Case digest

MUSTANG LUMBER vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Petitioner was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest Development. The Special Actions
and Investigation Division of the DENR were informed that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs
were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner. The SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen and
sent it to conduct surveillance. In the course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard
the petitioner's truck loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver
could not produce the required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its
cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises
because of the refusal of the owner. The team was able to secure a search warrant. By virtue thereof, the team
seized on that date from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a
negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various
species including almaciga and supa. On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's
lumberyard and placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan
lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the
corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the source
of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin. Parenthetically, it may be
stated that under an administrative seizure the owner retains the physical possession of the seized articles.
Only an inventory of the articles is taken and signed by the owner or his representative. The owner is
prohibited from disposing them until further orders. On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to
the Chief of SAID Robles requesting an extension of fifteen days to produce the required documents covering
the seized articles because some of them, particularly the certificate of lumber origin, were allegedly in the
Province of Quirino. Robles denied the petition. Subsequently, the Sec. of DENR Factoran issued an order
confiscating the woods seized in the truck of the petitioner as well as those found in their lumberyard.
Issue:
Whether or not that a lumber cannot be considered a timber and that petitioner should not be held for illegal
logging.
Held:
The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an affirmance of the respondent
Judge's conclusion that lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and
thus possession thereof without the required legal documents is not a crime. On the contrary, the SC rules that
such possession is penalized in the said section because lumber is included in the term timber. The Revised
Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products
as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the
definition of "Processing plant," which reads: Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or
combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer,
plywood, wall bond, block board, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products. This simply means
that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its
ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary,

lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market." Simply put, lumber is a
processed log or timber. It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases
used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar as possession
of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes
no distinction between raw or processed timber.
Full text
G.R. No. 104988 June 18, 1996
MUSTANG
LUMBER,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special
Actions and Investigations Division, DENR, respondents.
G.R. No. 106424 June 18, 1996
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
petitioner,
vs.
HON. TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and RI CHUY
PO, respondents.
G.R. No. 123784 June 18, 1996
MUSTANG
LUMBER,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions and
Investigation Division, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), ATTY.
NESTOR V. GAPUSAN, TIRSO P. PARIAN, JR., and FELIPE H. CALLORINA, JR., respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

The first and third case, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784, were originally assigned to the Second and
Third Divisions of the Court, respectively. They were subsequently consolidated with the second, a case of the
Court en banc.
Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at Nos. 1350-1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila,
and with a Lumberyard at Fortune Street, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly
registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) under Certificate of Registration
No. NRD-4-092590-0469. Its permit as such was to expire on 25 September 1990.
Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and respondent Atty. Vincent A. Robles were, during all the
time material to these cases, the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
and the Chief of the Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID) of the DENR, respectively.
The material operative facts are as follows:
On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen
inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the SAID organized a team of foresters
and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team
members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, loaded with

lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required
invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at
the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. 1 The team was not able to gain entry into the premises
because of the refusal of the owner. 2
On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that date from
the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra
lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and
supa. 3
On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela and placed
under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume
of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the corresponding certificate of
lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the
lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin. 4
Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an administrative seizure the owner retains the physical possession
of the seized articles. Only an inventory of the articles is taken and signed by the owner or his representative.
The owner is prohibited from disposing them until further orders. 5
On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to Robles requesting an extension of fifteen days from
14 April 1990 to produce the required documents covering the seized articles because some of them,
particularly the certificate of lumber origin, were allegedly in the Province of Quirino Robles denied the motion
on the ground that the documents being required from the petitioner must accompany the lumber or forest
products placed under seizure. 6
On 11 April 1990, Robles submitted his memorandum-report recommending to Secretary Factoran the
following:
1. Suspension and subsequent cancellation of the lumber Dealer's Permit of Mustang Lumber,
Inc. for operating an unregistered lumberyard and resaw mill and possession of Almaciga
Lumber (a banned specie) without the required documents;
2. Confiscation of the lumber seized at the Mustang Lumberyard including the truck with Plate
No. CCK-322 and the lumber loaded herein [sic] now at the DENR compound in the event its
owner fails to submit documents showing legitimacy of the source of said lumber within ten
days from date of seizure;
3. Filing of criminal charges against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of Mustang Lumber Inc. and Mr.
Ruiz, or if the circumstances warrant for illegal possession of narra and almaciga lumber and
shorts if and when recommendation no. 2 pushes through;
4. Confiscation of Trucks with Plate No. CCS-639 and CDV. 458 as well as the lumber loaded
therein for transport lumber using "recycled" documents. 7
On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending immediately the petitioner's lumber-dealer's
permit No. NRD-4-092590-0469 and directing the petitioner to explain in writing within fifteen days why its
lumber-dealer's permit should not be cancelled.
On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another letter to Robles informing the latter that the
petitioner had already secured the required documents and was ready to submit them. None, however, was
submitted. 8
On 3 May 1990, Secretary Factoran issued another order wherein, after reciting the events which took place on
1 April and 3 April 1990, he ordered "CONFISCATED in favor of the government to be disposed of in

accordance with law" the approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts, and
sticks found inside the petitioner's lumberyard. 9
On 11 July 1990, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a
prayer for a restraining order or preliminary injunction against Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and Atty.
Vincent A. Robles. The case (hereinafter, the FIRST CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-53648 and
assigned to Branch 35 of the said court. The petitioner questioned therein (a) the seizure on 1 April 1990,
without any search and seizure order issued by a judge, of its truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and its cargo of
assorted lumber consisting of apitong, tanguile, and lauan of different sizes and dimensions with a total value
of P38,000.00; and (b) the orders of Secretary Factoran of 23 April 1990 for lack of prior notice and hearing
and of 3 May 1990 for violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.
On 17 September 1990, in response to reports that violations of P.D. No. 705 (The Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines), as amended, were committed and acting upon instruction of Robles and under Special Order No.
897, series of 1990, a team of DENR agents went to the business premises of the petitioner located at No. 1352
Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila. The team caught the petitioner operating as a lumber dealer although its
lumber-dealer's permit had already been suspended or 23 April 1990. Since the gate of the petitioner's
lumberyard was open, the team went inside and saw an owner-type jeep with a trailer loaded with lumber.
Upon investigation, the team was informed that the lumber loaded on the trailer was to be delivered to the
petitioner's customer. It also came upon the sales invoice covering the transaction. The members of the team
then introduced themselves to the caretaker, one Ms. Chua, who turned out to be the wife of the petitioner's
president and general manager, Mr. Ri Chuy Po, who was then out of town. The team's photographer was able
to take photographs of the stockpiles of lumber including newly cut ones, fresh dust around sawing or cutting
machineries and equipment, and the transport vehicles loaded with lumber. The team thereupon effected a
constructive seizure of approximately 20,000 board feet of lauan lumber in assorted sizes stockpiled in the
premises
by
issuing
a
receipt
therefor. 10
As a consequence of this 17 September 1990 incident, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition
forcertiorari and prohibition. The case (hereinafter, the SECOND CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No.
90-54610 and assigned to Branch 24 of the said court.
In the meantime, Robles filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint against the petitioner's
president and general manager, Ri Chuy Po, for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O.
No. 277. After appropriate preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor, Claro Arellano, handed
down a resolution 11whose dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information be filed
against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber
consisting of almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in violation of
Sec. 68 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987.
It is further recommended that the 30,000 bd. ft. of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs covered
by legal documents be released to the rightful owner, Malupa. 12
This resolution was approved by Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, who served as Chairman of
the Task Force on Illegal Logging." 13
On the basis of that resolution, an information was filed on 5 June 1991 by the DOJ with Branch 172 of the RTC
of Valenzuela, charging Ri Chuy Po with the violation of Section 58 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 (hereinafter, the CRIMINAL CASE). The accusatory portion of the
information reads as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent thereto, within the
premises and vicinity of Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and

there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully have in his possession truckloads of almaciga and
lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including
almaciga and supa, without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations. 14
On 7 June 1991, Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila rendered its decision 15 in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment in this case is rendered as follows:
1. The Order of Respondent Secretary of the DENR, the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,
dated 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation in favor of the Government the approximately
311,000 board feet of Lauan, supa, end almaciga Lumber, shorts and sticks, found inside and
seized from the Lumberyard of the petitioner at Fortune Drive, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on April 4, 1990 (Exhibit 10), is hereby set aside and vacated, and
instead the respondents are required to report and bring to the Hon. Adriano Osorio, Executive
Judge, Regional Trial Court, NCR, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the said 311,000 board feet of
Lauan, supa and almaciga Lumber, shorts and sticks, to be dealt with as directed by Law;
2. The respondents are required to initiate and prosecute the appropriate action before the
proper court regarding the Lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions Loaded
in petitioner's truck bearing Plate No. CCK-322 which were seized on April 1, 1990;
3. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on August 2, 1990 shall be
rendered functus oficio upon compliance by the respondents with paragraphs 1 and 2 of this
judgment;.
4. Action on the prayer of the petitioner that the Lauan, supa and almaciga lumber, shorts and
sticks mentioned above in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment be returned to said petitioner is
withheld in this case until after the proper court has taken cognizance and determined how
those Lumber, shorts and sticks should be disposed of; and
5. The petitioner is ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the warrantless search and seizure on 1 April 1990 of the
petitioner's truck, which was moving out from the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded
with large volumes of lumber without covering document showing the legitimacy of its source or origin did not
offend the constitutional mandate that search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant. The situation
fell under one of the settled and accepted exceptions where warrantless search and seizure is justified, viz., a
search of a moving vehicle. 16 As to the seizure of a large volume of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber and
shorts effected on 4 April 1990, the trial court ruled that the said seizure was a continuation of that made the
previous day and was still pursuant to or by virtue of the search warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio
whose validity the petitioner did not even question. 17And, although the search warrant did not specifically
mention almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber and shorts, their seizure was valid because it is settled that the
executing officer is not required to ignore contrabands observed during the conduct of the
search. 18
The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation of the
seized articles in favor of the Government for the reason that since the articles were seized pursuant to the
search warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio they should have been returned to him in compliance with
the directive in the warrant.

As to the propriety of the 23 April 1990 order of Secretary Factoran, the trial court ruled that the same had
been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of the petitioner's lumber dealer's permit on 25 September
1990, a fact the petitioner admitted in its memorandum.
The petitioner forthwith appealed from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE to the Court of Appeals, which
docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 25510.
On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL CASE a Motion to Quash and/or to Suspend
Proceedings based on the following grounds: (a) the information does not charge an offense, for possession
oflumber, as opposed to timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even
grantingarguendo that lumber falls within the purview of the said section, the same may not be used in
evidence against him for they were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure; and (b) Civil Case No. 90-53648 of
Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila, the FIRST CIVIL CASE, then pending before the Court of Appeals, which
involves the legality of the seizure, raises a prejudicial question. 19
The prosecution opposed the motion alleging that lumber is included in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, and possession thereof without the required legal documents is penalized therein. It referred to
Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, series of 1989, for the definitions of timber and lumber, and
then argued that exclusion of lumber from Section 68 would defeat the very purpose of the law, i.e., to
minimize, if not halt, illegal logging that has resulted in the rapid denudation of our forest resources. 20
In her order of 16 August 1991 in the CRIMINAL CASE, 21 respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong granted
the motion to quash and dismissed the case on the ground that "possession of lumber without the legal
documents required by forest laws and regulations is not a crime. 22
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied in the order of 18 October 1991, 23 the People filed a petition
forcertiorari with this Court in G.R. No. 106424, wherein it contends that the respondent Judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to quash and in dismissing the case.
On 29 November 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 24 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 dismissing for lack
of merit the petitioner's appeal from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE and affirming the trial court's
rulings on the issues raised. As to the claim that the truck was not carrying contraband articles since there is no
law punishing the possession oflumber, and that lumber is not timber whose possession without the required
legal documents is unlawful under P.D. No. 705, as amended, the Court of Appeals held:
This undue emphasis on lumber or the commercial nature of the forest product involved has
always been foisted by those who claim to be engaged in the legitimate business of lumber
dealership. But what is important to consider is that when appellant was required to present the
valid documents showing its acquisition and lawful possession of the lumber in question, it
failed to present any despite the period of extension granted to it. 25
The petitioner's motion to reconsider the said decision was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 3
March 1992. 26 Hence, the petitioner came to this Court by way of a petition for review
on certiorari in G.R. No. 104988, which was filed on 2 May 1992. 27
On 24 September 1992, Branch 24 of the RTC of Manila handed down a decision in the SECOND CIVIL CASE
dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition because (a) the petitioner did not exhaust administrative
remedies; (b) when the seizure was made on 17 September 1990 the petitioner could not lawfully sell lumber,
as its license was still under suspension; (c) the seizure was valid under Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as
amended; and (d) the seizure was justified as a warrantless search and seizure under Section 80 of P.D. No.
705, as amended.
The petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP
No.33778.

In its decision 28 of 31 July 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petitioner's appeal in CA-G.R. SP No.
33778 for lack of merit and sustained the grounds relied upon by the trial court in dismissing the SECOND
CIVIL CASE. Relying on the definition of "lumber" by Webster, viz., "timber or logs, especially after being
prepared for the market," and by the Random House Dictionary of the English Language, viz., "wood, esp.
when suitable or adapted for various building purposes," the respondent Court held that since wood is included
in the definition of forest product in Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended, lumber is necessarily included
in Section 68 under the term forest product.
The Court of Appeals further emphasized that a forest officer or employee can seize the forest product involved
in a violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 pursuant to Section 80 thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 1775, which
provides in part as follows:
Sec. 80. Arrest, Institution of Criminal Actions. -- A forest officer or employee of the Bureau or
any personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police shall arrest even
without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the
offenses defined in this chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government,
the tools and equipment used in committing the offense, or the forest products cut, gathered or
taken by the offender in the process of committing the offense.
Among the offenses punished in the chapter referred to in said Section 80 are the cutting, gathering, collection,
or removal of timber or other forest products or possession of timber or other forest products without the
required legal documents.
Its motion to reconsider the decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in the resolution of 6
February 1996, the petitioner filed with this Court on 27 February 1996 a petition for review
on certiorari in G.R. No.123784.
We shall now resolve these three cases starting with G.R. No. 106424 with which the other two were
consolidated.
G.R. No. 106424
The petitioner had moved to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 on the ground that it does
not charge an offense. Respondent Judge Dizon-Capulong granted the motion reasoning that the subject
matter of the information in the CRIMINAL CASE is LUMBER, which is neither "timber" nor "other forest
product" under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and hence, possession thereof without the required
legal documents is not prohibited and penalized under the said section.
Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, an information may be quashed on the ground
that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense. It has been said that "the test for the correctness of
this ground is the sufficiency of the averments in the information, that is, whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically
admitted,
constitute
the
elements
of
the
offense, 29 and matters aliunde will not be considered." Anent the sufficiency of the information, Section 6,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court requires, inter alia, that the information state the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense.
Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No.
277, which provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without
License. -- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land,
without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of
partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,

collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to
the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any
forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products
are found.
Punished then in this section are (1) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other
forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; and (b) possession of timber
forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.
Indeed, the word lumber does not appear in Section 68. But conceding ex gratia that this omission amounts to
an exclusion of lumber from the section's coverage, do the facts averred in the information in the CRIMINAL
CASE validly charge a violation of the said section?
A cursory reading of the information readily leads us to an infallible conclusion that lumber is not solely its
subject matter. It is evident therefrom that what are alleged to be in the possession of the private respondent,
without the required legal documents, are truckloads of
(1) almaciga and lauan; and
(2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species
including almaciga and supa.
The "almaciga and lauan" specifically mentioned in no. (1) are not described as "lumber." They cannot
refer to the "lumber" in no. (2) because they are separated by the words "approximately 200,000 bd. ft."
with the conjunction "and," and not with the preposition "of." They must then be raw forest products or,
more specifically, timbers under Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which reads:
Sec. 3. Definitions. -xxx xxx xxx
(q) Forest product means timber, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil,
honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest plant, the associated water, fish
game, scenic, historical, recreational and geological resources in forest lands.
It follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered by the information. The public and the private
respondents obviously miscomprehended the averments in the information. Accordingly, even if lumber is not
included in Section 68, the other items therein as noted above fall within the ambit of the said section, and as
to them, the information validly charges an offense.
Our respected brother, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, suggests in his dissenting opinion that this Court go beyond
the four corners of the information for enlightenment as to whether the information exclusively refers
to lumber. With the aid of the pleadings and the annexes thereto, he arrives at the conclusion that "only lumber
has been envisioned in the indictment."
The majority is unable to subscribe to his view. First, his proposition violates the rule that only the facts alleged
in the information vis-a-vis the law violated must be considered in determining whether an information
charges an offense.

Second, the pleadings and annexes he resorted to are insufficient to justify his conclusion. On the contrary, the
Joint Affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman Belleng, which is one of the annexes he referred
to, 30 cannot lead one to infer that what the team seized was all lumber. Paragraph 8 thereof expressly states:
8. That when inside the compound, the team found approximately four (4)
truckloads ofnarra shorts, trimmings and slabs and a negligible amount of narra
lumber, and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various
species including almaciga and supa which are classified as prohibited wood
species. (emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the dispositive portion of the resolution 31 of the investigating prosecutor, which
served as the basis for the filing of the information, does not limit itself to lumber; thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information be filed
against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of
almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 63 of PD
705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987. (emphasis supplied)
The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an affirmance of the respondent
Judge's conclusion that lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and
thus possession thereof without the required legal documents is not a crime. On the contrary, this Court rules
that such possession is penalized in the said section because lumber is included in the term timber.
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is included
in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same
section in the definition of "Processing plant," which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of
machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials
into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallbond, blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or
other finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code
uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third
New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for
the market."32 Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should
be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. 33 And insofar as possession of timber without the
required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between
raw or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguere debemus.
Indisputably, respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong of Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to quash the information in the
CRIMINAL CASE and in dismissing the said case.
G.R. No. 104988
We find this petition to be without merit. The petitioner has miserably failed to show that the Court of Appeals
committed any reversible error in its assailed decision of 29 November 1991.
It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the petitioner's truck with Plate No. CCK-322 was coming out from
the petitioner's lumberyard loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of different sizes and dimensions which
were not accompanied with the required invoices and transport documents. The seizure of such truck and its
cargo was a valid exercise of the power vested upon a forest officer or employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705,
as amended by P.D. No. 1775. Then, too, as correctly held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals in the

FIRST CIVIL CASE, the search was conducted on a moving vehicle. Such a search could be lawfully conducted
without a search warrant.
Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the constitutional
mandate 34 that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after
personally determining the existence of probable cause. The other exceptions are (3) search as an incident to a
lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) customs searches, and (4) consented warrantless
search. 35
We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the search on 4 April 1990 was a
continuation of the search on 3 April 1990 done under and by virtue of the search warrant issued on 3 April
1990 by Executive Judge Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a search warrant has a
lifetime of ten days. Hence, it could be served at any time within the said period, and if its object or purpose
cannot be accomplished in one day, the same may be continued the following day or days until completed.
Thus, when the search under a warrant on one day was interrupted, it may be continued under the same
warrant the following day, provided it is still within the ten-day period. 36
As to the final plea of the petitioner that the search was illegal because possession of lumber without the
required legal documents is not illegal under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, since lumber is neither
specified therein nor included in the term forest product, the same hardly merits further discussion in view of
our ruling in G.R. No. 106424.
G.R. No. 123784
The allegations and arguments set forth in the petition in this case palpally fail to shaw prima facie that a
reversible error has been committed by the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision of 31 July 1995 and
resolution of 6 February 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778. We must, forthwith, deny it for utter want of merit.
There is no need to require the respondents to comment on the petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioner's appeal from the judgment of the trial court in the
SECOND CIVIL CASE. The petitioner never disputed the fact that its lumber-dealer's license or permit had
been suspended by Secretary Factoran on 23 April 1990. The suspension was never lifted, and since the license
had only a lifetime of up to 25 September 1990, the petitioner has absolutely no right to possess, sell, or
otherwise dispose of lumber. Accordingly, Secretary Factoran or his authorized representative had the
authority to seize the Lumber pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which provides as
follows:
Sec. 68-A Administrative Authority of the Department Head or his Duly Authorized
Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest
laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative may
order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or
abandoned. . . .
The petitioner's insistence that possession or sale of lumber is not penalized must also fail view of our
disquisition and ruling on the same issue in G.R. No. 106424. Besides, the issue is totally irrelevant in the
SECOND CIVIL CASE which involves administrative seizure as a consequence of the violation of the
suspension of the petitioner's license as lumber dealer.
All told then, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784 are nothing more than rituals to cover up blatant violations
of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 705), as amended. They are presumably trifling
attempts to block the serious efforts of the DENR to enforce the decree, efforts which deserve the
commendation of the public in light of the urgent need to take firm and decisive action against despoilers of
our forests whose continuous destruction only ensures to the generations to come, if not the present, an
inheritance of parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The Government must not tire in its vigilance to
protect the environment by prosecuting without fear or favor any person who dares to violate our laws for the
utilization and protection of our forests.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

1. (a) GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 106424; (b) SETTING ASIDE and ANNULLING, for
having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion, the challenged orders of 16 August 1991
and 18 October 1991 of respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, Branch 172, Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Ri Chuy Po"; (c) REINSTATING the information in the said criminal case; and
(d) DIRECTING the respondent Judge or her successor to hear and decide the case with
purposeful dispatch; and
2. DENYING the petitions in G.R. No. 104988 and in G. R. No. 123784 for utter failure of the
petitioner to show that the respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in the
challenged decisions of 29 November 1991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 in the FIRST CIVIL CASE
and of 31 July 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 on the SECOND CIVIL CASE.
Costs against the petitioner in each of these three cases.
SO ORDERED.