is more complete than what is found
in De port. an. 6sob 27, 692a 23 (see also Rite/oric 89b 33: <po{lo, "aTa.".,!,
.JUTW), or in Prob!. 903b 12: <po{lo, ,.ae Tt, " dro,.i", or in the Stoics as
cited by Stobaeus (Elhica, ed. Gaisford. II 172).
Cpo 82a 10-12: if evil can be present
a 22-23 eN yckp . ~p,,&Us
without pain it does not cause painful disturbance; and if it is understood at
all as evil by the individual, it is not, in such an instance, necessarily seen as
destructive. For most people their own ignorance is not ""Rerienced as

COMMENTARY

something painful; nor does even the unusual person of necessity experience
his injustice to another as painful or destructive to hUnsel Pead';~ here
is used of the mind and is opposed to dl'xl.o,a, on which see 62b 24 : 4
(misprinted as 24 : 2) and Plato, PhaeJr. 2390.
a 23-24 .n;\.' ... SUv.......,
On the interpretation of dwaTa, see 68a
5 : 2, and Cope, p. 59, for further examples. Again we come back to the kind
of evil which is the object of fear. To be noted here is the addition of ,..&l'dla~ to l';",a~ (see also 82a 30) which draws "axov 1v,.."eov closer in its
connotation to "a"o;; 'POaeT'''o;;. Not every "axo. l""''1eo, is an object
of fear. It is the evil described here which constitutes the 'PopB(!a of which
he will shordy speak, e.g., 82a 28/f. In the attempt to make the nature of
the emotion clear and distinct, A. seems to bear in mind. although it is not
his immediate concern. his comment at EE IUla 17-19 (see also EN lIISb
34 - III6a 9): "the confident man is the one who does not fear what he ought.
nor when he ought. nor as he ought to fear; the coward is the one who fears
what he ought not and when he ought not and as he ought not to fear" (see
also I229b 23-25). Intelligent fear is a valuable emotion and its teleology is
clear: the protection of the individual; cpo EE 12290 39-40.

iI....

"and that too" (S. 947). In other words. even the

a 24 x ..l ....
evils just described become objects of fear only when "so near [aV.ey".~]
as to be likely [WUTe ,..,<11...]."
a 26 cpoj3oGv.....,
The force of the middle is present in the word.
"fear for themselves"; Roemer's text misprints u'P0dea.
a 27 :

3..,... lyyO~

sc. AUT! OavaTo>. the elause is causal.

o~d

q>eo.Tl{ov,,,. is used in a different construction at A 3. S8b 37.

z d &>\
We begin here a brief analysis of the things which cause

fear. his first division; see outline to chapter.

a 28 <poj3Epci
These are determined by the definition itself, as A.
says. and must be potentially destructive ('POslee ..) or greatly painful (.i~ 1v,..".
,ueydl'1'). This specification of TO 'i'OPeeo, should be kept in mind
for it illuminates A:s discussion of the fearful in the EE and EN. In the
EE (1228b 10-35) we are told that we must distinguish between that which
is absolutely and that which is relatively fearful. The absolutely fearful
is that which is so to the majority of men or to man as man. Among these,
it would seem, fall both those fearful things which EN IIIsb 7-IS calls
fearful to all men as things beyond human strength, and those which, while
not beyond human strength, are fearful to many. The relatively fearful is
that which is fearful to some individual but in itself is not fearful or ouly
slighdy so. Such relatively "fearful" things are clearly not the concern of the

ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC II

82a 34

analysis here in the Rhetoric. In the EN (IlIsa Io-n) some fearful things
are mentioned. The nature of their fearfulness and of all truly fearful
things is made clearer at EE (1229a 32 - 1230a 33) where we learn (as we do
in the Rhetoric) that they can be called fearful only if they cause disturbance
and pain (and so c 82a 21 : 3. Kassel's reading of "ai). and then only
when they are near at hand and of such a magnitude (whether real or apparent) that the majority of men respond to them with fear.
56val'-ov fl-YcV.'JV
C 82a 28; "substantial capacity. power";
on the word in general see 60b 16 : 2.
a 29

EI~ ... 1NV,<,ovoUall~

a 30

12 :

and cpo A

s.

C 82a 23-2<\; on t1VVT.iv.... see

?lib

60b 9.

a'lp.dll ... 'PO~EPOv

This should be expected from the way
A. has analyzed sign. As he says in the following clause. the sign denotes
the closeness of TO 'P.P8(}ov. which is the signate; see 57b I : 2. ..1:1/".......
384. 39D-93. 39S-97. The enraged dog set to leap is a sign of an attack coming
momentarily; the sign is fearful as the signate (the attack itself) is.
a 30-32

a 32 : I ",oil",o . 1<A'Iaollap.6~
This is expressed in a more understandable way at EE I229b Io-I2: "For. in fact. danger is spoken of only in such
instances of feared objects when that capable of causing such harm [TO Tii~
T.'aVT'f/~ 'P8.eii~ ".''1T'''.v) is near. Whenever that appears to be on hand.
danger appears to be present." The signs (82a 30) indicate the proximity of
TO Tii~ .eii~ ".''1T'''''''. and so danger.
2 "'O'IIU'<II
sc. ,",,,era. of which we are given a Ii,t: l,,8ea . . TI
(a 33); dd",la .. l".vaa (a 34); de ...) . . . lx.vaa (a 3S); 'Popo~ ... ".'jjaa,

(b 2-3).
a B : 1 lJt8pII... opy>\ &uv1lP.OVO>V
For the omission of the article,
see S. II]2: "the hostility and wrath of those able to......
2
. . . OElV '<0'
is the punctuation of four edd.. Spenge!. Cope. Ross
omits the colon and includes a 33-34. diiAov ... "'.IBiv. in parentheses.
punctuating with a comma and not a period at the end of the parenthesis.
The TI here is euphemistic, and it denotes something harmful. bad; c LS.
A.II3
is the reading of four edd.. Spenge!. Cope.
a 34 ~oUl.ov"'"0. c,a...
Ross reads povA.VTa, TB [sic) "al dVva.<a, from a good tradition. In the
light of dvva"bw. (a 33) I see no point in the addition and would read with
the edd. It is clear from the definition of anger (78a 3I-B). and of hatred
whose definition is the opposite (82a 1-2) of friendliness (cp. 82a 8 with
80b 3S - 8Ia I). that such people (as A. says here) will to do harm (PovAo.Ta,).
Given such conditions: the power and the will to do serious harm. then the
actual doing of it is lyyV~ TOU ",oIBi

8:>.h 4

91

COMMENTARY

a 3S : 1 qouaox'
111e colon of Tovar, Ross, Kassel, Cope is, in the
context, clearly more reasonable than the period used by Roemer, Dufour,
Spengel. A. states here that the power to do harm is present but he must
show, as he does in the next clause, that the will to do so is on hand.
2 ...ijI ... a&lXO~
The articular infinitive (Uby his own choosing")
states the idea of willing. Since the power (a.s.al'w lxovlla) is also on hand,
the two conditions (the power and the will) are present, and so their consequence, the actualization, is near at hand; cf. Iba 34. What makes the tmjust
man unjust is the deliberate will to act unjustly; see, e.g., A 13, 74" II-I:>':
brae Tfi neoa'eellet 1/ I'0X9TJe1a "al TO ad",.,. (see also 7"" II : 2). Speaking
of injustice at AID, 68b 6--14, A 13, 73 b :>'1-36, A. emphasizes the idea that
it is action which is deliberately willed; cpo EN TI36a I: a. d' ~" neoar.eell8(,), {JAav>n, dd", .
Ibb 1 : 1 4PE-ri! {,~p.I;Ol'Ev"IJ
As we saw at 78b 14 - IS : 3, Pol. 13I2b
29-32, J{Je" is a powerful stimulant of anger, and the reason is explained
in part atA 13, 74a II-IS. Obviously if anger is present, the will to .etaliate is
present (cf. 82a 34), and A. states this in the next clause (dijAo . vii', b
1-2), where we have the obsetvation that deliberate intent (to punish) is
always present when one is subjected to lJ{Je'" Added to this deliberate
intent we now have the capability to act: atl.aTa.
vii.. A 9, 67a 19-22
is the basic principle of natural ethics on which this statement rests.
2 &ijAov... Wv
Ross alone includes this in parenthes.., omitting
any punctuation before the parenthesis and placing a comma after it (see
82a 33 : 2). The parenthesis is acceptable; the comma is not. His punctuation
of 82a 33 - 82b 4 is not as helpful as that of the edd., Spongel, Cope.

a.

The genitive;" subjective. The rpo{Jee&'

b 2-3 <p6~o~"""" &""III'ivwv
is this personal fear on the part of those with power to harm: "and the fear
of those able to do harm."
See 82a 33 : 2.
b 3 : 1 T' "o,ijaox,
2 Ev "oxpoxcncEUn
Since they fear, they expect serious harm to be
threatening, and so experience danger and are in readiness to protect thern,elves. Since the emotions can aH'ect one's judgment (e.g., 77b 30 - 78a 6),
such persons are themselves a danger to those they fear. For, like those who
think they are being wronged (82b 10), they are always ready to strike first
(ds!
TTJeovlI. "a,!!.,), Somewhat to the point is Cicero, De off. 1.7.24:
"Atque illae quidem iniuriae, quae nocendi causa de industria, inferuntur,
saepe a metu proficiscuntur, cum is, qui nocere alteri cogitat, timet, ne. nisi
id fecerit, ipse aliquo afficiatur incommodo."

rae

We now take up the persons who cause fear; see outline.

b 4 : 1 ;;"JrE; &'
Spengel, p. 226, remarks that the transition to this next division is marked
by this phrase. He returns to the idea in more detail at p. 240; see 8?a 16 : 1.

92

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

a Xdpou~ xed i\'M'OU~

"are quite bad and slaves to ["'aa.,., LS,
II] their own advantage." For the general idea Victorius suggests Aristophanes, Plutus 362-363; see also Lysias, On the Murder of Eratosthenes 44-4S.

cb,... "oAv C

b S-6 <poj3~po" .. "oAu

sc. <p0Psed. (iuTI); on
34 : 3; the phrase is used an unusual number of times in A

S'7ll

II.

b 6 "'0 ... dve..

"for one to be in the power of another"; the articular
infinitive is subject of the understood 6""t. On
"to be in the power of,"
see s.ca 33, LS, B.I.g.

.,,1,

6-JT ....cru . ly"",...CIIA,,,iv This is a result to b 4-6 (.,.1 6'

sl.a,) given as an example: "so that the accomplices [LS, aV.oc6a, II]
of one who has done wrong are regarded (by him) with fear as likely [LS, <pop,...
J.z) either to denounce him or leave him in the lurch."

eo',

1 .... aT~
sc. elva,.
a "E"0'"IIx6..., &.'VDv
is the reading of a good cod., three edd.,
Spengd. Ross, Kassd, Cope read: """0'71"0'" rc
also from a good
cod. and possibly more correct usage.

b6:

6.,...

b 7 lyx.....CIIA"iy
See 8Ib 27, and Plato, Symp. I79a; for a further
explanation of the word, Cope refers to his comments on pp. 47-48. This
infinitive along with "anme" is dependent upon cpoPseoL

b 8-9 x ..l ot ... &Uvt.>vT..,

Cpo A I2, 72b 27 - 73a 4-

By itsdf and unqualified this is a strange

statement. It is Plautus' "lupu, est homo hornini, non homo, quam qualis
sit non novit" (AJinaria 49S), .. well .. a more pejorative repetition of 82b 4-5.
It is somewhat similar to the realistic acceptance of man found at EN I095b
19-22. & a general statement its intent is unciear, and its pessimism is not
typical of A.'s thinking in the first book, particularly A 9-14, where such a
view of human nature could more readily sUIface, or in the EN, BE. In the
early pages of the EN (I09sa 111--20, 1098b 20-22), he tells us that the common
view of both ordinary men and cultivated men (with which he agrees) is
that happiness is the goal of man and that it consists in ro .J ,,,.. "al ro
eJ "ean .... What we seem to have here is a rather blunt and also somewhat
overstated acceptance of the fact of moral weakness in men.

b 9 cililXoucr,y . &Uvt.>vT..,

b 10 T"/IpoUcr. X"'pDv

i.e., "they watch CllTefully for the opportunity"; at

Pol. 1337b 41 we find "a'eOcpoM" which, from its usage (cp. "ace0rqet.,), appears to be a less vivid expression. On "ace" see 6Sa 20 : 1.

b II <poj3Epol

as at I12b

6-JT.

b 12 &E5,6"'E~ . <pOj3EPDv
i.e., the fear of tetaliation from their
victims makes such wrongdoers, if they have power, objects of fear. & we

COMMENTARY

93

see at 8.za 34-35 ("a! d61"ia .. lxovaa) and 82b 2-3 ("al ipo(Jo, nodi"al), such people are among the ipo(Jeed which A. presented at 8.za 27 - b 4The fact that sud, belong among the ipo(Jeed is the reason for his statement
of explanation, b r2: .In'''.ITO [on meaning: 69b 33 : 1] . . . rpo(Jeeo.: "for
such was assumed to be what constitutes the fearful." Furthennore, it is a
truism that men hate those whom they have injured (see, e.g., Tacitus, Agricol. 42.4: "proprium humani ingenii est odis,e quem laeseris"); and so in the
light of 82a 32-33 (Tola6Ta .. "0 ..i7 TI) such wrongdoers are also regarded
with fear (ipo(Jseof).
b r3 'riiiv IIV.."", ... 3a..
"rivals [c 83a 22] for all those things
which ... "; the critical element is contained in lipa, aprpoi7.
b r4 m>A!'wa,
i.e., men always treat such a rival as an enemy, one
for whom they intend painful harm (82a 22), and therefore these men are
tpa(Jseoi
b 15-16 x ..l ot ... xpd....ou~ "aL .. rpo(Jseot: "who are asouree of fear
in the context is practito men more powerful than they." piUA07
cally the equivalent of ITl !,cillo>! "all the more could they harm them."
el Ha! , sc. 61l.a...ro (J).th.....; the "at is adverbial and intensive.

rae

b 16-17 x ..l cril~ ........:...6

As commonly noted, this topic does not
differ significandy from the preceding b r 5-r6. In one respect there is no difference since in both instances those who are an object of fear to those' more
powerful than we are are fearful to us. A distinction which possibly could
be made between the two is that the first class is objectively fearful as A. takes
care to point out, i.e., they have the power to do serious harm; the second
dass is subjectively fearful, i.e., they are actually feared and so they are !po(J'eo~
but whether the fear is right or wrong either on the part of the "eBiTTOV,
(oil, !po(Jov.Tal 01 "esITTov,) or their own part is not stated. For " similar
repetition cpo A 7, 63b 35-]7, and c 63b 36-37b 18 : 1 .r..nplIx6...~
tial in 82b I5-r6.
2 lft,.. ,Si!,EVO'

C A IS, 76a 6. This dass realizes what is potenThe middle voice gives the verb its particular

meaning here (tS, B.IILz): "to attack."

b 19

~ ..v~lISMC~

so. la07Ta, !po(J'eot; see, for example, Demosthe-

nos in 01. 3-"5-28.

b 19-20 x ..l """" ... ,,:CIPPlIa, ..a .. ,xo(
tives are partitive; see S. 1306, 1312.

so. tpa(Joeol .Ial.

The geni-

b 20 6~u9u!,o,
C 68b 20 : 2; cpo 79" 17: sVnaeOep1lTOI. Euripides,
Med 319-320, illustrates A.'s point here, rtmj
.'1l6v!,0, 1<T.t: "for a

rae

94

AlUSTOTLB, 'RRBl'ORIC' II

82b 25

quick-tempered woman, just as a man of the same sort, is easier to guard

against than a quiet, clever person."

b 21 :

I
"'pCiOL
See 80a 6 : 1. Here we are speaking, it would seem, of
those with the lE'" "eadT1j'. Their general disposition is one of mildness,
meekness, but if they are ~ured or become an enemy or rival, they may
pose a threat of serious harm.
Z dp"",~
C 79b 31; the meaning here, however, is more specifically that found in Theophrastus' Ch.,aders: I,ony: one who dissembles.

b 21-22 ii&~OL "oPP'"

Ordinarily interpreted somewhat freely
as "since we never know whether they <Ire upon us, we never feel that the
danger from them is remote" (Cooper; the Roberts translation is similar).
In form the construction is called the personal constrUction (S. 2584). See
Xenophon, CyropaiJd. 2.2.12; Cope, p. 63; Sophocles, Antigone 400 (e.g.,
dl"a.d, .1,.. ... for dl"a.,", ienl ,...); Plato, Co,gi .. 448d 8ff. For an understanding of the statement, the questions to be answered are: What is Wl1jAO.?
What is 'I'd'Be""? To both the response comes from the context and is:
the threat from this class of "impending destrUctive or painful evil" (82a 22).
Thus I would interpret: "for with this type it is unclear whether they are an
immediate threat (if they are on the verge of acting), with the result that it is
never unmistakable that they are a remote threat (that they are far from

acting)."
b 21r-27 "u~........ iI.... l~
This appears to be a return to 82a 27ff.,
the things which cause fear. However, it is more correctly taken as a gen,,!"a1
statement on' what, be it a thing or a person, makes anything more fCarful.
Certainly the statements can and must apply to persons or things. There
is a clearer e"ample of this intermingling of persons and things at 84b 17-22
where A. is speaking formally of the person before whom shame is fdt;
but c also Boa 3<>-31 sf. Schrader, p. 253, makes a useful distinction between
i"a.rieOo"", (correction of an evil done) and po7/8..a (help for an impending
evil); cpo 83a 20.
b 23 11_ oi:.....p...a~O\IcrLv
This is the reading of cod. A, the edd.,
Spengd; Cope reads with cod. F ,iv tipaeTo>a... The corrdative pronoun
is object of rnapoe8waaa8a. (on verb, see 7Ib 3), while the participle (c!I'aeTdvova ..) is an indirect object to the main verb in the clause: "all fCared
things which men have bungled and cannot correct are more fearfuL"
b 24 t,,' ... twi
C 8zb 6. The repeated dU is peculiar: "at least
either totally impossible to correct, or not in their power but in that of their
enctnies."
b 25 Wv /It&LaI
.... is an objective genitive; on what A. means
by ecjd",., see 63a 21r-24-

82b 30

b 26

c:.~

COMMENTAlIY

... d"dv

See

ssa

95

7: ,.

b 26-27 cpOliEplt ........'v

Cpo 860 28-29. A. will di.russ pity in B 8.
However, as he does here, he brings fear and pity together in Poetics I453a
2-7; cf. 8Sb 13 : 1. There it becomes somewhat clear why this statement
in the ruetori, is true: namely, that the things we pity in others are fearful.
For we learn that we experience fear "eel Td7 6,.0000: for someone like
ourselves. Therefore, we see his misfortune, the Td .a.....w, as possible
for ourselves, and so fearful. On .'11' hie..v (in the case of others, with
regard to), see LS, "'1, A.I.2; see also 86a 28-29; 7')a 37 : I.
SC.

ytyvea8ah

b 28 : I ..It flEv oW . . . II cpolioilv.... '

A transitional sentence to the
next division: "cii~ do"".;,..voo. Although A. has covered in the precediug
section both "oi"a and T;va~ rpo(JoVvTao (820 20), he seemingly refers here in
Til rpo(Jeed and cI only to noi"a. This is quite possible, and Spenge!, p. 227,
would argue that it is the fact. He bases his argument on the next statement
of summation at 83a 13-16 (i".1 Blatv) and its omission of Tlva~ rpo(Jov.Tao, and on the fact that in the section on confidence (83a IS - 83b 10)
there is no formal presentation of the persons in whom men e.""perience
confidence, i.e., Tl.a, 8aeeovao. However, in taking up the things which
cause confidence A. does in fact consider in passing the persons in whom
men are confident: Tiva~ 8aeeovl1o; see 82b 4-22. What happens in the
passage Oll confidence is the vety same thing which Spengel admitted as
possible in B 2; see 79b 36. Furthermore, since it would seem clear that
"aVTa dA ...11 rpO(JBed (82b 22) refers to both persons and things, I do not
see why both neuters rpofJ.ea, iI. (b 28) cannot refer to the general thought
in the antecedent passage '82a 27 - 82b 27, i.e., things and persons feared,
particularly in view of the fact that persons, pace Sponge!, are mentioned in
the section on confidence; see 83a 21.
2 "XES""
"more or less," "approximately." Tlm use by way
of summation is fairly common. See, e.g., A 2, 560 35 and 5, 60b 17; see
also Slia 13.
b 30 .. 'v,;~
Read by all the edd. it is not found in Spongel, Cope:
"accompanied by a certain expectation." On "eol1do"ta cf. 82a 21 : 2.
b 30-3 I ..oil .. mlOO~
An articular infinitive, governed by ><e0ad...
xoa~. Cope's comment, p. 64. on the statement - namely, that, as it stands,
it is untrue - is not correct. If the evil is (as it is described in the definition
of fear) rp8ae""".v to the individual, it is in itself a all",!
11 "'aea%'!, and
so fear for A. There is little point in going beyond that since he tells us in
the chapter itself what kind of thing such a rpOfJBeOv is in his mind.

"'0'

ARISTOTLE, 'RHllTORIC' II

b 31-)2. 'tiiW olo!J.Ev"'~

Partitive genitive with 0,)d81" it governs the
following innitive with Ii. stating a future possibility (S. 1824 with c).
b 32 : 1 ....0.....
along with TOUTOV, (b 33) the object of rpop.iTa.
(b 31); tIris verb is understnod with TOTS (b 33).
or~"II' _8Ei~
is the reading of three edd., Cope. Spengd
reads naB..i. but questions its presence; Dufour secludes it as does Bywater
("Aristntdia II," 42), and Ross conjectures 11.. before it. Richards (p. I08)
would delete naB.i. or read 11.. with it. However, Bonitz notes (Index,
41 b 4f) that Ii. i. occasionally missing with the potential optative, citing
9837 (where Roemer and the edd. read II.v with cod. F); of the omitted Ii. at
983 7 Roemer says, and tIris is to the point of our text: "fort. ferri potest ex
superioribuubaudita particula ii." Certainly it is tn be understnod in our
text.
b 33 ......
The rpoPse&., as we have seen at 82a 31-32, 820 24-2S, must
pose a proximate, serious threat, which is not the case here.
b 34-35 livciyx'IJ .....6...
31 -33.

This is simply a positive statement of 82b

b 35 ...n.~ 6 ..1. ....u..c.r.

A brachylogy for TOO, Vrp' W. oio'Ta, naB.,.
as we find the clause at 82b 33, 83a II: "fear both those at whose hands they
think that they would suJfer as weIIa. that whiclt they would suJfer, and at the
time when they think it Iikdy." Although Spengd, p. 227, does not comment
on tIris phrase, he speaks tn the difIicuIty at 83a 12: "Aegre desiderarnus quod
post Hal TaiiTa hie deest: 4 00" tjlO'TO, velll "alOn."
83a I : 1 E6'NXIIl'~
See 6Ib 39 - 620 12, 6Ib 39 : 1. This, tngether
with the qualities at 83a 3 (nAoiiTo" laz.$" noAvrplAla, and possibly dv.al"')'
are all parts of ."da'l'ovla (60b 19-23) whose explanation substantiates the
present observation.
3 &OXoUV"'E~
sc. awoi,: "who think. they are. n
3 6ui
The explanation of what constitutes the confident person
(83a I6H:), as well as the explanation that the characteristic of the insolent
and the contemptuous is a senSe of superiority tn the common run of men
(78b 27-3 I), justify the inference that the people just mentioned are insolent,
contemptuous, rash. For such men are among the dO"OV.TS, . . etln,xla.,
l'.,.ciAa".
a 1-3 6,0 .. &Uvlll"~
Ross alone encloses tIris in parentheses; the
other edd. and Cope enclose a 2.-3 (no , .. dv.al"'); Spengd does not
use parentheses.

2: 1

613p .......1

2 &Alywpo.

See 78b 23-3 I, 78b 14 - IS : 3.

See 78b 10-IS, tngether with 78b IS - 79b ,370 7Sa 32.

COMMBNTAIIY
J

8pClCJ.i~

$C.

o~" olo ....a.

97

"aBB'. liv from 82b 35; on Beat1B;;,

(rash, audacious, overbold) cf. 90ll 3I.

a 3 : 1 nAoU"'O~
See A S, 6Ia 12..--24 and notes, and 62b IB : z, 90b
32 - 9ra 19; as well as 8sa I : 1, on which see 60b 20-29.
z taxu~
See 6Ib Is-rB.
J ,.O>'"",,).(Cl
See 61 b 3S-3 B.
4 IiUvClP.L~
This may simply be physical strength and power, one
of the goods of the body which is called more specifically at 60b 22 dv.a,,,.
c!yw"uTooIv, or it may refer to the power of position in society as we find
the word used at, e.g., 60b 27. How such accidental things as ".OiiTO"
etc. enter into the formation of character is discussed at B IS-I7.
a 3-4 olin ... S.Lvli
"nor those who consider that they have already
experienced every kind of disaster."

a 4 m.,:aJ!UYP.EvOL
"have grown cold and indifferent to." This is the
inertia of despair as the simile (&lanse . .., a S) would indicate. A. uses the
same root word to Mute fear in its physical aspect; see, e.g., B 13, B9b 3],
De part. an. 6920 23.
a S c!,.owp.,,"vL~6p."'OL liS,!
"like those actually being done to death";
on 116" see S4b 7. As for c!nonJptavLC..., we meet it again at Bsa 10.
We find it in Demosthenes, phil. 3.61, On the Embassy 137 where it has been
interpreted as "to cudgel to death," and id,ntified with the Romm military
punishment fostuarium which does mean fuste 1Iecare, but the word can also
mean a form of punishment. In LS the word is said to mean "crucify on a
plank." Cope, pp. 6S-66, says that it means "beating, sometimes to death,
with cudgels." The explanation from the scholiast on a; TVl"'a.a in Aristophanes' Plutus 476 is of litde help: "the wood on which ""pto.Co ...
or the cudgels with which those being punished were struck." Cope suggests
that the TVl"'avO. was a block on which the person was stretched and then
beaten. Bonner & Smith, II 279-B3, call it a form of capital punishment.
In the light of the evidence at their disposal they describe it as a method in
which the victim was &Stened to a plank and gradually strangled by the
tightening of a collar fixed around his neck; cf. Cope, p. 66, on the force of
c!nd in composition with certain verbs. From this simile and the metaphor
(c!nBVNl'l'bo.), A. is apparendy speaking of the passive response of inactivity
in those who despair, not the active response of which Schrader, p. 2S4,
speaks: namdy, a frenzied activity doomed to failure which despair can also
cause. In either case, however, since rhetoric is directed to rational action
and the intdligent use of emotional response (see 83a B-9: &laTe ... "aB.;;.;
COMMENTAIIY I 3S0), the objective of the speaker (or writer) would be to

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

98

introduce when possible. in such instances. the grounds for hope and so for
intelligent fear and deliberation.
a 5-<S cii.).ck <i:y"",.ii">a.v
On the meaning of the verb here ("anxiously contend"). cpo 6"]0. IS. The comment of Seneca. Epp. Moral. 5.7.
while in a different context, is to the point: "Desines timere. si sperate de-

sieris."
a 6

a'lfJ.iov 5t

a7:1
3

See ..:1/p.'o.... 393.

POUAEII"'ucoU~

POUA.ueru.

See S!lb 32 : I; i.e. "men inclined to ddiberate."

See 57& 2 : 1.

a 8 : 1 beA"{"""'"
See EN II390 I3ff.: "no one ddiberates about
that which cannot be other than it is."
z "IIPllcncEllci~E'V
See 60b II and 80b 31.
a 9 : 1 ...11 .. lI1koU~
articular infinitive subject of 11 liiAno. ("is
better. preferable").
z 3....... "..e.iv
IIT< = "namely that ... " (5. 2577); on oEo,
with the infinitive ('Just the sort able to suffer") c LS. olo,. III
a 9-10 "lit yckp &1I8ov
Ross alone includes this within parentheses
without any punctuation before and a comma afte!.
a 10 "'oU~ o""lou~ 5.uc""'
The infinitive is governed by de, understood from 83a 8. Our reading ("men like them") is that of cod. F and opparendy the reading which the scholiast and the author of the Vetus Translatio
had before them. It is also the reading of Cope and Kasse!. Spenge! and
the other edd. read with cod. A: TOU, TO'OVTOV, d..HvVva,. In the light of
the Poetics '453a s. d
e 'Polio,] ,.eel TO.lIpO .... the reading ofF appears
preferable; see 82b 26-27. 83a 32. In the Poetics. Else. pp. 373. 461. understands 8po,0, as: a fellow-man. one like us. an ordinary and representative

d. r,.

human being.
a II "lit 6,,11 ...0.0<......,. 6op' .rov
"(and that they are sulfering or have
sulfered) at the hands of men such as they did not expect to suffer from.

6....

a 12 "lit ...IIU...II "al ...

This is the reading of four edd. Cope. Spenge!
reads it but suggests: xa& Tavt'a Ii Hai 8T8; Ross reads: HaL TavTa <a> Hai
TOTt. With our reading and with the interpretation suggested at 82b 35 in
mind. I would construe a II- 12: " and have suffered at the hands of
those from whom they did not expect it. and have suffered the sort of things
they did not expect and at a time they did not expect it." Bottin. pp. 28-30.
interprets differendy.

83a 18

COMMliNTARY

99

a 13 : 1 'PII"'POv
sc. e<17:. We begin here the section on confidence.
The construction 'Pa.eed. ('CrT..) ..I e<17: is repeated at a 14-15.
2 ..c;;." 'P0Il'pCiw
sc. "'.et; on meaning cf. Ibb 28 : 1.

a 14 :

1 " ..1 ... 8.61..0-1

"and the disposition of each and everyone
who experiences fear."
2 'P""'POv
sc. ea..... Cpo EE 1228. 28
3 ..06"""
i.e., the three subjects just mentioned: the nature of
the emotion; the things which cawe it; how it is experienced. These are
paraIle!ed in what follows, e.g., 'Popov by TO 8aee."; 'POP.eii"w by ",o.a;
cb, ... 6edlaa, by ncO, ... ei.alv.

a 15 7<oi..
includes both the things which cause confidence (83a 19-21)
and the persons who inspire confidence (83a 21-25). See Ibb 28 : 1 where
the parallelism in both passages refleers the subject matter, e.g., d",a,oe8wa~
(83a 20) with lnav08waaaBa. (82b 23); po7j8 ..a. (83a 20) with po7j8a.
(8zb 25); .,6""1pivo. (83a 21) with .,6."'1piv.,v (82b 19); may.,v.<17:at
(83a 22) with d......
(82b 20), etc.

.u.,.

a 16 : 1 a"pp .."001 do-I,, ..6... Ross, Kassel, Spenge!, Cope read correctly, I bdieve, without the lacuna which is marked after .lalv by the
other edd. on the grounds that Tl.a~ 8aee06a. is not discussed; but see 83a
21, Ibb 28 : 1.
2 -nj> <'Poll'!' ,...1 ..I> a..pp..>.oov -nj
is the reading of the edd.,
Spenge!, with the following difference: Spenge! encloses the supplement
which comes from 1536 Venetian edition ofTrincavelus within parentheses.
Kasse! encloses the first and excludes the last T.p. While I accept the supplement I am inclined to agree with Spengel, pp. 227-28: "apte quidem sed non
necessario sunt addita; auctori enim nostro si Me.... opponitur TO 'PoP-eo,
sofficit."

a 17-19 !E-ni: .......oppm IN"""

This definition of confidence closely
parallels that of fear (820 21-22): "(confidence is) hope accompanied by the
image of that which brings freedom from danger as being near, and of that
which cawes fear as being non-existent or remote." Just as fear is a certain
kind of 1,)"'1 11 TaeaX'!, so confidence is a certain kind of hoping. As A.
tells us at A II, 70a 29-35, a 'Panaata n~ always accompanies hope and
hope looks to the future. Plato, in the Lathes I99b, puts it even more snecincdy: "the things which inspire fear and those which inspire confidence are
admitted to be future goods and future evils."
a 17 'P..".... o-I~

See 78b 8-9.

Ross alone of the edd. conjectnres 'PoPseii>. < .. ~>

a 18 'P0ll'pc;;." l\
with Richards; it does not appear necessary.

if

100

ARISTOTLE, 'RHJ!l'ORIC' II

a 19 8Clppcz).iCl

i.e., "that which inspires confidence."

a 1~2O 7tOpp... IlvTCl x ..l U eClppcz).ialyyd~

is the reading of most
of the codd., of two edd., Spengd, Cope. Spengel was slightly disturbed
t1lat the matter to be explained was in the explanation. Thus Dufour adopl5
a reading from the margin of cod. C: e.g., fur "al Ta 8aeeaAla he reads
ij Ta uarnie.a lyyV~. Ross retains the "at but reads Ta uw.-.je.a; see
also Richards, p. ro8. Kassd reads 8aeeaUa a. .uspect. I see no reason
= the proximnot to read with the codd.; "dee'" = the remoteness of;
ity: "that which inspires confidence is the remoteness of what i. dreadful
and the proximity of what gives courage."

s""v.

a 20 l7t""op8':'cr..~ ... j3o>'l8LCI'

See 82b a2-a5, Ibb 22-a7, 83a 15.
The apodosis to the protases of the general condition (av ibu., a 20; ibuw,
a 22; lx"'uw, ibu., a 23) is an understood 8aeeeAlo. slul, as it i. also in the
following sentence, a 24-25: ij <Iv i1fJ<pa>.

a 2I -IJS,x'lp.ivo,
Cpo 82b 10-12. These are the people who have
not done them harm. They together with those who are not their rivals
(a 22), or are rivals without power, or who have power but are friends (a 23),
as well as tho.e who have treated them well, and those to whom they llave
shown kindness (a 24), and those whose interesl5 are the same as their own
(a 24-5) - all represent the presumably missing TlP,,~ 8aeeoiiu. (see Ibb
28 : 1; 83a I6 : 1).
Cpo 82b I3-14.

a a3 :

p.iJ lxwcr,,, Suvap.'"

Cpo 8ab 15-19, and 8ab 8-ro.
",0.0'
They fed confident with such fur the reasons given at

80b lSi.
24-25 M(OU~ xp(TTOU~
i.e., those whose interesl5 agree with
theirs are more numerous or more powerful or both than those who can
block or interfere with their good.

On TO O"1J/MPieop see 62a I7-aI and A 6.

II.......... eNTol
Dufuur alone assumes a lacuna here after i1p'POJ
for the same reason as that given at 838 16 : 1.
3 cril.....~ lxOVT~
"those are confident who are so disposed,"
i.e., as he will set forth in 83a 26 - 83 b 10.
a 25 :

au .......P,

a 26 XClTOp8wxiv ..,

See 68a 14.

a 27 7t7tov8iva,
if their arritude is (Or_Ta,) "that they Iiave not
experienced many reverses."

101

COMMENTARY

a 28 : 1 x ..1 &'''''ECpuy6...~
Aeneas. Am. 1.198-207. attempts to
rekindle the confidence in his men (rf1lOcate .flimos) with a quick survey of the
serious dangers from which they had escaped.
2 .m..eEi~
"free from fear"; literally: "free from emotion."
However. A. is speaking about the disposition of men who are a;>nfident,
and to be confident is to be without fear. since confidence is the opposite of
fear (83a 16). While on this point. it is worth noting that A. is talking about
being without fear. which is a quality he attributes to those who are 8aeeaUo, (83' 26). But 8deuo~. while it may be an aspect of dJo~e.la (c
8sb 30). is not dJobeBla (EN 1I07" 33 - II07b 4. EE 1220b 39). and consequently the texts concerned with dJode.ta introduced by the commentators
in support or criticism of A.s statement at 83a 28-32 (d'%<ii~ . lpnsl/lirnl)
are not directly relevant; nor do they prove or disprove the validity of the
Rhetoric statement. such texts are MM II90b 22-34. EN IIIS_ 3S - IIISb 4.
They are concerned more directly with the problem Plato takes up in the
L4ches t, e.g. 191>-194, 196-199. As Nicias says (197b): ol"a, ..d lbpo(Jo.
"al ..d d.de.... 0'; ..avTo.lun.

a 29" T<'J<"piicre..., lxc."

The arti~r "infinitives are causal. (JOr,8B<a'
are the resources. the means, to cope WIth.

a 31>-31 ot ...... XIII 01

"both - and."

and so see 8]a

10.

a 33 XIII.r....
sc. "al ...otSTO" m.. The difference between this group
and the one immediately preceding is that the preceding group are actually
our inferiors while this group are considered to be such. The grounds for
sueh bdief are given in the following sentence. a 33-34: ol'o.Tal di ["e.l.....
...ou~ sl.a, To,)......1dip ..

.,,01....

a 34 ij 116........ . . 61'0"",,,
am<ii. = the people conquered; T<ii.
xe........d..... the superiors of those overcome; ..<ii
their equals.

".1_.

a 3S : 1 td..Lc.J XIII ",lr,;",

the "resources" in both quantity and qual-

ity specified at b 1-3.

2 oi~ UT<EP<XOV"E~
"in which those who excel are objects of
fear"; the dative is means; for the meaning of superiority found in ~"Bel%ov
TB~ see A 7. 63 b 7-20 and 63b 8 : 1, 3, ,sb 28 : 1 and the observation in
n. gen. an. 787" I, "the better resides in superiority." Our statement is general
and does not refer to "their rivals," "their enemies," as found in some interpretations.
8]b 1 td.ije.~ XP'IJl'ci........
83b 1-2 is somewhat reminiscent of the
parts of wealth at A S. 61. 12-14. However, I am inclined to think that A.

102.

ARISTOTLE, 'aHBTORIC ' II

is simply oJfering some general instances (as at 83a 2.-3) which make men
condent. They are broad categories and could be undetstood as either
personal possessions or properties of the society in which the individual
lives. as TW. ned, ",;;'B"O. "'aeaaH_ would suggest.

b 2 Kcll t"Xu~ ....."".......

This is the reading of the codd.. the edd.
(except Kassel). Cope. Spengel. I would take ,.;.,,9o, "al lavl' as an
hendiadys (cp. Thucyd. 3.74). governing all the genitives: "a powerful
abundance of wealth. and supporters. and friends. and property. and the
annaments, either all of them or the most important for war." Thorot ("Observations critiques [I]." 30S) suggested lax,), Hal ",MiBo,. taking laxv,
alone, and together with ,dfi90, governing the genitives. His reason was
that lavl' by itself means bodily strength (and from the use of the .word
in the Rhetoric he would be correct). Kassel. Det Text. p. 134. secludes lavl,.
calling it an interpolation introduced by a misundetstanding of a",,,aT""
in a militaty sense.
b 4-5 -/j&'K'IKO".~ .. <po(3oiiv.. c..
Cpo 82.b II-12.
read by all the edd. is a conjecture suggested by
b 5 .....p .rw <p0(30Uv..CI.
Spenge!. p. 22.8. and the scholiast who interprets: ",ae' w. CPO(Jov,uBSa dd""t'
Sfi.a,. Cope reads with cod. F: TO'OVTO~' "'Bel w. cpo(Jomao, refening
to his commentary, I 164~5, for the use of d,e preposition ""el (see also
66b 24 : 3). It seems to me that cod. F could be read here as far as the idea
is concerned.
There are as many
b s~ KClI 31r.>~ liv '1:" "pO~ 8.o!l~ . . . Aoylwv
readings. practically, for this phrase as there are edd. What I have accepted
is the reading of cod. F (using Kassel's apparatus), of Spenge!, Cope. Kassel
(but see below). Roemer, Dufour read with cod. A: d. "eo' TO'\, eBOV,.
Tovar reads Ii. "eo' geov,. Ross reads with corrected cod. A: 4. Td "eck
Tov,9..,v,. Kassel secludes b 5~ ("al ... ).oyl.,.) as an Aristotelian addition
and conjectures < "al 8Ta. dd"'WVTa.> immediately before it. With our
reading the interpretation would be: "And on the whole men are confident
[sc. 9aeealio, slal., b 26] if their relations with the gods are good, their
relations in general but particularly those dependent on signs and oracles";
on cflla see S. I2.73. This arguntent for inspiring confidence is rather
prominent in Demosthenes' Olynthiacs and First Philippic - see 01. :0.2.2and Phil. 1.42, and Jaeger, Demosthe..es. pp. 130/ and passim; Xenophon,
CyropaeJeia 3.3.34; and Thucyd. 7.77-1-4: Nicias' attempt to give conJidence
to his men at Syracuse.
b 6 '"l"dwv KIll AOY[wV
See Xenophon, CyropaeJeia I.6.2.; on "'1",l",.
see "E'IJ""'o,," 383-84. 395-98; on ;'oyl.,., Euripides. Chiltlren of Hetacles
405

COMMENTARY

103

b 7 8uppcU.o\ov ycip
Some of the difficulties experienced here might
be removed if rde is taken. not as causal (as it frequently is here), which of
course makes no sense, but a, adverbial and explanatory (S. 2.808; see 66a
2.S : 1), e.g., "anger, for example. inspires confidence." So I would interpret: "Anger, in filct, inspires confidence, and to be wronged without doing
wrong causes anger; moreover the gods are assumed to hdp those who are
wronged." The devdopment would seem to be that b 7-8 is a part of the
topic introduced at b j-<l: e.g., b j-<l: men are confident if their relations with
the gods are good; b 7"-8: tho,e unjustly wronged are angered with an anger
which inspires confidence because they assume that the gods are with them.
b !rIO 11-'18'" iiv ....eeLv 1I-'18~ ..dcreo-8... is the reading of all the codd.,
of three edd., Cope. Spengd read. it but is not happy with 1''16, ",elaeaBal, and Ross, Kassd seclude the words. which do not appear in the
,choliast. In the light of the evidence I would accept them, understanding
the difference to be that d. 7<aO.,. 'ignifies that they are nol likely here and now
to meet with disaster (S. 182.4, with c) and 1''16. ",s/asaBa., that they will
certainly not meet it in the future.

b 10

xCl'top8cbcrElV

See 8]a 26.

CHAPTER 6

I . Introduction. 83b 12-17

division and definition of shame and

shamdessness

II . Devdopment: 83b 17 - 8sa 13

I.

83b 17 - 84a

23

things which cause emotion of sIwne,

i.e., nor. (83b I2.): shame viewed
objectively, as also in II..
people who cause the feeling of sIwne,
i.e., >q!opl...< (83 b I2.)
the disposition, attitude, of those who
".;;< l;con (83b 13):
shame viewed subjectively
in genenl
in particular

feel shame, i.e.,

(0) B4b 27 - Bs",
(6) BS' I - BS' IJ

III . Conclusion: 8sa 14-15

with passing mention ofshamdessness

83b 12-13 "DU. ... S~""

the general division (cp. 78a :>3-:>5); each
division is formally developed in this chapter; cpo 79b 36.
b 13 If""",, Sir ,d"ltUv-rJ
On the definition see 78a 3I : 1; see also
843 :>4. An understanding of alaxVV7I and c!..aU7xv.....1a in A. must come
primarily from the chapter before us. Before taking up alaxVV71 we should
form some idea of its rdation, if any, to al6rb, in A.'. ethical writings, particularly since there is generally no discernible diJference between his use of
aldrb, - al..xVV71 in the ethical works and in the detailed .bternent on
al..xVv'l and its meaning which we meet here in the Rhe1oric. Although there
appears to be no sharp and clear distinction between aldrb, and al"xtl.'I
in the ethical works, Gauthier & JoIif say that EN n:>8b 10-35 "nous livre
sur I' aid8s I.e dernier mot de Ia pensCc technique d' Aristore: I'aid8s y est avant
tout pOut lui la honte et Ie repentir d'une aute d' ortS et deja commise" (II.I
3:>1). If this is so, it is not precisdy the view of al..xVV71 met in the Rheto,ic where in a larger and more adequate manner al..xV." is described as:
the distress experienced in regard to present, past, future evils which appear
to bring dishonor. Let us glance at .devant passages iD the EN, EE, MM,
but before doing so let us see what A. says about alhrb, as an "emotion"

106

AllISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC 7 II

since al<Tx<!v'I is such in the ~toric. At EN noSa 31-32. A. remarks that

aid." is not a virtue; at EE 12.2.0b 12.-13 he calls it one of the "d97J, formally
denoting it to be such at 12210 13 (Tel ,..hI nd9'1 Ta.n:a). At EE 12.33b t6I2.34b 14 speaking of the ,..'<TOT'/TO' to which aid." belongs, he denominates
such mean states na9'1T",at (I233b tS), and says of them (I234a 24-25):
ov" tal'" QesTat, ova' at evapTia, "axla&_ At I33 32 (with which
compare 0" the Virtues .nd Vices 1250b II-a) he notes that alb." contributes
to <TOJ'Peo","V7J (which is one of the virtues). On this question, see the comment of Alexander at IIJb IS. When we turn to the passages in the ethical
works which consider aId." - al<TX""'1 we find A. speaking formally of
aid." in EN 112Sb 10-35 but interchanging al<Tx<Jv7J with it and without
qualification, e.g., at II2sb 20-21; in the Rhetori, at 84a 36 he introduces
aldo; with the same ease. In noSa 30ff., where he discusses the intermediate
states in the emotions, he speaks of aid." in a manner not at all different (e.g.,
lIoSa 34-35) from the meaning given to al<TX""'I in the Rhetoric insofar as
the modest man (aldol,.."'v) falls between the man without shame, the dvai<TX'V'JITO(;, (cp. Rhetoric 8lb 12: noia d' aiuxVJ'O"JITaL "0& cn.a,aXVVTova,,,),
and the bashful man ("d.Ta aMov,.. ..o,). This distinction is also found in
EE 122Ia I, I233b 26-29, MM II93a I-tO. In these instances there is no
ostensible reason to think that what is said of aid." differs radically from
the statements abont al<Tx<!v'I in the Rilet.ric. This is also true of EN I 179b 1113, BE 1229a 13-14, 1230a 16-21 where aid." is the sense of shame which
makes one avoid doing wrong. A similar exchange between aid." and
al<TX""'1 is found in Rhetoric, A 9, 67a 6-14, where, speaking formally of
al<TX""'I, A. illustrates his point from two poets, both of whom use aid.".
What we find rellected in A.' s usages is very likely the historical development of aid." toward a gradual fusion with alux<!v'I, a word of which
Wilamowitz (Herakl..2, II 2SI) says "ist erst em Wort des 5. Jahrhunderts,
das an Stelle al<TXo, tritt." For example, in Thueydides and Aristophanes
(Gauthier & Jolif, II.I 322) al<Tx<!v.a9a<, al<Tx<Jv'l take the place of aldei<T9a<,
aldcb" in dleir varied meanings; see also Barrett, p. 207: u alt3Bia8at. in
Attic was obsolescent in favour of al<Tx<!vB<T9a< .. and in its obsolescence
acquired something of the ambivalence of its supplanter." In Homer ala."
signified substantially a social idea: a respect and regard for others, and for
oneself. An aspect of the first can possibly be seen in Antiphon's comment
(at S5a 13) to those on their way to death with him: "Why cover your faces?
Can it be that you fear that someone from this crowd will see you tomorrow?"
The second, respect for oneself, a sense of one's honor which exercises a
control over one's actions, can be seen to be behind the idea of al<TXvv'I
as we meet it in the special topics in this sixth chapter and in the statement
at 842 24: shame is an image of dishonor in the mind. aId." gradually underwent a change between Homer and Aristotle; see Sinclair, von. Erffa, and

COMMBNTAllY

107

Gauthier & Jolif, II.1 320-22. By the fifth century aM." in Euripides, accordiug to Gauthier & Jolif, II.1 320, can be found in its tnditional sense,
and also as shame for a present dishonor (Helen 417) and regret for a past
fault ([phigenia in Tauris 713). In one play, the HippolrulS, it would
seem to me that we can find its traditional social sense, e.g., at 78, 335,
1258-1259. On the other hand at 244, 772r-775, its denotation is the same
as that which we find for aiaxVv'1 in our present chapter, whereas at
385-386 it may be the feeling of shame concerning oneself and so more
directly alax~.'1, or it may well be Barrett's "sbamefastness" (p. 230) and
thus the more traditional sense. While A. retains the technical term ala."
and very possibly with a definite purpose in mind, I am not certain that the
distinctions Cope, pp. 71-'12, mentions are clearly discernible, e.g., ala.",
vere"lndia, a subjective feeling of honor which precedes and prevents the
shameful act; alaxVv'1, plldor, an objective aspect which reflects upon the
consequences of the act and the shame it brings with it. I am more inclincd
to think: that the judgment of Gauthier & Joli; Il.l 320, is correct: the concept ala." will become alaxVv'1 in Aristotle. And so speaking of the Rhetoric they can say (p. 321): "Dans la RMtorique Aristote d6fin.it I' aischun~ qu'il ne distingue pas de I' aida,'; and of EN 1128b 11-13 they say (p. 322):
"On rernarquera qu'Aristote cite cornme une definition de l'aid8s ce qui etait
en reaJite une definition de I'aisch."e ... Ies deux concepts sont en effi:t
pour lui identiques."

Cpo 823 21.

"a,,';;.

b 14-15 "'EP< xaKiilv

Ta TWv
= "that class of evils which
seem ..."; <pa"opB.a agrees with the idea represented by this noun phrase.
On da.,ela., see the definition of ala." at ENII28b II-I3 (<po{lo, TO, daoEta,),
or the definition of alaxv.'1 in Plato's "Definitions 416a, Diogencs Laertius,
Uves of the Philosophers: Zeno 7.Il2 (<po{lo, dao.ta,); on the idea in the
word, see 62b 20 : on a6Ea; and cpo A 10, 68b 23.
b 15 xaKii\v ... !,-EAAcIv""""
&. was mentioned at 83b 13, this is a
larger definitinn of shame than repentance for a wrong action just committed
which Gauthier & Jolif see as the definition of ala." in the EN. Shame is an
emotion which extends to the past through the present into the future, and
while it concerns actions primarily (hut not exclusively, e.g., 84a 9-13),
at least, as it is analyzed in this section, these actions do not have to have
occurred (e.g., pelMVTW'); nor, if they occur, do they have to be noticed by
others in order that shame be experienced. I say this because the principle
upon which A'.s analysis of shame is built in this chapter seems to be the
sense of moral rightness proper to the good man. For example, to take the
first division in the chapter (83b 17 - 843 23), the things which cause shame:

108

41USTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

the reason given for each is that they are either a v:iolation of a v:irtue or the
exercise of a v:iee. In fact, he introduces the section by saying that the ~axd
of which he is speaking are 8aa dnd ~axia, ill!'Ya ini. (83b 19-20); see
also 84"- 7-9. Even when action is not involved - e.g., at 84"- 9-13 - it is
still the sense of not possessing what is proper to the good man that causes
shame. This is rather interesting to me. For in this sense the a~oEia spoken
about (83 b 14) in connection with this emotion of shame caD readily refer
to the MEa a person has ofhimself; his v:iew of his own honor, his self-respect.
His violation of this causes him to experience shame. On the other hand,
a. we see at 84a 24-26, the Mea in question is mainly the opinion, the view,
of others which causes a person to experience sbame. From the fint perspective one caD seen the survival of the traditional meaning of aiM., in
alaxV"'1. One caD also understand, perhaps, Alexander of Aphrodisw'
problem (mentioned by Cope, p. 72) with calling shame a ",clOo, (Qllaestiones
naturales et moral.. fed. SpengelJ, pp. 270-73). His specific concern is with
as seen in EN n08a 31-32 and II28b 10-35, and his argument is
that, if aiM>, is a rp&{Jo, MoE/a" this is something all good persons of any
age experience. Therefore aiM>, would appear to be an d,uOTe.OT71' "ed,
Ta alalecl in such a person, and thus not so much a "dOo, as a liE., ~al 6.cl
O.a". This is in many ways quite reasonable, but it reduces itself to the prob'
lem seen earlier with respect to neaOT71'; see 80a 6 : 1.

aM"',

1 oiv.....xuv..I..
Cpo A la, 68b 23 and note, Theophrastus,
Characters: Shamelessness 9 is essentially correct in its generic definition, e.g.,
~aTatpeOv.ja.' Me1f" but far more limited are its specific differences which

b 16 :

reduce shamelessn... to a fOrm of alaxeoxied..a; see #30. In fact many

types among the varied characters share in what A. would qualify in this
chapter as ..sharnelesm......
z 6).'Y"'pl..
See 7Sa 32; from the ways (78b 14-IS) in which
.;hY"'eia expresses itself, its affinity to sbamelesmes. is rather close; c Demosthenes, On the Palst Legotion 206; cpo A 10, 68b 23.
3 4....eE'..
a total lack of feeling with regard to the shameful;
c 83a 28 : z. Where d).'Y"'eta would designate an intellectual attitude
(78b IO) toward the shameful, d"clO.,a designates the complete insensitivity
to it which would follow upon such an aItitude.
b I7 6p".8oia..
b 19 il>v 'Pp......II;EL

Cpo 84a 24, 84a, 24-26.

sc. TOVTO', tn.; cpo 79b 16-17.

b 19-20 _I~ Ipy..

On xa,,/a see 68b I4 : 1. leya is being used
as it is at 66b 27-34, and I would interpret d",d "ax/a, leya in a way similar
to the interpretation given to a,..aOo6 leya at 66b 28, i.e., "all those acts
which proceed from vice"; c 66b 28 : z, 66b 29.

COMMBNTARY

109

b 20 : 1 olDY cpuYiv
Cpo Archilochus, Erg. 6 (Diehl &: Beuder);
Alcaeus, Erg. Z.I05 (Lobel &: Page); Huod. 5.95; Anacreon, Irg. 38Ib (page);
and Horace, Odes 2.7.10.
&.lAl ..~
cf. 66b II-I3. 68b 18 : z.

b 21 :

1 '"' ,broc....pij...., ",..pu""",..8>\,.'I"

The particular topics in this
section through 84b 16 arc introduced by the articular infinitive. On the
verb see 63b 32; as Cope (p. 73) remarks, it is frequendy used of "the meaner
vices of cheating and de&auding," as well as defaulting, refusing payment
of a debt. To refuse to return money or propCIty entrusted to one's care,
which Cicero, speaking of a similar situation, calls injustice ("qui propter
avaritiam clam depositum non reddidit, quod est iniustitiae," Tusc. 3.8.17)
was. considered among the G<eeks a challenge to the gods to destroy both
the individual and his community; see, e.g., Herod. 6.86, Lysias, Against
Diogeiton 13. Apart from the betrayal of trust it was thnught to be an
outrage to friendship. Sec Isoerates, Against Eulhynus, a speech which is a
~l><1J "aem<aTa81j"'1"
il ol&,,.ij..u, read in cod. A corrected and by three of the edd.,
Spengcl. Cope does not read it; Ross secludes it; Kassel omits it. I incline
toward reading it since it gives the general class of which the preceding is an
instance; thus it includes unjust actions among the causes of shame. On the
idea in dd""i<1a. see A 10, 68b 6-26.

b 22 : I

48,,.1~

ol~

See A 9, 66b Io-II.

Ross alone reads aC,.

ol~ I'oi) &Ei

On the exchange of ool - ,..fI, see ?lib 18 : z.
It does seem that no real difference is intended here any more than at 78b
10-20; in some instances -:- at ?lib IZ : 3, for example - a distinction may
be at work.

b 22-Z3

b 23

cl"oAU.. lu~

Cf. 68b 17, 66b IS :

1.

b Z4 I'o"'pWv 4&uv1i....."
"to make a profit of mean and triJling
things, or things base and vile, or from the helpless" (Cope, p. 73). Io general,
the activity here described with respect to things or persons is set down at
EN II2Ib 31 - IIZ2a 16 as that of ai<1xeo"ie~"a, and it marks the oWdoOeBeO, (b 26), one who spends his time in pimping, usury, pCIty gambling,
clothes robbing, thievery. Greedy for gain. and even that wretchedly small,
he and his attitude are described somewhat vividly by Suetonius: The Lives

of Ihe Caesars: Vespasian 23.3. Cope, p. 74, mentions logography, a derogatory term in the fourth century, among such occupations; ef. 88b 22 : 1.

b 25 ",a b:a ... <j>P"v

Apart Irom the obvious implications, the proverb could also refer to such pracrices as forcing people to redeem the slain

no

AlUSTOTLB, IllHBTORlC'

I[

at a price (see, e.g., Homer, Iliad 24, in particular II7ff., and Vergil, Aeneid
9.213-215) or demanding money from parents for the burial of their children
(Cicero, Verrine Orations II 1.3.7), etc. Cope, Kassd alone read: T&
an6.

,.a.

b 26 dvu.""e'plIlS
See 66b 16 : a; for the meaning in ala"eo,.ie~a,a
see EN II22a 2-13, Theophrastus, Charaders ]0.
b 27

'Is

i.e., "in regard to" money; c LS, IV; EN II6sb 19.

b 28 ~,.o.......
i.e., wealthy, well off, persons of substance, e.g., Dcmosthenes, 01. 1.28. The idea of the topic from the viewpoint of the >lTTO.
s{inoeo, is well exemplified in Terence, phormio 41-46.
b 28-31 >c.d 6uvell;.aell' .. ~'<'<av
At the heart of this somewhat
ambivalent passage (see the conjectures of Thurot, Bywater, Richards) is
that the shameful action is the deceit on the pact of the agent. This is true
whether one interprets 83b 28-30 (dav.ICaaOa, ... 8n aITS") in either of
twO ways: (I) "to seek a loan from another when he seems likdy to maIte
a request of you, to make a request of the other when he seems lik:dy to
demand the return of something owed, to demand a return of something
owed when the other seems likdy to put a request to you"; (2) "to seek
a loan under the guise of asking a favor [when one will appear to be asking a
favor], to ask a favor under the guise of demanding a return of something
owed, to ask for the return of something under the guise of asking a favor,
to praise with the apparent purpose of asking a favor." While the first is
quite attractive,. the advantage of the second is that b 30 (inal.s .. r.a MEn)
gives unity to b 28-31 as the statement of the actions of one person. inal....
1.a then spells out the intent in all the actions: namely, to conceal one's
real purpose. These actions are all called signs of meanness (b 3I), and they
do exemplify that class of d.sllHlO8(!o, (EN II21b 17-21) who go to excess
in taking. Ross alone reads with Bywater, II Me.. for i.a MEn.
b 30 : 1 ml&'v"v
C A 3, 58b 381; 6, 63a raj[; 9, 67b 27-33.
sc. aln": "and though one has failed
z ....l '<0 d"'D'<"""'X1J>Co'<ll
in the effort, to ask nonethdess." The only way this statement makes some
sense is to take it as another example of the topic. If it is taken together with
what precedes ("al inal.e.. ... aln")' the verb which would be logically
understood (e.g., Thurot, "Observations ctitiques [1]," 306) would be inaI..... However, anOT8T1J%'1"OTa suggests aln" as the more likely verb to be
understood. On 1'7Jad. >lTTO. see LS, i/aaow: III.
b 31 :

dvdeue.pUas
See 83b 26.
See "X7JI'e,ov," 39~I. These 07Jl's,a would refer
certainly to the actions described at b 28-31 (aa/CaaBa, .. .); Spengd,
p. 229, appears to extend them to include b 2~28.
1

01J1'.'"

COMMBNTARY

III

b 32 "'06' .",...v.Lv " ..ptlv.....~ xo)...xd..~

is the reading of the codd.,
fuur of the edd., Spengd. Cope reads "Oo/!ovTa rHoAaHBia,]; Kassel secludes
the whole phrase as an Aristotelian addition. "oAaHBla, (sc. 111I,.."ov) was a
source of concern to Vahlen ("Kritik d, Rhetorik," 561-<52) as already
present at 83b 35, and to Kayser, II-I2, as not bdonging to the idea of beal"sip. In one sense Kayser is correct; however, the addition of nae&'IITa~
as object of the verb suggests that the praise meant is praise which is excessive, nAel", TWV "eOI11l"OvT"'O, MM II93a 21-22; e.g., Terence, Adelph.
26\)-2'70: "ah vereor coram in os te laudare amplius, ne id adsentandi magis
quam quo habeam gratum facere existumes." See 71a 22 : 3.
masculine, singular, accusative agreeing with underb 34 " ..ptlv.....
stood subject of the articular infinitive.
b 35 "'It'd..

See 83b

]I : .

b 35 - 84a 2 x ..l...a ... Cl'lJt'd..

C EN lI50a 9 - II50b 28; the
soft man is one easily overcome by pain, one who is deficient "with respect
to those pains against which most people fight successfully" (II50b 1-2),
or (as A. says more specifically in our passage) the difficulties tolerated by
those who are neeu{JUTBeO' "d.

84a I

:1
...purp....,..<E~
At EN II50b 3 Te"f'7i is called a ,..aAa"la TIl';
its meaning here is probably "those who are ddicate," but "sdf-indulgent"
is a possibility. Cpo 91. 3.
2 olv... &V....~
''holding a higher position, of a higher rank";
cpo leovula at 69a 13.

a 2 ~axl..~
a 3 ..... "o>.>.,D,,~

See 68b 18 :

(where 83b 5 should be: 83b 35).

sc. s.J "aUXe..; i.e., "and frequendy do so."

a 4 : 1 ov 6(~.LV
sc. (TO) av."'i~... (TOUTO) 8 ...
t'.xp"""'X("~
66b 19: 1.
3 ....." v6'<'1...o~
here in the moral sense: a vileness, low-mindedoess, meanness. A" the Virtues and Vi"" 1251b 14-16 calls it one of the
consequents of aosA.v9eela.

a S n:ci....,"rCZ AirEL" X(l1 E:n:a:yyo.1Ea8C1.1

practically the same as navTa
no's;;" "ai .Aiye",: "to stop at nothing [as TdlloTe,a aVTo6 tpaa"B'" suggests1
in making every kind of st.tement and proclamation about onesdE" Richards,
p. ro8, looks upon naPTa as a repetition from a 4.
a 6 : 1 ...:. ....u
sc. loa,; for the case, see S. 1303: "to assert the achievements of others as one's own. n
cU.C&~ov.(..~
See S6a 29 :', EN II270- 13 - II27b ]2; in On
the Virtues and Vices I251b 2 it is a consequent of aa."ia.

II2

ARISTOTLB,

RHETORIC' II

&. Ked
C 79a 20--2I.
riftO 'niw . . . KCOC{wV
sc. and ... heaaTf" Tru" dllcov
xtw. TOJ'ieOV" "from each of the rest of the vices of characrer."

a7:

8~ I I

op.ol",~

TWP

xa-

a 8 : J .... lpyll Kill .... en)p."-LCI

See A 9, 66b 27-34. In 83b I98.1'1 7 A. has given us examples of both, and specified them as actions or
signs of particular vices. He now extends the principle to all the vices of
character.
2 Kill .... 3p.o'lI IIlcrxp" y"p xlll IIlaxw.. ucci
This is the punctuation of Ross, Kassel, Spenge!, Cope. Since
is read in all the codd.,
this appears to be reasonable punctuation. The rae clause gives the explanation of the general statement made. Roemer, Dufour, Tovar punctuate and
read: xal Ta 6,.0,a aluxea "al clvaluX.,.Ta. I am inclined to accept aluX"VTC"d (provocative of shame) of cod. F since the chapter in this present
section i. concerned with what causes shame. d.aluXVVTa (shameless) is
possible, but there is no reason why these actions are to be called such any
more than the others mentioned in this section, for all proceed from moral
badness; see 83b IS. Ta 8,.0,a would be derived generally in the same way
as th~ varied activities that are virtuous are derived at A 9, 66b 23-34-

rae

a9:

b,l "oU..o.~
LS, Inl: B.I, i.e., "in addition to."1
....... 1'1) p.ttEx.v
Cpo A 7, 6sa 4-5; on Ta c end of 83b

21 : 1.

10

31'0L01 . .

MElmoL

an axiom used previously, e.g., at A 6,

63a 32; 7, 64b II-I3

'a Io--I2 p....lxLv, (op.olou~ ... laou)' IIlcrxpclv

Here the edd., Spengel, Cope read the same but punctuate differently. I would punctuate in
this way and use parentheses as Tovar does. Roemer, Dufour, Ross print:
,....X.... - 6,..tov, .. 1'<70v - aluxea., (but Ross omits the comma and
colon); Kassel, Spengel, Cope (and Freese): "'".X.... 6,.010v~ .. luov'
aluXe"" The punctuation of Roemer, Dufour is acceptable, but I do not
understand the period of Kas,el, Sponge!, Cope since the whole statement,
a 9-I3 ("allnl ... 6,.0IOJ~), is a single unit of thought, e.g., statement (a
9-I2), and the reason for it after the colon (a I2-I3).
a descending order which grows more
a I I op.oOvi~ ... CJUyy.vd~
restricted with each example. The summation, 8J.w~ TM>~ .~ rerov r'in short,
one's equals"), gives the validating criterion for each class: namely, full
parity with those in each group whose pO'Session of the honors he is without
is the thing which causes him shame. Without such equality, and consequently the opportunity for the person to be as the other is, there would be
no ground for him to experience shame at honors possessed by anyone in

II3

COMMBNTAlty

any of the groups mentioned. He might experience envy or other emotions.

~.,), l~ ru.v means persons of equal station in life; c Plato, Laws 777d,
919d.
a 12 i\6"'1
See also 84"- 15; "for in this situation [i.e., being equal with
others] it is a cause of shame not to share.... " On the word see 69& 27,
S4b 7, 79& 9
a 13 : 1 en:l ...oGcru....",
the neuter of the demonstrative used substantivally: "to the same extent as they do."
2
x,d... Of'O""~
coordinate with :n;aultolae.".
a 14 : 1 7tsv..... 6 .....G..... l'iiAAOV
sc. Ian alaxed. The ~av~a refers
minimally to the deficiencies mentioned at a 6-13.
3 ..u...... ... !'iiAAav
sc. 'Pal....at: "for in this case they now
appear to be more the effect of his moral badness."
"whenever (if ever) he himself is
a 15-16 ;tv ..u...b~ .. !'dAciv'<tdV
the cause of his past, present, or future condition."

o,..

a 17 ....... G_
the object of the preceding participles; it is specified
by the relative clause /Jua &vsld,!: "men are ashamed of .11 such present,
past, or future personal experiences which lead. ... "
a 18 R,I'/Clv ... " .. I civoi61J
i.e., disgrace and censure, as we find it
in Herodotus 9.71 tAe,~oa,!"" ... u.,8.!, .1X. 1I
"a! d~c,.I'1'), or
Plato, ]Up. 590c (pa.avula ... a,d TI, orec,II
'Pie.c). Therefore d~c,.la is
used here in a manner similar to its use in 78b 29 and A 7, 6sa 5 (and see noteS
thereto), and not in the legal sense, despite the explanation of T.caVTa .. . lJaa
(a 17) at a 18-19 (Tma . v{JeICea8ac) which might suggest the penalty,
6m,.la, which did exist for such actions; see e.g., Harrison, I 37, and on
dT.,.la in general, II 169-"76.

d.,

a 18-19 ..."G........ "Urxpii>v

brackets it, but olfers no reason.

,a.,

read by four odd., Spengd, Cope. Kassel

"and these are acts of prostituting one's body

a 18 .... d~ iI""PE-njGE'~
or submitting to degrading actions." On the construction see S. IIS3.
"among which is to be physically outraged."
a 19 ilJv iI(jpll;a8 ..,.
eli., partitive genitive; v{JeIC.a8at: to be physically outraged. A period is
the punctuation accepted by four of the edd., Spengd, Cope. Kassel omits
the period and makes this together with what precedes (apart from his seclusion at a 18-19) one statement down to a 20, cf.co.Ta, where he punctuates
with a colon as do the edd., Spengd, Cope.

These lines are interpreted in

a I~I : 1 " ..l....... (jl..v ihcav.....
different ways by the translators, and the Roberts translation reflects the

II4

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' II

84a 20

general tenor of these interpretations: "And acts of yielding to the lust of

others are shameful whether willing or unwilling (yielding to force being an
instance of unwillingness)." It seems more correct to interpret the lines as
follows (the reasons are given in the subsequent notes): "And on the one
hand acts of licentiousness both voluntary and involuntary are shameful;
however, the acts done under compulsion are involuntary."
2 XIII "Ill "." ott; ... xlllbov"... "Ill 6' EI~ ... lixov"..
This is
the punctuation of Ross, Spengel, and I find it the most reasonable. Roemer,
Dufour, Tovar punctuate: ... "at WcOVT4' (rQ /J' sl, ptav d"ona) '; Kassd
includes the whole in parentheses ("al Ta ",S' . (iia. Il"ona) .; Cope
omits the clause rei d' Bi, . . &"0'111'0.
J "Ill "EV .l~ m..o>'llcrl..v
This should be interpreted as was Ta d~
V"1J~.nj(J"~ (84& 18), or as 84a 34f: Ta .. o'P8a).por~ [acts done in the sight

a 20 :

of all], Ta .. 'Pa~q,. For example, I find it difficult to understand how Cope,

p. 78, finds no problem in interpreting a 18, Ta e!~ 1ln1J~'Tlj(J"~, as "acts of
service or subservience," but insists, p. 78, on interpreting our phrase here as:
UTa ai, d"OAQalav sc. tp6eO'llTQ, uv'JITsivovra; quae spedatlt ad incontinentiam."
which he then translates: "And of these, all that have a tendency or reference
to (all that subserve) licentiousness are disgraceful." If 'P~~o'Ta, (JIIVTEi.ona
are to be understood here on an analogy with (?) 84a 1., (8ua e!~ QT,,,,ICrP
cpi~,,) or 83b 14, then they should also be understood.t 84a 20, Ta 6' el~ (ila.
axOVTa. But Cope, p. 78, does not so understand them, and translates the
phrase: "the involuntary being such as are done under compulsion." This is
the same as his interpretation of Ta el~ V"1J~ETljU.'~. Furtb=ore, if we
understand tpB{!Ol1TO, auvTslvovra and translate in terms of acts, we have:
"acts that 'have a tendency to or reference to' compulsion." While this
can be defended as having some meaning, still such acts cannot be called
unqualifiedly Il"ona if all that A. says about such action in EN u09b 30 uub 3 i.! correct. I would interpret our phrase (c Bl~, LS, IV) to mean:
"things which have to do with lust, licentiousness," which comes to mean
"acts oflicentiousness" since in the context these things have to be actionsif ."ona - Il"o.m carry any meaning. On dxoAaula see A 9, 66b 13-15
and EN Iu8b 15 - IIl9b 18.
2 Exmll XIII cbcOV'<'Il
On voluntary-involuntary action, see A
10, 68b 26 - 69b 27, and in particular 68b 32 - 6,.. 2, 68b 10-11, 69b 21,
73b 34 : 2 and EN Il09b 30 - IIub 3.
a 20-21 "Ill 6' .t~ ~lllv axov"..
as A. says at A I5,77b 5, "d 6. (iiq "al
dnaTl1 d"o~u,a, which is a fairly concise statement of what he says about
(iia in EN u09b 30ff. In his discussion of the voluntary-involuntary in
that first chapter of Book 3, A. opens with the statement that the involuntary
action appears to be the one made under constraint or ill igno.rance. He

COMMENTARY

IIS

then spends the rest of the chapter in determining what is meant by "under
constraint" and "in ignorance. OUI concern is with the first, which we are
told means that the initiative for the action is external to the agent and is
such that the agent contributes nothing to the act (IIIoa 2-3). After reviewing other actions in which the initiative might be considered external
and which he calls mixed (voluntary-involuntary), he a.ks (IIrob 1-3)
whether "under constraint" should still mean what it was said to mean .t
IIIOa 2-3. He answers his question in the affirmative at lIIOb IS-16, and
sums up his position at the end of the chapter at HIla 22-24: an action done
under compulsion (Le., the initiative is outside the agent) is involuntary.
Thus, while acts of licentiousness which are, or could be considered, involWltary in a broader sense, are a source of shame, those done Wlder compulsion
are truly involuntary. But even as such they are a caose of shame to the
person since yidding to the force (a 21, Wr0l'olnj) seems to come from personal cowardice. It should be noted, however, that these truly involuntary
acts are not the kind of actions A. has been describing from 83b 13 to here;
C, for example, 83b 19 (TowTa ...).
II

a 21 IivCIV&p (.. ~ - &'LA(a~

See A 9, 66b II- 13 where de,}./a is defined
in terms of a.deela, for which reason I would take d.a.dela, as a synonym
of ae&J.l",,; see also 68b 18 : 2.

a 23 a ... "<ooa;;,:a
a summary of the preceding division. We now
tum to the second division neo, Ti.a, (83b 12) which is introdnced (840
24-27) by a partial repetition of the definition of alaxW>! (83b 13-15), but
with a concentration on the specifying difference, d60fla: the loss of reputation, the disgrace incurred in the minds of others. Since we are concerned
here with neo, Ti.a" this. limitation of the definition is quite reasonable.

a 24-26 "".pi "&o~(a~ ... &o~"~ov"<,,~

A. determines here what was

partly assumed in the definition at 83b 13-15: namely, that shame as an em0tion is "a vivid inrpression" of disgrace personally incurred. This disgracenamely, "a loss of respect in the esteem of others" - is the sole caose of the
shame, not any of the consequents of such a loss. However, the loss of the
esteem of others which constitutes the disgrace does not in itself cause shame
(e.g., 84b 22-24). Shame depends upon whose esteem is lost, i.e., dip M840 27, a phrase A. specifies at 840 27-29.

,.0. "X",

a 24 "&o~!~
the loss of one's reputation, esteem (Mfa), in the
minds of others; and so: "dishonor," "disgrace."
a 25

....tN'"I~ ... Xcipov

"foI its own sake"; i.e., the dishonor itsel

a 25-26 cN&El~ ... cill' ij aLii

"and since [b,ei] no one attends to
another's opinion of himself except in the case of who they are who enter-

u6

ARISTOTLE.

RHETORI C I II

tain it." ml6.t,: we have the singular here and in what immediately follows.
At 843- 29 there is a shift to the plural. In instances like this one can ask with
Spenge! on 86a 28: "cur ttansitus in singularem?" In this division there is
Ti.a, to ".ia (c 83b 12-13) at 843- 34-36, 84b
similar shift rom
I'T-20; cpo SSh 28-29.
.

neo,

See LS, My., L4. This particular topic is developed

_ 27 AOYOV XC.
down to 843- 34, after which A. turns to the more general category of
d.a" people (whether they are held in particular regard or not) whose
opinion matters sufliciendy to cawe others to experience shame.

"eo'

_ 27-28 81l.. p.1l~av-n..v . 8.... p.ci~c..81l,

See 79b 25-26, 81. 28-29
fur the use of the same norm in a related situation; see also A 6, 63a 34-35.
a 28 : 1 qnl.o-rLI'ELTClL

a XClTCUPPOVEi

See 79b 24-25; see .150 81b 21.

For the idea in the word, see 78b 15-16,

78h

14-15:1.
_ 29-30 81lUP.ci~...81l' . 8.... p.cit;ou..,
pm. oJ> is retrospective and
transitional (Denniston, p. 470). We are given here the development of two
of the five classes set forth at 843- 27-29. We should note that while the analysis concerns the kind of people held in esteem (84' 27: dl. My lx.'),
its u1tim.te purpose is to set forth the people before whom shame is felt.

(any good) "rom among those which bring

_ 31 : 1 Tidv -np."""
honor"; at A 5, 61a 27 - b 2, we are told the things which are Tip,a, the
things which. cawe men to be held in esteem.
z &eDp.IIO. "'Ppo&" ..."o~
i.e., "desperately want something."

_ 32-33 'PtAo..,p.oGv........ 'Ppovlp.wv

28-29: "ed, .~, ... ddc7J'.
_ 33 :,

a brief development of 84a

6p.oiou~

i.e., "equals," as arA 6, 63a 32-33, 83' 32-33.

See 6]_ 17; the word, modified by cr., cU1/9n".
("as speakers of the trudr"), is the object of 'PIl0n/Cov",.

z rppovip.wv

_ 34-35 " .. t ....... P.iiAAOV

sc. al"xVvovTw, on parallel widr palAo.
al"xVvovTa, (a 37) in a sentence which illustrates this p.rticuIar topic.
On Td Iv &p9aJ..po" sec 84a 20 : 1. On the shift in subject matter, c S....
25-26.
_ 35-36 38ev .. Ill&...
theses.

w.,. ...

Ross alone of the edd. encloses this in paren-

_ 36
Ill&.;;
If there is sequence of ideas here in what is
presumably intended to be unified statement, we must determine the

COMMENTARY

II7

meaning of (I) Ta l. d'l'6aA,..oi~, (2) Td b dtp8a).,..o'~ .l.al aldOl, (3) dla TO

i. d'l'6aA,..0'~ d"''I'dT.ea. Since it seems clear that the public character (Ta b
d'l'6a).,..0'~) of the act causes the greater shame (,..a.!).o., a 35, 37) - and
this idea is restated in the example given as an explanation of the proverb
(dla TOVTO ... d"''I'dnea) - it would appear that the proverb (TO b . ..
aldOl: shame is in the eyes) most mean here that shame resides in a person's
act being seen by others, in conspectu aliorum as Vater, p. 90, says; see also
Schrader, p. 281. This idea is hinted at by Suidas (ed. Adler, s. aidcb~) in one
of the explanations given for the proverb, e.g., II {In 1"01l~ naedoTa~ &eOl>T.~
aidoMal,..Woo 01 iI>6eomol 1J TOtl~ dnd>Ta~. This idea would find confumation in 84b 32-36, 8sa 8--13. It also seems reasonable that in this division
of the chapter devoted to those people before whom one experiences shame
A. should speak about a greater shame experienced for an act seen by others,
by those likely to be close associates (nae."o,..bov~) who give close attention
to one (neoaixona, aVi'oi,). If this is so, the citations given as explanation
for the proverb - e.g., Sappho 137 (Lobd & Page), Hymn to Demeter 214,
Theognis 85-86, Aristophanes, Wasps 446-447, Euripides, Cresphontes &g.
457 (Nauck & Snell), HippolyluS 246, Iphigenia in Aulis 993-994, Xenophon, Memorabilia 2.1.22 (see, further, Cope, pp. 8<H1I) - namdy, that the
eye is the .eat of the emotion as "the principal organ by which the emotion
is expressed or manifested" (Cope, p. 80); are not to the point. The intent
of these citations implies that the proverb here means that shame stands
revealed in the eyes of the guilty person. See, for example, 67a 8 on Sappho,
'or Gauthier & Jolif (II.l 323) commenting on EN II28b 13, iev6ea/vo>Tal!
"La manifestation de la pudeur, ce sont en effet les yeux baisses, soit parce
qu'i1s n'osent pas se lever sur I'objet qu'i1s respectent, soit parce qu'i1s n'osent
pas affronter Ie regard d'autrui OU iIs pourraient lire un bl~." The only
part of this comment which would be consonant with the interpretation
olfered here is the second reason - seeing one's shame in the eyes of tho..
who have viewed one's shameful actions: in conspectu aliorum, b dtp8aA,..o'~
dva, alae.

84b I

Suit 'to ... '!"Po't'p"

sc. loa" "because both instances [naesao,...the eyes of others." diJ'l'dnea

is the accosative of the neuter pronoun referring to statements in the preceding part of the sentence; see Riddell, nos. I7, 42, and Plato, Ph.edo 68c.
oo.~, neoa.X"Ta~l constitute being in

b 2 't";;'tli
The specification of the word must come from boX"""
"those not liable to the same imputations, charges," namdy, that their actions
are shameful. The fact that they are ,..~ boxol (i.e., ,..~ b.X0,....ol) indicates
that their usual way of acting is different, and so the reason: Mi)."" "ae . ..
TOUTO'C'.

I18

AIlSTOTLB, 'RIrETOllIC' II

b 2-3 " ..1 '<ou~ cltflo"P,<.ivELV

Kassd alone of the edd. secludes this
as an Aristotelian addition. Spengd reads it but has doubts since he bdieves
that if it is Aristode's, it is out of place because 84b 3-4 (II y~ . .. BpBaa.)
does not explain it. He would place it preferably right after boxov, (B4b 2):
b.xov, leal TO,), pf! ... d,aapra.... dii1o. "d. Although there is some
confUsion in the codd. and although Spengd's doubts make good sense, our
cod. A reading is acceptable. We know (see 74h 7) that a d,aaeT'I'Jpa is the
kind of wrong which is onderstandable, generally acceptable, and capable
of being done by most people. Obviously "tho.e who are not inclined to be
indulgent to those who commit such wrongs" are morally straitened individuals who judge others by the narrow standard they have set for themselves. Since such people are viewed as manifesdy good persons (cp. EE
1233b 27-29), to experience shame before them is natural although it may be
unreasonable.
b 4 VEfIo."av
I doubt that this means anything more here than "to be
angry at": "he i. usually said not to be angry at the same actions in his fellowmen." If it carries its technical meaning, "righteous indignation" (see B 9),
it makes little sense of A.'s statement here.
b 5 ~IlYYEA'<LXoU~
those inclined to make known matters which are
secret, i.e., to betray; cf. Demosthenes, Phil. I.IB. Cope oJfers, p. BI, "those
who gossip, tell tales."
b 6 aioSiv ... t;llyym.LV
This sentence i. given varied interpretations - e.g., Cope, p. Br: "because there i. no diJference (in regard to the
effect upou the other) between not thinking (a thing wrong) and not publishing it to the world." He then interprets this to mean: "as far as the
eJfcct upon the person who bas done something wrong is concerned, and the
amoont of shame which it cause. him, it make. no diJference whether the
other really thinks it wrong, or merely says so to the world." How this
comes out of the Greek is difficult to see, as is "having no tale. told is as good
as not being considered in the wrong" (Cooper), or "not telling others is as
good as not believing you wrong" (Roberts). Bonitz, StuJkn, pp. 9r-92,
also discusses the passage and conjectures Id for do".... The yap c1au.e,
as A. generally uses it in this kind of analysis, gives a general reason for the
specific topic mentioned (e.g., in this chapter B3b zoff., 84b rff.). Here it
would appear that the general reason should be enonciated in this way:
"for to such people [sc. To,01lTO"j not to proclaim something far and wide
and not to have an opinion on it are one and the same.tI Men experience
shame before such people because they know whatever such lEuyy61n"ot
think of them will be broadcast.

II9

COMMENTARY

b 7 iJ&'K'I"'tvO' ... ,,,.p ....'1P.v

See 82b 10. The verb (naeaT1leB1.)
emphasizes the danger from th.s. people who lie in wait for an opportllDity
to speak out; cpo Top. 16ra 23.
b 8 K..KO>'oyo,
See 81b 7 from which the impression is drawn that
"oHoMyo. are keenly aware of the faults of others and speak viciously about
"al
them. an impression borne out by the reason given here: .r,,'e
("""oA."o;;.,..) T.,), "TA. However. the subject of """.Aoy.6c1l is 1id"'"'!,..t.
and "a"oAOyo,. the two specifications of Ual'l'BAT" t.

yae

.r,

b 9 : 1 Kill ot~
sc. "al (T.6T.0, olav......o.)
(ian).
2 &'II"P'~~
i. . those whose way of life. whose business. is with
the faults of their fellow-men. From the example given - e.g. XAeoocr-rol,
(7\111 2~31. 80a 29). "w,..rpdo"ol,. and the classification of these people
as "o".Uy... i~OyyeAT.".1 - 6.0Te'P>! implies more than idle amusement
or innocent pastime.

For the general idea in the word. see 741> 7 and I14b :1.-3.
b II-I2 "Ill tv o~ ... &'''''.'''''11'
"And they experience shame io
the pr.sence .of those among whom they have never failed sioce (among such)
they are io the position of those admired." 60.,..01;&,.."" as p....ive and
subject of d.rb....TO. must refer to those who experience the shame. not
those before whom they experience it. Knowing that their past successes
....ure them of a good M~o among such people (843 27: My lX.' TW.
600,..01;&oT<01I). they are more readily susceptible to olaV"'7 io their presenc.
There are other ioterpretations of the statement which change the meaning
and neglect the middle. 60.,..01;0,..
b 13-14 &,a ... .n...ol~
"And as persons who are not yet held io disrepute they are ashamed In the presence of those who ask a favor for the
first tim.e." This statement curies on the idea of the iotegrity of the person's
6O~0. and so. ordinarily. a freedom from a sense of shame. However. it
implies that the inability or refusal to respond to the request will result io
the loss of one's M~o with these people (e.g. new friends. old acquaintances) whose opinion one respects. and so a consequent sense of shame.
A 12. 72b 21-22. 76a 30 : J.
This refers to those mentioned io 84b 13. i.e.
those whose esteem they still possess. They consist ofrwo groups: those who
have just recendy wanted to be their friends (b 14-1S). and old acquaintances
aware of no failures on their part (b 16-17).

b 14

: 1
2

iJ&ol;'1Ko...;

..o,oil... ,

b IS-16 &,1> EupCIKocr(...~

The problem with these Iioes is that
we have no evidence of any event to which we can asaibe it; nor are we
Wtaio of what was said. or who said it. The evidence for the speaker and

120

ARISTOTL~ cllHBTOBIC' II

the statement comes from the scholiast (Anonymus) who assumes that the
speaker is Euripides, the tragic poet, as an ambass.dor from Athens to Syracuse on mission of peace and fiiendship. This presumably would have
occurred prior to the Sicilian Expedition of 4-15. Certainly the words which
the scholiast cites are an apt illustr.tion of the topic. In the account of the
scholiast, the Athenians newly desirous to "be friends of the Syracusans make
request for peace which is rejected by the Syr.cusans; in reply Euripides
comments: "'f for no other reason, at least, gentlemen of Syracuse, you
should respect us, your admirers, for this present [the first, explains the scholiast] request made of you." As Spengd (pp. 23C>-3I) aod Cope (p. 83) remark,
there is no firm reason, apart from the absence of any confirmatory evidence,
which permits us to say that this is not the tragic poet or that the scholiast
has invented the story. Other conjectures have been made but they are
equally unsatisfying. On the positive side in some favor of the scholiast is the
fact that we know Euripides was deeply regarded in Syracuse and that many
Athenian captives owed their lives to him following the Sicilian disaster
(plutarch, Lives of the Philosophers: Nidas 29), and that A. from his many
citations of Euripides (he racks third after Homer, Isocrates) apparently knew
his work intimatdy.
See commClit at

84a 25-26.

b 18 : t .... P'I9,.......
certainly the shameful actions indirectly mentioned in this division (842 24- - 84-b 17) by way of illustrating "'e~' d.a"
but .lso those mentioned in the first division (83b 17 - 842 23).
3 0"1)p.E111
Sec l'E'1}PBiov/' 391.
b 19 itppo&LC..ci;l;ov..~ ... Moil
al"xVv0VTa& must be understood
with d'l'eoa&,,&a'ovre,: "those who engage in acts of sexual intercourse are
ashamed of the acts and also of the sign. of such actions." The underlined
phrase must be understood since A. is talking about actions even though he
makes the construction personal both here and in 84-b 20: ".&oiivre" Ul'DVTB'.
The context from 84-b 17 wil1110t tolerate any other meaoing. A. has already
indicated what he has in mind by this topic at 842 16-20.
b 20 "'o.oil.....~ .. ).eyov...~
See preceding note. For the general
idea, see Sophocles, philoct.ru 86-87, Oed. Tyr. 14-09; Isocrates, To Demonicus IS.
b 21 ....... ~ elP"IJp.vCl\l~
Cpo 84-b 18, Tel. tPI8bTa; the persons mentioned
are those ("eo, dv~) of this division, 84-' 24- - b 26.
b 22 cN"O~
i.e., the people before whom men experience shame, i.e.,
the -leTJPivov, (b 21). Now their servants and fiiends are put i.n this class.

COMMENTARY

b 22-26 1IAc.>~ voP.ov

84a 24 - 84b 22.

I21

a general summation of the whole division

b 2.3-24 oil8' WV ...lou

... cU.'18WE'v so. 060' (TOVTOV,) &iv: eli. is a

possessive genitive with M~'1' which is governed by the verb. This is the
positive expression' of what was previowly stated negativdy at 84" 28-29
(Hal eli. pT, "aTa'Pe.'" Tij, Mf'l'). The validity of the statement rests on
84" 25-27: shame is occasioned not by the Mfa but by the quality of the
person holding the 66~a. On "OTO'PeO"'v, see 78b 'S-I6, 78b 14 - IS : 1.

b 23 56;1)~ ",oil cU.1)8WE'V

"whose views (judgments) on speaking
the truth they deeply despise." On aA'IO.v... see 84" 33, A. II, 7" ro, 14.
The more wual interpretation found is: "whose opinions we quite look down
on as untrustworthy" (Roberts); "for the validity of whose opinion we have
a great contempt" (Cooper); "for whose opinion in respect of perceiving
the truth ..... (Cope).
Cpo A II, 7" 13-17. I would interpret O'leio
b 24 "",,5i.. x",l 81)p('"
here as there; see pa IS. In fact this present passage would confirm that
interpretation, for it is somewhat diflicult to comprehend how A., given his
definition of shame., could possibly speak of being ashamed in the presence
of animals.
b 25 oiln ",ar6d
an accwative of respect: "nor are they ashamed
with respect to the same things before those well known to them. ..."

. . . 50xoiiv..", . . . ",ck "po~ ... vop.ov The TO "eo'

phrases are also acowatives of respect: "with respect to those things righdy
evaluated ... with respect to those conventionally evaluated." Cope on this
passage, p. 84, refers to 8Ib 19-21 for the meaning of the. expression. However, this does not seem to be correct, and the reasons are set down at 8Ib
19. Spengel, p. 23', interprets our passage as a statement of what men are
wont to do and cites EN r 128b 23-25 as a contrasting statement of what men
should do. But there really is no connection between the two. In our p ....
sage we are talking, not abollt the actions men perform, but about their
emotional response to the actions they perform which are judged by others
as wrong. Actions which are TO "ed, ,U"Oav d."criivro are those which
are rightly viewed as wrong, i.e., in accord with what they really are. Those
which are TO "ed, vo,..ov are those viewed as wrong in accord with established law, wage, or convention; see e.g., SE 173a 29-30. As was seen at 8Ib
19, sf, these last are not necessarily the cause of shame to one if they are
done in the presence of close friends. In the discwsion on law and equity
in A 13, and in particular 74" 25 - 74b 22, there is a difference between legal
and real wrongness in an action.

b 26 ",ck .. po~

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

122.

b 27: 1 .r,&e
"(disposed) as follows"; c 82a 20 : 3. We begin here
the last division of the chapter. "W~ IXo .....~ of 83 b 13; it is analyzed (84b
27 - 85a I) first from a genexaI perspective.
z np"'TOY po...
This is :mswered at b 2.9 (-liera. 6') - if it is
answered at all; cpo 87" 6. The usual correlation can be seen at A I. 54" 34-

I.

1 d ,:,...cipXO'EV . ixoy.".~ oil...., '''''.~

OIiT"'~ is read by Roemer. Dufour. Ross. "If certain people are related to there in the manner
described."
3 oiou~ ... ,doxwOYT.., "people such as tho.!e we said are the
kind in who.!e presence they feel shame." .'Pa,.... i.e.. at 84" 26/[ (d.ay,,'1

b 28 :

TOVTOV," ).

ij."." ...

b 29-3 I
IWT";
Kassel alone of the edd. enclo.!es this in parentheses without :my break with what precedes; the other edd.. Spenge!. Cope
begin a new sentence with "iera. and omit parentheses. punctuating with a
comma after /J'Te~. Kassel gives his reason for the change in DeT Text.
p. 134. I do not see his reason. At 84b 29-36: >Jera... alerO"ljer.erOa. (b 36-38:
6... C7lA"'Tai is simply a further addition occasioned by the statement) A.
specifies what he means by 84b 27-29 (neWTO' ... alerx.s.o.Ta.). and he does
so by naming again the group mentioned earlier at 84a 27-32. In 84b 29-31
(>Jera.. /J'TB~) he mentions the four major groups in who.!e presence men
experience shame. At 84b 32-36 ("al OIiTO' alcrO>1er.erOa.) he determines
the OIiTO' o( b 2.9 more specifically: "these especially [see S. 1246) whether they
are onlookers ["al oIiTo. ~ (11. eli.,.",) de<iWT6~). as Cydias in his speech in the
Assembly presented them ... or are persons near at hand. or likely to learn
about (our action)."
b 29-30 ij 8C1Upo..~6p.EVo, ... 9C1Upoci~...8..,
Ross conjectures ~ <01> Oav,.aCo,...o

See 84" 27-28. At b 29

ij cr.v &.loy..,", ..,v..... IW ...~

See 84" 31-32. Ross alone conjecsecond w" e.g. T",a xe.la> 7j~ (as does Richards. p. 109).
However. leola> as a collective singular denotes a class (c S. 2502b): "or those
from whom they have some need which they will not.... " Kassel conjectures <"aTd>.",a citing the scholiast. Twa xe.la. is a cognate accusative.

b 31

tures >J~ for the

b 32-35 (C, ....Ep . lJnicp("""'....,)

Only Ross and Kassel enclose this
within parentheses. as does Freese. Doing so is reasonable. for the remark is
parenthetical. and a better use of the punctuation than that of Cope who
encloses b 33-35 (~'lov . .. 'P'1'Pler"'>Ta.).

85a I

COMMENTARY

123

b 32 : 1 Ku&I,,~
A. is our primary source (see, e.g., PW) fur this
Athenian orator who argued, probably in 365 B. c., against the establishment
of cleruchies in Samos, an action which, while legitimate since Sames was not
a member, was clearly contrary to the intent and spirit of the Second Athenian
League (on this last see OCD; CAH, VI; D. Siculus, Ip8.3-4, gives a brief
report of the formation of the League under the year 377/376 B.C.).
Eci"ou
In the year 365 Timotheus after a se.ige of ten months
captured the island, and the Athenians moved cleruchs into it; see CAH,
VI I05f, 209/f.
See OCD, PW, for thi, process begun at the end
3 x>.1JpouXI..~
of the sixth century B. c. whereby Athens settled her own citizens (who retained their citi2enship) in conquered territory. Its unpopularity in the
fourth century B.C. is reflected in the constitution of the Second Athenian
League, and in Isoerates, Panegyricus I05-Iog.

b 33 :

1 E&1JI'-1JYOP'I"'"
See A 3, 58b 8-10, and the whole chapter for
comments on deliberative rhetoric.
.n.ol.<I(3ELV
Its subject is TO., 'Ao.,valov" and it govern, the
following accusative and infinitive construction; c 77b 27. Cydias with
his request is employing a form of what is sometimes called jimo. See, e.g.,
Cicero, De oral. 3.53.205: "personarum ficta induct:io"; or Auctor ad Herenn.
4-53.66: "ConfOrmatio est, cum aliqua, quae non adest, persona confutgitur
quasi adsit."

"as if they were eyewitnesses [dew ..a,]

b 34-35 ':'~ .....xauao .....ou~
and not merely people who will eventually hear about."
b 36-37 bpii"e", .......Xoiiv..E~ (3..uAav..",
See the statements of Hecuba in Euripides' play of that name, 968-974. or of Ci=o on Murena in the
peroration of the Pro Murena (41.89): "Ibit igitur in exilium mioer? Quo?
ad orientisne partis, in qnibus annos multos legatus fnit ... res maximas
gessit? At habet magnum dolorem, unde cum honote decesseris, eadem cum
ignominia reverti" (Victorius).
Emulation, as a distressful feeling experienced by
b 37 ~'1AoUv'fWV noTE
good people at the absence in themselves of good things which they esteem
and which are possessed by their equals, is studied in chap. II. It i, a constructive, not a destructive, emotion, and as we see at SIb 21-23 the relationship between both persons is actually or potentially one of friendship. Thus
A. is able to bring (b 3?f) the C'l/AOlTai within the general elass of 8aviJacnal.

8sa I it x"""'axUvou",v We begin here a consideration of particular

aspects which are determinants of the disposition of those who experience
shame. Our reading is that of four edd., Spenge!. "aTa,,,xtIVO';,,.. read by

I34

ARISTOTLE,

R.HETORIC' II

8sa 5

Cope, Kassel has a sounder textual foundation and is read by the scholiast.
However, while the future may possibly be explained, it is difficult to understand how the context can tolerate it. A. says, for example: "men are ashamed
whenever they have deeds or achievements upon which they bring dishonor
- whether their own or their ancestors or certain others with whom they
have some kinship." If we accept the future - "upon which they will
bring dishonnr" - they must, in order to experience shame, already be
engaged in a course of action which will dishonor these achievements. Some,
e.g., Spenge1, Cope, Freese (Loeb), interpret II "aTalaxV>oVa&7 diJferendy,
taking 11 as the subject of the verb: "deeds or achievements which bring dishonor;" see also the Vetus Translatio and Victorius, who cites an apposite
example from Euripides, Hipp. 424-42S.
a 3 ciYX"...~!1I
Technically all blood relations up to second cousins;
what is a realistic understanding here would be: some close and special blood
relationship.

a 3-4 XIII 3Aw, ... oN",O!

"and in general (men experience shame) in
the case of all those on whose account they themsdves fed shame." In the
previous topic men experience shame when they theuudves bring dishonnr
upon the achievements of theuuelves or those closely rdared to them by
blood. Here men experience shame when these same people, or others closdy
relared to them (e.g., those who look up to them as modds or as their students,
advisees, or rivals), do something sham.efu1 themselves. The sentence has been
given different. interpretations: "Generally we fed shame before those for
whose own misconduct we should also fed it" (Roberts); "To speak generally
we fed shame before those persons whose own disgrace would affect us"
(Cooper); "And universally, we feel shame on be""!! of those whom we ourselves respect" Oebb Ill: Sandys); "In a word, men feel shame fnr those whom
they themsdves respect" (Freese).

a 4 : 1 slp'!""'o,
presumably those mentioned at 8sa 2-3, as wdl as
those, it is likdy, from 84b :>.sif.
2 01 . clvCUPEpofLWo,
"those who refer (themselves) to them,"
Le., "tho.e who defer to them as standards" (Cooper). This group (including
as it apparendy does 8sa S'"'l [see following note]: those taught or cOWlSeled,
and rivals) could also refer to 84h 30, 8avpd'....,.,.
a S il Jw .. yoyo"ua,v, il <lclv . .
is the reading of four edd., Spengd.
Kassel reads: oro> eli ,..,,&.aa&7. "ai M... ; Cope reads without the
first ~ (which is omitted by cod. F, anaong others). I follow the reading of
the edd. Kassel's oE.. is attractive hut I find it difIicuIt to confine the reason
at Ssa 6-7 (noUu,.ae .. "olo;;aw) to Ssa s~ ("al Au> 'P1A0T1po;;.Tal);
I :uso find a problem in the fact that with Kassel's reading the ~ngivenat

8sa 14

us

COMMBNTARY

8sa 6-7 (noAAd ,,~ ...) is so confined, it would seem. Yet this reason is
meant to apply to 8S' 3-<1 since it is because of the shame fdt on account of
such people (1.e., a 3: ~"'e w. alaxVvovTa,) that men (alaxwopBVo., a 6)
do or do not do many things.
a 6 IIfIo0<O'

See 84a II-I2; and cpo 8~ 32-33 (rpMoT'pomll' ... opolov,).

a 6-7 ..!lIJtuvop.Vo.........OU"fO\I~
by people such as these."

"out of a sense of sbJune occasioned

a 8-9 " ..I p.m..,...~ . . . et.,ly

These lines should be compared with
8~ 34 - b I; c 84a 36.
a 8 lv <p"".pcji 4Y.......ptcp .,8,..
an idiom meaning "go about in public"
(Xen. Hell 6.4.16; Plato, Rtp. ss8a) and so: "to associate publicly with those
who know their disgrace" (av'8&drlaw; cpo 84b 17, 82b 6).
a9:'

,.laxuv'nJMI ~OY

i.e., "are more ashamed" - a meaning

called for by the context and derived from the meaning of the word as it is
ordinarily used: sensitive to, su~ect to, shame, and so: modest, bashful; see
the word at 72b 30.
z AY....<piiiv
See 79b IS. There is a story told by Plutarch of the
orator Antiphon (ps.-Plutarcb, Lives of the Ten Orators: Antiphon 833 b-c;
and see 68a 18 : ,) who was killed for criticizing the tragedies ofDionysius.
Since the poet and the orator are often confused there might be some vestige
of the reason for the poet's death (mentioned here) in the story told about
the orator.
See 83a S.
a IO :, 4"'0.... fIo"'''''II;.,,8,..
z A.owcrlou
i.e., the Elder (ea. 430-367 B.C.); see 79b IS, OCD,
PW, CAHVI, chap. S.
a II Eyxa>.u.....op.lvou~ as a sign of their shame; see, e.g., Plato,
PhaeJrus 2.43 b, PhaeJo II7C, Acscbines, Against TimorchlU, 26.
a 12-13 ....I .......u-...",..
possible example of aiM".

See 83b 13 where the words are cited as a

a 13 ij flo"
sc. ij ly"aA,;,.na6. Pit . .. The alternative ii, here introducing a second question, is the equivalent of the Latin
The second
question usually (as here) anticipates and rejects the answer that would be
given to the first. See Plato, Apology 2.6b (11 MjA.. "'i ...) and Adam's note
on it (PI.tonu Apologia Suer.tis), or Crit. S3C (11 oJanee ...). Cope, p. 87,
offers another explanation.

.n.

the conclusion to the chapter."

a I4-IS ",.pl flo'" o(,"'OP"aofloEY
To;,. hani.,>, i.e., the opposite of the particular topics on shame presented
in the chapter. Apart from this nothing is offered on the emotion opposed
to shame; however, c Boa 19. ,~oefjaop.., cpo A 8, 66a 20.

CHAPTER 7

(Sec 85' IS)

I . Introduction: 8s, IS-2.S

I.

2.

introduction to, and triple division of,

8S' IS-I?

kindliness
definition

8S' '7-19

expIanztion of definition
when kindliness is gIOZt
what 4pb", in the cIe6nition

3. 8sa 1!)-2S
(oj 8sa '!)-"

(6J 85' 21-25

IT Development: 8S' 2.S-2.9

melD'

those who can be said to have kindliness. This is presented not so much
by showing how men are disposed .s
by considcrlng what kind of act they
perfOrm in terms of the definition:

.movey'a as.pIN,!,
of kindlincss: a restatement of the
triple division as now clear, and then
- most unusual- how one ;. to develop kindliness in others

III . Conclusion: 8S' 2.9-33

IV . Unkindlincss: 8S' 34 ~ 8Sb

10

development of unkindliness by Way of

showing how to remove xde" in others.
Again thiJ ;. done in the bare terms of
the definition, that is, by showing that
the person, or the act, ;. not commensurate with the definition

.tenv . _1 .....; ... ix"""o;

the usual division (cf. 78a
2.3-2S). The reading;' th.t of four edd. Tovar along with Spengd, Cope
reads with the codd. iJ

lisa IS-I6

,.Iii,.

There are two things to be said of thiJ chapter on xde'"

the emotion ofkindlincss, good feeling toward another. In the Drst place, in
organization it is, despite the brevity, the most loosdy constructed of all the
chapterS which have been met thus far in the second book. It;' also different

a IS XoiplV

u8

AlUSTOTLE, 'RHETOR[C' II

85' 17

from the preceding chapters and those which follow in the nature of its
analysis. It makes a token effort by way of simple statement to follow the
triple division, but does not do so. The analysis is concerned more with
what constitutes xde." and thereby what constitutes ar.ae",...la in the
second half of the chapter, than in determining in any detail the disposition
of those who experience xde." or the people toward whom, or the conditions under which, it is experienced. It defines xde., in terms of the actions
of the person experiencing the emotion; this is unique among all the definitions of the emotions. Then, unlike the other chapters, it analyzes these
actions in terms of those who would be the recipients of the emotion.
Even in this last analysis, which might seem to be a development of the
division "ed, -.:l.a, (those toward whom men fed kindliness), A. occupies
himsdf only with recipients who exemplify certain specific kinds of need
which illustrate the de6nition. He does not assume the definition and present
US with general classes which exemplify the kind of people toward whom
the emotion is felt. The best way to grasp what is meant by this criticism is to
take an emotion closely related to xde." namely, ",.lla, and compare the
division ned, d.a, (8la 8 - 8Ib 34) with what is said in our chapter in 8sa
21-2\1; this, in fact, is the entire statement on xde" in all its divisions.
The second point to be made is that xde., as we find it analyzed in the
chapter does not include the feeling of gratitude, as not only Cope, pp. 87, 89,
suggests, but Cooper, Freese, and before them Schrader, p. 299, and presumably Vater, pp. 93-94 (reading, a. Cope does, .t a 17-18 xde" unove,,'" for
xde .. lX"')' In. itself xde" means: (a) kindliness, benevolence. (b) gr.titude,
(e) a favor cOnferred. But the intent of the dc6nition (a 17-19) of xde"
as an emotion and its explanation in the chapter is an analysis of the emotion
as kindliness, benevolence: helping someone in need and doing so without
any expectation of a retum. Cope'. effort, p. 89, to defend (b) gratitude,
does not really stand up. Gratitude as a feding, or emotion, is pleasure at and
thankfulness for aJavor received. No matter how else the feeling or emotion
is described, gratitude is a response to kindliness shown to one. But A. excludes this in the definition of xae'" e.g., 85a IS-n, and repeats it at 8sb 4;
nor does he say anything itt the chapter which negates his definition. Further,
8Ib 35-37 makes it clear that xde', is kindliness shown to another. On pp. 94-95
of his commentary Cope speaks more correctly of xde" when he says that
it is "confined to doing a service to a friend in need."
a 17 l ....... ail XclPL~
On the definition, c ,sa 31 : 1. As was said
in 78a 22, xde., (the feeling of kindness toward another) is, as a ..d90"
exclusive to the Rhetoric. The "d90, met in the EN (where it is only mentioned, nosb 22), is xaed, and it would seem tomeanjoy, as it apparently does
in the De an. 403a 18 where again it is simply mentioned. In the, Top. Iub

Ss. 19

129

COMMBNTARY

21-26 it again appears to mean joy, as also in the Rhetoric to Alexander, i.e.,
Anaximenes 14221 17. When x<ie" appears in the EN at II20a 1S-I6,
lI67b 19-25, it means gratitude, as it does in the Rhetoric 74a 23, MM I2IIb
23, and in Axanimenes I439b 22-26, I444b 41 - 144sa 2. In two other places
in the Rhetoric, A I, S4b 34 and r 3, 06026, x<ie" appears to mean pleasure,
joy, as we found xaea used above. xae', appears at EE I240b s-<s but there
is some question about the reading. In EN
2-5 there is a possible
hint of the meaning for xae" found in our present chapter, but, since A. is
speaking about reciprocity, favor is the more reasonable meaning: give and
receive a favor. This is the sense in which it is also found in Anaximenes
14440 37 - b I, and in our work at 79b 30 and in the MM I2IOb I. In these
instances xae" as "favor" denotes something done for another, and as such
is quite close to the idea of ~"ovl!Y{a in the Rhetoric definition at a IS. It is
denominated xae" because it has the qualities particular to such an act.
However, whether or not it comes from or is motivated by the emotion
xae" as defined in the Rhetoric is not clear. Th2t can be determined in each
instance only by seeing whether or not it fulfills all the requirements for such
an action as xae" is defined in the Rhetoric. From SSb 1-5 it is clear that
acts which seem to flow from x<ie" do not necessarily do so. C 85' 29-30.

"B'

Ix"'" is intransitive (!.S, B): with which the one

17 xd' ilvo lxwho is in conformity is ,aid ... , i.e., "in confonnity with which one is said."
IS 6"oupylCl
literally: ,ervice rendered; here probably: being helpful
to, doing a favor for. And so: "Let kinclline.s (benevolence) be defined as
being he!pful to (doing a favor for)." Cicero, De inv. 2.3S.IIZ on beneficium
(Cope) helps toward an understanding of the idea here.
This statement would rule out
a IS-I9: 1 ",iI liwl .. :"<. oIxElvcp
the idea of gratitude as an interpretation of x<ie" (see 85' IS) or even the
expectation of any kind of a return from the one to whom the kindliness is
shown: ,..",d' Iva T' (fflavT,p ""oveyovVT'.
2 ~ 6"oupyouv....
is the reading of three edd., Spenge!. Ross
(according to whom T,p is missing in cod. A.), K2ssd, Cope read aVT,p T,p
iinotJ.Qyo!i:vn.
a 19 "'Eyli>.'1 &i
sc. laTa,. Since x<ie" is .moveyla . T' l".lv'P, the
statement at a 19-21 (,...".u", ... ,...u'aTa) is valid for both. However,
,..."al"'1 probably agrees with ~"oveyla and not xae": "the favor will be
substantial if it is done for someone in desperate need." I say "probably"
because a 21 (q.v.) which is part of the statement definitely requires some
form of the verb "nouey"v, Cope, p. SS, cites EN II63a 9f[ as explanatory
of ,..."aA", here. Since the distinctions offered there are directed to mutual

130

AllISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

favors typical of friendship based on utility, the comments are at most marginal
to our word, which is well specified in our text.

a 1!}-20 CRpcl&pCl &.ov-tv'l'

Cpo 8"" 3 I. Ross alone of the edd. reads
d.op""o~ with Bywater and Richards; see Richards, p. 109.

a 20 : 1 ".ym).1dV XCll xcxAmWv

These genitives are best taken with
a.op"''!': "to one in need of something quite important and difIicult to obtain." Cope (p. 88) apparendy takes the words with v"ov~yla. This is attractive (see also Spengel, p. 232) since it would extend the scope of ;cd~,~ in
what seems a legitimate way; e.g., ;C~I~ is present if (u"oveyla) the doing
of the favor is: (a) for one in great need, or (b) of something important and
difficult, or (e) at a critical moment. For example, the explanation of %~,~ (not
necessarily the emotion) found in Plato, Definitions 413e is of larger extension: %~I~ ';'.~y.,,[a J"oV"'o, . .meldo"o, dyaBov . u"ov~yla I. "a~<ji. However, from all that A. says in the rest of the chapter, it appears to be essential
to the idea of %d~o, that the Unoveyla is shown to one who is a.op""o,;
cpo 85a 24z Ev xlllpoi~ ",o'oU-ro,~
again understand aeop"''!': "to one in
need at critical moments which are important and difIicult" (TOIOVTOI, referring back to what preoedes; cf. 79b 28 : 1). On "a~o~ see 6sa 20 : 1.

a 21 : 1 l\ "Ovos ... "ciA"""CI

The idea intended seems clear: the kindness shown is very special. Since we apparendy revert to the personal construction here and this creates confusion, we can resolve the problem by
understanding the a. of a. " at a 19 (with which Richards had difficulties;
see 85a 1!}-20) together with UnoveJlii: ., (a.) po.o, (u"oveyfi) - "or if a
'person is alone in being helpful, or the first to be helpful, or is most helpful
of aII."
z c1pil;..~
See 78a 31 : z, 69a I : Z.
a

22 : 1

't"ou-r-

a partitive genitive: "and of these those appetites espe-

ciaUy...."

Z CIt ".."ck M"'IS

See the definition of deY>1 as 6e.~I' pB't"a )'V"'1~,
78a 31, and the comment at 79a II : 1.
3 ",oil,,~ y,yvo"c!vou
"for something not possessed."
a 23 : 1 W,.,.;;.".., .. in,au"ICl'
For the relation of 1".Bvp[a to o~e<",
see 68b 32 - 69a 2, 69a I : z, ?Oa 17-18. To,avTao, i.e., oes.", peTa )'V"'1'.
z i!p... ~
Cpo 8"" 32.

a 24 X"",:,,,.,,," ... X,"su"o,~ Cpo 86a 8 ("a"cba ,), 82a 32 ("I.a..o,). Both words, together with " ..I~ (a 2S), ",."ai" piye6o, Tij, d.>jaBw,
(a 26), and the statement at a 28-29:
made at 8sa 20 : 1.

avtly"" ... petew, bear out the comment

131

COMMENTARY

a Z4-zS c\ KLV&""el..... l"'LUuI'Ei AUttoUl'EVOS

If ..t.d""., is the
approach of what is fearful (see 8za 3Z), then fear, or the emotion occasioned
by a vivid sense of impending and harmful evil (82a ZI-ZZ), is present. The
natural response to fear is the hope for safety (83a s-6) which is a desire
(.,nBv,...r). Furthermore, the fact that fear makes one deliberate (83a 7)
means that the appetitive faculty is present; see S7a Z : 1. The same natural
e.g., 79>- II:
response (l,..8v,...t) occurs in the case of one who is
l,lBTal "de n1o'0C' d AV,",OVI-'670" on which see 79a II.

.:1"".6,....."

a ZS "'EVI,!,
Cpo 79a IS-19 where those who are poor are characterized
as among those who are bnB",..oWro,. "C1fI't1Ta,.....' = "those who help."
exile as at 72b 6. Plutarch (Parallel Lives) in his Thea 26 : 1 cpuylliS
mistoeles Z4-2S speaks of the assistance given to Themistocles in exile by his
friends; see also Thucyd. 1.137.3.
z I'LKPci 67nJP.-nj....,crLV
The verb here tolerates the meaning
found in vnovl!l'ta (a 18); further, the presence of vn01Jl!ytap at a 29 suggests
that this is the operative ide, in a 2S-29 (d,... ,...tC.,), and so I would
translate: "even if their helpfulness is insignificant." In, way this lends
confinnation to the interpretation at 8sa 20 : 1.

a 26-1-7 &Lci"';' l'iYE8oS . KIlLPav

to nplq., as Ha'l!6" does to qN')'ai'".

,..froB., T;j, 6mjl1 ." refers back

a 27 K)CIlPLal'ivoL
sc. Ia<: "have exp.....od fedings of kindness."
Cpo the use of the verb here with its use at A 12, 73' 16 (to gratify others).
a z7-28 orav ... &oUS
No one. apart from the scholiast who receives
small credence here. has any idea of what the reference is.
a 28 ElS ....116......
is the reading of three odd., Spengd (although he
questions it, p. 233). Cope. It is not the reading of any of the codd. Dufour,
Kassel read Taiha with cod. A; cod. F reads TO'aVTa, which would be my
preference, i.e., "with respect to the sort of instances mentioned." Cpo

a 3Z, 33.
a Z8-29
ness."

l)(ELV

'<ltv

6n:oupylllV

C 8sa 18: "to show this helpful-

a 29 : 1 IS 1,,11 ij 1'011;....
This is the reading accepted by all; the
punctuation, however, is that of Dufour. Tovar, Kassel, Cope. Ross punctuates with a colon; Roemer, Spenge!, with a comma.
z C.......E
with dijU. (dan), a 30.
a 29-30 oI",.l <pIlVEPDv .. i!xouaL
This is a restatement of the triple
division given at the beginning of the chapter, 8sa IS-16. Cope alone and
Freese read "ai 6n for "ai or, at 8sa 30, and so Cope's comments should be

ARISTOTLE. 'RHETORIC I

[[

85b 2

watched. "And so since it is manifest to whom and for what reasons kindliness is ,hown and how those are disposed who are kindly, it is clear that their
presentation must be made ready from these sources by those etc. [cE RS31 : Z]." A.'s assurance that all is now eminendy clear is somewhat starding.
It is true that he has covered each point, if very skctcbily, but "de'~ as a
does not emerge clearly. To interpret it as a "feeling of kindliness toward
another in need" is more a deduction from the fact that he calls it a
and defines it as .",verla dpAP", PT! d.d ...... " and from the explanations
briefly given in the chapter, as well as a statement such as that at 8Ib 35-37.

"dB.,
"dB.,

_ 31 : J me <"oU""""
i.e., from the particular (.I'd'l) topics presented
for this emotion; cpo 82a 16. The methodology is set forth in general outline
in COMMBNTAlI.Y I 354-55, and in some detail at Sgb 25-]2. A.'s expectation
that the method is to be used can be seen at A 7, 65b Ig; g, 66a 27, 68a 33.
19, 19b 17-28 where we are told that the
Further, see the comment at
analysis of the emotions was a presentation of particular topics au each.
z ''''PCl<r1CEUClcniov &E..,.w..,...Cl~
For the construction see 7Sa
a6 : 1; and so we have: Xaeat1x11aCIT4o~ dB,,-,vVvTa, TOU, PB1t ... Toil," ~ .. . :
"it is clear that their presentation must be made from these sources by
those who show that some either are or have been in the kind of pain and
need described, and that others have made or are making xome such helpful
contribution in such need." On "aea ..".vdC ..., see 6Gb II.

a 33 II 6mjp.TDilv<"Cl~
is the reading of four edd. Spenge!, Cope. Kassd reads it as < f}> Vn1}e ....OVVTa'.
a 34 Iii; x.d
"on the other hand it is also clear." I would take this as
, the use of "al with M to supplement the adversative sense with the idea of a
further addition (Denniston. p. 305). Here we are given another conclusion
(cE a 29) considered to be obvious (tpaeo.). But A. now introduces a
new emotion: d"ae, ..Tla.
a 35 - RSb I 4q>.llp.i.,S.Il .. 4xClpIGTOU~ The verb carries the meaning
found at A 4, 59b 29, 60a 10. From what follows at 85b 1-5 we remove the
presence of kindliness and acts of kindliness in others by showing that the
definition of "de" (85 a 17-21), in whole or in part, is not present.

Rsb 1 II yap 3... ,

sc. ~ rae (6 .....va..., from 85a 31) lin. The structure
in the subordinate clause to b 4 is a series of doublets: three sets of verbs, one
of participles.
b

2 : 1

iiy

,b,o

C 63> 9 :

1.

z
..ux"ll~ ClUllhcE.,W
The verb whose subject is an understood
.,..verla reinforces the prepositional phrase (on which cpo 59" 35). On
C 6ga 32.

wm.

133

COMMENTAllY

b 3 : 1 """1I"ClyxoicrS'IcrCIV
"were COnstrained, forced"; see Pol. I256b 7,
Demosthenes, Ag. Aristogeitr>ll B. 10.
z li",iI&.,xCIV
"or tbat tbey returned a favor, but did not do one";
for tbe idea, sec 79b 7, 29- 30 (Mal ~o'~ .. an06160ver..), and 79b 30; on the
form of the VCIb, see S. 755a.
b 4 : 1 or..e oI6':'~ cI-re p.it oI6':'~
is the reading of four edd. Ross
reads, as do Spengd and Cope: .rn el6dT8~ .rn 1I'i; but Spengel prefers
the reading accepted above. Strictly speaking, A.'s statement is correct.
If an action, objectively considered, is in fact tbe return of a favor (and is
not a favor freely given without any expectation of a return), it cannot be
called xde.~ as dc./incd. For it is, as A. says (85h 4), an action that is in fact
TO
T"O~. The fact that tbe person placing the act does not know that
bis act is such does not change its objective character. Subjettively speaking,
however, as far as the intent, the good will, and tbe attitude of the agent are
concerned, I think Cope, p. 91, is quite correct in saying that such an action
on the part of one who is pi! el6cb~ is an act that may have its source in xde.~
- provided, I would add, tbat the otber conditions for xde.~ are present.
"for in botb instances '[i.e., sldcb~, pi!
z liP.'PonEp"'~ .. T'''O~
.ldcb~l there is a return for something."

a""t

b 5 : 1 066' oiI..... ~
"not even in this respect." The statement is certainly correct witb regard to el6cb~; it is questionably correct (sec BSb 4 : 1)
in the instance of pi! .l6cb~.
XIITYJYop(~
i.e., the ten categories, or predicates (witb the
understood reservation about substance as a predicate) that can be assigned to
any being and arc studied in tbe work by that name, Cattgories. We have
five of them here (b 6-7) ~ tbe other five are: relation, position, condition,
action, passion. As indicated here, tbey are uscful for any kind of analysis
and have been used in the presentation of tbe particolar topics in the first and
second books. Here A.'s concern with tbe caregorics is to give one the tool
for developing ..zap.erda: look to the person acting, or the act, under different
categories and sec whether or not they arc witbout the constituents of xde".
And he in fact exemplifics what he means: e.g. IAaTTo. pi! VmJeiT1laav,
TO'~ "z6eoi~ belong to tbe category of relation;
to quantity.

rail,

b 6 ST...0&1 "oil
Cpo 64b 15; sec 64b 15-16. ST. introduces a
causal clause, 8n (lern1: "for kindliness is kindliness because it is this particolar
tbing, or of some magnitude, or quality, or done at .orne time, or place."
b 7 "'Ip.eiov
i.e., of dxae.~ta which was introduced at 85a 34- On
tbe use of '"IP.'o, here, .ec "I~p.'o.," 393: namely, the facts adduced
(e.g., not doing a smaller favor, or doing tbe same, equal, or greater favor

134
to

the person's enemies) are given as sign evidence of the presence of elxa-

e"1Tta in

those who do such things. The intrinsic connection between the

acts and the absence of xde" reside. in the fact the acts are not unselfish,
e.g., b 8-9 they are not done solely for the recipient, and so do not fulfill
the definition of xde" at 8sa 111-19. llano., TavTd, etc. are cognate accu-

satives.
b 9 tplliiACI dli':'~
sc. v"'leBT1J". A. has wed 'I'aiiAa a number of tinu:s
in these early chapters - e.g., at 79b 2.2, ~3, 81b ~, 83b 33; see 79b ~I.
Here it means "favor of no value." As A. goes on to say in so many words
(""601, .....A.): need signifies the want of something seen as good and so of
value, for it signifies, as he said earlier, a natural appetite (6"'i"'" ai law
al deBe.." a ~I).

CHAPTER 8

I . Introduction: SSh II-I6

I.

8sh II-[3

transition

2.

8sh [3-[6

definition of pity

II . Devdopment: sSh 16 - S& 8

I.

8sh 16 - 86a 3

(.) 8sh 16->4

(b) Bsh >4 - 860 l
3. 860 4- 860 I7

3.860 I8-86h8

attitude of those who experience pity:

subjective aspeet
what is necessary for one to fccl pity
those who feel pity

the things which excite pity: objective

aspeet
those for whom pity is felt: objective
aspect

Four edd. hegin the chapter here; Kassel, Spengd

8Sh II xIXI ".pl
begin at 8sh I3 (1m",), as does Cope in his comments. I would prefer to
. include 8sh II as the conclusion of chap. 7.
b u-13 "ou. ... >,oyw",...
the usual division first mentioned at 78a
2.3-2.S. In the devdopment the order is changed to
"oia, Ti....,.

,.Iii"

b 13 : 1 ........ &>\
Cope, p. 93, once again speaks of a "popular definition which is all that Rhetoric requires." On this matter see 60b 14 : "
or the comments on any of the definitions thus far seen. For example, in the
case of the present definition, one is at a loss to determine how it can he called
"popular" as opposed to scientific, since it is the only extended treatment
which we have of the concept in A. In his other works we find it simply
mentioned in a catalogue of emotions, e.g., EN IIosb 23, MM 1I86a 12-13,
De an. 403a 17. Similar to these citations are those found in the Rhetoric at
A I, S4a 17, 2.S; 78a 22; r '9, 19b 2.4-28. It is not mentioned in EE. In the
EN at lI09b 32, UII a I-2, we learn that one who acts involuntarily can be
the object of pity Uust as we saw at Soa 10 that such a one is the object of
"eao"'1'); and at III40 2S-27 we have a statement on pity which makes
sense only in terms of the definition given in the Rheroric. The other references
to 1160, in the Rheroric at 87a 3-S and 88a 26-30 are understandable in terms
of the explanation given in the present chapter. In fact, pity plays a prominent

13 6

ARISTOTLE. 'RHBTORIC' II

85b 13

part in the discussions of indignation in B 9 and of envy in B 10 (c 88a 2.3 : .).

Tvrice Anaximenes mentions pity as one of the emotions: I440b I, 1443 b 17.
At I439b 2.5-37 we are given the conditions necessary to arouse pity in the
auditor; the conditions echo in some respects the definition given here in the
Rhttoric. When we turn to the Poetics we find pity mentioned in conjunction
with fear, a relationship found in the Rhetoric, e.g., 8zb 26-27; 8, 86a 2.7-2.9.
The Rhetoric, however, also notes that the pitiful is different from the fearful
and that the fearful often produces the opposite of pity (860 22-24). While
the Poetics speaks of pity, fear, the pitiful, the fearful (I449b 27, I452a 2-3,
I452b 32 - I453a I, I453a 3-4, I453b 1,9, 12, 17, I456b 1-2), it has nothing
to say formally about the specific meaning of these terms. In fact to understaDd <p.fI." lA" <p.fI.er!.. lA.smi in the Poelics, one must turn to their
definitions and explanations in the Rhetoric, which is what the Renaissance
critics and commentators on the Poetics did; c Steadman, pp. 91. 74-104.
In a recent study on Greek tragedy, Stanford writes brieJly on pity; see
PP23-26.
2 AU""I
Cpo 82a 21 in the definition of fear, just as ''''X<p <p6"1!T'X<p
"ai Av"'!e<p should be compared with 823 2.2.. The implicit relationship
here indicated is further emphasized at 860 27-29. On Av,,'1 see 78a 21-22.
Diogenes Laertius. Lives of the Philosophers: Zeno III says of pity: Us ,.,
J.. Z.a. Av,,'I" cb, In! d,,,"l.,, xa"ona6ov.n; and see Cicero. Tusc. Disp.
4-8.18: "aegritudo ex miseria alterius iniuria Iaborantis."
3 bel 'P1l'VO!,tvcp x"xci>
On tnt, see LS, B.IlLI. <pa...,. ,
in the meaning .found at 7Sa 31 : 3, and this meaning of the word here is
confirmed by 86. 4-16, 860 29 - 86b 8. Furthermore. comments in the
Poetics such as those at I453b If[ indicate that pity is stirred by the manifest
unmerited misfortune of another; our own text, at 86a 29fE, states what is
frequently implicit in the Poetics: nanrely, the use of spectacle and language
to make the pitiful manifest. Cope's reservation>. p. 93. on Victorius' interpretation of tpa ...,.btp are quite sound. On the other hand his observation,
p. 94 (and note Il - see also pp. 99-100 - that all mention of mental as
opposed to physical suffering is absent in the text can be misleading; cpo
86a 5. It is true that the evils specified in the chapter are physical. This, in
itself, would not exclude mental pain and suffering from the word "a".
InOeed at 82a IOo-II the word is used of non-physical evil. Obviously in"
terms. of the definition (<pa ...,.btp """<p) mental suffering can evoke pity
only when it becomes known to another through some physical manifestation
(word, action, appearance, etc.), and one cannot overlook the further fact
(which A. himself could not miss) that most of the physical evils he mentions
carry, actually or potentially, concomitant mental sufferiug. Thus <pa...,.
"ax.. in the text can be physical or mental. The key idea for lAO.,

85b X4
is that the:

COMMENTARY

"a"rI.

be perceptible -

a1uO'lTri as A. says at 82.a IO:

X37

Ta ,...

l""'7ea aIUO'lTa ",i.Ta.

h 13-14 cpS ..pT1XCji ;j l.u,,'lPCji

C 82a ,,2.. ru at 8:>a 21 : 3 these
are two closely related ideas. and so: "painfully destructive."
h 14 &v ..~lou TUyxcivE1V
c Poetics 1453a 4-6. The importance of
this phrase in the deftnition becomes clear as the chapter develops. The
adjective also enters into the: definition of indignation; c 86b 9-x6.

_,.LV

While Cope's ohservation (pp. 94-95) is

h 14-Ij 3 xiv ...
correct ("the conception of general benevolence and love and duty to our
fellow creature is of modern and Christian origins and finds no place in
Aristotle's Ethicol System. . . . the limitation of pity to those sufferings to
which we ourselves or our friends are exposed ascribes a selfishness to the
emotion which seems not necessarily to belong to' it"; see also Schadewalt.
13If[, and Gomme. on Thucyd. 3.40.3). I am not certain that s~hness
can be drawn from the text here. It seems more reasonable to see at work
here an idea found in the Poetks whicll became popular in the fourth century;
see. e.g . Snell. pp. 246-52. and Dover. pp. 201-203. We read ill the Poetics
1452b 38 - 1453' I that the plot snitable to tragedy should be one which
responds to man', sense of kindly sentiment for his fellow-man. sense of
pity. and fear: 9"la.0eamo fl ....... rpo{J.erl.. This philantbropia ("ordinary
sympathy." as Else, p. 364, calls it; c Stanford, pp. 26-27) is the compassion
for oth"" aroused in man because of his sense of common humanity and
fellowship with men. I tltink that there is a fine expression of what I mean
in Cyrus' rellection. in Herod. I.86.6, or again in the words of Theseus to
Oedipus, in Sophocles, Oedipus at C%nnus 566-568: "For I koow full well
that I am a man and that my portion of tomorrow is no larger than yours."
In general, just as tltis idea of common fellowship is at work in goa 20 where
A. speaks of pity as experienced by the young. so, also, I believe it to be
present here when A. says that we pity that Wldeserved suffering in others
which we think that we ourselves or our friends could suffer. Unless we are
able to see such suffering as sometlting which we, too, can suffer by reason
of our cornman humanity shared with others. it is diflicult to comprehend
how we can understand or appreciate suffering in another and so be able to
"","tend pity to one in the throes of it. There must be this element of selfregard in pity (as there is in fear) in order that the emotion may be what it is
primarily (as opposed to fear): other-regarding. On I",U.Oewno. in the
Poetics, cf. Else, pp. 368-'7I; Lucas, p. 142; or Poblenz, 53/[ Pohlenz' description of philanthropy, p. 59, is somewhat to my point: "It is simply the feeling
of intimate unity with our fellow man. It is more comprehensive than eleos
since tltis has to do with our fellow man as suffering; and yet it is indeed a

138

ARISTOTLE, 'RBBToruc' 11

natural instinct out of which comes the fellow-feeling with

our fellow man."

""'1"

il"<iilv .........oii
Kassel alone reads a~Toii. On
of the two pronouns see 60a I : 1.

b IS.

8sb 21

the distress of
the exchange

1 ").'1"(OV'P..1"'Y''''
Cpo 82a2.S; another instance (cf. 8Sb 13 : z)
of the relationship between pity and fear. The clause is an important addition,
namely, that the other person's destructive evil is seen as an evil proximately
threatening the one who is to experience pity. Its importance becomes clear
at 86a 27 - 86b 1, and cf. 86a 24-25.
z liij).ov ytltp . . tiv"y>C'I
sc. AnI. We begin here the analysis
of the division
lXO.TB, with an explanation (to b 24) of conditions which
must be realized in the person who experiences pity.

b 16 :

,,,ii,

"'O"N"''''' at.... The verb (cp. A 4, S9b 34-35; 6, 62b 22;

7, 6sb 12; 13, 74a 8; IS, 76b I) states more finnly the necessity that one actually
b. (e.g., its use at b 22) this kind of person. On 010, with the infinitive, see
S. 2497. The phrase TO.oVTO, 010, occurs again at b 18, b 24.

b 17 6,."pxE'V

""'1"

1 il ..6...ilv il "<iiIv Moii

is the reading of three edd., Spengel, Cope. Dufour reads ~TOv, ~T06; Ross, a"TOV. See 78a 32r-3J.
Z otov oIp'l..... ,
i.e., 8Sb 13-14; the misfortune should be the same
(6'!'0 ...), or quite similar ("a~""'<1ja.o.), to the evil given in the definition,
i.e., "painfully destructive."

b 18 :

b I!}-20 01 ... ti,.O)"")'cI....~

the second perfect with middle force:
"those totally ruined"; cpo 83a 3-S; another instance of the relation between
pity and fear.
b 20

o6liev... a!.......... '

"for they believe that further suJfering is beyond

them."
b 21 6,..p."Ii..,I'-""cLV
A glance at A S on eudaemonia, or the
oudine of that chapter (COMMBNTARY I 103), readily explains why those
who d,ink theD1Selves to be enjoying an excess of it would easily become
hybristic or, as A. specifies their attitude (ssb 22-24), completely secure and
self-confident. On hybris as met in B 2, see 7Sb 14 - IS : 3. There it was
seen primarily as an aa, but we cannot forget that as part of tl.t.r.,~la it
denotes an attiIIlJ.. In our present passage A. appears to have in mind the
attitude and feelings which are at the root of the act (e.g., 8sb 31: b v(i~.C1Tm1j a.aOla) aud which make it possible to speak of an aa of hybris, as is
constandy done. Lattimore, pp. 2.3-24, points to the various meanings of
hybris as an aa, but questions the claim "that the Grew knew and described
such punishable pride in its pattern by the master-name hybris." Yet Solon
3.8 (in Diehl & Beuder) speaking of the hybris of the Athenians. as leading

85b 26

COMMBNTARY

139

to injustice is speaking of an attitude, not an act. So, too, it would seem, is

Theognis 151-152 saying that god gives hybris to the man about to be destroyed, or Aeschylus describing it at Persae 821 as something "which when
it has flowered bears a fruit" (and cpo Eumenides 533-534, Agamem.wn 763-'766,
Petsae '708-831). It is the attitude and spirit of going to excess, of excessive
pride, arrogance, insolence, recognized in Agamemnon (see Robertson), in
Creon of Sophocles' Antigone, and Ajax (e.g., 758-777) in his Ajax. This
attitude is recognizable enough to fonn the substance of the brief note on the
concept in PW, S. IX (1897).

b 22-23 El ymp . "IIXDv

A glance at A 5 with its sum of external
and internal goods which constitute .iida'/J""ta makes it obvious that those
who believe themselves abundantly favored with it (.mse ...da'/Jor.) do
not think themselves capable of meeting misfortune. On the contrary, they
view their life as da'PaU<1TaTO~ & Plo~ (60b 28), a life in which TO /J~ bM..
XBa8a. "a8.r. (8sb 23) is assured. Eudaemonia is atlTae"Bla C{JJij~ (60b I4).
But aUTae"..a makes life desirable and wanting in nothing (EN I097b I4- IS),
a life, in the words of 60b 15, & /JBTa da'PalBla~ f/~'f1TO~. The attitude of
mind subsequent upon such a view is well described at 8sb 21: 1JPeICoIJf1W.
b 22 &ij>.av 3.., ",d
sc. dijlo. lin "al (ofo.Ta .maeXB..): "it is clear
that they also believe suffering any evil an impossibility."

b 23-24 ~ ..a ..wv ckyll8&iv

TOUTO refers back to (b 23) TO /J~' ..
"aH.' and governs the partitive genitive. It should be clear from the explan.tion of dra8 in A 6 that freedom from experiencing evil is a good.
b 24 .t..l &

We begin here an enumeration of those who feel pity.

This is, as the TS" "at indicates, a

b 24-25 at u ... &......... ouya...~
single experience of both' Wldergoing a painful event and coming through
it successfully, an experience which makes one sensitive to the =merited
suffering of .nother. What Cope, p. 96, has in mind in relating this to B 5,
83' 27-28 is unclear, particularly in view of the fact that il'1Av8.TB~ BI~ Ta
dBwa does not signify that the individuals have suffered in the experience as
they do here (e.g., "",,o.8.TB~). Furthermore, the action at 83a 27-28 is
repeated ("oUd",~) .ction, and if suffering .t any time were part of the
experience, it is difficult to understand how 8aeao~ would be the response
to it since 8deao~ is the expectation of the .bsence or remoteness of the fearful
(83a I7-I9).
'Pea.... in the sense of the adjective
b 26 cppav.iv . ~"".LpIIlV
at 63a 17, 64b 12; on 'Peo''1a,~ c definition at A 9, 66b 2~22. The importance of experience in the development of this kind of practical wisdom is
explained at EN II42' II-I8. Both the practical wisdom and the experience
make one aware of the possibility of undeserved misfortune in one's life.

8sb

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

'40

]I

b 27 : 1 &EoAO..EpO' fLii>.Aov
i.e., "overly timid"; on the use of ,UI;AAOV
with the comparative see 64b 1-2, or Kiihner, Blass, & Gerth, I1.1.349b 6c,
Cope, pp. 96-97, meaning (2). The person who is excessivdy fearful is
deficient in confidence and is called a coward; c EN IlIsa 34 - IlI6a 3,
68b 18 : l.
2 e}My .....o.
In the context, a. Bonitz, ltu/ex, notes, it is the one
who is .v Aoy,C6,.."0,, one good at calculating, and, so, prudent, circumspect. This reason certainly applies to the "'."'aw.v,....', of whom it is
characteristic that they are good in making judgments (EN I094b 23 - 109sa
2), questionably to da6 ....i', dBlA6ueo,. Cpo dAOyurra at b 30, 32.

b 28-29 a.6'ro\j ... "'''Oft

"for these are one's own and are able ...";
see, e.g., 8sb IS, 18: ~OW aVTo;; T"a, which explains, I believe, A.'s use of
the singular (av..oii) here; i.e., yo..., etc. fall into the category TOW aVTO;; Tl.a.
The singular is questioned by Spengd, p. 234 (aV~oii); on the matter in
general, see II4a 2S-26, 8Cia 1.7 : 2.
b 29 dp1JfL.....

sc.

'P'l,.6,...a """d 'l'6a~,..a II

A""'1ea, 8sb

13-14-

b 2Sf-30 ."... 1Iv..~

"those who are not experiencing fedings of
courage"; see Bl,.;, LS, C.rv.3. These fedings are immediately specified as
anger (see B 2) and confidence (B s, 83' 13 - 83b 10). Aspects of courage
as an absence of fear can be found in both: direcdy in confidence as the opposite of fear; in anger, in the desire for retaliation. See also 83b 7: 6aeeaAiov
yae tj6ey7j
b 30 (liMy..............ii....)
The parentheses are read by the edd. and
,Cope, but not by Spengd. The neuter represeats an understood Ta na87j,
i.e., Ta;;Ta (Ta nd67j), referring back to anger and confidence. lliY'aTa =
not heeding, thoughdess ot; apparendy in the sense of o~ Aoy,C6,...0,; C
8Sb 27 : 2. Spengd, p. 234, questions the use of dAOy'aTa TOG lao,.bov
for these nd67j. I find the doubt a reasonable one for confidence; see, for
example, 83a 17-19. On anger, however, we have the statement at A 10,
6ga 4- I believe the point that A. is making is that reason plays a more active
role in pity as defmed (e.g., the one who pities "must be such a one as to think
that he him.!elf would suffer some evil," 8sb IiS-I7) than it does in anger or
confidence, where the reaction of the sense perceptions is more dominant;
he says of anger (EN II49b I) that "it follows reason to some extent."
b 31 6(3p,....."ij &,CI8taE'
C 8sb ,u; on d,a8l1as, C 7Da 2 : 1. This
attitude, which is described at 8sb 21-24, obviously excludes all thought of
experiencing any serious harm.
b 31-32 (x..l .....,)
The parentheses followed by a comma or no
punctuation are read by the edd. and Cope, but not by Sponge!. ,

800 2

COMMBNTARY

141

b 32 .. "da.aOed T.). Q>.).' 01 p..T"~U ToU","",

See asb 34. This is the
reading of all the codd. at this place. It is also the reading of Dufour, Tovar,
Ross, Sponge!, Cope, who punctuate with a comma, colon, or period after
TO~TOW. The phrase dll' 01 pna." T.VTOW read here makes sense in itscl
Moreover, taken as an integral part of the whole sentence8sb 29-34: "ai .1 ...
ndO , it permits the sentence to read intelIigendy. On the other hand,
put at the end of the next classification 8sb 32-34: pf}T' cnJ 01>0.1'1' ndO ,
where Roemer and Kassel locate it, it makes for far more sense, I believe,
although I can give no reason, nor does anyone else, for the dislocation (if
indeed there is one) in the codd. The contrast in this single sentence, 8Sb
29-34, is between two emotions, inrmoderate courage (e.g., anger, selfconJidence, hybris which is excessive and irrational self-confidence) and
excessive fear. It is possible to see midpoint between them: the experiencing
of reasonable courage and fear which permits the person to see the possibility
of suJfering misfortune and so being capable of pity. This, in fact, is said
for fear at 800 27-29. On the other hand, if we read our phrase where it is
found in the codd., it refers only to immoderate courage, specifically its
examples: anger self-confidence, hybris.
b 33-34 oU Y"'p ... " ..0..
Kassel alone includes this within paren-

theses without any punctuation before it. On the idea in the sentence, cpo
800 22-24: Tel
;e~a.pov.

rae ...

b 33 : 1 clX"E1fA.''lYp.vO'
strongly enforces the 'PoPODP"" u'P0dea, i.e.,
they are driven out of their senses by the fear; see Euripides, Medea 8.
orO " ..
"becawe of their:. preoccupation with their
own emotion"; see LS, slpl, C.N.6. Cope, pp. 97-98, analyzes the expression in terms of neo,.
b 34 otxcI", " ..0 ti)J;' 01 p.ET,,~u '\"eN","",
I would read eLll' ...
TOOT"'" here with Roemer, Kassel; for the reasons see Bsh 32. TQ,n"JV would
then refer to the two major emotions mentioned: courage and fear.

,. 5....

e..

b 3S : 1 'tcdv cln b.w

On the word, see 7& I3 : 2; recognizing that
there are good men, one acknowledges thzt there are men unworthy of their
suJfering and so one can experience pity. The genitive is partitive.
2 p.'15lv.. Otop.EVO~
sc. .lva. b."""i; see Cicero, Tusc. Disp.
4.1I.2S on Timon of Athens: "ut odium ... in hominum universum genus,
quod accepimus de Timone, qui p.advOem"., appellatur."
Ixll oIl....,~
C LS, l;em B. 2: "and generally speaking indeed
(men feel pity) whenever one is so disposed that ..."

8Cia 1

a 2 : 1 ...olcoin..
i.e., "axel aeT",el 'ill~"'1ed (8sb 13). dvap...,aOij.a.
Ta;;Ta is the side of the coin set forth in Bsh 14-IS, see Sophocles, DC

s60-S68.

ARISTOTLB, 'RHBTORIC' II

86a 6

z il cN...p il ....."
is the reading of three edd., Spengd, Cope.
Tovar reads aVT<ii; Ross: I} <Tq;> TOO.. On the expression see 78& 32-33.
a 3 : 1 o."[,,," y",,01..8...
"or to expect that they would happen."
Richards, p. "09, wants either av or y6Vlj17Ba8a,; but c S. 1868 and cpo
1991. Cope, p. 99, discusses the meaning of .]",1, and at I 65 the construction here.
z cN...p il ....." ..6 ..oii
the reading of three edd., Spengd. Kassd
reads c!aVTq;; Cope: aVTrp; Ross: I} <Tq;> TOO.

a 4 : 1 Il>~... dplI.....
"well, then, the disposition of those who pity
has been set forth."
z cl 8'
We begin here the second division: nola iA....d (8sb I2).
a S.J? CI....... q6v........
We have here a division of those things which
men pity, and from what A. says it is based on the definition: namely, "a"d
cpa ..&,..va cp9ae..."a I} Av""!ed, 8sb I3-14- Despite the disagreement about
the statement here - e.g., Spengd, p. 235 - it seems to be fairly straightforward: (I) 8aa ..... iA ....d is nothing but a statement of the definition
of the kind of evil that arouses pity; (2) "al Gaa ava'eBTIHd i. one specification
of the evil; (3) "al 817"" ... l;COvT"" is a second specification. Thus we
have two kinds of evil: (a) evils which are ruinous; (b) those which are substantial and due to chance. "For all destructive evils which are painful and
distressing arowe pity, both those that are ruinous, and those, provided
they are substantial, for which chance is the cause." In what follows A. goes
on to exemplify the destructive at 86a 7-9 and those caused by chance at
86a 9-12. From Victorius' comment on dva'e"""d compared with cp6ae""'Xrl,
he would agree in part with the interpretation offered here - e.g., ",9"11"'"d ... "tantum ilia [mala] esse, quae interitum alferrent"; dva<eBT ...d . .
"cuncta mala, quaecunque ilia sint, quae perdendi vim habent, et dva'e ...."d
sunt, misericordiam excitare" - as would Vahlen ("Kritik arist. Schriften,"
II6) essentially.

as

AUn1JpOw x.zl6&uv1Jpo.v
Victorius and Schrader (pp. 3II-12) refer
the first to mental, the second to bodily, pain. But Cope, pp. 99, shows
that each word can denote both. Certainly in the definition of fear (ltlm]
...., I} Taeax~ l" cpa.Taala" 82:1 21), Atlm] cannot be confined to the body
alone. Nor do I agree with Cope, p. 100, that the evils mentioned here are
"evils affecting the body alone" (Cope refers to Bipontine #8; he may mean
#9). There are no grounds, however, for excluding """'7ew. "al &a""'1ew.
from ##9, 10, II (86a 7-16). Moreover, the evils mentioned therein can be

both physical and mental; cpo BSh 13 : 3.

Kassd alone secludes; in this he would agree with
a 6 q>8C1p""'"
Vahlen ("Kritik arist. Schriften," II6).

86a 13

143

COMMBNTARY

-rox1J

C A 5, 61b 39 - 62a 12, 69a 32.

68w1)pc\!,tv ",d <p8IlfIT'xck
answered by 86a 9; dip 6' 7j TVX'1
would bear out the twofold division argued for at 86a 5~.
a7;1

a 8;

,dxlll'

Cpo A X2, '72a 22, 73a X3. Kassd alone reads "al a/".ia,

Ha, uOJpd:r:OJv.

z _xcdcr~
C 85' 24; along with al"la this is usually in prose
a term used in l.w for physical assault upon a person.
a 9 ; I yijPIl~ IClll V';crOl
Cpo A 7, 65a 33-34; 5, 6xb x3-X4, 27-34There is no reason to think that A. has tr.gedy in mind in the instances meotioned in a 9-X3 but they can be found there.
z
C 86a 7 ; 1.

-rox1J

a 10 C\<P0).11l, 6).lyo<po).lll
c Cicero, De dmicitid j.I7 where Laelius urges
"ut amicitiam omnibus rebus humanis anteponatis; nihil est enim tarn n.turae
.ptum, tarn conveniens .d res vd seCWldas vel adversas." Among the components of eudzemonia presented in A 5, 60b X9-27 are 'l'iAo" ",oAv'I'Mia,
Xe1/eTT0'l'Mla (on the last two c 6xb 35-38). Here we h.ve the opposites.
Also mentioned are "dllo~, 6xb 7-14 (opposite of al..xo~, 86a II); l..xV~,
p8y.Bo~, ~val"~' dr"""eTT'H>i ..rfJpaTo~, 6xb x5-26 (opposites of daBAvsuz,
d'=7Ie1a, 86a II). How chance may be the cause of these misfortunes is
explained in part at 6x b 39ff. where we are told that good fortune iudf
(61lTVxla) is owed simply to the causality of chance which, as presented, is
indefinite, arbitrary, and beyond human control; c 6.3a 3 ; z. While chance
may be the cause of these misfortunes, A. is aware that they may also be the
effect of voluntary human action and so not ,u....d; see, e.g., EN IIx4a 21-30
where he considers a..BAv..a, ~ela, and by inxplication al"xo~.

C 7Xa

II with which cpo EN XI26b 25-28.

"a...w

IClll..o . CN!,j3ijvlll
sc. "al TO
T. avp(#i.a, 8Bw "'eo";;"..... (leTTl IlA....".). leTTl AA.... is to be understood with the following two sentences. The experience, as Victorius notes, was th.t of Ariadne
in Catullus 64.132ff. On the force of "'eo";;"" c 78a 33.
z .n.ckpJ;lll is the reading accepted by the edd. from a suggestion
by Vahlen (''Kritik arist. Schriften," II7) who refers to 860 "7 (,,6) and
86b 3". All the codd. read "'e~a, as do Spengd (but he considers Vahlen
correct), and Cope, who interprets with "e~a" "when an ill results from
what might naturally have been expected to lead to good."

a 12 ; I

.w

a X3 ,.....ov8.....~
genitive absolute; on the construction, see S. 2073';
for a contrary view c Richards, p. x09. Cope, pp. 101, discusses it. Ordinarily with the statement in the articular infinitive (TO . draB ) one would
expect the dative.

144

ARISTO'ILE, 'ltHBTORJC' II

86a

20

a 14 : 1 4,o",d8E'
There is no assurance as to which Diopeithes this
is. A likely candidate is the general who led a contingent of cleruchs to the
'I'hracian Chersonese (a military colony in fact which brought the Athenians
into conflict in the area with Philip), probably in the years 343/342. and is
spoken of in two speeches of Demosthenes', On the Chersonese, Phil. 3; see
PW, Diopeithes (9), CAB, VI 2SI-54.
z T1!t "'IIPU ~"O'u.o1",S
If Diopeithes is correctly identified above,
the king would be Artaxerxes III (3S8-338 B.C.), and the gifts possibly were
sent during or after the successful resistance of Perinthus and BY2antium to
Philip, 340-339 B.C.
a IS :
61....).

xed TO ...

YEVop.oivow

sc.

(".,,8"i,,8a.,

dyaDw.

C CiIa 17 : .; cpo 61b 9, 72b 2S.

a 16 ILmll.llUO"v
a 17 .... ' oIS

The article serves both infinitives

On hrl c BSb 13 : 3.

a 18 : 1 ....uS ... yvwplp.OI>S

We begin here the fino! division: those
who are pitied. The use of ~. here is a prohlem. A more detailed explanation
is given at 86a 24-2S. HoweveI, ifwe read as all the edd. do at 86024,<0~
"de> In lA60v"w, then the .... is a connective with "at ~otl, opolov, at 860 2S.
If at 860 24 we read with all the codd., h. lA80ww, the n is connective with
h. lAov",.. To argue that it stand alone makes sense only if we assume that
the second idea present in A.'s mind is ""expressed; c Kiihner, Blass, &
Gerth, II.2.S20.4). On ","eipov, (acquaintances) c 84b 17; it is not used
as at A IS, 760 8. Spongel, pp. 235, points to !socrates, The Team of Horses
48 for examples of other persons who receive pity.
z obceLOnj'r' On the dative, see S. 1516.
i.e., those closely related to them.
sc. T' """."Da.. That is to say that
they fear for them; c 82a 2I-2S. Ross alone encloses 86a 19-25 ("eel . ..
'TO') in parentheses. In a way this makes for a closeI articulation between
860 17, 1).80v", ~i ~o,;, n, and 86a 25, "at ~01l, .polov, <A8OO" - on which
c 86a 18 : 1 - a conjW1ction which vahlen ("Kritik arist. Schriften," II7)
fDvors.
a 19 :

...n."O\IS

Z "'Ept ..noUS p.U.).OV'rIlS

a 20 vAf/oII.rtS
The story of Psammetichus III (?S26-S2S), son of
Arnasis (S69-?S26) and king of Egypt, is told in Herodotus 3.14, who calis
him Psammenitus. The point of the story is indicated at both 86a 18-19
(a. p~ . . . lxov"..) and 860 22-:'3 (~o~o pe. . .. "iov): P,ammetichus expeIienced fear and dread for his ,on on his way to death, compassion and
pity for his dear friend reduced to begging. The first pnnis~ent, death,

86a 24

COMMBNTARY

145

for one very closely rdated to him was -rd de..d., a thing that expelled pity,
something, as he told Cambyses, the Persian king (529-522 B.C.), beyond
tears: ",'C", ,,,,,,,I iJ dlne d.a"lat... (3.I,PO). His noble friend is not a close
rdation, and while Psamrnetichus sees his disaster as possible for himself
and so to be feared, his emotional response is pity not fear. A. in giving us the
father (Amasis) for the son has made a mistake, and Spengel, p. 236, cites
similar ones.
a

2.1

n:POO'ClL't'oUv't'l

"beggiog," as the story told by Herodotus demands.

a 22 5E.~Ov
a synonym for TO <paPeeo, but with a stronger and more
threatening force: the terrible, the terrifying; cf. 83a 4. I9, 27, Poetics I453a
22, I453b 14. 31 (0 I453b 14-37).
k.pov ",OG a.EE."oG
We have just seen Ta sl ....d (86a 5-16),
and -ra rpoPeed were explained at 82a 37 - 82b 4. 82b 2.2.-27. In the last
passage A. gave a general rule: the evil happening or about to happen to
another for which we experience pity becomes a source of fear when it
threatens us. Seen as an imminent and substantial personal threat it becomes
.""eovrm,," TOV lUov (capable of expelling pity) as fear for the self takes
over and drives out pity just as powerful desire drive, out reason (EN III9b
IO and cpo II54a 27, II7Sb 8; cf. 86a 24-25). However, we must keep in
mind that from the definition personal fear does operate in the experiencing
of pity. Victorius speaks of the meraphor in .,,"eova...."o. of a nail driving
out a nail, e.g., Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 4.]5.75 ("etiam novo quidam amore
veterem amorom tamquam clavo clavum eiiciendum putaot"), found also in
Plutarch, Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum ro88a. Cope, p. 104,
cites as a proverb ,,-;'0' lI'Ip '''''eove .. found in Lucian Apologia 9, Pro lapsu
7 (in OCT ed.).
a 2.2.-23

In the light of the use of this word at A I, 55a 21; 7,

a 24 XP>\"'fLOV
65b 8; 9, 66b 4-7, I think that A. ha, in mind the way in which the dreadful
can just as readily evoke fear as pity, and can be so used. For ......lip Radt,
"Rberorik," on good grounds suggests "the opponent."
is the reading of all the codd. All the
a 24-25 k. a..oG"." ... lIv",o~
edd., however, read Vahlen's conjecture: <0'; yae> in eleovaw . . . 8no,.
Cope, Freese do not read it; nor does Spengel, who nonetheless, agrees with it.
See 86a 18 : 1. With Vablen's conjecture our clause is rdated to the Psarnmetichus example at a 20-22. For example, A. at a 22-24 gives an explanation
for the example, and our clause is a further statement which gives the ground
for the explanation. This, therefore, means that the clause at 86a "'5 ("a! TO,),
",..otov, l ova..) is joined with 860 18 (U.oval dll TOV, ..s). Vablen
(uKritik arist. Schriften," II7E) gives his reasons. (I) To read without <o~
"de> unites our clause to 86a 18 (sABoDa, 88 TOo6, Te): since our clause is not

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' II

86a 24

a new idea this is not acceptable. (2) To interpret the codd. as Victorius does
(so, too, Cope, p. 1"4) gives only half the definition of pity, e.g., "further
men pity when the evil is near themsdves." (3) To translate "men experience
pity when the dreadful is near themsdves" encounters two difficulties: the
question is not when but whom men pity; moreover, this statement is at
odds with 8sb 32-33, 86a 28--29, 82b 26-27, 900 21-22, and especially with
86a 22--23. Vahlen's point is that the whole passage (86a 18-29) has to do
with those whom men pity and that our clause as found in the codd. does not
contribute to this idea. His conjecture (a substantial one as he admits) and
his explanation are quite attractive and tie in very well with the Psammetichus
statement. However, a few comments are called for. If we read with the
codd. the statement is not as meaningless as suggested - even granting that
the purpose of the whole passage is: those whom men pity. For it gives us
the second part of the definition of pity presented at 8sb 13-19: narndy, the
need to see the destructive evil as possible for onesdf (and so fearful) if one
is to be able to pity anyone. Without this dement there i. no pity, as A. says in
dfect at 8Sb 19-24. Thus it is possible to join 86a 16 (~A.o;;a. d~ ToV~ TO)
with 86a 24 (iT' lA_oVa), and the new idea (if such is indeed necessary)
is: for men to pity anyone they must see the evil as do.e to themselves. Vahlen's reading diminishes an idea necessary to the experience of pity for A.
Whether this idea correcdy represents the nature of pity (ef. 85b 14-IS) A.
does insist dIat the person who experiences the emotion must consider that
he can suffer the same evil and that it is near to him. Furthermore, as the
fearfuI i. explained at 82a 21-2S, that evil must be a potential <pOfJ-eo, to
the person who experiences pity. If not, why does the person experience
pity, as pity is explained at 8Sb 13-19? In that passage it appears that to
experience pity there must be an dement of apprehension and fear of the evil
as possible for onesd In fact, two ofVahlen's citation. would indicate this,
86a 28-29, 82b 26-27: that which causes fear for onesdf is the cause of pity
for others. This also appears to be the point of V ahlen's other citation (900
21-22) on why old men are inclined to pity: "they think that all possible
suffering is close to them and this is (as we .aw) an attitude which inclines one
to pity." Following the codd., however, still leaves a problem which is, as
noted above, hetter handled by Vahlen's emendation. In the text (86a 22--23)
the evil is called TO d..... and as such is said to be
TO;; lU.".
It apparendy signifies a monstrous evil such as was the killing of his son to
P.ammetichus or some of the incidents mentioned in chap. '4 of the Poetics
would be. such a d..... is the cause of overwhdrning fear which excludes
the possibility of experiencing pity. It has the same dfecc npon the person
as tbatmentioned at 8sh 32--33' <pofJ.6p a<p.dea,
Can we
then interpret T.;; d...o;; (86a 24) as I do in this note simply as "evil" and
mean by it evil which causes fear hut not overwhdrning fear l I am not

'''''e01Jn,,,''

.""rnA""',...

86a 32

147

COMMBNTAlIY

certain. Td 6...6. is interpreted as a synonym for Td "",(Jee6. in chap. 14

of the Poetics and could be so taken when it appears in the chapter on f=
in the Rhetoric. But the g=1 interpretacion of the passages is "horror" at
8334, 19 and "danger" at a 27; see 86& 22.
a 25 '<oU~ 6l'-"(DU~
Cpo 87b 25-27. Spenge!, p. 237, illustrates with
Thucyd. 3-40.3-4, Clean's speech on Mytilene, which is slighdy to the
point hexe. On 1jA",la., cpo 79a 26; on 118'1 c 6ga 18 : 3, 66a 12 (various
types of character are discussed in B 12-17); on l~." c 62b 13 : 2, l\9a
8 : 2; ~'rVfJaTa = posicion, social standing; )'BVlj = family, birth.

ru

a 27 : 1 p.iD.lov tpcdv."CI'
"it appears more likely."
subject of
~""e~a" understand Ta 6...< or Ta
(c 86a 34). On the statement

"a""

hex., see 84ia 24-25: in such instances the probability that the one pitying
may experience the same is far stronger, and so the pity for the othex, e.g.,
86a 29-30 (."",l, ... BA....d).
Z Kul cttJ'tc{l
"at is intensive and adverbial; the shift in person
has frequendy been seen, e.g., trom third person plural to first plural (at
81a 14, IS, 26, 8lb 30) and from plural to singular as hexe (see 84a 25-26).

a 28 : 1 iv"ClG8C1
C Cila 20.
C bb 2(j...27.
2 &cp' eN"..."
a 29-30 .,,01 ...,,"'v
as seen in Poetics 1453b t8,

C 8e1a 27 : " 8e1a 24-25. "d8'1 = sufferings,

1454& 13.

20,

a 30-32 ,<ell &l ... 6l'-"""~

Repeat In.i with this clause; the conclusion to both causal clauses begins at 86a 32, .1.,,)''''1: "and since men experience pity either not at an or not to the same degree for suffexing which they
neither foresee occurring ten thousand years hence nor recaU as having taken
place ten thousand years past, it necessarily fono.......
a 32 auvCl".pyCl~Op.oIvDU~
"those who contribute to the effect." If we
keep in mind that A. 's concern in this section is with those who are the
objects of pity, the problem with the usual interpretacion of this word and
what folio... becomes obvious: it shifts the subject of this whole passage
&om the pexsons pitied to those who attempt to arouse pity in othersspecifically here, the speakexs. Cope, p. lOS, for example, ascribes our verb
to the "(orators) who aid the effect of their descriptions," and interprets
elss"I'o-rseo'U, to refer to them: "are pitiable (ie., more successful in exciting
pity)." In the Roberts translation we read: "it follows that those who heighten
the effect of their words ... are especially successful in exciting pity." Apart
&om thls startling shift in the subject of this division, I find the interpretacion of
UsewoTieov, odd. I would retain the subject of the division and in reference
to that subject interpret the passage: "it follows necessarily that those who

148

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' 11

86b I

contribute to the effect by their bearing, voice, dress [reading luSiiu,; see
86a 33), and by and large by their dramatic manner are more pitied." Then
the reason given at 86a 34-3S for this statement relates the protasis and apodosis of the sentence at 86a 29-34 (.",1 ... lva,) in a logical and reasoned way,
and the statement at 860 29-3S is consistent with what follows to the end of
the chapter. See 86a 34.
a 33 t"eij,,'
is the reading of three edd., Spengd; cod. F reads Au8ijT.
as does Tovar; cod. A, alu8tju ; Cope, iuB1ju ; Kassd, aluBtju (which I
would translate "by a display of feeling"). For a discussion of. 32-33, see
Vahlen, Beitrag., pp. 27007I.
a 34 - 86b 8 iyyU~... 1t..eou~
In the reading and punctuation of
these lines, Roemer, Dufour, Tovar are in agreement. Changes in both will
be found in Ross, Kassd, Spengd, Cope. They will be indicated when they
occur.
ycip 1to,oii", 'Pcd"."e .., ..0 XIIXen. 1tpO .. ~,."" ij .:.~
"For they make the misfortune appear near, setting it before our
eyes as something about to happen or as just past." All the codd. read TO "a,,0., as do Ross, Kassel, Spengd, Cope. The other edd. seclude it. I do not
agree with Roemer's reason for the seclusion. Consequendy, I accept the
reading of /Jillo. - y.yov6~ with Kassel, Spengd, Cope, not the plural fonns
read by Roemer, Dufour, Tovar, Ross. The punctuation found in all the
edd. (save Kassd), Spengd, Cope is intdligent and obviates the need for
Kassd's parentheses, e.g., (Syytl~ ... Y"'ovcl~). Ross encloses a 34 - b I in
parentheses, 'e.g., (Syy1l~ ..." .... 6nea).

a 34-35

tyyU~

YOT""cI~.

a 34 1tpO 6"j.lIi....", 1to,oiiv...~

Por the idea, see r II, ub 22 - 12a 9;
and cpo r 2, oSb 12.; 10, lob 33-36. See also Poetics I455a 2.2-34 (cp. I453b
1-6), passages which may have contributed to the common interpretation
of our 860 32-34 (.way",! ... ,Iva.) but which are entirdy coDSonant with
the interpretation offered at 86a 32.. Cope, pp. 105-106, cites Cicero, Quintilian on the idea.

a 35 x ..1 ...ci YOT"".;.,...

is the reading of Ross, Kassd, Cope; Spengd,
p. 2.38, accepts it in a note to the passage. The other edd. read without the
article. In the sentence at 86a 35 - b 4, as he further illustrates his subject, A.
shifts from the subject of this division (people who are pitied) to things which
arouse pity (i.e., 860 4-16).

8tlb I : I

6,ci "'cxxt..n.
a common periphrasis for Taxi"".
6tci ...oii'l"O
preceded by a colon or period is the reading of
four edd., Spengd. Ross uses a comma followed by <><al> dId TOVTO.
Cope reads with cod. F d.d TO vT6 and makes it part of the preceding sentence.
2

COMMENTARY

149

b 2 ""l ..ci crij",i.. " .. I ..ci~ "pci~'4;

is the reading of all the codd.,
SP!'llgel, Cope, and none of the edd. Roemer, Dufour, Tovar, Ross transpose
"al Td, "I1dE.. , to b 3 before ,,"l Myov, with Thurot. Kassel simply secludes
the phrase. The reason given by Thurot ("Observations critiques [I),"
307) is that BaOijTa, refers to ""J,."a not to "~cl<.,, which would be more
appropriately linked with Myov" an idea closer to "ecl<.". This is re:lsonable, but ,,"i iJua TO''''Ta, even though coordinated with saOijTa" can refer to
more than clothing and could include actions; at A 9, 67b 32, 66b 27-29, 8428, we find leYa joined with ""J,..'a (on the passages, see "Ef/,..iov," 391-92).
b 3 /lOll ..DuN.... " ..I ).oyou~ See preceding note; this is the reading of the
codd. which I would accept with Spengel, Cope. /Jaa TO''''Ta would appear
to mean "all other such things like ""J,..'a and "ed'."," and li"a <fUa "all
other things like lOyo",."
b 3--4 ......,. ... /Iv....".
"of those actually suffering"; cf. LS, .1,.1, C. IV.).
b 4 olov ~a'l "oA"'~
"for example, of those in the very act of
dying." On ,,"", s4h 7, 69a 27.
b 4-8
p.ci).,......... -.oG "cieou~
For these lines the same text
and punctuation is read by the edd. (except Kassel), Spengel, Cope. It is the
reading of the code!., and I am following it. Kassel reads the same Greek but
transposes b 6-7 to b 4, e.g., ...lwroWr"", cinllYl"a XQe TO. ileo.. ,,"l
,.dA'''Ta ....t. Thurot ("Observations critiques [I)," 3"7) suggests some
change also. I find Kassel's change attractive insofar as it fits in coherendy
with the text immediately preceding. However, critically speaking, one
cannot say that there is not comparably good and satisfying sense present
without the transposition; see 86b 6 : 2.

",d

"ci).,.........

b 4-S "Ill
D.,.""", sc. I"T" "and most pitiable is it when
those caught up in such crises act nobly."
b 6 : 1 Ii,."",.... ycip '<IIil-r1l
Read here in the text (cf. 86b 4-8) this
appears to be a general summation of all that has preceded from 86a 29,
tn.1 6' ... : "For all these instances evoke pity more readily by the &ct that
the evil appears to be close at hand since both an innocent person is involved
and the suffering is set before our eyes."
2 fl4AAOV "o,.i
What we have in b 6-8 is a repetition of the definition of pity at 8Sb 13-16 and thus a cyclic closure to the clrapter: e.g., 6.a
T~ BYY,), ",al"Oa, (a 6) and liTa. nAf/"/ov <pa1'"Ta, (8Sb 16); ." m.aElov
6.TO, (a 7) and TO;; d.",lov (8sb 14); Iv d",OaA,.oi, ",awo,. ol1 TO;; "dOov,
(a 7-8) and inl <pa,,!O,.s.,!, "a,,<p (8sb 13).
b 7 ""I cl>~ /Iv....~ . " ..l'l'Il'''o"w....
On the use of ." with the
genitive absolute expressing cause, see S. 2086d. The two clauses give the
reason for a,d TO lyyV, ",,,/<18a.

CHAPTER 9

I . General Introduction: 86b 9 - 87 a S

1.

86b 9-12

2.

86b 12-16

a definition of indiguation
w.tion between pity and indignation

3. 86b 16-25

relations among envy, pity, indignation, fear

4. 86b 25-33

indignation, pity viewed in their effects

5. 86b 33 - 8,. 3

wation between envy and malice

6. 8,. 3-5

summary

II . Development: 87a 6 - 87h 15

T.

87.6-13

division, together with a restatement

of tbe dc6mtion" given at 86b 1D-12

those at wbom men become indignant
in the course of wbich discussion some
things which cause: indignation are
mentioned; cf. 87b 3:
"al dui ~l

or,

the attitude of those who experience

the emotion
(a) 87b ]-4
(b) 87b 4-'5

summation and ttaDsitiOll

those who experience the emotion

III General Summary and Conclusion: 87h IS-20

: 1 fUiA ....... p.lv

answered by 86h 16: ME ... d': "On the one
hand, what is called indignation is ahove all the antithesis of pity.... on
the other hand, envy would also appear to he opposed ..." Indignation,
not envy, is the real,opposite to pity. However, as is seen in chaps. 9-10,
hath indignation and envy are considered as emotions which exclude pity.
See following note.
vl'-criiv
Por the infinitive see S. 1987. Tws chapter i. quite
different in its structure from those seen thus far. As the ourline indicates,
the subject of the chapter and the threefold division is not formally approached
until 87a 61 Instead, a good third of the chapter is spent upon a quasi-definition of indignation together with a discussion on the relation of pity, indignation, envy. At 87a 61, assuming more or less the presence of a definition

86b 9

AllISTOTLE. 'RHEl'ORIC' 11

s6b

II

in what has preceded, A. devdops the rest of the chapter in the fonn to
which we have become accustomed. Whether this structure rellects the
uncertainty about this concept which is present in the ethical works (see,
e.g., Cope, pp. Il2-13) is another matter. It is true, however, that for any
(both words, as here studied,
detailed information on ..,..."a.~
express the same idea) one must tum to the Rhetoric. The brief comments
in the ethical works do not diH"er in any substantial way from the explanation of VB".""a.v as we find it in the Rhetoric. It is called .i".."", and is mentioned at EN nosb 1-6, EE 1221a 3, 1233 b IS-26, MM II92b IS-29. From
these passages the following common statement can be drawn: indignation
is pain felt at the undeserved good fortune of one's neighbor. However,
EE (1233 b ISf[) extends the meaning when it identifies indign2tion also as
pain for undeserved misfortune (which we know as pity) or as pleasure for
deserved good fortune or deserved misfortune (which we learn from Rho/Qric
s6b -31 is the response of the man who is just). In these passages it is
further described as a mean state between envy (pain at all good fortune
whether deserved or undeserved) and malice (pleasure at all misfortune whether
deserved or undeserved). However, in EE the extreme called malice is not
mentioned, and the extreme is called more precisdy d7ti)ov,..... There has
always been a problem about these two extremes of indignation (envy,
malice), and it surfaces in the commentaries on the EN: e.g., Grant, on EN
IL7.1S (II08b If[), Gauthier & Jolif, IL1.160-61. In the way he analyzes
the two extremes: envy ('1'860.,) - malice (h"xa1e"I<al</a), A. appears to
have missed a point which is correctly stated in the Rhet.ric. What he missed
is the fact that envy-malice, as explained, are not two extremes of excess and
but simply different aspeers of the same psy,defect whose mean is
cho-physical reaction. If anything is the opposite of '1'860.' it would be,
as Grant suggests, ihta,,,81J,,/a n,; an absence of any reaction to the good
or bad fortune of another. A. appears to realize this problem at the conclusion of his general discussion in the present chapter where he acknowledges
(86b 34 - 8,.. 3) that envy-malice are merdy diH"erent aspects of the same
attitude of mind. This was also the view Plato expressed in phileb. 48b.

- vi,.."",

vi,..."."

b 10 ...;:. yckp . . XIIXD",p..yl"L~

The articular infmitive is indirect object to the verb (see S. 1961) whose subject is the articular infinitive , .\11""aBa . . B1l"lIaylal!:. Our phrase is a condensation of 8sb 13-16, such as
is found at Top. Iloa 2-3. On h.t, cf. BSb 13 : J.
b n Tp6nav i\8DU~
"in a certain sense and arising from the same
motal disposition." In other words there ;. a kinship between pity and
indignation in which one emotion is complementary to the other in a person,
as A. also says in the MM passage. Such a rdation is not presco! between

86b '4

153

COMMBNTARY

pity and envy, or malice. On TqO".O, adverbial, LS II.2, and see 86b 17;
on >16.~ see 69a 18 : 3, ssb 30-31.
b 12--13 ci"""" ... XP'IGTOU
Both pity and indignation are emotions
experienced by the good man, as >16.~ Xfl7/lno. would indicate; on xe71aT&~
cf. 80a 30 : 1. See below Sllb 14 : 3.

b 13 : 1 &EL

would seem to imply a .ense of moral obligation, which

i. the force Cope finds in the word (cf. 78a 33) and which is strengthened
by 86b 14-16: 000"" l'~ . ",.Baa.. !u Barrett, p. r65, notes,
began
to replace Xq~ in denoting need, necessity (although in the fifth century xe~
to some extent was still reserved for moral obligation) until it became dominant and was used to denote various kinds of need. These needs could be,
as we find the word used in the New Testament, physical, moral, legal, etc.;
cf. Robinson or Bauer, or Gooddl.
3 4yCl~""~ "p.wrOUG' X"xcd~
On nqdTTS" "a"';;,, oJ cf. LS,
"edTT.", II; doa';tQJ~ modifies the expression as it does in the next line:
"those who undeservedly fare badly ... fare well."

a.,

b 14 : 1 GUV<iX8CGeCl' XCII ULV

"For a good man should experience
distress and pity at the sight of the undeserved misfortune of others." In
"""dx6Ba6ao (to be troubled, distressed) there is the idea of AV"71 Toeax"'d71~
seen at 86b 18.
z ..o~ &i:
i.e., TO'~
(d.a~l"'~ "qdnovao) oJ. The explanation
given here of pity and indignation is dearly echoed in Pseudo-Plutarch,
Life of Homer 132 (cf. Spenge!, pp. 238) where we are also told that the
Aristotelians considered these two emotions the dln.fa "Q871, the good, refined
emotions, or what A. calls. here the "d~ 1/60'" Xq71t1To;;.

6.

b 14-15 c1I&.xov ycip

sc. eaTL If we consider the unjust to be what is
unlawful (TO "oed.o,.o.) and unfair (TO a..ao.), EN II29b I, then what is
violated here is the law of nature and man which is understood to command
that right be done (EN If30b 33-24, "the law commands life in accord with
every virtue and forbids life in accord with any vice"). Part of the right is
that one receive in accord with one's merits ("aT' dElao): "in matters ofjustice
the equal is prim2ri1y that which is proportionate to merit" (ENII58b 30-31;
cpo II31a 24-27). when such a law is violated the response of both men and
the gods (e.g., 86b IS-III) is indignation. Speaking of the personification
ofNerncsis and Aides in Greek mythology, Grant (on EN I1.7.14-15: lI08a
30Jf.) says that they "seem to represent the natural and almost indestructible
ideas of justice in the human mind," an instinct in man of what is right.
in Homer, Hesiod,
Gruber, pp. 65--'72, brie1ly reviews the idea of
Herodotus; cf. also on justice Gauther & Jolif, II.I 325-28.

,..a,,;

ARISTOTLE. 'RHETORIC' II

154

e...i~

b 15

86b 20

Cpo EE I233b 26.

b 16 SoIl;.,. s' av x,d

correlative to 86b 9. The Hat is adverbial: "also";
i.e., as indignation, so too envy, might be considered an opposite to pity,
opposite, in &ct, in the same way (TO. aVTO. T~&"O') since it is very close to
(cnl.""v,), even the same as (Hal TatlT"'), indignaQon.
b 18 M"'I'" K,d ....P"X.:.S'I~
As we see at MM II92b 25-26, the
envious man experiences pain at all good fortune, deserved or not. The fact
that .lV"'1 is present in envy also (Hal 6 'P8&.0,) and that its object is good
fortune makes it seem like indignation; c 86b 18-19, b II-12 (-ro .lvxa8a

.. .~aylal').
1 cpe6vo~
See B 10; Soaates (in the Memorabili. 3.9.8 of Xenophon) defines envy as we find it here and also in B 10.
Z bel ":;"p ..yl'f
is the reading of four edd. with cod. A; Kassel,
Spengel, Cope read with an equally good tradition and the support of the
sclroliast BI, .~aytao. If Roemer, Kassel are correct, the cod. A reading of
the edd. ntay be suspect. Both readings give the same meaning. C Top.
noa

b 19 :

'-4.

b 19-20 ci1.).' av..I;Iou ... 0",,1....

This is what differentiates envy
from indignation. The genitives are dependent upon .tl"ea"Iq:. In the very
first instance (otl d.a~lov), the diiference of envy trom indignation is clear:
the envious man is pained at any good fortune experienced by someone like
himselfwhether deserved or undeserved. On TO;; laov "al .,..olov see 87b 22-27,
860 25-26; LS, fao, lb. It is frequendy joined with 8,..010, to denote
equality.
b 20-22 ..0 U ... ~"cipX.'\I
The TO 6A ,...q . .. :nI.l'lato. clause is the
subject of the main verb 6: "The attitude that 110t because something untoward will happen to oneself, but rather because of what happens to one's
neighbor must be equally present in caclr and every instance (of indignation
and envy)." On the use of ro, see S. II53g, or Gildersleeve, II 579. A.
himself gives the meaning to n 'neo. (bad, untoward) at 86b 24: TI 'PaVAo.. I interpret ibraa.. to mean: "any and all the instances" in whiclr one
ean speak of the presence of envy (and also indignation). Taking it as Cope,
p. no, and others do, "common to all men who have the feeling," does not
seem likely; A. is analyzing here the necessary constituents of the two emotions in order to distinguish them trom fear which can easily enter into consideration, as we see at 86b 23-25 (iel.. e1l"ea~t~), if the other person's
good fortune (and also bad fortune) is seen as an imminent personal threat.
If it is good fortune, it could be seen as placing the person enjoying it in the
class of those at 82b 2-22.

86b 32

COMMBNTAlIY

ISS

b 20 I'i! S... CI.mji

Cpo 87b 22-24: d "86.,,, ...
6,' ......OVl;. Cp.,.7J On with o~x aT' at 88a 34.
b 22 ..0 I'tv
indignation."

... ..0 li.

,.71 iva T' aVTq;,

cLUd

"in the one instance envy ..., in the other,

the antecedent to its clause of explanation at 86b 24:

b23 'nN....
6T' amq; ...

b 2.3-24 )'U'"I

'<Clp"XiI

C 82a 2.1 : J.

On the meaning, see 6za 29 : 2; cpo 78b 7.

....u.....~ "And it is evident that opposite feelings

refers to indignation and envy
attend indeed upon these emotions."
(just mentioned) and quite likely pity, and, from what follows, malice. From
86b 12 to 87" S, in the eIfort to discriminate pity, A. tries to show its difference
from indignation, envy, fear, and malice in that order. Here he states that
indignation and envy are each accompanied by its own emotional response
(i.anla nalhJ) which is diJfereut from the other and from that of pity, and
also (s6b 34ff:) from that of malice.
b 2S-2.6 ",d '<Ilt

b 2.7 tv..,,'<""~
b 28 ........ ~.

T.uTo.,

e.g.,

M'."

which is the way opposite to d.~I.".

I"Cllq>OVOU~

As Cicero says (Tuse. Disp. 4.8.18) in

the continuation of the citation at 8sb 13 : 2: "nemo eninr parracidae aut
proditoris supplicio misericordia comrnovetur." The accusative with the
passive verb, A""7J8.i7J, is noted by Cope, p. III; see S. 1S9S.
0

b 29 :

'<'l""pICl~

as seen at A 6, 63a 26; ro, 68b 2.1. C 74b 3 I.

C Boa 30 : J.

z XP1JcmI~

liEi yd!p '<O.ou'<O.~

(lja8ofaBTa .. xa"""'eal'Ooo,,).

b 2.9-30

This is a r ....tatement of 86b 27-28

b 31 : J cil"f'Cd
libel"CI
ill"., refers to: the punishment of wrongdoers, deserved good fortune. At 86b lS-16 we were told that undeserved
good fortune is unjust (since justice demands that one receive in accord with
one's merit; ,ee 86b I4-IS), and so we can assume that what happens (punishment, good fortune) to someone because he merits it is just.
z
The good man, the Xe7JaT6, (86b 2.9), of whom A. is
speaking in this section; cf. also 80a 30 : I.
0

m'."'ij

JAn.,....

J UvelY"1J
a,.u;v 'c. (Td. m xi/)
z Welp!;CI.. au'"i>
This statement in indirect discourse is governed by
and expresses a future possibility (e.g., I1Y with the aorist
(Ta;;Ta),
infinitive); cin'e is the subject of the verb VniieEB, Leo,
cinse (tlnijeEs) Tq; 0,..1<p. 11. ,jnae<a".alTq; atlTq;: "to hope that what has hap-

b 32. :

IAn.,...

iAn.,...

156

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

87" 6

pen.d to one like him could happen to him also." Th. general grounds for
such an attitude arc set down at 86a >4-27. namdy. the doseness and affinity:
cpo also 8<ja !}-I2..
b 33 :

i\O~

..aRk..

C 86b II.
i.... the feelings. emotions. just mentioned from 86b
2.6/f.. i.. pity. indignation: sec 86b 25-2.6.
3 ..ei 6' w....... I..
Thes. arc the emotion. which arc described in
the following clause: 0 "de ... qllJo>se&,.

b 34 - 87'l 1 6 yeip ... cp8av.p6~

Here. and in what follows to 87" 3
(.. Xale ...). we have A.'s correction of his statements in EN. MM (the
statement in EE is left open by the use of .ww.v/,ov): sec 86b 9 : 3. In stating
here that the malicions man and the envious man arc the sarne A. recognizes
that the two emotions arc mordy different aspects of the same state of mind.
As he goes on to say (87" 1-3). if on. is pained by the presence of something
in another (envy). he will necessarily be pleased by its loss (malice). ''The
envions man." say. plato (Phileb. 48b). "will b. dearly found rejoicing at the
misfortones of his neighbors."
b 34 m.x...pt......~
Th. passages concerned with malice have been
mentioned in 86b 9 : 3; 'l'6&.0, is taken up in the next chapter.
y.yvo~ ....1 ~mtpxOV"<.
Since I think that A. wishes to make
a distinction at 87" 2. between o-r.eoj".. and qllJoe~ which correspond to
"."vo/'t.rp and .dndexon.. I would interpret our phras.: "for that at whose
acquiring and actual possession someone is pained he must necessarily take
pleasure in its loss and complete destruction." qllJoea. then. is the ruin of
som.thing actually in one's possession (dndexo,), whereas UTie,,"', is the
privation of something whidr is still in the process (",,,,&/,"0') of becoming
fully possessed and established.

87'l 1

2 : 1 ......p>!aE cpOoP'

-...u......

a 3 1Ud1....' ..1i

5 xp>!a,p.cI
a 6 np.......... '""
~': cpo II4b 27 : z.

See preceding note.

refers hack to "'l"4> (a 1).

Cpo 6:Ia 29 : 1

C 86a >4.

If this is answered by anything. it is at a 8: 'l'ae6v

a 6-"'1 -ric.." ... qav...~ hol

Again the threefold division whidr
we have seen in each chapter. In this chapter. however. as in chap. 2. the
people with whom men become indignant and the things which cause the
emotion arc combined. A glance. in fact. at the outlines of th~ preceding

COMMENTAlIY

157

chapters reveals that the threefold division is formally followed in only three

instmces.
a 8 : 1 cD.Ac.w
the other emotions, presumably chaps. Io- II, since
envy, spite are not given further notice in this chapter.
z elp,! ..""""
i.e., 86b 9 - 87a 5.

a 9 01..1 -ni> .. 06"'PCly.LV

"at someone manifestly enjoying undeserved
good fortune"; on rpo..,o,..b'P, see 78a 31 : J.
a 10 : 1 ..p......ov p.o!v
auswered by 1,,01 6i, 87a I6.
Z ",iier, "<oL~ 4y..eo~
This is commonly I2ken to mean "all forms
of good"; e.g., cpo a I3 "lo~.'P' 61)110.,.. Such "goods" are given in detail in
A 5, and see 60b 20-29.

06 yAp ... v".......crc,

The reason for this is given at a 1:>-13
. .. Ial,), and is groWlded in the fact that ,i,..sa., is the opposite of
11,0, (86b 9-12). On that ground the argument is: if we are indignant with
a person for deliberately [virtue is the result of deliberate choice] being good,
then we should pity him for being deliberately evil.
a 12 0..0'
"pity"; on the plural see S. 1004.
a

II-I2

(o~di

a 13 :

l
..o6-n.>v
i.e., justice, courage, virtue.
sc. ",...rrlJa.~
z 4>.lil
J .u.o6'!' ... liwil..., .....o,o6-ro~
C A S, 61a 12-24 on
wealth; 6Gb 27 on d'VtldpBt as meaning either "power" or flposition'; 1'ot06is specified by what follows at a 14-16. C 87a r5.

TO.'

a 14 .:,~ cbu.....~ I..dy

C 74& 34 : z.
ixOVT~ 4ycz8il

is the reading of the codd.,

the edd. (except Dufour), Spengel, Cope; Dufour reads a conjecture of
Roemer's ("Zur Krltik," 504): 0~6' .1 .d 'l'VCIB< 0%0"" ciy08c1. In the phrase
Tel rp<lae. c!6aycl we are speaking of "the goods of nature," those bestowed
by nature itself; C A 4, 59a 35; 9, 67a 16-17; II, 70a 2Off.

a I4-I5 XCII 01 ... qroer..

a 15 06yw. _ _ I xcVJ.o~
C A 5, 60b 30-37, and 6Ib 7-14- At
87a I3-16 A. says: ''but a person will become indigoant at wealth and power,
and, generally speaking, at all such things of which men of virtue, a. well as
those who are endowed with the gifts of nature such as good birth, beauty,
and other such gifts, are worthy." This statement of the Greek accepted by
the edd. (except Dufour), Spengel, Cope, is clear: men experience indignation
at those who fare well because of goods which they do not deserve. Among
such goods they include things like wealth, position, and all other such
advantages which in their minds only the morally good, as well as those
endowed with natural goods, deserve. Why those endowed with natutal
gifts should deserve other c!ya6cl is questionable and is questioned. Thus

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC'

I[

Cope (pp. II3) rejects the above and accepts with qualification the interpretation of Victorius. Victorius understands our statement to mean that men
are not indignant at those who possess natural goods and fare well because
of them. In such instances envy might be possible, but not indignation.
This is an interpretation which is quite reasonable and understandable. Ostensibly, however, it is accepted only by Dufuur among the edd. who reads a
conjecture of Roemer's: 01 dya601 o~a' (sc. ,...mlas. TOOTO~ from a 12)
el Ta qnla.. lxova.. dra6a. If we ore to accept Victorius and Cope, the text,
as far as I can see, must be altered in a way similar to that of Roemer. On
the other hand, it is possible that A. may very well mean what is obviously
said in the Greek: namely, that men accept the fact that those who possess
natural goods are worthy, as the morally good are, of such dya6d which
bring with them success, i.e., .w.eayia, and so do not experience indignation
with such men as they do not with the morally good. There may be a hint
at such an attitude among men as A. knew them in the statement on .~Tvx[a at
A S, 6rb 39 - 62a 12 and the observation at 88b 27-28 together with 88b 3.-'7.
From A S we know that the ,~vXoVvrs, are those who possess natural goods,
e.g., 62a 3: Haw. (sc. dra6...) 1j qnla.,. From 88b 27-28 we learn that men
despise the .tlTvxo;;ne, for not having the other draM which are held in
honor and which A. specifies together with their possessors (good men) at
88b 3-'7. If men despise these people for not having these other dya6d, it
would appear that men in general expect them to have them and so would
not be indignant if they do possess them. This brings us back to the disputed
statement: it is not totally unreasonable to think that A. could mean that
those endowed with natural goods are deserving Qike the morally good) of
'other dyaM.
a 16 : J md S'
is the reading of four edd., Spengel, Cope. Kassel
reads l"..alj ae. In a note to the passage, Sponge!, p. 240, speaks of our
phrase as one used in transition to a new division and refers to instances in
chaps. s (82b 4), 6 (843 24), 8 (860 29), 2 (78b 10, mistakenly called I), 10
(88a 13). The following do not appear to me to be correct: 8, 2, 10. The
instance in 2 is change to a new idea, not a new division.
2 .... clpxlliov .yyU~ ..,
"the long established appears to be s0mething aIrin to the natural." lyyo, governs TO;; 'Poas. in which the article
(5. IIS3g) specifies the word: "the 'natural,'" i.e., long-established possession
appears the same as possession by nature. A. used a similar type of orgument
with regard to habit and nature, at, e.g., A II, 703 6-9: 8,..0.0. yde Tt TO
160,

Tii qnla..; c

70Il 6 : J, 70Il 7.

a 17 'ToiC; ... qouaLv

The dative is governed by vepsuiiv. TQV1'O, i.e.,
an identical good, no matter what it is. From what follows. these goods are
not natural. goods.

COMMBNTARY

159

a 19 'ni'w ",cUe.. ICed 6,elI ytvo~

sc. mowom",.: "those of established
and inherited wealth"; c B 16, 9Ia 15-19.
a 20-21 c\I'0u..~ .....o,eN.....,.

sc. Avno6a, and so cause indignation.

i.e., government officials (of whom one

a 20 c!pXov.....~ xed 6wci(l.EVO'
group was called "archous") and those with power or position of any sort.
a 21 : I noAucpW>L Kul oiIu""o,
C A 5, 6Ib 35-38 and 60b 38 6Ia II. "al dno6. ,...A: "and anything whatsoever of the same sort." The
principle at work in this section is the newness of the possessed good (cp. 8')a
17-20: Ad.. ywo, with B')a 23-25: Hal ... cUl",.) as the cawe of the
indignation, i.e., civic office, power, abundance of friends, a good 6unily.
It is possible to see the principle realized in the first three, with di1IicuIty in the

last.

z xed <Iv
"especially i" This is the reading of the edd. except
Kassd who with Cope reads "cJv; Spengd, p. 240, prefers "aiM.
a 22 c:.crcN.....~
sc. Avno6aLV, a 19; in all these instances the pain is that
of the indignation aroused in others.
Kul yeip
"for in fact" (Denniston, p. 108).
Mil;;'"
C 6Ia 20, and cpo 860 28.
The point of the statement is that having
J "EOn>.au..O' apxOVTE~

a 23 : I
Z

recendy acquired riches they have wed the money (d.a ~~. ,.loW..) to
acquire political office in the State. It illustrates 87a 21

a 25 01 pkI .. 01 6'

"the latter" (those in long possession of the

good) ... "the former"; c 62a 36-37-

a 26-27 ..0 yellp ixE'"

See the comment at 87a 16 : z on this explanation of the rea.on given at a 25: "Por that which appears to have been always as it is now seems to be the reality, with the result that recent possessors
do not seem to possess what is their own." One should compare with this
statement that atA 7, 6Sb 14-16 ("al il ... do"). On cU'18c!, as "the real,"
seeA 4, 59b 4; 7, 64b 9; 13. 74b I; Bxb 19-20. WithcllcnBunderstand do"o6a
the indicative stating the actual result. Cope. p. II5. has a note on the difference between cpalaBa. and do"

a 28: I

..oii 'NJtmo~

"any chance person"; c LS. A.2.b.

z ei"uMylca... ..o elIpl'o....ov

i.e.. there must be some rdation
between the good and the possessor so that a proportion is preserved. and drw
an appropriateness and fitness in the possession of the particular good; on
depO~TO' see 6]a 2B. Ross alone reads n ae/JOTIo. with Richards. p. 109.

a 29 liPI'o....E'

Cpo the we at A 15. 76b 140 17.

160

ARISTOTLB, 'RHBTORIC' II

a 30 : 1 &"''P.pOVT~
"distinguished," as used at A S, 61a 13, 'S; on the
idea cf. r II, I2b z'7-z8, or Alcibiades speaking of the marriage ofhis father,
Isccratcs, The Team of Horses 3I.
2 .u.ouCJIo.~
The reading of four edd., Spenge!. Kassel, Cope read
nhtn-oiiuw; cf. 87" 19.
a 31-32 WyWECJLV iiv oW .. VEIUCJ"IITOV
"it follows that [ow] it is
a cause of indignation if a man, through he be morally good, obtains a good
not appropriate to him." With a few minor differences the edd. agree on
the reading and punctuation, e.g., Ross, Kassd, Spengd punctuate with
oJ. begins the apodosis to
colon after BVyiuw. This is acceptable since
87" z7ff., Hal br.1 (and .ince) ... ; cpo Vahlen, ''Kritik arist. Schriften,"
II9. I do not understand Cope's period after eiJySViUIV, but see his note,
p. 116; Kassd, Cope read leW oJ..

a.

a 32 K,d <...0> To" ij.........

a conjecture of Ross's read also by Kassel.
An articu1ar infinitive <Td> . d.p",cufJ"'ITB" as the subject of an understood
BUTI """<1"'ITO' seems more reasonable than the accusative and infinitive
as object.

a 33: I cil'.q"CJ~"lJTEiv
C Iba 18 : z.
2 !cu'_II p.tv oW
"particularly '0," answered by 87b I: .1 ~. ,..i!.
Cope's note, pp. II6-18, on
oJ. should be compared with Denniston,
pp. 47<>-79
3 "oU~ Ov
"particu1arly so when they are engaged in one and the
same matter." The phrase is in explanatory apposition with Td. 1ITTOJ ...
a,.",IUfJ"'ITB'V, i.e., inferiors contending with their superiors in the very thing

,..A.

which defines their inferiority.

Kassel alone encloses this in parentheses,
punctuating with a comma at the end, not a period.. The text is (in part)
from Iliad U.S42; the second line is not found there, but it is found in the
Life ofHomer 132, attributed to PlulaIch, as well .. in his How to Study Poetry
360.

a 33-3 S &8w .. p.ciXo....

871>

I-Z

d IIi ... II.KIlI",

b I : 1 el liE p."I\
not the sam.e."

Cf.

87a 33 : 2; i.e., "but if the subject of challenge is

2 Kiv . KPEt....OVL
so. d.p",IufJ"'ITfi: "even if an inferior contends
with a .uperior in any way whatever."
b k-3 ~a...ov .. P.OUCJ'Kij~
For the nzture of
A 7, in particular, 63b 3S - 64a z, 64a 31 - 64b z3

I> 3-4

ol~

... cdI..ollii ...

the basic argument cf.

C outline; see 86a 6-7.

COMMBNTARY

161

b 3 &ij>....
Cope. p. II9. considers the impersonal construction here
inaccurate. preferring mjMI or d~Ao,; however. cf. 79b 37. 88. S. 88b 14-

v.".""..."a! On the force of the ending. cf. S!lb 32 : 1. There

is an actual order from the particular to the general in the presentation of those
who experience indignation: e.g. 87b 4-7. the particular class; 87b 7-9. a less
particular class; 87b 9-II. a more general class; 87b II-IS. the most general
class.

b4

rae

b 6 ",d ....G..c& x61C'<",""a.

In the light of the reason given (b 6: Td

.. dlHauw) for the statement at b S..s: lao IIE,o, .. '""T1J,uvo actual
possession of the goods. as stated here. would seem to be necessary for this
group to experience indignation. For ouly by possessing these "greatest
goods" can a person decide whether or not another is unworthy of them.
As A. says at 80ra IO-IZ. one cannot become indignant at another, possession
of =tain forms of good. e.g. justice. bravery. virtue, which are surely among
Ta ""r'rlTa draOd. One might well be envious. but indignant only if the
decision can be made that the person is unworthy of the good.

b 6-7 ,,0 ... "ij OfLOL....~

TIiW Gpol.,.. sc. dyaOIiW.

b 7-9 SEll...p......

articular infinitive subject of ot! dl"a,o. (~rIT').

"."oG".

This second type of per,on who experiences indignation i, the more general class: good people capable of making
an intelligent judgment on what is right or wrong.

b 7 ily..8al _1 ""au&..ia.
Tbese words are practically synonyms;
cf. Boa 30 : 1. Tbe good man is the man of moral virtue and like the anovdaro, (e.g. 67b 21 : 2) "he judge, correctly in each matter and in each case
the truth is manifest to him" (EN III3" 29-32). or as we read here. b 8:
"et.o~", .J. As a man ot moral virtue he will not tolerate the ~ust. and
we have been told (86b 14-16) that undeserved success is something unjust.
On ""o~daro, see 6Ia 25 : Z.

b 9-II " ..lib ... ""YXciv""'''v

sc. ,.pB<1f/T,,,ol.I,,,.

CPU.o...fLO'
The object of these "ambitious" men is honor. in
general. A 6. 63b 2. C 68b 20 : 1; cpo also 7fJ8. 35 : 1.
2 ...V""'" "'p ..y"......."
In the light of the previous note. the objects
of their desire will be anything which bring, honor; at 79a 35 it was philosophy; at A 5. 613 38-39 it was honor-conferring rewards. Cope alone reads

b9:

ne4E8OW.
b 10 : 1 jIociA.....1I ",.pl . . .

Ross alone conjectures <4.> with Richards.

p. I09.
z ..
cT>v
TafjTa would be anything which brings honor
with it and is the anteeedent of di.: "and above all if they are ambitious for

aN.......

ARISTOTLlI, 'RBBTORIC' II

those honors which others, who are unworthy of them, have received"; or,
"of which others happen to be unworthy," as Cope, Freese, Radt, "Rhelorik,"
interpret.

I>

II

",11 a:Aco>~

I> 12 cr.v

governed by the verb, as its antecedent,

would be governed by

a'.o;;.n,.

TOVT.,., if present,

1 """'""V
apparendy governed by the ,.pBt17JTCxot on an analogy
with the verb which can take a dative of the person (TO"TO.,) and genitive
of the thing. The word refers to those goods undeservedly possessed in their
view by others.
2 ci.v8pcmo8':'8E~
Such persons (whose opposites are the AJ.B.J6ie'0,) are characterized at EN 109Sb 19-2.0 as choosing a life suitable to
cawe. In 87b 13-1S we are given a general cl... of those who do HoI experience
indignation as a contrast to the general group (87b II-I3) who experience
the emotion; see 87b 4. sf

I> 13 :

1....u....... I would say that this refers to the contents of the whole
chapter, immediately to 87b 3-1S. mediately to 873 6 - 87b IS together with
86b 9 - 87a S. The sentence ('I'avseo, ... M) canilot be understood without
knowing the definition of indignation, at whom and for what reasons men
become indignant, and how the indignant feel. It cannot be understood
because it actually sets forth persons and feelings opposite to the emotion,
indignation.
2 ",,101,
Although ",oio" is used here, not Tlaw (i.e., persons). :md
",oio, has been used quite consistendy for the things which cause an emotion
(e.g., 78. 2S is the first instance). I do not see how it can be so interpreted
here, e.g., "the cases of misfortune, disaster ... ' (Cooper; Jebb & Sandys
similarly). The participles modifying the word are verbs which apply more
readily to persons, not things. I would interpret, as do others, "at what
kind of men they are at whose misfortunes, troubles, or failures one should
rejoice, or not experience pain." If men rejoice or remain neutral in such
instances, the misfortunes are deserved; c 871> 17 : 1. On the possibility of
",oiol, referring to things which cause the emotion, c 87a IS where such
(e.g., '~l'iv,"a. "dllo,) are mentioned in a section which has to do (c chapter
oucline II.2) with the people at whom men become indigoant.

I> IS :

~ cU.U"",~ qEIV
Cpo 86b 26-28. In EE I:>33 b 20-21 the
feeling of pleasure at the misfortune of another is said to be without a name.

I> 16 X,dpELV
I> 17 :

1 obc yci.p ci.V"L"IXEI/LEVU

See 861> 9 : " 2, 88a 28 : 2. The
reason is now given that rom what has been said in the chapter the opposites
are clear. In fact he has just set down some opposites to in.tion in bd

COMMENTAlIY

".[.,~ ... ~.~ The consequ=, as he goes on to say (dlUT' ...), i. that
"if our discourse develops in the judges (auditors) a corresponding attitude
of mind (i.e., to feel joy or nothing at all [b 16] at the failures of the undeserving) and further demonstrates that those who think it is their right to be
pitied happen to be unworthy, in fact worthy not to receive pity, and so,
too, the grounds on which they expect to receive pity, it will be impossible
to pity." This concluding paragraph is somewhat strange in its argument.
After presenting the threefold analysis of indignation, A. in this concluding
statement reverts to the argument of the opening statement of the chapter:
namely, that indignatinn is the contrary of pity but that there is a kinship
between them. As he says at 86b 12-14:, orin MM II92b 22-23: the man who
feels pain at undeserved good fortune (indignation) is the sarne man who feels
pain at undeserved misfortune (pity). The argument here (seemingly somewhat unnecessarily involved) is that if we put forward persons, causes,
reasons opposite to those which arouse indignation (pain at undeserved good
fortune), we will in fact make it impo.sible for others to experience both
indignation and also pity. For the opposite of pain at undeserved good
fortune (indignation) would be joy at deserved bad fortune. But to arouse
such a response in others is to remove any grounds for their feeling pity
(pain at undeserved bad fortune).
2
c,G..'
governs d~~.aT6. (eUT') lAi" "with the result that pity
is impossible if our discourse develops in the hearers a corresponding attitude
of mind and further deroonsttates ..."

b 18 : J "oU~ ... " ..p..GlCoucicrn

Cpo 77b Z4, 80b 3I, 83a 8, 8sa 3I;
on the verb, see 6Gb II.
2 lCp,..ci~
C 77b 21 : J.
3 Myo~
Le. discourse; see 55a 26; 5gb 16 : I; A 13, 74b 12;
77b 23 : 2.

CHAPTER 10

I Introduction: 87b ZI-34

with division and de6nition of envy

II . Development: 87b 34 - 88a :>5

I.

87b 34-35

3. 88a S-zS

the attitude of those who experience

envy: the subjective aspect of the
emotion
the things which cause the emotion:
the objective aspect of the emotion
the persoDS who are envied: the objective aspect

III . Conclusion: 88a ZS-30

87b 21-:0:0 &.JAW.. Ixov".~ The usual division for the study of the
emotions irst mentioned at 78a Z3-2S; here it serves as the apodosis to the
statement at h n-:>4The definition of envy is stated. It is
b n-34 6 'Pe6vo~ ixeLVDU~
essentially the same as that given at 86b 18-:0:0. The,.,q r.a ...
phrase
simply reiterates, hut with a different emphasis, what is said at 86h 20-:0:0:
namely, that the major cause of envy is ohjective, not subjective; .ee 861>
:00-:0:0. Men are moved by envy hecause of what happens to another; the
self enters in as a secondarY, not a primary, cause. It is an emotion, as we
are told at EN IlO?> 8-27, which is bad in se (see also 88a 36), and there
is no way in which it CUI he made, in itself, into something good. This is
an idea found again at EE 1Z34> 30 where we are told that it contrihutes
to injustice. As we find envy in the ethical writings (c 861> 9 : z for the full
passages), it is defined as the pain experienced at all good fortune; see, e.g.,
EN Il08h 4, EE I:O:OIa 38-40 (adding the qualification "even at those who
deserve their good fortune"), MM Il9>h :05-:>6. However, EE IZ33 h 19-:>0
defines it as pain at deserved good fortune. This idea is repeated in the defiDition found in the Topics (which in its terminology is quite similar to that of
our Rktom de6nition) at l09h 36-]7, IIoa 1-4: pain experienced at the
manifest good fortune of good people. The de6nition given here in the
Rktoric hovers hetween these two ideas. It is pain at good fortune, hut not
at .11 good fortune, or again deserved good fortune, hut simply: at .11 good
fortune of those who are one's e'l""l.r; c 86b 19-:00. As"equals" is explained

lo"'.ov,

166

ARISTOTLlI, 'RHBTORIC' II

at 87b 25-27 there is no necessary reason to confine them to "good men" (as
the Topics passage does, and EE I233b 1\r20), or to "friends," as we find
envy defined by Socrates in Xenophon, Mem. 3.9.8, and in the Definitions
416, which bear Plato's name. However, "equals" is more specific than the
generic term given in the definition of Diogenes Laertius, Zeno 7.IIl: pain
at another's goods, or of Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 4.7.16: "invidentiam esse mcunt
aegritudinem susceptam propter alterius res secundas, quae nihil noceant
invidenti." The discussion of 'P80 , in Plato, phileb. 47b - 50e is not relevant; e.g., is it envy or malice which is at issue? And the comments of Anaximenes I#DO 34-39 on how to stir up envy in others are based partly on an
understanding of it in direct opposition to A.'s statement at 86b 19 (dAA' .,; "06
d.aElov), e.g., 06, MO'PaJ..JU1' d.aEt." eil nmeaxo..a,.. . Plutarch also
has a small treatise On Envy and Hate; c II2a I : 1.

b 22 ...el w-n:pllyl~ <pIl'VOI'Wn

"at the nwrifest good fortune of .....
joying the goods mentioned." On '1'a...,..ivn, c 7IIa 31 : 3.
b 23 : 1 4yll8ew
These are those mentioned both in a passing way in
B 10, and in greater detail in A 5, 6. C also 62a 5-6 on a category of goods
particularly subject to envy.
2
bp.olou~
Cpo 86a 25-26; c 86b 20, 87b 25-27: i.e., an "equal"
in the sense of "someone just like onesd" C 8Ja 10.
sc. ylY.'1<a.. C 78b 24; cpo 78b 18:-19.
"Not with the intent that something may accrue to themsd~ but because
of those enjoying the good fortune." This is a straightforward statement to
the dfect that the object of and the cause of envy are the good ..yoyed by
another (d.' ", I.ov,) and not any personal desire for the good (,..~ l.a ..
av..qi). See also 88a 38. If the other person loses the good, envy goes even
though the envious person is also without the good. The statement here was
anticipated at 86b 20-22 (..0 . .. .melexs ) where the constitutive elements
of envy and indignation are given: not self-directed, but other-directed; c
86b 20-22.

b 23-24 I'it tVII . 1It.-nji

We begin here the explanation of

b 24-25 ..OLOU.... ' . <p1l(Vov-.lI'
na;,
"Such people as have, or appear to have, equals experience
envy"; on ......, c LS, ... " A.II.7.

'x.,.....,.

b 26-27 y.vo~ ... t.-n:cipX......1I Y"o, is birth, lineage, as at A 6, 63a 29;

for """"....a> c 8Ib 34 : 3; ~A."la" IE", (attitude, disposition), c 8Cia
25; MEa., C 62b 20 : 2; .melexo.<a (possessions, wealth).
is the reading of Ross, Kassd with
b 27 or~ I"xpbv D.).Eb... ..ou
the Basle edition of Isingrin. Three edd., Spengd, Cope read with the codd.
or, ,..."!!o;; ~ll8ln8' "'0. . Spengd, p. 242, is not happy with it" and Cope,

COMMENTARY

167

p. 124, says in part "ro (P~) if LUs"'" is impersonal, as it usually is, is redundant
as far as the sense is concerned; if not, ro ,.~ ,j"<le,,.w is its subject." With
the reading accepted whicb Bonitz, Index (me[m ), also prefers, the interpretation is: "and those experience envy [sc. <p8o.0;;a~ b 241 who faIl just
short of having everything." The fact that the classes mentioned in 87b 273S arc likely subjects of envy is fairly obvious even without the occasional
reason presented by A.

h :.8-29 6ncipx'Y (liLl> law) n<iY.....~

The question here is punctuation, although, despite the variety, I could accept any of those offered.
The parentheses are read by four of the edd., not by Kassel, Spengd, Cope.
These three also read a period after .mae".'" and a colon after <pOo'eeol.la.
Ross and Tovar also punctuate with a colon after <pOo.eeol.la.. and no
punctuation after Vn<le"." save the parentheses. If the parentheses are read,
the punctuation given in the entry seems more reasonable.
h 28 oil'Y.u..... 01 6"<UJ(oily...~
"those with eminent accomplishments and good forume in their lives." Kassel alone omits the second 01.
As likely subjects of praise and encomium (c A 9, 67b :'7"-3S), such people
arc aware of their superior qualities (c A 7) and concerned about them.

h 30 : 1 ... ,p.c:.I'YO'
C A S, 6ra 27 - 61b 2.
a ILI.cp.pciy.....,~
in the meaning of 8?a 30 : 1; "exceptioually"
honored.
CA S, from which it can be seen why one so fortunate
h 31 66cz'l'ovl,!,
might well be conditioned to feel distress at another's good fortune.
"pretenders to wisdom," a somewhat unique word
h 32 lol;oaocpo,
in A.; cpo Plato, Pha,tItus 27Sb. In this word and the following, note that
two dilfcrent ideas of the root word (60".") are present: here, "seem,
pretend"; in the second, "to be thought to be, to be reputed."
h 33 cpu.cl60l;oL

"those who love a reputation, fame."

h 34 1"lCpoljluxo,
A suitable comment on this class is found at EN
112sa 17"-24 where it is said that "the small-minded man, though he is worthy,
deprives himself of the goods he deserves ... owing to the fact that he does
not consider himself worthy of good things." At II07b 21 - n08a r this
type along with the ambitious and unambitious (c 87b 3D-F) is defined
with rdation to
From the detailed description of the small-minded
man in On lhe Virlues and Vices I2srb 16-24, he is clearly not a happy person
in the best of circumstauces.

n,.".

From here to 88a S we have the second division of the

h 3S : 1 icp' oI~
cbapter on the things whicb cause envy. In a very cursory way we learn

168

ARISTOTLB, 4RHETORIC' II

88a 9

that they are in pan the aya6& mentioned; see 87b 23 : 1. Other things that
cawe envy are indicated at 88a 1-5.
2 .... p.lv 4y..&ci
pb is solitarium.
8Sa 1-3 lcp' aI~ ........,
"For those achievements or possessions which
arouse in men the love of fame and for which they are ambitious and for
which they desire renown, as well as all the things which are the gifts of
good fortune - virtually all these are subject to envy." tpw,6oUw, tpuoTOpaii,.a~ if they differ, would dn so in that the former indicates the desire
for fame in the eyes of others which is won by one's achievements, etc.; the
latter, the desire for the honor in itsd oe8YfWTa, expresses the whole appetitive drive in man toward what is seen as good; c 69" I : 2, 68b 32 - 69a 2.
For the idea in stl",x1j,.aTa See 62a 5-12.
t....EflExOUC..V
For the idea in the word, see 78b 28 : 1.
~ p..xpc'ji m.lKOUG.V
What is meant by this phrase is clearly:
"or those thing. because of whose possession they fall off excellence but
slighdy." In other words, goods whose possession while not conferring
distinction still confer substantial honor. This is not always clear in the
interpretations.
] CPClVCpav...
the beginning of the final division of the chapter.

as:

a 6 &1'''

'Just now," i.e., in the preceding two divisions, e.g., 87b 23-27,
a passage he refers to in what immediatdy follows at a 6-7.

a 6-7 XP6"'1' XCII "0,"" . . . 56lin

The point behind the fint phrase is
made at a 9-II; C 88a 9-10. 8Sa II-12 picks up MEn.
, a 7 : 1 66lin cp8avaUG'v
The reading of Ross, Kassd, Spenge!, Cope.
Two edd. read with Roemer his conjecture: MEn <"a/yb > '1'6011060"";
c 87b 26-27.
2 saw ... In:IO"'O.......
read by the edd. (save Kassel), Spengd,
Cope. Kassd double brackets as an addition (or possibly such) of A.'s. The
saying is identified by Nauck as Aeschylus' (frg. 305, Nauck & Snell).

a 8 "Cll ...pc\~

p.aGv.....

alI~ cpll.....
sc. tp6o..vaw TOtlTO'~. It is important in this topic (a 7-17) which is concerned with rivals that we understand
that the main subject is: those whom nlen envy. On tp,10...,..-6a. "e&~
c 7lIb 14 : 2.

a 9 dp'lp.lvou~

presumably those mentioned in a 6-7 (e.g., see following

two notes), as well as those referred to at a j-<S (ol~ .. le1/Ta.).

a 9-10 ",pc\~ 6~ .. oN&d~

sc. tpUOT',. ........ Cpo 86a 29-31. Obviously
TOtl~ ,."e'o....O-' ho~ w.a~ . .. "'o,.bov~ ... 1'B6ciiTa~ refers 10 a 6: TO'~
. . . ."ytl~ ... xedvq>. Four of the edd., Spengd, Cope agree on t;he reading

88a I4

COMMBNTARY

of a 9--10. Kassel, however (0 Der Text, p. 134, for his reasons), secludes
and II n8.BwTflI;.

:ned~ ToV~ before laopbov~,

a 10 "oU~ .'P' ......TIj"CI~

refers to a 7: TO'~ . lyl'~~ ... TO"fjl.
Cope, p. 127, illustrates the use of the phrase from Pindar to denote the outermost limits of the known world.
I I-I~ wI' irw ... 6'REpQIELV,
sc. oil'" (ned~ TOVTO!', fP,AOTI.uoiWra,)
WP . : "nor are they rivals of those to whom in their own eyes, or the eyes
of others, they consider themselves to be far inferior or far superior." After
.moe';xo.. all save Tovar, Kassd read a comma, making the WotWTOJ~ clause
a part of what precedes; o following note.

a 12-13 ':' ..cahw~ XCII ..po~ "oU~ ...pl ..a. ..O..u-.CI

The reading is that
of cod. A, three of the edd., Spengd. Ross, Kassd, Cope, the Anonymus
Commentator read with cod. F: wua6Tw~ "al "oel TDVTDV~ "al "eel Ta TDI.w...a. Usually the passage is interpreted as though there were a complete
break before this clause, e.g., "So, too, we compete with those who follow
the same ends as ourselves" (Roberts translation). However, the edd. (save
Tovar, Kassd), Spengd, Cope punctuate with a comma before the clause.
Of equal importance with the punctuation i. the verb to be understood with
the clause. If one follow> the common punctuation, then the verb which
introduces the whole clause should be understood, e.g., a II: D~a' (II"MJTIpD6PTa. "ed, To6TOV~) WP "DAV For this reason Spengd, p. 243, would
transpose the clause to a 9: :ned~ TDU, 8Ie'lpbov, Q)"a6T.., "al ... TD,a6Ta.
Certainly with the common punctuation I do not see the possibility of dismissing 006' (9'MOT'po6vTa.). Therefore I would have to interpret our statement
to mean: "nor are they rivals of those to whom in their own eyes or the eyes
of others they consider themsdves to be far inferior or far superior; so, too,
they are not rivals of others in like instances." This offers the following sequence of statements in 88a 8-17: men are envious of their rivals, and their rivals are (I) the aforementioned (11-9), (2) not those far removed in time or place
or to whom they are clearly superior or inferior or those of similar status (9--13);
but they are rivals to those who are their competitors in general, or in love,
or who seek what they seek - of such they are necessarily envious (13-17).
The statement is eyclic: men are envious of their rivals. .. they are particularly envious of certain kinds of rivals. On the other hand, if we punctuate
with a complete break (Le., a period) before our clause, then it would be
corrdated with 88a 11-9: "al "ed~ o6~ 9"ADnpD6'Ta, .. Sle'lpBIIOV, ... r.6aaV't'Q), ("&1oT,,,,oo,.Ta&) ned, TOO, neel Ta TO&a6Ta: "Men are envious of their
rivals, for they are rivals of those already mentioned. . .. In the same way
they are rivals of those engaged in similar pursuits."
a 14 4"..ClY""' ..... Ii~
rivals, competitors in general (as at 8..b 13, 83a 22),
e.g., in law, in politics, in sports, etc.

AIUSTOTLB, 'RHBl'ORlC' II

a 17 xIXl XEP"!LUS .

88a 24

c 8Ib 16: 2.

a IS xul Wv ... XCX'Top9oUv'nIN

SC. tpB01IOVd& 't'oV'ro&" as at 88a 8; "those
whose past acquisitions or present successes." On H,"OeBoVvT<'" C 83a 26.
Immediately preceding our sentence Cope, Preese (Loeb ed.) read: "al Tol,
TaxV 01 " !'oA., TVxd,re, " !'~ T~XdOTB' ",Booo6"... This is read by the edd.,
Spenge! at 88a 24 where we find it in cod. A.
a 18-19 01....1" .. <0;> nus ... 3P.OLO.
Ross alone encloses this in
parentheses. Dufour, Tovar, Ross, Kassel read with Vater (p. 99) OilTO. <01>
with which Spengel would agree. The 6~ Hai (Denniston, p. 30S) strengthens
the adversative sense, "but especially those near and like them." In these
two instances, as the reason given (a 19-21) says, men are aware that the failure
to win the good is their own.
a 19-20 ",,,p' IX6-rWS
"becawe of themselves"; c LS, naed C.III.7.
Jebb &: Sandys intexpret: "in comparison with these."

a 20 ",..i;"o l."",oiiy
i.e., the failure to obtain the good won by the other
(-r06ro) is a cawe of pain (Atmo;;') resulting iu envy: "so that the failure
which is painful cawes envy."
21 ",o~ .. XEK..... p.Evo.S
governed by an understood ",80006"" "those
who either have now, or have ocquired." Cope, p. 128, interprets: "who either
have now in their possession or have once possessed."

a zz :

3u" "')",oiS "POaijXEV

"all that naturally belongs to them";

cf. 78a 33.

,

Spenge!,

bebe....."..'; "OTe
is the reading of Ross, Kassel. Three edd.,
Cope read: "bclT}nd "OTB.

a 2Z-23 &.0 "'p""I1~"'po, " ....... po.S.

is the reading and punctuation
of Kassel, Cope with cod. F. The other edd. and Spengd read d.a "es"P.sreeo, TB ""'Tieo", "al "d.; whether Y' or rB i. the reading of cod. A is
110t at all clear. In any event the reading of cod. P followed by a full stop
makes sense whereas tying this in (rB - "at) with the next clause does not.
It makes more sense to have a 23-25 ("a! 01 "olid ... TVXOVT', ",Bo,06"w)
introduce two other instances of persons who are envied.
a 23

'<GiS

6).(y"

sc. 6ant1l11faa".

a 24 ",oiS ","Xu 01 1'000.S 'N)tOv..ES

"And those who either have acquired something with difIiculty or have not ocquired it at all are enviow of
those who got it quickly." Sc. Tal, raxV (TVx06".). . .. The cod. P reading
seems the most reasonable in the context. It is accepted by Kassel (C. Der
Text, pp. 134-35). Roemer, Dufour, Tovar read ror, TaxV 01 "lj"OJ; Ross,
Cope (on Cope, C 88a 18): roo, TaxV 01 "

"dA.,.

88a 26
a 2S :

171

COMMENTAllY

U x ..[

The "al is adverbial.

<P' O~

is the reading of the edd., Spengel. Cope reads or~

but accepts in his note, p. 129, 1'1" or~. His difficulty basically is whether
1'1" or, or ",.I Tial stands for the persons in whom men take pleasure. He
opts for hi Tial, and, in the light of what has gone before, this is co=t;
cf. the use of Tl, at 78a 2S, 79a 10, 80a 7, 80b 34, 82a 20, etc., and the use of
1'1" or, at 860 17, 87b 19, lS. However, cpo I17b IS : z.
3 01 TOtoiiftL
i.e' those who are envious.
l

a 26-27 c:.s ylzp Z x _ )"unoiiv....... .nm..S Ex"""'~ bel .....S lv...,.(OlS

ilcr8>\cr.",.....
This is the reading accepted by the edd and Spengel, and
I consider it co=t. Cope reads: ." rde oil" l"oOTe, with which Vater
(PI! ."0.....'), pp. 99-100, would agree. If we look at the whole passage from
88a as, we can see the development: "It is al.o clear at what things and with
what persons men who are envious fmd delight and what their attitude of
mind is. For just as men with this attitude of mind [envyl experience pain,
so with this attitude they will rejoice at opposite in.tances; consequendy,
if men, on the one hand, are made to feel envious [oth-.., ,,,."1, whereas
those who deem themselves worthy of pity or of receiving some good are
.uch as those mentioned [i.e., in the class of those enviedl, it is clear that
the.e latter will not obtain pity from those with the power to grant it."
The statement in the entry, despite the discussion it has aroused - e.g.,
Cope, pp. ~3O-3 I - is simply a repetition of the clarification made in the
Rhetoric between '1'8.00' and l"""a'l!",a,,la in the preceding chapter. See,
for example, 86b 9 : z where it was said in part that the confusion between
the CWO appear. to have been corrected in the Rhetoric when A. points out
that envy-malice are not two extremes of excess and defect whose mean i.
indignation. Rather, as h~ says at 86b 34 - 87> 3, they are simply diiferent
aspects of the same attitude of mind or general disposition. In saying that
the envious man and the malicious man are the same, A. recognizes that
envy-malice are only diiferent movements experienced by one and the same
general attitude of mind They are not opposites as indignation and pity are,
as he states at 86b 9-14 and argues at 87a II-I3 (oil rde . .. Blalo). Just as
there is no contradiction in a man who experiences indignation and so pain
at undeserved misfortune finding joy and so pleasure in deserved misfortune
(or deserved good fortune), 86b 26-3 I, '0 there is none in a man, who experiences envy and so pain at another's possession and enjoyment of good,
experiencing joy and so pleasure at the other's loss of those goods. See
also I17b 17 : 1.

.''0"".'

a 26 c:.s ZxOIl'<ES
This, together with oii~..,
(a 27) and oiJ~.. ,
'''''' (a 28), refers back to ncii, ."0.....' (a 26) and 01 TOlo;no. (a 2S) and signifies
those who experience envy.

AllISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

a 27 lv.."..lo,~
joyed by another.

88a 29

i.e., instances of the loss or destruction of the goods en-

a 28 : 1 "CIfIllcncWllriii'l",,,
C 8sa 3I : 2.
2 "'irill'
See 86b 9 : I, z; 87b I7 : 1. Once again the emotion
pity appears in an atgUDIent on what happens if a person is made to experience
the opposite of the emotion under discussiop. It would be interesting to
know whether this emphasis on pity is owed indirectly to the pervasive
inHuence of forensic rhetoric.

a 29 41;106,,0"'"

Ross alone reads dE'.iin.~ with Bonitz (StuJien, p. 94).

CHAPTER II

I . Transition: 88a 3I-3S

definition of emulation

II . Development: 88a 3S - 88b 28

I.

88. 35-38

2.

88. 38 - 88b

definition explained by contrast with

envy
the attitude, disposition of those who
experience the emotion: the subjective
aspect

10

3. 88b II-I4

the things which cause the emotion:

the objective aspect

4. 88b 14-22

the persons towmI whom the emotion is

direCted: the objective aspect
contempt: the emotion opposite to

5. 88b 22-28

emulation
to the section on the emotions

III . General conclusion: 88b 29-30

88a 31-32 .....~ ... &ijAov

the usual tripartite division.

a 32 :, I:ij).o~
Apart from what is said here on this emotion, there is
nothing of any substance on CilAo, in A. It is merely mentioned in the ethical
works as one of the emotions; sec, e.g., EN IIoSb 23 and MM II86a 13.
At EE I229a 38 in a discussion of fear it is identified in a passing way with the
experience of A~"'1 (as we find it in our definition). There is nothing at all
in Anaximcncs on the emotion. When we turn elsewhere, we find that
emulation is generally linked with envy (as we find it at 8Ih 21-22, 88a 3S-38,
and BID, II) but that it has also 2Cquired a pejorative meaning, e.g., Diogcnes
Laertius, Zeno 7.II1: ",B.... all A~",," in' illOTelo" draB " CijA all
AUmjv inl TCP 4.lltp "ae.'va, di. mlTo, in,Bu,.,; Stobaeus, Ethica 2.178:

",Bo.o, all A~"'7 in' d,uOTelo" draBo'" CijAo, fl. AUmj .,,1 TIji IT6flO' in...
nrxd ,. div ""'TO, h"Bu,. , ""'To.
,.'Ij' Ai"aa8a, dll ,.al hJew, CijAo.,
I'QXQ(!U1poJ baB,av 1I-ro, cillov I'lp'Ia"" 01, 4" H(!BiTTO'VO' j Cicero, Tusc.

a.

Disp. 4.8.17: "Invidentiam esse dicunt [ei. 87b 22-24] .... Aemulatio aUtem
dupliciter ilia quidem elicitur, ut et in laude et in vitia nomen hoc sit; Dam et
imitatio wtutis aemulatio elicitur ... et est aemulatio aegritudo, si eo, quod
cupierit, alius potiatur. ip.e careat." In A. emulation i good emotion
and an emotion which belong. to good men (88a 3S-36); its object is the good

88a 38

ARISTOTIB, 'RHBTORIC' II

174

seen in others who are one's p=s and seen as possible of attainment for the
one who desires it. It is an emotion which is self-directed but with an element
of altruism in it (88b II-14), and it is intimately connected with nfA~ which
is itself a sign that one has a reputation for doing good (c A 5, 61a 28 - 61b 2).
Further, it is the prize of virtue, that which is given to goodmen (EN II23b
35).
AU"') ... ,~
The presence of pain indicates in this instance the
clear awareness of the absence of something seen as a good together with
the desire to achieve it; c 79& II. This is also true in the case of anger, fear,
envy.
C 7& 31 : 3
J rp",~o"''''l1
not simply dyaOd, but those which are
a 33 ."...(..."'" x ..l ."&<X0....,,...,.
held in honor, as he says at 88b II: C'1.lwTa TIl ''''''fAa dya66 (and he indicates
some such in b II-14). Furthermore they must be dya06 which are seen as
possible of attainment by the individuaL Since the phrase ""de;C0fA""".
a~Tq; .lape is in the definition of emulation and is therefore essential to the
meaning of emulation, I have reservations about any suggestions at 88b 2;

c 88b 2.

"BfI'

a 34 : 1 ".pl "'oU~ ... "<ii <pUG.,

"in persons like him by nature."
= in the case of, LS, C.I.5. The dative is instrumental.
2 cNX 3...,
''Not because the goods are another's but because they
are not also his"; c 86b 20 and Jdi BTL.

a 35-38 (&,0 .. rpOavov)

The parentheses are used by the edd., and
,are followed by a comma; Spengel and Cope do not use them. This paBSage
is a brief explanation of emulation by contrasting it with envy.

a 35

bi:,.,x";~

a 36

01",."""" ... rp..w..;;~

i.e., morally good;

C 80a 30 : 1; cpo

S6a 6.

for the case, S. 1304.

a 37 : 1 ....p ..crxEUci~.,
C 88. 28; here it governs the accusative and
the infinitive: "the man e."Perieneing emulation prepares himself to obtain;
... the man who is envious sees to it that his neighbor is deprived.... "
Strictly speaking, as envy is presented in the Rhetoric and the ethical works,
this is not correct. It may be an added effect of envy, but it is not the direct
effect. Neither envy nor malice directly seeks to deprive the other of the
goods possessed. The closest envy comes to such an idea would be in the
competition with rivals of whom one is also envious (88a 8--18).
2 a.yaOidv
sc. 6PT'fA"., a 33: "highly valued."
a 38 ~ciy><lJ s..;
the conclusion to the plorasis at 88a 32ff.; it introduces
the first division, '''"' <XO.TS,.

88b 6

COMMBNTAlIY

88b I : 1 ~'1_A"'cN~ fLEv

tic (S. 2897).
S. 2522.

175

the ".b is solitarium and somewhat empha-

z.rw

cN&ol~ yUt> 4;lOi .... ", ...volfL"'" cl&6vcx....

This is the
reading and punctuation of Tovar, Spengd, Cope. Roemer, under the
influence of Victorius, Muret, indicates a lacuna after lxova.. . .. This
lacuna is replaced in Dufour, Ros.s by the conjectured words suggested by
Victorius, Muret: 1.~.xo".A .,. a~To" lap.,.. This replacement is considered
necessary by Vater (p. 100) and schrader (p. 342) because of the "de clause,
and Cope, p. 133, incorporates it into his interpretation. Kassel doublebrackets ~~.k ... cI~"'aTa with no punctuation before, and a colon after,
the secluded passage. As was said at 88a 33, the possibility of obtllining the
good things is part of the definition of emulation. Therefore, it should
not be necessary to repeat it when speaking of emulous persons. According
to the definition, men can be emulous only of good things which they can
secure for themsdves. It may well be, as Spongel, p. 244. says, that "if the
[conjectured] words are added, the whole passage has better coherence,"
but I am not certain that its coherence as it stands is not quite adequate, i.e.,
"it follows of necessity that those inclined to emulation are persons who deem
themsdves worthy of the good things which they do not possess, for no one
deems himself worthy of good things manifestly impossible for him." The
"de clause, as an explanation of the statement immediatdy preceding (cI.a,,"'1
dlj ... T~' dE.oiivra" i.e., the tksi,e fo, certain good things, a desire denoted by d<.oiin"a, atlT~'), is a logical clarification of that statement, which
itself demands a knowledge of the definition. C 78b 3-4.

b 2 fLiI lxoua.v

b 3 : 1 &.0 ........oiho...
Ross alone encloses this in parentheses. All
punctuate with a period at the end; the punctuation before varies but in all
instances is sensible.
On the .it" see B 12; on ".."aM.,.,xo.,
z veo. p.eycxAclcJn>xo.
6Cib 17.
3 xcd.r.;
sc. "al (TOIO;;TO.) or, ...
b 4-5 h-<. lit
is the reading of the edd.; c Thurot, "Observations
critiques [IJ," 307-308. In Spenge!, Cope we have the reading of the codd.
(I".... "de) where "de ("nanIdy") would be explanatory. C Denniston,
p. 58, and Cope, p. 134"1.
b 5 1<Aoiho~ . clpxcd
On wealth, c 87a 13 : 3; on abundance of
mends, 8,... 21 : 1. On public olices, cpo A 8, 65b 32.

b 6--"'7

c:.~

y"p "pocrijl<OV cN....i~ 4y..eoi~ olv..., 0... "pocrijx....r.; 4y..lI&i~

This is the reading of the codd., three edd., Spen-

lxouaL . clyall&iv.

1']6

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBI'ORIC' II

88b 8

gd. It would be interpreted: "for assuming that it is their duty to be good

men they aspire to such good things because such goods belong by nature
to those who are good." The major problem in the reading ofthe text occurs
for the commentators (and here the reading of our edd. is influenced by them)
in the clause OTI ne0aij". Toi~ araB';;, lxova,. It might first be noted that
Stephanus indicates that he read: II... neoaij". Toi~ dra8.;;, exova.. Anonymus
gives an interpretation but I would find it difficult to determine what h. was
reading; e.g., his comment on the whole clause ,;,... lxova, is: C7lAova ..
dId Td olea8a. mlTO,)' araBo,). elva
aut ToUTO IX." ..0; dyaM, Ii neom!" Ix ... TO,)~ dyaBov~. With a slight correction (the same is required in Stephanus) to the first part, which is not the Greek of the text, this is effectively
the interpretation offered above of the Greek of the codd. Muret initiated the
problems by translating: "bonos enim vires esse se par esse arbittantur, quia
tales esse par est eos qui talibus bonis aiIluunt." This demands: 0... ne0m!"., (-fi".) Toi.ixova, TO; TOuWTa T';;V dyaB';;v (c Vablen, "Kritik d. Rhetarik," 566; Vater, p. 101; Spengel, p. 204). Vater, pp. 100-101, argued that
A wrote only: "';', neoaij"o. dra6oi~ elva. Toi~ dya6<b. "xova,," or possibly:
",;" rae neoaij"o. dyaBoi' .lval Toi, draB';;. lxova, C7l40Va, sciI. dya8o, .1va."; all the rest he considers spurious. Brandis, 46, changed this to ,;,. r4e
"eoaijHO'Jl aUTo;;, dya6o;;" elva&. xa! IxlZ'" 6T' 1q!oaij'lB Toi, dya6w, IxotJa&.
Vablen, p. 566, in tum changed this to: ,;,~ rae ne0aij"ov a~..oi~ araBoi,
.1"a,8T' Ii ne0aij". Toi~ araBoi, 'xova.. Cope adopts this reading but his note
(p. 134) is misleading. Kassel also accepts it but as 8... <&>. Por 8T' neoaij'"
Ross reads ola "eo,",,,... After all this effort a return to the reading of the
codd. might seem presumptuous. However, we should attend to what A. has
,said and is saying about C'ii40, and C7IAmT,,,ot. Emulation is an emotion of
those who are morally good (88a 35-36), and so one would expect that
those who experience it would consider themselves worthy of good (as
they do, 88b I) because they are good. Thus when he speaks in our passage (88b 3-7) of C7IAm ..."o/ who already possess good things and describes
their attitude (88b 6-7), it is natural for him to interpret the attitude as the
attitude of people who believe it their duty to be good and so aspire to
the good things which belong naturally to the morally good. c 87a IS.

..a,

b 7 Ily8w.; /!xoue..
Though araB.;;. may be used rarely by A. - we
have this instance, and that at Top. 136b 27-32 - it is surely correct here,
i.e., "those who are morally good." The moral goodness is made mote
obvious with dyaB.;;, than it would be with ro.
b 8 : 1 xed cril~
sc. "al (C'14WT,,,ot /",..) oU,; i.e., aware of the es=
in which they are held by others because of their draBd m.,.a, they strive
fot further distinction.
2 cr.v
Its antecedent is TaVTa (b 10).

88b 16

3 auYY"~'~
b 9:

b 10 :

c 8Ib 34 : 3

ob...o,
lv,<,I'-'"

177

COMMBNTAl!Y

OIXE'"

~LO'

"intimate friends of the family"; cpo 8Ib 34 :

"held in honor."

2.

The term is de6ned at A S. 61a 21-22; c 76b 6 : .

Ross alone conjectures: lIE",. <elva.> following

,<0<.","",

Richards. p. 109.
II : J d S t ....I" ... iy..t
the beginning of the second division.
Among the highly valued goods would be not only those that follow. but
certainly some from among those mentioned at 88a I-S andA S. 6.
2 cip ...~
Virtue and virtues are discussed inA 9 as moral excellence
and constitute the burden of EN. For an idea of what A. has in mind by a

virtue see 62.b 13 :

"all the virtuous."

2.

Cope, p. 13S. gives an odd interpretation to de....~:

On the idea in the word sec A S. 61a 28-32. At A

b 12 ":'EPYft"'ci
9. 660 36 - b I A. speaks of virtue as a d.wap., eU'eyeT'~ "ollwv "al I'By.uwv; c 66a 36 : z.

,<,,,,,,a, ...

b 13 : J
oiy..80<.~
Ross alone encloses this in parentheses
with no punctuation before and a comma after.
z _I 3""", ... oi,,6Mua~
"and all the goods which yidd pIcasure to their neighbors"; on d"&lav,,., c 6Ib 9. Kassd. Spcngd. Cope
begin a new topic with "al 6""",.
b 14 ")'crii,<o~ .. xoil).o~ ... lLoil).ov (,Y'EI..~
On nAo""o,. cf. 87a 13 :
3; on "dUo,. c A s. 61b ']-14 and cpo 87a IS. AtA 6. 62b 14-18 beauty
and health are excellences of the body which are productive of many good
things. In fact, health. A. says. is considered to be the best of all good things
(c 62.b 16) - obviously "the best" for the person hitnsclf, not necessarily
for others. which is the nature of the C'1Mmi Td lVT'l'a dya~d, the subject of
discussion here; cpo 88b 1S-18 (01 "de ... dvvdI'BVO'). Thus it is that he limits
health here as one of the goods that would qualify for the class: "rather
than health."
....;;....
i.e.. the C'1A.,Ta d"a~d. The people who are emulated
(C'1lwTol) (the third division) arc those who possess these goods or goods

b IS

like them, a few more of which are mentioned at 88b 16--18. Isocrates.
ISO-lSI mentions snch wrtl'a dy~a in connection with his own
life which is characterized (141) as worthy of emulation.

AntiJom.

_.,111

b 16 oivSpeI..
On the variant spelling of &.dee/a. c 6Ia 3 : .
Courage is called an excellence of the soul at A S. 610 3. and one of the parts
of de.n1 atA 9. 66b I (c 6Gb 20-29. with which cpo 62.b 12.-28). It is de6ned

AllISTOTL~ 'RHEl'ORIC' II

88b 22

atA 9. 66b II-13 (c 66b II); atA 6. 62.b 33 we are told that it is something
whose possession is advantageous. and at A 9. 66b 4-7 most advantageous to
othets. which is. of course. to the point he is developing here. "o",ta. as we
saw at 87b 3D-31. is something for which men are held in honor; it, too. is
mentioned as one of the parts of ap8ni (66b 3). but it was:not considered in the
analysis which followed there (c 66b 1 : 3) although we were told at A II.
71b 28 that it is "the knowledge of many admitable things" (c 7Ib 27 : 1).

b 17 :

1 clpx>l
as seen at 88b 5; it is explained in the following clause.
b 17-18. where Ross alone punctuates differently and not successfully.

3 E6 ""'Ei"
picks up JJ",il'pa Hal 81lBl'l'BT""'. 81l,pYBToii.~", of
b 12-13. On the idea c 7'Jl1 7 and cpo 8Ia 14. 8Ja 20 : 2 .

b 18

P>l""p.~

It is obvious from what is said here that A. regards

snch men with esteem. In this respect the comment rellects the same kind of
jndgment on rhetoric as was met atA I. 5sb 17-21 where he notes that while
there is a name for the man who misuses the art of dialectic (he is called a
sophist). there is none for the man who misuses the art of rhetoric. the kind
ofmisuse described. for example. by !socrates. Anlidosis 147-149; c ssb 17-21.
b 1!}-20 ot<; "aUol ... "allot
There are two ways in which this
sentence is taken. The first is that which the scholiast. Anonymus. and others
take: "Those men are objects of emulation to whom many wish to be like. or
of whom many wish to be their acquaintances. or their friends." The second
is that found in the Vetus Translatio and elsewhere: "Those men (etc.) ...
to whom many wish to be like. or those who have many acquaintances. or
,those with many friends."
b 20 8I1ufJA!;ou'"''
Cpo 79b 25. 8ra 28-29. At 84> 27-3 I admiration is
used as a criterion pointing to those whom the admirer respects and holds
in esteem.
b 21 mll'vo, x"llyxcl>I'-'"
At A 9. 67b 27-35 there is a definition of
praise and its difference from encomium. c 67b 27-33. 67b 28 : 2.
b 22 : 1 "0'"1)........ II ).oyoypcicp_
Ros. alone of the edd. reads" ,j"d 10yoyea",ow. The words Aoyoyea",o,. loyono.a, (most likely Ionian constructions as !~oe,oyecl'l'"') acquired a different meaning in the fourth century
at Athens. "Logographer" has a mixed history. however (c Bux in PW).
which permits us to say that Cope'. three interpretation. (pp. 136-37) are
true. but not as formally secure as he assumes. e.g,. (a) early prose writers.
mythographers. geographers. historians; (b) those who wrote ,peeches at a
price for others to deliver. particularly in the law courts; (e) writers of eulogies.
panegyric. epideictic literature. For example. none of the early historians is
formally called a logographer. and when the word was used in t!>e fourth

88b

22

COMMBNTAllY

179

century for speech writer it was a tenn of opprobrium. The range ofmeaning
found in the word in its later use, however, appears to rdlect its earlier meaning. Bux, for example, argues that like AO"""O'.~ it was originally used in a
serious way to denote prose writers including historians, mythographers,
geographers. There is a difference in the three groups, and this is reflected
in the change the word underwent when it was employed to denote serious
prose like history (e.g., Thucydides I.2I.I) as well as prose not seriously
concerned with the truth, "unreliable writers of stories," as Gomme, I 138-39,
puts it. It is this last meaning (see, e.g., Plutarch, De Iside et Onride 3s8f,
De deftctu o,,,,,,lornm 4171O-f) which appears to be reflected in the use of the
word for speech writers, and for the writers of epideictic literature, i.e.,
those concerned more with giving pleasure than with presenting the truth.
At the same time the word retains its denotation for ..nous prose, as Plato
Phaedrus 2s8b-c would imply. There is little question that when it was used
of speech writers (a practice called d"'oyea'l'ia by !socrates, Antid. 2) it was a
derogatory term; see, e.g., Plato, Phaedrus 2S7C, Aeschines, Ag. Timarchus
94 (applying it to Demosthenes), or Aristotle, Rktoric r 7, 08a 34 (so Bux;
Cope would disagree). The insulting character of the word resided in the
fact that such writers were not concerned with the truth, were unreliable.
It is this quality of unreliability which one senses in the use of the word to
designate writers of eulogistic literature. This appears to be its meaning in
our passage: namely, those concerned more with pleasing the auditor or
reader than with the strict truth. Cicero, De orat. 2.84.341 describes the
genre well: "Ipsi enim Graeci magis legendi et delectationis aut hominis
a1icuius ornandi quam utilitatis huius forensis causa laudationes scriptitaverunt; quorum sunt libri, quibus Themistocles, Aristides, Agesilaus, Epaminondas, Philippus, Alexander a1iique laudantur." When Aoyoyeaq,O, or
AO,..,,.,., is used with "'0' 1"''1" as it is in our passage, it may carry thismeaning.
Compare, e.g., Thucydides 1.:U; Dionysius ofHalicarnassus, On the Composition ojWo,ds 93; Plato, Rep. 392a; Isocrates, To Philip 109, with which compare his Evago,as 40, To Philip I#3 "",,,,,,,,,,,,,u.,,,
i.e., those who are opposite to 01 C'I1OJTol (b 15-22).
b 22-24 lv.."..!ov".. x ....."'PPDVEiv
Contempt, disdain, is considering
persons and things as worthy of nothing at all (78b 15-16); emulation, in
essence, is considering persons and things as worthy of very much. In contempt there is the pleasure which comes with self-satisfaction; in emulation
there is the pain attendant upon the dissatisfaction owing to the sense of want.
Herein lies their basic opposition. More fully, as we have seen at 88a 32-35,
emulation is defined as feeling that the highly honored good things possessed
by an equal but also available to the one experiencing the emotion are personally desirable.

180

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

88b 29

b 23
xed " .. ~'I)Aoilv "'" x""llfI>povEiv
is the reading of the codd. and
four edd., Spengd. It is parallded at 80a 5-6. Ross, Cope read: Tq;

err

lot;" TO HaT<lfPe0vei'".

b 24 oG"",~ lxov""~
as he explains in what immediatdy follows: those
who are C7]AaJTI"ol (b 1-10) as wdl as the C7]A"'Tol (b 15-22). Granted the
opposition stated at b 22-23, such people, when shown persons who possess,
not Tel bT.,.a cl,.a06, but their oppositu (which is the point here, as it is at
88a 26Jf.; see 8sb 29 : Z), will turn away from them in disdain, as is said at
78b 16-17: TOW 6~ "7]6 ...O~ del",. JA.,."'e06a
b 25 : 1 ....u.....v
i.e., those with Tel lva.Tla "I<a; see b 26 (6ao ).
z ml "cN""'~
This is taken in a number of ways but I believe that
inl is causal here (LS, B.III.l) and that Tomo., refers to Tel lvavda "I<a
just as T.v.",. refers to iIao, lxo~a.: "it is necessary that those who are so disposed to emulate or be emulated by others tend to be contemptuous of all
those who are subject to weaknesses which are opposite to the excellences
which arouse emulation, and tend to be contemptuous because of the weaknesses."
b 26 lvuvd.. xClxli
i.e., opposite to the good things mentioned, and so:
vices instead of virtues, attainments which are harmful rather than uselUl to
others, things which give pain rather than pleasure to others, cowardice
instead of courage, etc.
The explanation of this is contained in a.tV
The people despised are those who through chance
come into some valued good but are without other highly valued goods.
People who are emulous (which means that they are the kind of people
described at 88b 6-7: see note) would not consider these .,m,xo;;'TB~ to be
deserving of such good, and the response to them could frequendy be ("oAAd",,) contempt. Such an attitude is partially foreshadowed at 86b 14.-15

b 27-.28

&,......

fI..ux'l)

TOW lnl,.",. dyaOai..

(d6",ov ... ,..,..eI,.evo.).

b 29 : 1 &,' clJv .. &'uAU"""', t~ clJv
Kassd alone reads >eai IE ,;,. and
Conley ("IId01}," pp. 306) argues for it as necessary for the sense. It may
hdp but it is not necessary; see, for example ]ebb's note, p. 98112 in ]ebb &
Sandys. In each instance w. refers to the special topics; cf. 77h 16 : 1. They
constitute the necessary material whereby (6,' ,;,.) one devdops in discourse
anyone of the emotions studied, and from which (1< w.) one devdops the
,.taT" b ..." .., called "dOo" emotional proof This proof is incorporated
with the logical and ethical
into deductive and inductive forlOS of
argument thus constituting the unified logos so critically necessary in the
dfurt to communicate cffectivdy with another person.

"laT",

88b 30

COMMBNTARY

181

2 5...ME'tCO.
i.e., are dissolved, dissipated, destroyed. This was
done formally in B 3 for anger, and, indirectly becallSe of the rdation between
anger and mildness, for mildness in B 2; it was done for friendship at 82a II[
and for fear at 83a 13f For shame it was simply stated at 8sa 14-15; at
8sa 34f there is a somewhat similar presentation for kindliness. 86b 91[
enters into some detail on the opposite of pity. The eH"ort at 87b 161[ (in
the chapter on indignation) and at 88a 261[ 1m the chapter on envy) to set
forth ways to dissipate the emotions are less direct and explicit; see 87b 17 : I,
SBa 26-27, and 86b 9 : I, 2.

b 30 ... t"",,E'~
very probably (as at A 8, 660 18, or 7, 6sb 20) in its third
meaning (c 55- 4) as source material from which to devdop propositions
about each emotion for enthymematic or paradeigmatic argumentation;
in the Rhetoric, see Studies, pp. S~6.
on the meanings of

"t,rn,

CHAPTER 12

I . Introduction: 88b 30 - 890' 2

to chaps. 12-17: a study of the kinds

of ~Oo, as specified by emotions,
habits, age groups, the gifts of fortune; each kind is explained briefly

II . Development: 890' 3 - 89b 12

of the first age group: the young and

their character traits (the study of
age groups continues through chap.

8g. 3-9

desires of the young: .trong, bodily

in character, .fickle, violent but not

14,
I.

gob 14)

_permanent

3 8g"7-34

4. 890' 34- 8gb 12

their emotions: hot-tempered, easily

angered, eager to win
their attitudes: see the good rather
than the bad, are hopeful, confident,
courageous, bigh-minded
their actions: live in accord more with
wbat is morally right than with what
is advantageous, overact and re-act. are
ready to show pity, to enjoy themselves

III . Conclusion: 89b 13

i.e., Tel ,.~. ~Oo,;

cf. 89h

13

88b 30-31 TO. Stile'! ... ..uxCl~

We have seen the problem ofthemeaning of ~Oo, and the problems occasioned by identifying it as ..I,m, ln0V""
solely with the speaker's ~Oo, (77b 24). Despite this common interpretation,
even a casual reading of the RNloric makes us aware that A. has more than
the speaker's if00, in mind when he talks of the probative power of cbaracter.
Any doubt would be removed by 90a 25-28: "such then are the f/0'1/ of the
young and old. Consequendy, since men give a favorable hearing to discourse whicb is addressed to and in accord with their own ~Oo" it i. quite
clear how the speakers by the language they employ will reflect such cbaracter
both in themselves and in their discourse." In an eff'ort to understand whether
A. intends the speaker's ijOo, to be the only entecbnic pistis, let us review
briefiy some of the problems whicb .rise if this is so, and then look at A.'.
use of the word in our treatise. The most obvious difficulty is in the area of

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

ssb 30

the structure and the logical development of the work. We arrive at B

12-17

after an extended analysis of two of the three entechnic pisteis: lcIyo~ (A

4-15). "d90, (B 2-II). The only extended statemcot on ~9o, is found in
the fourteen lines at 7Sa 7-20. In the light of the logical organization of the
two books this is a substantial defect. and, of course, it leaves B 12-17 inexplicable. The purpose they serve is not known. Realizing this, some =lte
the ~90, of 12-17 a form of the entechnic pistis "d90" e.g., Siiss, p. 163.
A., however. says that ~90~ is not "d90~ (EN IIooa II-U) and from his
explanation of iJ90~, it could not be. The one merit to be found in making
chaps. 12-17 an extension of "d90~ as found in chaps. 2-II is the recognition
by those who do so that theiJ90~ of 12-17 is in A.'s view as much an entechnic
pistis as "d9o~. But this is precisely the problem: the conBict between what
A. is obviously saying in 12-17 and the position of those who confine iJ90' as
entemnic pistis to the ~9o, of the speaker. It is clear from A.'s statements
in 12-17 that the auditors' iJ90~ in the speaking situation is presented as
something whic:h must be known because of the way it affects the mauner
in which auditors respond. Such an argument on A.'s part is an indication
of the probative force of the auditors' iJ90,. How, then, can we limit the
meaning of ~80~ as "tcrn~ l .....X"o~ to the speaker? Indeed can we do so
when it makes nlmy of the 59 uses of the term in our Rhetoric meaningless?
For example, at 76. 23-29 A. clearly speaks of the two enteclmic pisteis
Myo~, ~90~; but the iJ90~ he speaks of is the character of either the speaker
or others. Again at 69a 28-3 I in discussing the motive forces behind human
action he speaks of the role played by ii80~: "And in general all the circumstances which cause men's characters to differ must be considered; for example,
,if a man views himself as rich or poor ... this will =lte a difference in him.
However, we will discuss these matters later." Strangely all who subscribe
to the view that the speaker's ~80' is the only enteclmic pistis still interpret
this forward reference to be B 12-17.
When we tum to the use of iJ9o, in the text in all it!. 59 appearances (I
except I3b 3<>-31), it refers to what we ordinarily understand by "the character
of a person." Furthermore it carries this basic meaning throughout the
text. Thus Cope's view (Introd., pp. IOS-I3) that it submits to three meanings
is not correct, e.g., (a) iJ80, of speaker; (b) i190~ of forms of government in
A S and iJ90~ of B 12-17; (c) 7180' of style in r 16. The meaning found in
(a) is the base for that in (b) and (c). A study of the sS instances as they arc
read in the text and context establishes the following meanings:
(I) 7 clear instances in which it refers to the speaker's >l90, as enteclrnic
pistis: 56a 2, 5, 13; 66, 26; 95' 23, 26-27; Isb 23;
(2) 4 where it can only be the 7190' of others as entechnic pistis: 66a 13,
14-15; 90a 26-27; 9Ib 2D-31;

88b 30

COMMENTARY

185

(3) I where it denotes the ;>j8., of both the speaker and another as entechnic pistis: 760 28;
(4) 43 where it signifies either the speaker's or another's (e.g., the auditor's) '18.,: to cite a few: s6a 23, 59b 10, 76a 25, 86b 12-13; and
(S) 3 where "character" is a possible interpretation; but quite possible is:
". trait, quality of character," "characteristic": gob 29, gIa 20-21, 91b 2.
This rather large range of referents along with the problems already mentioned makes the decision to limit ;>jB., as entechnic pistis to the first category
rather temerarious. It should also be noted that Anaximenes, a contensporary,
distributes his uses of ;>j8., in a comparable manner between speaker (2 instances: 1430a 28-29; 14460 14; possibly 1445b 17) and auditors or others
(7: 1429a II; 1430a 35; 1434b 28-31; 144lb 19-20,22; 144Sb 3, 12), and his
meaning for the word is fundamentally the same as A:s, i.e., the way a person
habirually acts (1428b u) prinlllrily in the area of moral activity (c the
actions he mentions).
This leaves us with the problem of Bland the interpretation of 78a 7-20.
There are a few dUngs to note about the chapter. It is certainly not devoted
to the speaker's >J8., as entechnic pistis. In content it is actually a chapter
of transition from logical pistis (77b 16-23), a general introduction to the
psychological pisteis ;>jB."
(77b 24 - 78a 6), followed by a comment
on ;>j8., (78a 7-20) and
(78a 20-28). The comment on ;>j8." however,
is directed to that of the speaker and enumerates three traits which make one
credible (as a speaker) to others: sound judgment, moral integrity, good will.
Oddly enough, these are the qualities which appear in the analyses of the
typical responses associated with a character type in 12-17. To exemplify
from the fir.t charaCler (12), that of the young: we learn that sound judgment
i. limited (89a 17-26, b 5-1), moral integrity mixed (89a 3-16, 35-37), good
will.trong in certain areas (89a 37- b 2, b 8-n). Theargwnent which underlies chaps. 12-17 is that by observing these traits and their presence or absence
in his auditon the speaker ensures the effectiveness of his own ;>j8., as entechnic
proo The argument is stated blundy at 90a 2S-28 and earlier at A 8, 66a
8-14 (hrsl ... siva,). Should the speaker overlook the.e qllalities in his
audience or dismiss them as insignificant or irrelevant, he effectively weakens
or negates the power of his own ;>jB., as entechnic proo As Demosthenes
remarks: "while other artistic or technical attainments are fairly autonomous,
the speaker's art is ruined should the auditors prove recalcitrant" (On the
Embassy 340). In such a relationship the auditors' ;>j8., is obviously seen as an
entechnic pistis for it must be understood and addressed by the speaker to
ensure the credibility of his own >J0o, with the auditors. Thus Spengel has
no hesitation in speaking of chaps. 1:>-17 (the "indolem auditorwn") as the
last of the three artistic proofs of 56a 1-4 (Specimen c.mmenlari.rum, pp. 3435). Finally, we must recognize the fact that A. has made the auditor the

",,8.,
",,8.,

186

ARISTOTI.E, 'RHBTORIC'

[J

88b 30

telos of rhetorical di!course (A 3, 58b 1-2; 9, 67b 7-II) and judgment ("el,"~)
on the part of the auditor essential to the whole process (77b 21 : 1). In
itself this is an argument for the auditors' ~90~ as part of the enteehnic pistis
~90~. In such a perception of rhetoric, to be effective, the speaker must
always recognize and utilize the fact that he is speaking to a certain kind of
audience with a particular set of established attitudes, interests, intellectual
convictions, emotional responses, desires, needs (i.e., a certain kind of ~90~),
all of which flow into the judgments and decisions made by them. & we
learn at A 10, 69a 7-3', it is this ~90~ which affects a person's decisions and
judgments. So it is that the actual purpose of chaps. 12-17 with its study
of the major character types is to show the speaker how his il90~ must attend
and adjust to the il90~ of varied types of auditor if he is to address them
successfully. The chapters di!elose th.t in A.'s mind the speaker', ~90~
cannot function autonomously as entechnic pistis nor con the auditors' ~90~
be viewed as neutral or passive as a source of proo The more realistic
assessment of the speaker-auditor relation is that the auditor's ~90~ influences
not only the speaker's il90~ but also the emotional resonance he lends his
argument (,,&90') and its intellectual temper (Mro~).
On this tnatter I would have to conclude that if any di!tinction on ~90~ as
entechnic proof were to be made, I would say that A. thinks of ij90' primarily
as that of the speaker (e.g.,.4 9, 66a 26-27), and secondarily but equally as
that of the auditors (e.g., 90a 2S-28; A 8, 660 9-14).
In the Rhetoric A. does not explain the meaning of il9o" but it is safe to say
that it carries for the most part the ordinary meaning found in the ethical
worle., i.e., moral character. We can come to some understanding of its
"'lJ1eanmg in the Rhetoric from what A. calls its root idea, 890~ (c A 10,
69b 6-7, 70" 6 : 1; EN TI03a 17-18; EE 1220a 39 - b r). This is the name
given to an action repeatedly placed by a person, an action done over and
over. Thus at 700 6 Ta l/hi refer to specifically diffi:rent actions repeatedly
performed by an individual. This manner of acting, as we are also told there
(70a 6-9), is like but not the same as that which flows from our nature; in
fact, .90, is said to be like a second nature (EN nS2a 31>-32). Thus i!90~
is the ground for what A. colis E'~, which, in turn, plays an important role
in determining A.'s notion of il90,. A lE~, it seems, is a disposition already
present in a person (see below) which can receive the effect of the repeated
action and thus become further disposed for the doing of that action (EN
IIo3b 7-25, c b 21; 1II40 9-10). A. speaks of this very notion of .E'~ at
.4 I, S4a 7 in the introductory lines of our treatise: "because of the habitude
['''''''j9.,av] derived from a stable di!position [dno lE.w,]." According to A.
(EN nosb 19-28, EE 1220b 7-20) there are three things found in that part
of the soul called TO Oee"",,", the appetitive part: .<.,~ (stable di!positions),
611>&,.." (capacities), ,,&9'1 (transitory motion proceeding from the capac-

88b 30

187

COMMENTARY

ities). From the passages cited it would appear that the dvvdp." possess no
specific determination from nature (EE 122.0b Hi) but may be influenced
one way or another. That influence come. from the
which shape the
capacities to function in a certain way (EN IIoSb :>3-28, EE 12Wb 16-20).
If a Mwap', is shaped pardy uuder the direction of reason by IE" as an dective
habit, i.e., iE', "eoal{!BTt"'7, into an habitual way of acting in the area of
moral activity, the tesult is a firm direction of the person toward or away
from the good proper to man which iJ called virtue or vice. A. also calls
it l}6o, which is a tendency toward (or away from) the standard of goodness
proper to man (BE 1:>2Ib 3:>-34; Poetics 1448a 2.-4). Such an understanding
of l}6o, as "moral character" is common in the Rhetoric. It is seen quite
dearly atA 8, 66a 14-16; A 10, 69a 15-19, 28-:>9; 89> 35-37; 90a 16, 17-18;
95b 14-IS; r 13, 140 21-:>2; 16, 17a 17, IS, 19-20, 22, :>3-24; 17, ISa 16-17;
18b 23. It is also the meaning found inA 9. In B 12-17 and its presentation
ofl}6o" there is constant reference to the virtues (and so good moral character)
as they are found in EN nD7a 2S - IIosb 10; EE 122.0b 3S - I:>2Ia 12. A.
speaks, for example, of courage, temperance, liberality, greatness of spirit,
love of honor, etc., and their presence or ahsence in the varied character
types. In analyzing the character types A. actually presents patterned ways
of acting common to a type and indicative of good or bad moral character.
Thus if we were to make specific the primary meaning of l}Oo, as A. uses
it in the Rhetoric we arrive at this: l}6o, is a firm disposition within the person
formed pardy under the direction of reason (BE 1220b 5-7), a finn disposition
with respect to the appetitive part of the soul represented by the emotions
which reflects the quality of the person's dominant habits in the sphere of
moral activity. As Burnet, p. 66, remarks, it was the formation of this kind
of l}Oo, that was the object of the first education in the Republic and Laws
of Plato; cpo EN II04b 11-13.
But ~6o, does not always denote this finn disposition deliberatdy formed in
part under the guidance of reason. For example, at EN II44b 1-30 we read
(4-6) that men are of the belief that each of the kinds of ~6o, (and he has in
mind moral character) are somehow naturally present: men are just, temperate,
and brave, and possess other kinds of character from the moment of birth
(cp. n03a 24-26 and cf. Schiitrumpf, pp. 4/[). In other words, there are
kinds of l}6o, with which people are variously endowed by nature; e.g.,
EN III70 3-6: "The courage arising from the spirited temper seems to be
most natural and, when it adds choice and motive, to be courage." This
natural endowment disposes the individual to a degree for the ddiberate
formation of the kind ofl}6o, which iJ formally identified with moral character,
whether it be good or bad. ~6o, as a natural endowment would appear to be
a dominant meaning at 11790 33 - nSoa 24. In the expression l}Oo, .~".,.i,
"a! OJ, ciA7jOw, ."uo"alov (II79b S-9) >lOo, signifies a natural predisposi-

Ie..,

188

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' 11

88b 30

tion for moral goodness, something that is .1", Pi~ de'Pi~ (II79b 30)
and that can be made ready for virtue (OJ soil is made ready for the seed)
by education in virtue Wlder proper laws. In itsdf, however, this fl9.~
does not signify moral eharacter. In the same way the states of feding discussed at EE I233b 16 - I234a 33 are closely roated to moral character but
they are not fl90~ as moral eharacter since they too are d.w "e.a'eiC1'''~
(12340 25). The same may be said, it would seem, of the statement at EE
I220b 7-10 in which A. speaks of kinds of character denominated by natural
capacities for =tain kinds of emotiom, e.g., the irascible, the lustful. It is in
this sense, however, that Kroll and Verdcnius enlarge the meaning of fl9.~.
Kroll (p. 69) argues that fl9.~ can denote a "passing mood" which seems to
mean an emotion typical ofone age group and not another. Verdenius (p. 243)
includes within the meaning "emotional states." Such stable emotional
responses or attitudes may be "praiseworthy or censurable states with respect
to eharacter" (I233b 16-17), but they do not constitute moral cltaracter.
As moral character fl90, signifies a stable and established attitude in the area
of moral activity which is the result of some kind of reasoned action by the
individual. We know that the emotions (nd9'l) are integral to fl90c;. We also
know that diJferent age groups (ljl",/a.) respond almost Wlanimously to a
spectrum of emotions peculiar to the age (and so the idea of the "ages of
man"; cf. Horace, AP I56-I7S). In the same way we know that individuals
because of the circumstances of life (TVXa.) can devdop =tain kinds of
emotional respOIlSe. In the sen.e that such responses are somewhat stable
and set they may be (and are) spoken of as fl90c;.
When A. is using the word in its strict sense in the Rhetoric and when in
,the wider .ense would have to be determined from the context. But in either
meaning it includes an aspect of the personality of tho.e addressed as of utmost
importance to the speaker. If he overlooks or dismisses it, as has been said,
he effcctivdy undoes his whole intention to communicate. In its strict sense
a. moral character Aristotelian fl90~ does not appear to have been understood
in the Latin tradition. As a matter of fact, it is a word for which according to
Quintilian the Romans had no equivalent (6.2.S): "There are two kinds of
emotions as we know from ancient tradition: one kind the Greeks called
"d90" a word which we, interpreting it properly ond correctly, call adfectus;
the other kind they call fl90" a term for which, as I helicve, Latin has no
equivalent. MoTtS is the term used, and so that part of philosophy known ..
>18'' 7/ is called moral philosophy." This is clear from Quintilian and Ci=o.
Quintilian's failure in Wlderstanding may wdl be owing to O=o's failure
(Roth, S58-59). In any event, an explicit reference by Quintilian (5.10.17)
to B r:Jr-I7 cannot be reconciled with our text OJ we have it. In the Latin
tradition 'lj"9.~ is interpreted as
For example, at 6.2.2-20 Quintilian
takes up the concept. Through 8-IS his comments are promising (~g., at s

"dB.,.

88b 31

COMMENTARY

it is morts; at 131 it denotes goodness in the speaker reflecting the morts

dic...tis; at 18 it requires that the speaker be a vir bonfls). But in the last analysis
~Oo, is a calm, gentle, perduring emotion, and "dOo, is a more violent, momentary emotion. Quintilian attributes the distinction to the more careful
writers on the subject (6.2.9). Thus ~Oo, is a "dOo, (c Martin, 97).
Cicero's comments on this matter arc contained substantially in Or.t. 37.128.
Everything dse met here and there in De or.t. :z.27.U5-2.S3.2Ia1f. could
be seen as a rather loose deveIopment of this. First of all it should be said
that Cicero recogniud the importance of the auditor, and therefore of hi.
~Oo" to the speaker. See, e.g., De inv. 1.16.22 (.b iuJicum person.); De or.t.
2.79.321 (ex eis opud quos . .) and compare 2.44-186-187. However, despite
encounging statements-e.g., Drat. 37-128 (cp. De or.t. 2.53.213, 2.43.182-184)
where he explairu >10.,,0. in a way which would qualify it for the ~Oo, of
speaker or auditor ("ad naturas et ad mores et ad omncm vitae consuetudincm
accomodatum") - he does not appear to understand ~O", (a word he uses once;
see De foto I) as we find it in the Rhetoric. At most where he is presumed to
be speaking of Aristotdian ~Oo, as a form of "t,m, (c Drat. 37-128; De orat.
2.27.115,28.1211,29.1281, 43.18a1f., 79.322), if he is not actually speaking
of what we know as "aOo, ("dOo, and iJOo, in Roman rhetoric are called
ajf.ctus; c Martin, 158--60), Cicero is speaking only of the ~Oo, TO;; liro..o,
and how it may exert an effect on the audience. But his statements are directed
to arousing an emotional respome in the audience. In A. this would be done
by the use of "dOo, (A 2, 56a 14-19, 78a 20-28). For A. any response of the
auditors to the speakers' ~Oo, is fonnally a response to the ertckntial quality
of the speaker (56a 5-8, 77b 25-28). It is a response that is more intellectual
than emotional, or as Roth, 856, says: "the speaker's ~Oo, is the prominent
quality in his personality and his style which respond. to the understanding of
his hearers." For another view on Cicero and ~Oo" c Fantham.
In conclusion we can say that in these chapters A. is speaking of the allditor's ijOo, and understands the word essentially in the same sense as ~Oo,
when used of the speaker. Further, the auditors' 1jOo, is studied because it is
apparently understood to be as much a "I....., hlTB""o, as is the speaker'.
~Oo,.

b 31 :, "aial .....~.~
sc. .lao: "Let us discus. next the characters of men,
the kind ofmeo they arc (Le., their character] in rdation to their emotions...."
On the meaning in "oio. c 77b 26-29. There is no formal hierarchy among
the "t......,
(66a 27: ,) and so the discussion of iJOo, (which has
been called 6."...iea "t.....,) in the third and final place is not in any way
unusual. In fact, methodologically the discussion is simplified by locating it in
the final place since there is no need to explain the many referents to the "dO,!
which constitute a critical part of the nature of ~60,.

"'TO""O.

190

88b 35

ARJSTOTlB, 'RIIEl'ORIC' II

governs each of the following four nouns, and .0 ifOo,

can be considered under each aspect. The explanation offered in the text
for each of the four words lend. confirmation to this interpretation as does
the scholiast in a general way for ,,&0'1, U .." and 9Ib 5 for 7jA..o/a" TVXa,.
A. does not discuss the first two forma1ly for the reasons given at 88b 33-37
in Roemer, 33-36 in Ross, Kas.e1: "Bel dip ... "ea"'''Ho~ The Vetus
Translano and some of the older commentators, e.g., Vater, p. rolfE, understand "aTd only with the last two nouns, e.g., "we will treat next the
ij67J, ,,&0'1, U .., with respect to various age groups, and the gifts of fortune."
Cope, p. 140, agrees with the first interpretation but later (ibid.) in replying
to Vater
to accept the interpretation of the Vetus Translatio. However,
A. appears to be saying that 110" can be considered from four general viewpoints: dominant emotions (we have an example of sueb at 79" 10-25), habits
(specifically moral habits, dqBT~ Hal "ax/a" 88b 34), qualities determined
by age, and those determined by fortune. Since the first two have been
studied, he concentrates on the last two showing how different periods in
man's life as well as differing fortunes bring about certain artitudes, dispositions,
traits of personality (emotional, moral, intellectual) which can determine
if00,. The point is made for >lA/x,a, in a passing comment in Euripides,
Hipp. 986-987. At A 10, 69> 21-3 I we are told that youth, old age. wealth,
good fortune can affect if0o, and that this will be discussed later.
2

" ...."

On "dO", see 78a 20 : 2, ,sa 22, 86b

12-13, and 84ib II. Anger was discussed in B 2. In&O"pla, as was. mentioned
at ,sa 22, is not one of the emotions in the Rhetoric but is found in the EN,
among the emotions.

b 32-33 Atyw .....o""G....

!E

b 33 dp~_I'EV ",po...pav
i.e., B 2-I!. Ross following Spenge), p. 248,
secludes the adverb; Spenge)'. reasons are not strong.

b 34:

J lll.'~ ... " ..,,!..~

Oearly A. has the moral virtues in mind
and is speaking of ojO,H'Ij dq.T1j; cf. 88b 30-3 I. On l~.", cf. 6zb 13 : 2, Ii9a
8: 2.
Kassel alone of the edd. read. Hal with cod.
F.

a.

b 34-35 Elp,)",,' "'po...,av

e.g., inA 9 the virtues and the vices. However, in A S there was a discussion of ,roda,pa.1a and the goods which are a
necessary part of it: goods of the sou!, of the body, extrinsic goods, rob
20-29. In A 6 after defining the nature of good he partially repeats and adds
to these goods, 62b Iolf. and see 62b 12-28'- Since the goods of the soul are
virtues, we can include A S, 6 also in nedneav.
b 3S-36 ",oi..... "'p.." ..",o!
In A S, 6, 9 A. mentions moral goods
which individual men eboose ("oia "eoa'eomal ;"aa-ro,) and <;hoose to

89Q. 3

COMMBNTAllY

191

do ("oiw. "ea"",,00, concluding in part at A 6, 63a 19 that "in general

all things deliberately chosen are good." On "ea"r",oi, 6xb 37 : z, 6:lb 4.

b 36 t..xl...
C A s, 61b 1-14; 7, 6sa 20. At A 10, 69Q. 7-8, B 8,
86a 2S-26 it is used together with I ..., and also with i/071 as indicative of a
set of established characteristics. The three age groups are studied in chaps.
12-14: 1 Wx1JV
This is one of the extrinsic goods, !Sob 20-29, among
which are mentioned at 60b 26-29 ""'''.,a, xe>!para (our nAoiiro.), dO ..,.".
In our present passage these notions are made a part of WXf/, which tromA. S,
61b 28-31 and 10, 69Q. 32 - 6gb s (the explanation of WX7l), seems more
reasonable; o 67b 24. That character can be inJluenced by the accident of
chance (fortune) becomes clear at EN II78a 28 - b 7 where A., speaking of
,"fOo, in the strict sense as moral virtue, .ay. that even such ,"fOo, needs the
chance gifts of fortune, e.g., the liberal man and the just man need wealth
to exercise their virtue, and the courageous man needs strength and power.
z ....yEv .......... M";;"O...... awll"",';
These are taken up in
chaps. IS-17; on good birth, A s, 60b 3<>-37; wealth, 61a 12-24; on "power"
see 60b 27 and 60b 27; this seems to be its meaning here and at B 17, 91a 2<>-29.

II9a I

a 2 ...."<11)(1(1\1
C A s, 61b 39 - 62a 12; 6xb 39 : 1. It is the acquisition
or possession of all, or very many, or the most important goods whose cause
is chance. A. uses it here together with a.envXia as his explanation of WXf/
(e.g., "al 8lto,). At 60b 22-23 it is a part of efJdaJ.po.la and one of the
goods of the body. In his long discwsion of its meaning at EE 1246b 37 1248b 7 A. concludes (EE 124Bb 3-7) that there are two kinds of good fortune: one, divine, in which success is thought to be given by the gods (and
so o 91b 1-4); the other, .narural.
"inclined to desiring," i.e., with appetites dominant;
a 3 : 1 m.Ouf'lI".xol
"cupidus" as Horace says of them at AP 16S, i.e., inclined to follow their desires
(0 ....010v07l,,"oi, a s). On h"Ovpla which is one of the dements of the ap68b 32 - 6ga 2) see A II, 70a 11-27, 6ga I : Z,
petitive acuity (r&
6ga 2-3. In the words of 70a 11-19 hnOv,.la can be either rational or iIrationai
desire. However, in the explanation of the De an. 433b 3-7 and 433a 23-26,
when one is moved by rational desire for the good, it is called potl17l'1&, (0
also Top. 126a 12-13) while desire in opposition to reason is called h"Ov,.1a.
From what follows immediately in our Rhetoric passage (a 4-7) it is more
likdy that irrational desire is intended The fact that their po.Ali".., (890 8)
are so readily dismissed and that
(a 9ff.), another irrational dement, is
introduced would lend confirmation to this, as do EN 109sa 4-II and Top.
II7a 27-33 which stress the fact that the young are ordinarily assumed "to
live by their fedings (ndOBlr (EN lu8b 17). And there is the statement, of

de""""'''',

0.1''''

A1lISTOTLE, 'RHBTOIUC' II

COOOe, at A II, 70a I9if. which identifies desires for sensual pleasures (our
89'1 4-5) with irrational desire.
2

OIol

'Iare

capable."

a 4 Ii
the reading of four edd., Spengd, Cope; Ross reads dlo from a
good tradition.
"inclined to pursue"; as he says at
EN I095a 8: the young live their lives and pursue each and every thing following the dictates of their feelings ("dOo~). ""o.,,,,lwo is a partitive genitive,
S. 1306.

a 4-5 ......... .. Uxo>.ou8YjTlXol

a 5 "<jj ..cpl . . .
Victorius conjectured ~ for Tai~, rii~ of the codd.
and in this he is followed by Ross, Kassd, Spcngd; the other edd. read Tai~
with cod. A, as does Cope, but he presents the problem, p. 14.1. The singular seems more likdy in the light of TavT17' (a 6).
J b:p"Ti~
"they are powerless in the face of it"; cf. 68b 14 : z.
z o6"....cil3o>.o, ... ~lxopo,
C Horace, AP 160 ("ct mutatur
in ho..."), 163 ("cereus in vitium fI.ecti"). Cope, p. 142, on dtp{"oeo~ ("fickle,
quickly sated") gives the evidence for this word which is found with some
frequency in Plutarch. VlCtorius suggests Horace, AP 165 ("amata Tdinquere
pernix") as an apt illustration of the meaning.

a6:

a 8-9 6Iiei.., . ..

1M."..,

Ross alone encloses this within parentheses

with no punctuation before the parenthesis and a comma following. The
ordinary punctuation followed by the edd. is preferable: "avona, 0.6ia' ... ".ioa~ Ross makes 89a 4 ("al TWO) down to a 10 (derfil one sentence,
not three, as found in the other edd., Spengd, Cope. The fact is, however,
that we have here three different topics relative to the ~O.~ of the young.

a 8 l3ou).>\cr,~ . IN "cyci)... ,
As we have seen povl1}(II, thus far e.g. 6tb 32 : 4, 69a 2.-3, 78b 18, 8ra 7, and see Bob 36 : J - it means rational
wish, desire. If it denotes that here, and there is no reason that it does not,
it must mean rational desire, wish, which, while impulsive and quick (d.eia,;
c also a 7: o-q>ddea ""0.,,,,0.0-'), is not substantial and lasting (ou ",aydlo,).
Comparing them to the hunger and thirst of the sick (cf. 70" 21 : z) A. indicates
their transient character.
a 9 eu",xol _I 61i6eu .... ,
au O"",&~ as a synonym for del"i (e.g.,
dtn'fi at a 10), see 69a 4 : z, 69b II, A II, 70h II, 78b 5: on anger, see chap.
2; on o<VO"p.' (quick-tempered), 68b 20 :"z. As Horace, AP 15!r-I60, says,
"iram colligit ac ponit tem.ere."
a 10 :

J alal
z~

c II9a 3 : z.
"unable to resist," LS, II.

89a 17

COMMENTARY

193

a II : 1 rpv.o"...I.."
As is clear from A 5, 6Ia 37 - b 2, 6, 63b 2, this
can be a legitimate love for honor, but it can also become excessive (as can
'PMO""/a, a 13; C 68b 21 : 1) and a motive for wrongdoing (e.g., A la,
68b 1:>-"4),; c 68b 20. !t seems "bett~. to "interpret this in its immediate
context as love of honor, not as ambillon; see 68b 20: 1.
2 OJ.'Y"'PWfLEVO.
a supplementary participle, S. 2098. For the
meaning see B 2, 78b 13 - 79a 8; for its rdation to an act of dishonoring and
injustice (d6""'a8a., a 12) c 78a 32, 78b la, and see 78b 39-30.
Ross alone includes this within parentheses
a 13-14 (,,,,.poxij~ ........~
and punctuates the text in b 12-21 ("al 'P,).6T1./JO .. dn:oTBnlm....a.)
differendy; C 8!)a 8-9. The other edd., Spengd, Cope are in agreement
save at 89a 18, q.v. On the idea in 1lnBpom, 68a 23, 63b 20 : 2. At 78b 28-29
we are told in effect that Ithe young consider themsdves superior (Horace's
"sublimis," AP 165). Here we learn that their desire forpre-eminence (",..pois the reason for dIeir love ofvictory since victory (as he also said earlier,
A II, 70b 32-34) signifies pre-eminence; see also A 9, 67" 22-23. Cicero,
De fin. 5.22.61 speaks in a similar vein about the young.

xtM

a 14 &fLrpw " ..il"..

lit.: "they are [sc. slaw) both of dIese"; for neuter

C S. 994; cpo 90b 8.

ijx.......

a 15 rpv.oxp1\ ...."o. &

Cpo Horace, AP 164- We find at 890 37
dIat the young cherish their friends and companions. This combined with
their disregard for money recalls an earlier comment of A.'s at A 7, 64b 1-2
.that to be fond of comrades is far more honorable dian to be fond of money;
C 64b 1-2. In contrast the old are concerned about money (89b 28-30
with which cpo EN I I20b II - 14), a contrast also found in Plato, Rep. 549b.
a 16 D.ffmxail
of Mytilene, who lived ca. 650-570 B.C. and was a
contemporary of Solon of Athens. He was elected head of Mytilene (aisymnetes) for a period of ten years. We know him mosdy from the poetry of
Alcaeus, a life by Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers: Pittacus I.74-8I.
A. speaks ofhim in the Politics, e.g., I274b I8/[; see also OeD, PW, CAH,
IV 98/[ We do not know the comment made about Amphiaraos (one of the
early Greek heroes), and nothing in the sayings attributed to him in Diogenes
Laertius is direcdy illustrative of the preceding clause: 'PMoxplj/JaTol ..
""'B<eiia8a~ None of the odd. notes a lacuna here, and it is questionable
dIat the comment is lost (e.g., Spenge!, p. 250) for Kassel righdy points to
73b 18, 98a 4.

a 17 KCllCo1\e.~ ... E61\e ~

The first means cynical, inclined to put
the worst construetion on dIings (89b 21-22); the second, guileless, accepting
things at face value (cp. Thucydides 3.83-1, Demosthenes, Ag. Timocrates,

194

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

89ll 21

52). etl>i8'1' can also mean simple, silly, foolish (as A. uses it at r I, 04a 24;
12, 13 b 19), and Cope, p. 1#, following Victoriw believl'S that such a meaning
may be possible here, i.e., "simple-minded." Victorius citing Plato, Rep.
4C9a says: "stl7j8.., is used by the Greeks of those who follow the old ways,
who never fear deception and construe whatever they see or hear favorably."
But this would seem more proper of the group mentioned next, .iin.a~o.
(a 18-19), the credulous, those who believe readily. They do so says A.,
as does Plato, because they have not yet been much deceived. The etl>i8.." however, are such because as yet they are innocent of most wickedness
("o"'1~ta,).

a 18 "'DV'Ip~.
Tovar, Kassel, Spengd, Cope place a period after
this word, which is preferable; Roemer, Dufuur, a colon; for Ross see 8ga
13-14.
a 19 e6"'",,6~
This trait of hopefulness is what determines a number
of the characteristics which follow down to 89ll 34a 19-20 C>crnp ... rp6cr... ~
as we also read at Pr.b. 955a It[, and
cpo ENU54b9-II. At 78a 2.0 : 2leferencewasmade to a few passages which
indicate that A. is aware of the corporeal (as opposed to the psychic) aspect
of the emotions. The present passage (e.g., the very nature of the young
infuses them with warmth in the same way as those intoxicated with wine)
is by way of confumation, as are 89b 30-33 and also ENII28b 14-15 (Cope,
p. 139) where A. is speaking of "a87) (aiM", 'Pop.,). To illustrate this physiological view of A.'s, Cope, p. 145 (also p. 139), refers to Plutarch, On M.ral
Virtue 4500-f, where we read: " ... our impulses which arise in and are
moved toward the corporeal and become violent or relaxed with bodily
changes. So it is that the young are quick to anger, reckless, fiery in their
appetites, and raging because of the abundance and heat of their blood
whereas in old men the source of the appetitive which lies about the liver
i. being quenched." oi .,,.....1 appears in this form as perfect participle in the
codd. of A. although the augmented form r/>.,;,,....., is common in Attic
(LS); Cope p. 1#, has a comment on it.
a 20-21 011'''''' 1'1) ",oJJ.ci ci"' .... """lt'l"tv...
a further reason is given
as a more concrete and practical explanation of their hopefulness; d"o~.",..
is to fail, miss one's object. Kassd and Cope read from a good tradition,..~ at a 21 for,..oj; cpo ,..>i"" at a 18, 89b I; o~ .. "., at 89ll30, 31-32.

za....

a 21 ~cr, ...ci 1<l.i....... "',dli,

Cpo 90a 6-7; ~a "l.i~a i. the adverb,
"for the most part"; on ilnta. cf. s. 1516, LS, I.I; a dative of manner. Hope
is of the future, memory of the past (e.g., a 22.-23), an idea amply illustrated at
A II, 'lOa 27 - b 22 in the analysis of pleasure; on p. 99 Cope mentions varied
meanings of llirt,.

890. 31

COMMBNTARY

I9S

a 24 'Ojj -li ...PI!'

"in the early years"; o Euripides. Ion 720. and
cpo 89b 34: TSMvTal", ijp4/",.
a:>.s oto" ....
sc. IUT'; this conjecture of Dobree (Kassel). not Bekker.
is read by the edd. for OrOPTa, of the codd.; P'Pv>7""" in middle voice takes

an accusative.
a 26 O'...(~I"rL... ~I!'8u..S
Ross alone encloses this within parentheses.
as he does with many of the following clauses in the chapter. e.g. 89a :>'7-:>'9.
a 30-31. a 31-34. 89b 4-S. b f>-J7. b 9-II. This cawes him to change the
commonly accepted punctnation and so to join together topics which seem
better separated. e.g.. 89b S; the edd. read: "m.Ta opo[.". "al Blaba, ...

.r.v..........

a 27
"the former of which" (6:>.a 36-37). Le.. the fierce,
hot-tempered (BvprMB") disposition diminishes a sense of fear for it is impossible to fear if one is angry; e.g. a 28. and o Boa 33. This absence of fear
is complemented by the positive quality of confidence. the opposite of fear.
as was seen at 83a 13f[ where we are told further. at 83a 17-19 (as we are
here at 890. 29: "to hope for some good inspires confidence"). that confidence
is a certain kind of hoping. The combination of spirited and sanguine temperament makes for the greater degree of courage in the young (rlvae"OTSeO').
Courage. defined arA 9. 66b II-13. is said to be (A S. 6ra 3-4) a virtue of the
young and. together with pryaAotpvX1a (0 890. 31-33). is called at A 6.
62b 12-14 virtue of the soul. It should be clear that in pointing to characteristics of this sort in this age group A. has moral virtue in mind (;;60,) in the
strict sense; o 88b 30-31 .

"sensitive to shame" (0 8sa 9 : 1) which expresses

29 ..lax......'!Aol
the idea more sharply than "modes!," "shy." etc. Owing to their limited
experience the young are immature in the matter of what is honorable, the
Tilo, of all morally good things (660 33 : 1). "Educated only in the established rules and customs of their society [n.,.aMswra, Wed TOV v&pouj
they have as yet not entertained the idea of other standards of the honorable
[.. aAr! keea Wrolap/lr:lvovalV)." I understand vop., here as explained at 73b
5 : 3 (I) and (3) (i) i.e. positive and customary law. Consequently. keen
as they are to do the honorable (89' 34-35) they are more sensitive to what
others think. i.e.. the MEa of others in their regard. This attitude exposes
them more readily to the fear of clishonor which is shame (83 b 14-15. EN
Iu8b II-I3). Their situation is described well at 84a 25 - 84b I (o~asl~ ...
a,.'1'onea).
a 31 : 1 "EYC&).6IJmxo.
This is another indication of their concern for
the honorable; o 66b 17.
Z olin yrlp
is the reading of the codd. four odd . Spengd. Cope.
Ross conjectures 011.

196

A1USTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

89' 35

a 32 ..on. d,""Y",d",,,
"the force of circumstances." Cope, p. 147, refers
to Anax. 1422a 2D-21 which explains d'ay"",a as "those things which do not
lie in our power to do but are such as they are as a result of divine or human
constraint."'
a 33 !'-EymA."'UXI..
The definition here is different from that at A 9,
66b 17. However, as can be seen from the discussion of the idea at EN Il23a
34 - Il2sa 16, both explanations of the word are contained in the concept.
At II23b 1-12 we find our present definition: "A person is thought to be
high-minded who being in fact worthy deems himself worthy of great things."
At II24b 7-18 we read that he is the person who does good and repays good
with greater good, i.e., 66b 17.

".A""

a 34 ..ail...... ":'EA7t.&.~
This meaning of
does not emerge
explicitly from 8ga 19-29 but a comparison of a 19-29 with a 31-34 indicates
what A. has in mind: namely, their attitude of hope combined with their
inexperience of life fosters a self-confidence and ,elf-assurance which in turn
inspires the self-esteem of the high-minded person.
a 34-35 x .., !'-iiAA." ... ""!'-'Popclv...,,,
Cpo Horace, AP 164: "utilium
tardus provisor." The distioction between ,d "aM. and ,d rlVI'rpiqa. at
work here i, that the honorable is an ultimate good chosen (when chosen)
for its own sake, whereas the advantageous is a relative good chosen with
reference to a more ultimate good. Action whose object is the honorable is
not self-regarding, whereas self is the object of action directed to the advantageous. A. says as much at 89b 38 - 90a 1 and earlier at A 8, 6sb 25: "All
,men are won over by the advantageous," because, ordinarily, as he remarks
at A IS, tsb 19, "no one chooses the absolute good but the good relative
to

himsel"

a 35-37 ..oj> yclcp ... "mAail

"For they live more by the rule of moral
character than by that of calculation." With the exception of Cope (lOo.),
all read 710 .. (an instrumental dative of manner, S. 1516). This appear. to be
correct both from 90a 16-18, the compauion passage, and from the explanation
of 1j0 by deoni (i.e., moral virtue) at 89a 36-37 (" 66 deonj ,au "aAav),
which is what "lOa, signifies in the ",trict" sen.e as seen at 88b 3D-31. In
A 9, 66a 33 - 67a 32 A. discus.e. the honorable, identifying it as good and
connecting it with virtue (c 660 33 : " 660 34-35). a. he says at EN
lI20a 23-24: "virtuous actions are honorable and done fur the .ake of honor."
The honorable is that which exists for its own sake and is the goal of all
good action. In describing the activity of the young as he does here, A.
is attributing to them either formal (deliberately acquired) or natural moral
virtue (de'ni). The advantageous is also a good (A 6, 62. 20) and is studied as
.uch inA 6. Its difference from the honorable was indicated in the.preceding

89a 36

COMMENT AllY

197

note. At 66b 36 - 67a I we have, I believe, the distinction A. wishes to make

in our present passage on the actions of the young: e.g., "all the objects of
human choice which a person does not for his own sake are honorable, as also
are things which arc absolutely good such as the things one does for onc's
country while neglecting one's personal interests, and those things which
are naturally good, and those which are not goods for the person himself,
for all such are not done for the sake of the seI" In other words the unselfish
choice of good is rd HaM., and (as he remarks at BB I~4ga IQ-II) for the
truly good man the advantageous and the honorable coincide.
Cope, p. 147, has a strange note in which he asserts
a 36 Aoy..r"o~
that ''The intellect and its calculations are here distincdy excluded from any
participation in virtue which is assigned soldy to the moral character."
SchfitrumpC. p. 7113, in a reference to Cope, explains the passage by the
6."&""1' concept of EN II44a 23f[ In view of the fact that cleverness itself
is a form of reason, I do not see how it responds to Cope. The first problem
with Cope's observation is that virtue and moral character, as we have seen
them, are a stable attitude formed pardy under the guidance of reason (88b
3Q-3I). There can be no moral character, good or bad, without some role
for the intellect in the form of practical reason since moral character implicates
"eoate.a." which is desire conjoined with reason. The second problem with
his comment is that from the companion passage at goa 16-18 we would have
to say that the old for the most part do not act with virtue and moral character.
Yet all of chap. 14 on the old in detailing their deficiencies specifies deficiencies
in moral virtue. Moral character and virtue are not possible without the
exercise of the intellect and its calculations. Furthermore it is not possible
to have good practical reason without good moral character since virtue is
both that which is in accord with right reason and that which aims a person
at the right objective and so enables practical reason to take the right means;
C EN II78a 16-~I, II44a 6 - II4Sa II, MM II98a IQ-~I. In his analysis
of moral virtue, A. does not exclude the possibility of incomplete or deficient
virtue and therefore an incorrect use of reason in deliberating. From his
statements on practical rcason, we find that it can be exercised wrongly.
In the first place, as II~a 7-Iof[ implic:s, to grasp one', good is not always
as simple as it might seem. Secondly, we learn at II~b I~ that the calculation can be quite correct and successful, but can in the case of a person not
fully good result in what is an evil and not a good. Thus in our present
passage, together with its companion, goa 16-18, the object of the criticism
and the contrast in the way of acting would seem to be the exercise of the
practical reason upon what is practically expedient for the individual in
given situations; his personal good at a given moment which as a good rdative
to himsdf i, not necessarily his rcal good as a person (e.g., to do an injustice

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' II

to another person rather than incur monetary loss). On the idea in practical
wisdom see Hardie, pp. 212-39; Gauthier & Joli; II 463~ (history of
concept) and noteS to II39a 17 - b 3, II4Qa 24 - b 30, II41b 8 - II4sa II;
and Sorabji.
a 37 <po).';'1"AO.
On the meaning in 'I'M&-, see 63b I : z. The friendship of the young is directed to pleasUIe, EN lIS6a 31 - IIS6b 1; that of the
old is generally a friendship of utility, EN IIS6a 24-30.
i)A.Xu""
i.e., the aged, those in the prime of life.
..cji cru!;ijv
i.e., "in companionship"; the case of the artK:ular
infinitive is detem:rined by ;ca4!8w.
89b 1 :

b 2 : 1 Xp(VE.V
sc. d,a Td; an articular infinitive in a construction
similar to 6.a Td Xa4!6W. In EN IIS6a 7-19 three kinds of friendship are
mentioned, that of utility, of pleasUIe, of the good. The friendship of the
young i. that of pleasUIe, the love of people for the pleasUIe they give. Cpo
EN IIssb 17 - IIS7b S.
2

Glen

sc. "~l,,e'71.

b 3 11_..... ck""'P""civou.n
"They commit all their mistakes with
excess and vehemence." The phrase A"I [in the direction of] Td I'dlAov
"al a'l'o6eoneov is another instance of the article used with the adverb
to fo= a noun (S. lIS3). On al'de"tTJl'a see 74b S, 74b 7. While potentially
harmful, al'aen,l'aTa as such do not have their SOUlce in moral perversity;
see, e.g., A 13, 74b 2-10.
b 4 Xv..;,VE.OV
Cbilon (fl. S60-SS6 B.C.), a Spartan prominendy influential in his country (as indicated in later references to him), served Sparta
as an ephor and may have contributed significandy to that type of government
found in Sparta; cf. PW, OCD. In Diogenes Laertius, Lives oJthe PI,iIo:lOphe,.:
Chi/on 1.3.68--73 we learn that the bUIden of his teaching was self-restraint
but find no mention of OUI proverb. In his Life oj Thaies 1.1.40-41, however,
Diogenes remarks that the sayings of the Seven Sages of Greece receive
varied attributions, with Chilon singled out as the author of the saying:
nothing in excess (41). On the expression cpo Euripides, Hippo/rlus 26S, and
Terence, Andria 61: "ut nequid nimis"; cf. 9sa 33-34b 6 &llGXUp(!;OV......
"confidendy allinn." This is a distinct step beyond
thinking that they know all. It is this complete self-assuxance (cf. 8ga 34)
which leads to their excess in all that they do, e.g., 89b 6-7.
sc. "ednB" from 89b 4- Although 1''76i. &yav
b 7 : 1 oroii cir"Y
can be considered a noun expression (cf. LS, 6, >1, TO, B.LS), the main thought
in b 2--7 is the manner of acting. At 89b 4 (nd.Ta rde) unrestrained action

COMMBNTARY

199

is given as the reason for their excess in wrong action. At A 89b S-6 ("a! ...
~""%"eICovTa,) another characteristic trait of the young is introduced and
it is now offered (To6ro rde) as the reason for their unrestrained action.
&&,x-IJp."'f" I; GI3P'v
. C 74b 8, 73b 36: 1. aaooj"aTa
are acts which proceed from moral badness and are done with knowledge
and so are considered voluntary. But they can be either the result of deliberation and moral choice (and so deliberately wrong actions) or the result
of emotion (and so partially outside the control of deliberation). In our
passage A. docs not say which they are, and so both meanings arc possible.
As to the meaning of 01, IJllelV . . . "altOVerlav ("with wanton insolence in
mind not small-minded malice"), the companion passage at 90a 18-'9 (sec
also 9I~ ,8-,g) is of assistance in deriving this understanding of the words;
c bdow. However, Po/. 129Sb 9-II says that the causes of d~'''''"a..a
are twofold, vile" and "axoverla, and identifies the former (cp.73a '3 : 1)
with great wrong acts, the latter with minor. This passage is in tum reinforced by B ,6, 9" ,8-1g which, together with our present passage (89b 7-8),
points back to 78b 28-29 (~.d 01 viOl "al 01 "Aov,,"o" ...). There we learn
that hyhristic action is typical of the yOWlg and the wealthy as the means
taken to asscrt their superiority. In this sense the wrong action of the yOWlg
is fully in accord with the general mode of behavior attributed to them ill
8gb 3-7: one of excess. Thus I am not sure that A. is diminishing the wrongdoing of the young as we find 8gb 7-ll interpreted in the translations: e.g.,
"If they do wrong to others, it is because they mean to insult them, not to do
them actual harm" (Roberts). Sec gIa 18 : 2 a10ug with A.'s example at a
Ig. The contrast between the wrongdoing of the young here and that of the
old (goa 18-19), who are shown in general as mean and ignominious in their
wrong action, not strong and violent, tends to confirm the interpretation
oifcred, as do Cope's remarks, pp. 14;1, 16g.
b 8-n D.E1J'fucol .. "':''f..u;
This becomes clear from chap. 8 where
piry is defined and explained. Here, however, A. stresses the aspect of the
manifest Wlmerited misfortWle of anodler which evokes pity and does not
mention its other aspect: namdy, misfortune which the person who pities
sees also as something possible for himsd As a matter of fact, from what A.
has said of the young in general. they could well qualify for those who do not
experience pity; see, e.g., 8sb 21-23 (oil... 01 . . "'16m- """".). However,
there are two statements which explain A.'s use of tAs'l"'''o/ of the yOWlg.
The first, 8sb 34 - 800 1 ("clv ol.",ra. .. """06) is directly connected with
the reason given here for the young's being disposed to pity, 8gb 8-g (dod
T w.o}.a"lIav ...). The second, 90a 20 (which attributes youth's capability for pity to their <p,}.av8eo",'av), contains that aspect requisite for
pity which is not mentioned in our passage: Ilamdy, some general sense

200

AllISTOTLB,

RHETORIC ,

of fdlow-feding with man on the part of one who pities which makes him
awal"C that he too can experience the misfortwle; cf. 85b 14-15.

b 9 Xp'l ....ou~ ><,11 ~u... iou~

The "al is alternative: "or." On the
meaning of xe7lC1TOV~ and so of {J....{ov~ (its alternate) as "morally good,"
see Boa 30 : 1; it is also confirmed hy the criterion used, d"a,,{a, i.e., the
absence of moral badness. There are two ways in which our phrase can be
inte<preted; I bdieve the first is correct: (.) "they 'S$wne all men to be
morally good or better than they [i.e., all men] in fact are"; (b) "they assume ...
or better than they [the young] are."
w"p,b'O>'OL
Ross, Spengd alone read 'I',lsv'ed".lo, with cod. A.
S~J1:ean.lla is analY2ed at EN II27b 33 - Iu8b 3, EE 1234a 4-23, MM II93a
II-I9, and the general impression A. conveys is that it is a form of well-bred,
tactful wit (as the word is ordinarily translated) and hwnor: e.g., ot de! E"".J.iiJ~
"a{l;o...~ sll'ed"slo, neoaayoe.Vo.Ta, (EN 1128. 9-10). In this sense it is
not a trait which one would readily identify with the young for whom 'I'loycll"T'~ (care-free enjoyment of life) seems more characteristic. The further specification of SVTean.Ua as "cultivated insolence" might be more
to the point. In fact, eVTean...la originally had a pejorative sense (Gauthier &
Jolif, II.I, 316-17) and that may be.t work here. Realistically the "wit" of
the young by and large is more akin to what Cicero (Orat. 26.87, De or.t.
2.54.218) calls dicaeitas ("in iaciendo mittendoque ridiculo") than to foutiae.

b II

b 13 .... ,,"Cv 7jeo~.

C chap. 13, init.

CHAPTER 13

I . Introduction: 89b 13 -IS

II . Development: 89b 15 - 90' 24

I.

89b 15 - 90a 6

2.

90a 6-11

3. goa 11-16

attitudes of the old: hesitant, positive

about nothiug, cynical, distrustful,
small-minded, ungeneIOUS, cowardly,
fond of living, self-seeking and thus
looking to the advantageous not the
honorable, shamdc.ss, not hopeful
their .ctions: live in the past
their tlnotions and desires: anger, violent, but weak; desires non-existent
or feeble
their actions: live in accord with the
advantageous, not the honorable; do
wrong in a petty and malicious waYi
are inclined to piry, are queruloll'

III . General conclusion: 90a 25-28

to chaps. 12-13

89b 13 TO ph ... ij8o~

Four odd., Spengd, Cope make thi. part of
ch.p. 13. I would prefer to read it as l{assd does, i.e., as the cooclusion of 12,
and to begin 13 .t 01 d~ 1Cf!WPVTBl!o.. . .. Thi. do not seem to be an unusual use of transitional ",6P oJ. followed by a sentence introduced by
de; we h.ve it at 88b 2!r30, or 9Da 25-29, or Pol. I25Sb 39.
with the participle: "p.st their prime more or less."
i.e., "formed of character rypes opposite to those just
presented." A study of ch'ps. 12, 13, 14, youth, old age, prime oflife, reveal. the
following qualitie. considered in each (the numbers are given serially): b,,6v"'''In"oi (89' 3; 90a 13; 90b 2); 6v",,,,01 (89' 9; 90a II; 90b 2); ",.l&~.",o.
(89' 12; ? 89b 26-27; -); ""loXI!7j",a~o. (89' IS; 89b 28-30; 90b I); WIl6 ,
(89' 17; 89b 20; -); oIm.aTo. (89' 18; 89b 22-23; 90a 32); etl.hr;,de, (89' 19;
9Da 4; -); a.dee'""l!o, (89' 26; 89b 30; 90' 31 .nd 90b 3); aluXV'~Aol (89'
29; 9Da 2; -), ",syaM'P"Xo, (89' 3I; 89b 26; -); "I!dn... ~d "aAd (89' 34;
89b 37; 90a 34); 1/6.. COOu. (89) 35; 90a 16; -); ",M6",.Ao, (89) ]7; 89b 36; -);
",Mo;;U, lira. (89b 4; 89b 23; -); sldba, a"av~a (89b 6; 89b 18; -) dd,,,06UIV (89b 7; 90" 18; -); 'A~",ol (89b 8; 90a 19; -); ",'AoyeAOI", (89b II;

b 14 :

"Xoliav

tv......."""

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' II

90a 23; -). Toward the end of 88b 30-3 I the significance of many of these
qualities for .q8o, as moral virtue was noted. The following qualities are
peculiar to the young: sVpd/lolot (89a 6), "o"at povl>ia.., (890 8), .';.~a",l
",TO' (89a 25), r7tpOa@&r'eo> apQ@TavoVr7t (89b 3). Cpo on the old, Horace,
AP 1<>9-174.

b IS .... 7dEi......... i\S'I

"for the most part possess characters." On

1j8'1 cf. 88b 30-31.

b 16 1<41... l!i'l" ..-rij ..S.., ... '!i'lll-"P~"o\v'"

nulw is a cognate ac-

cusarlve (S. 1573-1574) with both verbs.

b 16-17 .... 1<4u" "p..y~'t'WV
another articular infinitive with
a,a TO (b IS) understood: "and because human affairs in general turn out
badly."

This is the reading of all the codd., three edd.,

b 18 : 1 ~....6v "Y""
Spengd, Cope. Ross reads <iravTa.. which Richards, pp. III-la, rejects,
suggesting dyan';;a... Kassel considers aymo sputious. Both Spengd and
Cope and the translators assume that the reference is to 89b 4. Thus they
understand "@anoVr7'. and assume that the relative inactivity of the old is
contrasted with the hyperactivity of the young, e.g., "The result is that they
are sure about nothing and under-do [translator's emphasis] everything" (Roberts). There are three difficulties with such an interpretation, and Richards
points out the first: namely, that 89b 4 is too far away to supply a verb easily.
Second, the old do act in excess as 90a 9--10 (8"ee . .. Airon.,), 89b 36
l<pllauro, . .. d,,), and the chapter itself indicate. Third, the more likdy
contrast to the lack of sdf-assurance on the part of the old (89b 17-20) is the
total sdf-confidence of the young, 89b 6 (xal "dba, .. d..axveICona,).
In the light of these difficulties, it appears that the verb understood with this
clause is the one immediately preceding, doap,pa.oV.Ta" "to affirm with
assurance." Obviously the question arises as to whether one can d,ap.pa ..v.Ta, .qTTO. a"a.. If Kassel is understanding d.ap.pawVvTa .. his solution (i.e.,
a"a. as a dittography, e.g., ArAN AllANTA) is both reasonable and possible.
We then have: "Not only do they aflirm nothing with assurance but they state
everything with less assurance than is required." However, accepting the
fact that >in <ira. is read by the codd., that a number of scholars found it
tolerable, and that we have a phrase like ""''In",;;, <ira. at 06b Io-II or
plillo. "dAl,o. at 64b 2, will our phrase make sense with d.ap.pa,.v.m,?
It seems to me that it does and that one can interpret it in this way: "Not only
do they affirm nothing with assurance but they affirm everything with far less
assurance than is required." ataps{Ja,oiivTal. can mean "affirm, confirm" as
well as "maintain strongly."

203

COMMENTARY

2
OiOV"C'tlL, iaacn
i.e., '"suppose, suspect, believe," as opposed to
"know for a fact, have knowledge of"; e.g., Plato, Apol. 2Id: oJTO~ ",h or...
Tal TO .ldha, OVH .IMJ~ (this fellow supposes that he knows something though
he knows not). Cpo 89b 6. Victorius suggests Ci=o', comment on the
testimony of Indutiomarus "who omitted from hi. whole testimony that most
cautious word 'I think' [a,biITo,] which we customarily use even when, under
oath, we state those facts we have as=tained and have oursdves seen, and
scated that he 'knew' [scire] all" (For Fonteius 13-29).

cill<p'&oJ;.,;;v....~

...0 r"",~ K"[

C A 2, 56a 8. Cope reads d"''P,aP''lTO;;OTB~.

The joining of the two adverb. is not un\JSUai for a stronger statement of the uncertainty. Cpo Horace, AP 171.

b 20 :

""Yu..~

ep. r

2 KClKO>\8.,~
IS, r6b 10-15.

b 19 :

"'''x''

"without any reservation."

A. specifies his meaning of the word in what follows;

b 21 ...0 btl .. "dv..."

The articular innitive ("to put the worse constrUction on everything") is predicate; at 90a 5 we find
,,"eoo again.

.,,1 ...

Cpo 890 r8. We also find there

b 22-23 K"Xu"6",,,o( ... l,.."..p[DlV
in d,d TO ... 'O"l"aTija8a, the ""Planation of what is meant by the
of the old who have frequently been deceived; see the comment at 89a 17.

'''''''l(!iav

b 24 : J ....,;;.,."
This is specified most likely by the reason. given from
89b 15-23, e.g., b r5-17 (d,d,.Iie ... nea,.",tfraw), b 22-23 (cin,rrrlao ...
la .).
2 ..-Ijv B[DlV""~ ~"o8>l"'I"
"the counsd of Bi..... On vno801H'f/V,
68a 5 : J where it is used in the sarne sense. Bias of Priene is another of the
Seven Sages whose life we have in Diogenes Laertius. He is often referred
to in the early literature and lived, as did most of these wise men, in the early
part of the first half of the sixth century B. c. He is spoken of for his statesmanship and legal expertise; see PW.

' ' ' ' fI

b 24-25 ""l <pu.";;a,v ... .:.~ <pu.>\aov....~

They both hate and love
(xal- Hal). cl>~ ""aojaon.~: "as though they will one day hate," S. 2086.
With our passage cpo 95a 26-33 (TO d. >f8o~ ... del 'PIAB"). The saying is
fairly common in ancient literature: e.g., Sophocles, Ajax 677-683 (and ep.
Oedipus Col. 614-615), Euripides, Hippo/ylUs 253-257- Demosthenes, Ag.
Aristoerates 122 (660) accepts it as a sound principle in human affairs, whereas
Scipio is cited in the De amicitia of Ci= (16.59) as considering the sententia
most pernicious to the very idea of friendship and something which he could
not accept as a saying of Bias'. In his Lives of the Philosophers: Bias 1.82-88,
Diogenes Laertius notes as one of Bias' counsds to men: "to love friends as
though they will one day hate them" (87). Aulus Gellius (Noet.. Attica.

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

17.14-4) cites as a seuteuna of Publilius Syrus' (who came as a slave [from?

Antioch] to Rome in the first century B.C. and became quite popular ca. 43
B.C. as a writer of mimes): "Hold a friend in such wise that you consider
him one who easily becomes an enemy."
b 26 fI....p6<jNxo.

C 66b 19 : 1; cpo 89a 31-32.

C 63a 27 : 4.
b 27 : 1 7t.p.noU
z '""" . (jlov
i.e., the necessities of daily living.
b 28 : 1 clvu.we.po.
C 6xa 7, 66b 7 : 1. EN II21b 13-I4 (oj d' dlev6'1lla . nO&erv) is direcdy to the point. Cpo Horace, AP 170.
z clvllYXllk.>v
i.e., 89b 27: "ed, ... (Jlo.

b 29-30 060'''' .. 'CD "..-.jO'IIO'ell' .....0 cl7topoO.dv

These are all

subjects (ACId understood) to which 8. n, xaleno., 64d.o. are predicates:
"for money is one of these necessities, and at the same time they know from
experience that acquiring it is difIicult and losing it easy." Plutarch, MoraUa
786b, notes that Simonides when charged with being avaricious (c Aristophanes, Pax 698-699) remarked that since old age had robbed him of all
other pleasures, he was growing old with the only pleasure left, that of making
money.

b 3O-]I lioiAol ... 7tPCKpoP1]...... 1

Cpo 89a 26-27 and Horace, AP
171-172 ("res omnis ... inen"). "eo<po(J1JT""" = "inclined to be anticipative
in their fears."

v..

v.....

b 3I lv.. I"lS yoip a.&x

On the meaning in the verb, c 77b
27-28. The statement here is explained in what follows: "aT61pVY",ivo ..
xaT4tpvEI, ian.. In 892 19-20 there is a physiological explanation for the
sanguine temperament. Here, as in the definition of fear at 820 21-22,' the
physiological aspect of the emotion receives attention. Fear is identified with
a coldness in the physical system, 89b 33: <po(Jo, "aTd'PvEI, tCIT" as it also is
at De part. animo 650b 27-28 (6"de <po(Jo, "aTmpVX") and at Prob. 954b 13
(6 <po(Jo, "IITa'P.X")' At De part. animo 692a 23 he atttibutes the coldness to
a want of blood and a lack of heat. In the present instance the coldness is
identified with the condition of old age itsdf ("oTetpO""'ivo .. eliCITS
Td ,,;;ea,), with the consequence that the old are dlol, ne0tpO(J'f/n"ol. Schrader
cites Vergil, Aeneid 1.69 ("extemplo Acneae solvuntur frigore membra"), with
ServiWi' comment: "Frigare, i.e., timore, et est reciproca transIatio nam et
timor pro frigore et frigus pro timore ponitnr."
C 790 22; read by Spengd, Cope, Kassd. and all
b 32 7tpo...lio7ta(1]".
the codd. save corrected A. which reads the "eoOldonsnol'1". accepted by the
other edd. As LS note (s.v.), the form with the double reduplication is "probably corrupt." On the metaphor in the word, see S4a 8. Here it is ~ physical

205

COMMENTAlIY

condition of old age with its accompanying coldness which prepares the way
for timidity. In De part. anim. 650b "7-30, it is the condition of the cooled
blood, and in Frob. 954b 10-13, the condition of the chilled bile which prepares
the way ("eoQ)~O"O;'1Ta.; "eow6onrnol1J"') for fear.
b 33 xczTci<jm~I~
a good tradition.

ien."

Ross, Kassel, Cope read

"aTa.,v,I,

T"

from

b 34 : 1 "">.O~"'O'
A5 Cicero says in De senectute 7.24: "No one is so
old that he does not think that he can live another year," or Sophocles, "No
one cherishes life like an old man" (frg. 63, ed. Nauck & Snell).
2 Td<U'<czl, -IJp.olpq.
"in the final years"; cpo 89a 24.
b 34-35 SuI< TO ... m.BufLi.....
This is usually interpreted to mean
"because the object of all desire is the absent." This is acceptable if the following clause is also taken as a general statement of fact: "and further because
men particularly desire what they need." Otherwise a more direct reference to
the old seems called for by the context: "because their desire is for what is
gone from them [i.e., the fullness of life and its assured continuance) and
further because they particularly desire what they lack." As an object of
desire, life is seen by the old as good (A 6, 62a 21-29), pleasant (A II, 700 16-27),
and as fulfilling a need (EN III8b 18-19). On "al-6i (b 35: "al oli 6i),
cf. Denniston, pp. 200-202.
b 36 : 1 ",Il.IlN'L'O'
C 7Ib 20: 1. In the discussion of the love of
self (EN II68a 28 - u69b 2), A. distinguishes a bad sense of the word \I.e.,
those who are in essence selfish, seeking the larger share of good things for
themselves) and a good sense (those who live in accord with what is their
own excellence and nobility, i.e., moral virtoe, for in acting in this way they
do good both for themselves and for others). Here the first kind is implied
because of the added pWov iJ 6, since there should be no limit to correct
self-love, and because of the clause which immediately follows.
2 fL'XpO<J>uxlcz
Cpo 89b 25-:>.8 ("al ... .,,,I}vpooa.); cf. EN lI07b
21 - 1I08a I, lI25a 17-34. However, there is nothing in EN, EE, MM
which would justify the use of the word here as a reason for self-love. The
statement at 84" 3-5 ("al Td "'P' .. ~p"a) and that found at I25Ib 16-25
of On the Virtues and Vices (speci:6cally the consequence of p"'eo1pvxia: namely,
pettiness, faultfinding, pessimism, moral baseness) might indicate the selfseeking attitude A. appears to have in mind from what he says at 89b 37 - 900 [
("a! "ed, ... "aAclv 1in.i0i,); cf. also I19b 36 : 1. This may explain the use
of the word here; and so
"a! aliT,!: "even this is a kind o" Cope, pp. 15455, also offers an explanation.

n,

C 89& 34-3S. A5 we know

b 37-38 xczl "po~ ... ",o.CZUTO. .t"cz.
from A 6 the avp'Pieov is a good (62. 17-21) and as such is a legitimate object

206

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' 11

90a 6

of desire. As it is defined here at 90 a 1, it is a good rdative to the person.

There is nothing intrinsically wrong wid, such goods since even absolute
goods (i.e., goods desirable for their own sake) can be thought of as goods
rdative to the person choosing. Anaximenes 1422. !}-16 gives a list of ""p'I'leovra which include many that are absolute goods although he is obviously
thinking of them as goods rdative to the penon. However, as A. says at A 9,
66b 3tS-]8 absolute goods are Hald (and he gives his meaning of HaMW at
66a 33-34) but relative goods are not, the reason being that relative goods
are sdf-directed (672 I: atlTov"de bBHa Tei To,a.Ta); and he extends this
quality in a general way to those things whim are goods to living person
(672 2-3: TO "de aiTro;; bBHa pli).). l".. Tei 'olin,). In other words, rdative good has a sdf-directed quality, and the fact that the old moose the
rdative good pli).)..v II
is attributed to their love of seI

a.,

!IDa 2 civ,dOXWTO'

C 8sa 9:

Shamdessness is defined at 83 b 16. On all1xwn7i.ol

J.

a 2-3 &LClt ""1''Po!pOVTO~

"for, since they do not attend to the
honorable in the same degree as they attend to the advantageous."
a 3:

",d ""l"Po!pOVTO~

Ross, Kassd, Cope read with a good tradi-

tion: Ka&-r:oV avprpe(lO'llTo,.

2 TOG SOXLV
lIaf their reputation." i.e., TOG

dOH2i'P Blval n: of
being thought to be something, LS, 11.5. Thinking only of themselves they
disregard what othen think of them; c 84a 24-26.

Cpo 890 27; the reason (dcd d"",..eiav) is explained in

a 4 &u..u.7tLl;~
JVhat follows, 89a 4-6 (Tei"de ... ".'e.v).

a 4-6 : J '"'" iP.11:E.pl.... (To. yo.p ... E..".V ci11:O~ ..lvE' XE"ipOV), ",d
In ... &Eo,IOIV
This is the punctuation of Ross, Kassd and it is more
effective than that of the other edd., Spengd, Cope who in place of the parentheses punctuate with colons; c !IDa 6 : 2.
Z (To.
yoUV To. mt>.AclL ) "for most of the things
whim happen in life are bad, at least many of them tum out for the worse."
Kassel, Cope read from a good tradition
for the "de read by the other
edd., Spengd. The restrictive particle gives a more satisfying sense here;
c S. 2830.

.u.."" ...

".u.

J xc"ipov
Cpo 89b 12: ll1T "dna.
Z &Co,IClV
a second reason. Cowardice is a form of fear, and the
fearful person is expectiug evil (82.21-25), not good. On the cowardice of
the old, c 89b 30-33- However, granting the physiological explanation
given there, emotion as we have seen has a cogoitive dement. It appears,
therefore, more precise to join this reason for the cowardice of the old more

a6:

90a 19

207

COMMBNTAIIY

closely with the previous one (experience) keeping in mind Acschines' remark
(cited by Cope, p. 156): "the lawgiver is quite aware, I believe, that older
men are more advanced in good critical judgment, but that courage is now
beginning to fail them because of their experience of human affairs" (Ag.

Tim.rehus 24).

...

a 6-7 x,d ~"'a,

0.,,(6.
C 89a 21. A reading of A II, 700 27 70b 29 focuses A.'. comments on the role of the past and the future (9oa7-u)
in the lives of the old.
a 9-10 46o).."ltu.~ ... ~ov....~
Nestor in the Iliad is a good example. As Plato has the aged Cephalus say: "Know well that for me the desire
for and pleasure in good talk increase as the pleasures of the body wither
away" (Rep. 328d).

GulLO!
c 89& 9. The language here (d" pi> daB...,,) echoes
that of 89a 8 (&'m ... ou p.,.,uao).

a"II

a 12 : 1 XIII III i".GuIL!II'

""I b,,6upiao of cod. A is read by three
edds., Spengd. Ross, Kassd, Cope read with cod. F ""I "I b"6upi,,o.
Two lines bdow (o,IT' b"6up~TO,,ol olire "I1a"Tt"oi) all the edd. read with
cod. F; cod. A transposes the two words. On b,,8uplao, see 89a 3 : 1.
2 lxAEl.o!"IIG'V
''have failed"; and so the consequence at a 13:
oifr' b"6up~T",,,i: "they are not inclined toward desiring."

a 13 "plIX"'LXol ... xlp6o~

"nor do they act from motives of desire
but rather from those of gain." On "II""To"oi C 61b 37 : 2, Ii2b 4a 14 _'Ppov,xol
At A 9, 66b 13-15 we have the definition of ''''''Peomlv77; C 66b 13. Since the dderly are rdativdy free of desire, they "appear
to be able to control themsdves." On the force of the termination, see S!lb
32: I.
a IS 4vdx..o,

"have slackened"; for the metaphor c 60a 24.

a 16 .,.;;; xip6..
In what follows at a IIS-I8 A. continues this theme of
the sdf-interest and odf-seeking of the old which he has mentioned a number
of times: 89b 27-30 (T';;. "eo, TO. plo.. .), 89b 36 - 900 I ("al 'PtJ."1>TO .... ), 900 14 ("aT,hd "Iedo,).
a IIS-I8

x .. l fLUUov ..

tOT'V

a 18-19 XIII -..l6un\IL.......... llfip.v

89a 34-35,

a 35-37. a 36.

C 89b 7 : 2.

.1,

a 19 : 1 oUx GfiP'v
Ross, Cope alone read: ou"
ilPe .. from a good
tradition. However that tradition also reads ddo"ia. not the ""Houeria.
which Ross and Cope accept from cod. A.
2 o.CYjT'XO!
C 89b 8-n.

208

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' 11

90a 27

3 'r@'r<i
As explained at 8gb 8-II the primary motive for
pity on the part of the young is the unmerited misfortune of good men.
The young assume all to be good. From what has been said of the old, this
is not trUe, for we find that they are concerned with themselves ('I'I).aVToI,
"!!O~ TO uvptpeo. Cwe1l), are cynical ("a"O?j8.I~), suspicious ("aX""cI"ToI),
etC.

a 20 : 1 al f'iv .. . qU.AClV9Pld7dClV
"The latter," i.e., the young, are
inclined to pity because of their feeIing of common fellowship with all men
(e.g., 89a 3'7f, "al 'I',M'I'I;"I . To1l, '1'1).0"'); on 'I'I;'a.8e.",la, see 8Sb '4-'5.
2
el"8Ev.,,,~
This is explained at a 21-22 ("dna ... UB'1Tt"d.),
and the explanation is sinIply the second PaIt of the definition of pity: namely,
pain at another's manifest and harmful misfortune which one could expect to
suffer oneself particularly if it proximately threatens one (85b 14-27: 8
HCi s1IAOYluToI yael At 86a 27-29 he gives as a general principle for pity:
what we fear as happening to ourselves is the thing that exciteS our pity when
it happens to another.

naB.,.,

a 21 tWn>i~ ....8.i~
Kassel alone reads a~TO'~. The infinitive
with its object "dna, is subject to lyyu, el,'at: "for they believe that all
possible suffering is near to them"; cf. Goodwin, p. 745.

a 22 : I

D.E1]T'xOv
e.g., 85b '3-'9; 7}.: S. 1903.
"querulous"; cf. Horaoe, AP 173: "diflicilis, queruIus." On s1ITed,,';'ol cf. 8gb II.
2

'raU'rO
6&UP'rlXO{

a 23 qUAOY).O.O.
Kassel alone reads 'I'tAOYBMp, a nominative plural for
'I'tAoyiA"TB~ (LS, s.v.). Spenge!, p. 256, suggests this since 'I'tAdyeA.,~ is the
orm A. has been using, e.g., at 89b II, 90a 24a 25 'rel ij8"1)

C SSb 30-31; "the kinds of character."

a 26 cl_&'xWT...
ie., admit into d,e mind, and so "receive favorably,
hear with favor," give credence to.
"discourse addressed to and in accord
a 26-27 'roU~ 'rcj> . bp.o{ou~
with (reflecting) their own character"; cf. Plato, Gorg. 5131>-c. This appears
to be the more correct interpretation although Cope, p. 157 (wiili Freese),
interprets: "since language, ... as well as persons similar to themselves, are
acceptable to everyone." This interpretation may be occasioned by a 28
("ai mhol "al 01 ).61''' both ilie speakers iliemselves and the discourse).
However, if 7}80' as a form of proof is in question (which it is), its effect is
achieved 6,,1 Myov; cf. 560 I, a 4~ (dtd pi. . AirTa), 66a 10 (dl'~61"06,
sc. My.v), 66a 25-28 (uvppofJUtrral . .. deeTfJ.).
a 27-28 7";'~ . . . AOYO'
"how the speakers in the discourse they employ
will reflect such characters both in themselves and in their words."

CHAPTER 14

general statement: cbaracrer of those

in the prime of life lies midway
between that of the young and that
of the old

I . Introduction: 90a 29-30

II . Devdopment: 90a 30 - 90b

I2

I. 900 30 - 90b 6

not excessively confident or overly fearful

not ex=sively trustful or d;strustful

(.) 900 30-3'

(b) 90a 3'-33

(e) goa 34 - 90b
(d) 90b

1-'

(,) 90b >-3

(I) '90b 3-6

2.

of the introductory statement

specific instances:

90b 6-g

not living only for honor or the advantageous

frugal
similarly with respect to anger and desire
temperate with courage and vice vena
not extravagant or

general principle: those in the prime

of life possess the valuable qualities of
the young and the old
the age period of those in the prime of
life

III . General conclusion: 90b 13 -14

to chaps. 12-14

gOB 29 : 1 4"p.ci~ov..~
C 90b 9-12.
2 ..0 ij90~
accusative of respect, S. 1601. This is an instance
(c. 88b 30-31) of.the use of YJO.~ as the generic term which includes the
domioaot aod typical traits of 0 specific type, e.g., the young, the old, etc.
We find it at 89b 13, 90026, 90b 17, 9Ib 7.
a 30 ix..dp........ 6KIEfI(30).>jV
"removing the excess of each of the
other two," i.e., both excess aod deficiency as we see at 90b iI-9 (i/aa ...
dlkin.va ..). Since A. begins to exemplify the statement of 90a 29-30 in
what immediatdy follows, 0 clearer punctUation break in English might be
of hdp, e.g., ". .. of the other two - they will be neither excessivdy confident, etc." Cope, p. 158, on dq>a<e.;;vTO~ refers to the idea contained in it of
subtracting us. adding (neoanOba.); at A 4, s9b 27-30 we have both verbs
so used; more specifically to the text here, EN II06b 9-12. In the next seven

210

ARISTOTLE, cRHBTORIC' II

lines there is a series of active participles each specifying a'l""eo'ihrrs, .

""se/loA>lv.
a 31 8I1ppoGv...~ (8plI..u..YJ~ )
Ordinarily there is no distinction
made between Bd{1ao, and Beaao,; e.g. at Pol. us8a Io-II we read that
"the function of courage [d.6eeta,] is not to make money. but to produce
daring [Bdeao,]." and at 1312a 19 that "courage possessing power is daring
[Beaao,]." Bd{1ao, as "daring." "confidence" was discussed at 83a 16 - 83b
10. However. at 83a 2 Beaa", C'audacious." "over-bold',) appears to carry
the meaning given here. i.e., Beaa6TrJ, = atpddea Baeew., as we also find it at
EN II07b 2-3: 6 d' b Tq; Baees,v ,j"se/ldU.,. 6eaatl,. On the other hand.
at A 9. 6-]b 2 (c 67b I : J). 8eaatlv Iiluld mean confidence. daring and not
necessarily rashness. audaciousness. although this second meaning is possible.
See. for example, the shifts in its meaning at oob 19-20.
"they are well disposed." At I19b 14 : z the
a 32 ...w;;~ ... 1x0V"ni~
points of correspondence among the three age groups are noted.
a 33 I<1I..elI ..G ck}.YJ8~
Cpo 74b I; i.e. they make their judgments in
accord with what is really the case. C 6Sb 1 : 1. I14b 26.
9Gb I : 1 clllell "PG~ olI(IofPCd
There is no contradiction in this. as was
seen at I19b 37-38.
z 1<111 oil... "PG~ 'P.'8ci>
sc. ,"<iivTe" directing their lives neither
hy frugality nor by extravagance but by what is proper. appropriate to man
(-rd dep4TTOV). Le. the mean (EN II07b 8-10) which is liberality. defined at
A 9. 66b 15-16.
1 6p.al... ~ &I! 1<111
"so. too. . .."; cpo A 3, S9a 25; 9. 68a 18.
z flup.6v
This would appear more correcdy interpreted in the
light of 890 27-29, 900 II as "higb-spiritedness." "Passion" unqualified is
open to other meanings.

b 2:

explained at b 4-6; on the meaning in

b 3 cnlxppov.~ p..... elIv6plII~
each word see the references at 908 14 and 8!)a 27.
b 4 vta,~ .. ytpOUG'
The evidence for the separation (6'rie'7Ta.) of
the.e two virrues in the young and the old is obvious from the preceding
chapters. A specific statement on the absence of temperance and the presence
of courage in the young is found at 89a 4-6 and 890 26-29. The same is true
for the cowardice of the old (89b 30-33) . but not for the presence of temperance a. an active vinuc; at the most 908 12-IS indicates its presence by a
kind of default.
C S5- 7 :
b 6 .:.~ &I! ....80>."" ot_iv
meaning similar to "a60AOU here; 74" 30.

where dnl<ii, is used in a

90b 13

COMMBNTARY

211

b 7 8'lIP'I....'
This is a perfect middle (in eontrast to its use as a passive
at b 4-S): "all the useful qualities which youth and old age divide between
themsdves are each [TatiTa cJp'l'..] possessed by those in the prime of life."
On the singular form with the two eollective nouns, see S. 966; Ross alone
reads 6'rie'lOTa, with Richards (p. 110).

b 8-9 &..... U

\m:Ep~cUAou ...,y .. upp.6....crv

i.e., 6aa (TWO tb'l'sJ..tfJOJ.
TO ",fre'o. here is clearly A.'s oj fA"f16nj,; see, for example, Pol. 129Sb 3-5;
cpo Euripides, Hippolytus 253. At BNrlO6a 13 -1IQ7a24A.sbows man's excellence or virtue to be that which makes him a good man, makes him perform
his fimction as man well. This virtue i, moral virtue, which is concerned with
man's emotions and actions. It eonsists in finding the mean between excess
and deficiency in emotions and in actions and in deliberatdy cultivating
that mean as a habit; e.g., lI06b 36ff.: "virtue is a habit grounded in choice,
and it lies in a mean rdative to oundves, a mean defined by a rational principle in the way that the man of practical reason would define it." Men in
the prime of life in choosing the mean arc clearly choosing what is proper
to them (TO /ie",onoo, 90b 2) as men..

II

~ci. lvo~ &e:iv TrEV~~XOVTCl

"fifty

save one," a use of the absolute

innitive in place of the more usual participle; cf. LS, ai.. (B) 2.. As the
commentatorS note, A. here, as also at PoL 133 5b 32-35 and elsewhere, appears
to acccpt the septenary principle of the stages of life which we find in Solon
(g. 2.7; West) although he questions the theory at Pol. 1336b 37 - 1337" 3
-reading either "aAw, (codd.) or "a".., (eoni.). As Solon enunciates the
principle, man's life is divided into ten weeks of seven years for a life span
of seventy years. For Solon man's bodily prime occurs in the fourth week
of years (age 22-28). Plato, Rep. 46oe, places it at 30, as A. does here (e.g.,
3D-H), both somewhat over the age given by Solon. A. sets man's intellectual prime at 49 as does Solon who places this prime in the seventh week (4349). Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 4.29.3, 4.3I.4, speaks
indiscriminatdy of both ages 50 and 30 as man', physical and intellectual
prime. Macrobius (II. ca. A.D. 400) in his commentary on Cicero's Somnium
Scipionis 1.6.1ff: engages in an extended numerological analysis of human
life based on the number seven. Kassel reads dB, (cf. Der Text, p. 136).
b 13-14 _iwv iJ8iiiY
"Let these remarks so/flee [Toaa;;"a s/eojaOwj with
regard to youth .. and the kinds of character bdonging to each."

CHAPTER IS

I . Introduction: 90b 14-16

tranSlt10n to the goods of fortWle

which aft"ect character

II . Development: 9Gb 16-31

the character formed by e(,yw.,a

(well-born, good birth):
more ambitious
disdainful

1.9Gb 16-19
9Gb 19-22
3. 90b 22-3 1

2.

!lOb 14-15 ".pt ... liy,dlc'".

diff'erence between "well-born" and

"noble"

C 89a 1-2 and

II9a 1 :

1.

b 15-16 5,' 3"..... '<p.~ij~

"Let us speak in tum of all those [i.e.,
goods given by T.lX'll by reason of which men acquire certain kinds of character as welL" At II9a I : 1 instances were cited to illustrate how the chance
gifts of fortune can aft"ecc character and be instnunental in its development.
In what follows in chaps. 15-17, A. will indicate this more specifically with
regard to good birth (chap. IS), wealth (chap. 16), power, good fortune
(chap. 17). C 89& 1 : 1, 2. On /Ina, S6b 36 : 2.

.uy.vd..~
C A 5, 60b 30-37 which makes it clear that good
birth is not nobility of blood, which it can include, but ancestors marked by
distinctions and honors. When the concept appears in Augustan, postAugustan Latin as genuosus, gmerosilas, it carries a similar meaning. But see
also !lOb 22-23.

b 16

b 17 <po).OT,p.aT.pCN
C B7b 9: 1; it is predicate here in an articular
infinitive, Td ... all..".: "character proper to good birth means [c LS,
olpl, B. I 1that its possessor is more ambitious."
b 18-19 i".."..~ ... Ecnlv
This statement is in confirmation of b 1618, i.e., 'PMon,.la is characteristic of those who enjoy good birth. The argument is that all men are wont to add (O"wee(, ...: heap one thing on another)
to any good which is theirs. In this case eVyw.,a (wn,.oTT/' ~oyo .,.)
is the good thing. Consequendy, any natural impulse to increase it means to
be desirous of even more honor, and so to be 'P,}"on,.r!JTBeO'. In the Politics
A. calls good birth deeTi} ywo", (12.83a 37); or again deeTi} "al "},.OiiTO, deXa,o, (12.940 21-2.2.). On this idea of good birth, see Kerferd, pp. 154-56.

2I4

ARISTOTLB, IRHETORIC' 11

b 20 : 1 ,....."'PP""'II'rtxov
On the meaning, c 78b IS-I7; as Cope,
p. I62, indicates, the adjective agrees with an understood TO .""..11, which in
fact replaces the preceding .""iva in the following sentence. These two
character traits (ambitioumess, contempt) presumably belong to the wellborn as such, wbether or not they are also " ........ (true to their birth) as this
last is described in the rest of this chapter, 90b 22-] I. The reason for both
dispositions i. radicated in the i.T,pOT71' "!I.,,&...., a quality independent of,
and thus unaffected by, anyone who falls from this birthright. This point
is usually overlooked in the comment on this chapter. See !lOb 22-]I.
2 x,d ""'" . . . .ru..wv
"even of those who are equal to their own
ancestors," i.e., those of good birth show disdain toward their contemporaries
who are as distinguished in their own right (i.e., have won the same or similar
honors and distinctions) as the ancestors of those who are disdainful once
were. Four edd. read cWTIii.; Spengei, Kassel, a~TIiiv. Cope reads with cod.

F.

TOr, amwv.

b 21-22. 6.0..... w.o...~cIvEUT"

"because the same distinctions [TmlTa] when they are further back in time rather than near at hand are held in
greater honor and are easy to boast about." This explanation should be
compared with the argoment at 87" II-]2.. The translations, Spengel, Cope,
carry the comparative idea over to .~alaCo.8VTa, e.g., "easier to boast of,"
Kassel reads TriTa for TmlTd of the other edd., Spengei, Cope; Spengel,
however, p. 2S8, finds Tama of cod. A acceptable; .cWTa appears to come
from Victorius.

After discussing two ways in which good

b 22.-] I I ........ ~xpa..au~
birth affects character, A. breaks off the development at b 22.-]I. The break
is apparendy occasioned by his awareness of what he mentions at b 2S-]I
(IP.ea . .. ). Thus the ooly point which emerges in the rest of the chapter
as far as the specific intent of the chapter is concerned is that the chance acql1isition of good birth does not automatically ensure for one's
the qualities
attributed to .""ia. Something further is required. This is called '0
While TO " ...a.oo might in fact also be viewed as a form of wX"),
yet as defined by A. it presumes action on the part of the individual endowed
with good birth, some form of personal responsibility. This is the clear
implication in the specifying phrase (b 2]) "not to degenerate from one's
own nature." A certain kind of nature is received by the chance gift of good
birth (.,)yiv ..a). Such a gift, if the individual preserves it by being true to
his birth (TO " ai), can .ffect >l8.,. Historically, however, the known
facts (b 28-30) point to variance in families of good hirth: some continue,
some falter. The passage is a rdlection of the nurture-nature discussion of
the fifth and fourth centuries. Euripides mentions the problem in connection
dying of Polyxena, He<. S9I-OO.z. But his choice
with the noble (" ...

;jIJ.,

".".a'.'.

a'.')

90b 28

COMMBNT AllY

215

at Electra 367-372, Supplices 91I-9I7 is nurture, as it is that of A. here.

A. would appear to have in mind what he has said elsewhere about virtue
(e.g., at EN 1I03a 23-26): namcly, that nature gives us seminally the wherewithal for virtue but practice, exercise, education make virtue a reality for
the person. The well-born have a good beginning but no assurance of a good
end.

b 2.2-23 I ...., ... <pU ......;

"The tenn 'well-born' refers to [LS, HaTa,

B.iV.2] excellence of stock whereas 'noble' means not to degenerate from
one's nature." This idea is found in Hist. animo 488b 18-20. The verb UlaTaatla. in this construction carries the idea of a change to the worse; c 90b
28 (1lE1C1TQTQ . d~), LS, B.II.4- The meaning of qnla" here is that found
at P"I. 1252b 31-34: "qnla,~ is a completion, for the kind of thing each entity
is when its becoming (generation) is completed is that which we call the
qnla,~ of each, for example of a man, a horse, a household." In this sense
nature is the same as the essence of .. thing, that which makes a thing to be
what it i.. In our present instance nature, then, would be that which is
given by good hirth.

a".p ........"!!..I,,., 8"'e refers to TO I'q ',lrnQa6a, Tfi~ qnlaBW,.

Cpo Euripides, The Childr." q{ Hera,/es 324-328.

b 23-24

b 25-26 rpopek ... y'YV0p.vOt;

Cpo Pindar, Nem. 6.8-1I, 1I.37-42; Demosthenes, On the Crown 61 speaks of a opoeci. "'e066TW' Hal dweodQ"w.,
and Aeschines, Ag. Ctesiphon 234 of a opoeci e'1TOeW' "0"'le""

b 27 Eyyly"........, 5,ek . .

"extraordinary men appear over a certain

period of time." On 6.&, see LS, A.H.I; on 'yyl')lPOnQt., Plato, Gorgw 526a.

".v.,,,

c1v..5Ui..... ,,,
The verb is better .taken intransitively:
b 28 : I
"and then again it falls oK." This is the way in which the Greek scholiast
(Anon.) takes it, as do Bonitz, Index, the English translations, and Dufour
and Tovar. Vietorius interprets the word also in its more ordinary meaning,
and this meaning is adopted by Vater, pp. 108-109, Spengel, p. 259, and
Cope, p. 164: "and then (after an interval of unproductiveness) they begin
again to produce them."
2 ":'rpuii y ....'!
"Clever .tock degenerates into more demented
kinds of character." This is in contrast to C1Tda'I'Q (yiv1)) at b 30: "staid,
.table stock" which deteriorates toward "fatuousness and dullness." Spongel,
pp. 259, calls attention to Plato, Statesman 31oc-o which attributes the
same qualities to a decline in lineage owing to a certain self-seeking in marriage
which fails to develop the line by an intelligent mix of family stocks. The
close relation between cleverness and madness is mentioned at Poetics I455'
32 , Frobl. 954" 31-34.

u6

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC II

b ~!r-30 'AAxl~"i6ou mA.

A good illustration of what A. means by
clever vs. staid can be found in plutarch's Jives of Alcibiades and eimon.
In Plato's Alcibi.Jes I.u8e, the sons of pericles (Paralus and Xanthippus)
are called foolish and stupid, and much the same is said of Socrates' sons in
Plutarch', Life ofCato the Eltkr (chap. 20). We cae see this concern for the
preservation of the excellence of their stock: in the quest of LysimadlUs and
Me1esias (who accept themselves as ordinary men) for the right education
for their own .ons, in Plato's dialogue Laches. Indeed Lys.irnachus (the son
of Aristides) and Melesias (the son of Thucydides the elder) are mentioned
in the Meno 93'-940 along with the sons of T'hemistocles and Perides as
sons who did not achieve the excelIeoce of their father.. On Dionys.ius the
Elder, cf. S7b 30 : " 68a 18 : I.

CHAPTER 16

I . Introductory statement: 90b 32

wealth affects character

II . Development: 90b 33 - 9ta 19

I.

90b 33 - 9" 14

(.l

90b 33 - 9"

(6l 91 ......12

wealth makes men:

insolent, arrogant

(el 9" 12-'3

iDdined to lllXllriousncos aod 05.....

tation
to think themselves lit for public

(d) 9" '3-'4

prwperous fool.

91. 15-19

office

effects of old and new wealth on

character

!lOb 32. '<ii> .. m"raA"~

On wealth, a constituent of S1lda,/,ovLa (A S,
60b 1!r-20), cf. 8]& 3 : 1; the meaning of '''OTa. i. mentioned at 62a 2.9 : 2,
and that of brmol;;, at 76b 14. The relative clause with antecedent incorporated (<I ijO~) is an indirect que.tion (S. 2(68) in which the plural
(<I 1JO~) is best taken as "what kinds of character" and so as referring to the
diH"erent element> in the char.cter. This interpretation is .upported by 91a 14
(olOo, "lOUTOV) where it i. clear that A. is speaking in the chapter of the
character peculiar to the rich; c 91a 23.
6~p,......l ... 61C.P";'PIIVO,
"insolent and arrogant"; c 78b
23-3', 7Bb 14-15 :); Diodorus in the Mytilenian debate (Thuc. 3.4S.4)
attributes the same qualities to wealth. Victorius cites Cicero (De lege ogr'Gria
orGtio set;UntiG "mira Rullum 2.3S.9SIf.) on the character of the Campanian. as
an apt illustration of A.'. observation.

b 33

1CciGJ(""""~""'" nA04......
"seeing that they are somewhat
affected by the possession of wealth." The change in attitude, disposition,
character brought about by wealth is actually explained in 90b 34 - 9ra 2:
dla".~ ,,<Ie ... mlTOV. It is a change which .ubverts their mental and moral
outlook. Money becomes the standard of value for everything else; ep.
83a 1-3.

b 33-34

Ross alone encloses this within parenb 34 - !lla 2 &,....p .....6..-oii

theses followed by a comma, and without any punctuation before. All the

218

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC I II

edd., Spengd, Cope punctuate: TOV

".to"TO~ .

dl""'e . .. a~Tov.;

910 7
this is

clearly more acceptable.

liuixE'........ '
C 68b 4 : 1, 77b 27-28; the verb is indicative of an
established and set attitude, whicb is what is sigoified when one speaks ordinarily of if8o" "for their general disposition is the same as if they possessed
every kind of good."

lila I

a 1-2 I> lil ... lI1h'oG

is the reading of four edd., Spengd. Kassel,

Cope read with a good tradition d vUe ... ; copulative di (S. 2836) can
have the force of vae: "for wealth, as it were, is taken as a kind of criterion
of the worth of all other things." On ",."" c LS, TI,.Io>, II.2; on ~ta,
c 6sa 8 : 1; a~Toii (i.e., wealth) is a genitive of price; <:f., however, Bywater,
"Aristotelia V," 1I7.
"given to sdf-indulgence and pretena 3 'L'PU<PEpDl xed acz).axc..vE~
tiousness." Both words are explained at a 3-'7. On Te~'I'''' (Ross alone
reads TeO'l''1V), "luxury," see 84a I : J; on aald".,. (the lavish spender who
exceeds good Ia.te), c EE I221a 33-36, MM 1I92a 37 - II92b s.
i.e., "wealth"; or "good fortune," as we find it
a 4 : 1 a.lielLp.ovl..~
at 910 14z aOAD'XD'
vulgar, crude, e.g., Xenophon, Cyrop.iJei. 8.3.21:
aoAoI~"'T8eO~. This meaning, applied to manners is apparendy transferred
from the original meaning, SE r6sb 20-21: "To make one aoA.,,,t!;..., that
is, to make the respondent as a result of the argwnent speak ungrammatically." Soli was a town (whether in Cilicia or Cyprus is unclear and uncertain) where according to Diogenes Laerrl,u, Solon 51 (and c Strabo, Geogr.phy 14.66].28) the Attic dialect was corrupted by' Athenian colonists.
See also von Hiittenbacb.

a 4-'7 Ii,....o ...

ca....1 The subject of both articular infinitives is the

wealthy and so "c!VTa~ means "all of them without exception." Some generalize the statement, e.g., Cope, p. 166 ("they [like others] are all"), Jebb &
Sandys ("all the world is wont"). The first part of the clause (dId ...
awwv) could be read as a general statement and in this respect the rim would
be like all others. Bnt joined as it is to the following clause (C following
note) it is more clearly restricted to the ricb as a dammant preoccupation
of theirs. This is the point of the explanation at 97a 7-8 (ii,. ... .. 'X6OT"").
a 6 o""...:mi>v, . The edd., Spengd, Cope place a comma after this;
Ross alone punctnates with a period.
.
a7:

iii ...

'roU'fO

ca.... 1

sc. C'1AoVa ...

Le.. what is stated at a 2-7: HaL -revtpeeo, ... aUTot.

a 7-11. noAADl ... IiLC...pl~ov..~

Ross alone enclose. in p,arentheses.

9Ia I6

a8:

COMMBNTAlIY

219

)cOY"'"'"
sc. TO' "AMov: "of those who have money."
z ELfU"Yl&ou
See OCD, PW, and cf. A 6, 63' IS, 67b I9-20.
Hieron I moved from Gda, Sicily, in 478 B.C. to succeed his brother Gelon at
Syracuse. Somewhat later (476?) Simonide. visited Syracuse (one among
many distinguished poets to do so); he eventually died atAgrigentum in468.
TO I,,,.,,,ldov ert!1/Ta, = "the remark of Simonides was made...."
1

a I I Mcmenov inLv
Ross alone punctuates: ud01JO"O'JI'," The infinitive in narrative as an indicative is dependent upon the idea of saying in
ere1jTa,.
a lI-I2 'l:oU~" &LCI'l:pl~av'l~
I would read this without any quotation marks and Roemer's coD,jecture of 6<17:,. (se. scn,. oeli>) as do Spengd,
Cope, Ross, Kassd. Roemer, Dufour, Tovar use the quotation marks and
read (save Tovar) Roemer's conjecture. In the Republic 4891H: Plato refers
to the saying and calls irs author (whom he does not mention) a liar. Diogenes
Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers: Aristipp"s 69, attributes it to Aristippus
(a friend of Socrates') and gives it a new twist: Aristippus, when asked by
Dionysius (tyrant of Syracuse, 430-367 B.C.) why the philosophers frequent
the doors of the rich willie the wealthy no longer go to the philosophers,
replied: "The philosophen know what they need, the wealthy do not."

a 12-13 xctl'l:I. . iiPXELV

another characteristic of the rich, as Vater,
p. lIO, points out. And so the articular infinitive construction should be
taken as the subject of a phrase like that at 90b 32: b.eTa, Tq; "Ao.hl!'. On
IJex'" (hold public office) see A 8, 6sb 32-3S, 87' 23-24, 8sb I7-18.
a I3 X.LY ydp ... ii~lDY
"for they think they have that which gives
title to governing power." This is the usual interpretation with the scholiast
(Anonymus) and later Victorius. Cope, p. 168, disagrees and mentions the
Vetus Translatio as confirmation, but this can be questioned.
1 .:,~ .. xE<pIlACI!q>
C 6Gb 6 : 1.
z ciYoiJ...... dJ&ClI!oyo~ ~eo~ nAoUTOU
"the character produced
by wealth is that of the fortunate fool." Our reading is that of Spenge!,
four edd. Cope reads: ~80v~ " "AMo,; Ross, ~80, <~80'> "AO~TOV. The
denotation of eMat"o.., is well explained by Victorius' reference to Cicero's
uinsipiente fortunato," De amicit. 54-

a 14 :

a IS

&lCI<pEPEI "ciAClL

Cpo 87' 8-32.

311 instrumental dative (S. Is06f[): "in that the

a I6 -njJ ExELY
newly rich have all the vices in a stronger and baser form." Cpo Aeschylus,
Agam. l042-I04S. Some sense of the pejorative meaning of V.6n.lovTO,
which we see in A. is found in Ps.-Demosthenes, On the Treaty with Alexander 23.

9Ia 19

a 17-18 c. ....ep .1"..,

"to be newly rich is in fact like a lack of
education with respect to wealth." Cpo A 5, 61a 12-24- Ross alone encloses
this in parentheses.
On Ml"7Ipa cf. 73b 36 : I, 74b 8.
a 18 : 1 4Iiuc1\fL'l"'1I
2 x ....oupy".4 . obcpII'<IU'L"uc4
i.e., they are not of an insigDificant cbancter, but rather substantially vicious (1JPe.an,,&'), II!Ib 7 : 2,
and occasioned by the absence of all moral ,eI.restraint (dxean.,...."ci).
a 19 EI~ .. fI-OLXEIrtv
Cpo 89b 7-8, 90a 18-19. For a general idea
of the quality of wrong indicated here, see A 13, 74a 2-17; on a/"la cf. 73a
13 : 2; on p.'X8'a (adultery), 73b 23 : 2.

CHAPTER 17

I . Introduction: 91a 20-22

to power

IT . Development: 91a Z2-29

how power affects t}"9o,

m . Introduction: 91a 30-32

to good fortune

rv . Development: 9Ia 32 - 91b 4

how good fortune affects t}"9o,

V . Conclwion: 91b 5-7

9Ia 20 : 1 6JU1""~ &.1 x.a!

C 7lI8 20-21.
"&uvci/L.... ~
"power"; for this meaning see its use atA 4, 60a
1-2, 60b 27, 63a 29, 'lOb 14; ']8b 35 : z, 82a 34. 83a 3 : 4, etc.

a 20-21 "X.&Ov . 1181J

"practieally speaking most of the kinds of

character are obvious."

a 21-Z2 Tc!< /LW- Tc!< &i

"some kinds - others." A. does not specify
which kinds are the same (Td a~Td) as wealth, which are better (Tel /loAd.,).
Certainly among the former would be the type of wrong done (cp. 9Ia 29
with 9Ia 18-19) and probably, as well, the assumed right to govern (9la 13);
among the latter would be tho.e mentioned at 91a 22-27. Spengel, Cope,
Kassel read at a 21 fiom a good tradition: "
which I would read for
d.n.ap', of the edd., cp. Bywater, "Arlstotdia V," II7.

6.Wa,,,,

C 90b 17; 68b 20 : 1.

"more manly," i.e., honorable (EN II25b 8-16),
straightforward, virile, self-contained (EN II71b 6-10).
a

Z2 : 1

'PIAOT....sT.pO.

z 4,,&p ... &i.....po.

a 23 ij81J
accusative of respect, S. 1601. The plural denotes the varied
instances signified by the ahstract suhstanti"e.
a 24 ip"Y"""" 86v"/L'"
"all those deeds which they have abundant
resources [AEovl7la sc. Jan] to accomplish because of their power."
a 2S a.c!<... .t".11
"because of their diligent concem"; on the prepositional phrase with slpl, e LS, olpl, C.rv.3. C A II,7Da I2 on
lsta; it is this concern which makes them "more earnest"; e 7lI8 35 : I.

""p.B-

a 2S-26 4"..Y"..I;0/LEYo. 86v"/L''''

concerns their power." This explains the

"since they must look to all that

preceding statement. Ross alone

222

ARISTOTLB J 'RHETORIC' II

91a 30

reads a comma. not the period. after fnJ."I'IV. A new aspect of character is
introduced in what follows and therefore the need for a complete break.

a 2.6 ""1',,6"<po,
"and they are people who are more reserved rather
than more overbearing." As we find at EE I2.2Ia 8. I2.33b 34-38 and MM
II92b 30-38.
(dignity) is a mean in personal relations between
pride-arrogance and servility. As we see in Euripides. Hippo/rlUs. 93. 99.
103. 1364. its meaning is insecure enough to shift between correct self-respect
and haughtiness. arrogance. In what follows at 9Ia 2']-29. A. implies that
this reserve and dignity regulate for the most part a temperament which
inherently inclines to arrogance. Plutarch. Nicias j24-2.C.4. stresses the good
side of
e.g. "his reserve was neither severe nor annoying but
combined with carefol discretion." A.'s descriptive definition ofit also moves
in that direction; c lira 28.

u.,...OT7/'

u.,...,

a 27 ll''P....." ....tpOUi ..o liF;!w1'1l

u.,...odeoVl; is the reading of four
edd. and Spenge!. Kasse!. Cope. and Freese read from a good tradition
ip.<p....".ieov' ("more conspicuous"). Either reading is possible. In my
view the reading chosen suits the logical progress of the statement in a 26-28
("al ... pae6rr/,) better. I would take 64/.,,..a as at 86a 26. i.e.. "rank."
"position:'
1'cU.llxiJ. ucrxlj""",
hauteur."
a 28

i.e.. sernnotes is "a tempered and graceful

a 29 ci& ....;;..,,,... IHYcU.ci&,xo,

Cpo 9Ia 18-19; for the idea see

Bgb 7: 2

'" 30 : 1 ..nux!1l
is one of the parts of eudaimonia. A s. 60b 19-29.
60b 20-29. It is one of the goods of man and is explained in more detail at
61b 39 - 62a 12. Along with dVC1Wxia, good birth. wealth. position (890
1-2). it constitutes what A. means by
7jO'1 "a~"
.vxa, (88b 32). The
fortuitous nature of such gifts is underlined indirectly at 87a 8-32 where
some of the very goods discussed in B rj-r7 (e.g. good birth. wealth. position)
are mentioned as things which are fi-equently the objects of indignation
(i.e.. pain at the undeserved good fortune of another). There is. however.
a larger view of good fortune (chance) which explains in part the brief comments here (9Ia 30 - 9Ib 4). and it is found at EE 1246b 37 - 1248b 7. The
EE passage explains why A. is unsure at A j. 60b 19-29 whether he wants
a"TVxia among the internal or the extemaI goods of man.
2 XII.... p.6pui .."
"in its varied parts"; this is simply a specification of 89a 2: "al 8J.to, aVTVxla. "al dvCIT"XI.... and it refers .t1"'X.....
8vCITvxia. to stir........ "Aov.o dv.d,.. ..,. On the word ,..oe.a: 54'012 : 2;
sec also A I. S4b 19; 2. j6a 30; j. 60b 6. The.a is continued by "al ...
(a 32); c lira 32 : 1.

T"

T",

9Ib

223

COMMBNTARY

i .. in chaps. 15-17: good birth. wealth. power.

4
"contains the kinds of character of those just
mentioned." i.e those mentioned in preceding note.
3

.lp1JiLc""",
elI 1I81J

1x., ...

a 3 [-32 1I81J. el> yellp ... e6""X(",,'

"for those kinds of good fortune
thought to b. the most significant tend toward thes. effects." The lines in
this passage arc variously punctuated. I would punctuate as indicated sine.
sl, . .. sVTVx{at is an explanation of a 30-,3 I, whereas "al e-" .. . nAeOVSHTBE"
gives further elfecES of good fortune; see gIa 32 : 1. The usual punctuation
is a colon after ij6'1/ (save Kassd: a comma); a colon after eVT1JXiuo (sav.
Tovar. Kassd: a comma); Ross includes .k ... ~Tvxiao in parenthe.es
with no puntuation before and a comma after.
.Ir; ... TelU,,", GUV"'C'eLVOUG'LV
TaVT4, i.e., 1j8f} referring
thing as e!1!'/1'1. .,.. On awedw <I, see Iba 30; A 5. 60b 9.

a 3I

to

the same

If T is read at a ]0 (as it is by all). it

a 32 : 1 _ll.... d~ e6...1C\I(""
appears that iES coordinate statement is here at a ]2-33 ("aIiTO ... "AOO* ,
n"); c 86a 24-25. Despite the use of
which causes both the scholiast
(Anonymus) and th. Vetus Translatio to take our phrase with what precedes.
there is no discernible logical rcason in what is .aid at a 31-32 (01, "ae ...
s';T1JX1a.) to add our phrase to it. However. it does make sense to understand
"al I .. ... "Aso.s><Tei. as a further addition giving other specific efleets of
good fortune: "And further ,till good fortune provides advantages with
.regard to the blessing of children and bodily goods." In other words. good
fortune is a distinct asset with respect to dlC acquisition or possession of tbc
good, of the body. In fact, one could argue with some justification that A.
is following his distinction between what h. calls among tbc parts of eudaimonia (-<'1 5. 60b 19-29) tbc cxternaI goods (good birth. wealth. position;
our 91> 30-]2: " d' ... eVTvxia.) and the internal goods (our 9Ia 32-33:
"aUn ... "Aoo.s"ni.) as good fortune affects them. eVn".iu (c A 5.
60b 38 - 6Ia II) is one of these goods of tbc body to which he refers in the
phrase Ta "aTa Ta aiiJl'a a"aBd; on th. internal. external goods see 60b 20-29.

.1,.

a 33 : 1 "",.ovu....iv
This can be interpreted as it was at 60a 3 : 1;
Cope, p. 170. has a note on the word.
2 iLlY oW
C Denniston. p. 473; "thus it is that .....
3 ':'"eP1J'P""w..epo, .. ciAoyLa.... po'
Cpo gob 33; also 9Ja
14: d'O>1ToveVdail'o,o,. See Archytas on BllTvX1a in Stobaeus in the Gaisford
(ISaz) edition, pp. 45ff. (i.e. T.I.79. p. 16).
9Ib

b2

cixoAou8ei

a....

C 78b7:

1.

"namdy. that ..." S. 2577; 7sa 9 : 2.

91b S

ARISTOTLE, RHBTORIC' II

b Z-l lxoua,v .. ""'~

"stand in a certain relation to divinity"; the
relalion is explained by
TVX'1'; see 89a 2. The contrary view
of Lucretius. 3.S3-S4. "multoque in rebus acerbis acrius advertunt animos ad
religionem" (see also Lactantius [ca. A.D. 2S0-3'7] Divina. Institutiones 201.S).
calls attention to what is the more common reaction (e.g. Ssb 21-22). but by
no neans what Cope (p. 171) calls "a truer account of this matter." A. himself
at 83b s~ sets down the positive reaction of which he speaks in our passage.
See me reference to BE at !lla 30 : 1.

",.,....Von., ...

b 3 Tok Y'YV0l'vC>
tion.

Kassd. Cope read draM with this from a good tradi-

b 5 ".pl 1'6'1 Elp,,"'"

This is a general summation for chaps. Iz.17. However that which immediately follows b 6Jr (Tli rae . .. cloIvvdTOV)
refen only to chaps. IS-17. In his discussion of the age groups A. gave us the
special topics proper to the /j6o, of the YOWlg. the old. the mature. In presenGing these three groups. by way of contrast between each group. he actually
gave the opposites (..Ii lvaVTta) of each group.. In this respect he follows the
method he used to specify the opposites of many of the "d6'1. With -WX'1 in
its varied aspects. however. he follows his procedure with alaxUv'l (Ssa 14-IS).
CfjAo, (SSb 24-27). simply stating that by anaiy:>.ing the opposites of each (e.g.
poverty. lack of power. etc.) in terms of the topics presented in chaps. IS-17
the typical traits of these opposites will be discovered (the opposite of '~rlv..a
is nO! mentioned).

CHAPTER 18

I . Tramition: 9Ib 8-23

I.

9Ib 8-9

from B

1-17

(cf. 9xb

8-23)

rhetoric is concerned with ~ta,,; cf.

77b 2.1 -78a 6

2. 9Ib 10-20

how this is so in each kind of rhetoric

3. 91b 20-23

TW. "ol ...:.t... was discussed

in A 8; thus we have shown [presumably he has B "}'-17 in mind] how to
make discourse reBeet moral character

II . Transition: 9Ib Z4 - 92a 4

I.

91b Z4-29

2. 9Ib 29- 92a I

the ij61/

from A

to B 17

each kind of rhetoric has its own Ti.ao~,

and the ways for arguing in each have
been discussed, as well as how to make
the discourse reBcet moral character
we must now discuss the elements
common to each kind: namely, possible-impossible, past tact - futuIe fact,
amplificition-mciosis

3 92a 1-4

III . Conclusion: 92.4-'7

to complete OUI task we must consider

the proofs (enthymeme, example) as
formal modes of reasoning common to
each kind of rhetoric
a brief statement on the ""..<I by
way of introduction to B 19

!lxb 8-2.3 l ..El 51! .. "OL'ITI!OV

The chapter begins at b 8 as all would
agree although the paragraphing in a few editions may be unclear. But this
is a minor matter in a chapter upon which, ever since Spengd C'Ueber die
RhetorikU ) detected an absence of coherence in it, a good bit of ink has been
spilled without any satisfying results. There can be little question that the
chapter marks a transition and forms a writ with chaps. I!)-2.6, and this is
not disputed. The natUIe of the tramition is another xnatter. If one accepts,
a' I do (cf. Studies), that A. centers his stndy of rhetoric on enthymemeexample (dcduction-mduction) as DUldcs of inference, the transition at this
point is natUral and integral to the structural wriry of the work. A 4 - B 17
is A.', study of the three entechnic proofs (.aoyo~, "d60~, ii6o~) wherein the

ARISTOTLE. 'RHETORIC' II

9Ib 8

analysis provides matter for statements which can be used for inference by
enthymeme-example (or by itself) in the three branches of rhetoric (c
COMMENTARY I 349-S6). With the conclusion of this section, A. at B 18
makes a transition to the general aspects common to all the kinds of rhetoric,
or from a study of the particular topics which can provide material for use
in each of the three kinds of rhetoric to a study of dements common to all.
We should note here that one could object that the three entechnic pisrds
(Ady." "d8." 118.,) are also common to rhetoric. In one respect they are.
They are used in all discourse in varying ways. However, each of them does
not enjoy the same universality as typifies the material of B 19-26. Each
is limited by the discourse itself, narndy, its subject matter (Ady.,), its type of
auditor ("d8." 118.,). With regard to the dements A. calls common ("...6.)
this is not so. The " d (c 59& II-I3, 7sa 8 : :J and see 92a 4-7) which
we meet in chap. I9 are necessary preconditions to any kind of discourse.
Example and enthymeme of chaps. 20-22 are the common ways to argue
an issue without regard to subject matter or audience. The general topics
of enthymeme in chap. 23 are common ways in which to reason on any
matter with any audience. Fioally, apparent syllogism, chap. 24, and refutation, chap. 2S, are dearly common methods to discern false argument and
to refute an argument.
This interpretation of the devdopment of A.'s first two books does not,
however, remove some of the difficulties occasioned by chap. I8 as we shall
see. But it is consonant with what A. sets down as his intention in the programmatic statement ofA 1-3 (0 9aB 3-4). Further, it is in complete accord
with a statement like that at B 22, 96b 28 - 97a 6, which becomes rather
meaningless with the change in the order of the chapters suggested by Spengd,
Vahien, Marx (0 Studies, p. 32).
The problem with chap. 18 is primarily occasioned by the 10gicaI sequence
of ideas in b 8-23 caused by the introduction of the idea of "el,,,,. From
the time of the scholiast (Anonymus), most have agreed (e.g., Victorius,
Spengd, Cope) that the paragraph consists of the protasi< b 8-22 (en.! . ..
"'eOT8e.') and apodosis b 22-23 (0lf1T... "."'ITS). For examples of this
construction, see Spengd, pp. 26H3; indeed, Else, p. "38, points out an
unconscious irony in an example from Poetics I4sob 3<iK. Yet it is dear,
if one reads the passage, that there is no ostensible 10gicaI connection between
protasis and apodosis (e.g., Cope, p. I7", or Jebb & Sandys, p. IOSn4). This
has raised a question about the organization of Book " from the time of
Spengd (''Ueber die Rhetorik," 483ff.). If the statement is by A. (a point on
which all would essentially agree), does it bdong here or atB I; does it bdong
here but something has been lost and therefore the problem in meaning; can it
stand where and as wefind it? Spengd considers b 8-20 a paraphrasis of 77b 2Iff.
and possibly corrupt; Vablen ("Krink arist. Schriften") agrees. Spengd offers

9Ib 8

CCYMMBNTAllY

an attractive solution for our text: namdy, join the last sentence of chap. 17
(9Ib 5-']: "eel pi, ... dcl1wdTou) to chap. I8 at91b 20 ("eel de . .. "o''1do~).
Of the modem editors Kassel alone adopts this and double brackets the
troublesome lines b 8-20. Cope, pp. 17I-,]5, looks upon b 8-20 as A.'s,
but "most probably not written for this place." However, he accepts the
text as we have it and suggests, but without confidence, that a sentence or
more may have been lost. On p. 250 ofhis IntroJudion he supplies the sentence
and his interpretation. Vater, pp. III-I6, would include everything in
b 8-29 in the protasis and take b 30 (Aomdo .. "o..ciio) as the apodosis.
Thurot, "Observations critiques [II)," 4<>-41, also suspects a lacuna and offers
a similar solution. Roemer agrees in general with Spenge! but would place
b 8-23 back in B I (c preface to his critical edition, pp. xcvII-eI). Siiss,
pp. 147if., discusses the chapter at some length, finding little difficulty with
it as it is and in its relation to B I since he finds in it confirmation of his
interpretation of >lOo~. Cope's note in his commentary and that of Sandys
Oebb& Sandys, p. I05n4) set forth the various interpretations; see also Studies,
pp. 38-42, for some other problems connected with chap. 18.
None of the above interpretations really resolves the problem in the chapter,
an admittedly transitional chapter, and .ome intrude rather boldly on the
tradition of the text. Is there a solution within the te;"t as handed on to us?
Possibly there is. But it, too, would I.bor under a difIiculty to which all
the above are exposed, i.e., the absence of any mention of the "d0'1 (chaps.
2-II). In this chapter of transition, one would expect some mention of them,
particularly at the point at which we find ,,0"'06, (b 23, 28). Some do
maintain that "dOo, - >lOo~ are denoted by this word - Cope, p. '75, for
example, Barwick, 1~20, and most recently Lossau, p. I65n7. I have reservations about the inclusion, and they are occasioned by A.'s use of
in the Ri.etoric where it inevitably refers to >l00~ (i.e., the moral character
revealed in discourse) and in a nwnber of instances is explicitly distinguished
from naO'1T""',. One way in which one might possibly include the "dO,!
in the word would rest on the fact that "O",o~ in the Rhetoric always does
imply >lOo" and >lOo~ even in the RiletD,ic entails in the last analysis the "d67J.
The solution is not overly satisfying, but c 77b 27-28.
Turning to the chapter as it is written, it is clear that the immediate problem
in the text is the unexpected appearance of the statement on Hela,~. Yet,
though abruptly introduced and lengthy in detail, the statement is not necessarily out of place in a chapter of transition such as this in which A. is moving
from one major division of the work to another, i.e., fromA 4-B 17 toB I~
26, and more immediately nom his discussion of "dOo~ and >lOo~ in B 2-17.
With respect to this particular transition from "dOo~ - >l0o~ we must recall
that when he introduced them in B I (c outline to B I) he wished to show
their importance (77b 21-39) along with Adyo, (A 4-14) for "eta.~ which

,,0.,,&,

ARISTOTLE,

RHETORIC t II

is the telos (c A. 3, 5ab 1-8) of rhetorical discourse. So a restatement at the

end of the study of "dBa, - iJBo, of the importance of "e[a., is not strange
(c !lIb u). Theacldition of the reference toA 8 is odd but not unacceptable.
For with the completion of iJBo, in chap. 17 this concept would be uppermost
in his mind. Some ,ense might be obtained from b 8-23 by a schematic
statement of the lines: "Since the use of persuasive speech has "ela" (for
which "dBo,- iJBo, is essential) as its telos and this is so in all the kinds of
thetoric even if there is a 'ingle auditor for he, too, is a "e'nj,; and since
iJBo, as it applies to the 1IB'1 of constitutions has been discussed under deliberative rhetoric - so it is that the ways by which persuasive speech must
be made to rcBeet iJBo, may now be considered established"; see !lIb 12("opl .. Aclyou)
All the edd. use the parentheses.
"pIa,,,
Cpo 77b 2I-29 and the notes thereto; c also A 3, 58b
4-8. The reason for the role of "e'a., is also seen at A 2, 57" 22--26; c
S7I' 23

b 9 :

sc. xeta.,.
We might, ask as Spenge! does, why not also "ed,
"oAAo.k, but comparing this passage with 58a 36 - 58b 8 we find A. speaking
in the same manner. In fact 91b 8-20 in its content repeats that of 58a 3658b 20; c comment in 9Ib 8-23.
3 "po-rpmn
i.e., ddiherative oratory; c S8b 8-29. The general
condition indicates that in each instance (deliberative, forensic, epideictic)
there is always (1111:' d', b 8) a question of xeu",.

b 10 : 1 I...", Ii'
2

~ II-13

"pa~ Iv..

(06liw .. "P'""'~)

All the edd. use the parentheses.

b II "oIeov....,~
always in the sense stated at A 3, SSb 8-14; c SSb
10 : 1. I would think that there is a contrast between this word and .0~B&
...ov....,. The scholia,t says that .ov8...0;;,..... , are those who give counsd
(~,.{Jo~A.,;o.....,) or advise, which seems to me reasonable, and I find our
contrast paralld to that at A 8, 6sh 23 (".IB.w ... ~,.{JooA";.,.).
b 12 "P'""'~
predicate to an understood ia.... C'for one person is no
less a judge"). The distinction made later at 91b 16-19 is in the nature of a
technical distinction rather than one of actual fact. The auditor in all the
branches of rhetoric is called upon to make a judgment which is the point
A. wishes to make here as earlier; c 77b 21 : 1 with the references (to which
add S'711 II, S8b 4 : 1). Further A.'s view of the role of "eta" in rhetoric
and of what is important for its actuation is set down at 77b 21-29. There
we learn that both reason and appetition play a part in "eta" and that he
will now begin the study of the latter, i.e., "dBo, and iJBo,. So it is that
in emphasizing "et,,,, once again here (as wa' remarked at !lIb 8-:-23, and

gIb 16

COMMBNTAllY

see COMMENTARY I 350) A. is referring rather directly to the presentation

of ,,&80, - ~80, of chaps. 2-17 just completed; see gIb 16-23.
Ro.. alone conjectures a masculine plural. Schrab 13 oll"!""!3"1)TOilv""
der, p. 374. wants the word to refer to judicial rhetoric, and so we have (a)
deliberative, (b) judicial, (c) epideictic rhetoric named. But I believe that
it signifies nothing more than the one who opposes, argues against, in a
trial (S4A 27 : 1) or in any instance; see, for example, A 7, 73b 6, glb 13.
At gIb Ig (Td dP.'P'U{J~TO~P.BVQ: the points in dispute) the reference could be
to both deliberative and furensic oratory (e.g., Freese, p. 2-nnc), but see
gIb 27.
b 14 6"68... ,,,
"against a proposed subject"; Spengel, p. 264, reasonably
suggests the tetralogies of Antiphon. To this might be added many of the
discourses of Isocrates of an instructive or deliberative character, or Gorgias'

Helm, Pala....J...
b 14-16 &I'ol... ~ ('rii> ... "o iT..,), .:.....w....~
is the punctuation afRo..
and Kassel alone of the edd. All punctuate with a comma after "o.eiTa.
except Roemer, Spenge!. Cope. The above punctuation is preferable, containing as it does the three brief explanatory clauses, b II-I3, b 14-16, and
"".~~"
in one sentence.
later b 17-18 (dl"".~

...

..)

i.e., the opposing arguments. or theses, "against which,

b IS 'Ollt lv""..I..
as though an actual opponent. one speaks"; cf. LS, " i .., A.ILS.
C gIb 14-16.
is the punctuation
b 16-18 ....& .,....,xo~ (C, .....p ... auvt......xov)
of Kasse! (cf. 9Ib 14-16) which I accept. Roemer, Tovar, Spengel, Cope
read
dl"".~
'nml~"... So, too, Dufour but with a
comma after """i~" Ross includes b 17-20 in parentheses: .,,,d
I<oi,
(Joulw.'TaI). Most of these changes in gIb 8-23 are occasioned by the interpretation of the passage; cf. 9Ib 8-23.

.,,,a._.,,.i,

(dl""'e ...

..;

...

,,TI-

b 16-23 .:...aN..... ~... "O''1flov

"... similarly in epideictic discourse
(for it is composed with a view to the spectator as though he were ajudge);
in general, however, only that person is strictly speaking a judge who nukes
a judgment on the points at issue in civil issues [i.e., judicial and deliberative
discourse], for the matter of inquiry [C~T.iTai] is in one instance the status
[m, lXB.] of the disputed issues and in the other [TS ..
of the matters
under ddiberation; further, still, since [lnet, gIb 8] a statement was made
earlier under ddiberative rhetoric about the 1J~ of the several forms of
government, the consequence is that the ways and means to make discourse
reflect moral character would noW have been established."

"aq

ARISTOTLB, 'RHBTORIC' II

23 0
b 17

e.... pav

b IS : 1 lIM>~
who conjectures

See sBb 2 or Cope, p. 176.

is the reading of the codd. and all the edd. save Kassd

8,...,,; cf. Der Text, p. 136.

z xp,orlJ~ tv
All read in this way. Kassd, following a good
tradition, reads "1!'T-q,6 i., transposing the article from b 19 6 Tci ~rrr.';,.."a.
b 19 "a).'T'KDi~ ct.y&\cnv
Since our passage apparently has A 2, 5sb
2-S in mind, the words refer to deliberative and forensic rhetoric as the
explanatory clause (Td TS ycil! .. /I.u),.vTa,) would also indicate.
b 20 llouAoUovTcu'
I would place a colon after this word as Tovar
does. Ross, Dufour use a comma; Roemer, Spengd, Cope, a period. Kassd
(cf. 9Ib S-23) ends his double-bracketed passage here.
b 22 np.....pov
i.e. A S. The usual punctuation is a comma after the
word; a colon might be preferable; Kassd uses a period. On the meaning
of 1}B., in the Riletor;c, including these iJB17 Teil. ".),cnIOJ., see 88b 30-3 I,
77b 24.
I take this to be the conclusion to the
b 22-23 c. ........ no,'1..mv
protasis at b 8-22 and offered a possible explanation for it at 9Ib 8-23. If
"B,,,.';, here and at b .S does include
1}B., (c same note), then
6,ci Tl .,. refer to the study of the particular topics in B 2-17; if not,
then simply to 12-17. See, however, ~b 27-29.

,re."

"ci8., -

C A 3, 5Sb 20 - 59a 5, sBb 8-29. 1}. = "is,"

b 24 lupOll'" TtAO~
quite possibly the philosophical imperfect, 63' 9 : 1. The echoes of A 3
in B 18 are fairly obvious. In 3 A. spoke of the role of "I!/'''' and three
kinds of rhetoric with their Til7J as he does in IS. He mentioned next the
need for "I!OTa ..s" for each kind of rhetoric and in 18 (9Ib 25-27) he cdls
us that we 110W have them. Then he turned to the three ".,.d necessary
to each kind of rhetoric as he does here (9Ib 29 - 92a 1). In 3 after mentioning
these ".,.eI he said we must also have "1!.Ta...., for them, and these (cf.
also 92a 4-7) he will present in chap. 19. Taking our statement in chap. 18
with its back references to the opening chapterS of the first book (cp. also
92a 1-4 with A 2, 56. 34 - 56b 27) and recalling his statement in chap. I of
Book 2 it seems clear that A. is marking the end of one major division and
the beginning of another.
C 77b 18: I. From the methodology
b 25 6c1;Il' xlll "poTcicr..~
of B 2-17, paralld as it is to A 4-14 (and also IS), together with the statement
at the end of B I, i.e., 78a 28-30, there would appear to be little question
that A. views his effort ill the second book as one which provides further
8&Ea, "al "I!OTeI.."" for "dB., and 1}Bo,; cf. 78a 28-29. In fact "elBo,

9Ib 30

COMMBNTARY

:>31

and oJ80~ os "Icrr..~ lvr:0X"0o are dod TO;; l&yov (A 2. 56a 1-19) which must
be by way of expressed opinions or statements.
b:>6 "'{CJ'U'~
On the meaning of this word in the Rhetoric, c Studi...
pp. 55-07. and 55a 4- The word here may signify the modes of inference
(enthymeme. example) or the source material suitable to effect conviction
(the particular topics); Smdies. pp. 60. 64.
b 2.7-29 k ... 5..:.p........
Depending upon how one interprets "8",ov~
(c 9Ib 8-23. 9Ib 22-2.3) the words
TOUTO,. here will refer either to the
material of chaps. I2-I7. or 2-17. Because of the nature ofb 24-29 as a brief
oudine of what was done in the first two books (as well as as a transition to
a new division of the work). it is difficult (but not impossible) to believe
that A. would intend to make reference here only to a part of the second
book (I2-I7) and not to all that preceded (2-I7). This fact might encounge
an extended meaning for "8o"ov~. e.g. 9Ib 8-23. On the other hand. since
there is no mention of the "aBot Spenge!. p. 264. is inclined to delete lTO
"0"'" (b 27-28). while Vahlon ("Kritik arist. Schriftc:n." 126-28) would
drop ..., ... d"be,crrao.

di..

b 29 xo.ve;;"
The logic of this passage to 92a I suggests that this should
be interpreted as it was in A J. 59a II-I3 (and c 7Sa 8 : J): the elements common to the dA'7 of rhetorical discourse which he will discuss
in chap. 19. The nature of possible-impossible. past-future fact. greatsmall as ".wa is that they are necessary preconditions which must be on hand
befure one engages in the different kinds of rhetoric. At 92a I-4 A. follows
this up with the general program for the remaining topics of this book.
They cover material which is common to rhetorical discoune - e.g. chaps.
20-2.1: the common proofS. exarnple-enthymeme; chaps. 22-23: the stoicheia or general topics for argument by enthymeme; chap. 24: the nature
of fallacious reasoning; chap. 25: the ways in which to refute reasoning>;
chap. 26: a few general refiections on points mentioned in chaps. I!)-25.
b J 0 ...0 ",.p{
is the reading of cod. A and four edd.. Spengel. Ross
reads Teji with Bywater (with whom at b 32 he reads <Td> "oel); in the
light ofb 3I-32 (c 9Ib 3 : 1) this is a reasonable conjecture grammatically.
Cope reads Ta from a good tradition. In our reading TO marks the articular
infinitive: "in discoune the use also of the common principle of possibilityimpossibility is necessary for all speakers" ("also." i.e. in addition to the
kinds of argumentation already outlined in A 4 - B I7). As A. says. no one
deliberates about that which is impossible. A 2. 57" 4--'7. At b 29 "oO'W' is
commonly interpreted as "the common topics." Apart from the problems
mentioned in 59" II-I3. it is difficult to see how past fact, future fact. can be
called topics. Like possibility or gre.tness. they are aspects which the subject

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORICJ II

23 2

92.> 3

of discourse must have if you are to speak about it at all (possibility), or in

forensic discourse (past fact), deliberative (future fact), or convincingly
(greatness); c Studies, pp. 35-39.

e,..

b 3 [ : 1 x,d....u~ "." ... ",".pii..

Understand (doay"ai.. l<fn)
".'ecioOaL 6.."..s.a ..o~~ /o'd ..... T~~ 6d. . . . In specifying the "o el, A.
is nther precise, e.g., possibl~impossible common to all speech, b 2~3 r
("doL ,,<Ie .. b ..oi~ ldyo,~); past-future fact to some kinds; greatnesssmallness to all. Cooper (po I42) is, I believe, incorrect in subordinating
past-future fact to possibility (even though past-future fact entails possibility;
c ,Sa 26-33); e.g., "The topic of the Possible-Impo"ible ... is an appliance
th2t everyone is bound to use, ... some [as forensic speakers] must use it in
trying etc." A. is clearly speaking about each of the "owel, separating them
into three categories: possible-impossible; past fact - future fact; greatnesssm.allness.
z .:.~ I ........... yoyovs
As he says below at 92. 4-7, these refer
to deliberative and judicial rhetoric (A 4-8, I0-14).

u"'u...........

b 32 xa ....Ov
See comment at 9Ib 31 : 1. Of the "ow& greatness (and P9ssibility) are used in all three kinds of discourse. Past fact, future
fact. while specific to foreesic, deliberative, may obviously al.o be used in

all three.
b 34 x,d """j3ou~.uO\l",,'~ [ll Uno..-pmO\l"'~] x .. l m ......ailll....~
is the
reading derived from cod. A according to Spengel, Kassel; "al ""/o'pov},."';"
o.....~ "al inaL''';;VT.~ is the reading of four edd., Cope. Since the edd:.
accept the tradition of cod. A., Kassel, Spenge! are a more correct reflection
of the text, which i. also found in the Vetus Transl.tio. The reason for the
seclusion as Spengel, p. 264, notes, is that A. does not use <fv/o'pov;..v... for
neoTeb.... which is what it would have to mean here. Cod. F gives what
is the more usual expression for A.: "al ""/o'POV;..vOVT'~ "al "eOTernOVTS~
"al c!nOTernO...B, "al ... ; see, e.g., A 3, S8b 8--9 (<fV/o'povJ..ii, . cbro"e"'~)
and cpo 96a 26-32 ("al ),ae ... p},.apse).
92a 2 xa.Vii
"in general terms," i.e., the effort will be made to analyze
enthymeme and example in them.elves as general forms of argument available and useful to the speaker (or writer) in all the bnnches of rhetoric. The
transition in the sentence is clear: after an explanation of possible-impossible,
etc., an analysis of the other constituents common to rhetorical discourse,
specificaIly, example and enthymeme as common modes (93) 23) of rhetorical inference by induction and deduction; c 9Ib 29.

...

",poem." This statement is interpreted in different

a 3-4 a-~
ways depending upon how the commentator views the unity of the work;
Spenge!, for example, assumes that it refers to "dOo, - lj80" ~aps. 2-I7,

COMMENTARY

92.a 5

which came after chaps. X8-26 (c 9Ib 8-23 and the references there). Most
assume that A. is now talcing up the final part of his task: the elements common
to all rhetoric. It seems reasonable to seek an understanding of Tel lomd
and "ed8B"IV from the programmatic statement ofAx-3 (and cf. 9Ib 29).
Are there any major points there which still need explanation? At 560 35 S6b 27 the discussion of enthymerne and example tells us that they are like
syllogism (cp. also 5Sa ro-r4) and induction but does not instruct us in any
detailed understanding of these criticol instruments. This we are told (s6b
2S-27) will be done later; and it is done at B 20-23. In the sarne passage
(S6o 3S - s6b 27) enthymeme and apparent enthymeme are mentioned (as
earlier. ssb X5-X7. persuasion and apparent persuasion were spoken of). It is
only in B 24 that we have any analysis of apparent enthymeme and apparent
persuasion. At 58. 2-3S. an obviously important statement to A . two
kinds of topicol sources for enthymemes are set out. A. notes that he will
analyze first the particular topics. The only analysis in detail 'of the general
topics appears atB 22-24. At S9a xx-26 weleam that we must have premisses
both universal and particnlar for the three "0..,1. In B X9 this is done for
the first time. In shorr the program set down at A x-3 receives its completion at B x9-26. There is no mention of u,'~. Td"~ in the programmatic
statement and therefore it does not seem possible to refer Tel lo""d to Book
3 as some have done.
a 4-5 1I....'v

... ip'l.....,

e.g. A 9. 68a 26-30; GSa .6.

a 5-'1 ..... at ... crup.(3ou"u""xo(~

Cpo A 3. S8b 2-20; and c s8b X3.

CHAPTER 19

I . The "owd: 9.a 8 - 93a 18

I.

9'" 8 - 9.b 14

possible-impossible

3 93a 1-8

past fact
future filct

4 93a !)-I8

greater-smaller

. 9.b IS-13

II . Conclusion: 93a 19-21

As has been said, these "o d (not "owol .ono.,

essentially Wee in nwnber, not four (e.g., Cope,
I, 55, and see S9& '3), a fact which Cope, pp. 178-'79 (and again p. 194)
:u:knowledges in his introductory comment to this chapter. It is important to note A.'s method of proceeding in the chapter which is similar to
that of chap. 23 and to parts of his analysis of particular topics (a. Studies,
pp. 126-27). He offers us a series of general, axiomatic propositions on possibility-impossibility which can be brought into play in formulating particular
statements in favor of or against the subject under discussion. His occasional
exempli.6cations of the general propositions are illustrations of such particular
statements. Remarks (b) (c) at 6]b 21-30 are helpful toward understanding
the sentence structure in this chapter.
2 &WU'I:'oii
The possibles mentioned in this section are discussed
primarily as concepts. While they are not yet in the order of existence, it is
rather clear that A. is speaking of clwa.d as things which can exist, or, as
he says at Met. I046a 8: "we speak of things as possible or impossible because
they are or are not in some way or other." We can see this further in the
distinction between ~ a and l.6eX.,..tnlov (although he sometimes interchanges the words). Waitz, 1376 describes them in this way: a 6..a is that
which is of itself in such a state of readiness that there is nothing in nature
to prevent its "be-ing"; an ..6ezo,..evo. is that which possesses in itself no
inner cOlltradiction and so can be readily asserted. The former he calls physical possibility; the latter, logical possibility (a.
27 : 3). In other words,
6..a would signify the presence of a positive power to be (capable of
being), whereas ..6BXO,..tnlO. signifies that which in terms of its inner self
could be. In the use of 6v.a in the first book at A 6, 63" 21 and 7, 65a 35
(there is definition of sorts at 63' 21-23) I believe that the meaning just
!)2a

8:

"'pii'nov ",4Y

a. Studies, pp. 36-39) are

s'"

ARISTOTLE. 'RHRTORIC' II

92a 9

given for the word is operative (eE 63a 2I, 63a 22 : 1, 2); so, too for has0. at A 2, 55b 26, 57a 24, 36. What is presented in chap. 19 assumes
some understanding of A.'s theory of potency (""va,a',). Guthrie, Gre.k
Philosophy, VI II9-29, may afford some hdp. Met. IOI9a 15 - I020a 6 Qater
I045b 34f[) on
eld..
mentioned by Cope, p. 179, is of no
direct hdp. However, the idea in a
of a positive capabiliry for being, a
potency to be or to do, can be fuund with some frequency in the first book
e.g., at 74b 28, 66a 38, 65a 21, 63b 29 with 63b 32-33.
in the use of
At A 3, 59a 31-33 A. mentions the importance of TO d..aTov for deliberative rhetoric, and Cicero and Quintilian, as Cope. p. 179, notes, do the
same, e.g., Part. orat. 24.83, De oral. 2.82.336 (repeating A 3, 59- 32-34),
and Cicero adds: "the man who taught us this, a truth unseen by others,
had profuund understanding"; [mt. orat. 3.8.25-26.

%",...

Mwa,.."

a,.'a

aT".

Mw",.."

a 9-II av 6'/t ... vocrijcrelL

Cope's note (pp. 179-80), which is _ summary statement of what is fuund in Cat. IIb 15 - 14a 25, is a good, brief
synopsis of A.'s statement on the varieties of clOT"..
In Met. IOI8a 20-35

C,...".

there is a short enumeration of the four kinds with a general description of

what is meant by .."".t:la. Met. r055a 3 - I057b 34 enters into the question
in much detail, and Top. Iub 27 - II4" 25 is again an extended statement
on the four kinds of opposition, along with examples of how they can be
used in argument. The four types as we find them in the Categories are (a)
coudatives: terms reciprocal in their relation, e.g., doubk-half; (b) contraries (hania): extremes in the same genus not dependent upon but opposite
to each other, e.g.; good-bad, and cpo A 6, 62b 30-35; (e) privatives-positives:
~e opposition found in the same subject in which the positive is something
natural to the subject, the privative is its absence, e.g., sight (positive) is
natural to the eye (the subject) for which blindness is the privative; (eI) alIirmatives-negatives (or contradictory opposition): a negation of what is affirmed, e.g., sitting us. not sitting. In Top. 47-49 these are the four which
Cicero names, but his explanation of privatives is in a sense correct but can
be misleading. A. in our chapter uses basically the opposition of contraries
and correlatives. And with regard to contraries he has this to say at Cal.
13b 36 - 14" 25: if one contrary exists, it is not necessary that the other must;
two contrary conditions cannot coexist in the same individual at the same
time; the subjects of contrary qnalities must belong to same species or genus;
and, finally, contraries belong to one genus or to contrary genera when they
themselves are not genera.
In the light of the above, the argument here from the possibility of a thing's
existing or becoming to the likelihood (6c1~B'sv 4v) of the identical possibility for its contrary is grounded in the nature of contraries as extremes
within a genus or species. As such they are potentially present, aI!d if one

930 16

237

COMMENTARY

Ii "de ... fi hmoTia; o

EN I129a 13-14: "a dynamis of itself appears to deal with opposites"; and
we were told in A I that rhetoric and dialectic which ate
can argue
opposites, 55a 2!r30.
can be actualized, so can the other, e.g., a II-IZ:

a""a,..,.,

a II x,d vocrijer"'L

here and in the similar instances which follow: Hal

(dvvaTov ea'n) 110crijaaL: "so, too, it is possible. .. ,"

fi

64h

14 : 1.
Wv..Wv
sc." ,l.al " " ...aBal (a 9) here and in
the repeated instances of a""aT&' between a 12 and b 7.
3 x ..l TO a",OLOV
sc. a~Ttii: "so also the one like to it." If two
things are alike in every way as fat as the mind can determine, the possibility
that one can come into existence offers firm assurance of the same possibility
for the other. Such similarity is the ground upon which example often works,
e.g., 8polo'''eo,8,..olo., A 2, 57b 27-36, 02b 15-17. The likeness suggests
a class (or genus) and so equal possibility for actual or appatent members of the
class. The following from Book I are some instances of A.'s use of the
word: 56a 31, 59b II, 60a 5, 63a 32 (on the senses of "like," o Met. IOI8a
15-19, I054b 3-13).
IZ : 1
3

x",1

01

At A 6, 63a 24 the "difficult" is defined, and

a 13 : 1 TD X.a..ml>TOPOV
in terms of it the "easy" is explained (638 22 : 3), thereby establishing the
two as correlatives, in the sense that any greater contains within itself the
lesser. The principle is used immediately at a IS. Spenge!. p. 255, refers to
Isocrates, To Philip 3!r57 (0 6]a 22 : 0) as an illustration and to Alcidamas,
On the Sophists 6 (see Radennacher, B.XXII.15, p. 135) who atgues that
those able to handle the difficult can rcadily manage the easier but not vice
versa.
o d TO crnouli",iov
is the reading of cod. A and the edd., except
Kassel, who reads .f n with Vahien. Reading TO (0 next note): "if the good
and beautiful thing can come into existence."

a 13-15 x ..l eI ... yevierS...

"And if it is possible for a thing to
come into existence as something good and beautiful, then it is possible for
it to become in general." The axiom is m.de clear by the explanation at
a IS, or at Top. I39b 8 ("it is easier to do something than to do it well"). In
the real or the notional order of existence, a thing has first to be able to be
before it can submit to further qualifications.
It should first be noted that the suba 16-20 06 'II px'll ... yIYV'T"'L
stance of what is stated in this axiom is used implicitly by A. in the axioms
which follow in a 20-28 (TO IICIT'eo, ... "'I'IAc,,). The meaning of this
statement on possibility (somewhat befuddled as it is by the seeming in-

AllISTOTLE, 'RHETOllIC' II

92"

20

congruence of the explanation at a 16-19) is (with that e"'planation incorporated) as follows: any thing, not intrinsically self-contradictory (a 16-19),
which can be or become can also end, and any thing which can end can
begin. The explanation at a 16-19 simply extends the principle to anything
capable of existence in the real or notional world. At 64a 10: J rdevant
Aristotelian texts on dex~ axe cited together with references. Its meaning
there as the starting point, beginning, originating principle of a thing is the
meaning it carries here.
i.e., that the diagonal of the square could
be or actually is commensurate with its side. Spengd, p. 267, cites many
passages where A. uses this example. It is an instance of something intrinsically incapable of an dex~ as far as existence (even notional) is concerned, e.g.,
a square circle.

a 17-19 otov ... y{yve-r.. ,

11"........ . ..

Y{YVR..'
This in the order of physical reality as
a 11)-20
A. knew it is secure as a universal proposition of basic significance to investigation in any case of becoming. Cope (as has been remarked dsewhexe, e.g.,
6Gb 14 : .), with his emphasis on practical rhetoric for the practical orator,
has a tendency to triviaIize statements such as this; see, e.g., his comment
here on a 16-19 at p. IS2, or on the following principle, the priority
of o1!ala, which is described as "utterly usdess in Rhetoric, from which all
nice distinctions and subtleties of all kinds are alien" (p. IS4).
C 920 16-20; this is but another form of the
a 20 EI d GCJ'<8pOV
principle enunciated at a r6-19 (and c a 2]: "al deX'l ...). Two statements on the principle are found at Cat. 140 26 - 14b 2], and Met. IOIsb 9 1019a 14 particularly 1019a 1-14- Met 102sb l3f[ discusses o~"ta at some
length, and at 10]20 12 follows it with an analysis of yb18"". I believe that
Cope, pp. IS2-S3 (c preceding note) and some of the translators misinterpret
the explanation at a 21-2]; e.g., Cope: "if a man can be generated, then a
child; for that (the child) is prior in generation ... and if a child, then a man;
because this (the child ...) is a beginning or origin." But in reality as far as
prior-posterior is concerned, this is saying the very same thing: child comes
"'eOTBeov. But A.'s argument from the example given by way of illustration
is that if something in the order of nature can exist, something whose substantial being or generation naturally demands an antecedent, then the antecedent
can exist or come into being. For example, as A. says, if man can exist or
become, then a child. The reason (a 22: neaTeeO> ... ytyvna.) is that man
(i"e,vo) in substantial being (i> o~al~) is prior: the possible existence or
becoming of the substantial being, man, is necessary for the existence or becoming of the child. On the other hand, if the existeoce or becoming of a
child is possible, then, too, the man, since in the order of generation (iv yeveael) the child (dem . .. i".IV1j) in the order of nature is prior to ~e adult.

92a 28

COMMENTAllY

a 22-23 (TtpOTEpOV . yly.......,..)

theses here and at a 23. AH."O, i.e.,

239

All (except Spengd) read the paren-

iI.de" 1'rl8 ..,.

'e'" -

a 23-25 ..C1l cl)y '<0 Tto).u

On the closeness in A.'s mind of
hn8u,.!.. see 85a 23; on the nature of bn9v,.ia, A II, 7ll" 17-27. A.
continues to speak in terms of the natural order and states that the objects
of natural hwnan love or desire are able to exist or come into existence.
The ground of the argument is that objects of natural desire represent things
which bdong to the nature desiring because they complete, perfect, the
nature. In fact, they are draBd proper to the nature (on the dra8, A 6,
62a .21-29). Since they are such, the nature moves instinctivdy toward
them, and since "nature makes nothing in vain" (Pol. I256b 20-21; cf. Bonitz,
Index 836b 29-37 for numerous references to this principle), this instinctive
natural desire marks the objeclS as bdonging to the nature and potentially
existent and attainable. Thus the comment .t a 24: 0~6e1, ... hn8v,..t
The added qualification (cb, .. "OAV: "generally, for the most part") simply
faces the fact that man's desiring does not always conform with his real nature.

a 25 ....l wv ......qV"L
This is one of the opposites mentioned in the
Categories and identified as corrdatives; cf. !)2a 9-II. The 6vvaTa here are
those things contained in eLl', as he states at a 25-26 (dVV4-rOV ... Y'IIea8at;
see following note). The very nature of science and art (and on the latter
see A I, 54a II) is that they are a science and art oj something, a fact upon
which Socrates spends some time in the Charmides 1651>-171C. Granted the
science and the art, their objects either exist or can exist.
se. dVV4TO'V (eUTt);
a 205-26 6uvu'C'ov 'C'caU"C'lI KelL e.IvclI. xexl YfNEria.a.
this is the reading of a good tradition adopted by Spengel, Cope, Ross, Kassel;
the other edd. read with cod. A. I would accept the above reading, consistent
as it is with the usage in rhe whole paragraph.

a 26 iI cl:pxi)
When the principle and starting l1"int of anything (whether
the starting point be a thing or person; cf. a 28: T..vTa . <piA.,) lies in oUl
power (ie., we can compel or persuade), then the possibility that the thing
will come into existence is assured if we decide to elCercise the power: "(And
those things are possible) whose principle of coming to be resides in elements
which we can compel or persuade."
a 28 .....u........ cpll.OL
"such would be those things regarding which
we possess more strength, or power, or are their friends." "estTT:ovr:, in the
sense found at 8.zb 15-18. ""e'.t, in the meaning of the word found at S6a
I3; C 6sa.,. : On <pIAo, cf. B 4-

a 28-30: xC1l wv . .. TtO).u

Again we have the opposition of correlatives, and as one implies the other in the real or notional order, the

ARISTOTLE. 'RHETORIC' II

92b 3

principle explains itsel The meaning of 8AOV here is: that which has parts;
and such an explanation of it is found at Mel. 1023 b 12-36 where A. sets forth
the meaning of part and whole. As the text here is commonly understood
and punctuated, the phrase cb~ brl TO "oAV qualifies only the second member
of the sentence ("al iJJv TO 8Ao I'Be'!). This is reasonable. For the meaning
of "part" is that which belongs to a whole. Thus if the parts are possible,
then the whole is. To speak of possible (or real) "parts" otherwise is without
meaning. On the other hand, it does not always follow (and so cb, i"l TO "oAV)
that if a whole is possible, the parts also are. Any failure of efficient or formal
causality in the generation of an organic whole Qike a body) can on occasion
give a whole in which a part is missing; or again in any substantial union of
matter and form, the aWOAO. is possible but the parts (ilA'!, eldo~) are not
possible as independent entities.

a 30-32 .1 yup ... KE<pcz).I~.

K.xl d
This is the reading of four edd.,
Spengel. Ross, Cope read at a 12 with a good tradition "e'l'aAI~ Hai xmhv.
The period is read by Kassel, Spengel, Ross, and Cope (after Xm6v). All
four start a new sentence at Hal Bl. Roemer, Dufour, Tovar punctuate
with a comma. The problem with interpretation is that we are not sure of
the meaning of the words as applied to shoes; Cope, pp. I8S-86, outlines
the difficulty and olfers as translation of the three words: the slit down the
front of the shoe; the toe cap; the upper leather. Each of these is substantially
the accepted dictionary meaning; c LS. Furthermore there is some foundation for some of them: e.g., Prob. 9S6b 4 mentions "eO"X"'l'a. in connection
with shoes, and Xenophon in the same connection wes 0 "xIC.,v (one who
suts out the shoes) and 0 6'; X'Twva~ I'0VOV """Til'v", (another who cuts
out only the uppers) in Crrop. 8.2.5. In fact the passage from Xenophon
indicates that the shoes were made in parts. The scholiast is not of much
help in explaining neOt1x'''l'a, ''''I'a.tl~.

a 32 - 92b 3
K.xl d ...0 ... ttAOLOV
"and if the whole genus belongs
to those thing. which are able to be, then the species belongs...." d""aTw,
is a partitive genitive with tUTI understood (S. I3 I9). This axiom is a form
of correlative opposition in which each concept or reality entails the other,
and so to grant the possibility of one is to grant that of the other. If the
genus as a whole (TO 'YO,8AO.) is able to exist, obviously by that very fact
any of its species is a possible existent.
b 3-5 Kai d 8ci...pov . . . 6LttAci,",ov
sc. d""aTd. 'Y ...afJa. as the main
idea at a 9 (dIWaTo.1j .lva, 11 'Y ,,8a.) has been stated from a 14 on. Since
.the dependence of one upon the other is grounded in their very nature, the
fact that one can be or come into existence entails the other. The example
is the one given in theCalegorles passage cited at 92a 9-II. Odneov (lreeo,) =

COMMENTARY

one of two; Td "'.'P.,,6, = to be that which a thing is by nature. C A 4.

60a 22; IS. 76b 22; 60a 5 : 1. 6Ib II : 1. 1Qa 6 : 2; and see 92b 16. Thus
8oneo. TW. . .. ",e'PV,,6T"" = "if one of two things naturally related to
each other (can be or become)."
b 5-7 Ked e! .. 6uvCl..ov
All the words indicate care. attention. effort.
informed skill. e.g. TBX"'''I (5.... II : 1). "'aeaC11<eV>i (6ob II). ~".",I.}...a
(70) 12). Anything which can be realized without careful attention and
skill can be done all the more with those qualities.
b 7 Aycie...v,
On the case, see S. 1492. Agathon was an Athenian
and after Aeschylus. Sophocles. Euripides the most eminent of the tragic
poets. His birthdate is not known (perhaps in the 440S B.C.). His death in
Macedonia is thought to be ca. 401; he went there possibly at the age of 40
in 407 a year after Euripides iupposed to have gone to the same place.
Plato's Symposium represents a party held at Agathon's house to celebrate
his first victory in 416. and from the text he is apparently young (17Se. I98a).
A.peaks of his work a number of times in the Poetics (chaps. 9. IS. 18). C
OCD. PW Agathon (13). and also (PW) S.9.I895 for more recent bibliography.
All thing. considered I would follow
b ~ KClI 1''1'' ... npocrylyv..... ,
the Greek text as printed by Snell (frg. 8. Nauck & Snell. p. 7(5). which is
the text read by Cope and. among the edd.. by Kassel:
"al ",~. Tei ",.. ,.. xeli T6X"1I "'eo"".... Td M
fJ"," d.a,."17 "al -rum "'eoayt"l"Ta.
The major codd. and nwst other. read -rum for TBX"''lI in the first line. "18
Tfi -rum. as do the Vetus Translatio. and very probably the schoHast. TiX"1I
first suggested by Grotius (i Snell; Kassel. Der Text. pp. 136-37) was also
used by R. Porson. who conjectured xe~ TiX"'TI. dropping Tfi of the codd.
From our te.'<t (b sf[) it i. clear that TI.%"1I is required, and EN II40a 20
suggests that Agathon apparently wrote it. as does the contrast between
"'ed""... (achieve. accomplish. manage) and "I!O""IiYV8Ta. (happen to).
All the edd. read the word. e.g . Tfi dX"''lI: Roemer. Dufour. Tovar. Spengd;
T;j, TiV"I': Ross following Richards (p. 177). "I!d""... is read by Cope.
Kassel. but also by Spengel (on the grounds that we do not know what was
antecedently said) and Ross ("it bdougs to art to do"); all the others read
neaaae,b 10 xdpoa, KClI ij....oa'
The first is a comparative of "a,,6,; the
second i. often in sense a compar.tive of "a,,6, and ",'''eo' (A 2. 58. 14;
4.6oa I; 6. 63' 33;,ab 35: 1). The distinction between the two here would
be that of Victorius: e.g. x,teo",. those morally w~; fjTTo",. those inferior.
wesker in physical strength. On ci'PeO""Tieo" 68b 22.. Schrader. p. 380.

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETOBIC' ]]

suggests as illustrative of the concept Cicero, Tusc. 2.17.39 ("And so will the
military veteran be able to do this, the learned and wise man unable? Indeed
he will be better and not by a little bit"), and Tacitus, Agricala 3 I ("Under
a woman's command the Brigantes fired a colony ... and could have thrown
off our yoke: let us, fresh and unconquered, ... show at once from the first
assault what kind of men Caledonia has reserved for herself").

C 68a 20 :

2;

68a 21 :

1.

b 12-13 &vo" . ~pEiv

All the edd., Spengel, Cope, read Eil8,,.0,;
Kassel with the two scholiasts (Anon., Stephanus) reads E~ov.ov, as the name
appears in the speech mentioned below. The comment of Isocrates is not
known to us from his works, and this may be the occasion for the variety
in the spelling since the person is also called EII8v"a, in some codd., a name
also mentioned by Stephanus whose gloss indicates that he knew the speech
Against Euthynus. This speech appears in the corpus of Isocrates; it has been
dated to ca. 403/402, but it is incomplete and its authenticity has been questioned. Cope's conjecture (p. 188) is possible.

b 13-14

."Ept & "'I<cipX.L

As we saw (7Sa 22), A. studied the
emotions and character generally as pairs of contraries; but in some instances,
as here, he left the opposites to be worked out by the reader, e.g., 8sa 14-15,
87b 15-20.

i. the reading of four edd., Spenge!. Kassel, Cope

add from. good tradition 11 "'" yiyo ; however, Kassel expresses reservations on the addition in his apparatus criticus. This ..a is generally
spoken of in relation to judicial rhetoric (A 10-14). In judicial rhetoric the
initial question calling for resolution is that of fact. It should be noted, however, that by a kind of shorthand (.een earlier and at much greater length in
B 12-13) the whole passage from 92b IS to 93a 8 (concerning judicial and
deliberative rhetoric) is in effect a unit. The priociples (with the exception
of the fint two at b 15-19) proposed as source. for argument for past fact
(judicial rhetoric) are repeated briefly for future fact (deliberative): compare
92b 19-20 ("d.TS' ... o~6") with 93a 1-2 (TO yde ... lOTa.); 92b
21-24 (In .1 ... ",8v,,0;;a ..) with 93a 2-3 ("at rd ... Bna); 92b 24-26
(..al .! ... "od/aa.) with 93" 3-5 (TaVTa ... "'" "BllaVIa); 92b 26-31
(.. ai ,I ... e:rs4!aa) with 93a 5-8 (..al s! ... o!..ta). Further, the fint
two (b 15-19) are in fact slight variations of those seen in what precedes:
e.g., 92b 15-17 is another way of utilizing 92a 13 (el TO xaA,,,wTBeo ... eq.o.)
and 92b '7-19 is a form of the principle at 92a 20-21 (el TO 6areeo . TO

b 15 01 & YEYOV""

o.

"eOTBqa.).
b 16 : 1 TO ij....ov ... ".rpux"'~ YErov""
disposed to happen has occurred."

"that which is less naturally

COMMIlNTAR,Y

243

3 YoEy""O~ liv d'IJ ... I',z).).""

"then that which is more naturally disposed should also have happened." The optative signifies only the
possibility of, not the actual occurrence, even though the stronger ""tural
disposition to happen is present. This is one of the reasons for the comment
at 92b 31-32: lIaTI aol .. i%O'Ta.

b 17 "1:0 il,....pov l<o>a6~

"that which ordinarily [usually, customarily]
happens later"; cpo A 12, 7U 1.6: s/wBoTa (at 79b 4ff. the principle can be
seen in use). In such cases it is safe to assume the antecedent (-fd neo....eo.).
However, in the example used (ala . .. T06TO), A present> us with a neces,ary relation between consequent and antecedent in which given the consequen the antecedent has to be.
b 19 .MvIl"l:O Kill 01(300)."1:0
This principle is used at 82a 27 - 82b 4,
82b 8-9 in the chapter on fear; cpo 83a 19-24; the argument applies to action
which lies fully and unrestrictedly within the person's power, power joined
to the will to act. As the explanation at b 19-20 indicates, the ability to act
is complete (l,...odrb... ovdi.) and in this respect it diJfers from the following
principle at b 2I, sl S{JOVASTO ... ',,"'AvB>, where the power is contingent
on certain conditions. If such capability to act conjoined with the deliberate
intent to act can be shown, then, says A.., the action has been taken. Before
considering (e.g., Cope, pp. 189-90) whether A. had an idea of "will" in
s{JovASTo we should note two things: (a) that what is said about human
action here and at 93a 1-4 relects the statement at A la, 68b 32 - 69b 32;
and (b) that A. is apparently distinguishing here between the character of
s{JovASTo and ' ..sBv,... (b 22), just as he did atA la, 68a 37 - 69a 7 where he
says that {JovA"1Ja,~ is the rational wish for the good. c 69& 2-3 together
with 6gB I : 3, Met. I072a 27-28; and then 64b 32 : 4 together with 68b 326gB 2. In our present palisage l{JovA8To would appear to signify a more
deliberate and reasoned action; 1".Bv,. .. (b 22), amore habitual (C 69& 8 : 3)
and unthinking act, as the example (b 23-24: 01 ,.... I",Bv,.oiJaw) indicates. A look at some instances of {iovAsaBa, encourages one to interpret the
word in the direction followed by Victorius ("cuncti enim, inquit, qui agendi
facultatem habent, si volunt, quod volunt, efficiunt"), and Schrader, p. 381,
even more emphatically ("voluit praevia deliberatione"); for Schrader l"smeans "concupivit ex affectu." For example, at 80b 35 - 8ra 1 (see
Sob 36 : 1), {iovAsaBal in the context implies an act with reason behind it
and one more firm than mere desiring (just as 69a 1-4 calls (Jov)."1Ja,~ a rational
wish for the good, 69& 2-3). At 82a p - 82b 2 deliberate intent is the implication, and we find in the context that neoate.aBa, is used (on neoate.a,;
,ee 5.". 2 : 1, 63a 20 - 63b 4, 63a 20 : 1). At 84> 27-31, because of the
ernotion analyzed (shame), there is more in the word than simple wishing,
as there is also at 84b 14-15, 30, 37. {Jov;'.aBa" as a more deliberate act of

6V,..,

ARISTOTLE, I'RHETORIC' II

wishing, desiring the good or what is seen by the individual as good for
himself, implies reasoned action (the AoY.U"ijJ "tfa 6v.a,..(J)~ of the parallel
passage at 93a 3) in contradistinction to the spontaneous and natural desires,
the ,!Aoyo. ae'Eo.~ of A 10, 6ga 4. fu reasoned action one would expect
some calculation and therefore some choice in the action.
b 19-20 "clv...~ .. "pcl""OUcr,V

C PoL 13 ub 3.

b 20 lp."oSw" ymp "':'Siv

fu noted at g2b 19, nothing wilhin the
person is an obstacle to the act. This is by way of distinction from the next
principle closely joined to it (iT') where there is no obstacle .xlernal to the person. Spengel, pp. 269-70, sees no difference in meaning between b 19-20 and
b 21 (I... . ",aU".,.) and would change the passage as cOIrllpt. Omitting
his exclusions he would read b 21-22: In el
TOO' IE", l".,A".. "al
wwl{no,...A.

""a..

is the reading of a good tradition and accepted by

Ross, Kassel, Cope. The other odd. read "al .1 d".aT&'.

b 21 K,d d .su".._

1 rl>py{~...o
From the definition of anger (cf. B 2) it is clear
that the possibility of an act of retaliation is essential to it. See A.'s comment
at A II, 70b 13-14.
2 m.OUp..,
After b 21-22 (In ... hroO.") the verb "'''eax.
of b 19 is understood. On the idea in lnoO."." see references above in
g2b 19 and also A II, 70a 16-27 (with the notes thereto), II9a 3 : 1.

b 22 :

b 23 Wv bplyov.... , ... "o,OOcr",

For the reason see 6ga
,should note that it is qualified here (w~ ... noAu').

I :..

One

b 23-24 01 p.tv .. m,lh>p.OOcr,v

The opposition of these two classes

has been met before: e.g., 7Iia .8 : 2, 83b 32-33, 88a 35-36. On In.o,,,i~
C 86b JI : 2, Boa 30 : 1,788 13 : " 6Ia "5 : 2. On the ide. in d"eau1a,
68b 14: 2.

b 25 : 1 Ip.""'. ylynoa.. " " ..t rn".iv

is the punctuation of Tovar,
Ross, Kassel; the reading ofRoerner, Tovar, Kassel. Ross bracketsy,,,u6a,;
Spengel, Cope, y'y.oaOa, "al, although the words are found in all the codd.
Vahlen, Arisloleles De arte POttica, p. 183, reads as above and interprets "al .1
."dA. "lyv."Oa. "al [sc. sl ii"s}.A.] no i l><o~ yde "d., i.e., "if something
was about to happen, and [ifsomeone was about] to do something." He remarks
that while only the second part of the statement is explained "aeque verum
sit .I"o~ TO "i}.}.o. ",,,".aBa. "ayo'''a, et hoc ... a quovis intelligente lectore
ultra cogitetuI." Obviously if we complete Vablen above, the apodosis to
the first condition is yiyo.., and to the second nenol"".. I accept the reading
of the codd. and interpret it in the same way as Vahlen and Cope (pr. 191>-91)

COMMBNTAllY

do. This interpretation is found in the Roberts translation, quite unclearly

in Freese, and not at all in Jebb & Sandys, Cooper.
2 lXD~
See S?a 34 : 2, 3, S7b 1 : 2; ..If/p.i.....

"Olij",,,

b 25-26 Elxo~ ...

"for it is probable th.t a person on the very
verge of doing something did it." lu seen above (9Zb 25 : I), A. explains
The "al is intenonly the second part of the statement, sc. ellPMk

".,si..

sive.
b 26-31 XCll .. yCyOl/V .. rnElpCl"V
"And if all those things which
.re by nature antecedent to X or the means to X have happened (then X has
happened); for example if it has lightened, then it has thundered and if one
made the .ttempt to act, then he acted. And if all those things have happened
whose nature it is to be consequent upon X or which are the cause of X, then
the n.turaI antecedent X and the cause have happened; for example, if it
thundered, then it lightened, and if he acted, then he made the attempt to
act." This passage is a unit in which the statement ofb 26-28 is given conversely at b 28-31. The principle makes use of the idea of relation grounded in
as well as antecedent-consenature seen at 92b 3-5 (c 9zb 3-5 on
quent, 92. 20-23 (c 92b 17-19). Victorius interptets in.lea". in one of
its possible meanings: make an attempt to seduce a woman.

".'1'"".')

"tfpux.

".".,

b 26
is the reading found here in all the codd., and at
b 28 it is the reading of cod. A. The edd., Spenge!, Cope read it in both
places. Ross and Kassel read "l'l'v". at b 26; Kassel (as would 1) te2ds it
.also (with cod. F) at b 28. "s"v" .. is found in Plato and generally corrected
to nl'!'v....
b 31 ... fLv l~ .vci.YX'l~
This conclusion to the ways in which to establish the existence of past fu:t takes into account that in some instances the
natural relation between the two events establishes the past fact with certainty;
in other instances, particularly those involving human action, with strong
probability. The phraseology here takes us hack to A 2, 57a 22 - 57b 10
and particularly so since much of the form ofargumentation used in 92b 15-3 I
is based on sign and probability argument, as can be seen from the subsequent
passage in A 2, i.e., 57b 10-25. On the question of necessary argumentation
see S?a 22 : I, S?a 28, S7b 4, 57b 10-21. .iJno, lx.vTa qualifies both Ta
pl. and Tel de: "some are so related...."
This is the phrase used atA 2, 570 34 for
b 31-32 ... 5' .:.~ ... ""AU
probable argumentation from B!"oTa; c S?a 34 : 2, 3. However, it is also
applicable to argumentation from <1fIpBia &Vrhvvpa (A 2., 57b 4), as some of
the iustances in the argumentation at 92.b 15-31 clearly indicate: e.g., the
statement that one did something because one was about to do it (a sign)
(b 25-2.6), etc. For the reason why argumentation from <1fIpBia dvrhPvpa

ARISTOTLE. cRBETOlUC' II

is only probable. c 57b 10-:>1. and for the difference between the probable
argumentation of el,,6, and a'1p.6t01l cf. uX'Y}pst01l.'"
b 32-]3 ".pl . . . lp"lJl'"livo.~

C!)2b I3-I4.

b 33 <pllv.plw II... ix
is the reading of cod. A. Ross. Kasse!. Spenge!.
Cope. The other edd. read without 8" (from a good tradition). The parallelism with 92b 13-14 (",eel .. V"ae%") is obvious. Spenge! and Cope note
that the verb to be supplied in the 8n clause would be Vnae".~ It should be
clear. however. that the reading without 8 of a number of codd. is quite
acceptable and its correctness is not diminished by the parallelism noted.
93a I -rWv 116..b>v
i.e. the principles presented to argue that something
has happened. 92b I5-3 I.
a 1-2 ..6"t ... lIv ECM:Il.
"since that will be for which there is both
the power and the deliberate intent." On dv.ape.. povl7ja.. see !)2b 19.

/Iv......

a 2-3 xlll ..elt .

"and those things will be for which there is the
desire, or the anger. or the deliberate calculation. united with the power to
act." On ",,,8vpia c Ala. 68b 37 - 69a 7; II. 70a 16-27. Because of the
third sp~cation here (loy.ap<p). I would interpret b,,8vpia as ""dupe.
was understood at 9zb 19 and as A. uses the word at 69a 9-15 or 70. I9-25.
the irrational desire. which is what he actually calls ",,,8vpia and ae,,'i at
69a 4. On Ao".ap<p c 89& 36. 69b 5 : 2.
a 3 Mil ...IIU..II XCII Iiv
the reading and punctuation of cod. A. the
edd. Sponge!. Kassel is doubtful about the passage. Cope (and Victorius) reads
with cod. F: S.Ta. 6..i TaVTa "al d tv and offers an explanation for it; this
, i, the reading followed by .ome English translations. From the language of
a 2-4 it is clear that human action is the subject (e.g. b,,8vpi~ aero. lo".ap<p).
If we read with cod. A and the edd. the passage at a 2-5 might be interpreted: "and those things will be for which there is the desire [c note
above] ... united with the power to act. and all tho,e things [Tavra] which
are at the ,tarting point of action or are about to act will occur since usually that Whicll is on the verge of taking place actually occurs more than
that which is not."
"And if all the natural antecedents have
a 5--<1 XIII d ... yIYVEcrOIl'
taken place." !C. "then the consequent will happen"; c 92b 26-27. "eOTSeo, ",sqnlxe "1,,,sa8a i.e. determined by nature to occur first.
a 6 CNWi<p..
is Cobet. correction of the accent for this word as ordinarily found in the codd.
1 dxci~
C 9zb 31-32 and the references there.
z ..0 vEXII ...oU ..ou
Le. the means to the end; c 92b 26-27: be"a
lxsl'llotJ. The ICend" is 'tOV'fO at a 7.

a 7:

COMMENTARY

93' 14

247

a !HI "'.pl .. 'PI1VOPW

The truth of this statement, which is explained in more detail at a II-16, is borne out by a re-reading of A 7 ((1I)"'P1eo, and ddiberative rhetoric), 9 ("aU. and epideictic), 14 (61"a.o. and judicial). Though Spengd, pp. 271J-'71, partially challenges the statement (i.e.,
<b!:lw, at a 12-13, a glance at A 7 (c outline at COMMENTARY I 143) shows
that A. does look at ti,e greater and the lesser "dnlw.-" (in itself), as be says
here, as well as the greater-lesser good, i.e., uv"'P1eo" "aU., 61"alo" respectively. He does this formally for uv"'Pieo, in A 7, for 61"alo. in A 14less formally for "aM. in A 9.

a 9 ".pl ... "'P ..yfLci....,v

At A 3, 59a 22-26 A. makes a similar statement. The remark here and at A 3 is seemingly challenged at 93a 16-17:
"to examine greatness and superiority in the abstract is idle discussion." The
criticism is correct not only for the reason given at 93a 17-18 but also because
both tenns, great-small, in thernsdves are relative terms and determined only
by reference to another, a fact which A. indicates both at 93a 9-10 and at 59a 23
by his use of the full phrase "sel 6~ I'srlBov, xal I'I"eOT7JTO, ... "ai "stCo.o, T8 "ai ';lehTo.o,. If we ask then if A. has spoken about "the greatness
and smallness of things and of the greater and lesser and in general [HAW,]
of great and small things ... and about the greater and lesser in itself[dnAw.j"
(93a 9-13), the answer musr be yes. In determining the greater and lesser
individual goods in A 7, for example, A. set down general principles on
greatness and smallness (c 591l 24) whereby the greatness and Smalhless of
individual things could be determined. Thus in his analysis he has followed
his remark at 59a 24 ("al "aBoAov xai "eel '"elenov) and those here at 93a 13
(ww,) and at 93a 10 ("aIHAw,).

a 9-10 x .., fLd~ovo~ . , D.ci.....ovo~

21-35; 64a 12-23,

64a

]I -

64b

II,

ce.

specifically A 7, 63 b 7-12,

65a 8-J3.

a II "'PO P'lfLev.........

As already noted, A 7, 14, are clear instances

and readily recognized. A 9, however, does not receive the attention it
should. The discussion there is constantly of the greater (e.g., virtues, honorable, etc.) and the comparative degree is a common occurrence. At 68. Io-II,
22-27 the role of avE... is ina-oduced.
a 12-13 ".pl"<oU .. D.ci"<"<ovo~
a 13 xue" bClO'''fov .. . l.oywv
c A 3 for the e,6" Tela.

c 93a 9-11.
i.e., "in each of the kinds of discourse";

a '4 "<0 "'poxdp.evov .. 4yo:8w

C A 3, 58b 6Jf. and S8b 8-29.
As Til" the UVI''P<eo" "aU., d/xalo. are draB ; c 63 b 12-17 (1".1 ...
Ta IDa). Individually, for aVl"Pieo" c 6aa 20; "ala., 66a 33-34; 61"alO', 62b 28, one of the indisputable draB&.

ARISTOTLE., 'RHBTORIC' II

a IS bcol""",

93' 18

i.e., the advantageous, the honorable, the just, so, too,

TaVTa, a 16.

a 16-18 '1:11 lit . .. "p ..yp......"

C 93a 9. &. an h"anjf.'1/ "e"'"<>ni
concerned primarily with the elfort to enable men to make correct judgments
on open problems, rhetoric will be mosdy concerned with the particular
knowledge of experience. A range of experiential knowledge joined to
the theoretical knowledge of the art (0 Met. 981a 12 - b 3) makes the good
rhetorician and is the objective of A.'s study.

a 18 "pll~ -djv Xpel..... .. "PIIYp.""""

" ... for ordinary needs individual f.cts (carry more weight) than large theoretical statements." On
..." HaO' haaTa see 5gb 2.

CHAPTER

the common proofs; specifically. example

I . Introduction: 93' 23 -27

II . Development: 93a 28

-!)4a

r. 93' 28 - 94' 2
(a) 9Ja 28-3'
(b) 93a J' - 9lb 4
(C)9lb4-9lb 9
(d) 9lb 9-940'

2.

!)4a

2-16
(a) 940 >-8

(b)

940 9-16

III . Conclusion: 94a 16-19

20

16

the kinds and the use of =ple

the kinds
three kinds of onmple: IWtoric:al. parable
(parallel). fable
historical (i.... citing put fact) illustrated
parable (parallcl) iIlwtratcd
fable iUusttat<d

the uses
fables suit<d to dch1Jcrativc !hctoric but
IWtorical examples more valuable
use of ClClmple with reference to enthymcmc

(Roemer 16-19 = Ross 17-18. Kassel

I6-r8)

93a 23 lCo,vtirJ m..... ...,y ci""CIlV

C 9Ib 8-23 (with references) for
the pl.ce of this chapter in the development. Clearly Schrader. Cope (p. I9S)
by excluding chap. 19 as part of the discussion of the element> common to all
rhetoric do not accept the division of the work as given in 9Ib 8-23. Spengel.
p. 271, sees that drap. 19 is a part of all that follows to drap. 26 but considers
the introductory sentence here (93a 23) poorly written. Victorius has no
comment on 23-2-7. These "t......., common to all (&naa ..) rhetorical
discourse are called the "I......., anod""TO"al in A 2; C 5Sa I. Their dilference (as I view it) from the "t......., "'<6XVo. is given in COMMENTARY I 3SC>S4. On "t.......,. see 5sa 4. On their common use in all demonstration:
A 2, s6b 6-8. 56b 7, For a brief statement on them in A.. C lloyd. Aristotle
pp. n6-2 7.
a 24 : 1 t6"""
sc. ,,1......{JJ1I. Primarily these are the three "tan., MBXVO.
(Uyo,. "dBo" 7fBo,) of A 2. S6a IJf. but the dnxvo. as met in A IS would
also be included. On the "'TOXVO.. C S6a I : 1. 2. ]; S6a 3 : 2; 55. 4. On
the dnxvo SSb ]5: 2. 7sa 22 : z. 7sa 23.

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II
Z yEv.,
i.e., there are two kinds (1'i1n7) - namely, induction and
deduction - of the larger 1'&0' demonstration. These kinds have their own
species (.r~~): e.g., for syllogism, c 56b 5 : 1; for example, c 93' 28-30.

a 25 : 1 "'lIpcili.,Y!'-1I

""I EvOU!,-,!!,-1I

Cpo A 2, 56, 35 - 56b 27; 57' 7-

33, 57b 21'>-36, and the notes thereto in COMMBNTARY l. On the role of

each in the Rhetoric, 578 I5-I6.

2 yvc:.!,-,!
This concept is studied in B 21, as is its relation to enthymeroe.

a 21'>-27 3!'-OlDY ... "'''Y'''Yii

C A 2, 57b 21'>-36, 57b 27 : 2, S6b 5 : 2

a 27 dPX1\
As was said, 57b 27: 2, it is clear with respect to example
that one cannot use example. without explicidy or implicidy making a real
induction to apprehend the general class under which the example faIls.
In this sense induction is the "beginning" as far as example is concerned.
However, from A.'s remarks elsewhere - e.g., at An. Post. roob 3-5, 8ra
38 - 8Ib 9, EN II39b 25-31 - it is also the
with respect to syllogism.
The reason for this is that while the mind cannot know the individual but
only the universal the only way d,e intdlect can reacll the universal is through
the particular, as A. tries to show in An. Post. 99b 15 - roob 17, De an. 43Da
ro"17. On this problem see Owens, 167-68, or Harnlyn, pp. 140-41.

"em

i.e., two species or kinds of the genus example. We have

a 28 &IS,!
seen this use of the word at, e.g., A 4, 60a 21, 78b 14, 8Ib 33, and will see it
again at 94b 7, b 24. However, see s8a 36 : 1 and 68a 26.

Iv!,-Eo... Al(aU"ol
One kind is basically f.lctual and historical,
the citation of past events; the other is fictive in which one either invents a
comparable instance or utilizes suitable paraIlds already at hand (Cicero, De
part. orat. 11.40 mentions each kind). In all three instances of example, the
point to be noted is that the ground for each must be likeness, or similitude.
b c""'llp!e, a. A. explains it (An. Pro 2.24), we have two sta=ts of the
same order (A 2, 57b 29-30) with one more familiar and accepted as true.
The more familiar is used to establish the less familiar, or, as he says, the major
term (A) is shown to be applicable to the middle term (B) by means of a term
similar to the minor term (C). Thus if we wish to show that C is A, we can do
so through the example D which is like C since both have the attribute B.
But we also know that D has the attribute A. Therefore D is A, D is B, and
so B is A (thus the m'!ior term bdongs to the middle which is shown by way
of D). Then: B is A; C (as we already know) is B; so C is A. Ifin the example
at 93a 32 - 93b 4 we identify the terms, the use of example becomes clear:
A (cross over to Greece), B (take Egypt), C (Artaxerxes III Ochus), D" 2
(Darius, Xerxes). Arguments from example (or indeed parable, faple), based

'a 28-3 I

93' 30

COMMENTARY

25I

as they are on analogy, will yidd only probability; they can move only from
particular to particular in the same class and one particular must be better
known and accepted.
i.e., the speaker (writer).
a 30 : 1 aN..""
again a fO[IIl of argument by analogy grounded in
'''''p<>/301.>'1
similitude. It involves comparison as the word and the examples (93 b 5-9)
indicate. The word means: a juxtaposition for comparison, or as Cicero
denotes it col/ationem; c Quintilian, Inst. orat. 5. I I .2.3; Cicero, Defin. 4.27.75,
De o,al. 2.66.265. Ordinarily the comparison is invented by the speaker
(writer), and its effectiveness depends upon his acuteness of mind in seeing
analogies suitable to his argument (cp. Quintilian, Inst. o,at. S-II.I-6). In
itsdf the parable in its stricter form is an extended metaphor or simile in brief
narrative form usually for the purpose of teaching. An example of it can be
found in the objection ofCebes in Phaedo 87b 4-88b 8 to Socrates' argument
for the imm.ortaIity of the soul. In testameotalliterature where the parable
is a more readily identifiable form, it is mostly instructional, employed to
offer a clear illustrative example: ''The kingdom of heaven may be compared
to a man who sowed good seed in his field ..." (Mt. 13 :241f.).
a 3<>-31 l,Oya ... AL{3uxa(
In contrast to the parable, the fable is
not invented by the speaker (writer) but ddiberatdy sdected from material
at his disposal which A. points to here as Aesopic or Libyan. Of the latter we
know rdativdy little. There is a passing mention of Libya (Aeschylus, frag.
139, ed. Nauck & Snell) as well as Egypt and Sybaris as sources of fable; c
Plato, Phaec/rus 275b, Aristoph., Wasps I2.59. But Hermogenes, Progymnaslllala "Be! ,",-600v, says that the place names were given by those who discovered
the fables; c Spengd, Rhet. G,aea II, p. 3. The fable found in Classical
literature is apparently independent of the other main stream of fable which is
Oriental (India). Fabl... (Uyo~, Jabu/a: a thing said), parables, proverbs,
gnomic sayings possess in common the quality of wisdom literature. This
explain. in part both their suasive power and their use by speakers (writers).
They rellect the fund of common sense of the race. The fable of Classical
literature is identified with the name of Aesop (c Quintilian, Inst. o,al.
5.II.I9-21). The identification which was made by the Greeks in the fifth
century B.C. is confumed by the later formal collections of fables by Phaedrus
(ca. 15 B.C. - A.D. 50) and Babrius (latter half of first century A.D.). The sole
exception to this identification is the fables of Aphtbonius (latter half of
fourth century A.D.). However, we do have instanc... of fable prior to its
identification with Aesop. We know, for example, of Hesiod (? 750 B.C.),
Wo,ks and Days 202-212, Archilochus (? 68<>-640, or ca. 720 B.C.). Furthermore no collection of fables from the hand of Aesop has come down to us,
and indeed our knowledge of the man is meager despite the fact that in Greece

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

from the fifth century onward fable and Aesop became one, e.g., Aristoph.,

Wasps 1446-1448, Plato, Phaedo 61b. What these Greeks meant most likely
by Aesopic fable is that defined by Theon (second century A.D.) ". fictitious
story pictoring truth" (c Spengd, Rhet. Graeei II, p. 72-), such as we find in
Herodotus I.141, Aesch., Agam. 717-'736, or even Soph., Ajax II42-II58.
Aesop himsdf was most probably a Thracian from Messembria who was a
slave in Samos and a contemporary of Sappho's (ca. 612 - ? 550 B.C.); c
Herodotus 2.134-135. The first collection of fables under his name was made
by Demetrius of Phalerum (b. ca. 350 B. c.). This work is known to us only
through a copy made in the tenth century A.D., although it i. very probably
the source for the work of phaedrus and Babrius. Collection. of these Greek
fables in prose such as that of Demetrius (or later the sO<alled Augustana [i.e.,
Cod. Monac. 564J which probably goes back to a collection formed in the
second lfirst century A.D.) were made mosdy for practical reasons: for use by
writers and speakers. It is not until the time ofPhaedrus and Babrius that the
fable appears -as a onn ofliterature to be read for itsel The popularity of
the genre has continued, as can be seen in the aninral fables ofWalt Disney,
G. orwell's Animal Farm. See "Fabd" in PW; any of the works of B. E.
Perry - e.g., Aesopica 1- most of which are mentioned in the thorough
introduction to his Loeb aassical Library edition of B.brius and Ph..drus;
Hausrath, Haas, &: Hunger; and Cope, Introd., pp. 254-56. On the argument
from analogy, see Lloyd, Polarity, pp. 384-420, especially 403-14.

"the statement of facts is something such as

a 31 I ....'v .. "'0'''''&....,
the following," Basically this is the only kind of example An2ximenes con,sider.. His discussion of ".edd
apart from the question of similitude
is not of much hdp in opening up A.'s statements. The rdevant passages are
found at Anax. 1429a 21 - 14300 13, 1438b 39 - 1439a 7.-

"p.

".p ...

a 32 ......
>.iya'
If there i. any real situation here, 1 would
agree with Cope, p. 197, that it is the possibility of an attack on Greece.
Given the situation of Persia and Greece in mid-fourth century B. C., an attack by Persia on Greece seems far from likdy even though Artaxerxes Ill,
Ochus was engaged in subduing Egypt; c 93b 3.
Aapoio~ eN "po",.pov . . "plv
"for in the past Darius did not cross over [to Greece] until"; on the use of the second nedneov,
c S. 2440. Cambyses, king of Persia (529-522 B.C.) and son of Cyrus the
Great (559-529 B.C.), conquered Egypt for the empire in 5261525 (c Herodotus 3.11.). Darius who later became king (521-486 B.C.) was at the time a
member of the king's bodyguard (Herodotus ].139). whether Egypt revolted
from Persian rule in the general uprising. on the accession of Darius and
whether, as Olmstead (pp. 1411.) maintains, Darius "won baek his r~calcitrant

93b I "p6....pov

253

COMMBNTARY

subjects" in 519/518 before moving on Greece in the first Persim War of 490
B.C. is questioned.
Eldest son of Dariw, he came to the throne in 486/
93b 2 Sep~'1~
485 B.C.; he did not move against Greece in the second Persim War (480/479
B.C.), as Herodottu 7.7-20 tells us, until he himself had settled a revolt in
Egypt in 485 B.C. He ruled until 465.
b 3 cN"'o~
This would be Artaxerxes III, Ochus (358-338 a.c.). In 357/
356 he followed up a previous attempt made as crown prince in 359 B.C. to
return Egypt to its tributary position. He failed again but in 343/342 he
returned to the task and was successful. In 357 and again in 343 both Persia
and Egypt were employing Greek: mercenaries and in 343 prior to his attack
on Egypt Ochus sent an embassy to the major Greek: city-states to seek an
alliance against Egypt. Thebes alone responded. C CAR, VI 14!rI54.
24!r51; !socrates, Pa.ath. 159. For the structure of the argument c 93a 2831.
b 4 ...<k Ew"p"""XIi
C 93a 30 : 2. A.'s description of the we of comparison at Top. 156b 25-30 in fact rellects Socrates' own as seen in the dialogues: "Put forward your proposition by way of comparison, for people
more quickly accept a proposition made for some other purpose and of no
use for itse! Further don't put forward that proposition which has to be
established but rather one from which it [the proposition to be establishcd]
necessarily follows. For people more readily concede that kind of proposition
since the result from it is not as clear, and when this proposition is won then
the former is also." Anyone acquainted with the early Socratic dialogues
knows the frequency of such apparendy unrelated comparisons (''he talks
about pack-asses, bronze smithies, shoemakers, hide-tanners, and always seems
to be speaking about the same things in the same terms," Symp. 221e) and the
frwcration of his respondents when caught out, e.g., Callicles, Gorgias 4!)Od
II - 49Ia 3, or Critias at Xenophon, Mem. 1.2.37-38; c Cope, pp. 198-99,
for other examples.
Le., hold a governing office; c

87a 20.

b 5~ IljLOLOV ... ':'.",op Iv

C S.fa 25; S. 2478-2480; our 11.. represents
the suppressed apodosis ("as it would be").
is the reading of Spenge! accepted by the edd., i.e.,
b 6 l'iJ 01 6Uv .........'
"should appoint by lot as atblctes not those who are able to contend fur the
prize but whosoever win the lot."
b 7-8 i\... xA'IP.....'ov
"or if one should assign by lot some one
or other of the sailors as the one who must be hebnsman."

aS4

ARISTOTLE, 61lHBTOIUC' II

b 8 .. ~ lit... ..0... AciXav.... ciAUt l"iJ ..0... E"''''''ciI''EVOV

This is the
reading of Cope, Ross, Kassel; the other edd. read with Spengel, Vahlell
(eli, oV d~.o TOO '",<lTa,...".> d.ud TOO .<aX'OTa). From what can be learned
of the readings from the critical apparatus, the reading given above best represents the text tradition. For eli, dll.o o S. 2.086 and 2.076: "on the grounds
that the one who wins the lot, not the man with professional skill, must be
helmsman." Comparisons of this very kind presumably made by Socrates
are among the charges leveled against hin1 in his trial: see Xenophon, Mem.
11.9
1 E""I,rtXopou
one of the distinguished poets of the Western Greeks
whose work is highly spoken of in antiquity but survives only in fragments;
sec Diehl & Beuder. Born at Metaurus in southern Italy most probably ca.
631., he lived at Himera in Sicily until his death ca. Ss6. He is well known
for his Helm and its recantation, the Palil/ode. See, e.g., Plato, Phaedrus 2.43ab, 2.440; sec also Quintilian, I"stral. 10.1.62. Quintilian also mentions
there the story of Phalaris (C next note). c PW, also S. XI, aGO, GAli,

b9 :

IV S03-S04.
2 .mAciPllio~
tyrant of Acragas (Agrigento) in Sicily ca. S70-SS4
One of the more notorious of the cruel tyrants who seized power with
the aid of a mercenary force, he removed all opposition through the use of
t=or tactics; o Pindar, Pythians 1.94-98. His use of a brazen bull to roast
his enemies alive is thought to be historically correct. On the other hand, the
Letters of Phalans (148 in number) are forgeries of a second century A.D.
sophist, as Bendey showed. As far as the time period for Stesichorus and
pha!aris is concerned, A.'s story is historically possible. But the place is not
terrain. We have the same story told of Gelon (0 73a n : z) of Syracuse;
sec, e.g., CAH, IV 37001. As can be seen at 57b 30 : z dlC relation between a
bodyguard and tyranny is fairly common. On Phalaris see PW, OGD, CAB,
B. c.

IV 3S4-SS.
b 10 Alac:.",ou .. 1i'l1""Y"'yau
Ross alone reads <6> before the name.
The fable is given at 93b 1.3 - 940 2.

b 13-23 "~ ... ofoe&Acip'&'

This is 2690 in the collection of Aesop's
fables in the Perry corpus, Aesopica I; C Horace, Epp. 1.10.34-38.

"::""'p>\......O.., probably throughout here in the meaning of

punish ; C Ci9b 12 : 1, 2.
b 15 ..,~ .. civOp..."ov
Cope and Kassel read Tdv from a good tradition.

~ 14.

the reading of all the cadd. and four of the

b 17 CNVOl"oAOy>j ..~..o~
edd. Ross reads O'V'O,..oAoy'ljera, with Richards, p. 178, who says that "two
participial genitives, referring to different unexpressed subjects, ;u-e very

94'l

COMMENTARY

255

clumsy." Spengd, p. 274. was also unhappy with the double genitive. However, the unexpressed noun which goes with each participle i. quite clear
from the context: (lnnov) allVopoADl"ia""To (d.6ea",ov) a.apO'.To
b 19-23 .. 06..... 8E . +<zAeip.8."
Thi. is the epimythion, the explanation of the fable (and here its application to the situation); see again at
93b 32-94a 2. In both places the edd., Cope use quotationIlllllks; see, however, 93b 39-32 where Tovar, Ross use quotation marks also.
"pleading in defense of a
b 23-24 GUV'lyap"'" xp.val'iv'l' 8'l~Y"'Y<i>
demagogue on trial for his life." This is the reading of a good tradition accepted by Cope, Kassd. Spengd and the other edd. read dT/P71"OeW. "ewop';"ov d71pa"OYyo;; which is a reading based in part on cod. A and the Vecas
Translatio. Kassel, Der Text, pp. 137-38, discusses it.

b 24 - 94& I .n.:,"'''''CI... xAt",."OV"'~

This is fable 427 in Perry's
collection, AesopiaJ 1. It is also found in brief form in Plutarch, Morali.
79oc-<l.
b 25 rpeipClyYCI
"crevice of the bank." Cope, p. 201, has an explanation
of the word.
"but the fox did not allow him to do so."
b 28-29 rljv 8i .av
The indirect statement beginning at 93a 24 (6'P71) determines a number of
the inJinitives.
b 29-32 a...... CI[I'CI
liT' is causal; because these .. she said; Tovar,
Ross alone punctuate with quotation marks.
b 3I cirpa.ll~
"if you remove them." This is the reading of Spengd,
Cope, Kassd; <i9>iA71T8, of Roemer, Tovar, Ross, is suggested by Bywater,
..Aristotelia Ill," 72, for the d'P.A71Ta. of cod. A; Dufour reads d'P.A1I as does
Freese. The given reading found in some later codd. is more acceptable.

"p

b 32 "ci.. oW XCll6I'i~," irp'l, ".r. av8p.~ . "

The problem of deciding here between codd. A and F (neither differs in meaning) is found in the
critical editions. Kassd, the latest, reads basically with F, and it is the reading
I have accepted. Spengd, Roemer, Dufour, Ross read with A omitting
oJ., .'P71 eli; so, too, Tovar (but he reads l<pTJ) and Cope (.-eading 1<pTJ eli); C
Kassd, Der Text, p. !38.
The parentheses are used by four of the edd.,
b 33 (,u.oUa ..~ ......v)
Cope. Tovar, Spengd omit them.

94& I .." xa.vei

"your [llp,.j public funds." This is the reading of all
the codd., and it is found in Spengd, Cope, Kassd. The other edd. read
10"'0. with Roemer for the Latin reliqua found in the translation of de Moer-

beke.

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

94a 5

a:z : 1 S'IfL'IYOP'Xo[
"suitable to speeches in the assembly"; c 59b
J2. : 1. Apart from their more general and fictive character, which relates
them somewhat loosely to the subject under discussion, there seems to be no
intrinsic reason why fable as fable should be more fitted to one kind of speech
than to another. For A.'s thoughts on the pre-eminence of deliberative
rhetoric, seeA I, 54b 2Z--29.
2 ci.y ..8.~ oG..o
Cpo S6b 19-20 where dra8.. ("advantage"
here) is in one interpretation used substantivally as it is here.

a 4 : 1 >'oyou~ Sl p/j.<w
We are told that fables were collected precisely
for the practical purpose of their being used by writers and speakers and for
no other. Their appearance as an independent fonn of literature intended to
be read solely for their own sake only begins with the work of Phaedrus and
Babrius; c 93a 30-31.
2 7<O,>j .... ,
This repeats wkt was said of fables at 93a 29-30.
But there is an olmous diiference between the "making" of a fable and that of
a comparison or parable. From the evidence of A: s words, it is cleal that
fables exist as independent entities ready to be used elfectively by a discerning
speaker (writer). On the other hand, the speaker must "make" the comparison;
c 93a 30 : 2. In each instance the "making" is different. With fable it is a
matter ordinarily of "finding" the relevant similitude, likeness, in the material
already at one's disposal; in parable one "invents" the relevant comparison.
This would be the point of his adding with respect to fable "if one is able to
see the likeness, an ability which comes from skill in philosophy."
a 5:

pqw

.read by the cadd., edd., Spengel,

Cope; Kassel secludes it.

;rho text of the codd. makes sense, and there seems no need for any change
although Thuror, "Obserntions critiques [II] ," 4Z would rearrange the line
for wkt he considers a more logical statement.
z 'X cp"'ocro<p(l~
Kassel alone writes this as <Tw.>l" rprJ.ofJorpLa,
and refers to Pol. I34Ib 28. With his reading (c note above) I assume that
he would interpret: "which is the task: of those engaged in philosophy."
Some translators interpret the word as "literary training," " meaning more
akin to the extended meaning !socrates gives to the word. Aside from the
fact that it is not immediately clear how this ability to think: analogically
would be formally developed by training in literature, I am not sure that A.
uses the word for anything other than the different aspects of intellectual
investigation or what he calls a[ "aTa rprJ.ol1orpLa. ""/T'ipa" the philosophic
sciences (Top. lOla 27); cpo Pol. 1282b 14-23, Top. I63a 36 - I63b 12. Certainly the few times it appears in the Riletoric it means "philosophy" - e.g.,
at 79" 35-36, 06b II. At I2a 10-12 there is a comment relevant to the matter
here on the sort of thing A. believes goes on in 'l'rJ.ol1o'l'La: "metaphors should
be drawn from things proper to the object but not obvious, JUSt a~ in phi-

!j4aIl

COMMENTARY

257

losophy also it bdongs to the adept individual to see likeness even in objects
that are far apart."
a 6 p,p..
The reading of a good tradition and Dufour, Ross, Kassel,
Cope; the others read liq:o It, like xe'1rJcpwnea, is predicate to an understood lCITt, whose subject is the substantival expressions Ta dea Tal. Uyw.
(f.ble examples lpar.bles) and Ta dea Tal. "eaypriTw. (historical ...).
a 8:

t"t ...10 "oAU

~........

,,~

C 82b 5-6.
y.yevo,nv
Cpo A 9, 68a 29-31.
el,,08E,~.,,,v

(iJ yelp ... ..-oU'ftdV). lJ.ov..... 8

This is the more satisfYing punctuation,
and it is found in Tovar, Ross, Kassd, Cope, and with a minor change in
Dufour. Roemer, Spengd place a colon after 63<od.tEerJIV. With one exception (0 94ll II : .), all read the same Greek text. "The person without
enthymemes must use examples as demonstrations [for the way of demonstrating is by means of these two modes of inference]. but the person possessing
enthymemes must use examples as witnesses employing them as evidence
subjoined to the enthymemes." We meet AnU.oyo~ again at 94b 8ff., and its
nature as a confirming reason is explained there. In the present instance it
would confirm by way of addition that which has already been demonstrated.
a srIl lJ.1IV'rII

... t"t ...o~

...

~8u">\"",,,V

a 10 : 1 el,,08o1~.,,,v
C 7& 8 : J.
"(.....,~
C 55a 4 meaning (b), Studies, pp. 5!r6Q.

By way of illustrating !j4a 9-II Spengel,

a II : J .:.~ ""p.... plo'~
pp. 275-'76, cites Problomata 916b 25f[ where we read: "Why are men more
happy with examples and fables in speeches than with enthymemes? Is it
because they rejoice both in learning and in learning quickly? People in fu:t
do learn more quickly through examples and fables. For these are things
which they know and which are particular. But enthymemes are demonstrations from universals which we know less than the particular. Furthermore
we place more trust in that for which there are several witnesses, and examples
and fables are like wimesses; again, proofs by means of witnesses are more
easy to come by. Further, too, men perceive likeness with pleasure and
examples and fables show forth likeness." Interestingly enough, this same
principle of pri91Jac~ T"X"" plays a part in his urging the use of a condensed
furm fur the enthymeme in the third book; o Studies, pp. 88-91.
tnt ...oi~ ~8u">\""",,,
the reading of a good tradition.
Ant also appears in corrected cod. A. but Kassd alone reads it and comments
on it (Der Text, pp. 138). Cope, p. 203, who does not read it implies it in
M"p~parJe.. The translations interpret
explaining the common reading:
as Cope does and are essentially the same as the translation given in 94& srI!
where the preposition is accepted.

TO',

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

94" 16

Tn "'CJf!a6.lypaTa is undera 12 : 1 "'pOTlO.!"""" . lO'XEV oln"ywyij

stood with "'eo ..9Ipa, as it is with b"lsyops.a (a 13). On lo.".. lnay"'l'ii
see 93a 26-27. We have seen the nature of argument by example at 93a 28-3 I.
Argument by induction goes from the less universal to the more universal. It
do;" so (cf. An. Pr. 2.23) by establishing a relation between a major term (A,
men) and a middle term (B, mortal) by means of a minor term (C, individuals):
e.g., the individuals X, y, z are men; x, y, z are mortal; men are mortal. The
diiference between induction and syllogism is that the C which is used to
relate A to B is not a truly universal term but a collection of singulars.
Z ToiS Si ~lIToP'xoiS
i.e., "Rhetoric"; cpo 02a 3-9 where dialectic,
eristic, rhetoric are compared, and 7sa 8 : 3. This is the interpretation
commonly given to the word, and so nltj. b dliyo.~, 94" 13, is taken to

mean 'save rarely," "except in a few instances." If one reHects upon A:s
concern for the audience and their ready apprehension of what is said which
is round as early asA 2, S7" '-4, 7-21, and lateratB22, 9sb 22-9604, rIB,
I9a I"l-I9, it is possible to see why induction is not 01><0> to rhetoric. The
comment ofProblemDla notwithstanding (see 94a II : ,), any strong inductive
argument (as can be seen in many of the early Socratic dialogues) requires an
extensive presentation (nolAd Mys .., 94a IS) and labors therefOre under the
same problem as syllogism, S7" 7-17. AD this works against the pri9'1'J1' Taxs.a of the auditors which A. favors. There is, however, another interpretation offered by Victorius, p. 37], which is valid, attractive, and in accord with
what A. says of rhetorical merhodology. Victorius interprets
e'1Toe",oi,
as "those skill~d in speaking." nltj. b dlLyo" he would accept, but hesitandy,
as above. However, he believes that it is more righdy interpreted as "save
- in the presence of a small audience" ("nisi cum verba fiunt ad pauces").

TO.,

I]

IKLAq6"."..

C 94a u : , init.

a 14 6 ... ""P-rUS . K'OUVOS

To understand what A. intends by
this statement and that at 943 Is-r6 (PrieTv, ... xe>l<"po,) in which he likens
example to the evidence of a witness, it is helpful to read what he has to say
atA IS, 7Sb 26-76_]2 about the clfectiveness of the testimony by witnesses.
"for just one reliable witness serves the
a 16 "'LOTOS xul .IS xp"l\o,,,os
purpose." '''aTO, is the reading of cod. F and read by Kassel, Spengel, Cope,
but xe'1aTO' of cod. A is read by four odd. xe-qa.po, is the reading of all the
codd.; Kassel (cf. DeT Text, P.139), Spengel read instead dndxe'1 ("is sufficient''). In terms of the conte.'Ct it is quite attractive. I am not certain that in
the light of the codd. I would want to change since xefja.po, (serviceable) also
yields a meaning which satisfies the conteXt.

CHAPTER 21

I . Introduction: 943- 1!}-22

with threefold division: subject matter

of maxims; when maxims are to be
used; who are to use them

II Development: 94" 22 - 9Sb 18

the subject matter of maxim: given by
way of defining maxim, along with
the kinds of maxim and how they are
to be used

I. 94a2z-9sa2

2.

who arc: to use maxims

95a 2-7

when. how, and why maxims are to be

3 95a 7-95b 18

used
when and bow
why

(a) 9sa 1-34

(h) 9sb 1-18

III . Conclusion: 9sb 18-20

19 Y""'p.o>'oyl..~
probably "the uses of maxims"; possibly "the
theory of maxims," although in Plato, PhaeJr. 267c the word refers to what
would apparently be a collection of maxims (if Ta Mou".ia My",. is the name
of Polus' book) gathered from poet> such as Hesiod, Theognis. Apart from
Anaximenes we have here, as far as can be known, the only effort up to this
moment to define and specify
It is more complete and (despite Spengel's preference for just two kinds of 1' .,,...,, as we have in Anaximenes; c
94b 7) more specific than that found in Ana:ximenes. All future efforts made
by later writers, in particular the rhetoricians in their Progymnasmata, are
grounded in what A. says here. For Anaximenes the maxim is primarily an
instrument for argument. In his mst mention of it (1<\28a 20-25) he includes
it among his ,,1"TB'~. His formal discussion of the concept i. at 1430b 1-30.
At 143Ia 25 - I431b 2 he speaks of its clliference from two of the proofs,
enthymeme and sign. Oddly enough, however, in all other reference to
(when he means by it "maxim") he coordinates it with what he calis
enthymeme. This joining of the two because of their effectiveness preswnably
with the auditors reflects a basic relation between the two which we find in
part in A.'s discussion of yo",...". But Anaximenes, unlike A., appears to make
maxim and enthymeme equal or at least mutually supportive in argument.

!)4a

yv""''''.

yv""''''

. ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

Thus we are told that in presenting one's argument both confer a certain
degance and attractiveness (1431b 23-26; '434" 33-40); cpo r II, 12a 18-23.
Further, they are of assistance in deliberative (I44oa 20-25) and epideictic
(l44Ia 18-26, '44,a 39 - 1441b IO).discourse, and are to be used in thefonnal
confirmation of one's argument (I439a 1-4, 19-24; '439" 32 - 1439b 2;
1442b 38 - '443" 6). In counter argwnent both are effective in handling
opposition (I432b 25-32.) or interruptions (1433a 19-29) &om the floor, and
in formal refutation one must refute the maxims and enthymemes used by
the opponent (1443b 42 - 1#4" 2.).
a 20-21 nolc.>v .....L'rlV
The kind of subject and the times suitable
for maxims, and the persons best fitted to use them, will become clear with
the ddinition of maxim. The threefold division is renIiniscent of the analysis
of the emotions at 78a 23-25; c 7Sa 23. The kind of subject is covered
mainly between 94a 26 and 9.sa 2. Tbere we learn that in subject matter maxims are assertions about the moral character ofhuman living, assertions whose
brief statements are either well-known and accepted or readily grasped when
heard, or, on the other hand, are controversial or paradoxical and so in need
of a short supplementary explanation. At 9.sa 1r-'7 A. gives us the persous,
and at 9.1' 7-34 the occasions or times.

a 22 : 1 Aclyo,~
i.e., "in discourses"; c S9b 16 : 1.
2 lcs"" 5' 'Ii
a' oj is the reading of cod. A and four edd. Kassel
appropriates "'1 &om Spengd's conjecture ian" "'1 (c Spengd's note on
.s.sb 25); Cope reads at with cod. F. On 001 plnoo oJ.... ("not, however"
read by the edd. but not by Spengd, Cope, Freese, see .ssb 8 and Bonitz, In-

,dex 5460 2Off.

:1 1l,,6cpllV"U;

C 6Sb 27 : 2.

a 23-24 x,d a(, ".pt """"""" olav

is the reading of cod. A and
three edd., Spengd, Cope. Ross, Dufour read 0;;.... "eel with cod. F, which
is rejected by Kassd (Der Tex~ p. IU) .

....,.'v

This is A.'s ddinition of Y"wp7J. Without

22-26 E""" .. "p..
any significandy new contributions, it reappears together with dements of
Anaximenes' explanation of maxim in the efforts of later rhetoricians to
explain the concept: e.g., Hermogenes, Progymnasmata 4, Aphthoniw Frog. 4,
Theon, Frog. .I (all in Spengd, Rhet. Grata II), and c 94b 7, sf. The definition of Anaximenes is not adequate. He explain. maxim as the setting forth
of a personal view ("'1A.... darpaTo, 16(00). on gcneraI matters and leaves it
at that. A. gives us a ddinition offering both genus and species: (a) a general
statement on the objects of human actions, (h) specifically: objects to be
chosen or avoided in these action.. Maxim, therefore, is for A. directed
exclusivdy toward the human person and the quality of his actinn,. In this

o,

COMMENTARY

definition A. reHects the general nature of "'''1'71 as found in the antecedent

literature. i.e.. a terse. pithy statement of a general truth on the moral character
of human living. With two possible exceptions (94b 13. 95a 21; see below)
all the examples in chap. 21 illustrate the definition; c Studies. pp. 141-44.
The Audo, ad Heren,.ium 4-17-24 (ca. 86-82 B.C.) competendy describes A.'s
idea: "A maxim is a statement drawo from life which sets forth in a few words
what either occurs or should occur in human living." This idea is echoed
for the most part in the comments on "'''1'71 found in Rhelo,es G,aed. among
which the comment of Maximus Planudes (Rheta,.. G,aed. V 422) is a good
example. Obviously. such ao explanation covers an area large enough to
be transected by other popular modes of expression such as proverb (cp. A.'s
remark at 95a 20). apothegm (c 9Ia II-I2. for example). chri.. epigram.
In fact Quintilian. Ins/. o,at. 8.5.3. discussing senlenlia says: "The oldest forms
which are most correcdy called senlentia are those which the Greeks named
"'"'I'a< although the same name [St"l<IIlia) is given to all the types." From
Isocrates. To Meacle. 42-44. we gather that the source ofmaxims for the Greeks
was Hesiod (7750 B.C.). Theognis (fl. 544-541). Phocylides (same). From
the general commeots on gnome it is clear that the Greeks used maxims in
the way testamental or religious literature was used by othet peoples: as
guides to moral living. Isocrates remarks. for example. of the poets mentioned
that while they are recognized by all as "the hest counselors for human
living." the Greeks dismiss them so that even "if someone were to make a
selection from the prominent poets of those sayings called maxims" they would
be set aside for the pleasures of vulgar comedy. AJ far as such collections
are concerned, we have reason to believe that they were on hand by 400 B.C.
(possibly as a result of the use of maxims in the schools. e.g. Aesclrines [ca.
390-330). Ag. Ctesiphon 135). In fact, we know of an edition of the maxims
of the comic poet Epicharmus (fifth century B.C.) later translated into Latin
by Ennius (239-169 B.C.). There is a fascinating collection of maxims in
Volume One of Boissonade's Anealola GraeC4 which offers some sease of their
compelling effectiveness. See PW S. VI. OCD.

a 23

'IcplXP,"",,~
'sa 28. 67b 18-19. 9sa 25-26.
xa.86l.ou
in contrast to the individual instances
"of a general character."

(c Sga 24):

a 25-26 "Epl S""'" ... "p<inElv

It is rather clear here that A. has in
mind not simply human actions but those which have to do with desirable
and undesirable human conduct: "but about all those matters which involve
human action and which. with respect to such action. are things to be chosen
or avoided.
tt

a 26-27 e.o,....... iO"<lV

S6b 4. 57& 16.

76a 32

On enthymeme c ssa 4-'7. ssa 8. S6a 36 : 2. Studies. pp. -27. With the mention of enthy-

AltlSTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' 11

meme we have further confirmation that maxim fOr A. implicates the actions
of men. Rhetorical discourse coucerns itself primarily with contingent reality
and the probable. Its telos is to enable the auditor to maire, after deliberation,
a judgment in this area (57" 2 : 1; S'Ja 1-7) which is to issue in action by the
auditor (S'Ja 22-28). The argumentation of such discourse is directed primarily
to the practical not the specul2tive intellect. The object of the practical
intellect is reality insofar as it i. to be effected by human action, or, in our
ca.e, with tho.e thing. which the auditor can do. As the instrument for
deductive argumentation, the enthymeme for the mo.t part addresses itself
to this intellect and so, as A. say., "eel TOloVrWV (94a 2.6). A glance at chap. 23
will frequently substantiate thi.

a 27 l ....'v ax.aolv,
The question of punctuation here i. of some
importance. Victorius writes screw "xBdo. - he is fOllowed by Cope, Kassel,
Freese. The other edd. and Spenge! writjO B"TI', <1x.do. whereby
qualifies what follows. I am inclined to puncruate as Victorius does: i.e.,
"since the enthymeme generally speaking- is a syllogism about such matters."
I do so because if this is correct, the statement (27-29: Tel ""p"<qu",..aTa . ..)
on the conclusions and the premisses follows as a more correct comment on
enthymemes. For, as Victorius remarks, not aU enthymemes are general
statements (as maxims must be) about man's moral activity. Further, the
statements inA 2 (ef: 57a 22. : 1, S7b 4, COMMBNTAlIY I 355, Studies, pp. 9192) indicate that the reasoning of rhetoric can speak .!so to the speculative
intellect. On the difference between A. and Anaximenes on the relation of
maxim-enthymeme, c Studies, p. 80, 94a 19.

"".60.

a 2.8 mpx..1
i.e., the premisses of the syllogism, e.g., An. Pr. 43b 35-36.
From what A. says, either the major or the minor premiss can be a maxim. Further this passage clearly indicates that he thinks of the enthymeme as an ordinary syllogism in form, i.e., two premisses and a conclusion; c 57" 16,
Studies, pp. 87-91. Consequently I cannot accept Cope's statement, p. 2.09,
that the enthymeme in form is "an assumed syllogism."

a 29-30 XpIJ.
99a 13-16.

,,6'Po,,~

Euripides, Mede.294-295; c 94b 18, 30-31;

a 3I Clt... ICI~ " ..1 ,<oil au. ,<I

"the cause or the reason." "at links
alternatives; there is no difference between the two here.
a 33-34 X... pl~ ... &Ua"evij
Mede. 296-297. A. makes the lines into
an enthymeme at- 94b 30-31. Some of the codd. for "ae' dcrr:ow read "eo'
dC1Tlii. as found in the codd. of the play.
94b 1

" ..1 ..6

S. II53g.

94b IJ

COMMENTARY

b 2 06x ... E6811l1""'EL

Frg. 66r in Naud: 8 Snell from Euripides'
lost Stheneboea. We find the four lines with a partial omission of the fourth
spoken by Euripides in Aristophanes, Frogs 1217"-I2I9. As they stand in
Euripides-Aristophanes they contain the reason and form an enthymeme:
"There is no one fully happy for he is either well born and without a livelihood
or base born and farming a rich estate."
b 4 06x... D-E68EPO<;
Euripides, Hecuba 864 where the codd. of
Euripides read 6"'/T.... for A.'s ...de';;.. This and the preceding citation
(01l..... .vda'po>e') from Euripides are maxims (e.g., ".tfnJ, 94b 5), but A.
gives us the next verse (865) which gives the reason, and so, as he observes,
it becomes an enthymcme.
b 5 "pil~ ... ixo!,iv'l'
and cpo 68b 2 : 2.

"along with the llext line." c LS,

'xw,

C.l.J.

b 7 ttT'<"PII
Ana.'Cimenes divides maxim into two kinds: (a) l.doEo"
which is a maxim in accord with current opinion and as such has no need for
an appended explanation; (b) naeddoEo" which is not in accord with current
opinion and so demands a reason. A. accepts this division without the terminology (e.g., 94b 8), but further refines each. MaJCims without an added
reason (0) are dlOse which (I) are familiar to all (94b Il-14), or (2) are obvious
upon hearing (94b 14-16). Those calling for the addition (c 94b 8-10) of a
reason (b) are either (3) part of an endlymeme (94b 17"-r8) or (4) not part of
an enthymeme bur possessing characteristics of the enthymeme. Gregory of
Corinth (On Hmnogenes, Rheto"" Graeci, VII IIS4-IISS) gives a summary of
the above which follows Anaximenes' division and ,orne of A.', examples.
i.e., some kind of logical proof, or support, not necesb 8 cI:"o8d;..,~
sarily ,trict demonstration; .cpo 77b 2J : 2, ,sa 8 : 3, 54Il 27 : ;;. Cope, p. 207
As Victorius says, "Confirmatione a1iqua egent."
b 9-IO "lIpci8oliov . cI:!''1"cr13,,''oulUVov
On the fint c r II, I2a
25-27: contrary to COlllmon opinion and so to one's expectation; on the second,
91b 19: that on which there is strong diversity of opinion.
b II "pOEy,,';-'crOClt
known beforehand, and "": a maxim stating sonlething already accepted by a majority (c b 14). On the other hand, the second
group of this class (b I4-r6) consists of maxims which. while not known
before being pronounced, are accepted at once as intrinsically self-evident.
This is the reading of the codd. and four edd.,
b IJ ..,,8pl . 80xEi
Spengel, Cope; Kassel reads ipl. 60"e, with Meineke. The scholiasc Stephanus says the line is variously attributed to Epicltarmus (65a 16 : 2) and
Simonides (63a IS). KaibcI, frg. 262, assigos it to Epicharmus (also Dids 8

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

Kranz 23 B. I9); Olivieri, 233, is doubtful. Page places it with Simonides (frg.

I46) but questionably. Cope, pp. 207-208, discusses the matter further.
Plato, GOOTgUzS we 3-5 cites the line in a fuller form as a song sung at banquetS: "w-ealth is bcs~ second is beauty, third is wealth honesdy come by"; see
Dodds, Corgi"', pp. 200-201. The general acceptance of the maxim as we
have it in our text might be inferred from A 7, 63b 30-3I and 65b 6-u.
At EN 1099 a 27-28, BE I2I40 5-6 A. mentions an inscription at Delos where
healrb again is ci1l:d as best but only to disagree with the sentiment and state
that eudairnonia alone is best.
b I5 E11: ..~AbjI""V
"to those who attend to thenr with =e"; i.e. (as
Victorius nores), tum the eye of the mind (mentisque adem) on them. The
individuals are presumably hearing, not reading, the maxim.

b I6 GUIiEU; .. ''1"AEi
Euripides, Trojan Women I05I; cited again at
EE U35b 20-21. In Euripides the reading is: ov" laT' . ... Hecuba speaks
the "Words to Menelaus in an eifort to discourage him from the folly of taking
Helen hODl.e to Sparta for punishment rather than punishing her at once.
Her word. fell on deaf ears, and their truth was revealed in the subsequent
course at evenlS.
b I7-I8 ......,. U ... ap'd<pp"",
C 94b 7 on fourfold division. On
these lines c 94" 29 - 94b 6, and the references at 9.... 26-27 on entbymeme.
On this rdation between enthymeme and maxim accepted by A. and its
implicit affirmation of the coexistence of Mro~, ",18o~, .q8o~ in rhetorical
argument. see SluJies, pp. I4I-44; cpo also 95a 2I-34, 95b I3-I7 (~8,,,ov~ ...
~tro"-ra).

b I9 lv&uflo7Jf'CI~LX..1
Those maxims with the reason added which are
part of an enthymerne are dearly enough presented to be understandable.
Here we have those which are not part of the enthymerne but are still called
enthymemanc, which is to say that they have the characteristics of the enthymeme, or

"'the esse~tial character of," "the nature of," an enthymerne, as the

word has been tnmlated. In other words, they possess the capability to be
stated as an enthymeme (s9b 32 : 1). As "8u/J~/Ja.."'k has been used - e.g.,
at 54b 22. 55" II, 56b 2I-25 - it affirms some kind of capability for enthymeIne. The maxims whim A. gives by way of explanation are self-sulicient
as maxims and are not a part of an enthymerne (ov" . .. /Jieo~). However.
they have this dilference from an ordinary maxim such a. "there is no man
who is altogether happy" that the reason fo< their truth is present within the
maxim as stated. They stand independently but possess their validation within
themselves. And so I see their "capability for enthymeme" in two ways:
(r) they can readily become an enthymeme if one places the reason formally
in a premiss; (2) as maxims they are statements on the moral ch":,,acter of

COMMENTARY

265

human action and this is the content frequently found (e.g., 94a 25-29) in
the enthymeme, a fusion of the entechnic proofs (Ml'o~, ",d6o~, if80~). Cpo
Studies, pp. 141-44.
Cpo 73b 2r; d,e reason for their popularity might
b 20 ..u&OX1I'oUalV
be gathered from rIO, lob 2(}-27 (d.dl'''~ ... ~.6vp.w..dTW'). c Studies,
pp. 88-91, on p.d6~,,,~ TaX"a. In this kind of maxim, as A. says at 94b 2(}-22
togetl1er with an example, what would oIllinarily be the added reason (afTIO.,
d,d T0 is implicit in the very enwlciation of the maxim: e.g., you who are man,
and so mortal, are not to cherish immortal anger. The idea is seen again at
94b 25.
b 22. 4.8livCI"<ov . ;;'v
source unknown; c Nauck & Snell, Ailespota
79, where a somewhat .inillar line is cited from Menander, as Cope, p. 209,
also mentions. See, too, Euripides, philoctetes frg. 799 in Nauck & Snell.
S. IIS3E
b 23 : 1 '1:1> <pavCll
2 l'iJ Ii.LV "",Mn.1V
is the reading of the edd., Spengel with
cod. A; Cope (and Freese) read: p.~ 6. .Is! rp. ~ del"1v from a good tradition.
Spenge! suggests that ~. Oel"1' i. readily Wlderstood, and this seems likely
from the abbreviated statenlent just preceding at b 18 (;ceo! deT1rpe"").
Quotation marks are used by the edd. except Kassel; conversdy at b 25 (8.aTd
... rpeo,s,,) where none of die edd. uses them, Kassel does; in both instances he is correct.
b 24 Ol'o""~ lii XCll

Cpo 79a 2(}-2I.

attributed to Epicharmus, e.g., Kaibel, frg.

b 25 "BvCl"<clt . <pPOVEtV"
263; Dids & Kranz, 23 B 20; and so the Doric 6.a- read in mo.t codd. for
Attic 6''7Ta; Olivieri lists it, 239. c EN II77b 31-34 where the maxim is
challenged in a way sinillar to the procedure at 9sa 21-34. !socrates, To Demon;""s 32, uses the sentiment in a modified form, and it is sinillarly modified in
Horace,OJes 2.II.II-I:>: "Quid aeternisminorem I consillisanimumfatigas?"

"01,,,.

I am not at all certain that this refers exactly to

b 27 : I "oLav
at 94" 20 which indicates the "subjects" of maxim. Rather from what follow.
it would mean "for what type of statement" each kind of ma...Qm is suitable.
. z cltPI'O""'El
here used intransitively as it is at b 34: "is suitable,
appropriate." At 9sa 2 it is used with the infinitive, and with the accusative
and infinitive as subject at 95a 8 as at 94b 29 and b 32-33 where with Cope,
p. 210, I would keep it as the main verb; c 94b 29, 94b 32. What follows
here to 9sa 2 is a further explanation of 94b 7-16.

1'"" . . .

t"v,oyou
This is a specification of part of the
b 27-28 ".pl
content of "0'0'; c above. A further specification is found at 94b 32 - 9sa 2.

266

ARlSTOTLB., 'RHETORIC' U

b 29 xpija6..,
sc. tiel' a....., e.g., b 29-32: "it is appropriate either to
use the conclusion .. a maxim setting out the reason (epilogue) first ... or to
append the reason after first presenting the maxim." See 94b 31, 94b 32.

b 30-]1

orav ... " .. ,6"'000,1<1

within parentheses.

b 31

TOU"'C'O

C 94> 29-34. Roo. alone encloses this

i.e., dre maxim: oil 'P'1P' .. "a,de.ecrlJa.

b 32 'JtELK'EL'V
sc. aepone". In Tel l,meoaOev we have the reason (i.e.,
b 30-3 I: 'nB.d~ ... ,l.a.). Kassel reads a colon after ll"'eoa9sv, not the
comma of the edd., Spengel, Cope.

At"....

b 33 : I &.Ii-lj"""' ... "poa'r'04v'rCl

sc. c1epOTT..
The difference
between this kind of statement and that at b 27-28 is that the latter either
contradicts or seriously challenges commonly accepted opinion - e.g.,
children should not be educated - or the paradox of Socrates in the Gorgias
469C: it is better to suffer wrong than to do it. Here the maxin! (95a 1-2)
and others like it would be accepted but are not in themselves immediately
self-evident in a given situation, e.g., one should not be insolent.
2 a'rpoyyuAc:lTCl'rCl
.... tersely as possible"; cf. Plato, Phaedr. 234e:
UTeO"",)}.a TW' .VOpaT.,V (terseness of language). See the references in
Roberts, Dion}'sius ofHalicarnasst.is: On Literary Composition, p. 323. C also
Grube, p. 10"9. Some (Roberts, Cope, p. 2n) find its meaning (compact,
rounded, terse) in Latin rotundus, i.e., rounded off so that nothing is missing or
unnecessary (e.g., Cicero, D. fin. 4-3.7, Horace, AP 323). But this meaning
is questioned by Douglas at Bruoo 68.272. In later literary terminology the
.Greek word was used of d", periodic style.
i.e., when maxims which are controversial, parab 34 : I 'rO'aUTO'~
doxical, or unclear in their statement are used, Spartan apothegms or enigmatic
sayings are also appropriate. For,like the preceding, they, too, are not always
obvious and call for a brief word of explanation.
2 li",otpO.Yfl""'Cl
Plutarch has a collection of those in Book III
of his MornUa called Apophthegmata Laconica, 208bJ[ In his life of Lycurgus
19-20, he gives us further examples. Ftom Socrates' remark this manner of
speaking was typical of the Spartans: "Indeed if anyone is willing to associate
with the most ordinary Spartan he will find that he appears by and large undistinguished in conversation, and then somewhere in the cour.. of the discussion like a skilled marksman he throws in a notable remark - terse and compressed such that the one speaking with him seems to be no more than a
child" (Protag. 342e).
b 35 - 9sa 1 olav... or"....
Kassel alone reads U,,", (for U,.... of the
edd.) and gives it as the reading of all the codd. On Stesichorus 1'3b 9 : J.

COMMENTARY

The loenans are most likely the inhabitants of loen in southern Italy (c
9Sa I-Z), not those of mainland Gre=, i.e., East Locris running along the
Euboean straits and West loeris which lies along the Corinthian Gul
Cpo r II, IZa ZI-Z3. The fragment can be
95a l-Z 06 ... ~&"":JL"
found in Page, 104 (b). Demetrius On Style cites the saying in less full form
at 99, 100, Z43 and says that the comment was made to the locrians by Dienysius. If correct, it could be Dionysius II, who spent the ten years of his
exile at Loen in Italy (356-347 B.C.) ruling rather cruelly; c CAR, VI z85.
Demetrius giving the ordinary explanation of the saying (for a more confused
interpretation, see Gregory of Corinth, Rhetores Graea, VII 1155) says: "If
Dionysius had spoken directly and said that he would level the territory of
the Locrians, he would have appeared quite angry and undignified. But he
used allegory as a veil as it were for his meaning. Hidden meaning in all
instances is more frightening ... " (100).
a 2.-3 Y""'p.aA<>yi,. ... "'pEa(3up"'"
948 ZO-ZI. c Quintilian, ['lSI. Drat. 8.5.8.

These are the Tl",. of 94a ZI; c

a 3 ,r,,. lp." po~

"matters in which one is experienced." The comment seems obvious from the very nature of maxim (94a Z2r-z6) whose subject
is the moral character of human living. In this area experiential knowledge
is critieal enough for A. to say that while the young can be good mathematicians and geometricians and attain theoretical expertise in such matters, they
do not, as far as can be seen, attain practical wisdom "because practieal wisdom
is concerned with particulars as well as uuiversals, and particulars become
known through experience; but the young are without experience since
length of time produces experience" (EN lI4Za u-I6). The same reason prevails for <0 !'v80.tordv (a 5) which in its ordinary meaning signifies the telling
of legends or tales such as the Homeric poems which convey some larger
signicance for man, e.g., Plato, Rep. 39IC - 39ZC.
a4
<0

.:.~ ... 4i",pE1<i~

Ross alone readstll"'B for cL,. On a.nerni, c 78a 33.
"emo. which became the term for appropriateness of language (cp. 04b 4,

16; I4a Z5) among the literary critics signifies what is fittiug to man, i.e., as a
moral person, as well as what is fitting to extemaI circumstances. Its use as a
quality of language can be seen in Demetrius, On Language, or Dionysius of
Halicarnassus (on the latter see Pritchett, pp. xxvi-xxvii).
a 5 ".pt ... ri"'E'PO~
Not even the "eB,,{JinseO' should speak sententiously on these matters, a point not clear in some English translations.
The reason for this precept is given at a 6-7 (01 r<le ... dnoq>at.ovTa.) to
exemplify the fact tl12t such action on the part of anyone is foolish and vulgarian. This is the tenor of dreo,xo, here (rusIict) in contrast to the cultivated
understanding of its opposite, the aun;o, (urbani).

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' II

a 6 '"1",011

9sa 8

8Sb7.

a 7 p,!,6u..~ ,b,a'P,z(vav'<,".
This is the reading of the codd., two edd.,
Spenge!, Cope. Roemer Dufour, Tovar read Vablen's conjecrure: w.otpal.VO)lTa' <Ha8oAo,,>, i.e., "they readily make general statements"; c
"Kritik arist. Schriften," 68. I read with the codd. inter alia because a f>..J7
(C11/I'.'ov . . c!notpalvovTa,) goes with what pr=des; another idea is introduced at a 7J ("a80Aov de! .) which has no connection at all with a f>..J7. On
the overuse of maxims, e.g., YVOJI'OMO', e'J61OJ' dnotp. both the Auctor ad
Herenn. 'P7.2S (use themrardy) andQointilian 8.S.7 (not many, not randomly
used, not put in the mouth of anyone) oifer words of advice.

a 7-8 xu8Q).ou ..brE'v

e.g., Catullus 70.4-S: "mulier cupido quod
dicit amanti" in vento et rapida scrihere oportet aqua," or conversely 6+143:
"nunc iam nulla viro iuranti femina credat, I nulla viri spcret sermones esse
fideles."
"in expressing bitter complaint and
a 8-9 "ltE'<). ...o-l"i>... 6v':'0-..
indignation." The first sigoifies passionate or indignant complaint .uch as we
nd in the two citations above from eatullus. It later designated a technical
part of the speech devoted to winning sympathy by setting forth the wrongs,
injustice, etc. suJfered by the speaker or the subject of the speech; c: CiG., De
inv. I.SS.lo6fE (conquestio). The meaning of astvOJ''', is not quite clear. It
occurs in three other places in the Rhetoric (alb 3, 173 13, 19b 26) and not at
all in Anaximenes. Here I would take it to mean "indignation" (although
"exaggeration" is possible). At r 17a 13, 19b 24-.6 it is commonly taken
to mean "indignation." In each instance it is joined to the word for pity, and
in the second citation the corrdation of the emotions mentioned is suggestive
(but no more than that): A. mention. seven emotions which (le" excepred) he
discussed in Book 2 and does so in this order: lABO, "al 6BtOOJ"', recalling the
sequence of chap. 8-9 (pity-indignation), oeylj "al 1""0, which echoes
chap. 2 and 4, and then tp9&vo, "al C;jAo, of chaps. 10-1 I (envy-emulation).
At B 24, alb 3 the word is again interpreted to mean "indignation, indignant
language," but it can denote "exaggeration." Among the Greek literary
aitics the more common word is iJswoT1J', 6e",&" and it signifies "vehement,
vigorous, forceful." The one appearance of aBtOOJ"'" in Demetrius, On Style
'30, is taken to mean "intensification." In Quintilian there appears to be a
fusion of "indignation, exaggeration, vehemence," e.g., 8..].88: "dsll1OJU"
in "",aggeranda indignitate ... altitudo quaedam"; 6.2.24: "6BtOOJ"', .
language which imparts added force to things which are shameful, harsh,
hate:fol." But Maaobius, Saturn, 402.1 brings us back again to the idea of
indignation: "Opomt enim ut oratio pathetica aut ad indignationem aut ad
misericordiam dingatur, quae a Graecis ol"To, "al dBt.OJ"', appellatur."

9sa 20

COMMBNTARY

as he says specifically at
a 10 TE9puA'IP.Ev".~

19, 19b 19-28.

On the word, see Cope, p. 214.

a II : J S'" TO .....o.vei
Ross alone of the edd. and Cope read with
cod. P: ~"I rae Td ... " ...at (on the nominative see S. 1973a). C Roemer,
"Zur Kritik," 506.
2 cd~ ... ncivTCaJv
s. 2086d.

a 12 " ..p....CilAoiivT.
More likdy here "exhorting, encouraging" rather
than "summoning." I would explain the dative by an understood dePOTTB'
which has been the verb carrying the main idea of this section &om 94b 26;
see, however, Cope, p. 215.
a 13 9ucr.. P.EvOU~
Victorius (not Schrader as Cope says, p. 215) suggests
that our word means not simply to sacrifice to the gods but also to win their
favor. Schrader by way ofinterptetation offers the Latin 1m which expresses
both ideas. In its ordinary meaning our word in the active and middle voices
denotes simply "to sacrifice" or "to consult the gods."

Iliad 12.243; the words are spoken by Hector

a 14 et~... "ei..p'l~
to Polydamas prior to the attack on the defense wall of the Achaeans, an attack
Polydamas wished to call olf because of the sign of the eagle and the snake;
C 19S-229. Epaminondas the Theban general before the battle of Leuctra
(371 D.C.; c CAH, VI 80-83) is said to have rallied his men with the same,
appeal, Diodorus Siculus, IS.S2.4. See also Cic., De senea. 4.II.

.v...) lITTov, 6.Ta,:

a IS ml ....... 1Iv....~

sc. bd Td (" .. ~ ...

the danger though outnumbered."

"to face

~uvo~ EwciA.o~
Iliad 18.309: "the god of war is impartial and
he kills the killer." Again the words of Hector to Polydamas who had just
counsded the Trojans to withdraw to the walls of Troy now that Achilles
has returoed to the war. In his reply Hector just prior to our line says that
he will stand fast and :find whether he or Achilles will win out. C also
Archilochus (~d, "Ae'1')' &g. 38 in Diehl '" Beucler; Livy 28.19.11: Mars

a 16

communis.
a 17 :
a

19

reads

sc. "'aea"aAoVvT' (a 12).

J '"l..o oiv..lpEl"
intensive H:al: ~Ieven though they..."
....l... oiS"'oiiv....
viJ'K,o~... XCl"l'ddftEl

760 7; c Livy

40.3.7. Kassd alone

Krs[.vOJv.

a 20 iv....... " ..po.p.u..v

At A IS, ?6a 4-7 the maxim just cited is
given as a proverh; C the comment made at 94'l22.-26. In the light of that

AlllSTOTLB, 'llHBTORIC' II

comment only those proverbs which touch on the moral character of human
living qualify as maxims.
a ::I(}-::n olav ",upo,fUu ... ",cipo'xo~ The mixed feelings of the Greeks
toward Athens can be seen in Isocrates, Antit!. 299-300, Thucyd. 1.68-71.
Since the tinre of the scholiasts this proverb has been interpreted in a negative
manner to mean that with Athens as a neighbor one needs no enemies. Kassd
brackets naeo'pia.

a 22 5e5'1l'o,",EUI'EvU
"sayings which have become public property."
They can well be other maxims (as here), proverbs, etc., as in the examples
given.
a 22-23 (AEyto> .. ely..,,)
The edd., Cope (but not Spengd) use the
parentheses. I would read with Ross, Kassd, Spenge!, Cope without the
quotation marks employed by the other edd. for ,,>..0, ,,,,,,...d>, 1'''16& cIya.
I would also punctuate 9sb 9-10 without the quotation marks used by Roenrer,
Tovar, Dufour. On the two sayings and their assumed origin with the Seven
Wise Men see Plato, Protag. 342d - 343b, CharmiJes 1641' - 16Sb, and the
references at 63a 2 : Z, 66b 13.
a 23 ij8o~
On the meaning of the word 6ga IS : 3. Here A. is talking
of the speaker's >TOo, about which he spoke directly at 7Sa 7-20; c 78a 9 : 1.
However, on the meaning of >TOo, in general as used in the Rhetoric cf. 77b 24,
88b 30-31.
a 24 ",,,,8~,x&I~ etp'lI'iv'J. "or the maxim is likely to appear to be one
stated with strong feeling." This is the reading of cod. A, Ross, Kassd, and
Cf. Richards, p. 178: "na81J"'''''', .le1Jpi>1J 1i "''''1'''1, i.e. ,..tlln 'l'a ..."OaL"
The other edd., Spengd, Cope read Bekker's conjecture: ele1Jpiv1J !}.
a 25-.6 .,;s...o~ ... iJ~lc.>".
Victorius quite perceptivdy refen OifTO, to
Iphicrates mentioned at A 7, 65a 28 : I; 9, Ci']b 18-19. But Cope, p. 217,
disagrees, and suggests a reference to "Cleon, Thne. IV.27 seq." As noted
(650 28) we are not certain that this Iphicrates is the famed strategos of the
fourth century. However, everything in the Rhetoric points in that direction.
fle is mentioned many times as someone presumably well known to the
readers (e.g., at 6sa 28; 67b IS; 94a 23; 97b '7; 98a 5, 7, 17; 99a 34; osa 19;
IIa II; IIb I; 160 10), as well known in fact as the fourth-<entury general
Iphicrates, who appears frequently in Xenophon and Demosthenes. Certainly
there is no other Iphicrates of the fourth. or earlier centuries who would
qualify. The general, Iphicrates, had a reputation of being a speaker of some
distinction (see 97b 27 : 3, gSa s), and there is the flavor of the spoken word
whenever a citation from him is given in the above references. In fact there
is evidence of a defense in 355 I 3S4 against Chares and an Aristop'hon (see

271

COMMBNTAlIY

98a 3-8). See PW, OCD, CAR, VI passim. Cope's reasons for rejecting
Iphicrates as the referent are not convincing. The comment could easily have
been made by Iphicrates himsdf or an opponent in Victorius' instanee, or
that mentioned at 97b 27 : J, or that at 98a 17-22 (his defense against Chare.
and Aristophon, on which see r la, lIb IIf., CAB, VI 2II).
a 26-34 -n. U ~eo~ ... I'oU'lV"
Io this passage A. discusses the relation between the ~Oo~ of the speaker and this special use of "vrh!'7J in a paradoxical way (the "oea M~a. idea of 79" 24) which was introduced at 9Sa 21.
However, at 9sb 13-18 he will discuss the relation between ~Oo~ and ".rh!'7J
in general. On the ~OO~-'l"'rh!,1/ connection see 9Sb IS-16. In both places
~Oo~, as should be expected, is contingent upon moral choice, 9sa 28-29 and
9Sb 14-18.
a 26-27 TG U ~eo~ ... aU 5.i
sc. TO d. ~Oo~ (<pal.na,) {JiAT'" (sr T'~
<pa/TI) Un ou dei": "One's character appears superior if one should say that
one must not ..." The previous phrases are understood since they are clearly
implied by the statement; 'P7J!,llIn is not unusual in the fourth century.

C 8gb 24-2S.
a 29 : 1 ",pocdpc.,." cruv5Yjl.oil"
"to make the moral choice completely
clear." On the relation of ~Oo~ to "eoa/esa" c A 8, 660 14-16, 66a IS : I,
2; A 9, 67b 21-26, 67b 21 : I, Z; A 13, 74" II-I3, 74& II : 2; see also EN
IIub 4If., II39"]I1f. The relation between ~Oo~ and U~,~ was announced
.early on atA 2, S60 4-10; latel at 8, 66a 10-12, 9, 66a 2S-28; or again at 90a
27-28.
2 ..hI.....
C 94b !rIO (a"od.t~ ." ,...l.). If one's
moral choice is not fully clear in the statement of the maxim, one must make it
so by giving one's reason, just as one must do with unclear maxims. The
examples at a 30-34 fully illustrate the point. Thurot, however, notes, "Observations critiques [11]," 42 that the thzee examples illustrate the two precepts
in a reverse order, e.g., the first example exemplifies nt. ai-riav 1",U,,6w,
while examples two and three illustrate rfl U~ ... avVd1/AOJ

"''''ty.,,,

a 30

El",c\vor..

reason

subject of

.".lo/.w: "for

example, one must add the

by saying."

a 3I ",,~cNAou... 8ciTEPOV
On the first c A 9, 67a 34; the second has
been seen a number of times as a form of crasis: "for the other is the act of a
traitor."
a 33

9sb

Krd u cN8E . . .
1 : 1
2

l)(oua,

sc. H(d "ovde (deeax1.

"'0/)

.c. a! " .,!'a

AOyOU~ i.e., discourse; c A 3, S8b 7.

7:0 I'Tld;'" . .. ""aBiv."

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC t II

b 2 cpo!""x0'n)'ra
"because of the uncultivated minds." In general
the word signifies a view of life which is confined 10 its obvious and superficial meanings. I would say that Victorius has captured it in part: "the kind
of person captivated by the empty semblance of wisdom"; he also refers to
BE 12I5a 29-30 which is somewhat to the idea. The estimate of the auditors
seen here is similar to that expressed at A 2, 57a 1I-12. Cope, p. 218, looks
upon the word (correctly so it seems) as a unique imtance.

b 3-4 xa80Aou... ixou,,,Y

"if someone speaking in universal terms

hits upon ideas which they entertain about a particular instance." This is to
say that their grasp of the general truth is limited, partial, and prejudiced
owmg to their 'I'0e ..."oT71'. On "a9&).0v-"ieo, cpo S4b 5, S4b 6; on b"TV;m
cpo 54>9: 2.

b 4-5 /iILII . 8lJP~E'Y

sc. Ii"a de "al (Mj).o.'cn:a,) ,,0;,.... The metaphor in fi.qeB6 ... is found at AI,. Pr. 46a II-P2.
b 5-6

c::.cr"op . tcr'r'Y

b 6 ).OYOILvou 3
11..

).."0",,,.,.

i.e., 94a 22-23.

sc. (TOtirO) )..,,0,,8'0" 6; C S. 2072. Kassel alone reads

b 7 & 'rUYl(ciyoucr,
"upon which with respect to a particular instance
they happen to entertain an established opinion."

..ux0'

b 8
XEXP'lp.vo~
i.e., "happens to have." The individual who
is distressed by such particular instances will generally respond sympathetically
to a statement which universalizes (even wrongly) the misfortune. This is
even truer of those with a Iimiled and undiscriminating outlook; c 9sb 2.
, b 9 : 1 eI"ltOY'rO~ aT'
is the reading of Ross, Kassel, Cope. The other
edd., Spenge! read (with cod. A) without an; but c 7J 6n immediately following. The same three along with Spengel read the text without the quotation marks; c 9sa 22-23.
06&lv . XCIIA....:.... pOy
Cpo Hesiod, Works and Days 346 ("a
bad neighbor is a disaster''); Isocrates, Plalai",s 17-19 on the n,ebans as
neighbors; Demosthenes, Ag. Callicles I ("there is nothing worse than having
a bad and greedy neighbor"); also, Plato,Laws 843c, Thucyd. 3.1I3.6 (Cope).
Kassel reads "etTOVBla!;; everyone else, "etTovla,.
b 10 : 1 o6&lv .. 'r"'YO"lto,la~
418.

Cpo Menander 166 in Edmonds: or

b I I ""'~ . . . "ltoia .. oIi..... ~

"at what kinds of preconceptions they
happen to have and how ilis that they came upon them"; c 95b 7. Schrader
suggests Cicero, De orat.2.44-186 as an illustration of the comment. Ross,

95b 19

273

COMMBNTARY

Kassel read noo" for "w~ and do not read "w~. which is omitted on a good tradition. oil..."'~ (read as o/lT'" by Tovar. Sponge!, Cope) refers to the manner of
stating a maxim about such established views as he himself has just offered:
"and then to speak in general terms on these opinions in the manner described."
b 12 "..u,,'1Y'" xpija,Y
is Bekker's reading adopted by all the odd.,
Spenge!, Cope. The statement refers back: to 9sb I and forward to what
follows to xe;j"'" b u.
b U-13

". Sij .. " ..I

both - and; see Denniston, pp. 26~1.

b 13 ij8,,,oU~
This is a natural consequence of the definition of maxim
at 94" 25-26 (aAAa ned.........); c 94& 22-26.
b 14-15 ~90~ ... "po.. lpe.. ,;
See the references at 9sa 29 : I; cpo
17. ISa 17-1S; 16. 17a 16-33; Poetics 14sob S-II; Studies. p. 143.

b 15-16 ..I S~ ... """ n:po ..,p"";;'"

"All maxims do this owing to the
fact that the one who states a maxim makes a general declaration about his
moral preferences." All the edd., Spenge! read neoa.'ei..e",. of cod. A. Cope,
Kassel. and Freese read neoa.'I!e...w. from a good tradition. This is obviously
the correct word here since this statement is nothing more than summary
of the definition of maxim given at the beginning of this chapter (b 22-26).
See Kassel. Det' T....I. p. 139. for a further observation. At Poetics 14Soa 5-7.
a.da.
b 5-u there is an indication of a close relation among ~Oo~ in A.'s mind. as exegesis ofthese passages tends to show; see. e.g. Else pp. 23 S45; 263-73. Lucas. pp. 100, 108.

'Y''',.1/ -

b 18 XP'l""o>j9'1

C 86b 12-13. which r would take to be its meaning

here.

Ii....

b 111-20 ".pl p.~ .......

basically a summary of the divisions
followed in the chapter - c 94& 2cr.21 - with two exceptions: the persons
best suited to use maxims are dropped out and rep1tced by the advantages of
maxim.

C72a2:Z.

CHAPTER

I . Introduction: 9Sb

II . Devdopmcnt: 9Sb
I.

ro discwsion of enthymemes as forms

of argument

20-22

22 -

96b 21

enthyuwne as syllogism

9sb - 960 3

(0) 9sh 22-24

(6) 9sh 24-31
(e) 9sh 31 - 960 3

entbymcmc argues &om definite and

acc:epted opinions and infen ttom
premisses both necessary and probable

subject matter of these opinions and

premisses
material
be specific to subject
under dDamion
this acmpli6cd for dclibcrative rheto-

96 4 - 960 34

to...

(0) 96a 4-'1

(6) 96a

entbymeme is syllogism
its dilICrona: &om dialectical syllogism

7-12

ric

this exemplificd for cpidcictic: rhetoric

thi. only stated for juclidal rhetoric

(e) 960 12-22

(t!) 96a ....24
(e) 96. 24-34

3. 960

summation: on any .ubject the relevant

6cts are ncc:cssary

sources of this rdCVllllt subject matter

34 - g6b 21

(0) 96a 34 - 911b ]

(6) 96h 4-II

(e) 96h II-19

(t!) 96h :1.0-21

demonstration of one"s subject comes

only &om .he relevant &cIS
so there must be a selection of pro~
sitions which .peak directly to the
subject at hand
(0) and (6) .bove arc exemplificd
the mctbcd by which this selection
is made is that of the particular topics
(c 96b .8-34)

III . Transition and General

Introduction: g6b
I.

96b

21-2]

31 -

974 4

the Fecol sources of cnthymemes (i.e., chaps. '3-24)

to

96b .31, i.e. Ta di: aTO,xsia ,",1.:

there are two necessary prelim-

inaries to be noted

ARISTOTLB, 'RHBTORIC' II

(0) 96b 23-28

(6) 96b 28-34

95b 22

there are two kinds of en'hymeme

the method of ,he particular topia
for cnthymemes have been disalsscd.

(e.g. A4- B (7)

we will now study me memod of
general topics for enthymemes
IV Conclusion: 97a 4-6

when the above is done. the method

for the refutation of enthymemes
will be discussed (i.e. chap. 25)

In this chapter we have the final section of those

transition.l chapterS (I8-22) which move us from the study of the particular
topics (Bi'<l1j) as sources for the statements of enthymerne and =pl. (i..
A 4 - B I7) to a study of the general topics ("0'"01 ".0) as sources for forms
of inference by enthyrneme (chaps. 23-24). together with some other observations of a general character on enthymemes (chaps. 25-26); c Stlldies. pp. 3242, 49. On the rdation between particular and general topics. see Studies.
pp. 47, 68. II5-35; s8a 6-7. SBa II, s8a I7 : 1, SBa 35. ']6a 32 : 1. z. and
cpo 7sa 22 ,. 2. In a number of ways chap. 22 is a recapitulation and fuller
explanation of ideas seen at 58a 2-35 and 57" 7-2I. It is this chapter. too.
in which we are told (96b 28-34) that, with the pre.!entation of premisses bas.d
on particular topics for each of the kinds of rhetoric and for ~Oo, and "dOo,.
A. will now study the general topics. and then the ~o kinds of enthyrnernes
Jdemonstrative. refutative) etc. C( above; cpo jI2a 3-4.
!lsb 20 iv8ul''11'cl"<tdV

b ,.}..2I x0t861.ou ......6"ou~

i.e.. h. will make some genernl observations on the proper way to look for enthymernes and their topics. From what
follows at b 221f. (c chapter outlin.) this means (a) that h. will speak of the
enthymerne as syllogism. of the particular topics as generating source material
for its premisses which must b. specific and rdevant to the subject of discourse,
of the two general kinds of enthymerne. and (b) that he will introduce the
idea of the common topics. or the sources for forms of inference by enthymemo. H. mentions this last once again at the end of this chapter; c 9']ll2-4.

pau

This is the reading of a good tradition. of the scholiast

b 22 XIZ....
Anonymus, of Victorius. Cope. Freese. and ofKassd. who makes reference to
EN II3Ib 24-2.7. The other edd. Spengel read "'dneDl'. Our reading docs
not change the meaning. for it is best translated: "for each of these is different
in kind." If there is any question in the mind of anyone who has come this far
in the work that the topical method is twofold in A.'s mind and that the object
of the particular topics is not that of the general topics. the use of 4AAo .Mo,

COM.MENTAllY

'"aTieov should remove it. In a passing comment on this phrase. but with
the opening (95b :ro1E) and closing (96b 20 - 97'l I) words of chap. 22 obviously in mind. Victorius says of A.: "and so he rightly mentions that he had to
handle each kind separately."
b 22-23 Mlu""1) .... CN>'>'QYLa!"i~ ."",,LV
On the enthymeme as syllogism. 'ee Studies. pp. 53-I03. 55a 4--7. 55a 8. 56a 36 - 56b 4. 56b 5 : 1.
Victorius. Cope. Freese, Kassel read ,",AAoy,,,,ucl~ T'~ from a good tradition;
for an interpretation of that phrase as met in A r see 55- 8.
b 23 .lp"l)...... '"'po....pov
See references in previow note; for further
references see notes following. The same references are valid for the phrase
following: " ..I" 1E"~.
b 24 ...1 Ii'Clcptp~.
This is explained in what follows at b 24-3 I which
is partly. brief resum6 of 56b 32 - 57'l2I. The difference such as it is does
not (paa Cope, pp. 221-22. and passim) reside formally in the fact that an
enthymeme is a shortened fonn of syllogism. Further. see comment at !J4& 28.
I have discussed the question (Studies. pp. 87-9I; see also 571l r6 and the very
end of 57b ID-2I). and the most that can be drawn from A.'s statements is
that the enthymeme as syllogism favors a shortened. condensed statement.
In fact. if enthymeme as syllogism is in itself a two-statement form. one might
ask the meaning of r 18. 19a 19 where we are told to make them "as condensed (compressed. compact) as possible." Such a twO-statement form could
not be rednced further and remain a syllogism. C 96a 3S - 96b 2.
b 25 ,",opp...Oev cruvciYE.V
Cpo A 2. 571l 3-4 where the auditors
are given as the reason for this injunction. At Top. 157'l 18-20 (cp. 164a 12-14)
he indicates that the use of syllogism is for the more dialectically skilled.
What he has in mind by this cOIIUllCllt is a line of reasoning movin~ though a
series of arguments (our 1EoeewOev). This - namely. a,,1 ".AA ... '""'eli.is not easy for an untrained mind to grasp. as he remarks at 57'l 3-4; C 57a
7-17. The import of oiiTe "moTa ... .ta,u,8mo"Ta~ is the same as that of 57'l
17-21 (la. .. "'l'ro~): namely. that the object of rhetorical inference is to
convey to the auditor an immediate and ready understanding of the argument.
Therefore the inference should not be burdened with facts possibly important
but not directly necessary to the argument; a premiss or the conclusion may be
omitted if it is already known. See the next note. On '""dy .... 571l 8 : 1.
Here the faults of both procedures are noted.
b 25-26 "'0 .. AtYE'V
and they make the same points offered in the preceding note. The Drst kind
of inference leaves the hearer confused because ofits length; c 57" 7-12 (10611,,.Ta... a".t.ii~). The second at the very least annoys him since he is told the
obvious; cpo r 17. 18a 9-1:> ("al,u~ ... My.v" ..). On <la .t.""la C

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

95b 31

90a 9, 06a 33-34. It should be clear that dialectical inference. concerned as

it is with detemrining or challenging tenns as well as establishing or rejecting
propositions used in reasoning (e.g., the eatly Socratic dialogues of Plato),
toler.tes a more lengthy and involved reasoning; c Cope, p. 222.
b 27 ."oGTO ymp . ",d
The "de is e."<planatory (Denniston, p. 66)
and the "at adverbial: "this, in fact, is indeed the reason that ..."
Cpo 95' 3~ ("se! . .. cbral~'VT.V).
b 28 ,br'..&.u'<OU~
b 28-30 C,anEp", ).iYEtV
e.g., Eur., Hipp. 988-989; c Plutarch.
Moralia 6b-<1. On the plural ("O''1Ta/) c Cope. p. 223. POV<1'''WT.eOV" i.e.
"more accomplished"; C LS, s.v. 11.2..
b 30 01 f'tv . . ).iyoucrtv
i.e., the "ma,dwpwv, although some have
thought that the reference is to the clna,devTov, because it would be the educated who would argue from the detailed knowledge of the disciplines at their
command, i.e., ~E &;. faa,,.. - a position with which neither A. nor any
thoughtful petSon would take issue. However, b 27-2.8 (TO;;TO 6%.10")
reveals that A. identifies the use of dialectical infetence with the educated.
For it i. dialectical reasoning which would cause problems with the JX.lo" since
(among other things) dialectics is (Top. lOla 25 - b 4) a method to examine
the philosophical sciences and the ultimate principles of science. This is a
task which call. for a trained mind able both to investigate and to reason to
and from absolute terms and universal propositions. which is what A. apparently has in mind with Tel ".wel "a! "a06.lov; on these cpo An. Pro 29> 17, 59b '7.
24a 4-5, Bonit2, Index p. 399b 181[ Thurot ("Observations critiques [II),"
43) has an interesting comment on 95b 24 - 96a 3 in which he refers to
An. Post. 72. 1-5. While I consider the interpretation of "oeewO.. (9sb 25)
correct, his comment is relevant here. He argues from the An.lylies passage
th.t "oee"'Osv (9sb 25) means that which is abstract, far removed from sellS.
knowledge, which is specific and concrete. Thus he would interpret b 24-25
(OVTB rae ... <1vvciy.w): one must not infer from general and universal
principles.
b 3I TUyyU~.
"(speak) on matters within their experience." Thurot
(see previous note) interprets this as "concrete, very close to sense knowledge."
I would punctuate with a period as do Tovar. Kassd. Cope. Freese. The
other edd . Spengd use a colon. The point of the observation on the manner
of speaking by the educated - uneducated and the relative power of persuasion
of each method is to alert the student of rhetoric that in making hi. argument
he must .ttend to the questions. problems; difficulties present in the mind of
his auditors concerning the subject. A. says this in the very next sentence.
b 3I-32 eN" E~ . &0""""....."
Cpo S6b 35 - 57a I ("ai ... ..",00T""). i.e. not all opinions, views. judgments. At Top. Iosa 34 - ~ 37 princi-

96a 4

COMMBNTARY

pies for the selection of propositions are given which are valid for rhetorical
discourse. Once again we are engaged with the selection of particular topics
for argument; c 77b r6 : 1 with the references there, 77b 18 : 1.

b 32 :

1 ':'purp.vc.w
is the reading of the codd., the edd., Spengel
Cope. Kassel conjectures a dative and refers to 56b 36 and his reading there
of d,o",i.o.~ ; on this see S6b 35 - S'Ja T. A. in our passage here is speaking
of opinions, views which have been determined, established, set down for
themselves by the auditors, or readily accepted by them on the authority of
others.
l.ocuov
The impersonal verbal adjective is practically equivalent
to 6" with the accusative and infinitive. Since, therefore, the idea of necessity
is operating throughout this passage (b 31 - 96a 4: cllUT' . :><o'<6), in which
we are told what the spealcer must do, I am inclined to think that d., must be
understood with ,1.a.. """ay, .. (96a 2, 3). Even with the variety of punctuais difficult to understand without it.
tion offered by the edd.

,I.a.

96a r : 1 xptvouc,"v

i.e. the auditors; c 77b 21 : 1.

Three of the edd., Spengel use a comma after
this word; Tovar, Kassel, Cope, Freese, a period. With either punctuation
(as can be seen from Cope or Freese) the comment at 9Sb 32 : 2 (on
etc.)
is still necessary.
2

ci11:o8qOVTCI',

.I.a,

xed ~oU~O aij a.~L oG'RIJt; '9cdVE'fml, &ij:Aov E1vllL . . .

This is the
reading a"d punctuation of Roemer, Dufour, Tovar, Spenge!. Kassel, Cope,
Freese mark off the aT' . <pal.eTa. clause with commas and read oUr..
(Cope, Freese also read ToiiTO 6'). Ross reads his own conjecture and punctoates differendy. The translators interpret the reading given (the variant punctoation does not affect th" meaning as far as I can see) in various ways. I
understand it to mean: "And in fact it must be clear that the opinion offered
[ToiiTO] is the view held [06TC"~ <pat.eTa.] by all or most people"; cpo 57a !}-13
where that which is not probable is not masive since it is something which is
not admitted by men.

a 1-2

2.

anCXGLv ... 1tAe.lG'TOI.t;,

Kassel. Cope, Freese read ~ xaa", for /inat"'.,.

They also punctoate with a period for the comma of the edd. and Spenge!.
A colon migbt be preferable to the period.
a 3 : 1 """mYE'v

C 9Sb 32 : z for mood.

ciVClYX"""" .. 11:0).>1
C COMMENTARY
2 (cllUT' ..i'e~Ta,), S'Ja 7-17, S'Ja 15, S'Ja 22 :
2

58a
S7b 4

I 355, A 2, 57' T3I, S'Ja 28, S'Ja 34 : 3,

11:prdTOV
A. draws a series of conclusions (96a 4 - 96b 21) on the
subject matter of enthymernatic inference which follow upon his opening

a 4

2.80

96a 9

A1USTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

6., -

statement. The ~.,&'..,."a'oo stress the importance of the conclusions:

"First of all, you must understand that on whatever subject you have to speak
or reason, whether the subject of the reasoning be political or anything else,
you must have the facts relevant to the subject, either all or some. For with
nothing at hand you would have nothing from which to infer." On the idea
in "oAm"<ii C S4b 24 : 1, S6a 2.7 : C Anax. 142.1 b 7-8, !socrates, Ag. the
Sophists 9 [292.].
1 CNlloyl~"cr8 ..,
c S6a 2.2. :
"oh''''xiii croA}.oy,"!'-<i>
The reading of all the codd. and the
edd. except Kassel who conjectures <h> "oAm"<ii uvA.l

a 5:

a 6 xlZL 'flk TO\i~ . 6Kci.pXOV~Cl

The *rapxop-r:a represent the material present in the subject matter or topic of discourse which offers the ground
for reasonable di"""sion about the subject. An. Pr. 46a 3-10 is a clear indication of what is meant by the term. See sSa 6-7, S9b 25-]2.; cpo !socrates,
Ag. the Sophists 9 [292.], To Buriris 44 [229] where they are called Ta &vona.
c 96b 4-II. In rhetoric by the very nature of its subject matter (i.e., questions open to deliberation, 57& 1-2) this matc:rial will be determined by the
methodology of the particular topics working in three areas of entechnic
proof: Ml'o~, "dBo~, !f90~ and working in these areas precisely because deliberation is involved (S7& 2.: 1). In one respect these ~"c!~xooTa are the ~xov
Tit
a of SSb rO-II; c ssb ro : 1. Ross alone reads (from a good
tradition): HaTe! TOVTOV IXtt.'P Tel ~ndeXoVTa.

".9...

a 7-I2. hEye.> . TO'Clil.....

A. moves directly into an explanation of
,what he means and does so first for deliberative rhetoric, repeating some of
the particular topics mentioned at A 4, 59b 33 - 60a II; c S9b 2.5-32.. It
should not be necessary to repeat that propositions on purely factual matterS
such .. those proposed - material strength, 6nancial resources, etc. - can
be and in fact mostly are formulated not simply in terms of the evidence but
also with a view to the attitudes and disposition of the auditors (their !f9o~)
and in a manner which reflects the speaker's concern and good will (his !f90,)
and strikes an emotional response in the auditor ("dBo,). In short, as I have
said in the commentary on the first book: and in Studies, argument by enthymeme and example first of all by the nature of its articulation in linguistic
statements, secondly because of the material with which it work:s (matters for
deliberation), and finally because of its objective (to facilitate a judgment on
the part of others) necessarily incorporates the three entechnic
See
Demosthenes, On the Embassy r7-2.1 as he begins to set the background for
the Peace of Philocrates.

"'crT,.

a 9 : 1 li!'-iI "oh"!,-'1"''''''
These words, omitted in cod. A, are bracketed
by three edd.; c Roemer, "Zur Kritik:," 507. Ross, Kassel, Spengel, Cope

COMMBNTAIlY

281

read them. As Spengel remarks: war or not war is the subject that must be
resolved in the deliberation.
2 &Uv..p.,; Cpo A 4. 59b 33. 60a I.

"pooo5o,
Cpo A 4. 59b 24; 5. 6.. 18.
l .. , &~ ..Iv.. ;
the reading of cod. F and a good tradition accepted
by Kassel. Cope (Freese). and cpo A 4. s9b 36. Ross. Spengel read .ITa. The
other edd. read simply the BTl of Susemihl for the ern of cod. A.
a

II : 1
2

a 12 4".. ,vEiv
a further illustration (c 900 7-U) for epideictic; for
the infinitive c 900 8: dVllai,...Oa.
a 13 : I Eotl...p.lv,
the battle in 480 B.C. which was the beginning of
the end of Persian naval power and the campaign against Greece. The Athenians played a major role in the victory which remained fresh in their memories
ever afterward. even ISO years later; see. e.g. Dernosthenes. On the Crown
208. 238; c CAR, N 304-16.
2 Map ..e",v,
the lalld battle vs. the Persians in 490 B.C.; ct. Demosthenes in previous note; CAR. N 239-52.
By way of exception from the codd. and edd.
a 14 ..ei... "pciXO."....
Tovar omits TW.; Ross for ;;"~e conjectures .".. The .tory is told in part by
Euripides ill the Children of Heracles. The traditional tale is the story of the
courage of the Athenian. and their king Demophon (son of Theseus). They
alone of all the Greeks faced down the Argives on behalf of Hyllus. son
of Heracles. and his followers who had taken refuge in the Temple of Zeus
at Marathon. The time would be shortly before the Trojan War. These three
topics. which reSect praise .on Athen are cited often in the literature, and
Cope. p. 226. has reference. to Lysias. Plato. Isocrates. Demosthenes.
The formality within which epideictic works
a 15-16 o!x "civ-rE;
is prai.e (or blame which is mentioned next, b 16-22). and its proximate
TiAo~ is TO "aAel. - alaXed S8b 8-29. On the honorable see A 9. 66a 33-34.
66b 23 - 67a 32. [cannot accept the interpretation of dO"O TC as "imaginary deeds of honor." To attribute such to anyone i. a waste of breath since
it is readily recognized for what it i. by the auditor. rThought to belong"
is more correct here and at a 18. Such deeds would be accepted by an audience
either as possible. or as a reasonable misjudgment on the part of the speaker.
In fact. to interpret dO"oUnQ)' as "imaginary" would make a farce of deliberative and judicial rhetoric at a 26-32 where at a 28 we would be speaking of
"imaginary evidence."
a 17-18

GXO"oUYrE; .. 6,,4px""

Cpo An. Pr. 43 b 1-38 for the process.

96a 25

ARISTOTLB, 'RHBTORIC' II

a 18 en ... _'rEiouAc:J,,,,,,'<o
"namely, that they ... "; a dependent
statement which explains 1piyotJaw (a 16); S. 2577- On the verb cpo A 3,
58b 36-37a 19-20 auILIL"X......IL""au~ ""I IIp.Ir'<.u.....,,....~
"who had fought by
their side with distinguished valor"; this reading from a good tradition is
a=pted by Ross, Kassel, Cope, (Freese); Spenge! is favorable to it but reads
with cod. A and the other edd. cIeoaTSv. "al avppax. The reference is
again to the Persian Wars of 491)--479 B.C.
iJv8p ....o8Icr..""o
On word c A 12, 73a 23.
'A.y.V1\'<..~
There was a long-standing conffict between Athens
and this island. With a strong naval arm and a commanding position in the
Saronic Gulf, it was a threat to Athens. Just prior to 490 Aegina was forced
by Sparta to cooperate with Athens. The coercion was only partly successful,
although at the battle of Salamis the conspicuous bravery of the islanders
was acknowledged by all. In 457/456 the Aeginetans were made subjeer
allies of Athens' Oelian Confederacy, and finally in 43 I they were expelled
from their island (restored in 404 by the Spartan Lysander) which was occupied by Athenians and annexed to Athens. C Thucyd. 2.27; cpo rIO,
IIa 15-16.
Founded as a colony of Corinth ca. 600 B. C.
3 na,<.8""kT"~
In 480/479 it successfully refused to medize and withstood the scige of the
Persian land force under the general command of Mardonius. In 433, just
prior to the Peloponnesian War, as a member of Athens' Oelian Confederacy,
it would not comply with the Athenian demand to drop its annual officials
from Corinth, and war was the result. The war ended in 430 with the expulsion of the citizens and their replacement by AthClliam. C 'I11ucyd. 2.70.
a

20 : 1
2

a 21 : I " .. , ei ... .wTO~

Ross alone secludes ""l, on which c
Spengel. p. 284, who says (referring to a 31:
(Jaa .
sf): "this is
very obviously a duplication." and suggests the possibility of dropping the

""I

""I

second ;,at.
2

2Z

.:.~

Q.ILIlP'"!IL"

&cdl.....~

a 23 CJX011:oUf1&VOL
the facts on hand."

741> 7.

c 86b 30: "so, in this very same way."

"after examination they prosecute or defend from

a 25 A"".8...1""'1wv 1I A8'1""1wv
is the reading of cod. A and the
edd. except Ross, Kassel, Cope who read with a good tradition 'A6'1" 11
A ..".a. Since this same tradition reads the genitive singular (not the accusative plural of cod. A) in the following two nouns, it may be a better wit-

ness.

96a 34

COMMBNTARY

a :>5-26 TO ciuTI> ToijTO Spa...

a~.d ToJTO is that which he has been
insisting on from 96a 6f(: obtain the /lndeX""Ta. I find the construction
awkward. I take the phrase as an articular infinitive: ''Doing this very
thing differs in no way whether the subject be the Athenians or the Spartans, a man or a god." It also seems possible to take aeiiv as an imperative
or with an understood as,: "It is immaterial whether the subject be the
Athenians .. one must do the very same thing."
a 26 ""f'o~OU).";""TIl
This together with the following accusatives
(a 26-27) include all three kinds of rhetoric. In avpfJovAeilo>Ta (for the
accusative subjects of ).""'."'" [a 28], S. 21520) we have the word denoting
the kind of rhetoric. For epideictic and judicial he does not usc the words
signifying the kind of rhetoric but those denoting the fonnaliry under which
each operates; cf. schema, S8b 8-29. This usage continues through a 29-32,
and the fonnality of deliberative rhetoric (neOTe"'''''''"'~ - dno ...e."o.....~)
is omitted; c 91b 34. In a 29-32 (r.' ... fJAafJse6v) we learn that only by
seeking the /lndexo a can we 1lI2ke intelligent statements about the proximate .....).'1/ of each kind of rhetoric, i.e., "ald." alaxed. ""'A. A moment's
rellection on this should reveal why A. gave such an extended analysis (A 4 B 17) to the methodology of the particnlar topics.
a 28 6".p cNToij Til 6"lipX"'TIl
i.e., all the rdevant material on him
(Ross alone puncruates in a way which would give a different meaning).
This point is made a number of times, e.g., a 6 (Tli ... Vndexo ....a); a I5-16
(i" ... Vndex ...); a I7-18 (...1 . . Vndex...); a 22 (Vndex.1 ~TO"); a 23
(il< ... tlnaex ......,.); a 29 (il< TOVT.,.); a 29-30 (81 . VndeX"); a 33 (I" ...
Ilnaex ........ ... dya8q;); b 2 ('"'' . tlnaex6vT"'). At 96b 4-2I A. draws
the conclusion from this: namely, the need to have on hand propositions
directly rdevant to the subject if one is to present the subject effectivdy.
See comment at end of preceding note.

a 29-30 d T. ,...>.0" ... 6"oipXE'

sc. av...q;. Similarly vndex.. av...q;
is understood at a 31-]2 with 8f ..., at"alo. .. fJAafJ8e
a 32 6f'oO""~ .. Kill
"in the same way as the instances given"; cpo
79& 21)-21 where the phrase could be interpreted as here, i.e., the adverb and
dative.
a 33

II

f'o-IJ liYll801v

96a 9 :

J.

I would read the words with Ross,

Kassel, Spengd, Cope. Understood with the clause sI ... pTj araB is VndeX", just as ).1)="" (a 28) is understood with what follows: II, ... araBq;.
a 34 " ...... mE.S";
The consequence is at 96b 4f: e.g., "Conscquendy
since all indeed clearly demonstrate in this manner whether they reason
stricdy or loosdy (for they do not t~e their premisses from any and every

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' 11

thing but from the fact'! relevant to the subject), and since it is clear that
it is otherwise impossible to present anything by. way of discourse [or: it
is clear from reason that it is otherwise impossible to explain anythlngJ, it is
manifestly necessary ... "; C 96b 3.
a 35 ,i7,oS.uaoUv'<EI;

C S6a 3 :

2,

"b 23 :

2,

82a I7-I8.

a lS - 96b 2 Uv .. aul.l.oyl1;"",'<co, (eN ~",copxOv"""')

All the edd.
and Cope use the parentheses. Roemer, Tovar punctuate with " colon befOre
the parentheses; so, too, Spengd but he does not use the parentheses, and the
colon makes more sense. I (see 96a 34) find Cope's interpretation of the
U. clause questionable, e.g., p. 228: "whether his reasoning takes the exact
or rigorous form of the syllogism (as in scientific demonstration, and probably
also in dialectical argument), or employs the Iaxcr mode (of the rhetorical
enthymeme) ... "; and see his interpretation of the words at p. 229. In thls
kind of context, d"el{JsaTBeO. - paAa"wTBflo. are ordinarily used by A. to
refer to the content of the argument, i.e., its precision and .ccutaey; c Bonitz, 1tuiex, p. 444" 4I-45: "de neglecta dxel{JBlq. ratiocinandi." Certainly
what follows at 96b I-9 as the expl.nation refers to the content of the propositions. not to the form of the argument. In fact, in his comment, p. 230. on
~E''''B'Ypi.a. idoJrij, (96b 5. 20) Cope recognizes that A. is speaking of the
content of the syllogisms.

96b I-2
all that

(w ... ~",copxOv"""')

Cpo 95b 3 I-32 (d1aT' ... AB"TO'). and

has been said from 960 6/f. I would understand the phrase

o~

rae

IE dnanow as olin ,,&'Ta was explained at 9Sb 25.

b3

>.Gyou
C 960 34. This word has been understood in two ways
here: (4) "speech," "discourse," by Cope and others: (b) "reason." by Vater
(Animadversion .... pp. I24-25) and others. If by (b) is meant "logical exposi-

tion," c'rational explanation." "argument." ureasoned. discourse," or something

similar. I can see the possibility for either interpretation and would accept
either although I have given preference to (4) at 96a 34. From a study of 66
instances of the word (exclusive of the present passage) in the first two books.
and in all the cases of the singular and plural (which I do not intend to list)
the following emerges. Since in particular instances one can argue interpretations of a word, the meanings I offer are those interpretations of the word
found in most instances in the commentaries or the translations. In 40 instances
[m all word cases and in the singular and plural) it means "discourse" (e.g. 55a
26, 58b 7. 80a 2). In 9 cases it clearly denotes "argument" (e.g. 55' 33, "b
2, OIa 27); in 4 instances either "argument" or "discourse" (e.g. 55a 28. 9Ib
9); and in 3 either "rational explanation" or "discourse" (e.g. S604, 66a9, IO).
In 2 instances in the genitive singular it means "reason" (e.g. 70a I9.2S). In
the remaining examples it signifies: (i) "words." four times (e.g" 80 I9. SSb

COMMBNTAlIY
3); (ii) "account," twice (e.g., OIa 23); (iii) either "word" or "reason," once
(74b 19); (iv) "esteem," once (S4a 27). The two meanings olfered above for
our passage can be seen at s6a I : z, S6a 3 : 2, s6a 19 : 2. Either of those
meanings - "discourse," "reasoned discourse" - is strengthened, I believe,
by what follows in b S-I9, particularly the comment at 96b 5r-II (8aq>
"0"&) where the use of d."",vva. in the clause points to what he means at 96b
3 by d.el TO;; UYOV . d.....v.a.
...o".xoi~
Cpo s8a 2.9 (see s6b 13, ssa 9). The first book of the
Topics, chaps. 4-IS, give the general method for seeking propositions on a
subject. It does so by suggesting ways in which to look at any thing to discover its essential and non-essential aspects; it reviews the varied meanings of
terms, kinds of possible propositions and ways they should be sdected, sum-

], 4

ming up the process in part at IOsb 12-1S (on which see 96b 6).
], 4-II "p......"" .. xo.vci
This is a specification of what was explained
in a more gcneral manner at 96a 6; see note.
b 5 : 1 ~.o).'Y,,"tvCl
"sdeaed statements, premisses"; cpo 96b 30-31;
o A 2, sSa '7-23 (rd.a ... sldw.), 58a 26-35. Mention of the sdection of
one's material from what is olfered in the analysis of particular topics is common in A 4-IS (0 COMMENTAlIY I 354 [s.]- 355) and also in B I-17 (0
77b I6 : 1, 80b 30 : 2, 88], 29 : 1).
2 w8exo""""",,,
i.e., possible points of discussion relevant to the
subject; on the word 57" 27 : ].
b 6 b ..XCl.po...ci....",
i.e., matters most suitable to the subject; on the
word o 65a 20 : 1. At Top. IOsb I2f[ he says: "We should also sdect from
written handbooks and compose for oursdves outlines on each kind of subject,
setting them down in separate lists, for example, on good, on life, and on
every kind of good beginning with the nature of good itsel"
], 6 ~_YIIIGU
C 54], 3 : 1. These are the unexpected aspects of a
subject which suddenly arise, e.g., new problems, questions, uncertainties.
As he will say (b 7fI:) they are to be handled with the same care for rdevant
information as the subjects for which one is ptepared.

b.,..s '"oraAII"..,....Cl .. A6yo~

"one must search out [''ITS''] premisses
by looking not at indefinite gencralities but at the facts rdevant to the subject
of discussion." On dOelUTa cpo 740 34: 1.
b S-9 ".p.yp4<pov..-Cl ..... pciY,,"Cl...o~
"and by specifying as many
of these facts as possible, especially those intimately related to the subject."
On ly"vTaTa cpo 6sa 34 : z; o Cope, p. 23I, on ".e.yea'!'....

], 9-II 6"'1' p.tv ... xo.vci

These two comparative clauses explain
in tum first "l.iUTa, and then lyYVTaTa TO;; nedy",a..o~ ofb 9.

286

AllISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

b 10 Ix'l)..... '
is the reading of both cod. F and corrected A ("more of
the rdevant facts are in hand") and of Cope, Kassel, and Freese. The edd. read
1%1/ from uncorrected A.

b Ie-II 0<ret' 6' ~'<Epov

connected to the subject."

sc. IV/Ta" "the more closdy they are

b II 6LX'o...ep"
The root idea in the word is given at A 5, 6Ia 201-2020.
It is from this idea that we obtain the more common meanings: proper to,
suitable to, conformable to, the nature o Here it modifies an understood
TG\ ~"deX07ITa. With this passage at b !}-II one should compare A 20, 58. 410, :01-208; 4, 59b 2.-18 in which nothing is said that contradicts 96b!}-II and
what follows. But in the earlier passages a cautionary word of advice is given
concerning the llndexoVTa: narndy, the difiCrence between facts rdevant
to the subject as a topic for ddiberation and those rdevant to the subject
itsdf as a discipline. The first is the concern of rhetoric; the second, of the
specific discipline itsd As he says at A I, 5sa 26: "Discourse grounded in
specialized knowledge is proper to formal instruction."

b II-IS ij....ov XO'Vtl 4,op.'lj6'1)v

Tovar alone of the edd. and
Freese punctuate with period after Diomedes. A. makes quite clear in this
passage what he intends by "common." The point to be kept in mind is that
facts about a subject can be rdevant (~dexo>Ta) but so general (HO'Va) as
to be of no particular hdp in presenting it. Diomedes plays a prominent role
in the mad as warrior and man of counsd.

b 12.-13

a..,... 0.., ... k,

J) 13

ilp.,8twv

068~

14

These are causal clauses.

partitive genitive with an understood 'rn~ S. 1319.

p.iiUov

Sec SBa 14 :

2.

b IS-19 is,.......o,..u....
Each of the instances are truly ol,woTOea
to Achilles. The story of Cycnus, the son of Poseidon, is known to us in some
detail from Ovid, Metam. I2..64-168. Pindar, 01.2.81-83, in praising Achilles
gives a passing mention to Cycnus (and also Hector as here); sec also Isthm.
S.39-4I. Pausanias, 3.2.4.II tells us that Achilles came to Troy bound by no
oaths but as a favor to the sons of Atreus. In Euripides, Iphig. Alii. 49-6S
there is an account of the oath (Cope). There are a number of references in
the AAeto,;, to praising Achilles: e.g., at S9a 3-S, 96a 206-320, 96b II-19, 16b
206-2.9, I8a 33-38. In discussing the last, Vablen, Schriften, I 32.4-207, questions
the existence or influence of a Gorgian encomium on Achilles and bravery.
b 20 d~ ......,..x6~
C 9Sh 21, 97a I on TeO"OV. This topical method
of sdeering the pertinent evidence on the subject is the method of the particular
topics. Correctly used, it yields material in the arca of the three "T'~VO' "la-

COMMBNTARY

n" for use in either enthymeme or example, and is the subject of study in
A 4 - B 17. It is announeed at A 2, 58a 29-33, and apart from indirect
references to the method in the two books (e.g., the many." TW. summaries:
60b 1-1, 5gb 25-32), we have passages such as 76a 29-32, 77h 16-20, 78a 2710, 91b 24-29 which directly refer to what A. believes to be the object of
study in these books. Finally in our own chapter at 96b 28-34 we have what
is really a conclusion to the proposal of 58a 32-33 to "speak first of the particular topics."

b 21 "TO'X_"'" .l.Eyto>I'OV

I would begin (c chapter outline) theJinal

section of the chapter here. The statement here is picked up at 96b 34lE
(IT. d~ ...) afrer an interruption (b 22-34) which serves a double purpose:
it is an introduction to what follows in chaps. 23-26 (e.g., b 22-28) and a
recapitulation (e.g., b 28-34) of what bas been done from A 4 to B 17. It
i. a logical interruption since the analysis is about to turn to an entirely new
matter: namely, a study nf the general ways of iDference and reasoning which
apply to all three kinds of rhetoric and their subject matters. The meaning
of aTo'XBia is given in the next sentence.

b 21-22. " ..o'Xdov ... oNTO

C 01' 17-18, and 58a 35. It seems clear
that in b 20-22. A. repeats the statement made at 58a 29-33. Since the particular topics are Jinished, the common topics alone remain (c 58a 10-26).
The meaning of "common topic" is fiUrly well explained at 58a 12-17 (omo
. . . d.a"ses.), a ;U-22. ("",,s'.a ... ',..",eo.a); see Studies, pp. 129-35.
The explanation of <71'o.x.'o.at 03' 17 states: "I call stoicheion and
topic the same thing, for stoicheion and topos is a class into which [.1, 8]
many enthymemes fall"; C Studies, p. 132n76. A glance at the common
topics in chaps. 23-24 shows them to be forms of inference which can be used
on a wide variety of subject material in any area of discourse.

"''"'0,

From the first two books we know that the enthymeme

is the syllogism of rhetorical discourse. Up to this point A. has not spoken
of kinds of enthymeme, and what he puts before us here is relatively simple.
As a syllogism enthymeme can function in rhetorical discourse in the same
way as syllogism and refutation do in dialectics. It can be a syllogism proving
that something is or is not (d .."",."dv), or a syllogism refutiog what is asserted
or denied (LIsy"", ...dv). c O]a 25.

b 24-25 et5'1 &Qo.

On syllogism C 55' 8 with references.

b 26 n"YX0~'" ""Uoy'''p.O~
A refutation as explained by A. is syllogism (SE I7I. 2-3) which proves
the contradictory of a given thesis, i.e., concludes to that which contradicts
given conclusion; C An. Pr. 66b II-I7, SE I65a 2-3, 17Gb 1-3, I75a 36if.
Thus if one had reasoned to the conclusion: it is not most expedient to stop
the Persians at Thermopylae, a syllogism which reasons to the conclusion

288

AllISTOTLE, tRHETOR.IC' 11

that it is most expedient to stop etc. is an iA."xo~; or in our case an ."B1Jp.,..

pa U."" ....,.,;.. At ooa 15-22 A. partly exemplifies the idea; at oob 27-34.
18b 2-5 he speaks in praise of the refutative enthymeme.
The second TO is read by
b 28 TO 6l D.Ey><...,,1nI ..0 ....... """"Y"v
Ross. Kassd. Spengd. Cope. The other edd. omit it with cod. A. On
578 8 : 1, and cp. r 9, loa 2.2-23, "To infer -rei d'J'o,",oAoyovl't),Q" is to conclude to that which is not admitted by the opponent. or. strictly speaking. if
it is refutation. the contradictory of what he admits.

avo""....

b 28-34 "Xclilnl .. 01 ..0,,0.

"well then to all intents and purposes
the topics on each of the kinds of rhetoric which are useful and necessary are
in our possession. For propositions concerning each kind have been sdected,
with the result that the particular topics from which enthymemes must be
drawn on good or evil. the honorable or dishonorable. the just or unjust are
on hand, as are the particular topics on types of character. emotions. moral
habits which were earlier sdected by us in the same way." We have here a
summation of what has been done in the treatise from A 4 to B 17 (see 96b
20): namdy. the study of the particular topics. InA 4 -B 17 we were given
ways to devdop statements ("e.T"aBl~) for M".~. ~8.~. ",,8 (the l ..exv
"ian) in each of the kinds of rhetoric. This. was done by the methodology
of the particular topics (the er~1J). Since A. is about to turn to the study
of another methodology. that of the general topics (the
TOn). which.
as we will see in chaps. 23-26. is primarily concerned with the forms of
inference, not the content. he makes a summation here and thus brings to a
conclusion the proposal atA 2. s8a 32-35: "eOTBe." "eoTaae.~.

".IV.1

lt29 1""a'rOY"ii>v El6ii>v

C Studies. pp. 39-42, where the reasons arc
presented for interpreting this phrase to mean "each of the kinds of rhetoric."
i.e.. referring to deliberative, j~dicial. and epideictic. On A.'s use of .r~.,
C SBa 36: 1. Cope's interpretation. p.
in which .rd1J means "specific
topics" and TOn means "general heads or classes" I find difficult to understand
in the light of A.'s treatment of topics in the text. Both the particular (.r~1J)
and the general (".wol) topics can be and are called TO".' by A. e.g., 96b 34
where we find TO".' for "particular topics." However. I know of no comparable instance in which he would speak of TOn TOO' Bldw. as Cope has
him doing here. And I would say that Cope confuses one more with his
interpretation (pp. 235-36) of b 34 (e.... . lap"",,),

"33.

b 29-30 Xp'l.,(.......... civ"y",,"""

C Studies. p. 411145. As A. says
at A 3. 58a 37if.. when the constituent elements of discourse are taken into
account. there are necessarily (d.d",,'1. b 2; ., d.6.r"'1" b 6) three kind, of
discourse. The usefulness of rhetoric. and so the usefulness of the three ways
in which it can be exercised. are mentioned at 55a zIfE. SSb 9.

96b 34

COMMBNTARY

b 30 tIl.ol.oy",VIIl ... ",poTli,,,~

96b 30-34 should be compared with
9Ib Zo4-zB. At 7Ba 2B-30 A. declares unmistakably what he has done and
will do. These "eo~dl1o" would be prim.arily the larger proposals on general
subjects from which one would develop more specific propositions mevant
to the particular subject of the discourse. We find them exemplified from
the first chapter of the process (A 4) on to the end at B 17. For example,
at A 4 A. mentions as relevant subject matter for premisses in argument:
ways and means, war and peace, national defense, imports and exports, legislation. These larger proposals are frequendy added to and supplemented with
specific propositions; these are well exemplified in the next chapter, A 5,
e.g. "A friend is one who is able and inclined to do for the other whatever
he thinks to be the other's good." On neo~dl1'" C 5Sa IB, 66. 23, 66a 31 : 4.
b 31 "'Il<nov
C 96b 29. It is because he has discussed the question of
particular topics in each of the three genres that A. can say: "consequendy
the particular topics from which enthymemes must be drawn on the good or
bad, etc have already been selected and are on hand for our use" (b 31-33).
On the Use of ciya90ii 11 Ha"o;; for I1VfMP1eo, PlaP8eO' C 5!11l 2.0. Cpo
the observation at 96a 26.
b 33-34 xlll ",.pl .....6"'0'
A. completes the summary by mention
of the study of the particular topics for >J90, in B I:Ir-17 and "d90, in B
2.-II. The use of "a9111"a.TaW for "dB_ is not unusual for A.; c Bonitz,
Index, p. 554a 56/[ Cope, p. 234 and note, has some doubts; however, Lucas
on Poetics 1449b 27 agrees with Bonitz. On Uo.w read by all the edd., Spengel, Cope (a good tradition has BE dl. which is quite reasonable), the explanation of Cope, p. Z35, is aeeeptable. See 88b 31 : Z, 88b 34 : 1.
b 34 cl>"cN..... ~
I.e., for >JBo" "dBo, an analysis by particular topics was
done in tho same way as it was done for lOYD, in the three genres. This is a
confirmation on A.'s part of what has been said in both volumes of this commentary on A.'s methodology up to B 17, e.g., inter alia 77b 16 : 1.
b 34 - 97ll 1 H, ... l.ul3"'",v
This statement is interpreted in varied
ways by the commentators and trans1ators. In general all agree that A. is
changing his perspective and is now about to approach the subject from a
general viewpoint. However, some leave this "subject" undefined. Some
call it "commonplaces for enthymemes"; some, "universal topics for enthymemes." Some also give no indication of any difference between "a90lov
and "oel cind.~.,. in their interpretation. Certainly there is a sequence in this
passage (the concluding section of the chapter), and it begins at 96b 21. The
dominant idea in the passage is that of the topics of enthymemes, and specifically what he calls ~a l1~o,,,.ia TWv l.9vl"7Jd~.,. or ~&"o. lv9vl"f/l"d~_ (96b
21-2:0). The sequence ofideas is given in the chapter oudine at III (96b :01-

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

9?a 5

9?a 4). From there it is clear that A. intends to speak of topics here in a dilferent way. This would imply that the object of Up.,,...,, is TO".V, understood.
What, then, is the denotation of "Be! ""d......,.? It must refer to what is
mentioned in the previous sentences (b 23-34: irnw . .. T"".') or in the
sentence immediately preceding (b 28-34: "X.607 ... TO".'). I would consider the reference to be to b 28-34 and so the reference in ""d7TW7 to be to the
three kinds of rhetoric. Indeed, the function of the topical method (particular
or general) is to facilitate rhetorical discourse. Therefore I would translate
our clause: "But now let us consider topics in another way, that is, universally,
as they are applicable to all three kinds of rhetoric." I note that Victorius
makes a comment on the passage which I have not seen mentioned anywhere:
""a6cU.ov, i.e. comtnuniter atquc in universultl: cuncta scilicet simul genera
complectentes: n.el ""d7TW7 ... pollicetur enim se communes omnium locos, et qui sine discrimine tribus dicendi generibus accommodentur, nunc
traditurum"; see Spengel at 98a 3-4.

9'78 2 1tIlPIlCl'llU"VO""",,,o,
Cope, p. 236, considers this word an odd
choice for the discussion of chaps. 23-24 since it sipes a kind of marginal
comment on the material. However, it also means to "counterseal. "put
one's seal, stamp, upon." Thus we could say: "pointing out definitively."
If

a 2-4 ..ou~ .. wlloy".""",

TO~' sc. Tonov" and clearly the comnJon

topics that may be used for all subject matter (e.g., A 2, 58. 10-17, 31-32).
They are probative (""06 ......."'.,;,) and therefure useful for the d..........ci ill8v,..,,..aTa (96b 24), or refutative (1l.,."TO".6,) and useful for the i.u""T,,,d
enthymemes (96b 25). Mosdy the probative are presented in chap 23. The
'topics of apparent enthymemes are given in chap 24.

a 4 066 crulloy,CI""",
"since they .re not even syllogisms"; Cope's
interpretation, p. 236, is strange. C Studies, pp. 941, on apparent enthymemes.
a 5-6 _pI"';;" .. rpEP'V

discussed in chap 25.

CHAPTER

~3

The only reasonable ourline to which this wpter submits is to locate each
of the 28 topics by the note in which each first appears in the following pages.
I - rna7
II - rna ~o
III - rna ~3
IV - !'7b I~
V - !'7b 27
VI-'}8a3
VII - 98a IS
VIII - '}8a.8
IX - 98a30
X - 98&33
XI - '}8bw
XII - 99&6
XIII - 99& 10
XIV - 99& 18

XV
XVI
XVII
XVIII
XIX

XXI
XXII
XXIII
XXIV
XXV
XXVI
XXVII
XXVIII

xx -

99>:09
99& 33
99b S
99b '4-'S
99b I!r'O
99b 3'-3'
ooa6-7
ooa IS
ooa 23-27
00& 30-3 I
ooa37-bI
oob 4-S
oob!rIO
oob 17

!'7& 7 : I ..O"O~....... SEl,... l""'"

We come now to the general or
formal topics in contradistinction to the particular or material topics of A
4 - B 17. The subject has been prepared for since chzp. 2 of the first book,
s8a 1-30; c Studies, pp. IIS-Jj.
is correctly understood to refer to
enthymemes which is the way it is used in the treatise (e.g., 96b 23-28, I8b 24). Kassel, p. 212, refers it to Ton. The Greek text of this chzpter is, of all
the chzpters in the first two books, the one most subjected to variant readings
by the editors. In fact Roemer's comment appears to reflect their attitude:
"there are many things which occasion uneasiness in this most diflicuit discussion of the ".lV.l TO""" (p. 148). The change from the particular to the
general topics can be viewed in a way as a change from a static to a dynamic
phase of topical analysis. It is a move from a collection of particulars produced
by topical analysis (c Studks, pp. 126-27) to forms of inference which can
employ the particular facts to demonstrate reasonably the validity or invalidity
of the subject (c Studies, pp. II6-20). If, as many think, the topics found in
A.'s T.pics are logical principles, or laws, upon which arguments can be built,
then from the evidence on hand I would be constrained to say that the ".<v.l
TO"'" of the Rhet.,i, are the same; c oob 38. what A. meant by "topics"
must be derived from his use of them in the Topics and Rhetori& and from what
he says about them. Comments of the last sort are found primarily in the

a."...",".

ARISTOTLE, IRHETORIC' II

9.,.. 7

Rhetoric. In fact the ciosest we come to statement of what a topic is can be

found at Rhetoric 03' I7-I9: "1 call topic and a stoicheion the same thing,
for a stoicheion and a topic is class into which many enthymemcs fall."
'Ihis describe.> well what we find in the common topics in the present chapter,
and perhaps what Cicero had in mind.t De inv. 2.I5.48: "we call, then, those
argwnents which can be shifted to many situations common topics." They are
presented in a way which yields form of inference that is a self-evident
general principle, enthymematic in form, which can be used in an argument.
For example, arguments such as the following can be devdoped from definition (topic 7): whatever is predicated of the definition can be predicated of
the definitum. Another, using the antecedent-consequent form, would be:
if something is removed from. definition, it is removed from the dejinitum;
cf. !I8a IS. Admitting that our knowledge of wh.t A. meant by "topic"
is not as sure as we might wish, we must still acknowledge that a study of the
28 general topics in the Rhetoric reveals for each of thern an explicit or implicit
self-authenticating principle or rule often in the form of antecedent-<:onsequent - if A, then B - as in the topic of definition just given (cf. Studies,
pp. I30-35). Interestingly enough, this hypothetical form is the way medieval
logicians viewed the topics (eE Bird, Mullally, Stump, Green-Pederson, and
Boehner, Gal, & Brown). From what Alexander of Aphrodisias says, Theaphrastus (a student of A.) also appears to subscribe to this understanding of
topic (Studies, p. 132). So, too, could we assume did Themistius (ca. A.D. 320390) whose analysis of the topics (also 28 in number) is found in Book 2 of
Boethius' De topicis diffemrtiis. In fact the list of Themistian and Ciceronian
topics given by Boethius in Books 2-3 reflects in a somewhat striking manner
the general topics as we find them in our present chapter. By way of example,
here are A.'s first 10 topics in the order of their occurrence in our chapter but
with their class identification as given by Boethius, which he calls their differentia: (i) contraries; (ii) conjugates; (iii) antecedent-<:onsequent; (iv) comparison; (v) adjuncts; (vi) similars; (vii) definition; (viii) conjugates; (ix) division;
(x) enumeration of parts. A number of these classifications are fanUliar from
A.'s Topics and Rhetaric and Cicero's Topics. They also appear in most subsequent works which study the topics and can commonly be found in books
concerned with rhetoric; e.g., Maximus Planudes (Rhetores Graeci, V 4041f.)
offers 21 topics, most of which are consonant with those of our chapter, while
Apsines and Minucianus give us lists of common topics (Rheto,.. Gratei, IX
522--27, 604-13). These classifications, as we find thern in A.'s Rhetoric, are
"sources to go to for arguments" (the accepted meaning of "topic"), and they
contain in their very meaning a basic rule which can be formulated in dilferent
ways. The rule possesses the advantage of being self-evident and therefore
offers a potentialIy strOng argument for most people. At SE 170" 20 - I70b
I I in speaking of refotation (and so, too, of demonstration) A. sI!ows the

COMMENTARY

293

nature of the topics. He insists on their importance as self-evident, general

principles which apply to every art and faculty. This fact enables one to use
them for a valid refutation or demonstration without the speciali2ed knowledge of the discipline required if one were to do the same within the structure
of the particular disciplines. In brief the topics are seen by him as varied, selfevident, and general logical categories which enable one to refute or demonstrate effectivdy and to do so with strong probability.
z
c 93a 9-II on the four kinds of opposites. The
reference there to the Topics is the passage in which A. exemplifies each kind;
C also II9a 32-II9b 4. Here A. speaks of contraries, and the rule involved
is: opposites have opposite qualities; e.g., if X (dissipation) is m (bad), then
Y (moderation) is n (good). See Top. II4b 6-15. To this example (as far as
opposites in general go) we could add: to assert one of two rdatives is to assert
the other; e.g., ifx (parent), then Y (child): To asserr one contradictory as
true is to assert the other as false; e.g., if X (John runs) is true, then Y (John
does not run) is false. Contrary species have contrary genera; e.g., if X
(dissipation) is a species of vice, then Y (moderation) is a species of virtue.
See Socrates' refutation of Polus specifically at 475 (Plato, Gorgi/U). We can
thus see how a topic (here contraries) by its very nature contains a principle
which make. it a repository for discovering premisses useful for demonstration or refutation. See the argoment offered at 87a II-I3; C 87a II-I:>"
The point i. illustrated time and again in A.'s Topics or by Cicero for various
topics at De orat. :>.39.162-40.173

"'CIV.."""

.a 8 6vllv..I'I'... 6v""..lov
Here two sets are in play, and they are illustrated at b 10 (olov ... (J).a{J.~&,): e.g., moderation-dissipation which are
signified by ivanlrp, and good-bad by iva,,. Thus if one of the sets ("bad'1
belongs to (,0 l,anlo, ~",d~X") dissipation, then its opposite C'good")
belongs to the opposite (.cp iva.drp ~~") of dissipation, namdy,
moderation. In the example at a 10 "moderation" is the Tcpl,anlrp.
a 9 li.VCltpo\ivo;a.... XClTClcnceuciJ;ov"E'CI
SC. dBi ava&(?oiivTa tnlonai.." "TA.
On xaTaaxsvdC... (prove), S9b 14; e.g., in refuting, if one finds that "bad"
does not bdong to dissipation, then one denies that moderation is good.

a II

MccrcrlJV'"Kiii

C 73b 18 : 1.

a II-12 d ........VOpO.:.crllcrOCIt
Quintilian 5.10.73 uses the same
example. Cope, p. 238, cites Quintilian 5.IO.2Q-94 as a discussion of these
common topics. Some of the topics therein are obviously common topics;
others, less clearly so. Cicero, De part. orat. 2.7 does mention a number of
ordinarily accepted common topics which are in accord with his explanation
of the term at De in.. 2.14.47 and which he illustrates at De orat. 2.39.16240.173. Spengd (pp. 289-90) is not overly confident that Cicero's understand-

AllISTOTLl!, 'RHETORIC' II

ing of the topics comes from A. He sees a Stoic influence; see also p. 29:>
on the second topic at 9']a 20. I'm not at all as certain of the difference in
understanding and would take a stronger stand in favor of Cicero than I
took in Studies, p. II6nI8. Lloyd, Polarity, pp. 15-171, considers the idea of
opposition in Greek thought.
Cpo Cicero, De inv. 1.30.46. The author of
&: Snell, Adespoto 80, with
olpal .s a conjecture for .lval. The infinitive is problem, but dlis is an
excerpt and so possibly part of a larger whole which influenced the construction; cpo cob 17 : 2. Radermacher, C.48, notes that some of the common
topics were in use prior to A., as is clear from A.'. cieation at times of the
authors of his examples. Arguments from contraries he sees as common in
the fifth/fourth cennlrie., and he cites Aristophanes, Frogs 1443-1450, Andocides, On the Mysteries 24. To these can be added Dem., On the Emb....y
214, Thucyd. 6.92, both of which are forms of argument from contraries.
Spenge!, pp. 29<l-92, mentions a number of other instances from Lysias,
In D~{ense oj Malltitheus 11, O. the Confiscation oj the Property 24 (this is Or.
xviii, on which see 97b 27 : 1); Aeschines, On the Embassy 6; Isocrates, 0/1
the Peace 19; Isaeus, On the Estate oj'Ciron 32; Antiphon, Prosecutionfor Pown-

a 13-16 d ...p .. XciPlV

this passage is unknown. It is cited in Nauck

ing

II-I:>.

a 15-16 .,,:,6' ... XciPlV

"Neither need one be grateful to anyone if
under duress he does a good deed." The opposition (c 9']a 8) is between
untruthful statements (which are believable) and truthful ones (which are not
believable).
a 17-19 iUA' ... ~pa",au;
Attributed to the Thyestts of Euripides by
the scholiast Anonymus; c Nauck &: Snell, frg. 396. For 'P.vd07yoe.rv (tell
lies) K.,sel alone of the edd. reads a suggestion of Nauck's 'PsvM;, yieov;
for the reasons, which make good sense, see Der Text, p. 139.
a 20 o"",u"" ""'........v
C 64b 34-37 where there is also mention of
coordinates (atlaTolxa); 64b 35-37 also illustrates what he means by these
inflections. The rule contained in this topic is: If X inrplies Y, then whatever
inrplies X inrplies Y; e.g., if justice (X) inrplies virtue (Y), then just man,
jusdy done, inrplies a man of virtue, an act of virtue.
"for it is necessary that the inflecta 20-21 oILau..~ . ILiJ 6",ciPX.'V
ed forms be present or not present in the same way (in the subject)"; c Top.
1240 10-14, nga 36 - II9b 9; Cicero, Top. 3.12 and cpo Quintilian 5.10.85,
Cicero, D ...at. 2.40.167. A . .,sumes that the essential meaning of the inflected term remains unchanged (e.g., 6po[0)~) in its varied fonus; cpo Pol. 1309"
37-39. He exemplifies this at once in the example.

97" 23

COMMENTARY

a 21 a ....... liy,dlOv
"to say that the just is not good in every respect,"
ie. what "good" signifies cannot be predicated of all the in8.ected instances of
'just." Here A. demonstrates the general rule by ..."emplifying fJ~ tlndex....
i.e.. an instance in which "good" cannot be predicated of an inHection of
'Just." As Victorius says: those who argue that everything that is just is good
can be refuted by stating that if this i. so. then whatever occurs ju.dy happens
bene6cially and should always be desired. But it is far better (and so more
desirable) to be put to death 1lI1iusdy for it shows that one is innocent since
only criminals are put to death jusdy.
a 22 : 1 xal ... &.xau..~
.c. r"l TO ayaBo;,: "fur 'jusdy' would in fact
be 'beneficially." On c!yaBcII, (used to convey the idea). see 88b 7.
z Wv... Ii_Bav.iv " ... to be put to death jusdy i. not desirable."
There are two points calling for comment here. The first is the way d",al."
is being used. for which see 661> 29. second paragraph. and 97'l 29 - 97b I I
bdow. The .econd i. that aleoTa. = that which is good (here: an act which
is beneficial); on the rdation between draB&. and a/eSTOP cf. A 6.
a 23 0. ... ~~a C Radermacher. C.5I. The te.,<t between 97"23 and
97b I I isread by the edd. with these exceptions: at a 25 Ross conjectures el
<TO> "sA';;ua,; Kassel at 97b 2 reads d. aefJOTTT/. at b 3 'AAHfJi.,.,; he brackets
b 7-II ["al oj cbroBdvoVTa] while reading at b 7 "a! oCo. oj. The changes
are occasioned in part (e.g. Thurot, "Observations critique. [II]." 43) by
the fact that Dionysiu. of H.licam.as.u. in the first Lener to Ammaeus XII (747748) cites our text from 97a 23 to 97b 7 (,llAo, ... iJ"IfJouB. dl""l). Where
relevant, the changes will be noted. Cope, pp. 245-46, views Diony.ius'
alterations as W1fortunate, and Spengel, p. 297. questions the text he was using.
a 23-24 E\ ".",,,,,8lv,..
In this topic we are working with what A.
call, corrdative terms, i.e., term. which are reciprocal in their relation: master/
servant, lessor/lessee, father/son, buy/sell, to act/to be acted upon. In corrdative terms one term necessarily includes (cf. previous examples) or excludes
(e.g., vice-virrue) the other. A relative term e."presses a concept in which
the rdation to the other is the dominant idea. as A. says in Cat. nb 24-31
(and cf. 92a \rIl). The rule for this topic can be: relative opposites demand
each other; e.g., if X entails Y. to posit X is to posit Y. C 92a 32 -!/20b 3.
!/2ob 3-5. Thus in the text here: if it is a fact that (1l"dex", IS, B.V) A (B~'
etpl) does an honorable or just act to B, then B (B~ietp 2) experiences an
honorable or just action from A. Expressed as it is in this translation. the
statement is beyond cavil, as was remarked in 66b 29. At a 27 - b I I, however,
A. goes on to make some valid distinctions on uses of the corrdatives (act/be
acted upon) which are paralogism.. Plalludes (Rhetores Graeei, V 404) and
Minucianus (IX. 611) give this topic.

A1USTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

9~

29

a 25 ",d .l ..........O.'I"tv,..
sc. '"'dex" which emerges in the English
translations as: "if it is right to, if one had the right to," etc., and correctly
conveys the idea behind the correlatives: the polver to command entails somer..ne's: obligation to execute the command (n:sn:o'1J",sva,). On RossJs conjecture,
o ~ 23. Cicero, Drat. 4'.142 (as Schrader notes) exemplifies the topic in
an argument for the study of good speaking ("cur aut discere torp. est quod
scite honestum est aut quod nosse pulcherrimum est id non gloriosum est
docere").

a,"

a 25-27 otov ... ':'vi..

What is being compared here is the COIrelation between command/obey and seUJbuy. Cope remarks the pleonasm
in olo. cr., (also 97h 27), but it is an expression that appears elsewhere in A.
and in later Greek (e.g., Demetrius, On Style 94) and may simply indicate
development in the language: "for example, as." Diomedon is unknown.
Cicero citeS our example, mentioning in place of Diomedon the Rhodians
and a Hermocreon (De inv. 1.30.47), and QuintiIian repeats it (Inst. orat.
5. 10.78).

"and if 'well' or 'justly' is predicable of

a 27-28 " ..1 ct ... ,",O.ij ..ClV...
the one acted upon, then it is predicable of the one acting." At this point A.
takes note of the possibility of f.c.Ise reasoning in this topic; o 66b 29. The
ground for the paralogism is an assumed (but mistaken) correlation between
the temlS, e.g. a 29-30 (el
aov). The text at a 27-28 (..al ... "0'>1aa.....) is read in the same way by the edd. and Spongel. Cope and Freese read
after no,fjaav'E'~ : :seai d 'E'q; no,fjaav'n, ~aL -rep "110,.,80".

rae ...

a 28-29

l ..... S' tv ..aU"",

The reading of the edd.. Spongel, Cope.
Radermacher (918 23) reads with Dionysiw Ka.... d'l. TO;;"; he also contends
that this kind of f.c.Ise reasoning was common to Sophistic rhetoric. Certainly
it is not an uncommon form of argument in drama, e.g., our instance of
Alcmaeon (97b 3IE) from the play of that name by n,eodectes; this is paralleled by the argument in the Orestes ofTheodecte cited atola35- alb 2. The
argument is also found in Euripides. Orestes 538-539 (0 546-547, SSI-563;
and cpo Electra 1238-1"48. In Aeschylus, Eumeniaes 566-673 we have the
issue set before us. Further evidence of the stock character of the argument
is found at Ad Herenn. 1.10.17. 15.25. 16.26. and Cicero. De i,w. 1.13.18-19:
"a very common example."

a 29-30 El ya.p .....oil

In other words. in contrast to the statement
above (0 ~ 23-24). it is possible that a person.B, experienced justice (d",at,,",,0.8A.a.) at the hands of A. but it does not follow that A did a just
deed (d ...al." nOLfjaa.). Other factors call for consideration, as is indicated
in Ad Herenn. 1.16.26, De inv. I.I3.18-19 - specifically as we are told at 97b

co,

COMMENTARY

297

1 whether there is a true correlation in the terms. If there is not, as in the

examples given from 97b 2 on, there can be no argument.
The infinitive is clearly dependent on
97b 2 xpijaO .. , . iiv cl:PfLO"'"<!J
aei. Kassel alone reads &v ae,.OTT7I with a good tradition and Dionysius.
He also points to a similar usage at 76b 28, 82. 19, 99b 13 which is rather
suasive. ""OT4!.", i.e., "in whichever of the two ways is applicable": if the
terms are truly correlative, one can make the argument; if they are not, aile
ean show the fallacy in the argument.
"for occasionally there is disagreement
b 2-3 ivlo... ... 9o6obc...ou
in a case such a. this and nothing prevents (one from stating) as in the A/emeon
of Theodectes." Alemeon, .on of Amphiarans and Eriphyle, avenged his
father's death on his mother. Driven mad by the Eriny.. he was cured by
Phegens, king ofPsophis in Arcadia, who gave him his daughter Alphesiboea
(Arsino;;) in marriage. The play by Theodecres (ca. 375-334 B.C.) appears
from the citation to refer to the period in Arcadia. On Theodectes, a pupil
of plato and with Alexander the Great a student of Aristotle see OCD, PW;
he was a successful tragic poet as well as a competent orator and writer on
rhetoric (e.g., IOb 3).
b 3-"7 fL1l ....P.. . " .....VrV
C Nauck & Snell, Theodectes, A/emeon
2; c pp. 379-85 in Nauck & Snell for the fragments of Euripides' plays on
Alemeon. Clearly what are cited from Theodectes are not consecutive lines
but those relevant to the point A. is making. Thus amla{Jona ... ,",o".i.
(one must examine the question by distinguishing) is explained by nI.,.6P
.. . ,.-q "Tav.i. (where the distinction is given: they decided that she die, but
not at my bands) and the whole citation exemplifies 97a 30 - 97b 2: a.& ...
ae,.OTT7/.
b 7 : 1 " ..l"/J ".pl
Kassel, Cope read with Dionysius and a good text
tradition: "al oCovlj. Kassel also secludes b 7-II (c 972 23) as an addition of
A.'s which belongs with 97a 23-28 (&llo, . .. "O,>1aavT.) as Spengel thought
("Ueber die Rheto,ik," 498-501); Cope, pp. 244-45, in general agrees on the
misplacement of 97b 7-II as does Thurot, "Observation. critiques [II]," 4344. The argument is !hzt 97b 7-II is quite in accord with 97a 23-28 but not
with 97a 29 - 97b 6 (.1 ,.ae ... XTai.). Faced with .uch a consensus I hesitate
to disagree. But the nature of this topic, as A. indicates, is that it lends itself
to false reasoning and so, as he says, it is necessary to examine statements
grounded in correlative terms. I am inclined to think that 97b 7- II belong
where they are as further instances of statements based all correlatives which
are open to question: e.g., was the judgment on Demosthenes and the others
made correctly (a",at." 'xetO."aav ano"Teiva,). If not, what follows? Or

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC J II

298

97b

12

does it readily follow from the fact that the man at Thebes was ju,dy killed
that tho,e who killed him did so jusdy?
2 A'Il.LC'cr8vouS . N.xcivopcz
This doe, not appear to be the
orator Demosthenes, although Dionysius (c 9']3. 23) thought that it was and
that the reference was to the defense of Ctesiphon against Aeschines in Demosthenes' Crown speech. Dionysius apparendy did not have in his text the
words xal T.v .mO"T...".T.,. "d. which would make ,uch a reference
highly questionable since we know of no Nicanor with whom Demosthenes
was or could have been so involved. Victorius suggests a' a remote possibility
someone like the fifth-century general Demosthenes, but we know of no
Nicanor at that time either.

b 9 ....pl ... &'...o8civOVTOS Xenophon, Hellenic. 7.3.I-I2 narrates the story

of Euphron put to death at Thebes by Sicyonian exiles. This event occurring
ca. 366 B.C. during the Theban hegemony is the one which A. pos,ibly has
in mind. Cpo Helle;,;ca 7.1.44-46, 2. II-IS, Hammond, pp. 504-505.

b IO : J xu..ue .. 4 ...o8czvEiv "(The accused man) bid that a judgment

be made whether the man killed was righdy put to death." On ai"a.o~, ~',
S. I982.
2

<loS /Iv

S. 2086d: "on the ground that it was not wrong."

b I2 : 1 oiU0S

This fori topic is read by the edd. with many variants

from b r6 through the next five lines caused by what appear, to be a dittography. Con'equendy I print the text I am following, along with a translation. Roemer in his apparatus offers the readings found in the two main text

JIaditions. In the critical editions we find that Dufour reads exacdy as Roemer,
as does Tovar in effect; with minor conjectures and variants Ross is in basic
agreement. The major change from Roemer introduced by Kas,el is that
Roemer secludes b IS-I7 [nm...... de'<a.] and Kassel b I6-I7' ["a6' ."...
....eo ... piUAo. tlndez). Neither seclusion changes the meaning in any
substantial manner; c Thurot, "Observations critiques (11)," 44-46 on the
text. I will follow Kassel's text and lineation:

"e

IS Td 6' 8n .O~~ "~:'1"tov TV"T.. 8,

"al Td. na'"ea,
16 l" TOV, .1 Td ~...o. ,j"cleZ'" "al Td plillo. ,j"cleX"' ["aB'
I7 d"o....eo. d. dBrJ d,l<a
6n eI TO ~TTOV tlncleI71 ZBl "al TO plill.. tlncleZBI]' TOV,,,ae "aTiea, ~TTO'
TV"TOV".. '/I
nl."aiov. " "'I oifr.", '/I sI rJi plillo.
Ii' <11.> tlndezo. p~ tl""ez'" .., rJi ~TTO' .1 tlnaez... <"aB'>
11' d"o....eo. <11.> dBrJ
.,6' 0.... ,j"deXBI ..6' 8... oli. iT,

...m..B.

1',.

T.v,

a"<a.,

"Further the argument that the one who ,trikes his father ,trikes hi, neighbors,
(which follows) from the principle that if the less likely is, then the more
likely is; for men strike their fathers less than they strike their neighbors.

COMMENTARY

299

Or you may argue as follows: if that which would more naturally exist does
not exist, (then the less likely does not); or, if that which less naturally would
exi.t does exist, (then the more likely exists); (the argument proceeds) according to whichever of the two positions one must demonstrate: either that
something is or is not." The secluded Greek is not translated.
Z ",ii),),,,,, "Ill fj'<'<OV
C Radermacher, C. 52. This topic in the
example which follows immediately (olov .. . .IvOe""o,) is given by A.
in what is a common inferential form for these topics, c 9'7ll 7 : 1: if so and
'0, then .... Further the logical ground which validares the form in this
instance is offered in the next sentence: TOVTO <l> ~TTOV. A. wed the
argument at 92a I3-IS. C 92" 13 : 1 for other references to this kind of a
fortiori argument. Our present topic forms the substance of A 7. On the topic
in general c Top. II4b 37 - lI5a 24; see also Cicero, Top. 4.23, De orat.
2.40.172; Quintilian S.IO.S6--93. The argument afo,tiori (whether it be from
greater or from lesser) works from the principle: every greater contains a
lesser. We find the topic in one form or another in the Rhetores Gram: at
I 225, for example, where Theon calls it comparison of the greater, lesser,
equal (cp. Boethiw, De topids differentiis II90C - II9Ia); all three are also
mentioned in Minucianw (IX 60S); Planudes talks of the more and the less
(V 404) and Apsines mentions ouly the argument from the less (IX 522);
the references are from Spenge!, p. 29S.
"lC,o),ij
"much less so"; c LS, S.U. B,2. Victoriw comments that as
an argument this topic is a common one among the Athenians and cites Plato
Phaetirus 6sb. In support of his observation we might note Deinarchw (ca.
360-292), Against Demosthenes 4I-4S; Demosthenes, Against Conon 23 (I264);
Andocides (ca. 44D-390) Against Aldbiades IS (wrongly attributed to ADdoc.);
Lysias, On the Murder of Eratosthenes 31; Isocrates, Antidosis 166, Plataicus S2.
AU these are noted by Spengel.

b 13

b '3-14 ",oG1;o .. '" fj ......""

ToVTO lC1TW: "for this ... is to say
that [cpo TOVTAC1T' in later usage] if something is not present where [literally:
to whicll] it should more likely be present, then obviously it is not present
where it should less likely be." From b I2 on, Ross alone of the edd. encloses
statements such as this (el ... ~TTOV) in quotation marks.
b 15-172 "'0 S' ... "oU~ nA'lcrlov
C the text printed at lI7b 12 : 1
for comments on b 15-1'1'. Vater, p. I2S, calls the statement here fidse, stating that it is not an argument a minor; ad maius and so the other side of the coin
seen at b 13-14- However, A. is saying (as Victorius, p. 406, remarked) that
to strike one's father is a less likely action than to strike a neighbor; thw if one
is guilty of such action, one is more likely to have struck one's neighbor.
The argument runs from the evidence of the less likely to the strong possibility

300

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

of the more likely. Top. lIsa 6-8 expresses the topic as here: first, maio,i,
and then, minori.
b I'f - 174 <ciy> ... &i1J
<d.>, a conjecture of Spengel's (p. 300)
read only by Kassel. Kassel also conjectures < ..aO'> ""oneo. < 4.> Mn at

I'fA.
b 17 CI8 k-, el .. ijnov
At b 18 we return to the ordinaty lineation
found with slight variation in Roemer, Tovar, Kassel. Introduced here and
exemplified in b 1'J-27 is the pari argument.
b I'J-2O xcii "O~ . , . YOvov Cf. Nauck & Snell, AJespota 81. The author
is unknown although some suggest that it is Antiphon (on whom see "b IS,
Bsa 9 : 2). At 99b 25 we have a reference to the Meleager of Antiphon (c
Naua & Snell, p. 792), and some (c Cope. p. 248, Nauck & Snell, p. 8SS)
consider our citation and that at 97" 13ff. (.1 .. xcletv) to collie &om the same
play. In fact we know that an Oeneus was the father of Meleager and that
Meleager killed Plexippus ("b IS), the brother of Althaea, who was the wife
ofOeneus. So it is that the .choliast Stcphanus thinks "that our lines are those
spoken by Oeneus to Althaea as she grieves for her father (Thestius) in his
loss. Ocneus asks her If your father i, to be pitied for his son, am I not to be
much pitied for the los. of my son, Meleager?'" Stcphanus follows one account; A.'s citation follows another (e.g., "ai8a,) in which the two sons of
Thestiu. are killed. Diodarns Siculus 4-34.1-6 tells the story.
xed BT' .. 'Al.';",,6po~
a pari arguments in defense of Paris
and his abdllCtion of Helen and his killing of Achilles; cpo Top. II4b 25-36.
0n the grounds that among equals if one is guilty (or not guilty), all are, the
innocence of Paris is argued &om the like instance of Theseus (lsoer., Helen
18-20) who carried off Helen as a youog girl (plutarch, Theseus 31), and also

b 21-23

Ariadne from Crete, and &om that of the Dioscuri, Castor and Pollux (brothers
of Helen), who caxricd off Aethra, and also their cousins, daughters of Leucippus, Phoebe and HiIaera. Similarly, &om the instance of Hector, the killing
of Achilles by Paris is defended, These examples may come &om an encomiam
called the AlexanJros; cpo 98a 22, OIb 21, 36 and c Polycratcs in Baiter &
Sauppe, II 223, Erg. 13.
b "3-24 xed d . . . 'I'Ll-aoorpo,
by Spenge!.

b 25

e..y .....oiiYT..'

Cpo !soer. Amidosis 2O'J-2I4 mentioned

"condemned to death"; Cope alone reads 7jTTOi....a.:

"are defeated."
b ::16-"7 "d ... 'BU.""""","
All . except Spengel, Tovar print the
quotation marks. Most of the translations interpret 60<'1' as "rep~tation";

COMMENTARY

301

it could also mean "opinion." Either is possible since we have no idea of the
context of the statement.

"xo",.'"

b 27 : 1 IilAO~ ..
The fifth topic is an argument from the
adjunct of past time as an associated accident of an object or event. The
argument has its force in an accepted inevitable relation between the accident
of time and the object, e.g., ifx is true at t{I) in the past, then it is also true
at t{z). In such an inst:mce, time is viewed as an integral part of a larger whole
which includes the object (X) argued for. In fact, the object X when qualified
by past time is taken as though possessing that which makes it trUe in itsd
This can be .een in the examples offered by A. where a necessary conjunction
Df time and the truth of the object X in the past is taken as the ground fDr the
truth of X at the later time. The topic is a fairly common form of argument
and i. found freqqently among the Greek.. For example in the peroration,
found in the corpus ofLysias (0 <)7a 13-16) as Or. xviii, it is argued (1']-19)
that if the Athenians did nDt confiscate the property in 403 B.C. when they were
angered at collaborators why .hould they dD so now? See also: Demosthenes,
Ag. uplines 84-86 (this is mentioned by Apsines, Rhetores Graed, IX 525,
who also identifi.s the topic as "past time"), 01. 1.8-9 (if we had acted in
the past, W. wDuld nDt have this situation, therefor. act nDw), Ag. AnJrolion
6-7 (challenges the ...umed rdatiDn between past time and the obj.ct X);
Lysias, On the Olive Stump 27; Isaeus, On the Estate of Astyphilus 14-15; Isocrates, On the Team of Horses 12-15; Thucydides 3.55.1-4. Spengd, p. 304.
also mentions other instances .omewhat remDte to the topic as pr.sented her.
by A. In fact, Top. IIlb 24-31 enlarges the topic time to past, present, future
time, as does 1I5b II-35. Among other things, they make clear that.n event
can b. qualified (and so time is an .ccident of the thing) or nDt qualified by
time. Dionysius in hi. first Letter to Ammdeus XI (739-740) cites our p ....ge
97b 27 - 98. 2. with few minor variants. Quintilian, 5010.42-44, briefly
discusses time as topic; most ofhis comment is more directly concerned with
circumstances in their tempDrai rdation to an event. Spengd, p. 303, cites
Hermogenes (Rhetores Gram, III 132-35), who uses an example quite the
""xBte'1P" by which he
same as that of Iphicrates and calls it
means. "hypothetical argument." Apart from the similarity to an example
used by A. and the fact th.t it is calI.d an "argument," there is no direct
connectiDn with Dur ch.pter. On time as a topic, see Cope, p. 250, .nd
Radermacher, C.49.
3 oIov':'~
C 9'78 25-27; o oob 17.
3 'I<pucpci""l~
C lisa 25-2.6; lv -rti sci. cbto).o"l~: "in the defens....
From Aeschines, Ag. etesiphon 243, we knDW that the general Iphicrates was
honored with statu., an event most prDbably referred to by Demostbenes,
Ag. Leplin.. 84. In the life of Ly.ia. 836d in the Lives of the Ten Attic Orlllor.

"Aa......

302

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTOlllC' II

98a I

(found in the Moralia of Plutarch to whom the Lives are wrongly attributed),
we are told that Lysias wrote two speeches for Iphicrates, one of which was
against Harmodius. But Dionysius of Hali=nassus, in chap. I2 of his L ysi..,
denies that the speech is by Lysias, while clearly indicating that there was a
speech called "On the Statue." A. obviously considers the speech that of
Iphicrates; cf. Baiter & Sauppe, II 178 (Or. xviii), 179, frg. 36. In 390 B.C.
Iphicrates received the honor of a statue for his success at Lechaeum (CAB,
VI 51) against a Spartan hoplite force. After his retirement in 372/371, as
Dionysius tells us, he brought up the question of his statue not yet received
and presumably gave this speech. Pausanias, Altiea 1.24-7, mentions that he
saw a statue of Iphicrates on the acropolis in Athens.
h 29!P'
Kassel alone secludes this, following the reading found in Dionysius; he gives his reasons in Der Text, pp. 92r94h 30 p.ro""....S ",,,06v"'OS
when you receive it."

"When you expect something ... ;

h 3 I &"0",,,
The present infinitive, for which there is a good manuscript witness and which is also found in Dionysius, is read only by Ross,
Kassel in place of the more common aorist: d,ei7al. The construction is an
articular infinitive: "in respect ro the Thebans allowing Philip ro pass through
into Attica they (philip's envoys) argued that ..."; cpo 8TI, b 28.

98a

I : J ' A......udjy
For the history see next note. There are references
ro this need for Theban cooperation in Demosthenes, On the Crown I46,2H213, and somewhat indirectly in Aeschines, 4f. Ctesiphon 151.
"'ply .. ~"'x'is
Ross alone of the edd. omits the quotation
marks: ".i ... dl>111011',..." In 347 Thebes (an enemy of Athens) and Thessaly asked the help of Philip against the phocians in the Sacred War (356/355346). In 346 after the Peace of philocrates Philip decided ro give the help,
move against Phocis, and end the war. He came inro Greece by way of the
pass at Thermopylae and at the time the Thebans would not have stopped
his march on Athens if he had asked pennission to pass through. However,
Philip reduced Phocis and returned home; cf. CAB, VI 233-43. As the first
direct help offered ro Thebes against Phocis, this is the event referred to
in these words. In 339 Philip was back in Greece at the invitation of some
Greek states to help in the Amphissean War. Establishing himself at Elateo, a
town on the direct route to Thebes and Athens, he sent ambassadors to Thebes
whose help or neutrality he wanted against the threat of Athens. Athens also
sent an embassy, led by Demosthenes, who succeeded in winning the alliance
of the Thebans; cf. CAB, VI 256-60. The argument of Philip's envoys as
given ro us here is: Had Philip asked in 346, you would have allowed him to
pass through into Attica even before he ever gave you any help; n?w that

98a 4

COMMBNTAllY

303

he has given you substantial help, and thrown away any advantage ("'100''''0)
he had in that regard, and placed his trust in you, it would be unparalleled
to deny him passage through.
"another topic oomes from (turning) the
a 3-4 a>J.o~ ... d"c\v'rez
statements made against oneself upon the one who made them." aiTrov is
read by the edd. with Bywater ("Aristotelia III," 72.-73); Spengel, Cope read
atr... with the oodd. This topic 6 is one of those which Spenge! (pp. 28889) on the basis of 97a I argues does not belong among the topics since it is
not oommon to all three kinds of rhetoric. For example, he sees topic 6 as
applicable to judicial; 20, tojudicial and deliberative; 23, 25, and 27, to judicial.
On examination, however, they do not appear so limited, and Cope, for
example, accepts our present topic as usefuI in deliberative and judicial rhetoric. But Cope, p. 252, would restrict topic 6 to rhetoric, as does Brandis,
p. 19; neither offers a reason. In fact, as A. explains the topic in a 3-4, it can
be used in any kind of Idisoourse, and we find Euthyphro lIb 8 - lId 2 exemplifying the figure when Butbyphro gently turns back on Socrates a charge
he had made against him. As a common topic it is quite straightforward,
contingent as it is on what is said and the ingenuity of the respondent in
turning the statement.

ov,

a 4 6,ezrpoipEt... 'rpo"o~
I would take "'eo"o~ as "this tum of speech."
Spengel, p. 306, with the explanation (a 8-12) in mind interprets it as character
("the character of the speaker makes a difference"). 6,atpte.' tolerates two
meanings and each has its adherents. It can mean: this turn of speech "is
excdlent" or "differs." I do not know that either one can claim to be the
only oorrect interpretation. I am inclined toward the seoond. In the first
place there is nothing exceptional in the topic as presented by A. that it should
be called an "excellent" topic - and this, though there are excellent examples
of it like the well-known "If you were my husband, I'd poison your oolf.."
with the reton: "If you were my wife, I'd drink it." Many instances are quite
ordinary, as the reply of Alexander the Great to Parrnenio cited by Arrian
(Anabasis 2.25), Diodorus Siculus (17.54), plutarch (Life of Alex.nder 29),
e.g., on hearing Darius' peace terms Parmenio said: "Were I Alexander, I'd
gladly accept." To which Alexander replied: "Were I Parmenio I would too,
but since I'm Alexander I shall send another answer." SeoondIy, we do not
know the example (or examples) from the Teucer and whether it is different
in character and tone from or the same as that of Iphicrates. And so we do not
really know whether we are to understand the topic as it is given at a 3, which
is the way retort is ordinarily understood, or in tbe limited way ill which
A. explains it at a 8-14 (60' ... &.). The explanation would restrict the topic
to use against one who accuses you of wrong and who is looked upon as
morally inferior (as Victorius saw, p. 401) and as guilty.

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

a 4-5 orov . TEllxP'I" <I>

This is the reading and the punctuation
ofthree edd., Spengel, Cope. Ross pl~ces olov . . T";"erp. after el,,6vTa with
Bywater. Kassel conjectures 01..... T";"erp <"al> rJ> which appeared
in an early edition of the Rhetoric. I would accept this conjecture, which would
explain some of my problems mentioned in the previous note. & I understand the conjecture A. indicates that there are varied kinds of retort, the kind
found in the Teuc." the kind used by Iphicrates (with rJ> referring to TeO"O~).
As was remarked, however, one can take the first meaning of d.atpiee., read
without the conjecture, and have an acceptable, if restricted, understanding
of retort. It is commonly thought that the Teuc., is the play of Sophocles,
and Cope, p. 252, recoDSt:ruCts the possible retort in that play; see Pearson,
II 215-16.

a 5 'I'I"xpci'"l~...' A.p ....0'Pc;;II....

On the first, 97b 27 : 3. This is a
second speech of Iphicrates. It apparendy concerns a charge of betrayal.
It, too, is mentioned by Dionysius as not being written by Lysias (c 97b 27 :
3). In fact, A. assumes here as at 97b 27 that the speech is that of Iphicrates
as does Aristides, Or. 49.656-657 (Dindor, Aristides, II 518-19), wbo makes
reference to both the Hamwdius and Aristophon speeches; c also the comment ofQuintilian, P2.9-IO. The present speech was Dlost likely given when
Chares (76& 10 : 2) supported by Aristophon wrongly attacked lphicrates
for treachery as a fleet commander in the Social War, 357-355 B.C.; c CAR,
VI 2II and Diodorus Siculus 16.21 who gives the story of the baede and the
accusation. On Aristophon see PW. Bom before the Peloponnesian War
(431-404) and.living well into the fourth century, he became a leading states,man in Athens in mid-fourth century after the fall of Callistratus in 361.

a 6 "et...."

Tovar, Kassel of the edd. use quotation marks, as does Cope.

a 7-8 "crQ 'I<p.xpci"'1t;"

quotation marks.

All the edd. save Roemer punctuate with

a 8 bcEillov
i.e., the one who makes the original charge, e.g., Aristophon
in the example: "it is necessary that the opponent be one who would be
thought more likely to do wrong."

a 9 'Ap.u..d&'1"
known to the Greeks and to history as "the Just."
He lived ca. 520 - ca. 468 B. c., played a prominent part in the two Persian W m,
and was a paramount factor in the formation of Athens' first Delian Confederacy shordy after the wars. plutarch has a life of him. C OCD, PW, CAlI,
IV and V passim.
a 10 ....uri ...t; av i"." .nAOt;
ruo~ (for the codd. c!lld which is
read by Spengel, Cope) is a conjecture of Bywater's ("Aristotelia III," 73)
read by all the edd. Kassel also reads with Shilleto dv ..."".,.. for lJ....

r".,..;

98a IS

COMMENTARY

30S

Ross secludes 11 The standard English versions translate the reading a.Ud of
the codd., which is explained by Cope, p. 2S3. Our reading would be interpreted: "if someone should make this kind of statement to Aristide.la. a
prosecutor with reference to his lack of credibility as a prosecutor."
a I I (3cNA.....,
the verb.

C LS, s.". III "pretends to be." Cope, p. 2S4. discusses

12 : 1 "rOU","
i.e., a II-I2 (8Am, ... xa'tT/roeotJ): dlC accuser's pretension
to moral superiority.
z hi
is read by all the odd. for the manwcript reading dsl found
in cod. A and accepted by the ,choliast Anonymus, Spenge!, Cope.

I would agree with Victoriw, p. 402, and refer this to the

a 13 a-.o"o~
person who follows: "for one is ridiculous when one criticizes...... Cope,
pp. 2S4lf..: and others understand reM." "the lIS!' of this figure is ridiculow ...

a IS 6pu,,,,oG
A., Met. 10']8b 27-29, remarks that there were two significant contributions made by Socrates to philosophical thinking becawe of
the way in which he used both. They were definition and inductive reasoning.
Anyone acquainted with Socratic dialogues such as the Lathes, Lysis, Euehyphro etc., could readily agree. As a topic, definition is open to a number of
formulations such as we saw in 9'7Il 7 : 1, all based on the fact that the definition and tle}initum are convertible. A. has argued many times from definition
in the present book. Each of the emotions, for example, was fir.t defined
and then conclwions were drawn from the definition. In the first book we
have definitions and deductions therefrom for aya8&. (chap. 6, and C 6za
21 - 6zb 9) and "aM. (chap. 9) among others, and in chaps. 12-14 of our
second book the analysis devdops a series of qualities usefuJ for a good descriptive definition ofthe characters of the young, old. and mature person. Spengd,
p. 308, mentions as examples of definition [socrates, Antid. 27G-271, Lysias
Ag. Simon 41-43. A. engages in an extended study of definition in Top. 6(139) 24 - ISSb 8). Cicero, T.p. S.26-7.32 explains definition, distinguishing
it from enumeration of parts and analysis; cpo De part. orot. 12.41, De in".
2.17.S3-S6. Quintilian j.IO.S4-64 explains the topic together with a number
of dements which can invalidate it if neglected. It is mentioned in R1retores
Gram, V 4OS.
a 1S-17 &11'","'''" ... eivll'
This is repeated in more detail at r 18,
I9a 8-12, and the question is identified as that of Socrates to Mdetus who bad
accused him of atheism, e.g., Apol. 27b-e. As wed here and in the Apology,
da,pO., is apparendy the adjective and denotes either the result of divine
activity (ler , "'edypcrra), or that which bdongs to a aa/pow and sperifically
a god (806,). In general, one could say that this places the problem of tlaimon,

306

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC'

[I

98a 22

a.imon.. fairly accurately. Do they represent for the Greeks a kind of divine
action, or a class of divine beings (e.g., Apol. 27d I: 8.wp "aida~) lower than
the gods but cilled 8.ol? Cope, p. 2SS, gives .ome of the evidence for the
latter view; Burkert discusses daimon (cf. pp. 179-81, 330-32) and remarks at
p. 180: "Daimon does not designate a specific class of divine beings, but a
peculiar mode of activity."
Ro.s alone places this within quotation marks.
a 16-17 Cip' ... EtV'"
Cope reads a different text and punctuation at b IS-I6: olop 6..... . 1eYo,.
a 17-22 K.d.:.~ ......el< ..<i"
Thi. citation from Iphicrates may well be
from his speech against Harmodius; cf. 97b 27 : 3, 98a S. In fact, the tenor of
his comments here on the quality of true nobility is very much in accord with
the other comments attributed to "Iphicrates" atA 7, 6sa 28-29, and 9, 67b 18,
and that suggested as his at 9Sa 2S-26; cf. 9sa 2S-26. Certainly all of them
would be appropriate responses to an attack on lilin and his family background
by Harmodius. In the present passage (assuming such an attack) Iphicrates
responds to the charge by giving as a definition of nobility of birth (YBPpa"lT'1~) nobility in one's actions. This he asserts is true ofhirn and makes him more
the kinsman of the heroes Harmodius and Aristogeiton (cf. QIa 17 : z) than
Harmodius himself, who claimed the hero as his ancestor. This explanation
of Iphicrates' remark is most likely in the light of the following references to
it, which also incidentally tell us in effect ill that we know about the accuser,
Harmodius: Lysias XVIII.36 (see 97b 27 : 3); Plutarch, Sayings of Kings
Gerul,.1s I87b;PS.-Plutarch, On Nobility, chap. 21 (in the Bernardakis edition)
where we are told (as in Sayillgs) that Iphicrates' respon.e was: "My line begin.
<with me, yours end. with you."

ana

The statement at 90b 22-31 is relevant; cf. 90b 22a 18 yEW ...cI........D~
31. Cpo 60b 30 : 1; 90b 16.
a 20 cruyyEV ......EpD~
On the idea see SIb 34 : 3. In terms of the argument as given in 98a 17-22: if actions define nobility of stock, my actions more
than your. are like the actions of your noble ancestor and confer on me that
same nobility of .tock (y...a.dT77~) as he won by his actions.
Cpo 97b 21-23; cf. Baiter & Sauppe, II 223 frg. 13.
This is an example based on the third
a 22-23 K ..l .:.~ ... ""o)...u."v
idea "defined": & "dap.o~. Altogether four "defmitions" are exemplified,
da'pdop, Y8.pa.oT77" iJPe". Victorius, p. 403, suggests that Paris, c11arged
with licentiousness because of his actions concerning Helen, is defended on
the ground that the definition of the well-behaved, non-licentious man,
o "dap.o~ (Victorius interprets it as "temperate"), is: one satisfied. with the

98a 28

COMMBNT AllY

307

enjoyment of a single woman. This is found to be true ofPatis in his union

with Helen (on anoAavu.., enjoyment, c 6Ia 17-19).
a 24-26 x.d &,' . x"x"'~
Archelaus was king of Macedon (413399 D.C.) and brought a nwnber of Greek: artists - e.g., Agathon, Euripides
- to his country; c OeD, CAR, V, passim, and Plato, Corgias 47OC-47Id.
As we might gather from Plato, Archelaus was not a particularly attractive
person and as presented in the Corgias would be even less so to Socrates; cpo
Xenophon, Apol. of Socrales 16-17, D. Laertius, Socrales 2.25; Seneca, On
Benefits 5.6.2-7. The definition ofhybtis on which Socrates makes his decision
is somewhat unusual and has been questioned by some, e.g., Thurot, "Observations critiques [IIJ," 46. The fact that it is not in accord with the mealling
given to it by A. at 78b 23-26, as Thurot remarks, does not necessarily signify
anything since A. tells us that rills is Socrates' understanding of hybris. Furthermore, it is quite possible (see,sb '4-15 : 3) that the definition is legitimate
for it is "an outrage upon, an insult to, one's person" to be placed in the demeaning position Socrates describes: namely, "to be unable to make an equal
rerum when one fares well as to retaliate when one is hur~"
Cope alone reads the singular form.
a 27 : 1 op,aci!'ovo, ... cia",
Cpo 98. IS. The TO .1 i"" is the essence
of a thing or what makes the thing to be what it is, and, so, distinct and separate from anything else. The"definition" is the verbal expression of that
.essence, e.g. Met. I042a 17.
2 DUlloyl!;....."",
I iliv i.e., the persons mentioned, after defining and apprehending the essential meaning of a term, "draw inferences concerning the particular topics of their discussion." uvUoylC.uOa, may mean
simply to use reasoning (S6a 22 : 2) or to reason by syllogism (s7& 8 : 1,2).

".p

a 28-29 iiJ.}.0~ ... "0;; 6p8",~ The text here is read by the edd., Spengel,
Cope. Kassel alone reads dUo~ (for oe8cii~), a conjecture he attributes to Thurot,
in support of which he refers to Top. I06a 13, 32, 107" 14, I07b '4, 23, Phys.
248b 7-IO. Difficulty with the passage is occasioned by de8cii~, a word not
discussed as such in the Topics. On the other hand, there are two detailed
discussions I06a 9 - I07b 39 and Iloa 23 - IlIa 7 on the ways to determine
the right meaning of a term (leI. "oAlazcii~ liy'1Ta,) and its correct/incorrect
use. There are a number of interpretations of this passage which can be
found in Cope, p. 258. I can find no reason to refer the statement to a specific
section of the Topics and consider Victorius correct in referring .. ,~ TO""'O'~
to the "topical system" (disdplinam lopicam) where this method of analysis
is used, as can be seen from a glance at the Topics and Sophistici Elenchi. Therefore I would interpret our passage: "another topic is derived from the varied
meanings of a word [lH TO;; "OC1azcli~l as has been mentioned ['c. l~l'H.a'l

30S

ARISTOTLE, "RHBTORIC' 11

9S, 33

in the topical discipline concerning the right use of. word [se. %efjaOa, mlTrp;

cf. Cope)." This topic, .s Brandis, 19, notes, is related to the two topics
between which it stands: definition and division. In actual fact the present
topic and the one which follows both are related to and are aspects of the
topic definition.
If the division into parts correctly exhausts
a 30 &lAo~ ... &lCllpia_~
all the legitimate possibilities which apply in the given instance, this topic
can be the source of a valid argument to prove or disprove (e.g., X is and
only is a or b or c; but Y is c; therefOre Y is X). On the other hand, division
may be easily used incorrectly, e.g., OIa 24 - oIb 3 with A's warning at OI. 33
on such misuse: ''The whole topic is fallacious." We can see A. himself using
the kind of division he speaks of (9Sa 3<>-31), atA z, sSa 33-35 (accepting the
division of rhetoric into three genera), A IS, na sff. (the different kinds of
oaths), 7Sa 2.2.-30 (the three elements necessary to understand an emotion).
!socrates, Antid. 217-:>:>0 uses a division similar to that in our text at 9Sa 3<>32; cf. also Radennacber, C.so. As a topic. division is variously named by
Latin rhetoricians. The Auaar ad Hermll. '102940, using an example quite
similar to A.'s, calls it e"Peclitia, i.e., the elimination of the irrelevant reasons
offered for an action. Cicero in analyzing the nature of definition (Top. 502S
and cpo :>:>.S3; De arat. 2.39.165) speaks of division as partitia and di.i.io.
Quintilian, Insl. orat. 7.1.1, gives a reasonable explanation of each and remarks
at 5.10.63 that it is Cicero's distinction: partitio i. the separation of a .ingle
whole into its parts; divisio is the separation of a genus into its species. The
reference sometimes made to An. Pr. 46a 3I - 46b 37 with its discussion of
9ivision is in fact a reference to A.'s criticism of trying to prove that something
is necessarily what it is by using Plato's method of diairesis.

CiA 2, 56b 14-15 on the general similarity between

a 33 : 1 ~"..ywyjjs
argument by induction and argument by example. On the difference between
the two see S6b 5 : 2, S7b 27 : 2, 931> 27, !/4lL U : 1, z. Our topic certainly
speaks of induction [I.e., reasoning from particulars ro a universal, Top. Iosa
13) as the opening lines (9Sb 1-5) indic.te. They argue to the statement:
women everywhere best determine the truth about their children. This topic,
however, has been interpreted to include example (i.e., reasoning from part
to part, like to like, 57b :>7-30), e.g., Rhetore. Graed, V 405. Thus Riccobonus
cites 9sb 6-10 as concluding not to a universal but to a particular; e.g., do not
entrust your safety to those who have failed to protect the safety of others.
Cope, however (p. :>61), sees agmeralprindplein this. Ci=o (De in. I.3I.5157, Top. 10.4: seemingly makes no distinction between example and induction, calling both induction. Quintilian (PO.73, j.II.Iff.), speaking of
the argument from similarities (i.e., from analogy), also makes no distinction,
placing in the same category that "which the Greeks call epagoge, Cicero

COMMENTAllY

induction." Induction is regressive thinking working from the particular,

which is far better known since it can be apprehended by the s"",es, through
like particulars (from which in fact you can argue to a like particular, and SO
argument by example) to the principle (or the universal) which underlies
all the particulars. In his note on this passage (b I-S) I find Cope (p. 259)
somewhat confusing. His first statement that a general truth is derived from
a series of analogous cases is correct. His further explanation (''The meaning is ...") is unclear for there is no induction here to a geoerol truth from a
single instance, i.e., that of the Peparethian woman. such an argument
grounded in one such example would in fact carry small probability.
z UE1tClp'l8[CI~
Peparethus is the largest of a group of small islands
off the northeast tip ofEuboea; in the fifth century it was a member of Athens'
Ddian Confederacy and in the fourth century (3408) was again an ally of
Ath"",; Livy 3I.28.6 mentions its destruction in 200 B.C. Some - e.g.,
Eustathius citing our text in his comment on ad. I.:>IS - think the word
refers to the place (a woman of Peparethus). Victorius suggests a piece of
writing called the Peparethia; Cope proposes a trial, lawsuit (~IH7J). The
context (a 33 - b S) strongly suggests I"woman" (peparethian woman), e.g.,
b 4: "Dodonis," or "the Dodonian woman," and b 3: "the mother."
98& 2-J M""",[, ... 1':/j'"lP Cpo Herodotus 6.68~. Mantias is most Iikdy
the father mentioned in Demosthenes, Ag. Boeotus I; see also II. He is the
father of Mantitheus duly recognized and registered as a citi2en of Athens.
He also fathered (by another woman, Plangon) two SODS called Boeotus and
Pamphilus; ultimatdy he was forced to acknowledge and register these as
his own. This account is given in Or. XXXIX in which the son registered
by Mantias as Mantitheus is a losing (c Or. XL) plaintiff against his halfbrother, Boeotus, who had registered himsdf apparently as a Mantitheus.
Since it parallds in meaning TO;;TO at b 2 I take it together
b 3 "'oU-ro
with
as the object of Wride.E, functioning as a zeugma: "showed this
in proclaiming her son to be the child of Ismenias."

,,16.

Ismenias and stilbon are probably the Thebans who

were well known in Theban political life (IsmeDias was possibly boeotarch
in J68; and both men represented Thebes at the Amphictyonic Council);
see Xen., Hell. p.2S[; CAR, VI 46, 64; Buckler, pp. I35-37 and DU. 2S,
33. Ismenias was proclaimed the father. Dodona (the mother's birthplace?)
is the site of a very ancient shrine of Zeus in the mountains of central Epirus.

& 3-4 'Icrp.'I"iou

On Theodectes c 97& 2-3. Prom the

b 6 : 1 No....... -roil a.o&bc-rou
statement here and at 99b I-4 it would seem that this "Law" was probably
a speech of Theodectes and was possibly a statement concerning mercenaries
employed by Athens, their serviceS, and the rdations between Athenian

310

AIUSTOTLB, 'ltHBTOIUC' II

citi7ens and mercenaries; cf. Baiter & Sauppe, II 247, frg. I. See 98a 33 : 1
for Riccobonl1s' interpretation of the argument here. Mercenaries, a common
phenomenon in the fourth century B. c., when employed as a force integrated
with citizen levies were valuable and responsible. As a mbstitute for citi2en
troops they were a questionable factor, as might be expected ,ince apart !rom
pay and possible booty their ties to the COllDtry which hired them were inexistent; Demosthenes, Phil. I 20-27 illustrates these points as does CAR,
VI 57; and cpo Cope, pp. 2']6-77b 6-10 EI ........'"Ipl..v Ross alone encloses this in quotation marks as
though it were a direct citation. He does the same with b II-I9 (Ode ...

"oil.,).
b H VrN~
i. the reading of the codd., Speugd, Cope, Tovar, Kassel;
these edd. pllDctuate (as Thurnt, "Observations critiques [II]," 47) with a
colon. Roemer reads the conjecture <rd, .!~.la,> mggested by the scholiast
as do Dufour, Ross; they PllDctu.te with a comma.

b 8-9 .ruxoUv " .. I

"surely ifit is the same in all instances, then ... "

b 10 A:1.x,6ci(l."~
C 73b 18: I, PW; Radermacher, B.XXIl.I4, cites
b 10-17 as that of Alcidamas. Baiter & Sal1ppe, II ISS, &g. 5, attributes it
to a work of his which Stobaeus, Anth.logy (ed. Gaisford), III 459 (T.I20.3)
call. Movu o a work whose title and contents are much argued. It is thought
to be a collection, or golden trcasuty, of statements on varied topics; c Radermacher, B.XXII.I3, Cpo 000 I8/[ for a further comment on Alcidamas.
I I : 1 ao<poU~
The meaning is specified by the people mentioned:
poets [Including a woman, Sappho), philosophers, some of the seven sages of
Greece - in general, persons especially distinguished for talent and learning.
2 Olip'o,...
The places mentioned down to the end of this topic
are all well known: Paras and Chios are islands in the Aegean, as is Lesbos
on which Myruene is the major city. The Italiots are the Greeks of southern
Italy and Sicily, and specifically the city of Croton on the southeast coast of
Italy. Lampsacus is at the northern mouth of the Hellespont; and Sparta
(Lacedaernonians), Athens, Thebes are well known.

I>

b 12 ApXv.oxov
Born at Paws he probably lived ca. 75D-700 B.C.
From his fragments it is clear that he was a prolific poet and also one known
to antiquity for his bitter tougue, e.g., {Jildu'P"f/f-'OV (cp. Horace, AP 79), a
quality he more or less acknowledges in !rg. 66 (Diehl & Beutler Ill). He is
somewh.t notorious for the shield he tossed aside in battle to rl1D and fight
another day, frg. 5B (cp. Horace, Odes 2.7.10) and for his ongoing conBict
over Neobule with her father, Lyeambes; LTo PW, OCD.

98b 17

COMMENTARY

31I

b 13 : 1 1t.M'"!v
Seven cities claimed Homer as their own, and the
most favored is Chios, although A. here has Alcidamas denying that Chios
is his home; see, however, Thucydides 3.104.5 where Homer remarks of
himself: "blind the poet and he dwells in Chio., the rocky island."
z Ellmpw
C 67a 8.
b 14 Xo...wll
b 15 YEpciv......"

C 89b 4a partitive genitive: "one of their senators."

Kassel (Der Text, pp. 139) alone of

b 16 Du9I1YOPCLV AVCL!;CLYOPClV
the edd. secludes Hal 'LTd.roTa. IIv6ayoeCD' following an observation of Thorot's ("Observations critiques [11]," 47). Kassd bases his reasons for seclusion on
the structure of the sentence at b II-17 (II.Je ... Hal m). The argument
is reasonable and fOT me in the light of my regard fOT the articulation of A.' s
sentences - see, for example 7tb 2 : Z - suasive. Pythagoras was born (ca.
570 B. c.) on the Aegean island of Samo., which he left ca. 531 for the Greek
colony of Croton in South Italy. His life and wOTk are identified mosdy with
Croton, from which he and his followers were banished most probably toward
the end of the sixth century B. c. He went to Metapontum where he died. A
remarkably original thinker who was both a theologian (e.g., his doctrine
on the immortality of the soul) and "a founder of mathematical science and
philosophical cosmology"; c OeD, PW, and Guthrie, Greek Philosophy,
I 173-81. Anaxagoras (ca. 500 - ca. 428 B.C.), bom in Clazomenae, a city
on the coast of Ionia, arrived ca. 480 in Athens, probably as a conscript of
the invading Persian army. Here he taught philosophy and science and was
both the teacher and close friend of Pericles. This friendship was partially
the cause of his trial and exile (probably ca. 4]:'; there is the possibility of an
earlier exile in the 4505) which brought him to Lampsacus. Socrates records
(PhDedo 97b - 98e) his high hopes of and then disappointment with the Anangorean system.
The edd., Spengd, Cope assume a lacuna befOTe BT.;
b 17 : 1 ... aT'
Ross reads, as does Victorius, "al in place of Bn from a good tradition; Kassd
secludes b 17-20. In accepting the text the first thing to note is that we have
here a new induction with three instances to prove something which is not
stated at all and which was quite Iikdy: "wise men are the best political
rulers." Secondly, I would also note that from the statement at b II (Bn ...
n,..ro ....) the Bn at b 17 could well have been preceded and followed by a
lacuna, e.g., "(and as X said) that (wise men are the best ruler.)." This statement was then proven by the three instances of Athens, etc. On the passage
here see Vahlen, "Kritik d. Rheto.ik,n 557.

3I1.

ARISTOTLE, tRHBTORIC' II

EO>.c.rJo~
C 7Sb 32 : z; as one of the earliest known specialists
in the devdopment of Athens' constitution Solon made a major contribution
to the wdfare of the state in his codification and publication of its laws.
the legendary lawgiver of Sparta and the founder
b 19 : 1 AUJ(..upyou
of its constitution whose life Plutarch has given to us; C OCD, PW. He is
well attested in ancient sources but his existence, whether we assign him to
the traditional dates of the ninth or the seventh century B. c., itiII conteSted.
2 ciIL" ... ..o),~
"as soon as the leading men became philosophers
the city then prospered." Victorius suggested, and in this he is followed by
others, that the leaders were Epaminondas and Pdopidas. These men were
the instruments and leaders of Thebes' moment of glory in 371-361 B.C.
when she was the effective leader in Greece. The reference of Victorius is
actually to Polybius 6.43 where, comparing the Roman Repnblic with the
constitution. of some Greek stateS, P. remarks in part: "the fortunes of Thebes
very obviously grew, reached their peak, and declined with the lives of Epaminondas and Pdopida.... The fact that A. may be referring to them is s1ighdy
strengthened by his references in the topic which follows to others from the
same fourth century B. C. On both men see OCD, PW. Theban history offers
no other obvious candidate. apart from A:. mention (Pol. 1274" 31) of Philolaus of Corinth as the "lawgiver at Thebes."
b 20 J(pID.... ~
This is the argument from authority, an argument for or
against the point 1l1lder discussion based on the judgment of someone thought
to be a secure soqrce for its truth or falseness. This topic is often called an
extrinsic topic since it does not directly rdate to one's proposition; witnesses,
laws, documents, exhibits are other examples of .uch. Intrinsic topics are
those which are directly related (e.g., definition, parts, cause, etc.) since they
are involved with an analysis of the terms and the cnherence of the propo.ition.
An argument from authority is based on a witness (testis) who states/denies
the truth of something (testimonium). What is stated may range from an acrual
fact to a scientific or theoretical principle to a fact of religion, and the statement may be made on the witness' own knowledge (immediate) or on that
derived from others (mediate). The witness' authority is determined by the
fact that he knows and is truthful (scien, et verax). It is on this last point that
our motive for giving consent rests. An argument from authority can be a
source of certain knowledge. It should also be clear that this certitude can
vary in accord with the capability and quality of the authority. Finally, a
moment's reflection will reveal that there is no segment of human society from
the most to the least learned which does not direct many of its actions on the
acceptance of such authority. The topic can be found in Cic., D. inv. 1.30.48,
Z.22.68; Auctor ad Herenn. 2.13.19, 2.30.48; QuinIili2n, 5.II.17-18, esp. 36-44;
Apsines, Rhetores Gratci, IX 526; Minuclanus, Rhetor.. Graed, IX 6JI. In a

COMMENTARY

3I 3

more general form the topic is frequelldy wed by the orators when they call
for wimesses, the reading of documents. For its we in argument ef. Demosthenes, On H.lonneSfIS 40. A.'s discussion of wi messes, A I5, 75b 26 -760 3:0,
is generally to the point here.
The judgment ("eta.,) is analyzed here
b 20-25 ".pl ... &.&...."u>.o.~
fust in term, of what is judged: the "eta" employed as an argument may be
about something that is the same as, or like to, or opposite to, the point we
wish to establish. The analysis also considers those wha give the judgment:
(x) all men always so judge (in the moral order this is practically the same as
saying that the judgment is the sensus communis of man.lcind); understood here
and with the nominatives to b 23 is the verb "eHQi"aa..; (2) most men; (3)
all the learned; (4) most of the learned; (5) good men (ef. A 6, 63a 17-I9);
(6) the judges themsdves, i.e., those about to give judgment on the point under
discussion whose past judgments on the matter are favorable to it; (7) those
whose judgment these judges accept; (8) those whose judgment cannot be
overruled, e.g., those in authority; (9) those whose judgments it is unseemly
to overrule, e.g., the gods, one's father, one's teachers.
is the reading and punctuation of
b 22--23 ij <ly..Ool. ij 01 ..':'..01
Cope, Kassd; Ross reads similarly but places a comma after dya8ot. The
other edd. and Spengd read 11 d,.a8ol, "al allTo!....
b 25 ,;"..v.. I..... il>cmop ",,0
All the edd. read lv""da save Ross who
conjectures the singular. All the codd. and most of the edd. read wanee TO.
Bywater ("Aristotelia V'') suggested wa"ee iJ on a paralld with oxb I5 (010' 8
U,.e,),xoa I7-I8 ("al 8 ... eln), and it is read by Ross, Kassd. I prefer the
Bywater reading. Reading TO makes the whole phrase the object of the verb
(ef. S. U53): '1ike the statement Autodes made to Mixidemides."
b 26 : I M'~'&'1p.I&'1v ... Au""o""ij~
There is an Athenian, Meixidemides (as Kassd spells the name), who is known, at least by name, from a lost
(and possibly not genuine) speech ofLysias dating ca. 393; see PW. Autokles
is better known (ef. Cope, p. 265). Xenophon, Hellenica 6.3.2, 7--9 mentions
him as one of the embassy to Sparta in 37X (before Leuctra) and gives us his
words to those gathered at Sparta. In 368/367 in command of a squadron of
30 ships he was sent to the aid of Alexander of pherae (Diodoms Siculus
15.7I.3-4) and later in 362/36I took over from Ergophilus (see Bob II and
Demosthenes, Ag. Aristocr.us I04). Autedes himsdf was later prosecuted as
Demosthenes says (For Phormio 53); ef. PW.
2 et
seduded by Ross alone. With the punctuation given by the
ede!., Cope's suggestion (p. 264) is hdpful, i.e., understand 6...,", .lvat:
" ... Autodes said that it is frightful that [sI: S. 22471 it was all right for the
Dread Goddesses to stand trial before the Areopagus but not for Meixidemi-

314

AIUSTOTLB. IRHETORIC' II

98b

32.

des." The reference is to the Brinyes who willingly entrusted the just decision
of their case against Orestes to the Court of the Areopagus in Athens, as the
story is told by Aeschylus in his Oresteia presented in 458. Apparendy Meixidemides would not acknowledge the jurisdiction of the court in his own case
even though the goddesses had judged its authoriry valid.
b 28 E ..mp"
C 98b 13 : 2; again the .rgoruent is from a judgment of
the gods; o Lobel & Page, p. lOS, ttg. 20!. C Rhelores Grai. VII II53
where Om this example Gregory of Corinth (on whom see the note to frg.
201 in Lobel & Page) exemplifies what he calls an epenthymesis. i.e., a confinning argument added to an enthymeme.
Apl ....'1mO~ ... Ina....."..
On Aristippus c OCD. PW. Guthrie. Greek Philosophy. III 49D-99. He came Om Cyrene to be a pupil of
Socrates. Somewhat older than Plato. he taught as a Sophist with some success
and is the likely founder of the Cyrenaic school of philosophy. From what we
know ofhis own comments it is somewhat strange that he shollid rebuke Plato
with speaking "rather professorially"; c Mannebach. frg. 104. Cope. p. 266.
discusses the matter.

b 30

b 31-32 AUde .. Ewxpa'"IY

Cope, Tovar. Ross. Kassel punctuate with
quotation marks around "cillO. ... ",,,,wv," "ovBb 't'olo6To,,"; Kassel reads
o.d and with Ross the accusative in TJ for Socrates' name. If the quotation
marks are read, a verb of "saying" is understood with the quotation. In this
example the argument is on the authoriry of a teacher.

imJp......

b 32-33 AY'lar"oA,...
Cope. Spengel. all the edd. except
-Roemer read Agesipolis from a good tradition; the verb. also from a good
tradition. is read by Cope. Kassel. There seems small doubt that this is Agesipolis of Sparta (son of King Pausanias) who later became king (ca. 394); c
PW. Xenophon (Hel/enita 4.P) tells this story of his visit to both shrines
before he invaded Argos ill 387 B.C. (0 CAR. VI 52). As Xenophon notes.
this was an effort to neutralize the Spartan rear prior to the planned campaign
against Thebes and Athens in the Corinthian War (395/394-387/386). The
rea.wn for the precautionary double visit according to Xenophon was the
Argive habit of declaring a festival orod so a lime of In,a when threatened with
an invasion from Sparta. Cope (p. 267) gives an account of the text problem
as known at the time. Kassel (Der Text, pp. 141-42) presents us with a detailed
corrected account of the history in which we discover that Agesipolis was a
reading found in the tradition and that Hegesippus was probably the mistake
of a Byzantine copyist. In his account Xenophon uses the form ""'TJeWTa.
and Kassel offers evidence (p. 142nS8) in support of it as the term used to
consult an oracle. In this example the argument is on the authoriry of a
father.

99a 7

COMMBNTAllY

99a I c:.~ ...bt.iv

his father"; S. 2086.

3IS

"implying that it would be shameful to contradict

a 2 'IlJoxp"t'l~
The passages referred to are Helen 18-22 for Helen;
41-48 for Alexander; Evagoras 51-52 for Evagoras. Cpo our lines with 63a
11-19

a 3 Ov

Ross alone reads 6n.

a 5 KcIv_
a distinguished Athenian naval commander, ca. 444-392
B.C. He fought in the Peloponnesian War and was helpful in the rc:-establishment of Athens after her defeat; c PW, OCD, CAE, V-VI passim. On his
flight to Evagoras in 404 see Xenophon, Hell. 2.1.29. Ross alone punctuates
.. K67.,. ... illO.,."; I would not assume a citation though four of the words
in a S-6 appear in Evogoras S2.
a 6 ,.tp_ ... "to"'lCoi~
From the statement of thi. topic A. is speaking
of "parts" in tenns of genus and species, and the kinds of inference made
possible by this topic are seen at Top. lIla 33 - Iub I I (the likely reference
in To,.,,,oi,; cpo T2.Ib 2.4 - I2.3a 19; I27a 20 - u8b 10). This topic is closely
related to the triad at 98a 15-33, and the notes to those topics indicate some of
the possible, varied lines of inference. In the example from Theodectes we
see one line: if contempt for the divine (genus implied) can be predicated of
Socrates, then the profanation of some house of the gods (or) failure to reverence the gods recognized by the State (species) can be said of him. Since
the latter cannot be said ofhim neither can the former. For such an argoment
to be valid you should know all the "parts," as Quintilian (5.10.67) notes.
If one is omitted, the statement can be challenged and dismissed. For example
(e.g., Cope, p. 268), the "parts" of ,,1"'1"" are four in the De anima and six
in the Caregories. Quintilian, 5.10.63, discusses "parts" as we find it here;
Cicero does not, confining himself to the topic of definition (for the references
see the end of 9Sa IS).
a 7 "0(,. .. ilS.
Cpo Top. I27b 13-17. For A. the soul is the first
actuality (ivnUx.,a) of the body, the form which actuates the body (matter);
in the union a living being is constituted, whose formal cause is the soul.
The problem of the soul and movement (Is it movement? If so, what kind?
etc.) is reviewed in chap. 2 and 3 of the first book of the De anima. Guthrie,
Greek Philosophy, VI 277-330 olfers a survey of the psyche in A.
a 7-8 tIC . eE06t.."tOu
"Socrates" is apparently the title of an apologia by Theodectes (on whom see 97b 2-3, Guthrie, Greek Philosophy, IV
73). We have a number of ,uch defenses among which the Apology of plato
and th~t ofXenophon are the most well-known.

31 6

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

99-0 13

a 8-9 ".t~ ... "o"U;.,"

Cope and the edd. punctuate with quotation
marIa; cf. Baiter & Sauppe, II 247, frg. 3. Plato, Apol. 26b, Xenophon,
Apol. II mention Meletus' ebarge against Socrates of disbelief in the gods
of the city; c Memorabilia 1.1.2, 20; 98a 15-17; Cope, p. 255. See also r
I9a 8-12 and Cope, III 212.
a 10-13 au.o~ .. ojIoIy.,,,
This thirteenth topic on consequents is
closely related to the fourteenth. Topic 13, in A.'s words, is valuable as a
source of inference in all three kinds of rhetorical discourse (e.g., a 12--13,
cpo S8b &-29). But he confines topic 14 to deliberative discourse (a 1&-19:
6Ta.. d~, and see d7lPJyoes" a 22, 24). Another dilference between the
two is that 13 speaks of things whieb are simple and unqualified, anyone of
whieb can usually be found to have opposed (good or bad) consequents, e.g.,
education, running, courage, justice, etc. In 14 we start with two opposed
things, each of whieb has two consequents whieb are themselves opposed to
caeb other: e.g.,

anteadenl: to speak justly

- consequents: loved by gods I hated by men

vs. anlecedent: to speak unjustly - consequents: loved by men I hated by gods.

Top. '1I3b IS, II4a 25, 1I73 5-15 describe the character of argllDlCnt from
consequents well. At 62a 29 - 62b 9 A. uses the argument in establishing
what things are "a good." Cicero in his treatment of the topic (Topics 12.5354) speaks of consequents (also antecedents, contradictories) where the relation of the consequent to its antecedent is a necessary one. This is not 50 in
our present topic. Quintilian, 5-10.74-'77 speaks of two kinds: consequenlia
t<b<dlotl9a), practically a necessary consequent, insequenlia (naemdl'."a),
i.e., those thing. whieb did or will follow on another. Sec R1oetores Graeci,
V 405.
a

10 : J

bl ... ftldu"Cwv
"in most instances."
~'"'.
C 201Ia, 2271; for other examples, see Cope, p. 271.

s.

a II h ...e..,... .bcoAoue........... ~
We have seen these two concepts
at 62a 29 : 2, and cpo 63b 30 : z. Obviously Cope'. interpretation cited at
62a 29 : z would clearly have to be qualified in this topic where the cons&quent is nol seen as "invariable or necessary." From their use here (and at
62. 29, 63b 16, 28) the two words are in fact quite similar in meaning.
a 12-13 npo,<pm.,,, ... ojIoIYEL",
AIl the infinitives are dependent on
ruG, (a !O), with lad understood. Cope, Kassel read a period after 'l'iys...
a 13-16 olov 'rfi ... El".., &.i
Ross alone encloses Tjj . d in quota<0.>, a suggestion of Richards, p. 1I0.
tion marIa; he also reads at. 14
This excerpt is from Euripides, Medea 294-297; C 9~ 29-30. In th~ example

"a"

COM.MENTAllY

31 7

the two consequents, one good, one bad, arc expressed in the artirular infinitives. Gloon argues from consequents against pardon for the Mytilenians
at Thucydides 3.39.1-8, as Diodotos does for their pardon at 3.46.1-4 (Spenge!, p. 316); cpo Demosthenes, Ag. Aristocrates 2.
a 17

Ka1.Abmou

An Athenian from Lamptrai and a pupil of Isocrates

(AnIiJosis 93), he is mentioned again, ooa5. There is no reason to think that a

work of his on rhetoric is not intended (cf. Radermacher, B.XXIX.I-5)
which contained this topic together with (Tdlla, cb, .re'rr:a,), i.e., the elements common to all discourse set forth in B 19: pos.ible-impossible, pastfuture, more-less.

a 18 cllAo~, a...1lY ht Roemer the printed text of this topic leavessomething

to be desired: slllrting back at a 15 the lineation is olf, a quotation is started
at a U and not ended, and there i. a misprint ata25 (!"M>!eOV"'.). In this topic
we start with antecedents which are opposed (Ta.a....ta, a 21) and so the
consequents in tum arc opposed (d...."'"I'.......). So we ind in A.'s example
that a double opposition is found in the consequents: hate-love, gods-men.
d...." ...l'wo .. = opposed, contrary, and not the more technical sense: contradictory; cpo 68a 8. On the kinds of oppnsition, 92& 1)-11, 97& 7 : 2. See
Top. II3b 15 - II4& 25.
a 19 6in, IC,d ...ij>
"ahead by all the caddo is secluded by Spengel,
Tovar, Ross, Kassel. Reading it we bave: Hal (Mn) ... xe;j,,6a.; see next
note.
a 20 : 1 ...pOmp ... ~1"fI0iv
The reference is to the method described
in the preceding topic at a 13-16. Kassel reads TO"'P with Radermacher
(B.XXIX.3). al'!".'. = the two opposites: "and must use in the case ofboth
the method just mentioned."
2 be.;
$C. topic 13 (99a loll:).

This difference was explained at 99a 11>-13.

a 2.1 ""XOv........ -MVIIV... I..
On TVXO.Ta cf. 66a 31 : I, 67b 6: "any two things."
a 22-2.5 ."" ... tlv8p,"",o,
Sponge!, Cope, Dufour, Kassd read without quotation marks. Ro.. uses them, Tovar uses them at a 22.-23 (la. ..
6e.L) and, as noted (99& 18), Roemer's text is awry. On this example see Rlreto,es e,a.ci, VII IlS3, where it is cited as an example of." epenthymesis, i.e.,
the strengthening of an enthymerne by a corroborative argument (see 9IIb 28).
There is a further illustration of what A. is saying in Euripides, The Phoenician Women 954-958, and in Auct. ad Here"". 2..24.38.
a 2.6 'I"ij> n..~
The "saying" is a proverb ("to buy the marsh along
with the salt") whose provenance is unknown; cf. Leutsch & Schneidewin,
I 409. Its meaning, I should say, is rather clear in itself (sometimes to have a

31 8

AllISTOTLB, 'RBETOIue t II

99a 30

good you must take the bad), and in the context, i.e., in the sitwttion as given,
you are damned if you do and damned if you don't. In either sitwttion given
at a 22r-25 (im. ... &.6e"".'), the good has an admixture of the bad.
a 27 (nco,....... "
Cope, pp. 273--"74, explains well the problem with
this term as well as its possible meanings and the general lack of understanding

on the part of the commentators of its meaning here. The root idea in the
word is: crooked, twisted, bent, curved. Its form here appears to be a unique
instance in A. who explains it in the words which follow: a blaisosis occurs
"when good and bad follow as comequents upon each of two opposites,
each of the two consequents opposite respectively to each other." As I understand this, it means (cf. 99a 10-13):
(I) two opposites: speak justly I unjustly
(2) good/bad consequents of: speak justly: loved by gods I hated by men
good/bad consequents of: speak 1lJljusdy: loved by men I hated by gods
(3) each of the two consequents
opposite respectively to each other: { loved by gods I hated by gods
loved by men I hared by men.
In fact in this sense the term seems to have the meaning found in LS: to retort
a dilemma. Put in form, the dilemma would be: If I speak justly, I will be
loved by the gods; if unjustly, I will be loved by men. So I will speak either
justly or unjustly. Therefore I will be loved either by the gods or men. The
retort: If you speak justly, you will be hated by men; if unjustly, you will
be hared by the gods. So speak either justly or unjustly for in either case you
will be hated eitheJ: by men or the gods.
a 29 1iAM~ . <pClV.piii~ Il<pClviii~
This 15th topic on the inconsiStency to be found ordinarily between the expressed and the unexpressed
opinions or convictions of people is ultimately based on the fact that all people
seek what they perceive (rightly or wrongly) as their "good"; cpo EN n62b
34 - u63a I. A review ofA 6 on the nature and the kinds of good and on the
fact that the advantageous (""!''Pie.') is itself 3 good, and also ofA 10 on the
character ofhuman action, is helpful toward understanding why and how men
may profess publicly that which is conttary quite probably to their privare
view. SE I72b 36 - 1733 2 describes how the topic can be used to examine
the dilference between 3 person's wishes and his professed opinion. This
opposition often enables the speaker (cf. 173a 4-5) to work on it and cause
the individual to make 3 starement conttary to common, or to his private,
opinion. Thus the comment in our text at a 32-33 (~Oi... ""e"bTaT.').
See also BE I243a 34 - 1243b 2; Radermacher, B.xU.I4. Cpo IsoCtates,
PanatheniJicus 243-244, and the speech listed as Ps.-Demosthenes, Against
Th.",rines 39-40.
a 30 SIx..,Cl xd" ...
C A, chaps. 9 and 13. I

99a 3S

COMMBNTAlty

319

a 32 cruvoiyc'" O.....pov
Le., from these opposing views (h< T06T.,.)
try to establish one or the other. The Socratic dialogues of Plato frequendy
illustrate this divided viewpoint in the persons questioned by Socrates. Go,gias 455-460 is as good an inStance as any. Gorgias' professed opinion is
seen at 455 (rhetoric effects a persuasion which produces belief but not knowledge). At 460 we find his private view (rhetoric eH"ects a persuasion grounded
in knowledge).
"This is the mOlt effective topic for produca 32-33 TW. yollp . l .....v
ing paradoxes"; see SE r73a 4-6. 99a 29; on "<I/1a~o.o. see 94b !rIO. To show
that a person does or states something contrary to his professed belief - and
so seemingly contradictory - is an effective way to undennine his p",ition.
To counteract such an effect, as A. says at oca 23-"9. one should be able to
give the reason for the paradoxical statement or action.
a 33 lx ... au,,~cdvv This r6th topic argues "from the proportionality
present in the occurrence of things." dvalOJ'o,. an adverbial neuter = "in
propottion." Our clause is interpreted variously: "Another line is that of
rational correspondence" (Roberts); "Another topic is taken from the symmetry of results" Uebb & Sandys); "Another topic is derived from analogy
in things" (Freese), etC. This topic is similar to the third topic (97a 23 - 97b II).
An argument from analogy infers from one instance to a similar one. Such
is the argument from paradeigrna which we have seen in B 20. If the inference
is from an historical fioct, the argument is called analogy of example. If from
something belonging to one class (or genus) to something of another class
which is in some way like it (as in our examples, a 34 - b 4), the argument is
called analogy of proportion. Proportionality (or equaliry of ratios), an idea
common in arithmetic (e.g. 4:8::8:16). was carried over to other kinds of
reality, as we see at EN II3'" 10 - II3Ib "3 where it is used to determine a
moral concept 'just action" as being "fairness in distribution." Four terms
are required. as A. note. (PoetieJ I457b 16-19). and the analogy of proportion
i. present "when the second term is related to the first in the same way as the
fourth to the third," e.g., old age to life as evening to day. Quintilian throughout SoIl gives any number of instances of the argument under the general
concept of similarity. e.g. S-II.34: "I consider analogy as included under
similarity. For the statement that 1:10::10:100 is certainly a matter of similarity ..."; cf. also R},eto,es G,aed, V 404.
a 34 : 1 Irp.xpoi....'
c 95& 25-26, !J8a 5.
z..6"";;
Tovar. Kassel read atlTOV. .

!J8a 1']-22.

a 35 ).E.-.aupy.iv
The liturgies were public duties performed by individuals for the State in Athens. Among the more commonly known were
the trierarchy (the maintenance and repair and command for a year of a

32.0

AlllSTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

trireme for the Athenian Beet) and the Choregia (responsibility for the major
costs of a production of a dramatic presentation. e.g. tragic. comic. offered
at the major festivals). These obligations were imposed by the State on the
wealthier citizens and metics. and served as a fonn of taxation; c OCD.
PW. Alh. Pol. 57.3-4.

a 35 - 99b I at ..oU~ .. Ij>7J'P.oilv......

C Baiter III Sauppe. II 219.
Erg. 5. Ross alone reads a comma for the period. The future may represent a
simple future; more likdy it stands for a fonn of command (S. 1917): "they
must resolve that...."
C glib 6:

1.

b 2-4 k. ""oA("~ ... &"'''EnP''Yl'tvou~;''

The quotation marks are

read by the edd. with the exception of Kassd. Spengd. Cope. On the statement. see Baiter III Sauppe. II "'47. frg. 2..
b 2-3 Eoopcip..x ..... X"p(&7J1'OV
Charidemus is the centerpiece of
Demosthenes. Ag. Aristocrates; c 23. 65. 89 (mention of the citizenship given).
145. 188 (golden crown bestowed on him). 185. the tide ..Bey ...,' (hencfactor). c also Athenaeus 10.436b-c (ed. Kaibd). CAR. VI 2OOff. and p ....
sim. OCD. PW (5). Dernosthenes. Ag. uplin.. 84 mentions Strabax.
b 3 b",dxE'''V We bave seen the word at S6a II : 3. 73a 18.
The likdy meaning here is: "because of their merits."

76a 28 : 2.

Ross alone conjectures ",o,7j"B"OB. Since 'P"Ya~a, indicates

b 4 "O.'ij .....E
here those sent into exile. it implies that they are citizens (cp. Pol. I2.7sa 19b). and so I would interpret: "will you not make exiles of those among
the mercenaries (who bave been given citizenship and) who bave wrought
irreparable damage."
The statement of this topic 17 is elliptical.
b 5-<i auo~ ...........Ii
As it is written. I would understand it to read: b. T06 (lly.... cpo Eley...
b 6) . ilT. ;cal U eli. """pal, -raVTa (In.). This last would be translated:
"from stating that they also are the same [I.e.. the antecedents1from which
the consequent comes." Therefore we have: "Another topic comes from
stating that the antecedents are also the same if the consequent is the same."
The topic then argues the identity of cause or antecedent from the identity
of eflCct or consequent. The example from Xenophanes makes this clear:
the antecedents - (a) the gods come into existence. (b) the gods pass out of
aistence (die) - are identical because the consequent in each case is the
same: namely. the gods at one time do not exist. Spengd. pp. 319-20. cites a
number of examples of the topic of which the following are hdpful: Lysias.
Ag. Eratosthenes 34-36. Ag. AgoralUs 92-94. Ag. Epicrates 7. This far
topic

!"e

COMMENTARY

32I

is understandable. However, I am not certain that the topic is fully grasped

in the translations and interpretations given. In the first place, A.'s first
example is different from the other three. Antecedents (as the topic proposes)
are the same if the consequent is the same when there is a necessary relation
between the antecedents and the consequent as there is in the Xeoophanes
example. The antecedents (the gods come into existence; the gods die) are
equal because they necessarily entail the consequeet, e.g., at some time the
gods do not exist. But in the other three examples this is not so, and that
would seem to be the reason why A. tells us in that odd commeot at b !r-IO
"in general assume that the consequeet of each thing is always the same."
So it is that in the other three examples in some instances but by no means in
all the antecedeots may eotail the consequeot in each case, i.e. (a) a challeoge
of the need for pbilosophy, (b) an acceptance of slavery, (e) a submission to
the commands of another. The Isocrates example can serve to exemplify
the other two. If one assumes that the constant consequeot (0 b 9-IO) of an
act ofmaking a judgment on Isocrates is to question the worth of philosophy,
one could defend any attack on him (his method of teaching, his writings,
his failure in civic duty) as an attack: on philosophy and therefore unjust.
Thus one has the option (C b I3-I4) of presenting any attack on him as
unjust or accepting some as such and others as not.

b 6 :;;:vatpci"'1~
I 3601f.

b 7-9 8...,

al'-olw~.

a dative governed by

b9:

'/7& I9 : 2, PW, OCD, Guthrie, Greek Philosophy,

..

.,..t..,.

7<0....

Diels & Kranz, 21 A 12.

T." ... Ul'.vaw

1
"CIt .. 50!
63&7: 1.
z oixoi.....ou
the .teading of all except Cope, Freese who read:
v

",,"fie

b!r-IO "CIt 3Mo1~ lid

This statement in the light of the instances
given in this topic would appear to mean that while an antecedent may have
other consequents we are to assume in general (cU.., ... A",.Pd ) that one
given consequeet is the same in all cases. Thus we accept that passing judgment on the worth of philosophy is the regular consequent of judging Isocrates, or slavery as the regular consequent of offering tokens of earth and
water, etc., just as in the first instance we necessarily acknowledged that
deoying the existence of the gods is the consequent of asserting temporality
of them.

Rad by all the edd., it represeots a conjecture of

b 10 'I..o"pci......~
Speogd's (0 pp. 320-22) for E."'eaT , of all the codd. While "Socrates"
does make sease, a reading of !socrates' Antidruis I73-I75 as Speogd notes

322

AllISTOTI.E, 'RHETORIC' II

makes his conjecture more than reasonable. Spenge! also notes as comparable
parallels to lsocrates' statement, Andocides, On the Mysteries 103-105 and
Dernosthenes, On the False Embassy 229-233.
b II-I:> XCll II...... i ....!v
~t1Tl. is read by Cope, Ross, Kassd, and
bracketed by Spengd and the other edd.: "And to state that to give earth and
water is to act the slave.... " On the idea of total submission in the act see
Herodotus, 5.17.18; for other references see Cope, p. 278.
b 13 dp~'l~
In late 338 B.C. (after Cbaeroneia) Philip formalizcd his
re-c:stablished rdations with the Greek states by creating at Corinth the
League of Greek States (CAR, VI 266ft:). All except Sparta participated.
On Philip's death in 336 and the growing break-up of the League, Alexander
moved quickly in late summer to re-establish the League under Macedonian
control with himsdf replacing philip as general of the League. The commonly
accepted date for this "common peace" is 336 B.C. If the remark: of the scholiast Anonyrnus, who refers to Philip, is accepted, then ca. 338/337 seems a
probable date (c Cope, I.trod., pp. 36-49). Anonyrnus also notes, however,
is Demosthenes'. This does not
that the remark at b 12-13 (TO
make 338/337 improbable, for it could be a remark: ofhis for which we have
no evidence. There is, however, a speech attributed to Dernosthenes, O.
the Treaty "itb Alexantler, which is dated ca. 335. This mentions explicitly
"o...j eleoi"'l (30, 17-18; and cpo la-II); and so the acceptance of the 336 date.
The speech is an attack: on Alexander, and it is accepted as a work: not of
Demosthenes but of Hypereides (389-332 B.C.) or of one of the party of
Bernosthenes. The question of the actual date, I would say, remains a question.

pgr,,,......)

b 14 1m6...pov
See 99b 5-6. In terms of the explanation there one
could argue that the criticism of Isocrates' writings is equally unjust as a
criticism of the man himsdf since in each case one is questioning the value of
philosophy. Or the opposite can be argued: namdy, that such a criticism is
not at all unjust because in no way does it implicate the value of philosophy.
The example (b 16-19) illustrates
b 14-15 : 1 cD.M>~ . civ""d.y
well the way in which this topic can raise challenging questions and strikingly
sharpen the issue when persons are questioning or are in doubt ahout a former
decision they have taken. As instances of this topic Spengd mentions Deinarchus, Ag. Demosthenes 81-82, Thucydides 3.56.6-7 with 5702.
a ... lx "gij 1'1) "...:.,,;, ciEl "(another topic is derived) from the
fact that people do not always make the same choice." This is the reading of
all the edd., Spengel. Cope, Freese read with a good tradition and the scholiast, Anonyrnus: en TO;; p~ TIZ1lTO ...o1l~ av...ov~ dB!.

COMMENTARY

323

b IS : 1 1\
the reading of the edd., Spengel, Cope. The meaning is
"as"; cf. LS, B. Cope, p. 279, is not happy with this interpretation of the
word, and Richards (p. III) rejects it for "al which Ross reads.
2 "'~"'1"..
Victorius (p. 414) interprets this in the way in which
we find it in Cicero and later rhetoricians. His comment is-that here A. calls
the ent:hymemc not an inrperfect syllogism but an argument drawn from
contraries (sententiam ex conlTariis conelusam), the way in which many rhetoricians C'magistri dicendi') usually understood the term. On this interpretation of the enthymeme see Cicero, Top. 13.55, 14.56. More reccndy, Conley,
"Enthymeme in Perspective," 175ff., views this interpretation with some favor.
Without dismissing the interpretations of later rhetoricians I fail to see how
they, inJIucnced as they so obviously are by Anamenes (once thonght to
be Anstode) and by each other, can help to specify the term in A., who
clearly calls it the syllogism of rhetoric; c Studies, pp. 74-'75, 77-'78, 80-81,
and cpo Cope, pp. 279-80, c cob 35-38.

b 16-17 "d ... "1lJ(..

,,.e....

Tovar, Ross, Kassel among the edd.

along with Cope use the quotation marks. Quite possibly this is correct
since it reads like an adaptation to the enthymeme form of a statement by
Lysias in Against the S~bversion of the Ancestral Constitution of Alhens 11. Lysias'
statement starts with the words "For it would be strange, men of Athens, if,
when we. . .. These words arc understood in most interpretations of b 1617, e.g. (Roberts): "when we were exiles, we fought in order to return; now
we have returned, it would be strange to choose exile in order not to have to
fight." Dionysius of Halicarnassus in his critical essay Lynas at #33 preserves
Lysias' speech for us (cf. 31). At 32 Dionysius gives us the occasion of this
speech written as he says for a well-known statesman and probably not ddivcred. The year was 403 B,C., and dre occasion had to do with the return of the
democrats to Athens from the Peiraeus. The return was arranged by the
Spartan king, Pausanias, but only after an armed conllict with them (b 16:
(~l'o,~s,
i"a%o"s8a); cf. CAR, V 371-'75, esp. 373. On this matter
Cope, pp. 280-8 I, is quite exercised at what he call, A.'s "haste and carelessness in writing." Unfortunately his reasons (p. 281) for the comment arc to
me not convincing. There is no need for A. in exemplifying this topic to say
anything more than he docs; sec following note. Planudes, Rheto,.s Gratci,
V 406, cites b 16-17 as an illustration of topic 23 at oca 23-29 (Spengd, p. 323).

"t.

b 17-19 0... "'" ... "",,,tV

AlI the edd., Spenge!, Cope agree on this
reading given by all the codd. Spcngel (p. 324) has problems with A.' s Greek,
which he explains at some length, as docs Cope (p. 280); Kassel in his apparatus gives some conjectured possibilities for the Greek. The Greek. of the
codd. seems to be quite reasonable. In the first place A. at b 16-17 echoes
(with the exception of the mention of the Lacedaemonians) the statement of

32 4

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

Lysias at 33.n; as for the omissiou of Lysia.' d....o. ycle Ii r'l, cf. 98b 26
(as Kas.el notes). Secondly, the explanation at b 17-19 corresponds exacdy
with the example given, e.g., (I) b 16:.1 ep.vYOVT., . . "aTi),Ow/J" is explained
by aTi /Js, ... neO;;VTO (b 17-IS): "for at one time they chose their homeland
(TO /Jiv ....) at the price of fighting"; (2) b 17: ""TOO ....., /J"x"'/J.Oa is
explained by aT. /J1I /Jiv ... (b 18-19): "but at another they chose not to
fight at the price of leaving their homeland" (TO;; JJ1! /JI.). One possible
discrepancy which i. of no significance in terms of what is meant would be
that TO /Jiv ... .. iieOVvTO (b 17-18) answers to "ad),Ow/JtnI (b 16).
b 19-20 oi),AoS .. yoy.,.ij"eClL
literally: "another topic is to say that
the reason why [TO oJ b ...a] something might be or might have come to be
is the actual reason [TO.TO~ ' "a] for ... " We can simplify this without
changing its meaning by translating: "Another topic is to say that the possible
reason for a thing's existence or its having come into existence is the actual
reason." All the edd. concur on the reading of the Greek text, as do Spengel
and Freese. However, Cope reads at b 19: &r7j, .1 /J1I yivo'To, TO.TO~ ,
which is the reading of all the codd. and the scholiast Stephanus. Our reading 4 r'lll ,/ivO'TO is hinted at by the scholiast Anonymus and can be seen
in the comntent of Maximus Planudes atRhetores Gram, V 406 and in codex C.
Cope, pp. 28I, presents a more detailed discussion of both readings in which
he leans toward our reading. The topic itself in my understanding is not to
make an "inference from the possible to the real motive" as Cope following
Brandis says (p. 281) but rather to infer a possible motive for an action and
assert it as the real motive; sec, for example, b 28-30, r IS, 16b 9-IS. A. is
not necessarily urging this course of argument. Rather he is calling attention
(0 the possibility of this kind of argumentation.

On the use of 11." which Ross alone secludes, sec

b 20 orov d &0['1) civ
Goodwin, pp. 458, 506; Cope, II 331>-40. ~"'. eI = as i
b 20-21 orov .. l.uml"ll
Victorius cites as an example Horace, Epp.
1.I8.31-36. In this and the following examples at b 22-29 a possible motive
for the action is asserted as the real motive: e.g., b :u: to cause pain; b 24:
to make the misfortunes of men more obvious, etc.
b 22-24 ..cIllo.~ ... m"PClV....tpCls
Cpo Caesar, The Galli, W or I. 14
(Victorius). At b 22 all the codd., Ross, Kas.el, Spongel, Cope read epeew,
for epesv6iv (Schneidewin) read by the other edd. Our lines (also reading
epe ai.) arc found in Nanck & Sncll, AJespo/4 82 (p. 8SS) but we do not know
the author.
b 25

MdEciypau ..eNAv.."P""'''os

C 79b IS,

8sa 9 : 2, "b 19-20.

b 26-27 06x ... 'EUci&CI

The fragment can be found in Nanck &
Sncll, Antiphon 2, p. 792. The scholiast Anonymus say. by way of .explana-

COM.MBNTARY

tion that Antiphon wrote that eminent men of Aetolia came to King Oeoeus,
father of Meleager, not to kill the Calydonian boar but to see Me!eager do
it and so give public witness to his act. Ross reads .. ~ for

r....

b 28-29 AI..v..o~ cbcoAOU8iiN

On Theodectes cf. 97b 2-3, 98b 6 : 1.
This play and this incident are mentioned again at ooa 28-29 and the incident alone at r IS, 16b 12-15. A citation of our lines as a fragment of
Theodectes is found in Nauck & Shell, p. 801. For an explanation of the
possible context of the citation cf. Cope, p. 283.
b 30

w3tx ......,... mllijera,

C my comment at the end of 99b I!)-20.

b 31-32 cillo~ . oup.(!oul.eUOUC,.

This 20th topic, whilemadespecific to deliberation and forensic rhetoric, needs but a moment's thought to make
clear its usefulness and applicability to epideictic rhetoric as well, paa Spenge!,
p. 325, and cf. 98a 3-4- A reading ofA 9 quickly makes this clear, and see 67b
36 - 68a 9. At 67b 36 A. remarks that "epideictic and deliberative rhetoric
have a common nature." On this topic A 10, II, 12. on hwnan actions and
A 6, 7 on the nature of the good and the greater good merit a casual review
for an understanding of why men act. Cope, pp. 284-85, offers a running
comment on the topic.

b 31 rcpoTP7CCW"'C'U. .. ci.7COTPmN'rCl.
Le., "inducements," udeterrents,"
to action, as cD" b87J (b 32) denotes "reasons," llmotives," for acti.on/non-

action.
b 32-34 '<oN....... p.'iJ

",pel""".....

r"6T,, apparently refers back to rei

neoTein.n" ... eli. Iv.,." and forward to d"""rd. "d.; & is the object of
"'ean... ... ,..q nearn... What A. means to say is reflected in the common
interpretations, e.g. (Roberts): "These are the conditiODS which make us
bound to act if they are for us...." However, this is not the Greek. To
construe the Grode it helps to interpret ~"'dex." as "belong to, fall to" (LS,
B.llI) and so "be on hand to (us)," "? be favorable to": ''For these are the
conditions which, if favorable to us, one must actuate (i.e., one must act);
if unfavorable, one must not actuate.' The necessity in d.;; is moral, not
physical.
b 33-34 <~clr....... "pci'<'1: ..... > This clause does not appear in any of the
major codd. but is found in a later codex, and is read by all the edd., Spengd;
Ross, Cope alone read without the angle brackell.
b 3S xa... m.~..;P.'DV ii, tAli.......... "and if the act is liable to punishment,
the punishment being less than what is achieved." This is the reading whiclr
Victorius co,yectured. It is read by Kasse!. The other edd. and Spengel read
"a. 11 in.I;'>I,., el (el is a conjecture of Spengd's, p. 326). Kassel referring to .r.. el (b 34) dismisses .1. As should be clear from my inter-

32 6

AllISTOTLB, 'RH1lTORIC' II

ooa7

protation above I can see no need at all for.1. All the codd. read "al h .. C~
,..'0 ij 'Un",. which Cope accepts (as does Freese). On p. 284 Cope olfers
an interpretation of his reading. The point here appears to be that which we
met at A u. 72a 36 - 72.b I. 72a 4-9. For our passage at b 34-36 is speaking
ofinducements to action. and as we see at the A I2 passages. any action whose
reward is greater than whatever punishment it may bring is an inducement.
a motive: for action, not a deterrent.
b 36 ,.P.tYI'-""0S.

Ross alone punctuates with comma.

Kassd secludes this and

b 36 - ooa I XlIl "PO..pt,..."..CI' . atCIV..1co>v
Ross secludes a'. 1q!OTeinoVTa, = "they urge men to action."

refers back to the motives/reasons for

ooa I-2 be &~ .....aU....."
acting or not acting. And so. "on these same grounds men prosecute or
defend." He explains his meaning at a ~ ('" ,..i ... "a""IY0eOva,.):
those things which are deterrents to action offer material for defense. those
which are inducements to action do the same for prosecution.
This is the reading of Spengd. Cope, Ross.
a 4 XCI.....yopOU."v. la..,
Kassd (and Freese). Roemer. Dufour. Tovar read with cod. A "a"ll'0eovalV.
anoAoyoiiv..a, ,.. followed by a lacuna. Kassd. Der Text. p. I42. notes
that ,..h is not in cod. A and that anoA0l'0v...a, is a mistaken repetition /rom
the previous line.
Kassd alone conjectures <7j> TBV'1 (c
a 4-S la-., ... KtU.A1,.,."".
end of this comment) and refers to oob I6 (IS in his text). On Callippus c
99& I7. Pamphilus is not known; see. e.g. ?Cicero, De oral. 3.21.81. Whether
Quintilian 3.6.34 refers to the same Pamphilus is questionable. Radermacher
is uncertain (p. I92) that they are the same; Cope is not (p. 28S). On themeaning of A:s words, Radermacher, B.XXIX.4 (p. I92) argues against Spengd
(p. 317), as we saw at 99ar7, believing that there is good reason to think that a
work on rhetoric is intended.
a 6-7 ilAos... 1jv
The text here and in what follows to a IO is interpreted in different ways. E.g., how do we translate do"ou....,. here ("are
thought to." "appear to")? Is On causal (because), or does it introduce an
indirect statement (e.g., Cope's "you argue, namdy. that." p. 286)? Each of
these is possible. I would construe the passage in this way: "Another topic
is derived &om things which on the one hand are reputea 10 olXur but on
the other are unbdievable because men would not have conceived of their
occurrence if they had not happened or almost happened:'
a ']-8 XCll a.., ... ,:,,,oAIII'-P.tV""O'v
"And [one argues] that this is all
the more so" - ("this," namdy. ov" d1' laoE .... i.e.. men would not have
thought of these instances which are unbelievable) - "since the fa.ct is that

ooa

12

COMMENTARY

P7

men affirm the existence of those things which either are or arc probable."
At the moment we arc at the stage that the fact that these unbelievable things
are the object of men's thought makes them either real (truly existing) or
probable. In shott. man's mind affirms the true (i.e.. that which is) or the
probable (i.e. that which for the most pan is or can be). This principle is
the foundation for the following statement.
a 8-10 doW... oG-rc..~

"Consequently. if the thing is unbelievable

and not probable. it would really exist. For one does not think of it as one
does r.IJTal,] because it is probable and plausible." If the human mind affirms
either (a 8) Td6'....a (real entities) or Ta .....n.. (probabilities). and the matter
at issue is clearly not TO
(in fact. it is ","'aT.v. a 7). then it is real. TO 11
The argument is: men affirm either that which actually is or that which is
probable; but men affirm this thing which is improbable; therefore they are
affirming this thing as something which actually is.

sI".,

a 10 A,,6poXAij~ ... & nL.. 8.u~

On Andracles. cf. PW (4). CAR. V
286.291. 321. 326. Thucydides. 8.65. Cope. p. 287. A demagogue and prom-

inent member of the democratic party living in the latter pan of the fifth
century. he was a firm opponent of Alcibiades (eE Plutarch. AldbiaJe, 19)
whose banishment he helped to bting about and whose rctUm to Athens in
4II he opposed, only to be assassinared himsdf by the oligarchs. Pithos is a
deme in Attica. eE Eliot. On a ID-13 (.r.. .
cpo Baircr & Sauppe.
II 153-54. and denlCllt of Alexandria. Stromtlki. r .8.41.4. who in another
context circs the words almost verbatim.

cU.,)

I2.-IS "&eovTIII. ... G.cxLou"

Punctuation varies here. Roemer, Dufour, Tovar, Ross make this one citation, e.g., "diona, . .. elalov"; Kassel
breaks it up into three (" dJ ......., ... a,Oe0o,aovT.,." """I ... IXOv.,
""al Ta ... a-ri,.."",Aa iAalo~"). and Cope into two rdto....a' ... a'.e0rb-

cU.,."

a......' ... "" ..I,,1ie .. . lAatoo"). On setting apan the first citation I would agree
with Cope. Kassel. and I would accept Kassd's pWlctuation.
a II 180",,{3'10"""
i.e. the members of the Assembly in Athens were
creating an uproar and disturbance over his starcment on the law in ca.e
whose issllC indicarcs that it was a matIcr for deliberative rhetoric. and therefore the Assembly.
a 12 6'.p8c:.O"OV... ~

i.e. " for the purpose of amending. correcting"

(5. 2065; cf. 2060).

a 12-13 "xlll ymp 1t."J.D~"
Androcles' argument to confirm hi. statement on the law is the fact that fish need salt - for example. to preserve them
after they have been caught.

328

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

ooa 21

a 13-14 XClI...o, ... &>.O~

This is A.'s explanation relating the example

to the topic: namdy, that it is neither probable nor credible (cp. i'm/aT,,',
a 7; fb"'rTOV "ai pi} .1"tI~. a 9) that creatures whose environment is the brine
(aAp1J) need salt.

a 14 "XCIi. 'fa: ... D..cdou" Kcd~OL.

In "alTO' a:JUa~O'll eAalov
we have (as in the note above) an explanation by A. of Androcl.... stat<>ment that "olive-cakes need olive-oil" as another improbable and incredible
statement. On rn:ep'I"'Aa, Cope, p. 287.
a IS li>.Ao~ .. axo".iv
On IlA."..."tI~ C 97a 2--4- Here its refutative
force consists in looking (aHo".") for inconsistencies or contradictions in the
statement of one's opponents; cpo 96b 26-28. From the use of dp'!'.afl1JToVvTO~ (a 17) and the three examples, the topic seemingly refers to judicial rhetoric
and is so thought o But it is clearly of use in any of the three kinds of rhetoric. Cicero at Top. 3.n speaks of a topic ex repugnantibus and exemplifies
it at 4-21; A., however, conveys the concept more fully and clearly.

a 16-17 d ..., ... l.Oyco>v

scl. axon.E.: "to examine whether there is any

inconsistency (contradiction) &om among all the dates, actions, statements."
All the edd. save Kassd read this clause immecliatdy after axo".'" In all the
codd., however, it appears after X"'~l~ ... ap'!',afl1JTOV>To,. Mord placed it
whete it is now. Kassd reads it where it i. found in the codd., but brackets it
as an addition of A. Ross alone reads T."... for "dvT'" with Thurot, "Observations critiques [II]," 48. Thurot agrees with Mord's transposition but
suggests that Ta dvopoloyov,...a should go since it looks like an interpolation.
Lysias, Ag. Alcibiades I II exemplifies a contracliction in actions.
.. 17 X",pl~ fIo6v
Along with "wei, d' at a 18, 20 = "separately in the case
of the opponent ... and in the case of onc.df ... and in the case of both
together." It is usually interpreted: "in thr.. separate ways. First ... Secondly ... Thirdly ...."

a IS uxcd fP'IG'l ... "E'plcixav'TCI"

an obvious contradiction; no one who
worked with the Thirty (c ooa 33), who were viciously anti-democratic,
could have affection for the demos. The Thirty took over Athens in the
summer of 404 B.C. and were removed in Fcbruary 403; cf. CAH, V, 365-72.
As example. of the topic, c !socrates, Ag. Cal/imamus 47-48 (Spengd); Lysias, Ag. Eratosthenes 25-29.
a 19-20 "XCII ",,,,01 .. SIx.,.,."
,!"M6",ov, i.e., "litigious"; c 73a 3S : J
for the verb. 6/X1J' d",d~.aOa, = "to go to law with someone"; po is understood with 6ea,,,aapi-lo Cpo Lysias, Ag. Theomnestus 12-3, Ag. Eratosthenes
39-40
a 21-22 "XCII cro.... ~ . .:."""," Cpo Demosthenes, On the Palse Embassy 229-231, On the Crown 3XI-PO.

ODa

30

COMMENTARY

a 23-27 .nA0S ... 5'''(3oA>1

Ross alone reads a colon not a period
after 'Palv""a, at a 2S. The statement of this topic contains a series of problems: e.g., (I) Toi~ ... do"o ..., (a 23-24): why the dative? (2) II do"o"""
what is its meaning? (3) how are we to inteTpret vnop.pA'1,.b7J~ . . uCav?
To answer each: (I) a dative of interest (S. 1474); Spengel, p. P7, takes it
with ruo~; (2) it modifies d0geo\no,~ Hal nea",.a.... as does neod,ap.{J).1J,.i.o,~; for another interpretation t Cope, p. 289; (3) the common interpretation of the clause is "who palmed off her son on another woman" (0 LS,
s.". II); the usual meaning of the middle, however, is not this, but "to bring
in another's child as one's own." In the following translation I retain the
common interpretation (but see following note). "Another topic with reference to men or their actions misrepresented by prejudgment in actual fact or
seemingly so [i.e., thought to be by others] is to state the reason for the false
impression [naeadOEov], for there is some reason why the false opinion is
formed ['Pal.na" appears to be so). For example, the woman who palmed off
her son on another woman was thought to be the young man's mistress because
of the ardent embrace she gave him." It is this topic which Planudes exemplifies with 99b 16-17 (0 99b 16-17).
a 2S-26 6tt0(3EIiA'IfLiv'lS ... l&OxE'
c S. 2073 on the subject of the
genitive absolute and that of the main verb as the same. Without pressing
further on the meaning in vnop.pA.,,.b7J~ it should be clear that a mere kiss
or embrace would hardly cause anyone to form the idea expressed in ...,..ioa,
... ,..'ea"lrp. I am inclined to bdieve that Victorius' comment (for part of
it o Cope, p. 289) is a move in the right direetton, although Cope, pp. 28990, finds difficulty with the interpretation. A problem I have with Victorius'
explanation (which does catch the meaning in vno{JdAA...9a,) is that it not
ouly makes the mother's aetton quite unusual but also throws doubt on the
fact that anyone seeing such action could be accused of"misrepresenting the
aetton by prejudgment," which is the topic. A. seems to me to want to say
that the mother wantouly abandoned hersde in embracing the young man
who was in fact her sou.
i.e., that the youth i. her own child.
a 28-29 olov ... 06 50XEL Cpo 99b 28-29. On d,aTO (why) see 55a 20 : 1:
"Odyssus tells Ajax wby ...."
a 30-31 .nA0S .. o6x l ..... 'v
The general idea of the argument from
cau.e to effect is mentioned in passing among the intrinsic (0 98b 20) arguments by Cicero, De part. orat. 2.7, and exemplified at De Drat. 2.40.171. At
Top. 14.s8~ Cicero discus.es the variou. kinds of causes and the nature of
their effects; cpo Quintilian, S.IO.SO[ Our topic can be found at Rhetores
Graea, V 404; IX 606. The argument is from cause to effect, i.e., from exi.t-

ARISTOTLB,

330

RHETORIC'

l[

coalS

ence or non-existence of the cause (Il... ~"&em ... P7J ~"aem) to the
existeoce/non-<OXisteoce of the eJfect (8T' IiUT< o~x HUT").
a 3'-3z 4"..... l,,..,,v
"for the cause and its effect [oJ alT.oP] go together and nothing exists without a cause."
a p A.... 6mfoLa~
This does not appear to be the same man as the one
mentioned at CI4a 19 : 1 - c PW, Leodamas (2) - although Cope, p. Z9I,
believes it is; c Baiter & Sauppe, II ZI6-17. More likely this is the Athenian
statesman of the fifth and early fourth century; c PW, Leodamas (I). However, as far as age is concemed, it would not be at all impossible that the same
person is meant.

a 33 8p ..cruli..u>.ou
Athenian statesman and democrat who led the
democratic opposition to the oligarchic governmeot of the Four Hundred at
Athens in 4II :D.c. (CAH, V 330-34). A successful naval commander in the
waning years of the Peloponnesian War (CAH, V 34Iff.), he was banished in
404 by the Thirty (on whom see aDa IS} but was ultimately responsible for
the return of democracy to Athens in 403. Demosthenes, On the Palst Embassy zSo, call. him "the democrat who brought the people back from Phyle";
c OGD, PW, Thrasybulus (3).

p,m............

a 33-lS &..........
This could have occurred any time prior
to the period between the summer of 404 and February 403, which saw the
rule of the Thirty (i"l Tm. re.axopra). The reason for the public inscription
is not known, but the implication is clear from a 3S-36: namely, that he opposed the democracy. Cope, pp. 29'-9Z, offers an explanation of the possible
c;ircumstances and also of the procedure.
a 34 :

a'"l>"'"1~

"inscribed on a stele." People could be honored

by this action (Lysias, Ag. Agoralu.! 72), or dishonored (Dernosthenes, Phil.

III 41-42).
Ocxo<j. ..,
Ross alone col1iectures '""Axomal. Because of the
shift to the infinitive, Cope, p. 292, would understand UYOPTO,. I do not see
why the infinitive construction cannot depend either on HanIYOe"p (plato,
Gorgias 48zc) or on the idea of "stating, alleging" clearly present in "a'"'7yoe"p;
c oob II-12 where we have the same construction (01 pJ:. . .. ~ro.,).

a 3S-36 "au........ 6;J1'-""

The arguntent is that the asserted cause is
false for its effect would have been that the Thirty would have placed greater
trust in Leodamas, and this did not happen. The example illustrates the second
alternative: xap P7J ."aem, 8n 0.14 EUTIP. In Pro Milone 12.)2 Cicero argues
that C10dius had many actual motives to atta~ Milo, leaving the effect to be
drawn: C10dius was the aggressor - an argument using the first alternative:
unt1eZ'!1'

on

60"Ct.

oob 6

COMMBNTARY

33 1

a 37 - oob 1 /i).).O~ aXo"ELV

"AnothO!' topic is to considO!'whethO!'
the course of action which someone recommends or is taking or has taken
was or is possibly done better in another way." On the use of ,I c S.2675.
In the interpretation given hO!'e Wv (the course of action) is a genitive of attraction, .t (TO TOUT.,.) WV: if any of the things which. . C"pe, p. 293,
views the topic as mosdy forensic (judicial) in character, and in this respect
the Oxford (Roberts) translation is more an interpretation of the Greek, not
a translation. I can perceive no reason to exclude this topic from any of the
three kinds of discourse; c 99b 31-]2. However, this is a topic which
(with topic 23, ooa 23-29) Spengel also would confine to one branch of
rhetoric, e.g., judicial; c 98a 3-4. Cicero, Pro Milone 16.41 (Victorius) is
an example of the topic directly to the point; Demosthenes, Ag. Aristocrates
rro-U5 (Spengel) is far less obvious.
All the codd. and edd. read
oob 1 <pClV'po,. . , 01 fIoiJ nt"puxEV
pfJ except Ross, Kassel; Spenge!, p. 329, questions it. Certainly without it
the meaning is more readily obvious. Reading it we interpret: "for it is
clear that, if this is not so [i .. , if the person has not taken the better coursel,
he has not acted."
b 2 rN3EL~ "pOClLp.L..ClL
19, 63a 20 - 63b 4 (for 63a 38:

C A 10, 68b 9-12, 69b 18-]2; also 63a

in this note read63a38-63b3), 6]&20: 1.

b 3 <I>.uao~

i.e., fiillaciom, deceptive, and for the reason given at 3-4

namely, the more expeditious way may not have
been known at the time of the action and therefore to infer from it anything
about the action actually taken is misleading.
("o.ua".~

... .Id,/AO'):

All punctuate with a comma after ""'eayp~...

b 4-5 oJ).).o~ ... axO".LV
O.~ (Roemer alone places it after 8.pa). With the comma righdy placed
1J./J4 f1",eonei" = U to exa.nrine together": "Whenever some intended action
is contrary to wh2t has been done, another topic is to examine (thetn both)
together." On the idea in ba.Tlov, c 92a 9-II. Cpo SE 174b 19-23 (Spengel).
b 5-8 olav ... fIoiJ MEtV
This statement of Xenophanes (on whom
c 99b 6) is found in Die!. & Kranz 21 A 13. Plutarch who is mentioned
among the testimonia there in place of "the people of Elea" addresses the
response to "the Egyptians." Blea on the southwest coast of Italy is associated with Xenoph2nes and gave its name to the Bleatic school of philosophy,
which was actually started by Parmenides, a pupil of Xenophanes.
On the use of .1 see S. 2675; the subjunctive repb 6 .t ... ~ flo";
resents a deliberative subjunctive in the direct question which is retained
after primary sequence (S. 2677). Leucothea is a sea-goddess who was origi-

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

33 2

oob 13

nally Ino, the daughter of Cadmus and the wife of Athamas. She was transformed into a deity with her son Melicertes. C Euripides, Melka 12821292; OCD, PW.
b 7..,1j "",,_~cNAEU"" .. au_.v
If the example exemplifies, then the
people of Elea had done one of the actions (sacrificed to Leucothea or grieved
for her) and Wete about to do the othet. Xenophanes advises them of the
contradiction in the two actions: if a goddess, don't grieve for her; ifhuman;
don't sacrifice.
b 9-10 a>J.o~ .. &,.0>.0y_',,8,", C Rhetore. Graed, V 406. Once again
the extension of the topic is cballenged: e.g., Spengel, p. 329: "the whole
topic i. misplaced for it belongs to forensic not to deliberative or epideictic
oratory." The !reason for the restriction possibly resides in "aT1/'l'oe2i7 ij
cbroAo"..a6a. (e.g., A 3, 58b 10-12). Once again, however, I fail to see why
one cannot praise or blame an individual (epideictic), or e....nort or dissuade
(deliberative) using thi. topic. Further reasons fOI limitiug the topic may be
in the obsetVation (b 15-16) that thi. was the substance of the art of rhetoric
before (0 oob 15-16) Theodorus, a techne which was largely concerned with
judicial rhetoric. On Spenge! see 9Sa 3-4.
b

IO

X ..pxlvou

Our text here is cited in Nauck & Snell, p. 798. This

is the grandson of the tragic poet Carcinus much ridiculed by Aristophane.

Active in the fourth century, partieularly at the court (367-357 B.C.) ofDionysius the Younger at Syracuse, he was a productive tragic poet; o OeD
(2), PW(5).

11 II

x ....1Jyopoii...v
Again we appear to have the finite and infinitive
construction with this verb; o ooa 34.

b 12-13 ijp.cop...... ,...1&"",

Ross alone enclose. this in parentheses,
and secludes the following ct7, writiug OV [117]; codd. ov" 11.7. The particle
is repeated with the verb (b 14). At 08a 3" where the repeated If.7 is not in
all the codd. as it is here Kassel reads it, remarking that he would not dare
remove it when the repetition occurs at such a short interval.
b 13-15 "II 6' ... b:ol1J"""
Medea's mistake was in sending the children
away, for their absence wa. the reason for the charge of murder against her.
In reply Medea argues that (if she had doneany killiug) she would have killed
not the children but Jason. Consequendy, if she had made any mi.take at
all, it would have been in not killing Jason if she had killed the children.
And Jason, as all know, is very much alive. The validity of her argument is
confirmed by Jason's fierce reaction to the murder of the children in the MeJea of Euripides, 1293/

oob IS

COMMENTARY

333

b IS-I6 ii......... "'''xV'!

Cpo 99'1 rs-r6. ooa 4-S. "Tills topic and type
of cnthymeme constitutes the whole art of rhetoric in use before Tbeodorus."
This is the interpretation of Spcngel. pp. 329-30; Cope. p. 296. reading the
same Greek interprets: " ... is the whole of the earlier art of Theodorus."
Radermacher (B.XII.n) cites our passage and in his note agrees with Spcngel.
Theodorus of Byzaotium (fl. 431>-400 B.C.) worked primarily in Athens.
and A. places him (SE IS3b 26-33) with Tisias and Thrasymachus. identifying
all three as esteemed men who advanced the study of rhetoric. From this
comment. along with those of plato at Pluzed..... 2660, 2613-<: (and cpo Cicero.
O,at. I2..39. Brutus I2..4S) and of A. at y I2a 2S - r2b 2, I4b 7-IS. I lean toward
SpcngeI's view. The observations of A. and Plato are the earliest we have
on Theodorus. and they suggest a larger view of rhetoric in general. one
unlikdy to limit itsdf to the earlier and popular form of judicial rhetoric.
1 D.).o~ ... 6vOfLCl"'O~
The rdevance of this last topic to the
general character of the other topics as forms of inference is not very clear.

b 17 :

Its effi:ctiveness as retort - on which see topic 6. 9Sa 3-14 and 98a 4 - or to
emphasize and call attention to a statement in an argument is clearer. Used
well, it can have a devastating effect, as can be seen in the reply of the Italian
noblewoman to Napoleon's angry charge that aU Italians are scoundrels: "Non
tutti, ma buona parte." From the examples given. it is clear that A. is thinking in terms of one's proper name, and is not thinking of etymologizing (i.e.,
tracing the meaning of a word to its root ideas), as we find it in Top. r 123 323S, Cicero, Top. S.3S-37- The idea in our present topic receives passiog
mention in Cicero, De in 2.9.2S and is more or less dismissed as a technique
in Quintilian, S.IO.31>-31. A.'s idea in the topic can be seen in Eteocles' taunt
to Polyneices, Euripides, Phoenician Women 636-637, or !socrates, On the Team
ojHo,stS 2S (a play on the .word Eupatrid, i.e., noble birth), or ru.etores Gr_
ci, V 406. Cope, p. 297, gives some examples from Greek tragedy.
2 olav ......ailvOfLlZ
The fragment is from the Tyro of Sophocles and can be found in Pearson, II 6SS or Nauck & Snell. Sopko S97,
or Radt, Sophocles, F 6SS. This last gives citations of our text by Eustathius
in hi. commentary on the Odyssey and the Iliad, and cites the preceding line
found also in the scholiast Anonymus, which explains the dative a''''Ie'l'
read by all the edd. except Kassel. This line (alJT1/ dll
in.. ct.,
,",,1/) explains the dative ("d~e'l' as the object of ".xe1/,..iv1/. However, I
would read the proper name L",d~e" with Spengel, Cope. Kassel. TIlls reading
is also found in a good tradition and in the scholiast. As A. cites Sophocles
here, usiog the proper name does make the meaning clearer. Kassd reads
feoVoJaa for tpoeoiiaa.

,..ax,,...,

"'xerr

b IS c:.~ ... ".YE.V, XlZl c:.~

Only Roemer, Dufour read a lacuna
before Hal
Roemer conjectures that the tc:xt continued with the words

eli,.

A11ISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

334

oob 25

we find in the .cholia.t Stephanus, who explains the phrase .. , I. TOO, TW.
8sW. mat.o" thus: "as Zeus is given his name as the cause of our life"
(Cm;M; this would be the lost clause.
b 19

.:.~

K6vc.Jv . . , lxliJ...

C Did. &: Kranz 85 A 6. On Conon,

c 9!Ja 5 ; on Thrasybulus, ooa 33b 19-20 'HpoS'''Q~ 8pOl..u",OIXov "old ...r'

On Hcrodicu., 6xb 5: 1,
he i. the author also of the following comments on Polus, Dracon. Thrasymachus of Chalcedon (JI. 430-400 B.C.), a Sophist who is important in the
development of prose style, is well known from Plato's &publll: as an ardent
defender of the theory that might makes right (c 338b-e); c also OCD,
PW (1), Guthrie, Creek Philosophy, III 294-98, Radermacher, B.IX.I-I9.
I would punctuate with the quotation marks as do Tovar, Ross, Kassel, Cope.
b 20-21 1Iii">1ov "old ...r'
I would punctuate as here with Tovar,
Ross, Kassel, Cope. Polus of Agrigentum is a younger contemporary of
Socrates, and the author of a rhetorical tecbne. He is well known from Plato's
Go'gias where at 463 e he i. called by Soaates "young and passionate." This
dialogue at 461b 3 - 4C>1d 9 gives some sense of his "coltish" nature as h.
breaks into a conversation between Socrates and Gorgias. C OCD, PW (3),
Radermacher, B.XIV.I-n.
ApcbcOV'l"OI &pcbcOV"Q~
Cope and Kassd, reading with
the more recent tradition, omit dv in this sentence; Ross secludes it; the other
edd. and Spengd read it. Richards, p. III, co.yccturcs >fa"" for it, or po...
sibly dittography from dv8ecb"ov. Dracon is one of the early lawgivers
(~omothete, c S4b I) in Athens. His effort to counter social unrest arising
in Athens was to enact this law code in 621 B. c. and thus make clear the
rights and duties of all. These laws became rather notorious for the punishments attached to violations (c Pol. 1274b IS-I8) and won the reputation
of being "written not in ink but in blood," as Plutarch (Solon 17) notes. On
Dracon see OCD, PW (8), CAll, IV 28-36.

b 21-22

The citation is from the Trojan Women

b 22-24 E6p ...(Sou .. e~
990. Eustathius in his commentary on the niaJ, p. 414.37 refers to this p....
sage of A. It can also be read in Spengel, pp. 330-31, and in Kassel, p. 137Spengel finds the reference to A.'. text unclear, as it is.
b 25-26 XOI.pil/U'W . iml>vu",o~
C Nauclc &: Snell, p. 783; the
fragment is attributed to the Dionysus of Chacrenwn (fl. ]50 B.C.), a play like
the BtJtClute of Euripides. Chaeremon is a tragic playwright whose plays, A.
teI!s us at I3b 12-14, were intended for reading (7 not acting); c OCD (I),
PW (5). Pentheus, a king of Thebes in mythology, is well known from the
BtJtCh"" of Euripides.

cob 33

COMMBNTAllY

3JS

b 27-30 ":'&OX."oL . p.iiillov

In b 27-34. the end of the presentation
of the common topics for demonstrative enthymemes, A. gives us a brief
observation not SO much on demonstrative-re!Utative enthymem.es as on the
essential character of enthymeme as he understand. it: an inference marked by
such brevity and clarity of statement that the auditors readily apprehend it
as it is delivered, and, ifnot, comprehend it as soon a. it is completely expressed.
In our present passage (b 27-30) refutative enthymemes which conclude to
the opposite of the opponent'. conclusion achieve this objective very effectively since they allow the auditor to compare opposite.; cf. r 17, 18b 2-5. The
comparison of two opposites is seen rather well in the examples at 970 7-19.
C Studies, pp. 8~I on the enthymeme as an abbreviated syllogism. sV~o"...
lUi, cf. 9"b 20; h8~"'7J,..dT("" is a genitive of the whole; did TO . el.".,
articular infinitive with subject (TO oil."... 01.86,..71,..") and predicate (""""Y"Y>1v);
the articular infinitive is still at work (e.g., ,..i ... a~ in the following clause
naf!' elll'll" ... ,..allo., "because .tatements set side by side are ..." (on
nae' W7Jla, cf. Bonitz, Index, p. 340 13). Cpo r 9, loa 2.0-:>3.
b 30-32 ...Ii",""" .. dv...
On 8oevpsiTa, cpo A 2, 56b 24- "AU such
refutative and demonstrative syllogisms are particularly applauded which (the
auditors) foresee from the beginning (as they are begun) not because they are
superficial (.een at a glance)." TIP ... l.a" articular infinitive, dative of
cause; on .!n,,,oMi' 76b 14- On the idea cpo 94b 17-25, rIO, rob 21-27.
b 32-33 (11..........po.....8czvo'""o.) "for at one and the same time men
are delighted with themselves as they anticipate (the conclusion) with understanding." Auditors are pleased with the speaker's argument and also (d,..,,)
with their ability to foresee its devdopment. C Studies, p. 88; r ro, rob
10-26, A 2, 570 r5-21.
b 33-34 ....I a""", ... Y""'plt;v
"and all those enthymemes are applauded which they are late in apprehending only to the extent that they
grasp then! as soon as they are stated." lIa.,. governed by 1laTEet\ovaIV.

CHAPTER 24

C the outline to chapter 23.

I-alar
1a - oIa2-6
Ib - ala 12
II - ala 24-25
III - alb 3
IV - alb 9-10

v-

VI
VII
VIII
IX

alb 15
alb 20 :2
alb 30-34
alb 35
028 3-9

oob 3S-3 8 t"d 6' ... auUoy"rl'-o~ "L~

As we begin this chapter on
the apparent enthymeme, we should recall the statement at A I, ssa 29-38
that the student of rbctoric must be able to argue both sides of a subject
simply because in this way one eomes to know the subject as it truly is and
thus can then refute false statements about the subject; cf. ssa 2!r38. This
study of the sources of false enthymematic reasoning is not at all in aid of the
teclmiquc of deception as a positive factor in rbctorical discourse. On the
contrary it is an effort to unmask false reasoning on the part of others. We
read in SE (which in dialectics is eomparable to this study of the topics of
apparent enthymemes): "It is the task: of one who has knowledge about a
thing to speak the truth about what he knows, and to be able to expose the
individual who makes false statements," 16sa 24-27 (0 174b I!r23). This
S\lIllS up accurately the tenor of all A.' s writings: namely, the effort to apprehend and communicate, as far as possible, that which is. Viewing the
discussion of apparent enthymeme as a study of the ways to misrepresent
reality cannot be substantiated from the Rhetoric. and is totally at odds with
the cJfort of all his work. C S6a 36 - S6b 4, Studies, pp. 94-99. One should
also note the emphatic correlation here between syllogism and enthymeme;
o 99b IS : 2, ala 7-8.

The usc of TO"D' here reveals once again the character of the
b 38 "I:.mOL
common topics; o 978 7 : 1. For it is obvious that in these nine topics we
have nine principles from which inferences or arguments can be developed.
These topoi are nine general propositions each of which can be used for &lse
inference on any number of subjects. stoichcia (03a 17-19) into which many
apparent enthymemes fall. Roemer. Dufour. Tovar number the nine as la,
b, II, III. etc., a numbering found in the English translations, e.g., Roberts,
Cooper. Jebb & Sandys. In a passage in SE (16Sb 23 - I68a 16) comparable

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

OIa 2

to chap. 24 thirteen topics are given. A distinction is also made (I65b 24)
between fallacies which, while not stated in the Rhetoric, is valid for the
topics there. We are told that there are two kinds of fallacies: (a) fallacies
rooted in language, i.e., verbal, "oed -nj. lBE .. (c oIa I); (b) fallacies independent of language, lEO) Tii, UEBo)', i.e., grounded on principles which
result in false inference. In the Rhetoric the following would fall among the
verbal fallacies: la, b, ala 1-24 (ambiguity, amphiboly), on ala 12-24 cpo SE
165b 30 - 1600 23; II, ora 24 - alb 3 (composition and division), cpo SE 166a
23-38. Of the six verbal fallacies of SE all but the last two (wrong accent,
form of expression used) are found in the Rhetoric. The following fallacies
independent of language are found in the Rhetoric: V, oIb 15-20 (accident),
cpo 166b 2a:-36; VI, oIb 20-30 (consequent), cpo I67b 1-20; VII, alb 30-34
(not cause as cause), cpo I67b 21-38; IX, alb 35 - 02a 27 (confosion of the ab_
lute and the qualified), cpo I66b 37 - 1670 20. Five of the SE fallacies have no
formal counterpart among those of the Rhetoric, e.g., two verbal fallacies:
wrong accent (I66b 1-9), form of expression (I66b 10-19), and three of the
fallacies independent of language: ignorance of refutation (I67a 21-35),
assumption of the point to be proved (1670 36-39), combining separate
questions into one (I67b 38 - I68a 16). Of the Rhetoric fallacies only one,
use of indignant language, alb 3-9, has no comparable paralld in SE, since the
use of sign, alb 9-15, is included as a fallacy of consequent at SE 167b 8-u.
On fallacy in Latin, c Cicero, Do inv. 1.47.87-95; Auct. ad H""",. 2.20.3146. Cope, pp. 300-302, and Hamblin, pp. 50-88, review the fallacies of the
Rhetoric and SE. Chaps. 24-25 of the Rhetoric epitomize in a way the SE for
rhetorical use, aschap. 23 makes use of the Topics.
oia I "lIpci .. >.t;,v
verbal fallacy, one occasioned by the use of language; cpo SE I65b 24. This is divided here into "oed ~d u1/ip.a XTA. (a 7)

and naea niSI op,ru,,'tJp.La'JI (a 12.).

a 2-6 c...",.p .. V8uP.>'IP.II.... ~. VlCtoriUS indicates wdl that the contrast

in the sentence is between the procedure in dialectic (~,aA.,<TI"o.,) and that
in rhetoric (lvOvp.>ip.aa,). The fallacious process in dialectic is to present a
statement as the conclusion of a syllogistic inference although it is not such.
In rhetoric the fallacy resides in making a compact and antithetical statement
and p..sing it off as an enthymematic inference. In each case the form gives
the appearance either of a syllogism or an enthymeme. In short A. has given
us a single sentence as found now in the critical editions (Spengd, Cope,
Freese give two sentences) contrasting this verbal fallacy as found in dialectic
and in rhetoric. The reading of the codd., however, does not make this
contrast clear. At a 4 ("al ~d ~oi, EvOvp.>ip.au,) the codd. start another sentence. The edd., following Vablen's suggestion ("Kritik arist. Schriften,"
135-37), read < "al > ~o,~
or variants on the .. rde of a lau.: codex

.. "

OIa. 12

COMMENTARY

339

(e.g., Ross: h TO'~; Tovar: <h l'ae>TO'~; Kassel: "all. Toi~) while Spengel
and Cope read with the codd. but are aware of the problem. Even with oil.
the adjustments the passage does not read satisfyingly: "One lcind of this
allacy is to present, as is done in dialectic, the final statement [TO TelsvraiO.)
as the conclusion of a syllogism [""I""Sea"paT,x.;;d although it has not been
inferred syllogistically: 'And so such and such is not true,' 'Therefore such
and such must be true'; .unilarly in the case of enthymemes [i.e., in rhetoric)
presenting a compact and antithetical statement gives the appearance of an
enthymeme, for that lcind of language is the province of enthymeme."
a" 1i""'.E1C"'L"OL~

e.g., SE I74b 8-n; cpo I76b 31-3".

lip..... "V"'L".L"'""",~
Ross alone encloses a 3-4: oux Ilea
... xal TO in quotation marks. Ross, Kassel, Spengd, Cope read dYdy,,'1
aea TO "al TO; the other edd. read d.dl''''l Ilea xal TO xal TO. Ross, Kassd,
Cope read with a good tradition ...,....Teap,.h"'~ for the "",s""eappi.o.
of the other edd.
a 3-5

0(,,,

lv9u"'' ' ' .....

o~
Ross alone encloses this in parentheses. xr.IJea
a 6 il ...
= the locale, or the place where (T6"o~); on the statement cpo I9a 19, loa ":Ir
"3
a 7 "Xii","
i.e., "the form of expression," and so both the lcind of statement made and the way, the form, in which it is expressed are the source of
this allacy.

a ']-8 Et~ ...O l.EYELV

"in regard to spealcing in a syllogistic manner
by means of the lcind of wording used." In the context of oob 35-38 "".l.lo1',aT'x,;;~ is effectively h6.p'lpaT"'';;~, and so cf. oob 35-38, end of note. At a
8-9 TO ",,'\'\oy ...p';; . Ail'S" ("to state the main points of several syllogisms") the articular infinitive is subject to l ..T' xe'lj ..,po.. On ".."d.la.a cpo
Demosthenes, 01. 3."3.
a 10 Dc.......""

i.e., a !rIO (0..... . 1j.l8v6le"'..S); Spengel. p. 333, suggests

!socrates, Euagoras

65~.

a I I cillCo>v
"from other evidence." As dn.6.IX6'1 indicates, each main
argument set forth is itself the conclusion of a demonstration. When such
final statements are combined there is the appearance of some new conclusion
resulting from the union.
Homonymy and amphiboly are forms of the allaey of
a I2. 6f1o"'Vu",l_
equivocation, which is rampant in the EuthyJemus of Plato, as Sprague analyzes the dialogue. Homonymy is the use of the same word in diiferent senses,
as seen in the example. Amphiboly, mentioned in the SE passage similar to
our present passage, is a form of equivocation occasioned by the double
meaning of a phrase or clause, e.g., this commentary belongs to A.

340

ARISTOTLE. 'RHBTORIC' II

Ola 2.0

a 13 ..,,0118 ...011
C 6xa 25 :.: "held in respect." Baiter &: Sauppe
(II 221, frg. 8) gives this as a fragment of Polycrates; e.g., oxb 16. On PoIycrates see OXa 33-35.
i.e., a festival accompanied by mystic rites of initiation.
a 14 : 1 TEA""",
a l'uCJT>\p'"
Cf. OeD, "Mysteries"; Burkert, pp. 276-304. The
equivocation lie. in the as.umption that pv(mle,a (major annual religious
solemnities celebrated by the Greek.) is derived &om pJ~ (mouse) and not
pviw (initiate into the mysteries).
a 15 Ti>v aGp""c!>
i.e., Sirius, the scorcher, brightest star in the
constellation Canis Maior and known as the dog-star, harbinger of the "deg
days." Its appearance marked the beginning of the hottest part of the year.
C S8b 24: for the idea: take along
a 16 : 1 GUI',,"pd.CtI'(3civo,
with, take in as an assistant.
a Db..
For Pan, Cybele c OCD. There is no mention there,
however, of this relationship between the two. It is spoken of by Pindar, frg.
86 (Bowra) and again in frg. 85. Both fragment. are from the Parthenea which
were songs sung (and danced) by young girls to honor Pan; c Pindar, Pythi... 3.77-79. From frg. 85 Pan appears to be an attendant upon Cybele,
the Magna Mater, and his statue to be placed before shrines. On Pindar
(? 522/518-438 B.C.) the lyric poet see OCD, PW.
a 11)-20 i\ 8T' .....11',011
"or to state that to be without a dog is the
highest disgrace, and so it is clear that to be a dog [TO ".n.a (817a,)] is something
honorable." In.. itself the statement is a puzzle, or in Victorius' words "to a
hjgh degree ob.cure" (obscurus aurem lot:u.r admodum .<1). Of the scholiasts,
Stephanus suggests the possibility of equivocation inherent in the reference
to either dog or Cyuic philosopher (Diogenes of Sinope, ca. 400 - ca. 325,
the founder of Cynic philosophy received the nickname of"deg"); Anonymus
reads "owei for ",s.a and is not helpful. Schrader's interpretation (Cope,
p. 306) is substantially repeated in the modern interpretations and translations. I do not see the point of his "in the house" and prefer "to be without
dog." His Latin would read: ''That not even a dog is maintained in the house
is the highest disgrace. Therefore to be a dog is honorable. The equivocation
resides in the phrase 'to be a dog' which can mean either that a dog is in the
house, or to be a Cynic. For Cynic philosophers are called dogs... "
"to claim that Hermes particularly
a 20-21 XO'Vb>V,xOv... 'Epl'ij~
among the gods is the most sociable for he is the only one of the gods called
'sharer Hermes.'" Hermes (0 OCD), like Pan, is Arcadian in his origins
and has many facets: messenger of the great gods (e.g., Virgil, Am. 4-211)-276),
guide of souls (Homer. od. 24-1-14), and here the god of good luck. On the
chance discovery of money or anything else (such a find was called i1 TO Ie-

ora 27

COMMBNTARY

341

palOV), if anyone on hand cried out" ,.owo, 'Eepii'" (or OUI "halves'') he made
a claim to a share in the find, e.g., Theophra.!tIlS describes the covetous character (Characters 30.9) a. one who when "some money is found in the streets
by his slaves is clever at demanding part of it by crying out 'halves.'" The
phrase x. 'Eepii' (luck: is common) is proverbial, e.g., Menander, Epitrepolltes
284 (108) and ef. 28G-28s (cd. Sandbach). The equivocation rests on the
different meanings of x.w6" as in the following example it rests on the different meaning of .I6y., as speech (a n, To,. My.v) and as esteem (a 23, cU.Id

Adr"'),
a U-23 " ..I,,~... ~,.,
On the equivocation here see previous
note. ..,...,da,6TaTov, ef. ala 13; Spengel, pp. 333, cites Diodoms Siculus
1.1-2, Anaximenes I42Da 6 - I42Ia 2, and Isocrates, Pallegyricus 47-49 as
indicative of the high esteem in which logos was held.
a 23-24 "~YdIp .. ).EYE"'"
"for the expression Ady.v !l.E,.v is not
wed with a single meaning." On clnAw, see 560 7. dEt.Aoy., meaning
"notable, distinguished" is a word special to Diodoms Siculus.
a 24-2S lDJ.o~ .. &LlILPoGv"..
Ross (along with Bonitz, Studiell,
p. 87) reads TO <TO> 6'TJe'7pbov. This topic is found in SE as two topics,
oob 38. Here it is a single fallacy which in fact is twofold: composition,
division. Composition is to assert of the whole what is true of a part or
parts, e.g., a 24: "another topic of fallacious argument is for the speaker to
combine [a""..,66na Myew] that which is separate [TO 6'TJe'7P"""]"; e.g., the
Supreme Court is a prejudiced body since its members have prejudices.
Division i. to as.ert of a part or parts what is true of the whole, e.g., a 2S: "or
to divide [6Ia~.;;vTa] that which is combined [TO avyxstp...v]," e.g., all
the faculty members of Oxbridge are distinguished scholars for the Oxbridge
faculty is noted for its distinguished scholarship.
a 25-26 ,brEl ... ....u.CbCL~
"for since what is not the same is often
thought to be the same." On Tml",6. (not TaVr6 as at a 26) S. 32.8n.; theword
refers to the whole and its parts which frequendy appear to be the same and
therefore capable of the same attributes.
a 26-27 6..6"EpOV .. _'Ei"
c oob 35-38. The import of the comment (e.g., 6 ".'.'7) is, I would say, that one is to use the fallacy not in
presenting an argument but in refuting the statement of an opponent who may
have deliberately or inadvertendy used the fallacy.
a 2.7 ".,;:;".... My.~
Kassel alone conjectures Tmo <0>. Euthydemus (ef. OGD, PW [13]), a Sophist from Chias, was a contemporary of Socrates and is known to us for the most part from Plato's dialogue Euthytkmus
(ef. ola 12), a study of eristics and the use of fallacies; its character is

ARISTOTLE, 'R~TO'RIC' II

OIa 33

mirrored in A.' sSE. Whether the Euthydemus of Xenophon's Memorabili.

is a different person is questioned; cpo PW, Euthydernus (13) with Kerferd,
p53
a 2.7-2.8 or.." ... 0[&611
This example is not in the EuthyJemus. Its
OCCUIrence in a slightly different form at SE I77b 12.-13 would indicate that
it is sophism identified with Euthydemus. The kind of composition at issue
is of the following sort: Patti is good; Patti is an artist; Patti is a good artist,
(c D. into 2.ob 351f.). Thus we have here: What you know, you know in the
Peiraeus where you now are; secondly, you know that there are triremes.
And so the statement: you know that there are triremes in the Peiraeus. This
p ....ge is explained by Victorius in terms of the SE passage 177b 12.-13
which, .. it stands, is the same kind of fallacious statement. Cope, pp. 3"730B, gives an exact citation of Victorius' wor.u and his difficulties with them
.. an explanation of the Euthydeman logos.
a 2.9 -rav.. .",'......P.61IOV
The accusative is the object of Uy understood ("to say of the one who knows the lettets'I, which also governs the
dependent /In clause; see use of My... at a 2.5. The scholi..t Anonymus
intetprets bro, as "verse"- so too Cope - and not "word," citing by way of
illustration the first few words of the Ili.d: I";j'" d6. O.d.
a 3~3 I xed mEl ... icnLV
dt~ ToaouTo7 = twice as much: Iland since
twice as much of a thing is hannful." ",a.a. is again a predicate infinitive
(sc. allo, emf), governing the accusative I"716i Tel .. ("another topic is to say
~at not evc:n a "siDgI~ po~on") and infinitive 6l"a, ,sy,s,."d". IlTmro" (sc.
san). iaTw, I.e., CODSbtute.

~ 32.-33 oikw ... ",..p(l),oy....."'6~

The first formulation is refutative
since its conclusion - Two good things do not make one bad thing - is the
contradiction apparently of what was originally stated: One portion of a
thing is good, but its double is bad. This last statement is often correct but is
open to this attack. Even the converse - One good thing does not make
two bad things - though apparently demonstrative is not correct for it,
too, is open to the fallacy of division.
a 33-35 ",IU,,, ... Y"P
On Polycrates see Radermaclrer, B.xXI.I-13
and particularly # 13, together with Baiter & Sauppe, II 2.2.1, ftg. 5. He is a
rhetorician of the fourth century. His Aa:usation of Socrates, now lost, written
somewhere about 394 B.C., may have been occasioned by Plato's Gorgias.
It was criticized by !socrates, Busiris, 4-9 and answered by Xenophon, Mem.
1.2..1-<54 where Polycrates is apparently "the accuseT." He wrote a number
of encomia on startling subjects such as mice (Ola 13), pebbles. c Cope,
pp. 3II-I2.; oeD (2.); PW (7); Chroust, pp. 69-100; Dodds, Gorgias,pp. 2.B
On Thrasybulus see ooa 33. On The Thirty as a collective name. for this

olb 3

COMMBNTAllY

343

tyranny, c ooa r8; here they are spoken of differendy. This is not an obvious
example of composition. On the face of it this appears to h. the fallacy of
division sinc. we think of The Thirty as individuals, and we might think that
what we assert of them collectively we can assert of them as individuals.
Thus Thorot ("Observations critiques [III," 49), for instance, considers
this an example of division and the following an example of composition;
see Kassel's apparatus criticus, p. 139. However, this could be composition.
What is individually true of the patts here (namely: each was a tyrant,
each was overthrown by Thrasybulus) is asserted as true of the whole; i.e.,
Thrasybulus overthrew 30 tyrants and so 30 tyrannies. But the 30 were a
collective in fact constituting just one tyranny. Quintilian illustrates the point:
"Me 30 awards owed to Thrasybulus?" for putting down The Thirty, 7-4.44
(c 3.6.2.6). On the matter of this fallacy Joseph's monitum (p. 58:1..1)"It is difficult to keep Composition and Division apart" - is worth noting.
Joseph, pp. 586, exemplifies A.'s mixup of the two.
a 35- ~ ..o ... eEo&i..."ou

C 'iYfll 28-29, 97b 2.--3, and 97a 29 - 97b 6.

a 36 5,II,p......~
The fallacy of division is to assert of a part or parts
what is true of the whole, ala 24-25. We do not have that here as far as can
be seen. Rather we have the fallacy of composition. For what is true of the
parts has been asserted of the whole. It is right that she who murders her
husband die; it is also right that a son avenge his father. But one is not justified in asserting of the whole (as A. says,olb 1-2, "IJlITB8ivTa .. 61"a ...)
-that it was rigbt for Orestes to kill his mother. In adding that the faIIacy
may be the one of omission, A. bas in mind the faIIacy of the exchange of an
absolute and a qualified statement; c orb 35 - 02a 3, olb 35.
a 37

5IxlI'o" ... 1to.""

C Nauck & Snell, p. 803, frg. 5.

olb 1 06xoW."..;n1l XIII 1t1tPIIX..II'

"''''eaXTa. is the reading of all
the codd., Cope, Spengel, Ross, Kassel. The odler edd. read """efix8a.
0';"0;;" TO;;Ta "al is read by Kassel and in effect is the reading ofRoerner,Dufour, Tovar, and Spengel. Cope reads without explanation 0,)"0;;. "al TaiiTa
"lIneIl><Ta.; Ross reads with V ahIen ov"oii. "al TOliTO iJ..
b 2

4cplI'pd

"the statement (or, the speaker) leaves out at whose hand."

..,.1.I'' ;.,,,

On the verb see S9b 14. To the references

b 3 5e,"':'... , XII....
there may be added Cope, p. 311, on the use of the verb as a technical term
for demonstrative syllogisms. In the same way its opposite here (as at An.
Pr. 42" 1-3), d.o",,"vdC... , means to demolish (usually the opponent', argument) and i. used for refutative syllogisms. On
(exaggeration) see
9sa 8-9. In most respects this is a fallacy more typical to rhetoric as an- art
of discourse. Thus Quintilian, 6.2.24 speaks of deinosis as "language which

6.""b".,

344

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

olb 10

gives added impetus to shameful, harsh, or hateful subjects." This, however,

is but Ol1e aspect of the fallacy (see also Auaor oJ Herem,. 2.29.46), which, as
we see here (b 4-6), also has a positive character.
Ross alone conjectures ",oi"l"" <"'''Id' {In oil,.
b 5 rnol'lO"EV, co61;>icrn
'1<Oi"l"BV> all~~"11. Spengel, p. 337, would also question our reading of all
the cadd. ailEd.... can mean quite simply to amplify, eularge upon, strengthen
(76b 34 : z), or to glorify, exaggerate, exalt. From the use of del..""., the
latter is the meaning here. The subject of avE>1"11 is "the speaker" who is
specified in what follows. Spengel, pp. 335Jf., exemplifies the fallacy from
!socrates, Antidosis 88-92, Andocides, all the Mysteries 29-33, Lysias, Ag. the
Subversion ~f the Ancestral Constitution 2-6. Another example would be Cicero,

Pro Milone 23.61.

i.e., the accused, the defendant.
b 7 : I opyl!;'1Tco,
This reading of the codd. (except A: 6el17J', which
for the sense I find more attractive) is accepted by the edd. save Ross, Kassel.
."UUI'-'11'4
It fails to be an enthymeme because nothing is demonstrated or proven (oil dedo,,,,,,"o,,); any conclusion or inference by the
hearer that something was or was not done is a groundless inference (",aea-

Ao"lCeT"').
b 9-ro IDo~... ToUTO
This fallacy of sign, specifically semeia allonymo (non-necessary signs, S7b 1 : " 57b r0-21), is very much implicated with
the fallacy of consequent (olb 20-30). In fact SE 167b 1-20 not only remarks
that in rhetoric proofs frOlll signs are based on consequents (b 8-9) but exemplifies by using a sign argument (b 9-Il) which is the same example as that
used in the Rhetoric to exemplify d,e fallacy of affirming the consequent (oIb
24), i.e., assuming that the consequent is convertible with the antecedent.
On the other hand, there can be no question that non-lIecessary sign argument can be a form of valid inference which, however, is not logically
conclusive; c Studies, pp. 96-99, 104-15. Since the argumentation concludes
to the probable and not the certain, there is 110 inevitable demand that the
assertion must be accepted. When used correcdy and with reasonable circumspection, sign inference can be highly suasive, as can be seen from the
instance of seeking a bodyguard as a sign of conspiring for tyranny (A 2,
57b 20-36). But, by the very nature of the non-necessary (anonymon) sign,
this can be challenged on the grounds that it involves the fallacy of the consequenL Thus it is that sign (i.e., semeion anonymon) can be used as a legitimate
argument of persuasion, but the argument can be disproved as fallacious.
b 10 Tcoi~ ",6).0"' . "I"""copxov
enclosed within quotation marks by
Tovar, Ross, Kassel, Cope. Plato, Symposium 182C 4--'7 says substantially the

oIb 15

COMMENTARY

345

same thing. C Aeschines, Ag. Timarc"us I32-I35 (Spengel). On Harmodius,

Aristogeiton, Hipparchus, 6Sa 17 : z, also 9Sa IS. "oAe". here denotes the
Greek city-state in general.
b II : 1 .pWvTES
the reading of all the codd.; Kassel alone reads .e"'Te~.
z 'API'-0&lou ~d.
c 6Sa I7 : 2. Hipparchus, son of the Athenian tyrant Peisistraus, enjoyed a position of eminence in Athens when his
brother Hippias assumed power in 527 B.C. on the death of their father.
Hipparchus died in 5I4 B.C.
b I2--I5 ij.[ T'S . 'l<OV'lpoS yap
The fallacy is obvious from the
explanation given in the text. The argument is non-syllogistic for it is in the
second figure, the major premiss is not universal and there is no negative
among the premisses.
b 14

a1.

6 ~i"'"lS... 7tOV'lPOS

Tovar omits ,.a:~; Ross omits

o.

b 15 ....1'-!3E(3'1"OS
No one who speaks about the fallacy of accident as we
meet it here and in the SE is really happy or secure with it. It is far more
complicated than it appears, and in fact it is frequently explained as the fallacy
secundum quid of which the following would be an example: freedom is man's
supreme endowment, therefore do not discipline children. It would not
misrepresent the actual situation to say, as Joseph, p. 84, does, "what Aristotle
says about the Fallacy of Accident has seldom been clearly understood";
c also Connell. Fearnside & Holther, Pirie do not mention it. A. himself
(SE I68b 6-10) remarks that "the experts and the wise" have trouble with it.
He himself (SE T69b 3-'7, 168b 27-29) ties in the fallacy of consequent (as
does Hamblin) with that of accident, as he also does with the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi (SE 168a 34 - I68b 5, I69a 3-5). The examples of "accident"
which he offers at SE I66b 28-36, partly at 179a 26 - ISea 22, are the ones
mostly featured even in the contemporary explanations of the fallacy, and
thcy are not helpful. The RJ.etoric examples are ignored probably because
the expositors do not understand how they exemplify the definitiOll of the
fallacy of accident given at SE I66b 28-30: "Fallacies depending on Accident
take place whenever any attribute is thought to belong in the same way to a
thing and to its accident." The first problem here is the meaning of"accident."
Ordinarily what is meant by "accident" is that which belongs to something 110t
always, not necessarily, not only (e.g., Michael is irritable). It seems to nle that
Cope's explanation (pp. 3I2-14; but c 313nr) of b 15-20 understands the fallacy of accident in this sense, i.e., to assert an accidental attribute as an essential
one. On the grounds that bombing is wanton violence one could say, but
wrongly, that the destruction of Hiroshima was an act ofwanton violence. What
can be truly said of the accidental attribute (bombing) cannot be said with truth
of the subject (destruction of Hiroshima). Even with this understanding of

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' Il

orb

20

"accident" there is a problem insofar as it is not as simple as it sounds to decide

with regard to many subjects what are aedelental and what are essential attributes. The second problem with the fallacy of accident is that in his explanation of it at SE 166b 28-30 A. offu-s a different bnt not for him an unusual
meaning of "accident." "Accident" means any property of a thing which is
not fully convertible with (i.e., has not the same defmition as) the thing, as,
for example, rational animal would be with "man." And so what is true of
the accident cannot be true of the thing (Joyce). Thus the fallacy of accident
violates the principle that whatever can be predicated of a thing can be predicated of anything identical with it. For accident, particularly in this second
meaning, is not identical with its subject. Thus in the first example at r66b
32-33: "Coriscus is different from 'man' and so different from. himself since he
is a 'man. J., ""Mann is considered an accident of Coriscus, i.e., not convertible
with Coriscus since not every man is Coriscus. I do not see, however, that
this understanding of "accident" applies to our ruetoric examples. If anything,
I would accept for them the first and more ordinary meaning of accident,
i.e., asserting an accidental attribute as an essential one.
b 16 Do>.uxpci"O)~ ... "'u~
C ola 33-35, OIa 13-14, Cope, p. 313;
cpo Spenge!, p. 338 and Radermacher, B.XXI.IO both citing the scholiast
Anonymous to the e.ffi:ct that the inhabitants of Troy honored the mice of
the region for this action. A similar incident in another context is related in
Herodotus, 2.141.5.
b 17 jj et ....... ,"'..;,..........ov
The articular infmitive (TO ... "A~81j.a.) is
the subject of an understood "is" in the finite or infinitive construction. The
non-invitation is the accidental reason for the anger, the substantial cause of
which, as we see at a 19-20 (0 d' tb, . ..), was the disregard (d).'l''''eia)
shown in the action; cf. A.'s comments on the concept, 78b 10 - 79a 8,,sa 32.
The story is said to come from a play of Sophocles' called the Syndeipnoi
(Companions at Table), whose subject is the Greeks gathered at Tenedos prior
to the siege of Troy; cf. Pearson, II 198-209. In the past the incident has
been confused with another Sophoclean play, Syl/ogos (The Gathering of the
Greeks); cf. Pearson, 194-100, Nauck: & Snell, p. 161. Plutarch, Moralia 74"
speaks of a Sophoclean play in which reference is made to Achilles and an
invitation; cf. Pearson, II 205, Nauck & Snell, Radt, Sophocles, p. 425.
b 20 :

&, ...... "'~

Cope, Kassel read with a majority of the codd.:

hd TO;; p.o;" "on the occasion o"

z ....0 "'rc6",EVov
Fallacy VI is that of affirming the consequent.
It is ordinarily understood of the hypothetical syllogism (If Bill is clever, he
will see this deception; but he sees the deception; and so, Bill is clever). A.,
however, did not discuss the hypothetical syllogism. As A. underst\lod this

oIb 30

COMMBNTAllY

347

(inop ..o.; c 62a 29: z) is a predicate

necessarily connected with the subject as umortal," "animal" are hropna of

fallacy in SE I67b 1-20, consequent

"man." However, the consequent is not convertible with its subject, and
when it is so converted. we have the fallacy of consequent. In the example at
a 21-24 the consequent is "disdain for society"; e.g., high-minded people
have a disdain for society. When we affirm this of Paris, we conclude wrongly
that it is convertible with ''high-minded'' and therefore that Paris is "highminded." This misapplies the rule that two things identical with the same
thing are identical with each other. Thus. although A. did not speak of the
hypothetical syllogism. his explanation of the fallacy of consequent is easily
expressed in the antecedent-consequent statement of the hypothetical syllogism. C Poetics 14600 20-22; Rheto,es Gr._d. VII 322.
On the encomium of Alexander
b 21 ' A>.E1;.h6p'I'. hI fLycU"IruxD~
by Polycrates. see Baiter &: Sauppe, II 223. and 97b 21-22. With the comma
after Alexander accepted by all. I would understand a predicate infinitive
(lily ...). i.e., Ur.BT'; c OIa 29 or OIa 3G-31 ('I'''.a,). On p."aAO,,~ZO~ see
66b 17. Rheto,es G,aed, V 283 (Spengel) notes that Demosthenes commits
the fallacy in the CroUl. speech 136.
:'for seeing that the high-minded are such, so.
b 23-24 3..1 yckp ... cIv
then, should Paris be thought to be high-minded."

b 25

fLDIX6~' Wtoil..Dl

b 26 ~5oucrl ... 6PXoii,....1l

Cpo SE 167b 8-u.

TocoiiTOC sc.

i.e.. in begging for

pOC%ot.

alms.

b 27-29 hI yckp . . . iiv m&czlp.ovoiv

The same struct\lre as aT' at
b 25, 26; see Olb 21: "to state that since these qU2!ities belong to those who are
thought to be prosperous and happy, so. then. those who possess these attributes should be considered prosperous and happy." As in the other examples
the argument is: the very fortunate sing, dance, and travel, but so do the
poverty",tricken and those sent into exile; therefore these latter are very
fortunate. rsocrates. Hele. 8 uses a similar example of beggars and exiles.
&111(1'011'1 ... 111.,,1"""1
C below olb 35 - 020 3 on the
diiference between an unqualified and a qualified statement. The ,.cii~ should

b 29-30

be obvious 6:om the last example given: exiles travel without choice as to
the travel and the destination while the fortunate travel when and where they
wish. On Ill"" .. see olb 35.
b 3G-34 auo~ ... ,,6A'fLo~
This topic is cited almost verbatim by
Dionysius of Halicarnassus in clrap. 12 of his First Letter to Ammaeus in his
effort to show that the Rhetoric was composed after Demosthenes had reached
hi. prime and had delivered most of hi. speeches, i.e. post 330 B.C. A com-

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

orb 13

parison of the statement of our topic with the fallacy in SE 167b 21-36 reveals
a striking difference between the two. The SE fallacy (see also An. Pr. 6sa
3Sff.), although A. says that it is fairly common, is one infrequently referred
to in modem books (Hamblin, p. 78). The interpretation of the fallacy of
cause which is co=on in the modern books is that given here in the Rhetoric,
e.g., the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy. The fallacy of non-cause as cause in
the SE is a form of reductio ad impossible and was used to challenge (and presumably refute) an opponent's assertion. For example, if someone declares
that the death penalty for murder is just, the sophist argues that the statement
leads to nonsense because granting that the penalty of death for murder is
just and that a just punishment is one that is an effICacious deterrent, then it
would be equally just to inllict the death penalty for picking pockets (cf.
Joyce, p. 281). The conclusion is made possible by the gratuitous insertion
of a premiss (granting . . . that a just ... deterrent) which has nothing to do
with the original statement.
"Another fallacious topic is that dependent on
b 30 a>.>.o~ "lIpa .. 6
(non-cause as cause)." naea here as elsewhere in this phrase is best interpreted
as "depend upon," or "on aocount of" (a"'I, e.g., 02a 4; cf. Bonitz, Ind,,,,
p. S62.12fE
b 31 otav"'-;; ... YEY"""'IIL
"for example, by reason of the fact that
a thing occurred together with or after another...."
"for men assume the fact of coming
b 31-32 ..0 yap ... A.. ",~oi~QU"L~
after the other ("p fJtn:d. "06"0) to he the.ame as because of the other ("'~ d.d

-ro...ifro)."
b 33 :

J
Z

otav':'~
C fJ78. 2S-27 for the expression.
41J"'''&'IJ~''' 41J",oa61!~QU~
noA.iao, aida., double accusa-

tive objects of l).ap. understood. Antony was similarly blamed by Cicero

for the civil war between Caesar and Pompey, Philippics 2.22.SS (Victorius).
On both these Athenians see OCD, PW, CAR, VI (passim). Demades (fl.
3SD-3I9 B.C.) as an active politician was an effective intermediary with Macedoni. (both Philip and Alexander) during the 405 and 30S of the fourth century.
It is possible that he was in the pay of Macedon although he was fined along
with Demosthenes in the Harpalus affair of 324/3'.3 B.C., the incident which
brought to an end the distinguished career of Demosthenes (384-322 B.C.),
polirically active as a Scltesman in Athens from the year 3S4. The objective
of Demosthenes was to maintain Athenian freedom in the face of the advancing power of Macedonia under Philip and, later, Alexander, the very policy
Demodes attacks here. Whether this is the only (Cope, I"trod., pp. 4S)
mention of Demosthenes in the Rhetoric is questioned; c 97b 7 : Z, 07" S
(of the latter Spengd, p. 37S, remarks that Victorius and others "'1"ithout

02a 3

COMMBNTARY

349

reason" consider this a mention of the fifth-century general, but Cope, III S2,
takes it to be a reference to the general).
presumably the words ofDemades; cf. Baiter &
b 34 1/."<' ... "';).1/.0,
Sauppe, II 3IS, frg. 3. It is commonly thought that the war was the conflict
with. Philip ending at Chaeroneia in 33 8 B. C., the war which Aeschines, Ag.
etesiphon 136 also blamed on Demosthenes' policy. This may be the event
referred to, but I do not see any grounds fur certainty on the matter.

Ill.,,,,,...

b 3S
This fallacy is a form of the fallacy which fullows and
which is also found in SE, i.e., the confusion of absolute and qualified statement, or, as it is commonly called, the fallacy secuMum quid from its Latin
formulation jal/aia a Jic/o simpliciter ad dictum secundum qUid. This fallacy has a
converse: a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter. Something which is stated
absolutely (as the first example: Hdeo was free to take the husband she wished)
is wrong if it calls for a qualification which is omitted, e.g., naqd n). tA.l,,'P'. (in the example Hden's freedom was qualified as A. points out: .~"de
... ..ve'o,). The limitatiou exemplifies the omission of non (b 3S), a temporal dement qualifying Helen's freedom. A similar Ill,,'P" occurs in the
second example. The omission of a necessary qualification of manner (n';;"
b 3S) e.g., 6TaP ddt" ..., makes the explanation of hybris taIse. In each
example, if the qualified assertion is stated and one argues from it to the
unqualified, we have another aspect of this fallacy: namely, that of a dicw
secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter, e.g., to strike a free man without cause is
.hybris, from which we would falsely infer: to strike a free man is hybris.
Tyndareus was her father, and the story is
b 36-37 otov . """<po,
told in Euripides, Iphig. in Aulis 49-79; cf. Baiter & Sauppe, II 223, frg. '7.
b 37 06 ya.p .....p..........
"(This is fallacious) for the choice was not
given to her as one might think forever, but only for the first time." The
adverb
is used at times to qualify a strong statement and means "presumably," "as one might think"; cf. Bonitz, Index, p. 347.32lf.

I,,,.,

02a.2

lIpp....

C 73> 13 :

J,

78b 14-IS : J.

liS",,,,,,

> 3 11"<"" ..
For the phrase see LS, liex"', 1.1: "to strike the
first blow." Cope, p. 317, has other instances of the phrase. Demosthenes,
Ag. Aristocrates So cites the law as making this distinction.
> 3-9 l"f .. Ix6,
The meaning of this topic has been explained above
at olb 3S. The difference from the previous topic is that there the qualified
statement was restricted to time and manner while this topic refers to any
qualification. Further, from the explanation given through 02a ::18, A. is
demonstrating the fallacy involved not in arguing from the unqualified ....
serrion to the qualified one but in arguing a dicta secundum quid ad dictum sim-

350

ARISTOTLE, 'RHlITOIIIC' II

02.6

plkiter: from the qualified to the unqualified - or, as he says at SE I66b 38,
"whenever a qualified assertion is taken as an absolute assertion." The point
being made in these lines and then developed for rhetoric in the remainder
of the paragraph is that false inference is the result of confusing an unqualified
(absolute) statement with a qualified (non-absolute) one. In cristics and
dialectics and rhetoric this produces apparent inferences; in eristics and dialectics, an apparent syllogism; in rhetoric, an apparent enthymeme. In short,
the fallacy results in wrong reasoning in dialectics, for example, in proving
that what is not known i. known, or in rhetoric, in demonstrating that the
improbable is probable.

a 4 ~P'CJT'''Dit;
C 7Jf11. I : for the word as signifying what is mentally
challenging, competitive. In discussion of the word in his commentary, I
2II (which is substantially repeated in II 318) Cope suggests that it indicates
here a book or treatise as do the words for dialectic and rhetoric which follow.
It could also be used, it would appear, for "eristic arguments" as eristics and
dialectics are at SE 16sa 38 - 16sb 12; C l/48 12 :::1. The word carries two
meanings, that noted above ("challenging," etc.) and that signifying "captiou., false reasoning," primarily for the sake of apparent victory just as
sophistry infers falsely for the sake of apparent wisdom., SE 171b 24-34At SE 16sb 7-l! A. makes a statement about cristic argunrents similar to our
statement here: arguments that infer or appear to infer from premisses that
seem to be probable but are not; see also 16zb 3-S.
a 4-S ""pm... CN>.ADyLC'I'6~
"an apparent syllogism results from
something being stated both absolutely and not absolutely but with a qualification." With ""I1a TO ci:n;lw, ..TA. understand 1.,,01'''.'; ep. SE 166b 37l8. On the meaning of ci:n;lw, c S6a 7. The common interpretation of the
clause follows essentially that of Cope, e.g., "from the substitution of, the
interchange of, the confusion of the absolute with what is not absolute but
particular." Certainly the idea but not the Greek.

1'1. solitarium, S. 2896.

a 6 .....l ..1> 1'-1) av 1Sv
This is the reading of all the codd. and the edd .
ave Ross, Kassd who seclude the final If.. The fallacy resides in a ddiberate
confusion of two meanings of .l..." (a) that wbich signifies actual existence,
which is the meaning of 'rm in this phrase, and so the second is superfluous; and (b) that which indicates that Ian is a mere copula joining a subject
and predicate, which is its meaning in the following clause: Ian rae TO I'.q
8'l'iJ II.
a ~8 x ..lll.., ... a... liyvw....ov
another example of the fallacy: on the
fact that the unknown can be known (bnaT'7/To,) to be unknown (8T~ ll".....

oz. 13

COMMBNTARY

lSI

........) it is argued that the unknown can be known: "to argue that the unknown
can be known for the unknown is known as unknown."
a 8-9 oG.....~ ..,1 d .. 6~.
"So. too. in rh.toric an apparent enthymeme comes from that which is not absolutely probable, but only probable
in some respect." This. on what groWlds I caunot say. is commonly turned
"on the confusion of some particular probability with absolute probability."
This clause responds to a 3: ';''''''/1 ... /1' .....
& this eristic &IIacy of
the exchange of the absolute and qualified statement gives rise to the apparent
syllogism such as is found in dial.ctics. so. too. it appears in rh.toric as the
apparent enthymeme based on particular probability raised to an absolute
probability. On sI,,&, c A Z, 57a 34 - 57b I. 57'1 34 : J.

"'0.'.

"'""<0

a9: 1
refers back: to TI .1,,&,. a particular probability: "But this
particular probability is not universally probabl. "
'Ay48"",
C 9Zb 7.
a lo-II ftx ...1..6....
See Nauck: Il Snell. p. 765. ttg. 9. Poetics
1456a 23-25; Dionysius ofHalic. Epistula ad Ammaeum 18.
a 12-13 ylyvemL orO .lx6~
"for that which is contrary to probability does occur and so that which is contrary to probability is indd probable." CPoetics 1461b 15 : "it is probable that what is contrary to probability
happens." At a 12 the codd. and edd. read: rl""na, rde TO; Kassel and apparently the scholiast read: "t"...a, "a/l TI <"al>; at a 13 Ross places a comma.
not a period. after sbed,.
a 13 el U ... EI..6~
This is the conclusion drawn on the previous
statement. A. distinguishes on it in the following statement.
a 13-16 clU' cNx ... ..,1 dx6~
Her. is the distinction mention.d in
the preceding note: we cannot conclude to the absolute statement that the
improbable is probable from such evidence. The reason is that necessary
qualifications are ignored. i.. circumstantial qualifications such as "in respect
of." "in relation to." "manner." etc. which permit on. to make the original
statement: namely. that which is contrary to probability does occur. The
logic of a 13-16 is clear: just as in eristics such omissions lead to chicanery
(';''''''/1 "al ... C11J".'Pa>Tia.) so here in rhetnric ("al mrz;jOa . .. sI"d,) it also
CIeates deception. for it is deception when one leaps from a qualified statement to an absolute statement. The structure of the sentence at a 16 ("all..a;;"
8,. ... TI six.,) is elliptical. Literally the sentence reads: "so. too. here because
the probability ["ed TO ..17,.,] is not absolute but qualified." It is clear.
however. that A. means to say: "so. too. here [in rhetoric] the fact that the
probability is not absolute but a qualified probability creates the deception."

A1USTOTLE, 'RHBTOllIC' II

3S2.

o~a

2.2.

1 '<o".u
The topic here refers indirectly to the ninth topic of fallacious argument, the exchange of an unqualified for a qualified statement,
and directly to the use of the fallacy in rhetoric with regard to probability and
moving from qualified to unqualified probability.
2
Kop ..xa~ '<X"'!
We bave seen this use of
at oob r 5-r6.
Corax of Syracuse together with his pupil Tis;" are the reputed "founders"
of the rhetorical art in the fifth century B.C. (Cicero, De oral. r.2.0.9r), but in
the sense that with them the argument from probability came to the fore as
we see here. For A. certainly identifies probability argumentation such as we
bave it in a r 8-24 with the rhetorical techne of Corax. In the Phaedrus 273a-d
Plato, using more or las the same examples as at ooa 18-24, identifies it with
Tis;" with a likely reference to Corax in 2.73C. Cicero, Brutus I2..46; Radermacher, :B.II.2.o (also r 8).

a 17 :

""XV'7

a 18-2.0 ii" '<E ycltp . 801;.,,,

Cp.A 12., 72a 2.1-28, a statement which
illustrateS rather well how this principle of probability/improbability works
in men's minds with respect to wrongdoing; c 72.a 2.2. : 2. Ross alone places
these lines within quotation marks.

a 18 alav... <palytJ
"for example, if [d. repeated] a physically weak
man is accused of personal ..sault." On all,ia 73a r3 : 2, 78b r4-IS : 3. Ross
reads 'Pe6y.~
a r9 : 1 eN ymp .1x6~
enclosed within parentheses by Ross as is a 20:
o.J "ae ... M~.w. In fact Ross introduces here a series of readings, e.g., a
19: 'P8v".. (for 'P "iI); 1J (for w.); luX"eo. (for avluX"eo.). Our phrase can be
in~reted as it stands as can the parallel one at a 2.0. However, before each
it is ~~~ to unders~d som~~ like "he defends h~elf on the ground
that ... , the defense 15 that ..., you argue that. . .. In IsocrateS, Ag.
Ca/lima,hus 13-15 we bave an argument built upon a series of probabilities
and counter probabilities.
2
iiv taxupo~ ;;".
sc. aMa. 'PeVrrJ.

a......

a 2.0
801;.,,,
"because it was sure to seem probable." Antiphon, Tetralogy L (J.3 use. this very argument as Spengel, p. 344. noteS. Antiphon (48o-4II B.C.), an Attic orator, was influential in the formation of
prose style; c OCD, PW (14) and S. 1.93, 3.12.5. The tetralogies, three
groups of four speeches (two for prosecution, two for defense) on varied
kinds of homicide, were possibly model speeches for his students.
a 22-23 '1'..1,,,<.., ... dp,!"''''
By way of summation and conclusion
(,..h> oJ.) A. stateS that both ca.es which he has presented in a 18-2.0 appear to
be probable but in one instance we have a true probability, in the other we
do not. In the instance of the weak man liable to the charge of p!>ysical

02a 26

COMMBNTARY

353

assault (a 18-19), it is quite probable that he did not attack (jwt as we can also
say that it is probable that the strong man did attack). This is the true probael,,6,. In the second instance of the strong man (a 19bility of a 22-23: T6
20) we have the untrue probability. In this instance it is said that it is probable
that the strong man made no assault becawe he was bound to be considered
the likely candidate. This untrue probability is the qualified probability of
a' 23: T6 a. o~X .mAw,. In the very same way one can say of the weak man
that ids probable that he made the assault becawe he was not likely to be
considered a candidate. In the fint case (a 18-19) we have unqualified probability as .1,,6, is explained at A 2, 573 34 - 57b I. In the second (a 19-20)
case we have a qualified probability or what A. calls d .l..6, at a 8-9, 16,
and the qualification is the statement at a 20: If .1"6, ... ME ..v. To raise
this second case to the statu. of a general 81..", is an instance of Agathon's
generalization that "the improbable is probable." This makes for the sophistry
"""otpa1lTiav (a IS) which A. speaks of, the sophistry described in the concluding lines of the chapter (a 23-28). Such argumentation he claims (a 2627) is counterfeit, built on apparent and not genuine probability. This interpretation of a 22-23, as far as I can see, not only explains A.'s comment here,
but, more important, the logical connection with what follows at a 23-:;08.

,av

a 23-24 ""II ........." ... ,,,

C Cicero, Brutus 8.3D-3r. Such, says Socrates (plato, Apol. I8b), was one of the charges leveled against him, a charge
picked up in the Clouds of Ari.tophanes where at 889-II04 we have a debate
between "e81TTOJv and "..-TOJV .10)10', right and wrong logic, in which the
"better" argument naturally finds the going difficult with a self-assured "inferinr" argument.
a 25 ...0 Dp........yop"" ..;uyyu-p.cz
I.e. "the profession" of Protagoras
(?490-?42O B.C.), a very well-known Sophist to whom Plato devoted a dialogue. This together with other dialogues of Plato is the major source for
Protagora' thought which, perhaps, is best characterized for many by his
dictum: ."man is the measure of all things, of the existence of those that are
and the non-existence of those that are not" (plato, TheOBt. IS2a). c OCD,
PW (I), Guthrie, Greek Philosophy, III 262-69.
What appears to be called a "fraud" here is the teachiog
a 26 ojIij&o~
of Protagoras grounded in the lrind of relativism which we assume to be
identified with him: namely, the acceptability of arguing either side of a
question as expediency demanded. Troth was rdative, not absolute, and apparently if certain lrinds of improbability seemed probabilities to the individual, he could legitimately we them in argument, thw engaging in what
Dionysiw of Halicamassw called that "most maliciow of arguments that the
improbable is at times probable" (Epistula ad Ammaeum I 8).

354

AllISTOTLE, tRHBTOB.IC' II

02> 27

a 27 : J !ll' v
Ross alone reads dU' <it> with Gomperz. Of this
Kassel remarks "possibly right"; he rejects cLUd but does refer to Denniston
(p. 4), who cites this passage and remarks "Here the rendering 'except' seems
to be absolutely necessary.. Outside Anstode I can find no parallel except
S. OT 1332 "
2 P'ITap,xii
As should be clear from A I, SSb 17-2.1, there i. no
word for false rhetoric or the misuse of rhetoric as there is for false dialectic,
which is called sophistry. We have only 2j e'1"oe"'oj, which here denotes
bad rhetoric. C ssb 17-2.1.

CHAPTER 25

I . Introduction: 02a 30-37

refutation of enthymemes by counrasyllogism or objection (enstasis)

II . Dcvdopment: 02 37 - 03a IS
I. oaa 37 - ozb 13
(0) 02a37-0.b4

(6) o>b 4-'1

(e) o>b 7-9
(J) o>b 9-J]

. mb 13 - 03' IS
(0) o>b J3-ZJ
(6) o>b ZJ - 0 ] "
(e) 0] ......5
(J) 03' 5-JO
(.) ola Jo-I5

oza 28-29 "cal ",.pl ... lp......,

end of chap. 24-

the different kind. of objection

&om the opponent, eothymeme
&om aD opposite
&om. like
fiom the judgmeoa
penon.

of well-known

the different kinds of enthymetne and

their refutation
four kinds of eothymeme
refutation of an eik:0I eothymeme
refutation of semeia eothymomes
refutation of paradcigmatic eothythe tekmcrion eothymeme

Kassel alone places these lin.. at the

a 30 : 1 ).U ......~
This chapra on refutation is fairly sdf-explmatory
in its analysis of the method. Afra the presentation of the varied ways in
which one em argue by enthymeme validly (chap. :1.3) and sophistically (chap.
24), A. introduces the student to the methods of challenging the validity or
exposing the falseness of such arguments. While in SOtne ways this chapra
is compared with the concluding chapters of SE (chaps. 16-33), those chapters
are primarily concerned with the refutation of fallacious reasoning. In the
Rhetoric refutation is analyzed in terms of any kind of rhetorical inference.
Apart from Top. S.IO there is no comparable discussion of ADa., in the Topia;
and S.IO is dilIercnt from the Rhetoric. So, too, the discussion of lpf1Taa" in
An. Pr. 2.26 dilfers from our dlscussion by analy:>.ing 1lll11:aa" in terms of
syllogistic figures. I have briefly looked at SOtne of these problems in Studies,
pp. 100-103. There is a running analysis of the whole chapra in Cope,
Inlrod., pp. w,--,6. A. introduces the matter again at r 17, Isb 2-'3. On the

ARISTOTLB, 'RHBTORIC' II

02a 35

cluracter of refutation Ci=, De o,al. 2.53.215 repeats the twofuld classification we find here, i.e., counter-syllogism, and objection raised against one of
the premisses in the opponent's >argument. other references to "refutation"
in Greek or Latin authors should be examined with care since they probably
are speaking about refutation as a part of the speech (exordium, narration,
conrmation, refutation, peroration). Tn our chapter A. is more concerned
with an analysis of the technique of counter-argumentation. As he remarks.
all inferences which reason to a false conclusion must be refuted (Audo.) by
demolishing that which is the source of the fallacy (Top. 160b 23-24). At
SE 1761> 29-36 and 179b 23-34 he specifies AVu" as the exposure offalse reasoning with respect to that which makes it false. And so it is that in this chapter
his interest is in explaining the mechanics of handling the kind of false reasoning which is possible in rhetorical discourse.
ixcip.ovci~ laTL~
C 75" 22 : 3.
" 31 : 1 e1p"p.~.....
enthymemes.

i.e., both real (chap. 23) and apparent (chap. 24)

olv"'Lau).).Oy"'ci:p.ov~
"either by stating a counter-syllogism";
together with iv"'''O.TCI \,or by bringing an objection") it is an accusative
agreeing with the understood subject of A15.... A counter-syllogism would
conclude to the opposite of the syllogism it refutes, and this is what A. calls
at SE 170b I-II an l'.,,%o,: a refutative syllogism which concludes to the
contradictory of what was affirmed.

"33 Clu...;;;~> ...ci""",

i.e., the common topics of elIap. 23 (for valid enthymemes) and of elIap. 24 (for invalid).

l.aooa can be correctly desctibed as gen"

a 33~34 01 p.~ .. ~6ei~o>V
erally accepted opinions of suelI character that they are entertained by
reputable people; C Top. locb 21-23. Dialectic and rhetoric use b60Ea in
argumentation; cpo A I, 55a 1"7-18 and 2, 56b 33-35 (o~a ... a.a'.'m"~).
Ai: a 34-35 in the statement on opinions (aO"O;;.Ta) we have the reason
for the possibility of counter-syllogismJenthymeme; c 02b 21-25 (TO a1"0," ... rIJlaYHaioJl).
" 35 lva...ci:a..~
IIT<1//" in the passive has as one of its meanings to
"stand in the way of, to block," and so in logic to "object"; cpo 02b 25. The
noun would appear to have two meanings fur A. (c Studies, p. 101). Tn the
Rheto,ic we find the word at 97a 5 (a reference to our present chapter), in this
chapter at 02a 35, 02b 2,5, 12,23,29, 37, at 03a 27,31-33; r 17, I8b 6. Tn
all the.e places with one exception (see below) the explanation of enstasis
given at An. P,. 69a 37 would fit the text: namely, "enstasis is a premiss contrary to another premiss"; c also 69b r, 28-31 whielI indicate that it is a proposition (Premiss) introduced as an objection to another statement. This inter-

COMMENTAllY

357

pret:ation is confumed by the remark in the final chaptet at 03a 31-33: "an
enstasis is not an enthymeme but comists in stating a received opinion";
C 03a 33. Further. with one exception. each of the examples of CDStasis
between 02a 35 and 02b 13 tolerates this meaning. The exception is at 02b
2-3: ",aua loa6.,. "'O"'leo.. and it brings us to the second meaning of enstasis
found in Top. lIoa II: "emtasis will be an argument [i.e.. dialectical syll<>gismj against. thesis." This understanding of enstasis as an inferential process
(found also in An. Pr. 6gb I - 70a 36 in a chaptet which as seen above also
calls enstasis a premiss) does make it difficult to diJferentiate between refutation
by countet-syllogism and refutation by custasis. e.g. 02a 31-3:1. and Isb 6.
The refutation offered at02b 2-3. "all want is an evil." does callforsorne kind
of inferential procedure to refute the statement "love is good." Or are we to
assume that everyone knows that love in one respect represents a need in the
individual (on love as a need c Plato, Symp. I99o-:l.ooe)? By the same token
it is possible to see how both meanings (premiss, syllogism) may be compatible.
and to do so in An. Pr. 69a 37 - 70a 1 (i.e., :1..:1.6): emtasis as a premiss which
is contrary to another premiss may have to be established as a valid counterstatement by the usc of inference. This would be the case with "all want is
an evil" as an objection to "love is good.." Cpo Ross, Analyties, pp. 492-95

.....

P'IJt...~
This is to clie best of our knowledge a
a 36 : 1 ..o,,,,,o,~,
reference not to the Topies but to the larger body ofhis writings on dialectics
. in general; it is similar to the usc at Stib 13. S8a 29, and cpo ssa 9. The fact
is that we have in the Topies no division of ..<nan., comparable to the one
here. There is a fourfold division of ways to object to an inference at Top.
I60b 23 - I6Ia 15 but it is different. On the other hand, the division found in
the Rhetoric is recognized -in the Analylies, 6gb 38 - 70a I; cpo 6gb 19--37
with our 02b 1-3 (oC... .. "'00'leo.); v. Cope, IlIlroJ., pp. 269--71.
l""..oij
i.e., the inference which is offered by the opponent.
It is refuted by using his premiss or premisses, e.g., 02h 2-43 6.... lou
On the idea cpo 92a I2 : 3; on usc, 02b 7-9.

a 37 : 1 Ev"v-.lou
See 02b 4--'7; cpo 973 7 : 2, Top. II4b 6-15. and see
Iub '-7 - 1I4a 6 (9:za 9--u).
,.E.,p,,",,,,,,,
Cpo 9Sb 20 - 99a 6, 98b 20, glib 20--25; 9Sb 32f[;
on use, 02b 9-13.

02b

cmou8"io~

Cf. (b) in 6Ia 25 : .

b 2 : 1 8,X"'~
a general or particular statement as an objection is also
mentioned at An. Pr.69b 1-3. The two arc exemplified at 02b 2--3. On HaBoAov, "aTa peeo" see S4b 5.

02b 12

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' [[

or.."".....

Same construction as at

02a

3I

: 2,

but here with

Eun U" '!!'derstood, i.e., "it is possible for one to speak generally and to
say that. ..
b 3 K ..u...,o~
a proverbial expression for forbidden love, one that is
morally wrong. Caunus, as the story is told, was passionately fond of his
sister Byblis, or she of him. To avoid the rdationship he went to Carla and
founded the city Byblis. Ovid. MI. 9-4S4~6S tells the story; cf. PW, Kaunos (3) Byblis (4).

b 4 btl5~ ...oi:i
"in the case of. .."; the reading of all thecodd.and Kassd.
The other edd., Cope read Spengd'. correction dna (p. 346). See o20b 7.
b

6 ci.y..eD~

on the article,

.s..,. 22 : 4.

b 6 W ..o,.i, cUl.' ..u5'

Ross alone reads <lfn> dU'; cp, {IT. at b 8.
Cf. Denniston, pp. 23-24 on dU' o~a.: "why not even...."

b 7 btl 5 """" 6...... """', ot ii"

is apparently the reading of all the codd.
and ofKassd for the dnd 6~ TO;; o!'olov, olo. read by the other edd. Spengd
conjectures dna; Roemer, or..; Spengd and Cope omit oro.. Cf. Top. 1I4b
25-36.

b 8-10 &.... , 'Pu,oi:i..."

Gaisford, p. 344, cites Victorius for the following comment on these lines (the comment is not in my copy). Victorius
notes that this way of objecting from a like statement is the same as the one
which immediatdy precedes it, i.e., from a contrary statement. For the "illgsed" are opposite to the "well-treated," and leto hate" is opposite to "to like."
But, he continues, it is also an example for what it claims to be since those
who always hate because they have been harmed are like to those who always
love because they have been treated well. Spengd, p. 347, apparently did
not agree with this for he claims that a more apt example is called for since
the one given also exemplifies an objection from a contrary statement; see also
Jebb & Sandys, p. 138n3. Victorius' answer to that (as cited by Gaisford)
would be: ''There is no difficulty with the same instance exemplifying diJfering arguments understood in clillering ways." On ill' o~d' cf. O2ob 6.
!rIO xp(a..~ ... yvwpl""",
Judgments are acts made after ddibcration and reBection. Those of distinguished individuals are taken by A. to
carry added weight because the very fact of their distinction marks the respect
in which they are or were hdd by men, e.g., A IS, 7sb 26 - 76a 13 (where he
speaks of "men of repute whose judgments are well known"); cf. 98b 20 99a 6.

cf.

89a

16.

02b 16

b 12

COMMBNTARY

359

C Pol.

I274b 18-23 where his "special" law on a

heavier penalty fur assault when drunk is mentioned as it is also by D. Laertiw, Lives: Pittacus 1.76. Cope cites to the point EN II 13 b 30-33: the penalty
fur drunken assault was twice the ordinary penalty becawe it is in the control
of the offender not to become drunk. The verb is in the past potential; See
S. 1785.
,,"o..o8EnjcrEII

.,,01

b 13-15
8l ... I .... , 8l .." ..,...
"Inasmuch as enthymemes are
detived fIom ... and these fuur sources are ... , some of them come
fIom. ..." The modern English translations ignore ind.

>i........

b 13 """'..

Spengd gives the word a larger extension than that

met in A 2, B 20 and refers the meaning to s6a 3-4 ("laT." do a~T.p T.p Ao"q>
TO;;
...v.a. II tpalv.a9a.
...v.a.). In this way he would include
"aeda"'Ypa under lvIMp'lpa. I do not accept this interpretation of s6a 3-4,
e.g., Stia 3 : 3. See also S6a 35 - S6b II or 93a 24-25 where A. calls the two
the "OLVa! "lar ,. Further I do not view Spengd's comment ("Nunc et
"aeda.''Ypa in numerum enthymernatum referre licet'') as correct or necessary.
It is not necessary as will be seen; and it /lies in the face of the constant distinctionmade between the two in the whole work, e.g., S7"n - s8a2.

a.a

b 14 : 1 ..t......p..
I have discussed these four sources in St..dies, pp. 104IS, as well as the seeming contradiction with statements in A, to say nothing
of B 20, occosioned by the introduction of naeda.''Ypa as a source of enthymeme. In the context of the chapter A. is saying that enthymemes come rom
these sources and that such enthymesnes are open to objection becawe of
either their inferential form or the statement of their premisses. Even the
irrefutable enthymeme fIom infallible sign, the T."p>le'''' can be challenged
on what it alleges as a fact, e.g., 03a 12-13.
z elxo~ ... "'11""....
On 01"&, C S?a34 : 2, J, Grimaldi, "EfJp ....
0.," 389-90, ]95--97. On "aeda."Ypa: s6b 5 : 3, S7b 27 : 2, S?a 15-16; 93a
28 - 94" 19 with 1l0tes. On TB"p>le'oP; S7b 4. and on dvay"aiov, another
name for the necessary sign (e.g., 02b 19): S?an : 1. On G'}pov: 57b I : "
S7b 10-21. See also Studks, pp. 104-15; "1:fJp<lov"; Cope, I.trod., pp. 160-64,

2fYT-76.
b 15-16 ,,"!,lv ... olx6........
"Some enthymemes drawn fIom ["""fI'Y"""
va] what generally happens [TW' cr., h! TO noAv, S?a 34 : J) in fact or seemingly so are enthymesnes fIom probabilities."
This is the reading of
b 16-17 .." 8l 8,' .""'Y"'yij~ 8." ..oil ,,!,olou
all the codd. and of Cope, Tovar, Freese (Loeb). Spengd, Roemer, Dufour,
Kassd seclude a.' haytyii,; Ross reads I" TO;; 6polov with Richards, p. III.
Dissatisfaction with the text probably begins with Victoriw who thought
that a.d (2) should be dropped and the phrase interpreted: "other enthymemes

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' II

02b 21

are from the induction of a like instance either one or several." The text as
it stands is aceeptable, and I would retain it: "other enthymemes come by
way of induction from one or several like instances." The enthymeme A.
speaks of here is the one whose source is n:aea6 ..y,.a, which at A 2, 57b 27
is called may.,,,>! or the inductive method of proving. This, of COllISe, is
part of the problem (see O2b 13) since n:aea6 ..y,.a as a coordinate method
of demonstration with blM,.7J,.a in the Rhetoric (mduction and deduction) is
not something that is a part of enthymeme, O2b 13 (C the references in 02b
14 : z). See the next note.
"whenever one by assuming the univerb 17-18 3TClV Aa(3cl>v I'.po~
sal reasons deductivdy to the particular instances"; on "a6<110v - "aTa ,.ieo~
cf. 54b 5. From the analysis of n:aeda.'y,.a at 57b 26-30 - narndy, that it
reasons from part to part, like to like - Vater, pp. 137-38, would drop this
clause as one at odds with such an explanation. However, what A. says is
perfectly correct. In order that an example be understood to be an example,
one must in knowing the particular thing intuir the universal principle inherent
in it which it shares with other things and thereby becomes an example; cf.
57b 27 : 2. This is what A. means when he says "by assuming the universal."
This is what gives the person a probable universal premiss from which to
"reason deductivdy to particular instances," e.g., from the example at S7b
20-36: the probable universal premiss is: "all who ask for a bodyguard are
aiming at tyranny."
b 19 <ad> vahlen's conjecture read by all the edel., Spei1gd, Cope.
See O2b 3I; Cope, p. 328, cites a number of instances confirming this usage
with d.ay"aio>: "enthymemes based upon that which is always and necessarily what it is."
b 20-21 Ttl &. &'tI . . . '"11'"""
"Those enthymemes expressed by
means of a universal or particular proposition whether true or not are sign
enthymemes." Ross alone reads "a6&10v ["1 ...06. On the statement see 57&
10-21 and An. Pr. 700 3 -70b 37. In the interpretation given I understand
11 with id. 11 ... ,.>1; Cope (ad loc.) calls this "a rare ellipse of the subjunctive mood of elva" II

T.

b 21 - 03a 2 TO s. txo~ ... El"o~ I'iill.ov

As Spengd, p. 348, notes,
ml TO "olv (02b
Victorius (p. 443), Vater (p. 138) consider Td a~
21-22) an insertion from a marginal note. Spengd disagrees, saying that
zfter presenting the sources of enthymemes A. undertakes to show how each
source can be refuted. Thus he returns here (02b 21 - 03a 2) to the first of the
four, i.e., el"d" and at ala 2-I5 to fl7Jpsia, xa.eade&ypa. TBH"'''e'OV. While I
would not remove the phrase, which also appears in the scholiast Anonymus,
it is an awkward intrusion. I would resolve the logical articulation of

.l"d, ...

COMMBNTARY

o~b I3-~5 in which it appears in this way. There is a protasis at o~b I3-U
(hr.t . .. ) which is followed by an apedosis at ~b ~:1.-~5 ('1"17Bedv .):

(13-21) Seeing that (hrB'1 enthymemes come from the four following sources.
(21-2 and seeing that el"o~ means that which is generally true,
(22-25) it is clear that enthymemes based on el"o~ (TOIaiiTa) can be refuted.
This is then developed into an explanation of what a refutation of the probable
means (o~b Z5-JI). the dif!iculty experienced by the auditors with such a

refutation (02b 31-35). and the way to counteract this diflieulty (02b 3503a 2). Cope. Introd. pp. 271-'74. offers a loose paraphrase of 02b 21 - 03" 2.
b

23

TOUZUTI1... lfCH't ,,"UCtY

i.e., enthymemes whose source is tlHor;;

but the fact is that all the sources except Te",..7je"" are sources of probable
argumentation. Spengel cites as an example of the refutation of probable
arguments AIltiphon. Tetml. III.y.z.
b 24 .u1Jei)~ 6:d

"not always genuine"; Kassel alone secludes dBi.

b 24-~5 ~ ycip II... , ... 6:VOtY"Ot'OV

"For the one who brings an objection offers a refutation not that the statement challenged is not a probable
statement but that it is not a necessary statement." See following note.
b 25 iv,.....ci"."o~
C 02a 35 on the word. The reason why the refutation is only an apparent and not a real refutation is that it must show that the
statement which is being rejected is not a probable statement. which is all that
it professes to be. To argue in refuting such a statement that it is not a necessary statement is no refutation, only an apparent refutation. Thus it is of no
help in refuting the statement that all who seek a bodyguard are ainIing at
tyranny to assert that this does not necessarily follow. The statement does not
pretend to assert a necessary connection between subject and predicate but
only a probable one. To refute it one must show that the asserted connection
is not probable.
C 60a 30 : 1. Spengel remarks (pp. 349-50) that
b ~6 "" .,..x....'V
the orators db not agree. e.g.. Dernosthenes. On the Crown 6-7; Demades.
On the Twelve Years 3 (the authenticity of the speech is questioned); lsocrates.
Antidosis 17-19; Andocides. On the Mysteries 6; Lysias. On the Prop.rty of

Atistophanes 2-3.
b ~7 : 1 1tOtpcz).oy,afLCN
"False rea.oning "and the fallacy which causes
the false reasoning ("aeaJ.oy'C&,.. ..o~. b 3~) on the part of the auditor is that
explained in 02b ~5 and stated here in more detail at b 27-3 I; e.g. you refute
a probable statement or inference only by showing that it is not probable.
3 l1tEl ycip
This introduces a number of statements whose consequence is at b 31 (d dA "e'T~~ ...). e.g. "since the prosecutor proves ...
and since it is not the same thing to refute ... and since the probable statement

ARISTOTLE. 'RHETORIC' II

o2b 38

is always open to objection ... , the consequence is [6 dB "IJ'T~' ... b 3I]

that the judge, if the .tatement is refuted in this way [i.e., as not necessary],
reasoning falsely, as we said, thinks that the conclusion is not probable or
that he must not decide the mattet." c ssa IO.
b 28-3 I lenL 6E 06 ... Xld a.vaYXlliov
I would read this without any
punctuation save a comma before it and a colon at the end as Spenge!, Cope,
Kassel do. Tovar uses acceptable parentheses before and after with the colon.
Ross reads the first part of the sentence as Spongel etc., but reads 30 as: (0';
yae "" 11.,.' dBI slxo" del xal d.ayxaio.) followed by a comma; Roemer,
Dufour punctuate b 28-3 I with dashes before and after and a colon at the end.
At b 30 the edd. (save Ross who reads as cited above) read with Vablen:
<w, inl Td "oAu>; Cope omits it.

c ozb 27 : 2. The reading is that of the edd.,

b 3I iiv o6-n.> ).u8ij
Spcngel, accepting Bonitz' change of the codd. lAuD,!. Cope accepts lAu8,!,
reading .1 oOTo), ll.JB>7 with Bekker.
Cpo s~ 22 : I, COMMENTARY I 355. Ross alone
enclose. b 33-35 in parentheses (0'; yae . .. "e'.ew).

b 33 ""Ilyxcd"",

b 34-35 yvW,''"n a.pllJ'<"fI

7sa 29 : 4.

b 35-36 oGxouv ... lxo~

"And so it is not sufficient to refute [a. Ava!1,
general condition] by showing that the statement is not necessary but one must
refute by showing that it is not probable." This rc-states by way of conclusion the problem with refuting the probable introduced at b 21-25, and b 2831.

37

b
"ii).).ov ... "0).,,
i.e., if the objection is "a more probable statement." For the use of "probable" here sec A 2, 57" 34. In Antiphon's Tetralogy III.y.:>. a refutative argument is urged as etxoneo, (more probable).

This is the twofold way whereby an

b 38 : 1 XPOv'l"" "pciy"llalV
enstasis becomes more probable. There are difficulties with the interpretation (and so the meaning) of both words, as a glance at Cope, p. 329, and
[ntrod., p. :>'74, Jebb & Sandys, p. '40H:>', and Spengel, p. JI5, will reveal.
"Facts" is the common interpretation of "edy,.aalV. I would accept that, or
uactions," "circumstances," "incidents." The problem. is with xedvcp. If we
assume fiom the context (e.g., b 25-28) that A. has only judicial rhetoric in
mind here, then an interpretation of the word such as that of Cope, Jebb &
Sandy. is normal, i.e., "time" when the action 'took place. This is acceptable,
and such a meaning could apply in fact to other kinds of discourse. However,
I am inclined to interpret ;ceo''!' (literally, "by means of time") as the scholiast
Anonymas did and, later, Victorius, i.e., "by the frequency (of the act)." Tbis
would mean that an enstasis by xew'!' cites more instances which are qpposite

COMMBNTARY

OJ' 5

to what is claimed by the opponent. I find this meaning (which Cope says is
impossible for xeoo'P) more likely, but I cannot offer an instance of xeo,o, so
used. Still those points must be considered which make such an interpretation seem "more likely." At oja I in explanation of what he means by the
statement the codd. read: sl yde Tel ""Bovd,,,, oih:w, ... (on which see 03a
x). This means: "For if things (happen) in a similar way [OilT.,,] with more
frequency ["lBWe.,], this is more probable." Further, the scholiast interpreting this Oja I reading of d,e codd. specifically in terms of time (dncl TO;; xeoo.,,)
and action (dnd TO;; "edypaT.') understands it to mean: "If a larger number
of incidents [Td nA.l.oa Tlii. "eayp,lT.,.] are such as I say and the incidents are
more frequent [xai nABovd."" -liTO' bd l'cihl n:o .U.wv

xedvru,,], etc." Further

still, we know (see Oja 5..{i) that enthymemes drawn from examples are refuted
in the same way as those drawn from probabilities. But as can be seen at oja
5-10 both the idea of frequency of incident and similar incidents are stressed in
Td "lei", ;j "i.e We., at oJa 7-8. It is quite possible, I would say, dIat with
the sense of this whole passage (o2.b 3S - Oja ra) in mind as well as the schaliast's gloss Vicrorius conjectured as the reading of Oja I: el yde Td <",i.e/OJ
"al> ",l ,;".,. TherefOre I would understand the words in this way:
xeo,'P, the sanle thing repeated a number of times; "'edypaa.., other instances or acts similar to it. For example, if I show that a man has violated the speed
limit a number of times (xeo0'P) and has committed other violations - e.g.,
neglected traflic signals, passed other vehicles on the wrong side, ignored stop
signs ("edypaaIV) - my objection to his probable innocence of traveling 80
miles an hour i~ a 40 mile an hour zo~~ is deini~~,more pro~ble. ..
2 xup ...........'"
an adverb: best of all, most effecavely.
ot y/&p "4 1<Aoov<ix,~ oil"",~ This is the reading of the codd., Spengel,
Cope, Kassel, Freese. Roemer, following, as he says, an observation of
Victoriw, suggested: sl yde Ta <",let., "al> ",lB.VI"", which is read by Dufour, Tovar, Ross; Bottin, p. j2., finds Roemer's adaptation of Victorius
supported by the Arab tradition. Roemer's I92.J ed. has an extra Td.
03a I

a 2r-5 AUo..""... aVa<Au""x""

signs and sign enthymemes can be
refuted even if thcy are true, correct ("d. 11 v"aex.....a). These are .emei.
anonyma; see references at ozb 14 : 2.
a4 :

"C'oiC; 1'CpW't'Dl4i

niiy '''I!,-orav

i.e.,

2.

57b

rO-I4, 17-21.

TB"poje'.p is a a~pe'.' - e.g., 57b 1-5 - but it is

nDt refutable, a, he al,o says at 57b 5-10, 14-17.

a5:

aVa<Au",,,,,,,

e.g., An. Pr. 2.2.7.

"against enthymemes based on examples";

cpo 56b 2.I-2.j where a distinction is made between enthymernatic and paradeigmatic rhetoric and speakers. In this chapter, however, A. speaks about
2

1<.. p..s"y!'-",""W5"1)

03a 15

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

the refutation of enthymemes, and here of those developed from example

(02b I4).
a 6 <&6..-l) 01..0....
sc. ("ed~ .a) .I,,&.a: "the refutation is the same as
that of probabilities," i.e., that found at 02b 21 - 03a 2. In the light of what
we find at a 7-8 (.0. "kt., ... "l.o.a,,,~) we should keep in mind 02b 38 : I,
ola I. On mlnj ... "at cf. Herodotus, 4.109. In the following note there is a
ttanslation of 03a 5- ro.
a 6-10 Uv"< yap ... Ix-'
The edd., Spengel, Cope agree fairly
much on the Greek of these lilles, which is that of the codd., with the exception at a 7 of .1 "al .d from the scholiast. The following co~ectures are found
among the edd.:
a 6: <"'>from VahIen and read by all except SpengeJ. Cope.

a 7: el "al Ta, from the ,choliast', reading; Spenge! accepts only .1 "ai.
a 8: Ross places a comma not a colon after all.,,; Tovar reads la. as; Cope places
a comma before, not after, oifr",; Kassel seeludes lW"" ... "Aeo.""")'
a 9: Kassel conjectures <M 1'>1>, paXeT....

In the following interpretation I accept both the text and the punctuation

usually read by the edd.; if I diverge from either I indicate it in a parenthesis.

The intent of the passage is to show two ways to refute enthymemes from
example, e.g., (a) a 6-8, (6) a 8-ro. "The refutation of enthymemes based
on example is the same as that for those based on probabilities; for if we have
one negative instance, there is a refutation, since the argument is not a necessary argument, even though there are more [i.e., diverse?] examples or several
in,tance, of the example on the opponent's side; on the other hand, if[lo.. ~s]
tIlere are more examples or several instances of the example favoring the
opponent, we must contend that his present example is unlike those examples
or shows dissimilarities or at least has some difference." Kassel, Vcr Text,
pp. 143-44, explains his changes at a 8-9. Bottin discusses a 5-9 at length
(pp. 33-39); on p. 38 he offCrs a summary account of his interpretation.

Cpo ola 5:

2.

a II 1CII"<,z "'~ 4uulloy",..""

"on the ground of not forming a
valid syllogism." The statement is answered at a 12: k""eTa. d'.
a 12 liv,""....,""'"

C ola 5 :

I.

"YO"'' ' ' '

a 13 "<0
"the fact alleged." But if, as A. goes on to say, the
fact is true and it is a .."p>le'o, (on which see o2b 14 : a) there can be no refu-

tation.
a I 5 1i,,0&'1i~

"Fat the whole statement becomes at once a manifi:st

demonstration," i.e.. a reasoning from premisses that are

alone read dnoa.t~B' from a good tradition.

true.

Cope, Freese

CHAPTER 26
I . 03a 17-25
II . 03a 25-33
III 03a34-03b 2

amplification/depreciation is not a
of enthymeme

TO".,

refutative and demonstrative enthymemes are not different in kind

conclusion CO first two books and
transition CO the third

03a 17 : I oW &' <rllI;ELV . . This final chapter is somewhat anomalous,

and seems like an afterthought. Chapters 19-25 are fully consonant with the
statement at 9Ib 24 - 92a 4 where we clearly make a transition co those
principles common to rhecorical discoune. e.g., the " d (chap. 19: the dements essential CO the process of intelligent discourse); the common proofS
(chaps. 20-22: example, maxim [which "is part of an enthymerne," 93a 251,
and enthymeme iudf); the common copics (chaps. 23-24); the common
modes of refutation (chap. 25). In this structure chap. 26, which corrects
appalent misunderstandings about amplification/depreciation and refutative
enthymeme, fits (in a loose sense) as a conclusion co the discussion on enthymeme since it takes up "common misconceptions about enthymeme." The
final line. of the chapter, 03a 34 - 03 b 2, which ale found in all the codd.,
occasion some dissatisfaction among scholar.. For there bas been no mention
in the first two books of a triple division of the treatise into principles of invention (i.e., Books 1-2), style, and =gement (Book 3). This division is
repeated in similal language at the opening of Book 3, 03b 6-8, and this, too,
bas caused doubts about whether the third book (now accepted by most as
A.'s) Was written at the ,ame time and as part of the work which includes the
first two books. The two modern commentators see it as a work: independently produced: Spengd (p. 354), tYter the publication of 1-2; Cope (p. 334),
earlier with high probability than 1-2. I do not believe that either position
can be proven with any firm assurance of its rightness. On the other hand, I
do bdieve that the third book: forms a whole with the first two and have given
some reasons for this in Studies, pp. 50-52.
2 <rllI;ELV x ..l "ELM
This is one of the three " .d, first mentioned
at A 3, S9a I I-26, which are numbered among the basic concepts of A.'.
theory of thetoric as given in A 1-3. These " ...d ale pre-condiuons CO the
whole process of deliberation in any of the three kinds of rhetoric. In order
CO take up any subject for discussion and deliberation we must know whether
the subject is possible or not, whether it bas happened, is happening, will
happen, whether it i. important or unimportant. C S9a II-I3, !lIb 29, 923

366

ARISTOTLE, 'BHBTORIC' II

03' 19

4-'7, 92a 8 - 93' 21, Studin, pp. 36-38. On amplification/depreciation itself,

.ee 93' 9-18 with notes; cpo olb S, 75.8 : 3. lu the "0"'& are explained by A.,
it can be seen th.t they form a general category applicable to all argwnentation. In this respect they are, like the common topics, basic components for
reasoned discourse. lu the ". TOnO. are forms of inference for reasoning on the
subject matter of rhetoric, the "0<>" are neces.ary specifications of that subject
matter if one is to .peak intelligently. For some reason A. mentions here only
amplification/depreciation, but the other "0"'", possible/impossible, past,
present, foture fact, conld also be cited since what he says at a 20-23 could also
apply to them; i.e., amplification/depreciation, just/mUust, etc. are constitutive aspects of the subject matter about which one reasons by syllogisms or
enthymeme. We can see the point be is making at A 7 in the discussion of
the greater good (ddiberative rhetoric); at A 9 (670 23-28, 68a 26-33), tbe
more honorable (epideictic); and atA 14, the greater injustice Uudicial).

a 18 TO yap .. TllmIV
C 96b 21-22 and 96b 21-22, s8a 3S. We find
<lTO'XB''''' at 62. 20, 01. 29, and it denotes a basic component of thing.
Here it is spoken of as the basic component of enthymeme and identified with
T6,,0, (a 18-19: ItIT,,, yde .. . ipnUns('). Here TO"O, means the "oIVol TOnOl..
This seems more than justified by the way the word is used at s8a 2-35, particularly 58a 29-35. Further, it is only the common topics of which one could
say that they are > category to which different kinds of enthymeme bdong
(a 18-19). The point at issue in a 17-'5 is that aiJ~.w /I'",ov.is not > TO"O' i ...
8vl'fJl'aTO,. From the Rhetoric, however, there is no reason, with one exception,
to think that aiJ~...JI'.IO;;" should be a topic of enthymeme. The one exception is at 97b U-'7 where the topic ofmorefless is given as one of the common
topics of enthymeme. But this topic of more/less (l'iillo.MTTOV) is not the
same as amplification/depreciation (aiJ~."'/I'.loiW). To amplify, enlarge, show
the greatness of something, or, the opposite, to minimize, diminish it is to
sdect dements directly or indirectly rdated to the subject which will enhance
or depreciate it, indicate its importance or insignificance. To use the topic of
more/less is to construct an argument either from the intrinsic nature of the
subject matter or from a comparison of the subject with something dse in an
attempt to demonstrate that something can or cannot be. The topic more/less
is in fact the argument. fortiore/a minore/a pari, or what is known as the argument from comparison with a greater, or a smaller, or an equal. See the
references to the Topics II4b 37lE, Cicero, Quintilian, etc. in 97b 12 : 2.
On Tli"o. C S8a 2, Studies, pp. IIS-19; on the common topics, c S8a II,
Studin, pp. 129-3S; on the particular topics, . c S8a 17, S8a 27-28, S9b
25-]2, Studies, pp. 122-29.
a 19-22 TO Ii' ,,is;,v ... 6T'oUv At a 20 1wonld agree with the seclusion of
.,,8"l'fJl'aTa (Studies, p. 49) which appears in all the codd. and in Ano!,ymus

03a 26

COMMENTAllY

but is secluded by all the edd. except Ross, Cope. It also appears in Freese and
in most English versions. What A. is apparendy saying is that greatness and
smallness (achieved by means of ailEe/,...'0;;") is one of the things like justice{
injustice, goodness/badness, the honorable/the dishonorable (i.e., the dl., of
rhetOric, 58b 8-29) which the speaker (writer) attempts to demonstrate about
the subject of discourse. such attributes of the subject can be proven in ways
other than byenthymeme, e.g., by example, simple narration, etc. Thus there
is no rcason to limit such demonstration to "enthymemes." Further, A. makes
it clear (a 23: "eel Ii ... W8v,..>i,..aTa) that he is speaking about the subject
m2tter enthymcmes utilize, not about the &mns of inference (T."O.) enthymemes take. The two arc different, as he says at a 23-24: Olen' .z ... TO"O,.
I would interpret: "Amplification/depreciation has as its object to show that
the subject is significant or insignificant, just as one shows [se. dBI"""a.] that a
subject is good or bad, just or unjust, or anything else of that character." C
his brief comments on this point in the Poetics 56b I and 4.
a 21-22 tlyu86v ... Ii&ucav

C references at the end of 03a 17 : 2.

a 23 ...pi a . . .
i.e., the subject matter of rhetOrical discourse as it is
presented in genere atA 3, 58b 6 - 59a 10 as well as 59a II-29.
a 25 : 1 .... AUTUC"
se. bBv,..>i,..aTa; on refutation and its kinds, e
chap. 25 where the refutative syllogism (enthymeme in rhetoric) was merely
mentioned (oza 31-35). However, in that mention the grounds for the
comments here at 03a 25-31, particularly 03a 29-30, Olan .. d",,,."eoo,
arc given at 02' 32-33 (dijl..... "0 ). On the refutative enthymeme, e
Studies, pp. IOD-roI.
2 d&6~ ..,
"Nor arc refutative enthymemes some one specific
kind; for it is clear ... "; e 96b 23-28 (laT< ... <11I>a"s ..). In this earlier
passage A. says that there arc .rd'1 .!vo of enthymemes. It is clear, however,
that he means by the words simply two types of the same thing: namdy, two
types of enthymcmes as there are two types of syllogism, one to demonstrate,
one to refute. For example, lMyxo" which is the other eldo, of syllogism
(96b 26-28), is defined dsewhere as
In definition both types of
enthymemes (as also syllogism) arc the same. Any diJference between them
is accidental. It is not a specific difference (sldo, understood as species). He
emphasizes this point when he says here (a 30) that both types use the same
topics as forma of inference. The reason for his taking up the point is no more
clear than that for the discussion of amplification.
3 [.nAo'nilv x ......"xou......'ICCiIvI This is secluded by the edd. and
Spengd. Cope, Freese read it, and it appears in the English versions, e.g.,
"another kind from constructive syllogisms." On ""TaaxBtlaen..aw, 5910 14-

""Alo".a,...,.

a 26 i\ &o(~l1~
"either by proving"; and from the conteXt "prove"
means to make an inference. None of the edd., Spengd, Cope reads the ,;

rISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

found according

to

Kassel (who secludes it) in many of the codd., e.g., [oj

a.IE",.
a 27 :

lv.......,,'v
C 02a 3S, 02a 3S - 02b 3.
~11:o&,xWou",v
"(by the first [i.e.,

a.tEa.]) they demonstrate

in reply the opposite (of the opponent's conclusion)." The plural is read by
all the edd. save Ross. Cope reads it; Spengel favors the singular (which is
Ross's reading).
3 ......",&11'11011
C 92& !rIl. The explanation of refutation by
the rhetorical syllogism, which is the subject of these lines (a 27-31), was
described at 02a 31-32 as d....."".uorl~.a8aL As the refutativc enthymeme is
described here, "they prove in answer the opposite (of what was proven),"
it is the definition of
found .t SE I6S' 2-3: "refutation is syllogism
which entails the contradiction of a given conclusion."
2

.).."''0'

a 2!r3I Ei1J [iI] &"ltI'OP' ..oi~ ... 'P~pCNCrLV

Ros., Kassel, Spenge!
<pie ova..
righdy seclude oj; Ross, Kassel oniit the colon and enclose
in parentheses.

TO', ...

a 30: 1 ...i~ ~..oi~

Since enthymemes are spoken of (e.g., a 25-31),
I would understand these words to refer to the topics (particular or general,
i.e., to content or form of the argument), and I notice so does the scholiast
Anonymus. See also oz. 31-33.
2 Ih:, ya.p
rde = "since," "seeing that"; "Since they present
cnthymemes to show ..."
a 31 lv......,,~
C 02a 3S, particularly the first part of the note, which
speaks of enstasis as"in objection, which is what A. intends here. On the other
han~ as is pointed out in the rest of the note, it is not so certain from Top.
I60b 23 - I6Ia IS or An. Pr. 69a 37 - 7D" I, or indeed from the Rlrttoric
itself at ozb 2-3 (I) rde "a8o).ov . .. "O"'7eo.) that enstasis is simply an objection to a premiss, as explained at 023 35 - 02b 13.
'r011:'''O~

c Studies, pp. IOD-I03.

36 : 1. However, see Vahlen, "Kritik arise.

schriftcn." '40, and Brandis, p. 22, who understand it to refer only to

a 32 :

02a

the Topics.
2

&cI~"v

opinion, view. Some such opinions were set forth at

02b 1-13.
a 33 ~ fi~ ... D.1J'P1I
This is a good explanation of l.aTaa.. as 3
propositional statement directed against the opponent's reasoning. For it
includes an objection to formal or material errorin the reasoning. One presents an objection to the inference itself by showing either that a premiss is
wrongly used and so the inference does not give the conclusion stated (an error
in form; 06 av.u,Ur.aTa.), or that one of the premisses asserts something not
true (m.terial error: "PriM. T rAws.).

COMMBNTARY

a 34 :

... 01 Ii. Ii'lj

Ross alone reads: J",.I aBo
"pezYf'G"1:Eu8ijvez,
C S4a 16: 1.

a 35 :, Myov
C s6a I :
2 ..ezpczli.,yp.ci....." .

2.
lv8up.'1~

e.g., in a formal way

this

was done for the three in B 20, 21, 22-23.

a 36 3Aw~ ... li,ci.oulY

"in general those matters which have to do

with the process of invention," i.e., Books 1-2. By "process of invention"

I mean those matters which in the words of Dionysius of Halicamassus, On
Literary Composition 1.3-4 could be called the substantive ideas, the subject

matter, of rhetoric (T."O' "earpa..".,), as distinguished from expression,

diction (TO"'.' A'l<T"'O~); C 77b 16 : 1. I prefer "invention" to interpretations
like "the intellcctual part," "the thought element" because such phrases appear
to establish a dichotomy between the role of the intellect in the first two books
and the discussion of u,'~ and T~" which follows. Obviously, thought,
intelligence play a significant role there also. Further, "invention" describes
more accurately what A. say' of a,a oa in the Poetia at I450b 4-13, I456a
33 - I4S6b 8. In the first passage he says that it i, the ability to state what
belongs to and is pertinent to a subject, an ability he calls a function of rhetoric
and politics (i.e., ethics; cpo A 2, S6a 25-27). In the second passage he repeats
the remark that
is more proper to the methodology ofrhetoric and says
further that his comments on the concept made in the Rhetoric are to be assumed. The reference to the statements made in Rhetoric are understood to be
those made in Books 1-2. This is a reasonable interpretation since he continues that under a,d.. ,a come "all those things which must be produced by
speech"; and he goes on to specify them as demonstration, refutation (i.e.,
the ",CIT.'~ and
particular and common), the emotions (",dB'I), greatness!
smallncss (the H . . .&), and probability (.l".~). Thus the phrase 8A.., . .. a,d
would be a shorthand expression for the study of rhetoric offered in the
first two books.

a,a..,..

T.".'

,a.

o3b 1-2 >'Ol.."" . . . . .cili.... ~

This raises the problem mentioned in
O]a 17 : 1: Is the third book part of A.'s original plan? Cope discusses it at
pp. 333-35. There is no formal direct statement in Books 1-2 about the
subject matter of Book 3. Further, it is true that the programmatic statement
of the first three chapters of the first book presents in some dctaiJ the structure
of the first two books. In the light of this detail one might expect that A.
would also make some mention of UE'~, TdE" if they were part of his program at the time. Whether more than that can be said I am not sure - apart
from the fact that I do not sec as likely (e.g., Studies, pp. SO-52) the appearance
of Book 3 prior to the first two books; nor would I consider it an intelligible
entity without. knowledge of the first two books.

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