Persons Case Digest Midterms

San Beda College Alabang School of Law
League of Extraordinary Gentlemen Notes and Case Digests

CIVIL CODE
PRELIMINARY TITLE (ARTICLES 1-18)
ARTICLE 2
ISSUE: Whether or not Central Bank Circular No. 20 has no force and effect
HELD:
Yes, the said Circular has no force and effect because it was not published. Article 2
of the new Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless otherwise provided. While Central
Bank Circular No. 20 is not of a statute or law but being issued for the implementation
of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to
settled jurisprudence. Rules and regulations which prescribe a penalty for its violation
should be published before becoming effective. The public cannot be held liable for
violations of laws or regulations unless they are informed of its contents and penalties
for violation.
Tanada vs. Tuvera

No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
Ponente: Justice Cruz
Facts:
The petitioners sought the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees, which
they claimed had not been published as required by law. The governments
contention that the phrase otherwise provided means that a decree will become
effective immediately after their approval. The trial court affirmed the decision of
having the necessity for the publication of the said decrees. The petitioners now
sought for the reconsideration or clarification of the said decision. The prayer
constitutes of ordering the respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all the
unpublished Presidential decrees of general application and unless published they
shall not be binding.
ARTICLE 3
Garcia v. Recio
G. R. No. 138322
Panganiban, J.
Issue:
Whether or not the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of
effectivity of laws or to the requirement of publication.
Oct. 2, 2001
FACTS
Rederick Recio, a Filipino, married an Australian citizen named Editha Samson in
1987. Two years later a decree of divorce was released by the Australian
government.
Held:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not
to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot be omitted. Publication is
indispensable in every case, but the legislature in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen day period shall be shortened or extended. The omission of the said
publication would run against the due process clause and would deny the public
knowledge of the laws. The court held that all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity. The
publication must be in full since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of
the law.
Petition granted.
On June 26, 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen and married a certain Grace
Garcia in 1994 in Cabanatuan City with the former declaring that he was single and
Filipino.
Garcia filed a declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of bigamy alleging that
Recio had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her and only had
knowledge of it in 1997.
Recio countered wifes claim asserting that he disclosed the previous marriage to her
in 1993. Moreover, he contended that his first marriage had been validly dissolved by
a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989 making him legally capacitated to
marry.
People vs. Que Po Lay

No. 6791, March 29, 1954
Montemayor, J.
FACTS:
Que Po Lay is accused of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank requiring
those who are in possession of foreign currency to sell the same to the Central Bank.
Que Po Lay alleges that said circular was not published in the Official Gazette before
he committed the act and therefore, it had no force and effect.
ISSUE
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained
in Australia by Recio ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Samson thereby

capacitating him to contract a second marriage with Garcia.
Cui vs. Arellano University (2 SCRA 205)
HELD
Facts: Plaintiff Emeterio Cui, studying law, received scholarship grants for scholastic
merit at Arellano University. During his last semester of his fourth year, he left the
defendant university and enrolled at Abad Santos University, wherein he finished his
law degree. After graduating, he applied for the bar examinations. To secure to take
the bar examinations, he needed the transcript of records from the defendant
university. Defendant refused to give him a transcript until he paid back the tuition that
the university returned when he was granted scholarship. According to the contract
signed by the plaintiff, scholarships are good only if the student should continue in the
same school. This contract was followed from Memorandum No. 38 made by the
Director of Private Schools.
The Supreme Court ruled that the divorce decree obtained by Recio does not ipso
facto terminated his first marriage to Samson on the account that presentation solely
of the divorce decree is insufficient. Article 15 and 17 of the Civil Code establish the
rule that a marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce
obtained abroad. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of
the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national
laws. The Court highlights that before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by
our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing
it.
Issue: Whether or not the contract between plaintiff and defendant, whereby the
former waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the
equivalent of his scholarship in cash valid or not?
Held: The contract between plaintiff and defendant is not binding since the
memorandum made by the Director of Private Schools is not a law. The provisions
are only advisory and not mandatory in nature. Furthermore, the said officer had not
authority to issue such memorandum and that provisions were not published in the
Official Gazette.
ARTICLE 6
DM Consunji, Inc. Vs CA
Facts: On May 9, 1991, private respondent Maria Juego filed in the Pasig Regional
Trial Court a complaint for damages against petitioner for the the death of her
husband Jose juego. Jose was employed by petitioner as a construction worker.
While working on November 2, 1990, Jose fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower
in Pasig. He died. Maria availed of the death benefits form the State Insurance Fund.
Petitioner is claiming that she can no longer recover damages under the Civil Code
because her prior availment of the benefits form the State Insurance Fund. The trial
court and CA decided in favour of maria.
ARTICLE 15-16
Minciano vs. Brimo
50 Phil. 867, November 1, 1924
J. Romualdez
Facts: Joseph G. Brimo, a citizen of Turkey, died and left a partition of the estate.
Juan Miciano, the judicial administrator of the estate left filed a scheme of partition.
However, Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. Brimos
opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the
provisions of Joseph Brimos will which are not in accordance with the laws of his
Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation of Article 10 of
the Civil Code.
Issue: Whether Marias availment of the death benefits provided under the Labor
Code amounts to a waiver of her rights to claim for damages from petition under the
Civil Code?
Held: No because maria was not only ignorant of the fact but of her rights as well.
Marias election of the death benefits does not bar any action inconsistent with the
elected remedy.
For a waiver to become valid, there must be an intentional relinquishment of a known
right. Where one lacks knowledge of a rights, there is no basis upon which waiver of
its can rest. Waiver requires a knowledge of the right waived with an awareness of its
consequences. Thus ignorance of material fact negates waiver.
Issue: Whether or not the national law of the testator is the one to govern his
testamentary disposition.
Held: Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen, though he declared in his will that Philippine
laws must govern the disposition of his estate; however, it must not prejudice the heir
or legatee of the testator.
Therefore, the testators national law must govern in accordance with Article 10 of the

Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce decree is valid in the Philippines and if the private
respondet can file a complaint of adultery against the petitioner.
Pilapil VS. Ibay-Somera

G.R No. 80116
June 30, 1989
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and
private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before
the Registrar of Births, marriage and deaths in Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic
of Germany. The couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where they
had a daughter.
After three and a half years of disharmonic marriage, private respondent Geiling
initiated divorce proceedings against petitioner in his native Germany. He claimed that
there was failure of the marriage and they had been living apart since 1982.While
petitioner filed an action for Legal separation, support and separation of property
before the Regional Trial Court in Manila.
On January 15, 1986, the Schoneberg local Court of Germany, promulgated a
decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.
On June 27, 1986, five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private
respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging
that during the marriage Pilapil had an affair with a certain William Chia and another
man named Jesus Chua.
After corresponding investigation, the assistant fiscal recommended the dismissal of
the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However upon review of the
respondent City fiscal a resolution was approved and the cases were raffled to two
branches of the RTC of Manila.
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice that the
cases be dismissed. The Secretary of justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor,
gave due course to both petitions and directed city fiscal to inform the DOJ if the
accused have already been arraigned and if not, to move to defer further
proceedings and to elevate the entire record of the cases to his office for review.
Pilapil filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer arraignment and to suspend
further proceedings. As a result, one of the criminal cases was suspended, while the
date of arraignment of the other was merely reset.
During the arraignment of the criminal case, the William Chia pleaded not guilty
while the petitioner refused not to be arraigned. The petitioner was then held in
contempt and was detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. She later
entered a plea of not guilty.
On October 27, 1987 petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari on the
ground that the court is without jurisdiction to decide and try the case.
On March 29, 1988, the Secretary of Justice issued a resolution directing the
respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the
petitioner.
Ruling:
Yes, the divorce decree is valid in the Philippines. In the present case, the fact that
the private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country is admitted. Said
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concern in view of the nationality principle on our civil law on the matter
of the status of persons.
Under this consideration, private respondent, being no longer the husband of the
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture
that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed the suit.
The allegations of the private respondent that he could not have brought this case
befor the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge even if true, is of no legal
significance or consequence in this case. The severance of the marital bond had the
effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other.
Roehr vs. Rodriguez
GR No. 142820
June 20, 2003
Facts:
Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr, a German citizen, married a Filipina, Carmen
Rodriguez in Germany. The marriage was ratified in Tayasan, Negros Oriental..
Private respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the
RTC of Makati. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but was denied by the trial court.
The petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Cout of First Instance of
Hamburg-Blankenese and granting the custody of the children to the father.
Issue:
Whether or not the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign country such
as support and custody of the children can be determined in our courts
Held:
Yes. In order to take effect, a foreign judgement must clearly show that the
opposing party has been given ample opportunity to do so under the Rules of Civel
Procedure. Accoringly, the respondent was not given the opportunity to challenge the
judgement of the German Court, therefore, legal effects of divorce must be
determined in our courts. The court held that the trial court has jurisdiction over the
issue between the parties as to who has parental custody.
HUMAN RELATIONS (ARTICLES 19-36)

ARTICLE 19-22
Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave
the party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who
did all the necessary precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in
requesting him to leave the party. Considering almost 20 years of experience in the
hotel industry, Ms. Lim is experienced enough to know how to handle such matters.
Hence, petitioners will not be held liable for damages brought under Article 19 and 20
of the Civil Code.
TITLE: Nikko Hotel Manila vs. Reyes

CITATION: GR No. 154259, February 28, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila and Ruby Lim assailed the decision of the Court of
Appeals in reversing the decision of RTC of Quezon City. CA held petitioner liable for
damages to Roberto Reyes aka Amang Bisaya, an entertainment artist.
TITLE: Sps. Quisumbing vs. MERALCO

CITATION: GR No. 142943, April 3, 2002
There are two versions of the story:

Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the
lobby of Nikko Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back.
According to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse
for the hotels former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart
agreed to vouch for him and carried a basket of fruits, the latters gift. He He lined up
at the buffet table as soon as it was ready but to his great shock, shame and
embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotels Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud
voice enough to be heard by the people around them. He was asked to leave the
party and a Makati policeman accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All these time,
Dr Filart ignored him adding to his shame and humiliation.
FACTS:
The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are the owners of a house
located at #94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City. Around 9AM on March 3, 1995,
defendants inspectors headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a
routine on the spot inspection of all single phase meters at the house and observed
as standard operating procedure to ask permission and was granted by the plaintiffs
secretary. After the inspection, it was found that the meter had been tampered with.
The result was relayed to the secretary who conveyed the information to the owners
of the house. The inspectors advised that the meter be brought in their laboratory for
further verifications. In the event that the meter was indeed tampered, defendant had
to temporarily disconnect the electric services of the couple. After an hour, inspectors
returned and informed the findings of the laboratory and asked the couple that unless
they pay the amount of P178,875.01 representing the differential bill their electric
supply will be disconnected. The plaintiff filed complaint for damages with a prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction despite the immediate reconnection.
Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the
manner claimed by the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr.
Filarts sister, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, if Dr. Filart did invite him as the captain waiter told
Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr. Filarts group. She wasnt able to ask it
personally with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking over the phone and doesnt want
to interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave because the celebrant specifically
ordered that the party should be intimate consisting only of those who part of the list.
She even asked politely with the plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party.
ISSUE: Whether or not MERALCO acted maliciously and malevolent manner done
without due process, lack of regard for QUISUMBINGs rights, feelings, social and
business reputation and therefore held them accountable and plaintiff be entitled for
damages.
During the plaintiffs cross-examination, he was asked how close was Ms. Lim when
she approached him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered very close because we
nearly kissed each other. Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lims intention
to relay the request only be heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene
causing everybody to know what happened.
HELD:
Supreme Court partly granted the petition and ordered plaintiff to pay respondent the
billing differential of P193,332.96 while latter is ordered to pay petitioners moral and
exemplary damages including attorneys fees. Moral damages may be recovered
when rights of individuals including right against the deprivation of property without
due process of law are violated. Exemplary damages on the other hand are imposed
by way of example or correction for public. SC recognized the effort of MERALCO in
preventing illegal use of electricity. However, any action must be done in strict
observance of the rights of the people. Under the law, the Manila Electric Company
(Meralco) may immediately disconnect electric service on the ground of alleged meter
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the
party.
HELD:

tampering, but only if the discovery of the cause is personally witnessed and attested
to by an officer of the law or by a duly authorized representative of the Energy
Regulatory Board. During the inspection, no government official or ERB
representative was present.
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or

negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Petitioners claim for actual damages was not granted for failure to supply proof and
was premised only upon Lornas testimony. These are compensation for an injury
that will put the injure position where it was before it was injured.
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, the court held that where a
mans promise to marry in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate
cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and obtain her consent to
sexual act could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of
such breach of promise of marriage but because of the fraud and deceit behind it, and
the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential
however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs, or public policy.
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs Court of Appeals

219 scra 115
Article 21 of the Civil Code
This is an appeal by certiorari. On October 27, 1987, without the assistance of
counsel, private respondent filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint for
damages against petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married.
She alleges in said complaint that she is 20 years old, single, Filipino and a pretty
lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her country; other
petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at Lozano Apartments,
Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student, before August 20, 1987 the latter
courted and proposed to marry her, she accepted his love on the condition that they
get married; they therefore agreed to get married. The petitioner forced her to live
with him in the Lozano apartments. She was a virgin at that time; after a week before
the filing of complaint, petitioners attitude towards her started to change. He
maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of the complaint. Petitioner
repudiated the marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and
that the petitioner is already married to someone in Bacolod City. Private respondent
then prayed for judgment ordering petitioner to pay her damages. On the other hand,
petitioner claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with
the private respondent and denied all allegations against him. After trial on the merits,
the lower court ordered petitioner to pay the private respondent damages.
CASE DIGEST ON GLOBE MACKAY V. CA [176 S 778 (1989)] - While an employer

has the right to dismiss an employee who was involved in anomalous transactions,
the right of dismissal should not be exercised in an abusive manner, such as by
making accusations of being a crook, forcing him to take a forced leave, threatening
to file a hundred suits against him. Hence, the employer is liable for damages.
Art. 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so
many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered
material and moral injury. This article should vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for
that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to
provide for specifically in the statutes.
University of the East vs Jader
327 scra 804
Article 19 of the Civil Code
Petitioner was enrolled in the defendants College of Law. He failed to take the regular
examination in Practice Court 1 for which he was given an incomplete grade. He
enrolled for the second semester as a fourth year student, and filed an application for
the removal of the incomplete grade which was approved by the Dean. In the
meantime, the faculty members and the Dean met to deliberate who among the fourth
year students should be allowed to graduate. The plaintiffs name appeared on the
tentative list, he also attended the investiture ceremonies to which he tendered
blowout afterwards. He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination and took
review classes. However, he was not able to take the bar examination because his
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar.
HELD: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. Notwithstanding, Article 21, which is designed to expand the
concepts of torts and quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, which defines quasi-delicts thus:

academic requirements is not complete. Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for
damages alleging that he suffered moral shock besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, sleepless nights, when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations
arising from the latters negligence. He prayed for an award of moral damages,
unrealized income, attorneys fees and cost of suit.
marriage was celebrated by a military chaplain. When Escaos parents learned of

this, they insisted a church wedding to be held but Escao withdrew from having a
recelebration because she heard that Tenchavez was having an affair with another
woman. Eventually, their relationship went sour; 2 years later, Escao went to the US
where she acquired a decree of absolute divorce and she subsequently became an
American citizen and also married an American.
ISSUE: Whether or not an educational institution be held liable for damages for
misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for
graduation when such is not the case.
In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further alleged that
Escaos parents dissuaded their daughter to go abroad and causing her to be
estranged from him hence hes asking for damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00.
The lower court did not grant the legal separation being sought for and at the same
time awarded a P45,000.00 worth of counter-claim by the Escaos.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that UE is liable for damages. It is the contractual
obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to
each and every student as to where he or she had already complied with the entire
requirement for the conferment of a degree or whether they should be included
among those who will graduate. The school cannot be said to have acted in good
faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful
prosecution by the aggrieved party in suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the
Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar
HELD: Yes.
On the part of Tenchavez:
Pe et al vs Pe, 5 SCRA 200
His marriage with Escao was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did not
result to public humiliation; that they never lived together and he even consented to
annulling the marriage earlier (because Escao filed for annulment before she left for
the US but the same was dismissed due to her non-appearance in court); that he
failed to prove that Escaos parents dissuaded their daughter to leave Tenchavez
and as such his P1,000,000.00 claim cannot be awarded. HOWEVER, by reason of
the fact that Escao left without the knowledge of Tenchavez and being able to
acquire a divorce decree; and Tenchavez being unable to remarry, the SC awarded
P25,000.00 only by way of moral damages and attorneys fees to be paid by Escao
and not her parents.
Defendant is married separated and correlative of the plaintiff unmarried woman, 24

years of age. Defendant frequently visited the girls house on the pretext of teaching
her how to pray the rosary. They fell in love and had clandestine trust until they
disappeared.
Held: No conclusion can be drawn from the fact that defendant, not only deliberately,
but thru a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love to the woman
to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong caused to her and her family
is contrary to morals etc as contemplated in Art 21.
On the part of Escaos parents:

ARTICLE 26
It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the Escaos
is unfounded and the same must have wounded their feelings and caused them
anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise
prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society.
What is important, and has been correctly established in the decision of the court
below, is that they were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable
affair. The SC reduced the damages awarded from P45,000.00 to P5,000.00 only.
Tenchavez vs Escao
5 Phil 355
Torts and Damages When Liability for Quasi Delict Arises Unfounded Suit
In February 1948, Tenchavez and Escao secretly married each other and of course
without the knowledge of Escaos parents who were of prominent social status. The
TITLE: St. Louis Realty Corp. vs. CA

CITATION: 133 SCRA 179
ARTICLE 36
FACTS:
Donato vs Luna
Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and member of the faculty of UE Ramon

Magsaysay Medical Center, seek to recover damage for a wrongful advertisement in
the Sunday Times where St Louis Realty Corp. misrepresented his house with Mr.
Arcadio.
160 scra 441
St. Louis published an ad on December 15, 1968 with the heading where the heart
is. This was republished on January 5, 1969. In the advertisement, the house
featured was Dr Aramils house and not Mr. Arcadio with whom the company asked
permission and the intended house to be published. After Dr Aramil noticed the
mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis demanding an explanation 1 week after such
receipt. No rectification or apology was published despite that it was received by
Ernesto Magtoto, the officer in charge of the advertisement. This prompted Dr.
Aramils counsel to demand actual, moral and exemplary damages. On March 18,
1969, St Louis published an ad now with Mr. Arcadios real house but nothing on the
apology or explanation of the error. Dr Aramil filed a complaint for damages on March
29. During the April 15 ad, the notice of rectification was published.
Leonilo C. Donato was married to Rosalinda Malupig and without such marriage
having been legally dissolved; he contracted a second marriage with Paz Abayan.
Facing bigamy charges by the latter, petitioner alleged force, intimidation and undue
influence employed by Paz which forced him into marriage. A complaint of annulment
of the second marriage was instituted on the ground that her consent was obtained
through deceit. He is raising the issue of prejudicial question.
Prejudicial Question
ISSUE: Whether or not the action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial
question to the prosecution for bigamy.
HELD: The court averred that the requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in
the case at bar. The nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner
Donatos guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr. Aramil.

HELD:
CIVIL PERSONALITY (ARTICLES 37-47)

ARTICLE 37-41
St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely circulated

publication. Furthermore, it never made any written apology and explanation of the
mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ".
Quimiguing vs. Icao

34 SCRA 132
The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral
damages and P2,000 as attorney's fees. When St. Louis Realty appealed to the
Court of Appeals, CA affirmed the judgement for the reason that St. Louis Realty
committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code
because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not
belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that
contretemps.
Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing, a student, and Felix Icao,
married, were neighbors. They had carnal intercourse
several times until Carmen became pregnant.
Assisted by her parents, she filed a claim for
support at P120/month plus damages.
Icao filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause
of action since the child is yet unborn. The Trial
Court dismissed the complaint, Carmen amended it but
the trial court disallowed it.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Costs against the
petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not, the CFI erred in dismissing
Carmens complaint.

her second pregnancy and Syquia left and married
another woman. Syquia disowning the child stopped
giving support. Thus Antonia filed this case to Compel
Syquia to acknowledge the child using the letters
written by him as evidence.
Held:
Yes. A conceived child, although as yet unborn is
given by law a provisional personality of its own for
all purposes favorable to it.
GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
2 SCRA 801
Issue:
Whether or not letters are sufficient to prove
acknowledgement of paternity.
Facts:
Nita Villanueva came to know Geluz in 1948 through
her aunt. In 1950, Nita became pregnant by her then
boyfriend now husband but she had a baby aborted. After
getting pregnant, after their marriage, she again
aborted the fetus because of work. Less than 2 years
later, she became pregnant and aborted it again. It is
this last abortion that is the basis of this action.
Held:
Yes, the words of recognition junior, contained
in the note refer to a baby then conceived was expected
to be born in June. Although the child was given a name
of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia Jr., his
identity as the child who Syquia intended to
acknowledge is clear.
Issue:
Whether or not, the husband of a woman, who
voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover
damages from physician who caused the same.
ARTICLE 43
LIMJOCO vs. INTESTATE OF FRAGRANTE
Facts:
Pedro O. Fragrante applied for a certificate of
public convenience to install, maintain, and operate an
ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, where the Public Service
Commission held that the public interest an convenience
will be prompted in a proper and suitable manner by
authorizing the operation and maintenance of another
ice plant of two and one-half tons in the municipality
of San Juan, that the original applicant Fragnante was
a Filipino citizen at the time of his death; and that
his intestate estate is financially capable of
maintaining the proposed service.
The commission issued a certificate of public
convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased
Fragnante, authorizing said Intestate Estate through
its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the
proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and
operate said plant. Petitioners claim that the granting
of certificate applied for the estate is a
contravention of law.
Held:
The lower court erred in awarding damages. The
fetus is not endowed with personality as required by
the law.
Parents of unborn fetus cannot sue for damages on
its behalf. A husband of a woman who voluntary aborted
a child cannot recover damages from the abortionist
since damages must be inflicted upon the parents so as
to collect damages at all. Similarly, an action for
pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or
death. Pertains primarily to the injured.
DE JESUS vs. SYQUIA
58 Phil 866
Facts:
Out of amorous relations, a baby was begotten by
Cesar Syquia with Antonia de Jesus. During the
pregnancy, Cesar wrote a priest to name the baby after
him for it was his. Syquia took them to a house where
they lived in a regular family style, until Antonia had
Issues:

Whether or not the estate of Fragnante can be
considered as a person within the meaning of the Public
Service Act? Whether or not citizenship of decedent
extended to his estate?
Issue:
Can Orias heirs claim from Quality Plastics.
Held:
Judgment against Oria was void and sale of his
land is also void. However, Orias heirs are not
entitled to claim from the corporation. It is for the
reason that the corporation is unaware of Orias death
because soliven did not appraise the Court or the
corporation of Orias demise.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the estate of P.O.F.
should be considered an artificial or juridical person
for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of
his estate which, of course, includes the exercise
during the judicial administration of those rights and
the fulfillment of those obligations of his which
survived after his death.
The Supreme Court furthered that if by legal
fiction the personality of P.O.F is considered extended
so that any debts or obligations left by, and surviving
rights may be exercised for the benefit of his
creditors and heirs, there is no sound and cogent
reason for denying the application of the same fiction
of his citizenship, and for not considering it as
likewise extended for the purposes of the aforesaid
unfinished proceeding before the Public Service
Commission.
CITIZENSHIP AND DOMICILE

MOY YA LIM YAO V. CIR1
G.R. NO. L-21289, 4 OCTOBER 1971
FACTS: On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the
Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection with her
application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she
was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a
pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her greatgranduncle Lau Ching Ping for a
period of one month. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March
1961, and was permitted to stay for a period of one month which would expire on 13
April 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of
P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually
depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay
in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of
Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated
extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February
1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated
action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest
and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an
action for injunction with preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took place one
and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write
either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either English
or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except
one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. The
Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer for preliminary
injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.
DUMLAO vs. FAMILY PLASTIC PRODUCTS

Facts:
On February 28, 1962, CFI of Pangasinan issued a
judgment ordering defendants Soliven, Oria, Laurencio,
Sumalbag and Darang to pay solidarity quality plastics
products, Inc. the sum of P3667.03 plus the legal rate
of interest from November of 1958.
Upon the defendants failure to pay said amount,
lower Court ordered upon motion of Quality Plastics
Products, Inc. the foreclosure of the surety bond and
the sale at public auction the land of Pedro Oria which
he has given as security under the bond.
On September 24, 1962 Orias land was sold and was
confirmed by the lower court on November 20, 1962.
However, Oria died on April 23, 1959, and on March
1, 1963 heirs of Oria sued Quality Plastics Products,
Inc. for the annulment of judgment against Oria and
execution against his land.

ISSUE: Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her
marriage to a Filipino citizen.
protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was merely
forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the
Martial Law Dictators agents abroad. He also argued that the challenge to his title
should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been
filed within 10 days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the
Omhibus Election Code.
HELD: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a

Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here
follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as
Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization
proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an
applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not
required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a
Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be
denied the same privilege. This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no
evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our
country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a
substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen
to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not
have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a
transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no
proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's
acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains
even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensible in a judicial or administrative case, Whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not
considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the
occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino
citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.
ISSUE:
Whether Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election
on 18 January 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon?
HELD:
The Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over the question as the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the Congress and elective provincial and city officials. However, the
decision on Frivaldos citizenship has already been made by the COMELEC through
its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner.
The Solicitors stance is assumed to have bben taken by him after consultation with
COMELEC and with its approval. It therefore represents the decision of the
COMELEC itself that the Supreme Court may review. In the certificate of candidacy
filed on 19 November 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence
shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per
the certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California,
as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate
General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. There were many other Filipinos in the
United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk
than he, who did not find it necessary nor do they claim to have been coerced to
abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. Still, if he really wanted to disavow his
American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo should have done
so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA
No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. He failed to take such categorical acts.
Rhe anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing
exclusive allegiance to another country cannot be permitted. The fact that he was
elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the
salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but
during the officers entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his
FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC

FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on 22
January 1988, and assumed office in due time. On 27 October 1988, the league of
Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who
was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Comelec a petition for the
annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a
Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on 20 January 1983.
Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded
the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to
10

title may be seasonably challenged. Frivaldo is disqualified from serving as governor
of Sorsogon.
ARTICLE 1
PT&T vs. NLRC
272 SCRA 596
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

G.R. No.119976
September 18, 1995
FACTS:
PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman
specifically as Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from November 21,
1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave.
She was again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on
leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8,
1991.
Facts: Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Cirilo Roy
Montejo, a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for cancellation and
disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. Private respondent contended that petitioner
lacked the Constitutions one-year residency requirement for candidates for the
House of Representatives.
On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary

employee where probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion
of the job application form under civil status that she was single although she had
contracted marriage a few months earlier. When petitioner learned later about the
marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum
requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a
reminder about the companys policy of not accepting married women for
employment. She was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992.
Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner
illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular
employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been discriminated on account
of her having contracted marriage in violation of company policies.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement as mandated
by Art. VI, Sec. 6 of the Constitution.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary
residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First
District of Leyte, the COMELECs questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May
11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby
directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly
elected Representative of the First District of Leyte. For election purposes, residence
is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the qualification of petitioner,
despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the
district for only 7 months, because of the following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of
her parents; Tacloban became petitioners domicile of origin by operation of law when
her father brought the family to Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when there is
actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose;
in the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile
of origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the
husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the
same thing in Political Law; when petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she
kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium
necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage
and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts
following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her
domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.
ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate
the services of an employee.
HELD:
Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly
prohibits discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is
recognized that company is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to
firing, according to their discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases
of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.
PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who
contracts marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women
workers by our labor laws and by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that
de Guzmans ties with PT&T were dissolved principally because of the companys
policy that married women are not qualified for employment in the company, and not
merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
FAMILY CODE
REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE (ARTICLES 1-26)
11

The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As
stated in the labor code:
and sacred of human rights. The States interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be
merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free
exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in
enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner.
Thus the States interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced
prohibition.
ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to

require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman
shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a
woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss,
discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason
of marriage.
Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality
should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality.
The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor
Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage
in connection with her employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals and
public policy, depriving a woman of her freedom to choose her status, a privilege that
is inherent in an individual as an intangible and inalienable right. The kind of policy
followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an
inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation. Such
policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as
discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only for order but also
imperatively required.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the
Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to
further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that
the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate
goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it
constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.
ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR [492 SCRA 1 ; AM NO P-02-1651; 22 JUN 2006]
Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda

35 Phil 252
Facts: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has
been living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five
years and had a son with him as well. Respondents husband died a year before she
entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.
FACTS:
Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were
married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila.
They stayed together for a month before petitioner returned to her parents home.
Goitia filed a complaint against respondent for support outside the conjugal home. It
was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts
on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her
husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing,
respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face
and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that
Goitia could not compel her husband to support her except in the conjugal home
unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from
respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent.

According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed
therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religionthe
Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They
allegedly have a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness under the approval of their
congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it
impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
Issue: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal
arrangement.
ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the
conjugal home.
Held: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to
freedom of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of
the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable
HELD:
12

The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the
act of marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the
wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining
her in his own home at his option. However, this option given by law is not absolute.
The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his
wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts.
In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the
lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support
from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home.
Catalina which was prepared by Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga who
testified in the hearing as well.
Leoncia and Gaudioso contended that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should
have been proven in accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889
because this was the law in force at the time of the alleged marriage was celebrated.
Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should be
proven only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the
books thereof have not been kept or have been lost, or unless they are questioned in
the courts, in which case any other proof, such as that of the continuous possession
by parents of the status of husband and wife, may be considered, provided that the
registration of the birth of their children as their legitimate children is also submitted in
evidence.
Balogbog vs. CA
GR No. 83598, March 7, 1997
FACTS:
ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino and Catalinas marriage is valid.

Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for partition and accounting against
their Aunt Leoncia and Uncle Gaudioso for partition and accounting of their
grandparents estate at the Court of First Instance of Cebu City which was granted by
the latter. Leoncia and Gaudioso appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter
affirmed the lower courts decision.
HELD:
Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in
rendering Gavino and Catalinas marriage as valid and thus entitle Ramonito and
Generoso one third of their grandparents estate.
Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal died intestate in 1951 and 1961 respectively.
They have three children, Leoncia, Gaudioso and Gavino, their older brother who
died in 1935. Ramoncito and Generoso was claiming that they were the legitimate
children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such they were entitled to the onethird share in the estate of their grandparents. However, Leoncia and Gaudioso
claimed they are not aware that their brother has 2 sons and that he was married.
They started to question the validity of the marriage between their brother Gavino and
Catalina despite how Gaudioso himself admitted during a police investigation
proceeding that indeed Ramonito is his nephew as the latter is the son of his elder
brother Gavino.
The court further states that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 889 of Spain did not
take effect, having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines
shortly after the extension of that code of this country. Therefore, Arts. 53 and 54
never came into force. Since this case was brought in the lower court in 1968, the
existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance with the present Civil
Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related
to vested rights, and the rules of evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption
is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally
married.
In the efforts of Ramoncito and Generoso to prove the validity of their parents
marriage, they presented Priscilo Trazo, 81 years old then mayor of Asturias from
1928 to 1934 and Matias Pogoy who both testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina
to be husband and wife and that they have three children. Catalina herself testified
that she was handed a receipt presumably the marriage certificate by Fr. Jomao-as
but it was burned during the war.
Albeit, a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to

present it would not mean that marriage did not take place. Other evidence may be
presented where in this case evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was
held competent to prove the marriage of Gavino and Catalina in 1929, that they have
three children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six and that they are
recognized by Gavinos family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.
On the other hand,Leoncia claimed that her brother Gavino died single at the family
residence in Asturias. She obtained a certificate from the local Civil Registrar of
Asturias to the effect that the office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and
13

ARTICLE 2-6
Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34
of the Civil Code thus exempted from the marriage license requirement. According to
him, he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of
the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar but the latter failed to
do so. In order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized the
marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a
copy of which was then filed with the civil registrar. The other five marriages were not
illegally solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign their marriage contracts and the
date and place of marriage are not included. It was alleged that copies of these
marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo. The alleged marriage
of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater & Nacario were not
celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage
license and that the marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte was celebrated even without the
requisite license due to the insistence of the parties to avoid embarrassment with the
guests which he again did not sign the marriage contract.
Eugenio vs Velez
186 scra 425
Custody of a Dead Body
The petitioner claims legal custody of the dead body on that basis that she was his
common law wife. On the other hand, the next of kin claim they are legal custodian of
the dead body of their sister, wanting of a decent burial.
ISSUE: Whether or not the legal right to custody of the dead body be claimed by a
mere common law husband.
An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents.
HELD: Petitioner failed to sufficiently establish a clear legal right to the custody of the
dead body of Vitaliana Vargas simply because they are not lawfully-wedded. Custody
of the dead body Vitaliana was rightfully awarded to her surviving brothers and
sisters.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid.

HELD:
Bocaya & Besmontes marriage was solemnized without a marriage license along
with the other couples. The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including the
photographs taken showed that it was really Judge Palaypayon who solemnized their
marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by judge to return after 10 days
after the solemnization and bring with them their marriage license. They already
started living together as husband and wife even without the formal requisite. With
respect to the photographs, judge explained that it was a simulated solemnization of
marriage and not a real one. However, considering that there were pictures from the
start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage certificates in front of
him. The court held that it is hard to believe that it was simulated.
Cosca vs. Palaypayon

237 SCRA 249
FACTS:
The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1), Edmundo B.
Peralta (Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora (Process
Server). Respondents are Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge, and
Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy, clerk of court II. All work in MTC-Tinambac, Camarines
Sur.
On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage between
Abellano & Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so the
marriage license was dispensed with considering that the contracting parties
executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for
almost 6 years already. However, it was shown in the marriage contract that Abellano
was only 18 yrs 2months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together
for 6 years already before they got married as what is stated in the joint affidavit,
Abellano must have been less than 13 years old when they started living together
which is hard to believe. Palaypayon should have been aware, as it is his duty to
ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might have executed a false
joint affidavit in order to avoid the marriage license requirement.
Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the

requisite of a marriage license. Hence, the following couples were able to get married
just by paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly
Edralin; Francisco Selpo & Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias & Maria Gacer; Renato
Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater & Margarita Nacario; Sammy Bocaya &
Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, the marriage contracts of the following couples
did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, Palaypayon did not sign the
marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization reasoning out that
he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which
happens usually several days after the marriage ceremony.
14

Navarro vs Domagtoy
Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that in the absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas an
irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and
administratively liable.
presumptive death - family code

Navarro is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. He has submitted
evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by Municipal Circuit Trial Court
Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as
inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. First, on September 27, 1994,
respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn
Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.
Domagtoy claimed that he merely relied on an affidavit acknowledged before him
attesting that Tagadans wife has been absent for seven years. The said affidavit was
alleged to have been sworn to before another judge. Second, it is alleged that he
performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G.
del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Domagtoy counters
that he solemnized the marriage outside of his jurisdiction upon the request of the
parties.
Wassmer vs Velez
12 scra 648
Breach of Promise to Marry
Franciso Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided
to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954
Velez left a note to her that they have to postpone their wedding because his mother
opposed it. And on the next day he sent her the following telegram Nothing changed
rest assured returning very soon apologize mama papa love Paking. Thereafter
Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again, sued by Beatrice for damages,
Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. The record reveals that on August
23, 1954, plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which was
subsequently issued. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and
acquaintances. The bride-to-bes trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the
important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl
were prepared, but two days before the wedding he never returned and was never
heard from again.
ISSUE: Whether or not Domagtoy acted without jurisdiction.

HELD: Domagtoys defense is not tenable and he did display gross ignorance of the
law. Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first
wifes presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ihis
former wife. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of
Domagtoy to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect
or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. On
the second issue, the request to hold the wedding outside Domagtoys jurisdiction
was only done by one party, the bride NOT by both parties. More importantly, the
elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing
judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the authority of the
solemnizing officer. Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others,
any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction. Article 8, which
is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does
not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding
provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not in the case at bar, is a case of mere breach of promise to
marry.
HELD: Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere
breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding
and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it
when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable
in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid. The lower courts judgment is
hereby affirmed.
Araes vs. Judge Occiano

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1309 April 11, 2002
Facts:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata charged respondent judge with Gross Ignorance
of the Law, via a sworn Letter-Complaint, for solemnizing the marriage between
ARTICLE 7
15

petitioner and her late groom (Ret.) Commodore Dominador B. Orobia without the
requisite marriage license, among others.
Since the marriage is a nullity, petitioners right, upon Orobias death, to
inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was not recognized. Petitioner was likewise
deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia. Petitioner prays that sanctions be
imposed against respondent for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations,
which caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings. The case was
referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to the Office of the Court Administrator,
which required the respondent to comment on the complaint.
Respondent averred, among others, that before starting the ceremony, he
examined the documents submitted to him by the petitioner and he discovered that
the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license so he refused to solemnize
the marriage. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors,
and the delivery of the provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the
marriage out of human compassion. After the solemnization, respondent reiterated
the need for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give
it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured the respondent that
they would give the license to him, but they never did. He attributed the hardships and
embarrassment petitioner suffered as due to her own fault and negligence.
Private respondent Tan Put alleged that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan,
who was a partner and practically the owner who has controlling interest of Glory
Commercial Company and a Chinese Citizen until his death. Defendant Antonio Lim
Tanhu and Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua were partners in name but they were mere
employees of Po Chuan and were naturalized Filipino Citizens. Tan Put filed
complaint against spouses-petitoner Lim Tanhu and Dy Ochay including their son
Tech Chuan and the other spouses-petitoner Ng Sua and Co Oyo including also their
son Eng Chong Leonardo, that through fraud and machination took actual and active
management of the partnership and that she alleged entitlement to share not only in
the capital and profits of the partnership but also in the other assets, both real and
personal, acquired by the partnership with funds of the latter during its lifetime."
According to the petitioners, Ang Siok Tin is the legitimate wife, still living, and with
whom Tee Hoon had four legitimate children, a twin born in 1942, and two others born
in 1949 and 1965, all presently residing in Hong Kong. Tee Hoon died in 1966 and as
a result of which the partnership was dissolved and what corresponded to him were
all given to his legitimate wife and children.
Tan Put prior of her alleged marriage with Tee Hoon on 1949, was engaged in the
drugstore business; that not long after her marriage, upon the suggestion of the latter
sold her drugstore for P125,000.00 which amount she gave to her husband as
investment in Glory Commercial Co. sometime in 1950; that after the investment of
the above-stated amount in the partnership its business flourished and it embarked in
the import business and also engaged in the wholesale and retail trade of cement and
GI sheets and under huge profits.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a
marriage license and outside his territorial jurisdiction.
Ruling:
Respondent judge should be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the
requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara, the Supreme Court held that a
marriage, which preceded the issuance of the marriage license, is void, and that
subsequent issuance of such license cannot render or even add an iota of validity to
the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to conduct marriage. Respondent judge did not
possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of the petitioner. Judges,
who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said
areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite, which while it may
not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.
Defendants interpose that Tan Put knew and was are that she was merely the
common-law wife of Tee Hoon. Tan Put and Tee Hoon were childless but the former
had a foster child, Antonio Nunez.
ISSUE: Whether Tan Put, as she alleged being married with Tee Hoon, can claim
from the company of the latters share.
HELD:
Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, the declaration of the contracting parties that they
take each other as husband and wife "shall be set forth in an instrument" signed by
the parties as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage.
Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the
marriage contract. While a marriage may also be proved by other competent
evidence, the absence of the contract must first be satisfactorily explained. Surely, the
certification of the person who allegedly solemnized a marriage is not admissible
evidence of such marriage unless proof of loss of the contract or of any other
satisfactory reason for its non-production is first presented to the court. In the case at
ARTICLE 22
Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete
66 SCRA 425
FACTS:
16

bar, the purported certification issued by a Mons. Jose M. Recoleto, Bishop,
Philippine Independent Church, Cebu City, is not, therefore, competent evidence,
there being absolutely no showing as to unavailability of the marriage contract and,
indeed, as to the authenticity of the signature of said certifier, the jurat allegedly
signed by a second assistant provincial fiscal not being authorized by law, since it is
not part of the functions of his office. Besides, inasmuch as the bishop did not testify,
the same is hearsay.
married and his residence was Davao City. The trial court ruled that she failed to
establish the validity of marriage, and even denied her petition. This was latter
appealed to the appellate court, but it decided in favor of herein respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial and appellate court is correct on their ruling on the
validity of marriage of Antonietta Garcia to Roberto Chua.
An agreement with Tee Hoon was shown and signed by Tan Put that she received
P40,000 for her subsistence when they terminated their relationship of common-law
marriage and promised not to interfere with each others affairs since they are
incompatible and not in the position to keep living together permanently. Hence, this
document not only proves that her relation was that of a common-law wife but had
also settled property interests in the payment of P40,000.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the lower court and the appellate court are
correct in holding that petitioner herein failed to establish the truth of her allegation
that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage
contract which the petitioner failed to produce. Transfer Certificates of Title,
Residence Certificates, passports and other similar documents cannot prove
marriage especially so when the petitioner has submitted a certification from the Local
Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter
from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized
said alleged marriage. The lower court correctly disregarded the Photostat copy of the
marriage certificate which she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence
rule, together with other worthless pieces of evidence. A valid, original marriage
contract would be the best evidence that the petitioner should have presented. Failure
to present it as evidence would make the marriage dubious.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted. All proceedings held in
respondent court in its Civil Case No. 12328 subsequent to the order of dismissal of
October 21, 1974 are hereby annulled and set aside, particularly the ex-parte
proceedings against petitioners and the decision on December 20, 1974. Respondent
court is hereby ordered to enter an order extending the effects of its order of dismissal
of the action dated October 21, 1974 to herein petitioners Antonio Lim Tanhu, Dy
Ochay, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and Co Oyo. And respondent court is hereby
permanently enjoined from taking any further action in said civil case gave and except
as herein indicated. Costs against private respondent.
ARTICLE 25
Vda. De Chua vs. CA

G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998
Republic of the Philippines vs. CA and Castro

G.R. No. 103047 September 12, 1994
Facts:
Roberto Chua was the common-law husband of Florita A. Vallejo and had
two illegitimate sons with her. On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao
City. Upon the death of Roberto, Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato
City a petition for the guardianship and administration over the persons and
properties of the two minors. Herein petitioner filed for its dismissal, claiming that she
was the sole surviving heir of the decedent being his wife; and that the decedent was
a resident of Davao City and not Cotabato City, which means that the said court was
not the proper forum to settle said matters.
The petitioner failed to submit the original copy of the marriage contract and
the evidences that she used were: a photocopy of said marriage contract, Transfer
Certificate of Title issued in the name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta
Garcia, and a resident of Davao City; Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989
issued at Davao City indicating that he was married and was born in Cotabato City;
Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the
decedent was stated as married; passport of the decedent specifying that he was
Facts:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married
in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay
City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castros parents.
Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents
required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the
marriage license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no.
3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig,
Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the
marriage was unknown to Castros parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when
Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together.
However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple
17

parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by
Castros brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
dismiss the complaint on the ground that the cause of action was barred by a
previous judgment in the divorce proceedings wherein he had acknowledged that the
couple had no community property.
Issue:
Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidences presented by
private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by
the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private
respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.
Issue:
Whether or not absolute divorce decree granted by U.S. court, between
Filipina wife and American husband held binding upon the latter.
Ruling:
The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada Divorce of the parties. There can
be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any states of the U.S. The
decree is binding on Upton as an American citizen. Hence, he cannot sue petitioner,
as her husband, in any state of the United States. It is true that owing to the
nationality principle under article 15 of the civil code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorce abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case,
the divorce in Nevada released Upton from the marriage from the standards of
American law. Thus, pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the husband of the
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as petitioner husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is also estopped by his own
representation before the Nevada court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property. He should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property.
Ruling:
The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage
license first issued by a local registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid
marriage, absence to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance. The
above rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent
search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a
specified tenor was not being found in a registrar. As custodians of public documents,
civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a
register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage license,
including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and
such other relevant data.
The certification of due search and inability to find issued by the civil
registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law
to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of due search and inability to find sufficiently
proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 1396182 to the contracting
parties. There being no marriage license, the marriage of Angelina and Edwin is void
ab initio.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

GR. No. 154380, 5 October 2005, First Division (Quisumbing, J.)
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or
her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
ARTICLE 26
Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr.
139 SCRA 139
On 24 May 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva and
their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V.
Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
Facts:
In 1986, his wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer.
A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen and sometime in 2000, learned from his son that his wife had
obtained a divorce decree. His wife then married Innocent Stanley and is now
currently living in San Gabriel, California with her child by him.
Alice Reyes, a Filipina, married Richard Upton, an American, in Hongkong in

1972. They established residence in the Philippines and had two children. In 1982,
the wife sued for divorce in Nevada, U.S.A., on the ground of incompatibility. She later
married Theodore Van Dorn in Nevada in 1983. Upton sued her before RTC, Branch
LXV in Pasay City asking that she be ordered to render an accounting of her
business, which Upton alleged to be conjugal property. He also prayed that he be
declared with a right to manage the conjugal property. The defendant wife moved to
18

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (FC). No opposition was filed.
Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration
but it was denied. Hence, this petition.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr., which involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
where the Court held that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is
valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to
remarry under Philippine law.
ISSUE:
In the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals, the parties were Filipino
citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in
1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of
obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer
married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Whether or not respondent can remarry under Art. 26 of the Family Code
HELD: The petition is granted.
The OSG contends that par. 2 Art. 26 of FC is not applicable to the instant
case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and an alien. Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law
that governs the respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of
legislation and not of judicial determination.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, the Court holds that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them became naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtained a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
The respondent admits that Art. 26 is not directly applicable to his case, but
insists that since his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which
capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
In view of the foregoing, the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2
of Article 26 are as follows: (1) There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (2) A valid divorce is obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the
citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
The Court noted that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial
court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. The requisites of a petition
for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party
seeking the relief has a legal interest in thecontroversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe
for judicial determination. This case satisfies all the requisites for the grant of a
petition for declaratory relief.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen,

there was still a valid marriage that had been celebrated between her and Cipriano.
Then the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her
to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
are both satisfied. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to
remarry.
Article 26 does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at
hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one
where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens,
but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently
obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an
American citizen while residing in the USA.
However, the Court notes that the records are bereft of competent evidence
duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of
respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. For his plea to prosper, the
respondent must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American
citizen, must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign
law allowing it, and that such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws. Furthermore, the respondent must also show that
the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article
Records of the proceedings of the FC deliberations showed that the intent

of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the
Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse.
19

26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated
to enter into another marriage.
fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.
Nevertheless, the Court is unanimous in holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26

of the FC should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a
spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.
However, due to lack of sufficient evidence submitted and on record, the Court is
unable to declare, based on the respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was
naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried
an American, that the respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration
could only be made properly upon the respondents submission of the aforecited
evidence in his favor.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of
rights. It can be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage.
Manzano vs. Sanchez
AM No. MTJ-001329, March 8, 2001
FACTS:
Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been
married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had
four children. On March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with
Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated
that both contracting parties were separated thus, respondent Judge ought to know
that the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he officiated the
marriage of David and Payao, he knew that the two had been living together as
husband and wife for seven years as manifested in their joint affidavit that they both
left their families and had never cohabit or communicated with their spouses due to
constant quarrels.
MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM LICENSE REQUIREMENT (ARTICLE 27-34)

Ninal vs. Bayadog
328 SCRA 122
FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3
children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by
Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the
guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma
Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating
that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage
license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death,
petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and
Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license.
ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties

who both have an existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been
cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of Family Code.
HELD:
Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to
marry each other. Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as
indicated in their marriage contract that they are both separated is an impediment
that would make their subsequent marriage null and void. Just like separation, free
and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years does not severe
the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez
demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous
marriage.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity
of Pepitos marriage after his death?
HELD:
The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They
cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they
cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed.
Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the
Mariategui vs. CA
GR NO. 57062, January 24, 1992
FACTS:
20

Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages
during his lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor.
He had 4 children with his first wife Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely
Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbano and Ireneo. Baldomera had 7 children namely
Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed
Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a son named Ruperto. On the other hand,
Lupos second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had a daughter named
Cresenciana. Lupo got married for the third time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco and had
3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina. Jacinto testified that his parents got
married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported
themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such.
Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In
lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together
for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina
Pascual. They were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating
Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against Jose and an
administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose
filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage
where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was
secured through fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they
executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.
Lupos descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of

extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the
Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to a voluntary registration proceedings and a
decree ordering the registration of the lot was issued. The siblings in the third
marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of the estate of their deceased father and
annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.
HELD:
CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years
at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and
Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the
celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a
marriage license.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law
and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn
affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have
qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license,
cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely
required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. Hence, Jose and
Felisas marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of
marriage is imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may
be raised any time.
HELD:
Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipas marriage,
no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact
that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all
requisites for its validity are present.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place
between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting
themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that
a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board
is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of
nature and the ordinary habits of life.
VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES (ARTICLE 35-54)

ARTICLE 35
Hence, Felipas children are legitimate and therefore have successional rights.
Domingo vs. CA
226 SCRA 572
Republic vs. Dayot

GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008
FACTS:
FACTS:
Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property. She did not know that
Domingo had been previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She came to
21

know the previous marriage when the latter filed a suit of bigamy against her.
Furthermore, when she came home from Saudi during her one-month leave from
work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman and had been
disposing some of her properties which is administered by Roberto. The latter claims
that because their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is
unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists the declaration of
the nullity of marriage not for the purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a
basis for the separation and distribution of properties acquired during the marriage.
1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was
estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in
1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he
abandoned them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
HELD:
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for
purposes of remarriage.
The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What
constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences
and confliction personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit
inclinations which would not meet the essential marital responsibilites and duties due
to some psychological illness. Reynaldos action at the time of the marriage did not
manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for psychological
incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband
cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison
showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not
considered as psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of
remarriage. However, it is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent
spouse who believed in good faith that his or her partner was not lawfully married
marries the same. With this, the said person is freed from being charged with
bigamy.
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall provide
for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the
custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive
legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
Soledads prayer for separation of property will simply be the necessary consequence
of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Hence, the petitioners
suggestion that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be
instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the
effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of
property according to the regime of property relations governing them.
The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set
forth in this case:
burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff
root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with

the essentials of marital obligations of marriage
such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and
225 of the Family Code
decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church

must be respected
court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act
on behalf of the state.
ARTICLE 36
Republic vs. CA and Molina
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
FACTS:
LEOUEL SANTOS, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND

JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the
respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological
incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs
of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a father preferring to spend
more time with friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his parents for
aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. In
Leouel, a member of the Army, met Julia in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they got
married. The couple latter lived with Julias parents. Julia gave birth to a son in 1987.
22

Their marriage, however, was marred by the frequent interference of Julias parent as
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The
averred by Leouel. The couple also occasionally quarrels about as to, among other
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PI to the most serious
things, when should they start living independently from Julias parents. In 1988, Julia
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
went to the US to work as a nurse despite Leouels opposition. 7 months later, she
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must
and Leouel got to talk and she promised to return home in 1989. She never went
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be in the US due to a military
training. During his stay, he desperately tried to locate his wife but to no avail. Leouel,
The SC also notes that PI must be characterized by
in an effort to at least have his wife come home, filed to nullify their marriage due to
Julias psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted that due to Julias failure to return
(a) gravity,
home or at least communicate with him even with all his effort constitutes
psychological incapacity. Julia attacked the complaint and she said that it is Leouel
(b) juridical antecedence, and
who is incompetent. The prosecutor ascertained that there is no collusion between

the two. Leouels petition is however denied by the lower and appellate court.
(c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in
ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the case at bar.
the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
HELD: Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not define
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. In the case at
the term "psychological incapacity, which is adopted from the Catholic Canon Law.
bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because the
But basing it on the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, the
alleged PI of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings presented. The
provision in PI, adopted with less specificity than expected, has been designed to
factual settings do not come close to to the standard required to decree a nullity of
allow some resiliency in its application. The FCRC did not give any examples of PI for
marriage.
fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the
Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano

GR No. 149498, May 20, 2004
principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the FCRC would like the judge to interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
FACTS:
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her

marriage with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological
incapacity. She and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan and lived in
the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there
for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on November 16, 1987.
provision was taken from Canon Law. The term "psychological incapacity" defies any
precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety. Article 36 of
the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. PI should refer to no less
In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their
marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate
the holidays with his family. Toshio sent money for two months and after that he
stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but never respondent.
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68), include their mutual obligations to live
23

In 1991, she learned from her friend that Toshio visited the country but did not bother
to see her nor their child.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented quantum evidence for the declaration
of nullity of his marriage with Leni on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him
remained unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave
to effect service of summons by publication. The motion was granted and the
summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of
general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Toshio filed to respond
after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a motion to refer the case
to the prosecutor for investigation.
HELD:
The court held that documents presented by Alfonso during the trial of the case do not
in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. The evidence was
insufficient and shows grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity. Alfonso
testified and complained about three aspects of Lenis personality namely lack of
attention to children, immaturity, and lack of an intention of procreative sexuality and
none of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity.
ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital

obligation.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and

incurability. It must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the
performance of marital obligations. A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.
Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Furthermore, the testimonial evidence from other witnesses failed to identify and
prove root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. It just established that the
spouses had an incompatibility or a defect that could possibly be treated or alleviated
through psychotherapy. The totality of evidence presented was completely
insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity more so without any
medical, psychiatric or psychological examination.
Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged
nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. Although as rule, actual
medical examinations are not needed, it would have greatly helped Lolita had she
presented evidence that medically or clinically identified Toshios illness. This could
have been done through an expert witness. It is essential that a person show
incapability of doing marital obligation due to some psychological, not physical
illness. Hence, Toshio was not considered as psychologically incapacitated.
Antonio vs. Reyes

GR No. 155800, March 10, 2006
Choa vs. Choa

GR No. 1473376, November 26, 2002
FACTS:
Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in
1989. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall and
then a subsequent church wedding at Pasig in December 1990. A child was born but
died 5 months later. Reyes persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her
occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things. She even did
not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she represented to her husband as
adopted child of their family. They were separated in August 1991 and after attempt
for reconciliation, he finally left her for good in November 1991. Petitioner then filed in
1993 a petition to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void anchored in
Article 36 of the Family Code.
FACTS:
Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa got married in 1981. They have 2 children namely
Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. In 1993, Alfonso filed an annulment of his marriage to
Leni. Afterwards, he filed an amended complaint for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage based on psychological incapacity. The case went to trial and the trial court
further held that Alfonso presented quantum evidence that Leni needs to controvert
for the dismissal of the case.
Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with perjury, concubinage and deportation
which shows latters psychological incapacity because according to him it clearly
showed that his wife not only wanted him behind bars but also to banish outside the
country.
ISSUE: Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for
declaring their marriage null and void.
24

HELD:
not even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers. A case was then filed to
declare the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Gina claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show
his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil
and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the
defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status
here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man. The
defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation
on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for
this, according to the defendant, was that every time he wants to have sexual
intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her
private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced
his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was
shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped. The defendant submitted himself to a
physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the
purpose of finding out whether he is impotent. As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza
submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. It is stated there, that there is no evidence of
impotency, and he is capable of erection.
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not
he has an erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or
five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one
centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why
his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his
soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman
Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of

marriage as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. The petitioner, aside
from his own testimony presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who
attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and
pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior, which amounts to
psychological incapacity. Respondents fantastic ability to invent, fabricate stories
and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of make-believe that
made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving
meaning and significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes psychological
incapacity have been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by
experts. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity was considered so
grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage without their
consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit the basic
tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Furthermore, Reyes case is incurable considering that petitioner tried to reconcile
with her but her behavior remain unchanged.
Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI,
G.R. No. 119190. January 16, 1997
ISSUE: Is the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner
a psychological incapacity?
FACTS: respondent Gina Loi and petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi were married at the Manila
Cathedral on May 22, 1988. After the celebration of their marriage and wedding
reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of
defendant's mother. There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for
the first night of their married life. Opposite to Gina's expectations that the newlyweds
were to enjoy making love or having sexual intercourse with each other, the
defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went
to sleep. There where no sexual intercourse occurred during their first night, In an
effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together
during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so
together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited
by the defendant to join them. They stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But,
during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the
defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on
a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and
on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period,
there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. She claims, that she did
HELD: One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is To
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Continuous non-fulfillment
of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity of the marriage, In the of Chi Ming
Tsoi, the senseless refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. If one of the party, although physically capable
but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligation, and the refusal
is senseless and constant, Marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity.
The family code provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor
is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any
legal mandate or court order. Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed,
no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not
have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist
25

has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings
spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the
mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and
ensures the continuation of family relations.
The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six months. They met in
January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in
June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties
psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the
classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondents, that of the
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital
obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate
court. Hence the court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November
29, 1994. declaring the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on
May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception,
Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera,VOID.
There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated

be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough
to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.
Te vs. Te
GR No. 161793, February 13, 2009
The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of

the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe
and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
FACTS:
Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the
essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and
rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without
advice from others, and allows others to make most of his important decisions (such
as where to live). As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything
dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no
sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals
and clear direction in life.
Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering organized by the

Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Initially, he was attracted to Rowenas
close friend but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court
Rowena, which happened in January 1996. It was Rowena who asked that they
elope but Edward refused bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence,
however, made him relent. They left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he,
providing their travel money of P80,000 and she, purchasing the boat ticket.
They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to her uncles
house and Edward to his parents home. Eventually they got married but without a
marriage license. Edward was prohibited from getting out of the house
unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and her uncle. After a month,
Edward escaped from the house, and stayed with his parents. Edwards parents
wanted them to stay at their house but Rowena refused and demanded that they
have a separate abode. In June 1996, she said that it was better for them to live
separate lives and they then parted ways.
As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes
her unable to assume the essential marital obligations on account for her disregard in
the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse,
and her tendency to blame others. Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is
impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her
threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity,
the precipitous marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null
and void.
After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his
marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity.
ARTICLE 40
ISSUE: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
Morigo vs. People

GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004
HELD:
FACTS:
26

Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a
while but after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they
became sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for
work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted.
In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial
declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo
was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the
civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded
not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner
contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.
marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Valdez vs. RTC
260 SCRA 211
Facts:
Same. Article 147; Emphasis to the RTCs judgment on liquidation of
properties in connection with the provision of property regime w/o unions of marriage.
Issue:
ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with
Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.
Whether or not Article 147 correctly applied on the status of the parties in the
liquidation of their properties.
HELD:
Ruling:
The Supreme Court stated that, in avoid marriage, the property regimes are
those provided for in Article 147 or 148as, the case may be. The liquidation of the coownership shall be in accordance with the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil
Code which are not in conflict with Article 147 or 148.
The conjugal home shall equally be co-owned by the couple and shall be
divided equally during liquidation in accordance with the rules on co-ownership.
However, the fruits of couples separate property are not included in the coownership.
Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual
marriage ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they
just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file
declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his second marriage with
Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.
Terre vs. Terre
211 SCRA 6
FACTS:
People vs. Aragon

100 Phil 1033
Dorothy Terre was then married to a certain Merlito Bercenillo, her first cousin. Atty.
Jordan Terre successfully convinced Dorothy that her marriage was void ab initio for
the reason of public policy and that they are free to contract marriage. They got
married in 1977 where he wrote single under Dorothys status. After getting Dorothy
pregnant, Atty. Terre abandoned them and subsequently contracted another marriage
to Helina Malicdem in 1986. Atty. Terre was charged with abandonment of minor and
bigamy.
FACTS:
Proceso Rosima contracted marriage with Gorrea. While his marriage with the latter
subsist, he contracted a canonical marriage with Faicol. Gorrea is staying in Cebu
while Faicol is in Iloilo. He was a traveling salesman thus, he commuted between
Iloilo and Cebu. When Gorrea died, he brought Faicol to Cebu where the latter
worked as teacher-nurse. She later on suffered injuries in her eyes caused by
physical maltreatment of Rosima and was sent to Iloilo to undergo treatment. While
she was in Iloilo, Rosima contracted a third marriage with Maglasang. CFI-Cebu
found him guilty of bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Terres marriage with Dorothy is null and void.
HELD:
Dorothys first marriage is indeed void ab initio considering that Merlito is her first
cousin thereby against public policy. However, she did not file any declaration for the
nullity of their marriage before she contracted her marriage with Atty. Terre thus, her
second marriage is void. Article 40 states that the absolute nullity of a former
ISSUE: Whether or not the third marriage is null and void.

HELD:
27

The action was instituted upon the complaint of the second wife whose marriage with
Rosima was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage
was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and prosecution against
Rosima for contracting marriage cannot prosper.
son had been born but 15 days after, Janet left. Nolasco went home and cut short his
contract to find Janets whereabouts. He did so by securing another seamans
contract going to London. He wrote several letters to the bar where they first met but
it was all returned. Gregorio petitioned in 1988 for a declaration of presumptive death
of Janet.
Mercado vs. Tan

337 SCRA 122
ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his wife, Janet, is
already dead?
FACTS:
HELD:
Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he
contracted marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did not
know. Tan filed bigamy against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an action
for declaration of nullity of marriage against Oliva. The decision in 1993 declared
marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and void.
The Supreme Court ruled that Nolascos efforts to locate Janet were not persistent to
show that he has a well-founded belief that his wife was already dead because
instead of seeking assistance of local authorities and the British Embassy, he even
secured another contract. More so, while he was in London, he did not even try to
solicit help of the authorities to find his wife.
ISSUE: Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity
of the former marriage.
Lukban vs Republic
L-8492, February 29, 1956
HELD:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent
marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as void.
FACTS:
Lourdes Lukban and Francisco Chuidian got married in 1933 and after a violent
quarrel he left Lukban and has not been heard of since then. She diligently looked for
him asking the parents and friends but no one knew his whereabouts. She believes
that husband is already dead since he was absent for more than 20 years and
because she intends to marry again, she desires to have her civil status put in order
to be relieved on any liability under the law.
In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Oliva right after Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had already been
consummated. He contracted second marriage without the judicial declaration of the
nullity. The fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a
bigamy charge.
ISSUE: Whether Lukban needs to secure declaration of presumptive death before

she can remarry.
ARTICLE 41-42
HELD:
Republic vs. Nolasco
220 SCRA 20
The court ruled that Lukban does not need to secure declaration of presumptive
death of her husband because Civil Code prevails during their marriage in 1933. It
provides that for the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have
the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made
in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable
the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the
absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the
former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be
FACTS:
Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He met Janet Parker, a British, in bar in England.
After that, Janet started living with Nolasco in his ship for six months. It lasted until
the contract of Nolasco expired then he brought her to his hometown in Antique.
They got married in January 1982. Due to another contract, Nolasco left the
province. In 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother informing him that his
28

living, that each former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse
present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
be better for her to go back to her parents. Lea left after that fight. Allan checked if
she went to her parents house but was not there and even inquired to her friends. He
went back to the parents-in-laws house and learned that Lea had been to their house
but left without notice. He then sought help from the Barangay Captain. For
sometime, Alan decided to work as part-time taxi driver and during his free time he
would look for Lea in the malls. In June 2001, Alan reported Leas disappearance to
the local police station and an alarm notice was issued. He also reported the
disappearance in NBI on July 2001. Alan filed a petition in March 2001 for the
declaration of presumptive death of his wife.
Armas vs. Calisterio

GR No. 136467, April 6, 2000
FACTS:
Teodorico Calisterio, husband of Marietta Calisterio, the respondent, died intestate in
April 1992 leaving several parcel of land estimated value of P604,750.00. He was the
second husband of Marietta who was previously married with William Bounds in
January 1946. The latter disappeared without a trace in February 1947. 11 years
later from the disappearance of Bounds, Marietta and Teodorico were married in May
1958 without Marietta securing a court declaration of Bounds presumptive death.
ISSUE: Whether Alan has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
HELD:
Antonia Armas y Calisterio, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a petition claiming to be

the sole surviving heir of the latter and that marriage between Marietta and his brother
being allegedly bigamous is thereby null and void. She prayed that her son
Sinfroniano be appointed as administrator, without bond, of the estate of the
deceased and inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate
would have been settled.
The court ruled that Alan failed to prove that he has a well-founded belief, before he
filed his petition with RTC, that his spouse was dead. He failed to present a witness
other than the Barangay Captain. He even failed to present those friends of Lea
which he inquired to corroborate his testimony. He also failed to make inquiries from
his parents-in-law regarding Leas whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It
could have enhanced his credibility had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law
about Lea's whereabouts considering that Lea's father was the owner of Radio
DYMS. He did report and seek help of the local police authorities and NBI to locate
Lea but he did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in RTC.
ISSUE: Whether Marrieta and Teodoricos marriage was void due to the absence of
the declaration of presumptive death.
HELD:
Valdez vs. Republic

GR No. 180863, September 8, 2009
The marriage between the respondent and the deceased was solemnized in May
1958 where the law in force at that time was the Civil Code and not the Family Code
which only took effect in August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limit its
retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Since Civil
Code provides that declaration of presumptive death is not essential before
contracting marriage where at least 7 consecutive years of absence of the spouse is
enough to remarry then Marrietas marriage with Teodorico is valid and therefore she
has a right can claim portion of the estate.
FACTS:
FACTS:
Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl
named Nancy. They argued constantly because Sofio was unemployed and did not
bring home any money. In March 1972, the latter left their house. Angelita and her
child waited until in May 1972, they decided to go back to her parents home. 3 years
have passed without any word from Sofio until in October 1975 when he showed up
and they agreed to separate and executed a document to that effect. It was the last
time they saw each other and had never heard of ever since. Believing that Sofio
was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985. Virgilios
application for naturalization in US was denied because petitioners marriage with
Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in March 2007, petitioner filed a petition seeking
declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
Alan Alegro, the petitioner, was married with Lea in January 1995. Lea arrived home
late in February 1995 and Alan told her that if she enjoys life of a single person, it will
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of
declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
Republic vs. CA
GR No. 159614, December 9, 2005
29

filed for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he agreed to
married Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin. The Lower court decided
in favor of Luida.
Issue:
WON Luidas concealment of her pregnancy constituted a ground for the
annulment of marriage (fraud)
H eld:
No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred
institution in which the State is interested.
In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was concealment of
pregnancy constituting a ground for annulment; it was unlikely that Godofredo,
a first- year law student, did not suspect anything about Luidas condition
considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy when they got
married.
HELD:
The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofios death is necessary
because Civil Code governs during 1971 and not Family Code where at least 7
consecutive years of absence is only needed. Thus, petitioner was capacitated to
marry Virgilio and their marriage is legal and valid.
ARTICLE 45-46
Anaya vs. Palaroan
36 SCRA 97
FACTS:
Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953. Palaroan filed an action
for annulment of the marriage in 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained
through force and intimidation. The complaint was dismissed and upheld the validity
of the marriage and granting Auroras counterclaim. While the amount of
counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando divulged to her that several months
prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his.
According to her, the non-divulgement to her of such pre-marital secret constituted
fraud in obtaining her consent. She prayed for the annulment of her marriage with
Fernando on such ground.
Aquino vs. Delizo

109 Phil 21
FACTS:
Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955 on the ground of fraud against
Conchita Delizo that at the date of her marriage with the former on December 1954,
concealed the fact that she was pregnant by another man and sometime in April 1955
or about 4 months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. During the trial,
Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco represent the state in the proceedings to prevent
collusion. Only Aquino testified and the only documentary evidence presented was
the marriage contract between the parties. Delizo did not appear nor presented any
evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital
relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.
HELD:
The concealment of a husbands pre-marital relationship with another woman was not
one of those enumerated that would constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it is
further excluded by the last paragraph providing that no other misrepresentation or
deceit as to.. chastity shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. Hence, the
case at bar does not constitute fraud and therefore would not warrant an annulment
of marriage.
CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioners complaint for annulment of marriage, which was

affirmed by CA thus a petition for certiorari to review the decisions.
ISSUE: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by Aquino does not
constitute such fraud as would annul a marriage.
HELD:
Buccat v. Mangonon de Buccat,

72 Phil 19 (1941)
The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for
annulment of marriage. Delizo was allegedly to be only more than four months
pregnant at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it is hard to say that her
pregnancy was readily apparent especially since she was naturally plump or fat. It
is only on the 6thmonth of pregnancy that the enlargement of the womans abdomen
Facts:
Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccatmet in March 1938,
became engaged in September, and got married in Nov 26.
On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida, who was 9 months
pregnant, gave birth to a son. Godofredo left Luida and on March 23, 1939, he
30

reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more
general and apparent.
their marriage. Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective documentary
and testimonial evidence. In June 1995, trial court dismissed Florences petition and
throughout its trial, the State did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal
Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation dated November 1994 stating that he
found no collusion between the parties, he did not actively participated therein. Other
than having appearance at certain hearings, nothing more was heard of him.
In the following circumstances, the court remanded the case for new trial and decision
complained is set aside.
Jimenez vs. Canizares
L-12790, August 31, 1960
ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence of
the participation of the State in the proceedings.
FACTS:
HELD:
Joel Jimenez, the petitioner, filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with
Remedios Canizares on the ground that the orifice of her genitals or vagina was too
small to allow the penetration of a male organ for copulation. It has existed at the
time of the marriage and continues to exist that led him to leave the conjugal home
two nights and one day after the marriage. The court summoned and gave a copy to
the wife but the latter did not file any answer. The wife was ordered to submit herself
to physical examination and to file a medical certificate within 10 days. She was
given another 5 days to comply or else it will be deemed lack of interest on her part
and therefore rendering judgment in favor of the petitioner.
Article 48 of the Family Code states that in all cases of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
The trial court should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating his reasons for
his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The records are
bereft of an evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case thus,
the case is remanded for proper trial.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage can be annulled with only the testimony of the
husband.
De Ocampo vs. Florenciano

107 Phil 35
HELD:
The wife who was claimed to be impotent by her husband did not avail of the
opportunity to defend herself and as such, claim cannot be convincingly be
concluded. It is a well-known fact that women in this country are shy and bashful and
would not readily and unhesitatingly submit to a physical examination unless
compelled by competent authority. Such physical examination in this case is not selfincriminating. She is not charged with any offense and likewise is not compelled to
be a witness against herself. Impotence being an abnormal condition should not be
presumed. The case was remanded to trial court.
FACTS:
Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They begot
several children who are not living with plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered on
several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations
with Jose Arcalas. Having found out, he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study
beauty culture where she stayed for one year. Again plaintiff discovered that the wife
was going out with several other man other than Arcalas. In 1952, when the wife
finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately. In June
1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with Nelson
Orzame. He signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation to which
defendant manifested conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a
criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation in 1955.
ARTICLE 48-49
Sin vs. Sin
GR No. 137590, March 26, 2001
FACTS:
ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of

judgment disallowed by the Family Code.
Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in January
1987. Florence filed in September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of nullity of
HELD:
31

Florencianos admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the
existence of evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of
judgment disallowed by Article 48 of the Family Code. What is prohibited is a
confession of judgment, a confession done in court or through a pleading. Where
there is evidence of the adultery independent of the defendants statement agreeing
to the legal separation, the decree of separation should be granted since it would not
be based on the confession but upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. What
the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on defendants confession. The
petition should be granted based on the second adultery, which has not yet
prescribed.
HELD:
ARTICLE 55-56
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property
rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source
being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so
that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If
death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming,
death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected
consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there
could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that
automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either
party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved
and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of
the appellant.
Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio

43 SCRA 177
Gandionco vs Penaranda
GR No. 72984, November 27, 1987
FACTS:
FACTS:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on
August 1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after
nine days. They had lived together as husband and wife continuously without any
children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her. They acquired properties
during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a
Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a
decree of legal separation, which among others, would order that the defendant
Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against herein petitioner,

Froilan Gandionco for legal separation on the ground of concubinage as a civil case.
Teresita also filed a criminal complaint of concubinage against her husband. She
likewise filed an application for the provisional remedy of support pendent elite which
was approved and ordered by the respondent judge. Petitioner moved to suspend
the action for legal separation and the incidents consequent thereto such as the
support for pendent elite, in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against
him. He contends that the civil action for legal separation is inextricably tied with the
criminal action thus, all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be
suspended and await the conviction or acquittal of the criminal case.
LEGAL SEPARATION (ARTICLE 55-67)
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on
the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the
parties adduced their respective evidence. However, before the trial could be
completed, respondent already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner
died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her
death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on
the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided in
Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal
separation. Petitioners counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her
father, Macario Lapuz.
ISSUE: Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the
resolution of the criminal case for concubinage.
HELD:
Supreme Court ruled that the contentions of the petitioner were incorrect. A civil
action for legal separation on the ground of concubinage may proceed ahead of, or
simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not
one to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense, even if both the civil and
criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one
intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof
ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal
separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.
32

including the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of the children,
support and disqualifications from inheriting from the innocent spouse. Decree of
legal separation may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence, where no
criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal

separation. A single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties
ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation and where the parties live in the same
house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.
Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action

for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. If in case, the
petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can
always file a motion to modify or reduce the same.
Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil Code states that the legal separation may be
claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or
consent to the adultery or concubinage.
ARTICLE 58
Bugayong vs. Ginez

GR No. 10033, December 28, 1956
Pacete vs Carriaga
231 SCRA 321
FACTS:
FACTS:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy was married with Leonila Ginez on
August 1949 at Pangasinan while on furlough leave. Immediately after the marriage,
they lived with the sisters of Bugayong in said municipality before he went back to
duty. The couple came to an agreement that Ginez would stay with his sisters who
later moved in Manila. On or about July 1951, she left the dwelling of the sisters-inlaw and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to Pangasinan to reside
with her mother and later on moved to Dagupan to study in a local college.
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la
Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and
separation of property. She averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete
on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently
contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of
such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was
impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
Petitioner then began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco, (plaintiffs sister-inlaw) and some from anonymous writers, which were not produced at the hearing,
informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. He admitted that his wife
informed him by letter that a certain Eliong kissed her. All these communications,
prompted him in October 1951 to seek the advice of the Navy Chaplain who asked
him to consult with the navy legal department.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within
which to file an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted
misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the defendants failed to file an
answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare
the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The court received
plaintiffs evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980.
After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,1980.
In August 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife. They met in
the house of the defendants godmother. They proceeded to the house of Pedro,
cousin of the plaintiff where they stayed for 1 day and 1 night as husband and wife.
The next day, they slept together in their own house. He tried to verify with Leonila
the truth on the information he received but instead of answering, she merely packed
up and left which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity. He then filed a
complaint for legal separation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners
motion for extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and
in rendering its decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of
Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.
ISSUE: Whether there was condonation between Bugayong and Ginez that may
serve as a ground for dismissal of the action.
HELD:
The Civil Code provides that no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated
upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance
of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or
not collusion between parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney
HELD:
33

shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is
not fabricated.
The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of
uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under
Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract.
The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has no effect on the
legal separation. When the decree itself is issued, the finality of the separation is
complete after the lapse of the period to appeal the decision to a higher court even if
the effects, such as the liquidation of the property, have not yet been commenced nor
terminated.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that
an action for legal separation must in no case be tried before six months shall have
elapsed since the filing of the petition, obviously in order to provide the parties a
cooling-off period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the
parties to reconcile.
The law clearly spells out the effect of a final decree of legal separation on the
conjugal property. Therefore, upon the liquidation and distribution conformably with
the effects of such final decree, the law on intestate succession should take over the
disposition of whatever remaining properties have been allocated to the deceased
spouse.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or

underscored by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which
provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal
separation. Therefore, if the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for
legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no
collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is
not fabricated.
Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree.
Article 106 of the Civil Code, now Article 63 of the Family Code provides the effects of
the decree of legal separation. These legal effects ipso facto or automatically follows,
as an inevitable incident of the judgment decreeing legal separation, for the purpose
of determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal assets.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBANDS AND WIVES (ARTICLE 6873)
ARTICLE 63
ARTCLE 68
Macadangdang vs CA
GR No. 38287, October 23, 1981
Potenciano vs. CA
GR No. 139789, 139808, July 19, 2001
FACTS:
FACTS:
Respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and petitioner Antonio
Macadangdang were married in 1946 after having lived together for two years and
had 6 children. They started a buy and sell business and sari-sari store in Davao
City. Through hard work and good fortune, their business grew and expanded into
merchandising, trucking, transportation, rice and corn mill business, abaca stripping,
real estate etc. Their relationship became complicated and both indulged in
extramarital relations. Married life became intolerable so they separated in 1965
when private respondent left for Cebu for good. When she returned in Davao in
1971, she learned of the illicit affairs of her estranged husband. She then decided to
take the initial action. In April 1971, she instituted a complaint for legal separation.
In March 1999, Erlinda Illusorio, the wife of herein petitioner, Potenciano, petitioned
for habeas corpus which was dismissed on May 2000 for lack of merit and granted
the petition to nullify the CA ruling giving visitation rights to Erlinda. This case before
SC is Erlindas motion to reconsider the decision made. A conference was set on
September 2000 to determine the propriety and relevance of a physical and medical
examination of Potenciano and how it will be conducted. Erlindas motion to have
Potenciano be medically examined by a team of medical experts appointed by the
Court was denied with finality in March 2001.
ISSUE: Whether a court can validly issue an order compelling the husband to live
together and observe mutual love, respect and fidelity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation
has effect on the legal separation.
HELD:
HELD:
34

Erlinda claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano to live with her in consortium
but clearly she wanted the latter to live with her and is the root cause of her petition.
What the law provides is that husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity. The sanction thereof is the spontaneous, mutual
affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order to
enforce consortium.
In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the
lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support
from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home.
Evidently, there was absence of empathy between Erlinda and Potenciano having
separated from bed and board since 1972. Empathy as defined by SC is a shared
feeling between husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous
sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way
process. It is for two loving adults who view the relationship with respect, sacrifice
and a continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime
social institution.
FACTS:
Ty vs CA
GR No. 127406, November 27, 2000
Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married with Anna Villanueva in a civil
ceremony in March 1977 in Manila and subsequently had a church wedding in August
1977. Both weddings were declared null and void ab initio for lack of marriage
license and consent of the parties. Even before the decree nullifying the marriage
was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty herein petitioner on April 1979 and had their church
wedding in Makati on April 1982. The decree was only issued in August 1980. In
January 1991, Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to have his marriage with petitioner
be declared null and void. AC ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the prior
marriage with Anna must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be
validly contracted. However, SC found that the provisions of the Family Code cannot
be retroactively applied to the present case for doing so would prejudice the vested
rights of the petitioner and of her children.
Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda

35 Phil 252
FACTS:
Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were
married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila.
They stayed together for a month before petitioner returned to her parents home.
Goitia filed a complaint against respondent for support outside the conjugal home. It
was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts
on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her
husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing,
respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face
and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that
Goitia could not compel her husband to support her except in the conjugal home
unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from
respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty.

HELD:
SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no damages should be awarded to the
wife who sought damages against the husband for filing a baseless complaint causing
her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation
from her parents. Aside from the fact, that petitioner wants her marriage to private
respondent held valid and subsisting. She is likewise suing to maintain her status as
legitimate wife. To grant her petition for damages would result to a situation where
the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so,
would make the application of the law absurd. Moreover, Philippine laws do not
comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of
breach of a marital obligation.
Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage between Ty and Reyes is declared valid
and subsisting and the award of the amount of P15,000 is ratified and maintained as
monthly support to their 2 children for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise
legally entitled thereto.
ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the
conjugal home.
HELD:
The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the
act of marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the
wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining
her in his own home at his option. However, this option given by law is not absolute.
The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his
wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts.
Ilusorio vs. Bildner

GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000
35

FACTS:
cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the

sheriffs or by any other process.
Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property

valued at millions of pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and
President of Baguio Country Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein
petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner
(defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed and
board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at
Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other
hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City.
ARTICLE 73
Ayala Investments vs CA
GR No. 118305, February 12, 1998
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP
of PBM, executed security agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making
him jointly and severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to
pay the loan hence filing of complaint against PBM and Ching. The RTC rendered
judgment ordering PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal
amount with interests. Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued writ of
execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy sheriff, caused the issuance and
service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal
properties on May 1982. Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners on
the ground that subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal
partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing its order paving
way for the scheduled auction sale of respondent spouses conjugal properties. A
certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being the only bidder and was registered on
July 1982.
In 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5
months in Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their
mother overdose Potenciano which caused the latters health to deteriorate. In
February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the person and
property of Potenciano due to the latters advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight
and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio,
Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in
Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have the
custody of his husband alleging that the respondents refused her demands to see
and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.
HELD:
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by
which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To
justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and
effective not merely nominal or moral.
ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is
considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and is it chargeable.
HELD:
The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM and not
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove
that Ching contracted the debt for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains.
PBM has a personality distinct and separate from the family of Ching despite the fact
that they happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity. Clearly, the debt was
a corporate debt and right of recourse to Ching as surety is only to the extent of his
corporate stockholdings.
Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of
Potencianos liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was
86 years of age and under medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental
capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the subject of visitation rights
against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy.
The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the
right of a wife to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his
wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty attached
to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial authority and
Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, if the money or services
are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as
a surety orguarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling
within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The
contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for
36

the surety or his family. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan contracted with
AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry
or profession, it is not embarking in a business. Hence, the conjugal partnership
should not be made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly for the benefit
of PBM.
The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for the family
may have resulted when the guarantee was in favor of Chings employment
(prolonged tenure, appreciation of shares of stocks, prestige enhanced) since the
benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil Code must be one directly resulting from
the loan. It must not be a mere by product or a spin off of the loan itself.
37

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San Beda College Alabang School of Law

League of Extraordinary Gentlemen Notes and Case Digests

Tanada vs. Tuvera

People vs. Que Po Lay

San Beda College Alabang School of Law

Cui vs. Arellano University (2 SCRA 205)

San Beda College Alabang School of Law

Pilapil VS. Ibay-Somera

San Beda College Alabang School of Law

TITLE: Nikko Hotel Manila vs. Reyes

TITLE: Sps. Quisumbing vs. MERALCO

There are two versions of the story:

San Beda College Alabang School of Law

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or

Gashem Shookat Baksh vs Court of Appeals

CASE DIGEST ON GLOBE MACKAY V. CA [176 S 778 (1989)] - While an employer

San Beda College Alabang School of Law

marriage was celebrated by a military chaplain. When Escaos parents learned of

Pe et al vs Pe, 5 SCRA 200

Defendant is married separated and correlative of the plaintiff unmarried woman, 24

On the part of Escaos parents:

TITLE: St. Louis Realty Corp. vs. CA

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Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and member of the faculty of UE Ramon

160 scra 441

ISSUE: Whether St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr. Aramil.

CIVIL PERSONALITY (ARTICLES 37-47)

St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely circulated

Quimiguing vs. Icao

San Beda College Alabang School of Law

San Beda College Alabang School of Law

CITIZENSHIP AND DOMICILE

DUMLAO vs. FAMILY PLASTIC PRODUCTS

San Beda College Alabang School of Law

HELD: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a

FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC

San Beda College Alabang School of Law

Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary

San Beda College Alabang School of Law

ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to

ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR [492 SCRA 1 ; AM NO P-02-1651; 22 JUN 2006]

Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent.

San Beda College Alabang School of Law

ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino and Catalinas marriage is valid.

Albeit, a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to

San Beda College Alabang School of Law

An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid.

Cosca vs. Palaypayon

Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the

San Beda College Alabang School of Law

presumptive death - family code

ISSUE: Whether or not Domagtoy acted without jurisdiction.

Araes vs. Judge Occiano

San Beda College Alabang School of Law

San Beda College Alabang School of Law

Vda. De Chua vs. CA

Republic of the Philippines vs. CA and Castro

San Beda College Alabang School of Law

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

Alice Reyes, a Filipina, married Richard Upton, an American, in Hongkong in