9/20/2016

G.R.No.159636

TodayisTuesday,September20,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
FIRSTDIVISION
G.R.No.159636November25,2004
VICTORYLINER,INC.,petitioner,
vs.
ROSALITOGAMMAD,APRILROSSANP.GAMMAD,ROIROZANOP.GAMMADandDIANAFRANCESP.
GAMMAD,respondents.

DECISION

YNARESSANTIAGO,J.:
AssailedinthispetitionforreviewoncertiorariistheApril11,2003decision1oftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.
CV No. 63290 which affirmed with modification the November 6, 1998 decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, Branch 5 finding petitioner Victory Liner, Inc. liable for breach of contract of carriage in
CivilCaseNo.5023.
The facts as testified by respondent Rosalito Gammad show that on March 14, 1996, his wife Marie Grace
PagulayanGammad,3wasonboardanairconditionedVictoryLinerbusboundforTuguegarao,Cagayanfrom
Manila.Atabout3:00a.m.,thebuswhilerunningatahighspeedfellonaravinesomewhereinBarangayBaliling,
Sta.Fe,NuevaVizcaya,whichresultedinthedeathofMarieGraceandphysicalinjuriestootherpassengers.4
OnMay14,1996,respondentheirsofthedeceasedfiledacomplaint5fordamagesarisingfromculpacontractual
against petitioner. In its answer,6 the petitioner claimed that the incident was purely accidental and that it has
alwaysexercisedextraordinarydiligenceinits50yearsofoperation.
Afterseveralresettings,7pretrialwassetonApril10,1997.8 For failure to appear on the said date, petitioner
wasdeclaredasindefault.9However,onpetitionersmotion10tolifttheorderofdefault,thesamewasgranted
bythetrialcourt.11
AtthepretrialonMay6,1997,petitionerdidnotwanttoadmittheproposedstipulationthatthedeceasedwasa
passengeroftheVictoryLinerBuswhichfellontheravineandthatshewasissuedPassengerTicketNo.977785.
Respondents,fortheirpart,didnotacceptpetitionersproposaltopayP50,000.00.12
After respondent Rosalito Gammad completed his direct testimony, crossexamination was scheduled for
November17,199713butmovedtoDecember8,1997,14becausethepartiesandthecounselfailedtoappear.
OnDecember8,1997,counselofpetitionerwasabsentdespiteduenoticeandwasdeemedtohavewaivedright
tocrossexaminerespondentRosalito.15
PetitionersmotiontoresetthepresentationofitsevidencetoMarch25,199816wasgranted.However,onMarch
24, 1998, the counsel of petitioner sent the court a telegram17 requesting postponement but the telegram was
received by the trial court on March 25, 1998, after it had issued an order considering the case submitted for
decisionforfailureofpetitionerandcounseltoappear.18
OnNovember6,1998,thetrialcourtrendereditsdecisioninfavorofrespondents,thedispositiveportionofwhich
reads:

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/nov2004/gr_159636_2004.html

1/9

9/20/2016

G.R.No.159636

WHEREFORE,premisesconsideredandintheinterestofjustice,judgmentisherebyrenderedinfavorof
theplaintiffsandagainstthedefendantVictoryLiner,Incorporated,orderingthelattertopaythefollowing:
1.ActualDamagesP122,000.00
2.DeathIndemnity50,000.00
3.ExemplaryandMoralDamages400,000.00
4.CompensatoryDamages1,500,000.00
5.AttorneysFees10%ofthetotalamountgranted
6.CostoftheSuit.
SOORDERED.19
Onappealbypetitioner,theCourtofAppealsaffirmedthedecisionofthetrialcourtwithmodificationasfollows:
[T]he Decision dated 06 November 1998 is hereby MODIFIED to reflect that the following are hereby
adjudgedinfavorofplaintiffsappellees:
1.ActualDamagesintheamountofP88,270.00
2.CompensatoryDamagesintheamountofP1,135,536,10
3.MoralandExemplaryDamagesintheamountofP400,000.00and
4.Attorneysfeesequivalentto10%ofthesumoftheactual,compensatory,moral,andexemplary
damageshereinadjudged.
ThecourtaquosjudgmentofthecostofthesuitagainstdefendantappellantisherebyAFFIRMED.
SOORDERED.20
Represented by a new counsel, petitioner on May 21, 2003 filed a motion for reconsideration praying that the
caseberemandedtothetrialcourtforcrossexaminationofrespondentswitnessandforthepresentationofits
evidence or in the alternative, dismiss the respondents complaint.21 Invoking APEX Mining, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,22 petitioner argues, inter alia, that the decision of the trial court should be set aside because the
negligenceofitsformercounsel,Atty.AntonioB.Paguirigan,infailingtoappearatthescheduledhearingsand
move for reconsideration of the orders declaring petitioner to have waived the right to crossexamine
respondentswitnessandrighttopresentevidence,deprivedpetitionerofitsdayincourt.
OnAugust21,2003,theCourtofAppealsdeniedpetitionersmotionforreconsideration.23
Hence, this petition for review principally based on the fact that the mistake or gross negligence of its counsel
deprived petitioner of due process of law. Petitioner also argues that the trial courts award of damages were
withoutbasisandshouldbedeleted.
The issues for resolution are: (1) whether petitioners counsel was guilty of gross negligence (2) whether
petitioner should be held liable for breach of contract of carriage and (3) whether the award of damages was
proper.
Itissettledthatthenegligenceofcounselbindstheclient.Thisisbasedontherulethatanyactperformedbya
counselwithinthescopeofhisgeneralorimpliedauthorityisregardedasanactofhisclient.Consequently,the
mistake or negligence of counsel may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against the client.
However,theapplicationofthegeneralruletoagivencaseshouldbelookedintoandadoptedaccordingtothe
surrounding circumstances obtaining. Thus, exceptions to the foregoing have been recognized by the court in
cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when its
application will result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property or where the interests of justice so
require, and accord relief to the client who suffered by reason of the lawyers gross or palpable mistake or
negligence.24
The exceptions, however, are not present in this case. The record shows that Atty. Paguirigan filed an Answer
and Pretrial Brief for petitioner. Although initially declared as in default, Atty. Paguirigan successfully moved for
thesettingasideoftheorderofdefault.Infact,petitionerwasrepresentedbyAtty.Paguiriganatthepretrialwho
proposed settlement for P50,000.00. Although Atty. Paguirigan failed to file motions for reconsideration of the
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/nov2004/gr_159636_2004.html

2/9

9/20/2016

G.R.No.159636

orders declaring petitioner to have waived the right to crossexamine respondents witness and to present
evidence,henevertheless,filedatimelyappealwiththeCourtofAppealsassailingthedecisionofthetrialcourt.
Hence,petitionersclaimthatitwasdenieddueprocesslacksbasis.
Petitioner too is not entirely blameless. Prior to the issuance of the order declaring it as in default for not
appearingatthepretrial,threenotices(datedOctober23,1996,25January30,1997,26andMarch26,1997,27)
requiringattendanceatthepretrialweresentanddulyreceivedbypetitioner.However,itwasonlyonApril27,
1997,aftertheissuanceoftheApril10,1997orderofdefaultforfailuretoappearatthepretrialwhenpetitioner,
through its finance and administrative manager, executed a special power of attorney28 authorizing Atty.
Paguiriganoranymemberofhislawfirmtorepresentpetitioneratthepretrial.Petitionerisguilty,attheleast,of
contributorynegligenceandfaultcannotbeimputedsolelyonpreviouscounsel.
The case of APEX Mining, Inc., invoked by petitioner is not on all fours with the case at bar. In APEX, the
negligent counsel not only allowed the adverse decision against his client to become final and executory, but
deliberatelymisrepresentedintheprogressreportthatthecasewasstillpendingwiththeCourtofAppealswhen
thesamewasdismissed16monthsago.29ThesecircumstancesareabsentinthiscasebecauseAtty.Paguirigan
timelyfiledanappealfromthedecisionofthetrialcourtwiththeCourtofAppeals.
InGoldLineTransit,Inc.v.Ramos,30theCourtwassimilarlyconfrontedwiththeissueofwhetherornottheclient
should bear the adverse consequences of its counsels negligence. In that case, Gold Line Transit, Inc. (Gold
Line) and its lawyer failed to appear at the pretrial despite notice and was declared as in default. After the
plaintiffspresentationofevidenceexparte,thetrialcourtrendereddecisionorderingGoldLinetopaydamages
totheheirsofitsdeceasedpassenger.ThedecisionbecamefinalandexecutorybecausecounselofGoldLine
did not file any appeal. Finding that Goldline was not denied due process of law and is thus bound by the
negligenceofitslawyer,theCourtheldasfollows
This leads us to the question of whether the negligence of counsel was so gross and reckless that
petitionerwasdeprivedofitsrighttodueprocessoflaw.Wedonotbelieveso.Itcannotbedeniedthatthe
requirementsofdueprocesswereobservedintheinstantcase.Petitionerwasneverdeprivedofitsdayin
court,asinfactitwasaffordedeveryopportunitytobeheard.Thus,itisofrecordthatnoticesweresentto
petitioner and that its counsel was able to file a motion to dismiss the complaint, an answer to the
complaint, and even a pretrial brief. What was irretrievably lost by petitioner was its opportunity to
participateinthetrialofthecaseandtoadduceevidenceinitsbehalfbecauseofnegligence.
Intheapplicationoftheprincipleofdueprocess,whatissoughttobesafeguardedagainstisnotthelackof
previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. The question is not whether petitioner
succeededindefendingitsrightsandinterests,butsimply,whetherithadtheopportunitytopresentitsside
ofthecontroversy.Verily,aspetitionerretainedtheservicesofcounselofitschoice,itshould,asfarasthis
suitisconcerned,beartheconsequencesofitschoiceofafaultyoption.Itspleathatitwasdeprivedofdue
processechoesonhollowgroundandcertainlycannotelicitapprovalnorsympathy.
Tocatertopetitionersargumentsandreinstateitspetitionforrelieffromjudgmentwouldputapremiumon
the negligence of its former counsel and encourage the nontermination of this case by reason thereof.
Thisisonecasewherepetitionerhastobeartheadverseconsequencesofitscounselsact,foraclientis
boundbytheactionofhiscounselintheconductofacaseandhecannotthereafterbeheardtocomplain
thattheresultmighthavebeendifferenthadhiscounselproceededdifferently.Therationalefortheruleis
easily discernible. If the negligence of counsel be admitted as a reason for opening cases, there would
never be an end to a suit so long as a new counsel could be hired every time it is shown that the prior
counselhadnotbeensufficientlydiligent,experiencedorlearned.31
Similarly,inMacalalagv.Ombudsman,32aPhilippinePostalCorporationemployeechargedwithdishonestywas
notabletofileananswerandpositionpaper.Hewasfoundguiltysolelyonthebasisofcomplainantsevidence
and was dismissed with forfeiture of all benefits and disqualification from government service. Challenging the
decisionoftheOmbudsman,theemployeecontendedthatthegrossnegligenceofhiscounseldeprivedhimof
dueprocessoflaw.Indebunkinghiscontention,theCourtsaid
Neither can he claim that he is not bound by his lawyers actions it is only in case of gross or palpable
negligence of counsel when the courts can step in and accord relief to a client who would have suffered
thereby.Ifeveryperceivedmistake,failureofdiligence,lackofexperienceorinsufficientlegalknowledgeof
the lawyer would be admitted as a reason for the reopening of a case, there would be no end to
controversy.Fundamentaltoourjudicialsystemistheprinciplethateverylitigationmustcometoanend.It
wouldbeaclearmockeryifitwereotherwise.Accesstothecourtsisguaranteed,buttheremustbealimit
toit.
Viewed visvis the foregoing jurisprudence, to sustain petitioners argument that it was denied due process of
law due to negligence of its counsel would set a dangerous precedent. It would enable every party to render
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/nov2004/gr_159636_2004.html

3/9

9/20/2016

G.R.No.159636

inutileanyadverseorderordecisionthroughthesimpleexpedientofalleginggrossnegligenceonthepartofits
counsel. The Court will not countenance such a farce which contradicts longsettled doctrines of trial and
procedure.33
Anentthesecondissue,petitionerwascorrectlyfoundliableforbreachofcontractofcarriage.Acommoncarrier
isboundtocarryitspassengerssafelyasfarashumancareandforesightcanprovide,usingtheutmostdiligence
ofverycautiouspersons,withdueregardtoallthecircumstances.Inacontractofcarriage,itispresumedthat
thecommoncarrierwasatfaultorwasnegligentwhenapassengerdiesorisinjured.Unlessthepresumptionis
rebutted, the court need not even make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common
carrier. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary
diligence.34
In the instant case, there is no evidence to rebut the statutory presumption that the proximate cause of Marie
Gracesdeathwasthenegligenceofpetitioner.Hence,thecourtsbelowcorrectlyruledthatpetitionerwasguilty
ofbreachofcontractofcarriage.
Nevertheless,theawardofdamagesshouldbemodified.
Article176435inrelationtoArticle220636oftheCivilCode,holdsthecommoncarrierinbreachofitscontractof
carriagethatresultsinthedeathofapassengerliabletopaythefollowing:(1)indemnityfordeath,(2)indemnity
forlossofearningcapacity,and(3)moraldamages.
In the present case, respondent heirs of the deceased are entitled to indemnity for the death of Marie Grace
whichundercurrentjurisprudenceisfixedatP50,000.00.37
Theawardofcompensatorydamagesforthelossofthedeceasedsearningcapacityshouldbedeletedforlack
ofbasis.Asarule,documentaryevidenceshouldbepresentedtosubstantiatetheclaimfordamagesforlossof
earningcapacity.Bywayofexception,damagesforlossofearningcapacitymaybeawardeddespitetheabsence
of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is selfemployed earning less than the minimum wage under
currentlaborlaws,andjudicialnoticemaybetakenofthefactthatinthedeceasedslineofworknodocumentary
evidence is available or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum
wageundercurrentlaborlaws.38
InPeoplev.Oco,39theevidencepresentedbytheprosecutiontorecoverdamagesforlossofearningcapacity
was the bare testimony of the deceaseds wife that her husband was earning P8,000.00 monthly as a legal
researcher of a private corporation. Finding that the deceased was neither selfemployed nor employed as a
dailywageworkerearninglessthantheminimumwageunderthelaborlawsexistingatthetimeofhisdeath,the
Courtheldthattestimonialevidencealoneisinsufficienttojustifyanawardforlossofearningcapacity.
Likewise, in People v. Caraig,40 damages for loss of earning capacity was not awarded because the
circumstances of the 3 deceased did not fall within the recognized exceptions, and except for the testimony of
theirwives,nodocumentaryproofabouttheirincomewaspresentedbytheprosecution.Thus
The testimonial evidence shows that Placido Agustin, Roberto Raagas, and Melencio Castro Jr. were not
selfemployed or employed as dailywage workers earning less than the minimum wage under the labor
laws existing at the time of their death. Placido Agustin was a Social Security System employee who
received a monthly salary of P5,000. Roberto Raagas was the President of Sinclair Security and Allied
Services,afamilyownedcorporation,withamonthlycompensationofP30,000.MelencioCastroJr.wasa
taxidriverofNewRocalexwithanaveragedailyearningofP500oramonthlyearningofP7,500.Clearly,
these cases do not fall under the exceptions where indemnity for loss of earning capacity can be given
despite lack of documentary evidence. Therefore, for lack of documentary proof, no indemnity for loss of
earningcapacitycanbegiveninthesecases.(Emphasissupplied)
Here,thetrialcourtandtheCourtofAppealscomputedtheawardofcompensatorydamagesforlossofearning
capacityonlyonthebasisofthetestimonyofrespondentRosalitothatthedeceasedwas39yearsofageanda
Section Chief of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Tuguergarao District Office with a salary of P83,088.00 per
annum when she died.41 No other evidence was presented. The award is clearly erroneous because the
deceasedsearningsdoesnotfallwithintheexceptions.
However,thefactoflosshavingbeenestablished,temperatedamagesintheamountofP500,000.00shouldbe
awardedtorespondents.UnderArticle2224oftheCivilCode,temperateormoderatedamages,whicharemore
thannominalbutlessthancompensatorydamages,mayberecoveredwhenthecourtfindsthatsomepecuniary
losshasbeensufferedbutitsamountcannot,fromthenatureofthecase,beprovedwithcertainty.
InPlenov.CourtofAppeals,42theCourtsustainedthetrialcourtsawardofP200,000.00astemperatedamages
inlieuofactualdamagesforlossofearningcapacitybecausetheincomeofthevictimwasnotsufficientlyproven,
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/nov2004/gr_159636_2004.html

4/9

9/20/2016

G.R.No.159636

thus
Thetrialcourtbasedtheamountsofdamagesawardedtothepetitioneronthefollowingcircumstances:
...
"Astothelossorimpairmentofearningcapacity,thereisnodoubtthatPlenoisanent[re]preneurandthe
founderofhisowncorporation,theMayonCeramicsCorporation.Itappearsalsothatheisanindustrious
and resourceful person with several projects in line, and were it not for the incident, might have pushed
them through. On the day of the incident, Pleno was driving homeward with geologist Longley after an
ocularinspectionofthesiteoftheMayonCeramicsCorporation.Hisactualincomehoweverhasnotbeen
sufficiently established so that this Court cannot award actual damages, but, an award of temperate or
moderate damages may still be made on loss or impairment of earning capacity. That Pleno sustained a
permanentdeformityduetoashortenedleftlegandthathealsosuffersfromdoublevisioninhislefteyeis
also established. Because of this, he suffers from some inferiority complex and is no longer active in
business as well as in social life. In similar cases as in Borromeo v. Manila Electric Railroad Co., 44 Phil
165Coriage,etal.v.LTBCo.,etal.,L11037,Dec.29,1960,andinAraneta,etal.v.Arreglado,etal.,L
11394,Sept.9,1958,theproperawardofdamagesweregiven."
...
Werulethatthelowercourtsawardsofdamagesaremoreconsonantwiththefactualcircumstancesofthe
instant case. The trial courts findings of facts are clear and welldeveloped. Each item of damages is
adequatelysupportedbyevidenceonrecord.
Article 2224 of the Civil Code was likewise applied in the recent cases of People v. Singh43 and People v.
Almedilla,44tojustifytheawardoftemperatedamagesinlieuofdamagesforlossofearningcapacitywhichwas
notsubstantiatedbytherequireddocumentaryproof.
Anent the award of moral damages, the same cannot be lumped with exemplary damages because they are
based on different jural foundations.45 These damages are different in nature and require separate
determination.46 In culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages may be recovered when the
defendantactedinbadfaithorwasguiltyofgrossnegligence(amountingtobadfaith)orinwantondisregardof
contractualobligationsand,asinthiscase,whentheactofbreachofcontractitselfconstitutesthetortthatresults
inphysicalinjuries.ByspecialruleinArticle1764inrelationtoArticle2206oftheCivilCode,moraldamagesmay
also be awarded in case the death of a passenger results from a breach of carriage.47 On the other hand,
exemplarydamages,whichareawardedbywayofexampleorcorrectionforthepublicgoodmayberecoveredin
contractual obligations if the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner.48
Respondentsintheinstantcaseshouldbeawardedmoraldamagestocompensateforthegriefcausedbythe
deathofthedeceasedresultingfromthepetitionersbreachofcontractofcarriage.Furthermore,thepetitioner
failedtoprovethatitexercisedtheextraordinarydiligencerequiredforcommoncarriers,itispresumedtohave
acted recklessly.49 Thus, the award of exemplary damages is proper. Under the circumstances, we find it
reasonabletoawardrespondentstheamountofP100,000.00asmoraldamagesandP100,000.00asexemplary
damages.Theseamountsarenotexcessive.50
The actual damages awarded by the trial court reduced by the Court of Appeals should be further reduced. In
Peoplev.Duban,51itwasheldthatonlysubstantiatedandprovenexpensesorthosethatappeartohavebeen
genuinelyincurredinconnectionwiththedeath,wakeorburialofthevictimwillberecognized.Alistofexpenses
(Exhibit "J"),52 and the contract/receipt for the construction of the tomb (Exhibit "F")53 in this case, cannot be
consideredcompetentproofandcannotreplacetheofficialreceiptsnecessarytojustifytheaward.Hence,actual
damagesshouldbefurtherreducedtoP78,160.00,54whichwastheamountsupportedbyofficialreceipts.
Pursuant to Article 220855 of the Civil Code, attorneys fees may also be recovered in the case at bar where
exemplary damages are awarded. The Court finds the award of attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the total
amountadjudgedagainstpetitionerreasonable.
Finally,inEasternShippingLines,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,56itwasheldthatwhenanobligation,regardlessofits
source,i.e.,law,contracts,quasicontracts,delictsorquasidelictsisbreached,thecontravenorcanbeheldliable
forpaymentofinterestintheconceptofactualandcompensatorydamages,subjecttothefollowingrules,towit
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing.
Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/nov2004/gr_159636_2004.html

5/9

9/20/2016

G.R.No.159636

absenceofstipulation,therateofinterestshallbe12%perannumtobecomputedfromdefault,i.e.,from
judicialorextrajudicialdemandunderandsubjecttotheprovisionsofArticle1169oftheCivilCode.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the
amountofdamagesawardedmaybeimposedatthediscretionofthecourtattherateof6%perannum.
No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the
demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with
reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or
extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the
time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is
made(atwhichtimethequantificationofdamagesmaybedeemedtohavebeenreasonablyascertained).
Theactualbaseforthecomputationoflegalinterestshall,inanycase,beontheamountfinallyadjudged.
3.Whenthejudgmentofthecourtawardingasumofmoneybecomesfinalandexecutory,therateoflegal
interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from
such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a
forbearanceofcredit.(Emphasissupplied).
Intheinstantcase,petitionershouldbeheldliableforpaymentofinterestasdamagesforbreachofcontractof
carriage. Considering that the amounts payable by petitioner has been determined with certainty only in the
instantpetition,theinterestdueshallbecomputeduponthefinalityofthisdecisionattherateof12%perannum
untilsatisfaction,perparagraph3oftheaforecitedrule.57
WHEREFORE,inviewofalltheforegoing,thepetitionispartiallygranted.TheApril11,2003decisionoftheCourt
of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 63290, which modified the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao,
CagayaninCivilCaseNo.5023,isAFFIRMEDwithMODIFICATION.Asmodified,petitionerVictoryLiner,Inc.,is
orderedtopayrespondentsthefollowing:(1)P50,000.00asindemnityforthedeathofMarieGracePagulayan
Gammad(2)P100,000.00asmoraldamages(3)P100,000.00asexemplarydamages(4)P78,160.00asactual
damages(5)P500,000.00astemperatedamages(6)10%ofthetotalamountasattorneysfeesandthecosts
ofsuit.
Furthermore, the total amount adjudged against petitioner shall earn interest at the rate of 12% per annum
computedfromthefinalityofthisdecisionuntilfullypaid.
SOORDERED.
Quisumbing,Carpio,andAzcuna,JJ.,concur.
Davide,Jr.,C.J.,(Chairman),onofficialleave.

Footnotes
1Rollo,p.57.PennedbyAssociateJusticeAndresB.Reyes,Jr.andconcurredinbyAssociateJustices

EugenioS.LabitoriaandRegaladoE.Maambong.
2Rollo,p.135.PennedbyJudgeRolandoL.Salacup.
3Motheroftheotherrespondents(TSN,1July1997,p.8).
4TSN,1July1997,pp.46.
5Records,p.1.
6Id.,p.10.
7InitiallysetonNovember7,1996(Records,p.16)butmovedtoDecember18,1996onmotionof

petitionerscounsel(Records,p.20),andthereaftermotuproprioresetbythecourttoFebruary12,1997
(Records,p.24).Finally,uponagreementofbothcounsels,pretrialwasscheduledtoApril10,1997.
8OrderdatedFebruary12,1997,Records,p.27.
9Records,p.29.
10Id.,p.31.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/nov2004/gr_159636_2004.html

6/9

9/20/2016

G.R.No.159636

11OrderdatedMay6,1997,Records,p.33.
12PretrialOrderdatedMay6,1997,Records,p.34.
13OriginallysetonAugust13,1997(Records,p.36),butwasrescheduledbythetrialcourttoNovember

17,1997(Records,p.38).
14Records,p.39.
15Id.,p.41.
16Id.,p.44.
17Id.,p.45.
18Id.,p.46.
19Rollo,pp.140141.
20Id.,pp.7980.
21CARollo,p.93.
22377Phil.482(1999).
23ResolutiondatedAugust21,2003,Rollo,p.83.
24APEXMining,Inc.,supra,pp.493494.
25Records,p.19.
26Id.,p.25.
27Id.,p.28.
28CARollo,p.95.
29377Phil.482,494495(1999).
30415Phil.492(2001).
31Id.,pp.504505.
32G.R.No.147995,4March2004.
33ProducersBankofthePhilippinesv.CourtofAppeals,430Phil.812,830(2002).
34BaliwagTransit,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,326Phil.762,768(1996).
35ART.1764.DamagesincasescomprisedinthisSectionshallbeawardedinaccordancewithTitleXVIII

ofthisBook,concerningDamages.Article2206shallalsoapplytothedeathofapassengercausedbythe
breachofcontractbyacommoncarrier.
36ART.2206.Theamountofdamagesfordeathcausedbyacrimeorquasidelictshallbeatleastthree

thousandpesos,eventhoughtheremayhavebeenmitigatingcircumstances.Inaddition:
(1)Thedefendantshallbeliableforthelossoftheearningcapacityofthedeceased,andtheindemnity
shallbepaidtotheheirsofthelattersuchindemnityshallineverycasebeassessedandawardedbythe
court,unlessthedeceasedonaccountofpermanentphysicaldisabilitynotcausedbythedefendant,had
noearningcapacityatthetimeofhisdeath
(2)Ifthedeceasedwasobligedtogivesupportaccordingtotheprovisionsofarticle291,therecipientwho
isnotanheircalledtothedecedentsinheritancebythelawoftestateorintestatesuccession,may
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/nov2004/gr_159636_2004.html

7/9

9/20/2016

G.R.No.159636

demandsupportfromthepersoncausingthedeath,foraperiodnotexceedingfiveyears,theexact
durationtobefixedbythecourt
(3)Thespouse,legitimateandillegitimatedescendantsandascendantsofthedeceasedmaydemand
moraldamagesformentalanguishbyreasonofthedeathofthedeceased.
37Tiuv.Arriesgado,G.R.No.138060,1September2004.
38Peoplev.Oco,G.R.Nos.13737071,29September2003,412SCRA190,222.
39Supra.
40G.R.Nos.11622427,28March2003,400SCRA67,8485.
41TSN,1July1997,p.8.
42G.R.No.L56505,9May1988,161SCRA208,224225.
43412Phil.842,859(2001).Inthiscase,theCourtawardedP200,000.00temperatedamagesinplaceof

theP5,760,000.00awardedbythetrialcourtasdamagesforlossofearningcapacityofthedeceased
becausetheprosecutiondidnotpresentthebestevidencetoprovethedeceasedsincome.
44G.R.No.150590,21August2003,409SCRA428,433.Here,theCourtdidnotcomputedamagesfor

lossofearningcapacityonthebasisofthewidowstestimonythathisdeceasedhusbandwasearning
P22,000.00amonthandP10,000.00fromhissideline.Instead,thewidowwasawardedP25,000.00as
temperatedamages.
45Peoplev.Trapane,436Phil.671,682(2002).
46Peoplev.Astudillo,G.R.No.141518,29April2003,401SCRA723,739.
47Expertravel&Tours,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,368Phil.444,448449(1999).
48Yobidov.CourtofAppeals,346Phil.1,13(1997).
49Id.
50FortuneExpress,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,364Phil.480,496(1999).
51G.R.No.141217,26September2003,412SCRA131,139.
52Records,p.53.
53Id.,p.49.
54Exhibit"C",Exhibit"D",Exhibit"E",Records,pp.4748Exhibit"G"andExhibit"H",Records,pp.5051.
55ART.2208.Intheabsenceofstipulation,attorneysfeesandexpensesoflitigation,otherthanjudicial

costs,cannotberecovered,except:
(1)Whenexemplarydamagesareawarded
...
56G.R.No.97412,12July1994,234SCRA78,9596.
57SeeTheInsularLifeAssuranceCompany,Ltd.v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.126850,28April2004.In

thiscase,theCourtsetasidethedecisionoftheCourtofAppealsandinlieuthereofdecreedtheawardof,
amongothers,P500,000.00monthly,representingtheunrealizedmonthlyincomeofpetitionerorP6Million
ayearfromDecember1,1992untilrespondentvacatestheleasedpremises.Theinterestimposedwas
12%perannumcomputedfromthefinalityofthedecisionoftheCourt.
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/nov2004/gr_159636_2004.html

8/9

9/20/2016

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/nov2004/gr_159636_2004.html

G.R.No.159636

9/9