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  • Sultanism J. Linz

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    Sarasur Oc
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    Primeros tres capítulos del libro sultanism de j linz

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    Primeros tres capítulos del libro sultanism de j linz

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    17 vues39 pages

    Sultanism J. Linz

    Transféré par

    Sarasur Oc
    Primeros tres capítulos del libro sultanism de j linz

    Droits d'auteur :

    © All Rights Reserved
    Téléchargez comme PDF ou lisez en ligne sur Scribd
    Signaler comme contenu inapproprié
    sur 39
    A Theory of Sultanism 1 ‘A Type of Nondemocratic Rule H.E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz sn Line's comparative ‘The concept of “sultanistic regime” emerged from analysis of nondemocratic regimes, which systematically developed the difer- fences between totalitarian and authoritarian forms of rule! At the developed this dist ies were few, whereas the range of nondemoc jimes was enormous. Since xd to the communist wor rare and ‘other nondemocratic regimes in the ich denotes a wide range of governments tics that allow their societies a limited pluralism short of genuine democracy. ‘Authoritarian regimes can thus be mostly civilian one-party states, ranging tionalized authoritarian regime such as Franco's Spain 0 che very early days of indepen the bureaucratic~ legitimated monart ences among them are therefore vast Butas vast as they all the major dimensions used in the or totalitarian regimes are not ‘overall conception of polities, differences between these and authoritar merely a matter of degree bi le 4 * COMPARATIVE STUDIES A Theory of Sultanism 1 + 5 ‘ease something happened to him. Soon afterward the dictator had Galindez ‘in New York and taken to the Dominican Republic, where he was 0 death.! The contrast between Franco's nondemoctatic regime and le led to the conceptualization of a regime type for which Linz ince it too rested an the extreme develop- 11. Moreover, Weber, although cons ideal type of sultanism in a sec trasted the traditional basis of sultanism (see quotation above latter, Just as Franco’s rule became the archetype of an author ‘Trujillo's became that of a sultanstic regime in Linz’s 1973 clasiication of nondemoe Subsequently a number of scholars confirmed the applicability of Linz’s paradigm to a number of regimes not mentioned in the 1975 article. Crawford Young and ‘Thomas Turner wrote about Mobui personalist patrimonial resembles what Linz, borrowing a Weberian term, has ll Terry Karl characterized the regimes of Juan Vicente Gomez and Marcos Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela as sutanisti, and 11. E. Chehabi explored how the Shah contributed to the Islamic revolution. For the Philippines, applied i to local politics, and Mark Thompson to Marcos’s rule. Finally Same! Huntington wrote that “some personal dictatorshi ‘operates and the traditional patrimonal systems Weber ha asthose of Marcos and Ceausescu, lke those of Somoza, Duvalier, Mol “neopatrimonialism” came to be widely used? But Weber's formulation of the Shah, exemplified Weber’s model of sultanistic regime characterized by ” was neglected by scholars patronage, nepotism, conyism, and corruption,” The citcsm so often lev- sification of nondemocratic led against inductively derived theoretical concepts—that since, in Par 5 Franco regime in the late swords, they lead “from facts to concepts, and from concepts back to facts 19505, he soon oon the Stalin since ithas Independently of Linz’ revival of the term, Richard Sandbrook called We- ber's notion of sultanism “more relevant to the circumstances of contemporary [Afrca” He added that it lourished “onder a number of guises: civilian, quasi- itary or military forms y or competitive-party sj tems or even under the socialist veneer of Guinea, Benin, and the Republic Although a republican émigré, of Congo! yy Spanish diplomats in New York. But when At the 1990 conference on which this book is based, the late David Nicholls revealing some of the pointed out that whereas Weber's sultanism was a subtype of traditional au regime, he confided to Juan Linz in 1955 that he ‘thority, our cases were characterized by the decay or incomplete development and that he had deposited his manuscript in a safe place in ‘of modern legal-rational author ther than by the disappearance of all comy did not exhaust the range of nondemo. 19508 Linz met his Spanish compatriot Jestis 6 + COMPARATIVE STUDIES advantage of not only dist “sultans” but al ishing them from the Weberian use of the term ing the logic of Weber's terminology; as we shall sween patrimonialism and sultanism is ly continuous" neosultanistic regimes are: patrimonial forms of governance, The scheme shown {Also the etymology of the term “sultanism” strikes some as the conference, Jonathan Hartlyn suggested the term “diser .ce“sultanisn.” For Weber, the Near East was the “classical loc which is presumably why he chose a term derived. from the Arabic language. Weber’s study ofthe Islamic world was less thorough than his systematic explorations of Chri ism, and even Confucianism, and it is not for us to pa analyses,!* more particularly on whether traditional regimes headed by asultan ‘were in fact “sulta he sense defined by Weber: recent scholarship tends to between the theoretical principles whereby the kad renders legal deisions.”® Furthermore, Weber ‘does apply the term to other societies, such as China,” and the doyen of Ottoman hi x sd Weber's concepts to the Ottoman Empire does the term have an anti-Islamic tinge, since, unlike the c Ithough the etymological objection to “sultanism” seems ional forms of authority rather however, and since “sultanism” has already achieved some recognition among political scientists, we retain the term even though “neo- sultanism” would be mote accurate, so as not to add to the terminological confusion that is already too prevalent inthe social sciences. Let us now turn to Definition and Prevalence of Sultanistic Regimes [No king was despotic of right, not even in Persia; but every ing prince who amasses money, becomes Philosophical Dictionary is based on personal 1 by his embodying or articulating an ideology, nor by a unique personal to his collaborators. The ruler exercises his power without restraint, at wn and above all unencumbered by rules or by any commitme yr value system, The binding norms and relations of bureaucrat itary personal decisions of the ms. Asa is constituted not by an th dist fed based on more or less universal yment reaueratic army or a civil service, rec ‘Among them we very friends, rectly involved in using violence to sustain the regime. from their purely personal submission to the ruler, and their pe thority in society derives merely from this ‘not represent any ‘many ways be modi and legal jon, The ruler and his associates jerests. Although such regimes. the weakness of tra 8 * comPARATIVE STUDIES Paraphrasing Weber, one might even unrestrained by say that al snism may appear to be compl legal-rational norms, this is nev ideal type can be found all over the world. The regime of Rafael ‘Trujillo Molina in the Dominican Republic, Jean-Claude Duvalier’s rule in Haiti, Fulgencio Batista’ dictatorship in Cuba, the rule of the Somoza family in ‘Nicaragua, the later stages of both Pahlavi shahs' reign in Tran, Ferdinand Marcos’ presidency after his declaration of martial law in 1972, and Manuel ‘Noriega’s dictatorship in Panama come closest, as do many of the personalistic dictatorships in sub-Saharan Africa.* ‘Asin any typology, there are of course borderline cases that the comparativ- ist has difficulty assigning to one category or another. Alfredo Stroessner’s rule ough many comparative studies of Latin Rodriguez, did not produce But a few years after this was wi daughters father-in-law and became president himself before handing power to an elected civilian head of state, To complicate matters further, a Paraguayan 1 characterize “Stronismo” typotogically best with the proviso the " ™ We have decided to stick by ‘our original choice, however, a decision that was confirmed by the Colorado Party's retention of power after the first free elections in Paraguay, which is jons and shows to what ext of Stroessner. A sit urope’s postcommunist par trast to the muddle that resulted from the overthrow of Ceaugescu in neighbor- ing Romania.” The African states present a simi of them, but cent ways, Whereas Richard Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg divided personalistrul A Theory of Sutanism 1 + 9 personal coercive, populist, and ambiguous." Michael Bratton clas van de Walle designated almost all regimes neopatrimonial but and “neopatrimonial totally coincide, by and large they correspond to anism’ two decades ago. And here the clearest cases are Jean Bédlel Bokassa in the Central African Republic, Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire, Francisco Macias Nguema in Equatorial Guinea, and Idi Amin in Uganda.” In the last two cases, however, the typical enrichment of the ruler and hi sgime of Kim l-sung and his son, Kim Jong-il, in North Korea show clear su- tendencies. And among democracies, the rule of Eric Gairy in Grenada of the Bird family in Antigua and Barbuda evince some but an evolutionary one, in the sense that most such regimes develop out of other forms of rule. Jean-Claude Duvalier owed presidency to his being the son of the champion of noirisme. Francois Duval ally came to power through democratic elections in 1957, as did Ferdinand ‘Marcos in 1965, Eric Gairy in 1967, Macias Nguema in 1968, and V. Bird Sr. in 1976. The Shah never abrogated the 1906 cons the 1950s tion and tolerated a Congress and ‘courts. Ceausescu came to power through the normal functioning of the Ro- manian Communist Party, And yet other political regimes that also had des- potie and arbitrary dimensions did not develop into sultanism. jcal concepts, no empirical reality fully me, It could be argued that it regime.® We could then. can occur in different kinds of regimes, can bbe stronger or weaker at different moments, and can coexist with other aspects and dimensions of governance. For simplicity, however, we will use the term ic regime” most oft + COMPARATIVE STUDIES called neopatrimonial. Personalist rulers whose regimes penetrate society by sneans of a political party, such as the Colorado Party in General Alfredo Stroessner’s Paraguay, or who represent a certain segment in soc rule on the black middle classes in opposition to regime. OF course if the circle of people included the regime can become st vvalier’s role in Haiti to Jean- analysis ofthis type of regime, Characteristics of Sultanistic Regimes In the course of this analysis we wi constantly referring to other types of nondemocratic regimes around the fol- themes the state over which they preside, their personalism, their con- tional hypocrisy, their social base, and their political economy. Io sti “The Blurring of the Line between Regime and State By “regime” we mean the patterns of alloca polity. This encompasses more than the politica dnd less than the comprehensive structures of domination tems. Robert Fishman has noted that for understanding authoritarian regimes (and more specifically transitions to democracy finguish Under authoritarian regimes the more limited ‘makes it possible to discriminate between th the government, in the party, o in the military and exercise functions normally asso the armed forces, or in the judiciary. Therefore the th only limited modification in many state apparatus is likely to persist regime changes, except when they are revo tanistic rule the distinction |, and in very advanced cases of fasion between regime and state.” Bureaucratic structures pers ined and rendered more efficient, especially atthe Tocal level where his associates and may even. norms, profes structures” less serviceable after a regime change. “Trujillo, Reza Shah, Somoza Garcia, and Mobutu all began by strengthening the state after a period of challenges to the hegemony of the center over the periphery inthe ea strengthening of the 1 over society po: founders’ power increase self, his immediate i character by a absence oF perversion of legal- unrelated to an ideological p ind by rampant nt corruption and venality. In the state administration and the army such features of modern bureaucracies as areas of offic an office hierarchy with channels tem of super- and subordina- ate life, and fis ly ist on paper and, depending on the country’s level of development, even in reality, but they are under constant attack by the ice of regulating al relationships through individual privileges and bestowals of favor. in their autocratic rule, the dictators often bring technocrats, would ensue in the absence of the ruler. In thumber of well-trained bureaucrats after the White Revol course of which he climinated big landowners as the pol class In what was then Congo-Kinshasa, Mobutu very ea ‘merous public and semipublic agencies headed by young technocrats and for- ‘mer politicians concerned and relied inereasingly “ and technical Philippines Marcos “brought a corps of technocrats into his government,” announced in mid-1981 that he would “sit back and let the technocrats run pressed both US. officials and International Monetary In fact, however, the agenda inthe form of economic and development plans which formed the basis for foreign loans. The political leadership then allowed the unconstrained intro- duction of exceptions that made complete mockery of the spirit and leter of, ta + COMPARATIVE STUDIES them, some due to his wife's objections, and others because they a¢ -ompatible with a certain rational the admit Jn enhances the abil riler and his cronies to extract resources fr! If the technocrat the regime's dominant ethos, however, they are mar ‘when an official s not a personal dependent of the ruler, the ru} ‘compliance. In his view the officials loyalty is not an impersonal con vat define the extent and content of his office, but rather & ‘a strictly personal relationship to the ruler and an permits no lim These off and enjoy no independent status. In “often dismissed and replaced cabinet members on the advice of his wife or counsel of some trusted minister. These shake-ups occurred twice a year on srerage.. and ministers operated in a climate of insecurity and paranofa dishonor and persecution one ied by the Zairian extreme cases, mi day and return to the graces of the ruler next, as exeph Karl-1-Bond, who was foreign mini ent into Belgian exile, was condemned to death, and later repented, returned rnd became prime minister. Tt bears emphasizing again that most modern sultanistic states do have pockets of bureaucratic organization, but the more these come under attack, the more we can say that the sul regime is advanced. ‘Of particular importance isthe organization the armed forces and their ‘age mutual espionage to protect tse private militias to sustain their contol of society, such as the Duvaliers ‘Tonton Macoutes or Eric Gairy’s “mongoose men.” Intricate structures are ‘maintained to make each branch help co e others. Often there is no ified command, and the commanders of each force report directly to the ia for promotion are disregarded or subver led forces are thus deprofessionalized as the rulers aims ft converting them into their private instrume: In the PI pines Marcos made his driver, Fabian Ver, chief of staf, and in the Cental ‘african Republic Bokassa named Sublieutenant Bozize ar force general after the man slapped a Frenchman who had treated Bokass disrespectful.” As the rulers’ men in the military gain access to patronage, the gap between them and ing resentment less fortunate colleagues grows. In arms purchases in the 19708 enriched those generals who di rents and thereby alienated many others.* Tn discussing the armed forces of sultanistic regimes, itis useful to dis- inguish analytically between their autono profes The ian army was highly professional, but atthe same time closely related tothe cd was loyal to Somoza and fought perhaps the armed forces -ountry was forced procure- relat to fight against its from degenerating into out the ruler is crucial when the regime undergoes a crisis and may indeed single very names bespea the rulers’ effort to make them look ike rev ‘movements, destined to be the link between the leader and the people he (New Society Move- 8 Sociale en Afrique Noire (MESAN) for this purpose. Yet in reality the revolutionary quality of these partes is like the charisma of its, leaders—mostly declarative, Nor do they full the functions assigned to parties t+ COMPARATIVE STUDIES jré Mobutu to Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku powerful watrior who will go from led, among other changed his name from Joseph-l Nabendu Wa Za Banga, meaning “The ues, leaving fire in of emperor, and Ceausescu r scribed as ‘Amin styled bi and Macias Nguema topped be thought of as great thinkers and fil many bound volumes with their speeches, declarations, and proclama- tions ‘numerous (mostly ghostwriten) books. Frequently fealing the need to legitimize their regime ideologically, they come up with an cology that, reflecting the regime's personalism, often bears the rulers name mn-Claudismy” became official ology in 1978, Ferdinand led An Ideology for che Shah published a book under his name titled The White Revolution, which was taughtasa subject in Iranian high schools in ninth and elves works were collected in Les grands textes du Mobuti tial state ideology in 1974. The implementation evolution’ such as the Shabis “White Revol 1 ofthe Shah and the People”) or Marcos’s“Revohi- ‘but the main function of these revolutions seems tobe gy often exal ‘an “invented tradition" to demarcate the nation from its and even rac cient Persian| discussed by Jonathan Hartly, Frangois Dow tence that Romanians are descendants of the ancient Dacians,” and Mobs return to the roots was Macias Nguema, who purged his country of all Western even modern medicine. However, the function of this ideology is different from that of to h ofth to be mere window dressing, elabo- rated after the onset of the rulers regime t Iran, Reza Shah was to some extent me his advantage. And except Albania, never experienced a ‘unlike all other East European states 1 to posttotalitarianism, Ceauges- le was an aberration of the Marxism-Leninism prevalent in that part of in’s personal pedia was longer than those on Marx, Engels, and Lenin combined" ‘The cult of the personality also leaves geographic traces, since sultanistic rulers like to name cities and even natural features after themselves, Orumich and Anzali became Retavieh and Bandar Pahlavi in honer of Reza Shah, Santo . and in Haiti the town of Cabaret became Duvalierv bert and Lake Edward were renamed Take Mobutu Sese Seko and Lake Idi Amin, and the island of Fernando Pio became Macias Nguema Island, Only in Nicaragua did the dictator have the modesty to give his name just to a new port established on the Atlantic coast: it became Puerto Somoza (and was renamed Puerto Cabezas after his ouster). “The second aspect of personalism is the prominent role of family members in these regimes, which has led many analysts to speak of “dynasties” In Haiti and Nicaragua sons “inherited” the presidency from their fathers, and i 1¢ Dominican Republic family members occupied important the armed forces: in the latter the dictator’s son Ramis was a brigadier general at the tender age of nine. Wives play an important role too. commands regime wielded considerable influ- In the Philippines, Imelda Marcos amed mayor of Metro- Manila, while her husband’s sister was governor of the Marcoses’ na Norte province, with her nephew Ferdinand Marcos Jr. as vice-governor at age In Romania, Ceausescu’s accession to the newly created post of “president of the republic” in 1974 was marked by ceremonies closely patterned after coronations:* ‘was the Communist Party’ second in command by the early 1980s, his four brothers all held key levers of power, and their son Nicu was groomed to succeed his father until his constant brawling, gambling, and philandering turned party leaders (isluding other relatives) against the ya was there for the hundred years of, 1971, one of his guests, Imelda Marcos, was so impressed that she is said to have suggest nperor and empress of the Philippines (see chapter 9 below). In Equatorial 16 + COMPARATIVE STUDIES

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