G.R. No.

L-8748

December 26, 1961

TESTATE ESTATE OF NARCISO A. PADILLA, deceased. ISABEL B.

VDA. DE PADILLA, executrix-appellant,
vs.
CONCEPCION PATERNO, administratrix-appellee.
Padilla Law Office and Associates for executrix-appellant.
Claro M. Recto for administratrix-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This appeal from an order of the probate court in the special proceeding
for the settlement of the testate estate of the deceased Narciso A. Padilla
involves the same properties that had already been the subject-matter of
two earlier appeals also brought to this Court by the executrix-appellant
Isabel B. Vda. de Padilla, G.R. No. 48137 decided October 4, 1943, during
the war, and G.R. No. L-4130, decided September 30, 1953, after the war.
The facts of the case, up to the time the second appeal (G.R. No. L-4130)
was taken by the executrix to this Court, were summed up in our 1953
decision as follows:
Narciso A. Padilla died February 12, 1934, leaving a childless
widow, Concepcion Paterno, whom he had married in 1912. His
last will, which was probated in due course, instituted his mother,
Ysabel Bibby Vda. de Padilla, as universal heiress.
In the proceedings for the settlement of his estate in Manila (Civil
Cases 46058-63), his widow moved for delivery of her paraphernal
property together with some reimbursements and indemnities, and
for one-half of the conjugal partnership property. She also asked
that her usufructuary right as surviving spouse be imposed on the
corresponding portion of her husband's assets. The heiress, who
was executrix, opposed several such claims.
After hearing evidence on both sides, the Court rendered on
January 15, 1940, a decision which, as amended by its resolution
of April 24, 1940, declared as paraphernal certain personal and
real properties. Other realties, although originally paraphernal,
were considered part of the conjugal assets because of buildings
erected thereon during coverture, but reimbursement of their

value was directed. The main bulk was adjudged conjugal

property. The Court ordered the appointment of commissioners to
estimate the amounts to be reimbursed, to divide the matrimonial
assets into two equal parts for the spouses, and to determine the
specific portion of the deceased's estate to be encumbered with
the widow's usufruct (/3). Other minor directives are omitted for
the sake of brevity.
The executrix appealed to this Supreme Court, wherein, dated
October 4, 1943, a decision was promulgated upholding the
judgment of the Manila court with a slight modification as to
payment of interest.
(That year Concepcion Paterno died. She is now represented by
her testate heirs and legatees.)
For compliance with the decision, the records went back to the
Manila court. Therein three commissioners were duly appointed:
Vicente A. Rufino, chosen by the widow's side, Augusto J. D.
Cortes by the heiress-executrix, and V. R. Endaya by the Court.
After hearings held before the said committee (May-November,
1947), Vicente A. Rufino submitted his report dated July 9, 1948
which was concurred in toto by V. R. Endaya. A few days later
Augusta J. D. Cortes filed his own report, wholly at variance with
his colleague's recommendations on many important particulars.
In December, 1948, counsel for the executrix interposed legal and
factual objections to the Rufino report. In May, 1949, Atty. Claro M.
Recto, for the Paterno relatives, replied to said objections and
prayed that they be overruled with the approval the aforesaid
report.
On July 3, 1950, Judge Rafael Amparo of the Manila Court
approved the majority report except that he declared: (1) lot No.
50 on Juan Luna Street was conjugal, and (2) the usufruct of the
widow shall be constituted on the one-third estate. (Report on
Appeal, pp. 149-151).
After the return of the records to the probate court for partition in
accordance with our decision in G.R. No. L-4130, which affirmed the
decision appealed from with the exception of the modification that one

piece of property (the R. Hidalgo property) adjudicated to the widow was

assigned instead to the estate of the deceased, in exchange for another
property (in Azcarraga-Reina Regente) given to the widow, and after
delivery by the executrix on December 7, 1953 of the properties
constituting the widow's share in the partition of the conjugal estate, the
executrix, on March 3, 1954, filed a petition for the final closure of the
testate proceedings. A day before the filing of this petition, however, the
trial court had issued an order, upon motion of the administratrix of the
estate of the widow Concepcion Paterno, for a final accounting of the 1951,
1952, and 1953 credit balances of the estate, and to determine the rentals
or income of those properties found to be paraphernal assets of the widow,
so that the undelivered portions of said rentals could be turned over to the
widow's estate. Accordingly, the estate of the widow opposed the petition
for closure pending the final accounting required of the executrix in the
court's order of March 2, 1954; and also pending determination of the
share of the widow in the additional value of the R. Hidalgo property, due
to the construction of the Illusion Theater, that in 1952 would become
property of the owner of the land. The administratrix of the widow's estate
likewise sought an amendment of the court's order of March 2, 1954, so as
to require the executrix to account for the undelivered rentals or fruits of
the widow's paraphernal properties from October 5, 1938, when the
executrix started her administration, until December 7, 1953, when they
were finally turned over to the widow's estate.
On March 15, 1954, the executrix submitted an accounting of the credit
balances of the estate for the years 1951, 1952, and 1953, but in
subsequent pleadings objected to the accounting of the fruits of the
properties declared to be paraphernal on the theory that (1) said
properties were actually held conjugal, subject only to paraphernal claims;
and that (2) consequently, their income belonged to the conjugal estate
and had been periodically divided equally between the executrix as the
universal heir of the deceased and the widow's estate. As for the R.
Hidalgo property, the executrix also objected to any further determination
of an additional share of the widow on the improvements thereon, claiming
that the widow's estate was bound by the value of P189,240 given to this
property by the Rufino report from which the administratrix of the widow's
estate did not appeal.
Reply and counter-reply having been filed by the parties on the above
issues, the probate court finally resolved the same in its order of July 31,
1954, the pertinent portions of which are as follows:

The questions that should be passed upon by this Court are those
raised by the administratrix of the estate of Concepcion Paterno in
her motion for reconsideration, to wit: (1) Should the herein
executrix be made to account for the income of the paraphernal
properties belonging to Concepcion Paterno as prayed for by said
administratrix? (2) Is it necessary to determine the additional
value of the R. Hidalgo property as sought by said administratrix?
The answer to the first question is in the affirmative. The Civil
Code of 1889 provided that upon dissolution of marriage the
husband or his heirs may be compelled to make immediate
restitution of the paraphernal property which has been turned over
to the husband for administration (Art. 1391 in connection with
Art. 1369). The Code of Civil Procedure provided in its Section 726
that 'where a deceased person in his lifetime held lands in trust for
another person, the court may, after notice given as required in
the preceding section, grant license to the executor or
administrator, and the person, his executor, or administrator, for
whose use and benefit they are holders; and the court may decree
the execution of such trust, whether created by deed or by law.'
Upon the death of Narciso Padilla his marriage with Concepcion
Paterno was dissolved. From the moment of his death, his heir was
bound to return the paraphernal properties of Concepcion Paterno,
and from said moment any income or fruit derived from said
paraphernal properties belonged to the owner thereof. It is
contended by the executrix herein that the properties under
administration in this proceeding are conjugal subject to the
paraphernal claims of the widow, Concepcion Paterno, and that the
rentals from one or the other property cannot be excluded 'for
such exclusions cannot be justified, as the definite character of the
properties as adjudicated in favor of the wife or of the husband
became absolute and definite only after the decision of the Hon.
Supreme Court late in 1953'. This contention is not well taken,
because the determination made by the Supreme Court of the
character of the properties in question retroacts to the date
Narciso Padilla died.
It appears that Ysabel Bibby was appointed special administratrix
in this proceeding on August 29, 1938.

The other question refers to the R. Hidalgo property. With respect

to this property, the Supreme Court in its decision in G.R. No. L4130 said
This Illusion Theatre was not reckoned with in the Rufino
report. Apparently it would pass to the estate in 1952 upon
the occurrence of specified contingencies. If it has passed
the matter could undoubtedly be the subject of further
deliberation upon appropriate motions. It would only be a
question of determining the additional value of the R.
Hidalgo property and of requiring the herein appellant to
pay the Paterno estate its corresponding share.
The above quoted portion of the decision is clear and needs no
further elucidation.
WHEREFORE, the executrix herein is directed to submit within ten
(10) days from receipt of this order an accounting of the income of
the paraphernal properties in question covering the period from
August 29, 1938 to December 7, 1953.
Regarding the R. Hidalgo property, this proceeding is hereby set
for hearing on August 19, 1954, at 8:30 a.m. for the purpose of
determining the additional value of said property in consonance
with the above indicated decision of the Supreme Court.
The executrix herein is hereby authorized and directed to deliver
immediately to the estate of Concepcion Paterno the one-half
portion of the credit balance on the 1953 annual accounting.
The consideration of the prayer to close this proceeding is hereby
deferred until the accounting herein above called for shall have
been submitted and passed upon and the additional value of the R.
Hidalgo property shall have been determined.
Let the corrections indicated by the administratrix of the estate of
Concepcion Paterno be made.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
(Record on Appeal, pp. 60-62.)

The executrix sought but failed to have the above order reconsidered;
whereupon, she filed this her third appeal before this Court. 1
The executrix-appellant assigns six errors, which may be reduced to the
following propositions:
(1) That the lower court erred in holding that some of the properties
included in the estate are paraphernal in character and that all their
income belonged to the widow Concepcion Paterno;
(2) That the widow having already raised the question of her right to all
the fruits of her alleged paraphernal properties in a petition for the
liquidation of their fruits filed before the probate court even before the war,
and no fruits having been awarded to her by the probate court in its
decision of January 15, 1940, as amended by its resolution of April 24,
1940, or by this Court in its 1954 decision in G.R. No. 48137 or in its 1953
decision in G.R. No. L-4130, the widow or her estate is now barred from
raising again the question of her exclusive right to such fruits either by the
principle of res judicata or that of conclusiveness of judgment;
(3) As to the R. Hidalgo property of the estate, the lower court erred in
sustaining the additional claim of the widow's estate over the
improvements therein.
In support of her first proposition, that the lower court erred in holding
that some of the properties in the estate are paraphernal and that all their
income belonged the widow Concepcion Paterno, the executrix-appellant
claims that our decision in G.R. No. L-4130 did not declare any properties
in the estate of the deceased Narciso A. Padilla paraphernal, but that
certain properties therein were declared "conjugal assets, subject to
paraphernal claims", and that this decision is the "law of the case" in this
incident and appeal.
The above argument appears to be a mere reiteration of the claims
already urged by this same appellant in G.R. No. L-4130, where she
similarly argued that the probate court, and this Court in G.R. No. 48137,
did not hold any properties in the estate paraphernal, but the certain
properties therein were declared conjugal partnership properties, with the
widow being entitled to reimbursement for the value of her paraphernal
claims (see Appellant's Brief in G.R. No. L-4130, pp. 70-71, 103, 106).
Rejecting this argument in our decision in G.R. No. L-4130, we said:

The Rufino report which is printed in full on pages 169-192 of the

Record on Appeal, states that the buildings constructed by the
partnership on the two lots were destroyed by fire during the
battle of liberation of Manila in 1945. Then it goes on to
adjudicate:
As already stated, the conjugal improvements on the lots
on Arquiza and Juan Luna have been destroyed by fire,
and the Supreme Court having held that the lands on
which said improvements were erected remained
paraphernal until the value of said lands were paid to the
widow Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla, said lands must
be returned to the Testate Estate of Concepcion Paterno
Vda. de Padilla.
However, any amount due or that may be received from
the War Damage Commission for the improvements that
were destroyed on those two pieces of property shall be
divided share and share alike between the estate of Ysabel
Bibby Vda. de Padilla and the estate of Concepcion Paterno
Vda. de Padilla. (Record on Appeal, p. 177).
The executrix earnestly challenges the first paragraph contending
that the lots became conjugal properties from the time the
buildings were erected thereon, and the subsequent destruction of
such buildings did not make them paraphernal. She also argues
that the indemnity to the widow for said lots should be their value
at the time of the construction of the buildings, or at most, at the
time of the dissolution of the partnership in 1934.
These contentions may not be upheld in view of the decision of the
Manila Court and the confirmatory decision of this Tribunal in
1943. There are, to be sure, some propositions in said decision
which we may now hesitate to ratify, especially the pronouncement
that the lot continued to be paraphernal until its value had been
actually paid. But that judgment is now the law of the case.
(Record on Appeal, pp. 151-152).
In other words, we maintained in G.R. No. L-4130, as the law of the case,
our previous decision in G.R. No. 48137 that

The ownership of the land is retained by the wife until she is paid
the value of the lot, as a result of the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership. The mere construction of a building from common
funds does not automatically convey the ownership of the wife's
land to the conjugal partnership. (Record on Appeal, p. 138).
Considering that our decision in G.R. No. L-4130 is, in executrix-appellant's
own words, "the last and final decision of this Honorable court intended to
definitely settle and close this estate" (Appellant's Brief, p. 49), and that
the "law of the case" in this appeal are all the previous decisions herein,
"including the 1953 decision G.R. No. L-4130" (idem, p. 17), the
dispositions made in our decision in G.R. No. L-4130 should be considered
as final and conclusive on the parties in this case and its incidents.
But to what extent does the "law of the case", as expressed in the above
decisions, bear on the more important question in this appeal namely,
the alleged exclusive right of widow Concepcion Paterno to all the fruits of
the properties of the estate declared paraphernal from the time the
conjugal partnership was terminated by the death of the husband Narciso
A. Padilla up to their final delivery to the estate of the widow Concepcion
Paterno on December 7, 1953?
On this matter, we must perforce distinguish those paraphernal properties
that did not cease to be such all throughout and were, accordingly, turned
over to the widow's estate on December 7, 1953, from those that, having
been paid or indemnified in full to the widow upon the final partition and
division of the conjugal estate, had finally been converted into conjugal
assets. To determine the properties that belong to either class, we must go
back to the records of these settlement proceedings before this appeal, the
proceedings taken in the court below in the course of the execution of our
final judgment in G.R. No. L-4130.
Let us recall that in its original resolution of January 15, 1940, the probate
court found the following properties to be paraphernal:
(1) the lot at 305 Arquiza Street and the demolished
improvements therein;
(2) the lot at 1393-1409 Juan Luna Street and the improvements
therein that had been torn down;

(3) the lot and improvements (except the building constructed

during the marriage) at 401-407 Camba Street;

Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla, (Record on Appeal in G.R. L4130, p. 177).

(4) that lot at 613-631 and 634-636 Martin Ocampo Street, with
the original "accesorias" and a camarin which was destroyed in
order that new "accesorias" might be constructed, these new
"accesorias" being conjugal property;

(2) As to the Camba property:

(5) the property at 620-H, Callejon De la Fe;

According to the evidence presented, the portion of this lot located

right at the corner of San Nicolas and Camba Streets, otherwise
known as Lot No. 6-A, and the building existing thereon, are both
paraphernal properties. They should, therefore, be delivered to the
Testate Estate of Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla.

(6) one-half of the property at 631 Regidor Street; and

(7) 9/29 of the property at 302-306 R. Hidalgo Street. (Record on
Appeal, pp. 133-134).
The findings of the probate court as to the nature of the above properties
were affirmed in toto by this Court in our decision in G.R. No. 48137 dated
October 4, 1943.
After the above-mentioned decision was returned to the lower court for
execution, the battle for the liberation of Manila supervened and as a
result of the general conflagration in the city sometime in February, 1945,
the conjugal buildings on the Arquiza and Juan Luna properties were
completely destroyed. As for the property at 631 Regidor Street, the same
was later expropriated by the government.
When the commissioners appointed to execute the judgment submitted
their report, therefore, the majority of the commissioners (whose report,
otherwise known as the "Rufino Report," the lower court approved) made
the following recommendations:
(1) As to the Arquiza and Juan Luna properties, the improvements
of which were destroyed during the battle for the liberation of
Manila:
As already stated, the conjugal improvements on the lots on
Arquiza and Juan Luna have been destroyed by fire, and the
Supreme Court having held that the lands in which said
improvements were erected remained paraphernal until the value
of said lands were paid to the widow Concepcion Paterno Vda. de
Padilla, said lands must be returned to the Testate Estate of

The portion of said lot which is otherwise known as Lot No. 6-B
likewise originally paraphernal, but a building was erected thereon
by the conjugal partnership, so that it would become conjugal
partnership property upon the reimbursement to the wife of its
present value. According to the evidence, Lot No. 6-B has an area
of 83.422 sq. ms., and the present value thereof per square meter
is P30.00. This Testate Estate, therefore, should reimburse the
Testate Estate of Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla in the sum of
P2,502.66. After said reimbursement, Lot No. 6-B and the existing
improvement thereon shall become conjugal partnership property
and should be divided accordingly for purposes of distribution.
(Record on Appeal in L-4130, pp. 179-80).
(3) As to the Martin Ocampo property:
According to the evidence the portion of the lot occupied by
paraphernal building or the accesoria otherwise known as Nos.
612, 614, 616, 620, 624, 626, 628 Quezon Boulevard, has a total
area of 360.5 sq. m.; while the interior portion of said lot actually
occupied by the accesoria constructed during the marriage of the
spouses contained an area of 528.1 sq. ms. This interior portion is
the one which must be appraised by the Commissioners, and its
value reimbursed to the Estate of Concepcion Paterno Vda. de
Padilla, in view of the ruling of the Court that "el valor actual del
suelo ocupado por dicha accesoria construida durante el
matrimonio se determinara por los Comisionados y se adjudicara a
la Viuda en concepto de indemnizacion." The outer portion of
360.5 sq. ms. having been declared paraphernal property, should
be delivered to the Estate of Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla.

The evidence further shows that the reasonable value of said

interior portion is P125 per sq. m., so that the amount to be
reimbursed is P66,012.50. As soon as said reimbursement is
made, said portion of the lot and the buildings existing thereon as
conjugal property should be divided accordingly for purposes of
distribution. (Record on Appeal, Ibid, p. 181)
(4) As to the Callejon De la Fe property:
In view of the fact that finding of the Supreme Court was that this
property and the improvement which used to exist thereon were
both paraphernal, the lot should be delivered to the Testate Estate
of Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla and whatever amount is paid
by the War Damage Commission as compensation for the
destruction of said building should also be totally paid to it.
(Record on appeal, ibid, p. 182).
(5) As to the Regidor property, which was expropriated by the
government:
The compensation received for the expropriation of the Regidor
property, should be divided between the spouses in accordance
with the finding of the decision of the Supreme Court as to the
character of said property. (Ibid, p. 192)
(6) And as to R. Hidalgo property:
The R. Hidalgo property is partly conjugal and partly paraphernal.
Nine-twenty-ninths thereof belong to the Testate Estate of
Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla as paraphernal property, tentwenty-ninths thereof belong to it as share in the conjugal
partnership, while the remaining ten-twenty-ninths should belong
to Da. Isabela B. Vda. de Padilla as her inheritance from the
decedent herein. It has a total area of 1962 square meters. At the
rate of P200 per square meter, it has a total value of P189,240.00.
The lot shall become conjugal property and divided accordingly
after the Testate Estate of Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla shall
have been reimbursed in the sum of P58,729,67.
Any payment made by the War Damage Commission shall be divided in
the same proportion, to wit: nine-twenty-ninths shall belong to the Testate

Estate of Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla, and the remaining tentwenty-ninths shall belong to Da. Isabel B. Vda. de Padilla. (Idem., pp.
182-183).
All the above recommendations were approved by the trial court, and in
her appeal from the order of approval (which is G.R. No. L-4130), wherein
the executrix-appellant specially protested against the declaration that
upon the destruction of the improvements on the Arquiza and Juan Luna
properties, they remained paraphernal and must be returned to the estate
of the widow, as well as the recommendation to subdivide the Camba and
Martin Ocampo properties, declaring those portions thereof occupied by
paraphernal buildings as paraphernal and should be returned to the
widow's estate, the same recommendations were affirmed by this Court.
Considering, then, the "law of the case" in this appeal as expressed in the
Rufino report and approved by both the probate court and this Court in
G.R. No. L-4130, we find no error in the lower court's pronouncement that
as sole owner of those properties that never became conjugal because the
conjugal improvements thereon were destroyed before they could be paid
for the widow (i.e., the Arquiza and Juan Luna properties), as well as Lot
No. 6-B on Camba Street, the outer portion of the Martin Ocampo lot, and
the Callejon de la Fe property, that never ceased to be paraphernal
because there were paraphernal buildings thereon at the time of the
termination of the conjugal partnership, the widow Concepcion Paterno is
also the sole owner of all their income that accrued during their
administration by the executrix-appellant until they were finally delivered
to the estate of the deceased Concepcion Paterno on December 7, 1953;
minus of course, the administration expenses incurred by said executrixappellant with respect to these paraphernal properties. This is also in
accordance with that portion of the Rufino report making the following
recommendation as to the rentals of said properties during the period of
settlement:
E. RENTALS AND OTHER INCOME DURING SETTLEMENT
For a complete liquidation of the estate under administration, the
rentals from real properties, and other income, such as proceeds
from expropriation, etc., should be disposed in the following
manner:
The rentals of property declared paraphernal, after deducting
administration expenses, must be delivered to the estate of

Concepcion Paterno; while the rentals from conjugal property, after

deducting administration expenses, should be divided equally
between the heir of the husband and those of the wife.... (Record
on Appeal in L-4130, p. 192).
Appellant claims that the above recommendation is void because the
commissioners appointed to execute our 1943 decision in G.R. No. 48137
were vested only with the limited authority of putting said decision into
effect, and said decision made no disposition as to rentals or fruits of the
paraphernal properties. This contention is unmeritorious because the
above recommendation was approved by the trial court in its order of July
3, 1950, and by this Court in the 1953 decision in G.R. No. L-4130, and
has become part of the "law of the case;" as such it is now binding,
conclusive, and irrevocable in this appeal. Indeed, it nowhere, appears in
the brief submitted by the executrix-appellant in G.R. No.
L-4130 that she then questioned the disposition, made by the Rufino
report and by the lower court, as to the rentals of the properties declared
paraphernal during the period of her administration, and it is now too late
for her to raise this objection many years after our decision in L-4130 had
become final and executory. With this result, it becomes unnecessary for
us to discuss the executrix-appellant's proposition that the lower court
order of January 15, 1940, as amended by its resolution of April 24, 1940,
and this Court's decision in G.R. 48137, both of which came ahead of our
decision in G.R. No. L-4130, are res judicata by passing sub silentio this
issue of the exclusive right of the widow to the fruits of her paraphernal
properties.
The above discussion does not, however, imply that the estate of the
widow Concepcion Paterno has also the exclusive right to the fruits of
those properties which, although originally paraphernal, had finally
become converted to conjugal assets after their values were reimbursed or
paid to the estate of the widow Concepcion Paterno in the final partition
and division of the estate left by the deceased Narciso A. Padilla. These
properties are the following:
(1) Lot No. 6-B of the Camba property;
(2) The interior portion of the Martin Ocampo property; and
(3) the 9/29 share of the widow in the R. Hidalgo property.

As to the above properties, their conversion from paraphernal to conjugal

assets should be deemed to retroact to the time the conjugal buildings
were first constructed thereon or at the very latest, to the time
immediately before the death of Narciso A. Padilla that ended the conjugal
partnership. They can not be considered to have become conjugal property
only as of the time their values were paid to the estate of the widow
Concepcion Paterno because by that time the conjugal partnership no
longer existed and it could not acquire the ownership of said properties.
The acquisition by the partnership of these properties was, under the 1943
decision, subject to the suspensive condition that their values would be
reimbursed to the widow at the liquidation of the conjugal partnership;
once paid, the effects of the fulfillment of the condition should be deemed
to retroact to the date the obligation was constituted (Art. 1187, New Civil
Code). As a consequence, all the fruits of these properties, after the
dissolution of the partnership by the death of the husband, until final
partition, logically belonged to the universal heir of said husband (his
mother Isabel Bibby) and to the surviving widow in co-ownership, share
and share alike. As there has been periodical equal distribution between
these two parties of the current income of the estate, there is no need for
the executrix-appellant to make any new accounting for the fruits of these
properties.
Coming now to the third issue in this appeal, namely, the right of the
widow to an additional share in the improvements on the R. Hidalgo
property that was adjudicated to the estate of the husband Narciso A.
Padilla in the 1953 decision, G.R. No. L-4130, we find and no merit to the
claim of appellant that
When the R. Hidalgo property was appraised by the Rufino Report
on July 9, 1948, at P189,240.00 and under such appraisement
awarded to the estate of the widow, we respectfully submit that
the value as appraised included not only the land but also the
improvement which was then already existing, the same having
been built in 1947.
because the Rufino report states in clear and unmistakable terms that only
the land was appraised in the report and only its value included in the
project of partition:
The R. Hidalgo property is partly conjugal and partly paraphernal.
Nine-twenty-ninths thereof belongs to the Testate Estate of
Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla as paraphernal property, while

ten-twenty-ninths thereof belongs to it as share in the conjugal

partnership, while the remaining ten-twenty-ninths should belong
to Da. Isabel B. Vda. de Padilla as her inheritance from the
decedent herein. It has a total area of 946.2 square meters. At the
rate of P200 per square meter, it has a total value of P189,240.00.
The lot shall become conjugal property and divided accordingly
after the Testate Estate of Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla shall
have been reimbursed in the sum of P58,729.67. (Record on
Appeal in L-4130, pp. 182-183)
Indeed, the Rufino report could not have included the value of the
improvements at the time the commissioners appraised this property for
purposes of partition between the parties, because the old improvements
thereon were destroyed during the war and whatever improvements were
found therein by the commissioners in 1948 still belonged to the lessee of
said property. This was admitted in the executrix-appellant's own brief in
G.R. No. L-4130 (pp. 119-120), to wit:
The increase in the valuation of the share of the widow in the R.
Hidalgo property from P45,608.26 to P58,729.59 is certainly
unjustified, considering, as above stated, that the permanent
improvements on the R. Hidalgo property were totally destroyed
by fire during liberation. Besides, if the property present has
increased in value, it is due to the executrix-appellant who, after
liberation, entered into a contract of lease with Cinema Operators,
Inc., which built the Illusion Theatre and the commercial
establishments nearby. The improvements built by the lessee will
become the property of the estate of Narciso A. Padilla after the
expiration of said contract of lease.lawphil.net
Hence, the footnote in our decision in L-4130 to the following effect:
This Illusion Theatre was not reckoned with in the Rufino report.
Apparently it would pass to the estate in 1952 upon the occurrence
of certain specified contingencies. If it has passed the matter could
undoubtedly be the subject of further deliberation upon
appropriate motions. It would only be a question of determining
the additional value of the R. Hidalgo property and of requiring the
herein appellant to pay the Paterno estate its corresponding share.
(Record on Appeal, p. 157)

As correctly observed by the lower court in the order now appealed from,
"the above-quoted portion of the decision is clear and needs no further
elucidation" (Record on Appeal p. 62).
Considering that the improvements on the R. Hidalgo property accrued to
the owner of the land only after the expiration of the seven-year lease
entered into by the executrix-appellant with the tenant on February 2,
1946, the lower court did not err in ordering the appraisal of said
improvement with the view of determining the additional share therein of
the widow Concepcion Paterno.
WHEREFORE, with the clarification that the accounting of the income of the
paraphernal properties to be made by the executrix-appellant should refer
only to the Arquiza, Juan Luna, and Callejon de la Fe properties, to Lot No.
6-A of the Camba property, and to the outer portion of the Martin Ocampo
property, the order appealed from is affirmed. Without special
pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and De
Leon, JJ., concur.
Padilla and Concepcion, JJ., took no part.
Footnotes
1 Appellant Isabel Bibby Vda. de Padilla died during the pendency
of this appeal. For convenience of reference herein, however, she is
still referred to in this decision as the executrix-appellant.
MRS. HENRY E. HARDING, and her husband, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
Lawrence & Ross for appellant.
Gibbs, McDonough & Johnson for appellees.
FISHER, J.:
This was an action by plaintiffs to recover from defendant the sum of
P3,000 and interest, alleged to be due under the terms of a policy of
insurance. The trial court gave plaintiffs judgment for the amount
demanded, with interest and costs, and from that decision the defendant
appeals.

The court below stated the issues made by the pleadings in this case, and
its finding of fact, as follows:
It is alleged by plaintiffs and admitted by defendant that plaintiffs
are husband and wife and residents of the city of Manila; that the
defendant is a foreign corporation organized and existing under
and by virtue of the laws of Great Britain and duly registered in the
Philippine Islands, and Smith, Bell & Co. (limited), a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippine Islands,
with its principal domicile in the city of Manila, is the agent in the
Philippine Islands of said defendant.
The plaintiffs alleged that on February 16, 1916, the plaintiff Mrs.
Henry E. Harding was the owner of a Studebaker automobile,
registered number 2063, in the city of Manila; that on said date; in
consideration of the payment to the defendant of the premium of
P150, by said plaintiff, Mrs. Henry E. Harding, with the consent of
her husband, the defendant by its duly authorized agent, Smith,
Bell & Company (limited), made its policy of insurance in writing
upon said automobile was set forth in said policy to be P3,000 that
the value of said automobile was set forth in said policy (Exhibit A)
to be P3,000; that on March 24, 1916, said automobile was totally
destroyed by fire; that the loss thereby to plaintiffs was the sum of
P3,000; that thereafter, within the period mentioned in the said
policy of insurance, the plaintiff, Mrs. Henry E. Harding, furnished
the defendant the proofs of her said loss and interest, and
otherwise performed all the conditions of said policy on her part,
and that the defendant has not paid said loss nor any part thereof,
although due demand was made upon defendant therefor.
The defendant, by its answer, admitted the allegations of the
residence and status of the parties and denied all the other
allegation of the said complaint, and for a separate and affirmative
defense alleged (1) that on February 17, 1916, at the city of
Manila, P.I. the defendant upon request of plaintiff, Mrs. Henry E.
Harding, issued to the said plaintiff the policy of insurance on an
automobile alleged by the said plaintiff to be her property; that the
said request for the issuance of said policy of insurance was made
by means of a proposal in writing signed and delivered by said
plaintiff to the defendant, guaranteeing the truth of the statements
contained therein which said proposal is referred to in the said
policy of insurance made a part thereof; (2) that certain of the

statements and representations contained in said proposal and

warranted by said plaintiff to be true, to wit: (a) the price paid by
the proposer for the said automobile; (b) the value of said
automobile at the time of the execution and delivery of the said
proposal and (c) the ownership of said automobile, were false and
known to be false by the said plaintiff at the time of signing and
delivering the said proposal and were made for the purpose of
misleading and deceiving the defendant, and inducing the
defendant, relying upon the warranties, statements, and
representations contained in the said proposal and believing the
same to be true, issued the said policy of insurance.
The defendant prays that judgment be entered declaring the said
policy of insurance to be null and void, and that plaintiffs take
nothing by this action; and for such further relief as to the court
may seem just and equitable.
The evidence in this case shows that some time in the year 1913
Levy Hermanos, the Manila agents for the Studebaker automobile,
sold the automobile No. 2063 to John Canson for P3,200
(testimony of Mr. Diehl); that under date of October 14, 1914,
John Canson sold the said automobile to Henry Harding for the
sum of P1,500 (Exhibit 2); that under date of November 19, 1914,
the said Henry Harding sold the said automobile No. 2063 to J.
Brannigan, of Los Baos, Province of Laguna, P.I., for the sum of
P2,000 (Exhibit 3); that under date of December 20, 1915, J. C.
Graham of Los Baos, Province of Laguna, P.I., sold the said
automobile No. 2063 to Henry Harding of the city of Manila for the
sum of P2,800 (Exhibit 4 and testimony of J. C. Graham); that on
or about January 1, 1916, the said Henry Harding gave the said
automobile to his wife; Mrs. Henry E. Harding, one of the plaintiffs,
as a present; that said automobile was repaired and repainted at
the Luneta Garage at a cost of some P900 (testimony of Mr.
Server); that while the said automobile was at the Luneta Garage;
the said Luneta Garage, acting as agent for Smith, Bell &
Company, (limited), solicited of the plaintiff Mrs. Harding the
insurance of said automobile by the defendant Company
(testimony of Mrs. Henry Harding and Mr. Server); that a proposal
was filled out by the said agent and signed by the plaintiff Mrs.
Henry E. Harding, and in said proposal under the heading "Price
paid by proposer," is the amount of "3,500" and under another
heading "Present value" is the amount of "3,000" (Exhibit 1).

The evidence tends to show that after the said proposal was made
a representative of the Manila agent of defendant went to the
Luneta Garage and examined said automobile No. 2063 and Mr.
Server, the General Manager of the Luneta Garage, an experienced
automobile mechanic, testified that at the time this automobile
was insured it was worth about P3,000, and the defendant, by and
through its said agent Smith, Bell & Company (limited), thereafter
issued a policy of insurance upon proposal in which policy the said
automobile was described as of the "present value" of P3,000 and
the said defendant charged the said plaintiff Mrs. Henry E. Harding
as premium on said policy the sum of P150, or 5 per cent of the
then estimated value of P3,000. (Exhibit A.)
The "Schedule" in said policy of insurance describes the automobile
here in question, and provides in part of follows:
"Now it is hereby agreed as follows:
"That during the period above set forth and during any
period for which the company may agree to renew this
policy the company will subject to the exception and
conditions contained herein or endorsed hereon indemnify
the insured against loss of or damage to any motor car
described in the schedule hereto (including accessories) by
whatever cause such loss or damage may be occasioned
and will further indemnify the insured up to the value of
the car or P3,000 whichever is the greater against any
claim at common law made by any person (not being a
person in the said motor car nor in the insured's service)
for loss of life or for accidental bodily injury or damage to
property caused by the said motor car including law costs
payable in connection with such claim when incurred with
the consent of the company."
The evidence further shows that on March 24, 1916, the said
automobile was totally destroyed by fire, and that the iron and
steel portions of said automobile which did not burn were taken
into the possession of the defendant by and through its agent
Smith, Bell & Company (limited), and sold by it for a small sum,
which had never been tendered to the plaintiff prior to the trial of
this case, but in open court during the trial the sum of P10 as the
proceeds of such sale was tendered to plaintiff and refused.

Upon the facts so found, which we hold are supported by the evidence, the
trial judge decided that there was no proof of fraud on the part of plaintiff
in her statement of the value of the automobile, or with respect to its
ownership; that she had an insurable interest therein; and that defendant,
having agreed to the estimated value, P3,000, and having insured the
automobile for that amount, upon the basis of which the premium was
paid, is bound by it and must pay the loss in accordance with the
stipulated insured value. The assignments of error made on behalf of
appellant put in issue the correctness of those conclusions of law, and
some others of minor importance relating to the exclusion of evidence.
Disposing of the minor objections first, as we have reached the conclusion
that the trial court was right in holding that the defendant is bound by the
estimated value of the automobile upon which policy was issued, and that
the plaintiff was not guilty of fraud in regard thereto, the exclusion of the
testimony of the witness Diehl is without importance. It merely tended to
show the alleged actual value of the automobile, and in the view we take
of the case such evidence was irrelevant.
Appellant contends that Mrs. Harding was not the owner of the automobile
at the time of the issuance of the policy, and, therefore, had no insurable
interest in it. The court below found that the automobile was given to
plaintiff by her husband shortly after the issuance of the policy here in
question. Appellant does not dispute the correctness of this finding, but
contends that the gift was void, citing article 1334 of the Civil Code which
provides that "All gifts between spouses during the marriage shall be void.
Moderate gifts which the spouses bestow on each other on festive days of
the family are not included in this rule."
We are of the opinion that this contention is without merit. In the case of
Cook vs. McMicking 27 Phil. Rep., 10), this court said:
It is claimed by the appellants that the so-called transfer from
plaintiff's husband to her was completely void under article 1458 of
the Civil Code and that, therefore, the property still remains the
property of Edward Cook and subject to levy under execution
against him.
In our opinion the position taken by appellants is untenable. They
are not in a position to challenge the validity of the transfer, if it
may be called such. They bore absolutely no relation to the parties
to the transfer at the time it occurred and had no rights or
interests inchoate, present, remote, or otherwise, in the property

in question at the time the transfer occurred. Although certain

transfers from husband to wife or from wife to husband are
prohibited in the article referred to, such prohibition can be taken
advantage of only by persons who bear such a relation to the
parties making the transfer or to the property itself that such
transfer interferes with their rights or interests. Unless such a
relationship appears the transfer cannot be attacked.
Even assuming that defendant might have invoked article 1334 as a
defense, the burden would be upon it to show that the gift in question
does not fall within the exception therein established. We cannot say, as a
matter of law, that the gift of an automobile by a husband to his wife is
not a moderate one. Whether it is or is not would depend upon the
circumstances of the parties, as to which nothing is disclosed by the
record.
Defendant contends that the statement regarding the cost of the
automobile was a warranty, that the statement was false, and that,
therefore, the policy never attached to the risk. We are of the opinion that
it has not been shown by the evidence that the statement was false on
the contrary we believe that it shows that the automobile had in fact cost
more than the amount mentioned. The court below found, and the
evidence shows, that the automobile was bought by plaintiff's husband a
few weeks before the issuance of the policy in question for the sum of
P2,800, and that between that time and the issuance of the policy some
P900 was spent upon it in repairs and repainting. The witness Server, an
expert automobile mechanic, testified that the automobile was practically
as good as new at the time the insurance was effected. The form of
proposal upon which the policy was issued does not call for a statement
regarding the value of the automobile at the time of its acquisition by the
applicant for the insurance, but merely a statement of its cost. The amount
stated was less than the actual outlay which the automobile represented to
Mr. Harding, including repairs, when the insurance policy was issued. It is
true that the printed form calls for a statement of the "price paid by the
proposer," but we are of the opinion that it would be unfair to hold the
policy void simply because the outlay represented by the automobile was
made by the plaintiff's husband and not by his wife, to whom he had given
the automobile. It cannot be assumed that defendant should not have
issued the policy unless it were strictly true that the price representing the
cost of the machine had been paid by the insured and by no other
person that it would no event insure an automobile acquired by gift,

inheritance, exchange, or any other title not requiring the owner to make a
specific cash outlay for its acquisition.
Furthermore, the court below found and the evidence shows, without
dispute, that the proposal upon which the policy in question was issued
was made out by defendant's agent by whom the insurance was solicited,
and that appellee simply signed the same. It also appears that an
examiner employed by the defendant made an inspection of the
automobile before the acceptance of the risk, and that the sum after this
examination. The trial court found that Mrs. Harding, in fixing the value of
the automobile at P3,000, acted upon information given her by her
husband and by Mr. Server, the manager of the Luneta Garage. The Luneta
Garage, it will be remembered, was the agent of the defendant corporation
in the solicitation of the insurance. Mrs. Harding did not state of her own
knowledge that the automobile originally cost P3,000, or that its value at
the time of the insurance was P3,000. She merely repeated the
information which had been given her by her husband, and at the same
time disclosed to defendant's agent the source of her information. There is
no evidence to sustain the contention that this communication was made
in bad faith. It appears that the statements in the proposal as to the price
paid for the automobile and as to its value were written by Mr. Quimby
who solicited the insurance on behalf of defendant, in his capacity as an
employee of the Luneta Garage, and wrote out the proposal for Mrs.
Harding to sign. Under these circumstances, we do not think that the facts
stated in the proposal can be held as a warranty of the insured, even if it
should have been shown that they were incorrect in the absence of proof
of willful misstatement. Under such circumstance, the proposal is to be
regarded as the act of the insurer and not of the insured. This question
was considered in the case of the Union Insurance Company vs. Wilkinson
(13 Wall., 222; 20 L. ed., 617), in which the Supreme Court of the United
States said:
This question has been decided differently by courts of the highest
respectability in cases precisely analogous to the present. It is not
to be denied that the application logically considered, is the work
of the assured, and if left to himself or to such assistance as he
might select, the person so selected would be his agent, and he
alone would be responsible. On the other hand, it is well-known,
so well that no court would be justified in shutting its eyes to it,
that insurance companies organized under the laws of one State,
and having in that State their principal business office, send these
agents all over the land, with directions to solicit and procure

applications for policies furnishing them with printed arguments in

favor of the value and necessity of life insurance, and of the
special advantages of the corporation which the agent represents.
They pay these agents large commissions on the premiums thus
obtained, and the policies are delivered at their hands to the
assured. The agents are stimulated by letters and instructions to
activity in procuring contracts, and the party who is in this manner
induced to take out a policy, rarely sees or knows anything about
the company or its officers by whom it is issued, but looks to and
relies upon the agent who has persuaded him to effect insurance
as the full and complete representative of the company, in all that
is said or done in making the contract. Has he not a right to so
regard him? It is quite true that the reports of judicial decisions
are filled with the efforts of these companies, by their counsel, to
establish the doctrine for the acts of these agents to the simple
receipt of the premium and delivery of the policy, the argument
being that, as to all other acts of the agent, he is the agent of the
assured. This proposition is not without support in some of the
earlier decision on the subject; and, at a time when insurance
companies waited for parties to come to them to seek assurance,
or to forward applications on their own motion, the doctrine had a
reasonable foundation to rest upon. But to apply such a doctrine,
in its full force, to the system of selling policies through agents,
which we have described, would be a snare and a delusion,
leading, as it has done in numerous instances, to the grossest
frauds, of which the insurance corporations receive the benefits,
and the parties supposing themselves insured are the victims. The
tendency of the modern decisions in this country is steadily in the
opposite direction. The powers of the agent are, prima facie, coextensive with the business intrusted to his care, and will not be
narrowed by limitations not communicated to the person with
whom he deals. (Bebee vs. Ins. Co., 25 Conn., 51; Lycoming Ins.
Co. vs. Schoolenberger, 44 Pa., 259; Bealvs. Ins. Co., 16 Wis.,
241; Davenport vs. Ins. Co., 17 Iowa, 276.) An insurance
company, establishing a local agency, must be held responsible to
the parties with whom they transact business, for the acts and
declarations of the agent, within the scope of his employment, as if
they proceeded from the principal. (Sav. Bk. vs. Ins. Co., 31 Conn.,
517; Hortwitz vs. Ins. Co., 40 Mo., 557; Ayres vs. Ins. Co., 17
Iowa, 176; Howard Ins. Co. vs. Bruner, 23 Pa., 50.)
In the fifth edition of American Leading Cases, 917, after a full
consideration of the authorities, it is said:

"By the interested or officious zeal of the agents employed

by the insurance companies in the wish to outbid each
other and procure customers, they not unfrequently
mislead the insured, by a false or erroneous statement of
what the application should contain; or, taking the
preparation of it into their own hands, procure his
signature by an assurance that it is properly drawn, and
will meet the requirements of the policy. The better opinion
seems to be that, when this course is pursued, the
description of the risk should, though nominally proceeding
from the insured, be regarded as the act of the insurers."
(Rowley vs. Empire Ins. Co., 36 N.Y., 550.)
The modern decisions fully sustain this proposition, and they seem
to us founded on reason and justice, and meet our entire approval.
This principle does not admit oral testimony to vary or contradict
that which is in writing, but it goes upon the idea that the writing
offered in evidence was not the instrument of the party whose
name is signed to it; that it was procured under such
circumstances by the other side as estops that side from using it
or relying on its contents; not that it may be contradicted by oral
testimony, but that it may be shown by such testimony that it
cannot be lawfully used against the party whose name is signed to
it. (See also Am. Life Ins. Co. vs. Mahone, 21 Wallace, 152.)
The defendant, upon the information given by plaintiff, and after an
inspection of the automobile by its examiner, having agreed that it was
worth P3,000, is bound by this valuation in the absence of fraud on the
part of the insured. All statements of value are, of necessity, to a large
extent matters of opinion, and it would be outrageous to hold that the
validity of all valued policies must depend upon the absolute correctness of
such estimated value. As was said by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of the First National Bank vs. Hartford Fire Insurance
Co. (5 Otto, 673; 24 L. ed., 563), at. p. 565 of the Lawyers Edition:
The ordinary test of the value of property is the price it will
commend in the market if offered for sale. But that test cannot, in
the very nature of the case, be applied at the time application is
made for insurance. Men may honestly differ about the value of
property, or as to what it will bring in the market; and such
differences are often very marked among those whose special
business it is to buy and sell property of all kinds. The assured

could do no more than estimate such value; and that, it seems,

was all that he was required to do in this case. His duty was to
deal fairly with the Company in making such estimate. The special
finding shows that he discharged that duty and observed good
faith. We shall not presume that the Company, after requiring the
assured in his application to give the "estimated value," and then
to covenant that he had stated all material facts in regard to such
value, so far as known to him, and after carrying that covenant, by
express words, into the written contract, intended to abandon the
theory upon which it sought the contract, and make the absolute
correctness of such estimated value a condition precedent to any
insurance whatever. The application, with its covenant and
stipulations, having been made a part of the policy, that
presumption cannot be indulged without imputing to the Company
a purpose, by studied intricacy or an ingenious framing of the
policy, to entrap the assured into incurring obligations which,
perhaps, he had no thought of assuming.
Section 163 of the Insurance Law (Act No. 2427) provides that "the effect
of a valuation in a policy of fire insurance is the same as in a policy of
marine insurance."

SPOUSES ALFREDO and ENCARNACION

CHING,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 167835

- versus FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, and SHERIFF OF

MANILA,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
ALFREDO CHING,
Petitioner,

- versus -

G.R. No. 188480

Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
November 15, 2010

FAMILY
SAVINGS
BANK
SHERIFF OF MANILA,

and

THE

Respondent.

By the terms of section 149 of the Act cited, the valuation in a policy of
marine insurance is conclusive if the insured had an insurable interest and
was not guilty of fraud.
We are, therefore, of the opinion and hold that plaintiff was the owner of
the automobile in question and had an insurable interest therein; that
there was no fraud on her part in procuring the insurance; that the
valuation of the automobile, for the purposes of the insurance, is binding
upon the defendant corporation, and that the judgment of the court below
is, therefore, correct and must be affirmed, with interest, the costs of this
appeal to be paid by the appellant. So ordered.

x-------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Street, Malcolm and Avancea, JJ., concur.

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court are two consolidated [1] cases. In G.R. No.
167835, the spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching (the Spouses

Ching), via a petition for review on certiorari, are seeking to annul and set

3151, was attached, levied, and thereafter sold at public auction

aside the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated November 17,

on October 10, 1983, wherein the Bank emerged as the highest bidder.

2004 and April 7, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 87217. While in G.R. No.
188480, Alfredo Ching (Alfredo), also via a petition for review on certiorari,

G.R. No. 167835

is assailing the Decision[2] dated July 31, 2008 rendered by the CA in CAG.R. SP No. 96675, dismissing the petition, and the Resolution dated June
19, 2009 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

On March 30, 2004, after more than two decades since the levy
and auction sale, the Bank filed a Motion to Retrieve Records, For Issuance
of Final Deed of Conveyance, To Order Register of Deeds of Makati City to

The procedural and factual antecedents are as follows:

Transfer Title and For Writ of Possession [5] before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 40. Alfredo opposed [6] the motion and his wife,

Cheng Ban Yek and Co., Inc. secured a loan from Family Savings Bank

Encarnacion Ching (Encarnacion), filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and

(Bank), now BPI Family Bank, with Alfredo acting as surety. On August 6,

to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention.[7]

1981, the Bank filed a Complaint with the then Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Manila, for collection of a sum of money against Cheng Ban Yek

On August 12, 2004, the RTC issued an Order [8] granting the Banks

and Co., Inc. and Alfredo, docketed as Civil Case No. 142309. On August

motion and denying Encarnacions motion, the dispositive portion of which

12,

reads:

1982,

the

CFI

rendered summary

judgment

in

favor

of the

Bank. Alfredo and Cheng Ban Yek and Co., Inc. appealed the summary
judgment before the CA.[3] The CA later issued a Decision affirming the
summary judgment. Also, the subsequent petition filed before this Court
questioning the CA decision was dismissed for having been filed out of
time.[4]

Meanwhile, upon motion of the Bank, the CFI issued an Order

granting execution pending appeal. Consequently, the conjugal property of
the Spouses Ching, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. S-

WHEREFORE, Order is issued directing the retrieval

from the archives of the Court records of this case granting
aforesaid motion of plaintiff and ORDERING:
1. the issuance of a Final Deed of Conveyance by
Deputy Sheriff Ferdinand J. Guerrero or the Clerk of
Court/Ex-Officio Sheriff or any of her duly authorized
deputy sheriffs, all of this Court, to plaintiff herein
(renamed Family Bank and Trust Co., Inc.) as the highest
bidder at the public auction sale;
2. the Register of Deeds of Makati City to issue a
new title in the name of Family Bank and Trust Co., Inc.
(formerly Family Savings Bank), after payment of the
required taxes and fees; and

3. the issuance of a Writ of Possession directing

the Clerk of Court/Ex-Officio Sheriff of this court or any of
her deputies to place herein plaintiff, thru its duly
authorized officers and employees, in possession of the
subject property presently covered by TCT No. S-3151.
SO ORDERED.

In granting the motion, the RTC ratiocinated, to wit:

xxxx
1.
The validity of the execution issued
on September 22, 1982 by this Court thru Hon. Augusto E.
Villarin is already res judicata when it was raised on appeal
by co-defendant Alfredo Ching with the Honorable Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02421, whichdismissed the
appeal and the dismissal was affirmed by the Honorable
Supreme Court when co-defendant Alfredo Chings Petition
for Review was dismissed for being filed out of time per its
Decision dated February 24, 2003, in G.R. No. 118830
(Annex F of plaintiffs aforesaid motion to retrieve records
etc., dated March 26, 2004, pages 46-55 of record) which
Decision has become final and executory on November 4,
2003 (Annex G-1, supra, Entry of Judgment; page 56 of
record).
2.
The judgment of this Court had not
prescribed since it was timely executed on October 10,
1983 and the herein plaintiffs motion to retrieve records,
etc. dated March 26, 2004, seeks only to transfer the
registration of title in its name and to take possession of
the property as the new owner thereof by virtue of the
execution sale and the return of the writ of execution to
this Court by the executing Deputy Sheriff, Ferdinand J.
Guerrero.
3.
The issue as to whether the conjugal
property of the spouses Alfredo Ching and Encarnacion
Ching could validly be levied upon and executed to answer
for the personal debt of Mr. Alfredo Ching arising from his
execution of an accommodation surety, has been resolved
by the Honorable Supreme Court in its aforesaid Decision,
dated February 24, 2003 (Annex F, supra) when it held
that:
xxxx

4.
Plaintiff does not seek to execute the
final decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in G.R. No.
118830. The statement in paragraph 2 above is reiterated.
5.
The cited cases of Ayala Investment
and Development Corporation v. CA, 286 SCRA 272
(1998) and Alfredo
Ching
and
Encarnacion
Ching
v. CA, G.R. No. 124642, February 24, 2004, are not res
judicata in the instant case, since the parties involved are
not the same and the facts are completely different. The
former case was also cited by them in their motion for
reconsideration, dated March 28, 2003 (pages 155-166 of
record) and amended motion for reconsideration, dated
March 31, 2003 (pages 169-187 of record) with the
Honorable Supreme Court in G.R. 118830, but the same
was denied with finality in its Resolution, dated October
13, 2003 (page 188 of record).
6. Defendant Alfredo Ching and movant Encarnacion
Ching are to blame since they did not redeem the property
within the one (1) year redemption period which expired
on October 20, 1984 and which resulted in the forfeiture of
the property in favor of the plaintiff as the purchaser at the
public auction sale.
7. Plaintiff is not liable for damages and, in the first
place, this Court has no jurisdiction to award said damages
claimed by spouses Ching.
8. The execution of the final Decision of this Court
had been completed in 1983. Movant Encarnacion Ching
cannot anymore intervene under Section 2, Rule 19 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.[9]

The Spouses Ching filed a Motion for Reconsideration, [10] but it was
denied in the Order[11] dated September 28, 2004.

Aggrieved, the Spouses Ching filed a petition for certiorari before

the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87217, arguing that the August 12,
2004 Order of the RTC was an act in grave abuse of discretion.

On November 17, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution [12] dismissing

that an Order be issued directing the Register of Deeds of Makati City to

the petition for failure to attach copies of pertinent pleadings and relevant

cancel not only the original TCT No. S-3151, but also the original duplicate

documents to the petition, the decretal portion of which reads:

owners certificate of title.

For failure to attach copies of all pleadings and

documents relevant and pertinent to the instant petition,
the same is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

On August 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order [17] granting the
second ex parte motion. Alfredo filed a motion for reconsideration, which
the Bank also opposed.

The Spouses Ching then filed a motion for reconsideration, but it

was denied in the Resolution[13] dated April 7, 2005.

On December 1, 2005, the RTC issued an Order [18] denying both

motions.

Hence, the petition docketed as G.R. No. 167835.

Consequently, the Bank was able to effect the cancellation of TCT
G.R. No. 188480

No. S-3151 with the Register of Deeds of Makati City, as well as cause the
issuance of TCT No. 221703[19] in its name.

In the meantime, during the course of the proceedings in the RTC,

the Bank filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Cancel TCT No. S-3151,
[14]

praying for the RTC to order the Register of Deeds of Makati City, to

cancel TCT No. S-3151 in the names of the Spouses Ching, and issue a
new title in its name.

The Spouses Ching then filed a petition for certiorari before the
CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93199, questioning the Orders of the RTC
dated June 30, 2005, August 25, 2005, and December 1, 2005, claiming
that these were issued with grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
RTC judge.

On June 30, 2005 the RTC issued an Order[15] granting the ex

parte motion. Alfredo filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Bank
opposed.

While the case was pending before the CA, and on account of there
having been no temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction issued, the Bank filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Resolve

During the pendency of the motion, the Bank filed another

Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Modify Order

[16]

dated June 30, 2005 praying

Motion for Designation of Another Sheriff to Serve/Enforce Writ of

Possession/Court Processes.[20] The motion was stamped as received by

the discrepancy between the date of filing the ex parte motion and the

the

its

date of the issuance of the RTC Order, the CA held that considering that

Order[21] dated March 28, 2006, or a day before the motion was filed, the

the said issue was only raised for the first time before the CA, the issue

RTC already granted the urgent ex parte motion.

could not be touched upon without violating the rule on due process. It

RTC

on March

29,

2006. However,

it

appears

that

in

stressed that an issue which was not averred in the complaint cannot be
In relation thereto, Alfredo filed an Urgent Motion to Recall and Set

raised for the first time on appeal.

Aside Order[22] dated March 28, 2006, which the Bank opposed.
In addition, the CA ruled that title and ownership to the property is
On May

2,

2006,

the

RTC

issued

an

Order [23] denying

the

consolidated upon the lapse of the period of redemption. It is automatic

motion. Alfredo filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in the

upon the failure of the judgment obligor to exercise his right of redemption

Order[24] dated August 18, 2006.

within the period allowed by law. Thus, title may be consolidated in the
name of the purchaser even without a new title issued in his name. The

Aggrieved, Alfredo filed a petition for certiorari before the CA,

docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 96675.

term title, as used in consolidation, does not pertain to the certificate of

title, or piece of paper, issued by the Register of Deeds, which is a mere
evidence of ownership. It is synonymous with ownership.[27]

On July 31, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision [25] affirming the

Hence, the petition docketed as G.R. No. 188480.

Orders of the RTC and dismissing the petition for lack of merit. Alfredo
filed

motion

for

reconsideration,

but

it

was

denied

in

the

The Courts Ruling

Resolution[26] dated June 19, 2009.

Both petitions being interrelated, it is best to resolve the issues
In affirming the assailed Orders of the RTC, the CA opined that
since the urgent ex parte motion of the Bank merely sought for the

collectively. In G.R. No. 167835, the Spouses Ching raise the following
issues:

designation of another sheriff to enforce the writ of possession previously

issued by the court, it is a non-litigious motion which may be acted upon
by the RTC ex parte without prejudice to the rights of Alfredo. As regards

A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS

DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IN CAG.R. SP NO. 82717 IS IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND/OR
APPLICABLE
DECISIONS
OF
THE
HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT.

B.

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURTS QUESTIONED

RULINGS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 142309 ARE IN GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION, ARE NOT IN ACCORD WITH
LAW AND/OR APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT, AND WORK TO DO AN
INJUSTICE TO HEREIN PETITIONERS.[28]

the Rules in dismissing the petition and denying the motion for
reconsideration, the CA relied more on technicalities than resolving the
case on the merits.

The Bank, on the other hand, argues that the resolution of the CA
While in G.R. No. 188480, Alfredo raises the following issues:
A.

B.

C.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN DENYING THE PETITION

IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 96675 AND UPHOLDING THE
ACTIONS OF THE LOWER COURT JUDGE, EFFECTIVELY
AFFIRMED A VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT OF A THIRD PARTY WHO IS NOT A DEFENDANT
IN CIVIL CASE NO. 142309 AGAINST DEPRIVATION OF
PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN DENYING THE PETITION
IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 96675, ACTED IN A MANNER
INCONSISTENT
WITH
THE
RULING
OF
THE
HONORABLE
SUPREME
COURT
IN COMETA
V.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (151
SCRA
563) AND YSMAEL V. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. NO.
132497, 16 NOVEMBER 1999) THAT BOTH MILITATED
AGAINST THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A WRIT OF
POSSESSION ON PROPERTY ON WHICH HAS BEEN
IMPROPERLY AND/OR INCOMPLETELY EXECUTED.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
UPHOLDING AND IN NOT CONSIDERING AS GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION, IF NOT TOTALLY ANOMALOUS
THE ACTION OF THE LOWER COURT JUDGE OF
ISSUING AN ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT BANKS
URGENT EX
PARTE MOTION
EVEN BEFORE SAID
MOTION WAS ACTUALLY FILED.[29]

The Spouses Ching contend, among other things, that their

subsequent submission of the documents, which the CA deemed relevant
and pertinent to the petition in G.R. No. 167835, constituted substantial
compliance with the Rules.Consequently, by invoking strict compliance with

dismissing the petition for failure to attach all relevant and pertinent

pleadings and documents has legal basis, totally substantiated by the facts
of the case, and supported by jurisprudence.

Indeed, this Court has maintained that the subsequent and

substantial compliance of a party-litigant may warrant the relaxation of the
rules

of

procedure.[30] Thus,

in Jaro

v.

Court

of

Appeals,[31] it

elucidated that:
x x x In Cusi-Hernandez v. Diaz and Piglas-Kamao v.
National Labor Relations Commission, we ruled that the
subsequent submission of the missing documents with the
motion for reconsideration amounts to substantial
compliance. The reasons behind the failure of petitioners in
these two cases to comply with the required attachments
were no longer scrutinized. What we found noteworthy in
each case was the fact that petitioners substantially
complied with the formal requirements. We ordered the
remand of the petitions in these cases to the Court of
Appeals, stressing the ruling that by precipitately
dismissing the petitions the appellate court clearly put a
premium on technicalities at the expense of a just
resolution of the case.
We cannot see why the same leniency cannot be
extended to petitioner. x x x

was

If we were to apply the rules of procedure in a very

rigid and technical sense, as what the Court of Appeals
would have it in this case, the ends of justice would be
defeated. In Cusi-Hernandez v. Diaz, where the formal
requirements were liberally construed and substantial
compliance was recognized, we explained that rules of
procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision
or resolution of cases and other matters pending in court.
Hence, a strict and rigid application of technicalities that
tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice
must be avoided. We further declared that:
Cases should be determined on the
merits, after full opportunity to all parties
for ventilation of their causes and
defenses, rather than on technicality or
some procedural imperfections. In that
way, the ends of justice would be served
better.
In the similar case of Piglas-Kamao v. National Labor
Relations Commission, we stressed the policy of the courts
to encourage the full adjudication of the merits of an
appeal.[32]

Nonetheless, this Court deems that the ends of justice would be

better served if the issues raised by the Spouses Ching in their petition
before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 87217 be resolved in the present petition.

In their petition, the Spouses Ching mainly argues that the trial
court gravely erred in granting the Banks motion, because the RTC no
longer had jurisdiction to issue the questioned Orders since the Bank failed
to execute the judgment, to consolidate title, and to secure possession of
the subject property.[35] They maintain that the RTC erred in totally
disregarding the ruling of this Court in the cases of Ayala Investment &
Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals[36] and Ching v. Court of Appeals.
[37]

Finally, the Spouses Ching posit that the execution sale of the subject

property was void, considering that the property was conjugal in nature
and Encarnacion was not a party to the original action.

In the case at bar, the CA dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No.

87217 for the Spouses Chings failure to attach copies of all pleading and
documents which the CA deemed relevant to the petition. However, in their
Motion for Reconsideration, [33] the Spouses Ching stressed that they have

The arguments and contentions of the Spouses Ching cannot be

upheld.
First, the Spouses Chings reliance on prescription is unavailing in

effectively complied and cured their procedural lapses by submitting all the

the case at bar. The Spouses Ching are implying that the RTC violated

pleadings and documents required by the CA in their Amended Petition.

Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, viz.:

[34]

The Spouses Ching even explained that the said documents and

pleadings were not relevant and pertinent to the petition, yet they still
submitted them. Hence, the amended petition filed by the Spouses Ching
should have been given due course by the CA.

Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent

action. A final and executory judgment or order may be
executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of
its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is
barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be
enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be
enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of
its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the
statute of limitations.

Transfer Title and For Writ of Possession was merely a consequence of the
However, it must be noted that contrary to their allegation, the
summary judgment of the RTC in Civil Case No. 142309 had in fact already
been enforced. During the pendency of the case, the subject property was

execution of the summary judgment as the judgment in Civil Case No.

142309 had already been enforced when the lot was levied upon and sold
at public auction, with the Bank as the highest bidder.

already levied upon.Subsequently, after summary judgment and while the

case was on appeal, the RTC granted the Banks motion for execution
pending appeal. Consequently, on October 10, 1983, an auction sale of the
subject property was conducted, with the Bank emerging as the highest
bidder. Later, a Certificate of Sale in its favor was executed by the Sheriff
and, thereafter, inscribed as a memorandum of encumbrance on TCT
No. S-3151.[38]

Moreover, contrary to the Spouses Chings contention, this Court,

in Paredes v. Court of Appeals,[41] citing Rodil v. Benedicto,[42] categorically
held that the right of the applicant or a subsequent purchaser to request
for the issuance of a writ of possession of the land never prescribes. A writ
of possession is employed to enforce a judgment to recover the possession
of land. It commands the sheriff to enter the land and give possession of it
to the person entitled under the judgment. [43] It may be issued in several

It is settled that execution is enforced by the fact of levy and

sale. The result of such execution was that title over the subject property

instances, among which is in execution sales. There was, therefore, no

grave error on the part of the RTC in granting the motion.

was vested immediately in the purchaser subject only to the Spouses

Chings right to redeem the property within the period provided for by law.
[39]

The right acquired by the purchaser at an execution sale is inchoate

and does not become absolute until after the expiration of the redemption
period without the right of redemption having been exercised. But inchoate
though it be, it is, like any other right, entitled to protection and must be
respected until extinguished by redemption. [40] Since, the Spouses Ching
failed to redeem the subject property within the period allowed by law,
they have been divested of their rights over the property.

Second, the applicability of the cases of Ayala Investment &

Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals and Ching v. Court of Appeals to
the present case cannot be sustained. Suffice it to say that these cases
involved different parties and sets of facts, therefore, they did not operate
as res judicata or a case barred by prior judgment in this particular
case. However, what could operate as res judicata in this petition is the
case of Spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching v. Court of Appeals [44] and
that of Cheng Ban Yek & Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC).[45]
The doctrine of res judicata is a rule which pervades every well-

Verily, the Banks Motion to Retrieve Records, For Issuance of Final

Deed of Conveyance, To Order the Register of Deeds of Makati City to

regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds

embodied in various maxims of the common law, namely: (1) public policy

void the levy and sale on execution upon their conjugal property. The Bank

and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should

then elevated the decision to the CA, which decision was reversed and set

be an end to litigation - republicae ut sit litium, and (2) the hardship on

aside by the latter on the ground that the annulment case was barred

the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause - nemo

by res judicata in another annulment case. The Spouses Ching sought

debet bis vexari et eadem causa.

recourse before this Court, but the petition was denied and the assailed

A contrary doctrine would certainly

subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and

decision of the CA was affirmed.

prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to

the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness. [46]

It is undeniable, therefore, that the disquisitions of this Court in

the above-cited cases are controlling and should be given great weight and

In Cheng Ban Yek & Co. v. IAC, the petition arose when Cheng Ban

consideration in the resolution of the issues raised by the Spouses Ching in

Yek & Co., together with Alfredo, appealed the summary judgment in Civil

the present petition. All matters relevant to the action must, and should,

Case No. 142309 to the CA. The CA, however, affirmed in toto the

conform to these precedent cases; otherwise, parallel actions emanating

judgment rendered by the lower court. The matter was then elevated

from the same case could lead to conflicting conclusions. The winning

before this Court via a petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 73708, but

party would not enjoy the fruits of his victory; instead, it would be an

it was eventually dismissed for having been filed out of time and for lack of

empty victory, ultimately ending in the denial of justice on the part on the

merit. Therefore, the decision in Civil Case No. 142309 became final.

righteous litigant.

In Spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching v. Court of Appeals, the

Third, the Spouses Ching maintain that the subject property could

case arose when the Spouses Ching, in an effort to prevent the deputy

not be levied upon and be sold at public auction because it is conjugal in

sheriff from consolidating the sale of the subject property, filed an

nature. This Court, in G.R. No. 118830, had this to say:

annulment case, Civil Case No. 8389, with the RTC of Makati City. The
Spouses Ching sought to declare void the levy and sale on execution of
their conjugal property by arguing that the branch sheriff had no authority
to levy upon a property belonging to the conjugal partnership. The RTC
later rendered judgment in favor of the Spouses Ching and declared as

In any case, even without the intervention of

Encarnacion Ching in the collection case, it appears that
Alfredo Ching was able to raise the conjugal nature of the
property in both the trial court and appellate court. A
perusal of the records reveals that petitioner Alfredo Ching
filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash Writ of
Execution before the CFI of Manila. In the motion, he
specifically argued that the execution was invalid for
having been enforced upon their conjugal property. Alfredo

Ching raised this argument again on appeal in CA G.R. CV

No. 02421. Evidently, due process has been afforded to
petitioners as regards the execution on their conjugal
property.[47]

that the said date was erroneously and inadvertently stamped on the
pleading as its date of receipt.

Verily, the issue of the conjugal nature of the subject property has been

Be it inadvertence or a simple mistake in stamping the appropriate

passed upon by the courts and this Court several times; it is no longer a

date, to remand the case to the RTC for it to issue a new order granting

novel contention. The Spouses Ching cannot, therefore, raise the same

the motion for the designation of a new sheriff would not only be

argument again and again. The Spouses Ching could not even raise such

impractical, it would cause more injustice to the parties and protract an

an argument to bar or prevent the RTC from granting a writ of possession

already long and dragging litigation.

to the Bank or any other motion in furtherance or as a consequence of the

It must be stressed, however, that the RTC Judge should have

issuance of such writ. From the foregoing, the Spouses Chings petition
would logically fail.

been more cautious when he issued the Order, taking into consideration
the

respective

dates

wherein

the

motion

was

received

and

the

Alfredo also contends that the issuance of the Order dated March

corresponding order issued. Time and again, this Court has emphasized

28, 2006 by the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 96675, was highly irregular,

the heavy burden and responsibility of court personnel. They have been

considering that the motion which the said Order granted was filed a day

constantly reminded that any impression of impropriety, misdeed or

after its issuance, or on March 29, 2009. Alfredo insists that contrary to

negligence in the performance of their official functions must be avoided.

the conclusion of the CA, he has raised the matter of the Orders irregular
issuance in his urgent motion to recall and set aside the said order.

[48]

A judge should keep in mind that the delicate nature of work of those

involved in the administration of justice, from the highest judicial official to

the lowest personnel, requires them to live up to the strictest standard of

For its part, the Bank contends, among other things, that

honesty, integrity and uprightness.[49]

the March 28, 2006 Order was but a result of the lower courts failure to
act on the Banks earlier ex parte motion dated October 7, 2005. Moreover,

Alfredo is assailing the validity of the RTC Order dated March 28,

the Bank insists that the only logical reason why the lower court

2006, which granted the Banks Urgent Ex Parte Motion To Resolve Motion

stamped March 29, 2006 as the date of receipt of the ex parte motion is

for

Designation

of

Another

Sheriff

to

Serve/Enforce

Writ

of

Possession/Court Processes. It is to be noted that the said Order was but

an ancillary motion emanating from the writ of possession granted earlier

We note, with affirmation, the discussion of the CA on the matter:

by the RTC. Corollarily, with regard to a petition for writ of possession, it is

The right of the purchaser to the possession of the

property after the period of redemption has lapsed and no
redemption was made under the old rule, has not been
changed with the advent of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. The only significant change is the time when
the period of redemption period would start. Under the old
Rules, the redemption period would commence after the
sale, while under the present Rule, the period to reckon
with is the date of registration of the certificate of sale with
the proper Registry of Deeds.

well to state that the proceeding is ex parte and summary in nature.It is a

judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only and without
notice by the court to any person adverse of interest. It is a proceeding
wherein relief is granted without giving the person against whom the relief
is sought an opportunity to be heard. [50] Consequently, so too was the
nature of the urgent motion, it was ex-parte and summary in nature.

Moreover, it is settled that the issuance of a writ of possession to a

purchaser in a public auction is a ministerial act. After the consolidation of
title in the buyers name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the
property, entitlement to the writ of possession becomes a matter of right.
[51]

To be sure, regardless of whether or not there is a pending action for

nullification of the sale at public auction, the purchaser is entitled to a writ

of
[52]

possession

without prejudice to the outcome of

such

action.

Undeniably, Alfredo

failed to redeem the property within the redemption period and, thereafter,
ownership was consolidated in favor of the Bank and a new certificate of
title, TCT No. 221703, was issued in its name. It was, therefore, a purely
ministerial duty for the trial court to issue a writ of possession in favor of
the Bank and issue the Order granting the motion for designation of
another sheriff to serve the writ, which is merely an order enforcing the
writ of possession.

In the instant case, there is no dispute that the

property of the petitioner was sold in an execution sale in
favor of the respondent bank and that no redemption was
made by the former over the said property within the
required one-year period. It has been held that a writ of
possession may be issued in favor of the purchaser in an
execution sale when the deed of conveyance has been
executed and delivered to him after the period of
redemption has expired and no redemption has been made
by the judgment debtor. After such period, the judgment
debtor would be divested of his ownership of the
property. Thus, just like in extrajudicial foreclosure, the
issuance of the writ of possession after the lapse of the
period of redemption is ministerial on the part of the court.
It is the contention of the petitioner that a writ of
possession could only be validly issued upon consolidation
of title and ownership in the name of the purchaser. We
agree. The petitioner then argues that a valid consolidation
could be obtained only upon filing of a separate action with
the RTC acting as a cadastral court. That we dont
agree. The petitioner cited the case of Padilla, Jr. v.
Philippine Producers Cooperative Marketing Association,
Inc., to support his argument. The said case involved the
issuance of a new title in the name of the purchaser. In
fact, the primary issue therein is whether in implementing
the involuntary transfer of title of real property levied and
sold on execution, it is enough for the executing party to
file a motion with the court which rendered judgment, or
does he need to file a separate action with the Regional
Trial Court. There is nothing therein which states that a
new title in the name of the purchaser is necessary for the
validity of the writ of possession. On the contrary, a
perusal of the said case would reveal that a purchaser, by
virtue of a levy and an execution sale, would become the

new lawful owner of the property sold if not redeemed

within the one-year period.
Following the argument of the petitioner, he might
have confused consolidation of title and ownership with the
issuance or application for a new title after the redemption
as provided for in Section 75 of Presidential Decree No.
1529. Title and ownership to the property is consolidated
upon the lapse of the period of redemption. It is automatic
upon the failure of the judgment obligor to exercise his
right of redemption within the period allowed by law. Title
may be consolidated in the name of the purchaser even
without a new title issued in his name. The term title as
used in consolidation does not pertain to the certificate of
title, or piece of paper, issued by the Register of Deeds,
which is a mere evidence of ownership. It is synonymous
with ownership.
There is neither law nor jurisprudence which requires
that the certificate of title to the property must first be
cancelled and a new one be issued in favor of the
purchaser before a valid consolidation of title and
ownership could be said to have taken place, and before a
court could issue a writ of possession, or an order
designating a sheriff to enforce such writ.
Not even the pendency of another action with the
appellate courts involving the validity of the writ of
possession can stop the enforcement of the said writ in the
absence of any restraining order or injunctive writ from the
said courts. Accordingly, considering that this Court and
the Supreme Court have not issued any temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction against the
order of the court a quo for the issuance of writ of
possession, we see no cogent reason why the said writ
could not be effectively enforced.

The RTC, therefore, acted well within its jurisdiction in

issuing the questioned order granting the urgent exparte motion of the respondent bank which proceeds from
the writ of possession which had long been issued. For all
the foregoing, there is no need to address the other issues.
[53]

As regards petitioners remaining arguments, suffice it to say that

this is not an appeal from the Decision and Orders of the RTC in the
collection case in Civil Case No. 142309 which, to reiterate, has become
final and executory,[54] the correctness of the judgment is, therefore, not in
issue. Accordingly, there is no need to address the other errors allegedly
committed by the trial court in issuing the assailed Orders.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, and subject to the above

disquisitions, both petitions are DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals, dated November 17, 2004 and April 7, 2005, in CA-G.R. SP No.
87217; and the Decision and Resolution dated July 31, 2008 and June 19,
2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 96675, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.