Abbas vs Comelec (179 SCRA 287)

Facts: The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be categorized
into either of the following:
(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and
(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in
Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous
region which make the creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of the
plebiscite.
In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 which
declares that [t]here is hereby created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be
composed of provinces and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite called for the purpose, in
accordance with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution. Petitioner contends that the tenor
of the above provision makes the creation of an autonomous region absolute, such that
even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be
created composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes were obtained.
The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its composition needs to be
clarified.
Held: Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region
shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units
in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the
Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein
such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It may be
that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine
(9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The
single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be
determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and
(2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise
it.
It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend,
not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each

of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this. for if the intention of the
framers of the Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of the votes cast,
they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for the ratification
of the Constitution, i.e. the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose.
It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes
approving the organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of
the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual constituent
units.
More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the sense in which the
vote requirement in the plebiscite provided under Article X, section 18 must have been
understood by the people when they ratified the Constitution.

Chiongbian vs. orbos

Facts:
-Pursuant to article X sec 18 of the 1987 constitution, Congress passed Ra No. 6734 the organic act for the
Autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao calling for plebiscite to be held in 23 provinces
-4 provinces voted in favor of creating the Autonomous region and these are Lanao Del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and
Twi-tawi. Hence, in accordance to RA NO ^&#$ THESE 4 PROVINCES BECAME THE ARMM.
-On the other hand, With respect to the remaining provinces who did not vote in favor of creating ARMM. Article XIX
Sec RA 6724 provides; That only THE PROVINCES and CITIES VOTING FAVORABLY IN SUCH PLEBISCITE
SHALL BE INCLUDED IN ARMM and the provinces WHO DID NOT VOTE FOR THE INCLUSION IN ARMM SHALL
REMAIN IN THE EXISTING ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS; PROVIDED, However, THE PRESIDENT MAY BY
ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION, MERGE the EXISTING REGIONS
-Pursuant to the authority granted by the above provision, then President Aquino issued EO NO 429 PROVIDING
FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMM Where in those who are not in favor in creating the ARMM where
transferred (provinces of a certain region to another) some of which are; a. misamis occidental, at present part of
Region X will become part of REGION XI,
-PETITIONERS, PROTESTED and Challenges the VALIDITY of EO 429 CONTENDING that THERE is
NOT LAW WHICH AUTHORIZES THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE ALTERATIONS ON THE EXISTING
STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENTAL UNITS in other words REORGANiZATION. And that the AUTHORITY
MERGE granted in RA 6724 DOES NOT INCLUDE the AUTHORITY to REORGANIZE even if it does not
affect the apportionment of the congressional representatives. In addition, they contend that Article XIX SEC
13 of RA 6724 is UNCONSITTUIONAL for 1) it is invalid delegation of power by the Legislative to the
President 2) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law.
Issues:
1.
2.
3.

WON Article XIX sec 13 of RA 6724 is invalid because it contains no express standard to guide the
Presidents Discretion and whether the power given fairly expressed in the title of the statue.
WON the power granted authorizes not just to merge but even the reorganization of those who did not vote
or not in favor to it.
WON the power granted to the President includes the power to transfer the regional center of Region IX
from ZAmoanga to PAgadian since it should be the acts of Congress.

Ruling
While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the constitution, it is a power which
has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over
local governments (Article X sec 4 of the Constitution). The regions themselves are not territorial and political
divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are mere groupings of contagious provinces for
administrative purposes. The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust municipal boundaries.
1.

2.

No, A legislative STANdARD NEED NOT BE EXPRESSED. May simply be GATHERED OR IMPLIED. Nor
need it be found in the law challenge because it may be embodied in other statues on the same subject as
that of the challenge legislation. And with respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the
standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant to the President in RA NO. 5435 of the power
to reorganize the Exec Department to Promote simplicity, economy, and efficiency in the government to
enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic
development and to improve the services in the transition of public business.
No, while ARTICLE XIX sec 13 provides that the provinces and cities which do not vote for inclusion in the
autonomous region shall remain in the existing administrative regions this provisions Is subject to the
qualification that the PRSIDENT MAY BY ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION MERGE THE EXISTING
REGIONS. This means that while non-assenting provinces are to remain in the regions as designated upon
the creation of the Autonomous region, they may nevertheless be regrouped with continuous provinces
forming other regions as the exigency of administration may require.

3.

Yes, for administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purpose
hence are not territorial and political subdivision like provinces, cities municipalities and brgys. Therefore
there is no basis that only Congress can determine the region center.

Chiongbian vs. Orbos

G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995 CHIONGBIAN, et.al. v. ORBOS et.al.
FACTS:
Pursuant to the Constitution, Congress passed R.A 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao calling for a plebiscite to create an autonomous region. The provinces of Lanao Del
Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, which voted for the creation of such region were later on known
as the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Consistent with the authority granted by Article XIX,
Section 13 of RA 6734 which authorizes the President to merge the existing regions, President
Corazon Aquino issued E.O No. 429 providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative
Regions in Mindanao. Petitioners contend that Art. XIX, Section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is
unconstitutional because it unduly delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing
him to merge by administrative determination the existing regions or at any rate provides no
standard for the exercise of the power delegated and that the power granted is
not expressed in the title of the law.aw They also challenge the validity of E.O. No. 429 on the ground
that the power granted by RA 6734 to the President is only to merge regions IX and XII but not to
reorganize the entire administrative regions in Mindanao and certainly not to transfer the regional
center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the R.A 6734 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the Presidents
discretion.
HELD:
No, in conferring on the President the power to merge by administrative determination
the existing regions following the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of
administrative regions in 1972. The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of
the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local governments but
also the direction of executive departments which the law requires should have regional offices.
While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided
for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate
the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments. (Abbas v.
COMELEC) The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative
purposes. The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust municipal boundaries
which has been described as "administrative in nature. (Pelaez v. Auditor General)Thus, the regrouping
is done only on paper. It involves no more than are definition or redrawing of the lines separating
administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local government
units by the President and insuring the efficient delivery of essential services

Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011
DECISION
BRION, J.:
I.

THE FACTS

Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were
enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the
ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No.
9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional
officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular
elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional
elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held
on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted
certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30,
2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to
coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.

In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners
assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

II. THE ISSUES:

1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM
elections]?
2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under
Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA
No. 10153 in toto.]

1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize
national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the
Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the
Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent
officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission
exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as
patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections,
starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.

In this case, the ARMM elections, although called regional elections, should be
included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local election based on the wording
and structure of the Constitution.

Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections, including the ARMM elections.

2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-days
requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become
laws they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION
when the President certifies to the necessity of the bills immediate enactment. The Court,
in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the Presidents certification of
necessity in the following manner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also
that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated
conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate
days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally
approved.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. Following
our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification exempted both the House and the Senate from
having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.

3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is
constitutional

[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in
order to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to
achieve synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the
ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the synchronized
elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those
elected to expire when those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3)
authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last also until those elected
in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]

3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of the
incumbent ARMM officials

We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. This provision states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the
three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a
holdover. xxx.

If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by
Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for
the new term. This view like the extension of the elective term is constitutionally infirm
because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would
effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly
can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term
and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of
appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment
power of the President. Hence, holdover whichever way it is viewed is a constitutionally
infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.

Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been
statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to
remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or
implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is
evident.

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of
suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this
provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to
make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation, except where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.

3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has
no authority to order special elections.

The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections
may be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of
Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon
orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the
authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power.

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled
August 2011 elections and setting another date May 13, 2011 for regional elections
synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so doing,
Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall
not call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with
the other elections.

After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the
contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court,
particularly, cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and
effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the power to declare an act of
Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of
discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act
of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself
should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers.

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended
through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the
three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen a term of less
than two years if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is
achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution.

3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is
valid.

The above considerations leave only Congress chosen interim measure RA No.
10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the presynchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law as the only measure that
Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be examined for any attendant
constitutional infirmity.

At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations
on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is
embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also
appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint.
These are:

First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and
consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval
captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.

Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls
under the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs
under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM
executive and legislative officials to be elective and representative of the constituent political
units. This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed
law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more
apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a
law that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153,
however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets

outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to appoint
officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the
said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and
assumed office. This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the
abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013
elections.

[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in
fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the
meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read in the manner it was written
and based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely
and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.
Case Digest: Abas Kida v. Senate
G.R. No. 196271, : October 18, 2011

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity, and in representation of

MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., et
al., Petitioners, v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et al., Respondents.
FACTS:
On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress acted through
Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao."The initially assenting provinces were Lanao del Sur,Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawitawi.RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the regional officials of the ARMM on a date
not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its ratification.
Thereafter, R.A. No. 9054 was passed to further enhance the structure of ARMM under R.A. 6734. Along
with it is the reset of the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of
September 2001.
RA No. 9333was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to the
2ndMonday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA
No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held onAugust 8, 2011.
COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the
various regional offices to be elected.But onJune 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the
ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the

country.With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the
ARMM elections.
Several cases for certiorari, prohibition and madamus originating from different parties arose as a
consequence of the passage of R.A. No. 9333 and R.A. No. 10153 questioning the validity of said laws.
OnSeptember 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of
RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform their
functions should these cases not be decided by the end of their term onSeptember 30, 2011.
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend RA
No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed
under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to comply
with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution.Also cited as grounds
are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere
to the "elective and representative" character of the executive and legislative departments of the ARMM.
Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the
functions of the elective ARMM officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections
shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of appointment also gave the
President the power of control over the ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
A. Whether or not the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections
B. Whether or not the passage of RA No. 10153 violates the provisions of the 1987
Constitution
HELD:
Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the constitutionality of R.A. 10153 in toto. The Court
agreed with respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on its position that the Constitution
mandates synchronization, citing Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987
Constitution. While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national
and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions
(Article XVIII) of the Constitution,which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by
deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization
of elections.
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among others
through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of votes, is to
synchronize the holding of all future elections whether national or local to once every three years.This
intention finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional Commission deliberations.
Furthermore, to achieve synchronization, Congressnecessarilyhas to reconcile the schedule of the

ARMMs regular elections (which should have been held in August 2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the
fixed schedule of the national and local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).
InOsme v. Commission on Elections, the court thus explained:
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the terms of office of Senators,
Members of the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and the Vice-President have
been synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections that the term ofsynchronizationis
used synonymously as the phraseholding simultaneouslysince this is the precise intent in terminating their
Office Tenure on the sameday or occasion.This common termination date will synchronize future
elections to once every three years (Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p.
605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials (under
Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for President and Vice President (under
Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the x x xrecords of the proceedings in the Constitutional
Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be
synchronized as it is a "local" election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution. Regional
elections in the ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-governor and regional assembly
representatives fall within the classification of "local" elections, since they pertain to the elected officials
who will serve within the limited region of ARMM. From the perspective of the Constitution,
autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article Xof
the Constitution entitled "Local Government."Autonomous regions are established and discussed under
Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted to Local Government.
Second issue: Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional mandate. Given
an array of choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of
the necessary adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be accused of any
evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty nor is there reason to accord merit to the
petitioners claims of grave abuse of discretion.
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national and local elections
are recognized and established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling as the other.If their
compelling force differs at all, the difference is in their coverage; synchronization operates on and affects
the whole country, while regional autonomy as the term suggests directly carries a narrower regional
effect although its national effect cannot be discounted.
In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-the-way arrangements and
approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust to the goal or objective in sight in a manner that does

not do violence to the Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms.Under these limitations, the choice
of measures was a question of wisdom left to congressional discretion.
However, the holdover contained in R.A. No. 10153, for those who were elected in executive and
legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as an option that Congress could have
chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. In the case of the terms of
local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any
implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an
interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3)
years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.

RA No. 10153, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM(RA No. 9054) sets outs
in terms of structure of governance.What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to"appoint officers-in-charge
for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly
elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office."This power is far different
from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of
the officials elected in the May 2013 elections. It must be therefore emphasized that the law must be
interpreted as an interim measure to synchronize elections and must not be interpreted otherwise.

ABAS KIDA VS SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, GR NO. 196271

FACTS:
There were several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) were enacted by Congress.
RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday
of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held
on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had
accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected.
But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular
elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the
country.
ISSUE:
WON the Presidents power to appoint is constitutional.

HELD:

YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is
constitutional
Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls
under the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional
basis.

Datu Kida v. Senate of the Philippines., GR 196271 (2012)

1. Datu Kida v. Senate of the Philippines., GR 196271 (2012)

(Constitutionality of RA 10153)/CONSTITUTIONAL
Facts:
RA 6734 provided for the organic act mandated by the constitution for the formation of ARMM.
Unfortunately said organic act did not provide for the exact date for the regional elections in ARMM.
Because of this, several Laws were enacted to provide for the date of the election ; RA 9054- Second
Monday of September 2001, RA 9140November 26, 2001, RA 93332nd Monday of August 2005.
And on the same date every three years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA 9333, COMELEC made preparations for August 8, 2001 Election but sometime in June,
Congress enacted RA 10153- An act providing for the synchronization of the elections in ARMM with the
national and local elections.
Several people, including herein plaintiff assailed the constitutionality of the said enactment.
Issue/s:
1. WON ARMM is a distinct from an ordinary local government unit and therefore should not be
required to hold its election during the local elections mandated in the constitution.
2. WON RA. 10153 is constitutional on the basis that it granted the president the power to appoint
OIC for several elective positions until such positions be filled during the May 2013 elections.
Held:
1. No ARMM is not a distinct government unit therefore not exempt from the synchronization of
election. SC held that the inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political subdivisions of
the State under the heading Local Government indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to
consider autonomous regions as one of the forms of local governments.
That the Constitution mentions only the national government and the local governments, and does
not make a distinction between the local government and the regional government, is particularly
revealing, betraying as it does the intention of the framers of the Constitution to consider the
autonomous regions not as separate forms of government, but as political units which, while having
more powers and attributes than other local government units, still remain under the category of local
governments. Since autonomous regions are classified as local governments, it follows that elections
held in autonomous regions are also considered as local elections.
2. Yes, The Supreme court upheld the constitutionality of RA 10153 stating that there is no
incompatibility between the Presidents power of supervision over local governments and autonomous
regions, and the power granted to the President, within the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to
appoint OICs.
The power of supervision is defined as the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers
perform their functions in accordance with law. This is distinguished from the power of control or the
power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.

The petitioners apprehension regarding the Presidents alleged power of control over the OICs is rooted
in their belief that the Presidents appointment power includes the power to remove these officials at
will. In this way, the petitioners foresee that the appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and
act as representatives of the President and not of the people.
Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners supposition. The provision states:
Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. The President shall appoint officers-in-charge for the
Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in
the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.
The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of the
Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will
remain in office until they are replaced by the duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in
this provision even hints that the President has the power to recall the appointments he already made.
Clearly, the petitioners fears in this regard are more apparent than real.