1

G.R. No. L-8927

March 10,
1914
ASUNCION
NABLE
JOSE,
ET
AL., plaintiff-appellants,
vs.
MARIA
IGNACIA
USON,
ET
AL., defendants-appellees.
FACTS:
The question involved arises from the
interpretation of the first and second
clauses of a codicil to the will of
Filomena Uson.
They read as follows:
First. I declare that all the
property which belongs to me as
conjugal property, referred to in
my said testament, shall be the
property of my aforesaid husband,
Don Rafael Sison; in case all or part
of said property exists at my
husband's death, it is my will
that at his death my sisters
and nieces hereinafter named
succeed him as heirs.
Second. I declare to be my sisters
in lawful wedlock the persons
named Doa Antonia Uson, now
deceased, who has left two
daughters called Maria Rosario,
widow, and Maria Paz, unmarried;
Maria Romualda Uson, widow of
Estanislao Lengson; Ignacia Uson,
married to Don Vicente Puson;
Eufemia Uson, now deceased, who
is survived by three daughters
called Maria Salud, Maria Amparo,
and Maria Asuncion; and Maria
Pilar Uson; Maria Manaoag Uson,
unmarried, issued had by our
deceased after Don Daniel Uson
with one Leonarda Fernandez, alias
Andao de Lingayen, so that they
may have and enjoy it in equal
parts as good sisters and
relatives.
TRIAL COURT:
1] The children of the deceased
sisters should take only that
portion
which their respective mothers would have
taken if they been alive at the time
the will was made;
2] Property should be divided into six
equal parts corresponding to the number
of sisters;

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3] Each living sister should take onesixth, and

4] Children of each deceased sister
should also take one-sixth,
each
onesixth to be divided among said
children equally.
Appellants assert that under a proper
construction of the paragraphs of the
codicil
above-quoted
the
property
should be divided equally between
the living sisters and the children of
the deceased sisters, share and share
alike, a niece taking the same share
that a sister receives.
ISSUE:
W/N property should be divided
equally between the living sisters and
the children of the deceased sisters,
share and share alike - YES
We find expressions which seem to
indicate with fair clearness that it was the
intention of the testatrix to divide her
property equally between her sisters and
nieces.
As we look at the codicil we observe:
First - the testatrix, in the first
paragraph, declares that after
her
husband's death she desires that "my
sisters and nieces, as hereinafter
named, shall succeed
him as heirs."
Second - the testatrix, in the second
paragraph of the codicil,
names
and
identifies each one of her heirs then
living, in each one of the persons
whom she desires
shall succeed her
husband in the property.
- Among those mentioned specially
are the nieces as
well as the sisters.
- The nieces are referred to in no way
different from
the sisters.
- Each one stands out in the second
paragraph of the codicil as clearly as
the other and under exactly the
same
conditions.
Third - The last clause of the second
paragraph of the codicil which if taken
together with the last clause of
the first
paragraph of the codicil, is
decisive of
the intention of the testatrix.
- In the last clause she says that she
names all of the persons
whom
she
desires to take under her will be
name

"so that they must take and enjoy the

property in equal parts as good sisters
and relatives."
In the first paragraph, there's a
declaration as to who the testatrix desires
shall become the owners of her property
on the death of her husband.
Among them we find the names of the
nieces as well as of the sisters.
In the final declaration of the
testatrix, she desires that the sisters
and the nieces shall take and enjoy
the property in equal parts.
That being so, it appears to us that the
testatrix's intention is fairly clear.
The living sisters and the children of
the deceased sisters shall take per
capita and in equal parts.

Note: No ruling on PRETERITION.

G.R. No. 129505
January 31,
2000
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner,
vs.
PACITA
DE
LOS
REYES
PHILLIPS, respondent.
----------------------------G.R. No. 133359
January 31,
2000
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FERNANDO
V. GOROSPE, JR., in his Official
Capacity as Presiding Judge of RTCMakati, Branch 61, and PACITA
PHILLIPS as the alleged executrix of
the alleged will of the late Dr. Arturo
de Santos, respondents.
FACTS:
Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a
resident of Makati City, filed a petition for
probate of his will
Dr. De Santos alleged that:
1] He had no compulsory heirs;
2] He had named in his will as sole
legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos
Foundation, Inc.
3] He disposed by his will his
properties with an
approximate
value
of not less than P2,000,000.00;
4] Copies of said will were in the
custody of the named
executrix,
private respondent Pacita de los Reyes
Phillips

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RTC Judge issued an order granting the

petition and allowing the will.
Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr.
De Santos died
Petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a
motion for intervention claiming that:
1] As the only child of Alicia de Santos
(testator's sister)
and
Octavio
L.
Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded
nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De
Santos. His interest in the matter is
material and direct.
2] He was a creditor of the testator.
ISSUE:
W/N PETITIONER IS A COMPULSORY
HEIR - NO.
or
W/N PETITIONER, BEING A CREDITOR
HAS A RIGHT TO INTERVENE TO
OPPOSE THE PETITION FOR ISSUANCE
OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY FILED BY
THE RESPONDENT - NO.
RULING:
Petitioner has no right to intervene as
found by the CA:
- The private respondent herein is
not an heir or legatee under the
will of the decedent Arturo de
Santos.
- Neither is he a compulsory heir of
the latter. As the only and nearest
collateral relative of the decedent,
he can inherit from the latter only
in case of intestacy.
- Since the decedent has left a will
which has already been probated
and disposes of all his properties
the private respondent can inherit
only if the said will is annulled. His
interest in the decedent's estate is,
therefore, not direct or immediate.
His claim to being a creditor of the
estate is a belated one, having
been raised for the first time only
in his reply to the opposition to his
motion to intervene, and, as far as
the records show, not supported by
evidence.
Rule 79, Section 1 - Under this provision,

an "interested person" is one who

would be benefited by the estate, such as
an heir, or one who has a claim against
the estate, such as a creditor, and whose
interest is material and direct, not merely
incidental or contingent.
Even if petitioner is the nearest next of
kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be
considered an "heir" of the testator.
It is a fundamental rule of testamentary
succession that one who has no
compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of
his entire estate by will. [Art. 842 of the
Civil Code]
Compulsory heirs are limited to the
testator's
(1)
Legitimate
children
and
descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing,
legitimate parents and ascendants,
with respect to their legitimate
children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children,
and natural children by legal
fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children
referred to in Article 287 of the
Civil Code.18
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is
not a compulsory heir who may have been
preterited in the testator's will.
Nor does he have any right to intervene
in the settlement proceedings based on
his allegation that he is a creditor of the
deceased.
Since the testator instituted or named an
executor in his will, it is incumbent upon
the Court to respect the desires of the
testator.

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probate of the will allowed.

The bulk of the estate of Basilia was
destined under the will to pass on to the
respondents Perfecto Cruz, Benita CruzMeez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz, and Luz
Cruz-Salonga, all of whom had been
assumed and declared by Basilia as
her own legally adopted children.
More than two years after her will was
allowed to probate, Basilia died.
Respondent Perfecto Cruz was appointed
executor
The present petitioners filed a petition
in intervention for partition alleging that:
1. They are the nearest of kin of
Basilia, and
2. Five respondents Perfecto Cruz, et
al., had not in fact
been adopted by the
decedent in accordance with law, in
effect rendering these respondents mere
strangers
to the decedent and without
any right to succeed as
heirs.
The respondent Benita Cruz-Meez who
entered an appearance separately from
that of her brother Perfecto Cruz, filed a
motion
to
confine
the
petitioners'
intervention, should it be permitted, to
properties not disposed of in the will of the
decedent. This was granted.

RUBEN AUSTRIA, CONSUELO AUSTRIABENTA

and
LAURO
AUSTRIA
MOZO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANDRES REYES, Judge, Court of
First Instance of Rizal, PERFECTO
CRUZ, BENITA CRUZ-MENEZ ISAGANI
CRUZ, ALBERTO CRUZ and LUZ CRUZSALONGA respondents.
FACTS:
Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed a
petition for probate, ante mortem, of her
last will and testament.
The probate was opposed by the present
petitioners
Ruben
Austria,
Consuelo
Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo, and
still others who, like the petitioner, are
nephews and nieces of Basilia.
This opposition was dismissed and the

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At the heart of the controversy is

Basilia's last will immaculate in its
extrinsic validity since it bears the
imprimatur of duly conducted probate
proceedings.
The petitioners nephews and niece
insist that:
1] The entire estate should descend to
them by
intestacy by reason of the
intrinsic nullity of the institution of heirs
embodied in the decedent's will.
They have raised the issue of whether
or not such institution of heirs would
retain efficacy in the event
there exists
proof that the adoption of the same heirs
by the decedent is false.
The petitioners cite, as the controlling
rule, article 850
of the Civil Code.
2] The petitioners have called the

attention to the following

pertinent
portions of the will of the deceased
which recite:
III

Ang
aking
mga
sapilitang
tagapagmana
(herederos
forzosos)
ay
ang
aking
itinuturing na mga anak na
tunay
(Hijos
legalmente
adoptados) na sina Perfecto,
Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani,
na pawang may apelyidong
Cruz.
xxx xxx xxx
Kung ako ay bawian ng Dios ng
buhay, ay aking ipinamamana
ang
aking
mga
ari-ariang
maiiwan,
sa
kaparaanang
sumusunod:
A.Aking ipinamamana sa aking
nabanggit na limang anak na
sina Perfecto, Alberto, Luz,
Benita at Isagani, na pawang
may
apelyidong
Cruz,
na
parepareho ang kaparti ng
bawa't isa at walang lamangan
(en
partes
iguales),
bilang
kanilang
sapilitang
mana
(legiti[ma]), ang kalahati () ng
aking kaparti sa lahat ng aming
ari-ariang gananciales ng aking
yumaong asawang Pedro Cruz
na napapaloob sa Actuacion
Especial No. 640 ng Hukumang
Unang Dulugan ng Rizal at
itinutukoy sa No. 1 ng parafo IV
ng
testamentong
ito,
ang
kalahati () ng mga lagay na
lupa at palaisdaan na nasa
Obando at Polo, Bulacan, na
namana ko sa aking yumaong
ama na si Calixto Austria, at ang
kalahati () ng ilang lagay na
lupa na nasa Tinejeros, Malabon,
Rizal, na aking namana sa
yumao kong kapatid na si Fausto
Austria.

Petitioners argue that the tenor

of the language used gives rise to
the inference that the late Basilia
was deceived into believing that
she was legally bound to bequeath
one-half of her entire estate to the
respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. as
the latter's legitime.
The petitioners contend that had
the deceased known the adoption
to be spurious, she would not have
instituted the respondents at all

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the basis of the institution being

solely her belief that they were
compulsory heirs.
Proof therefore of the falsity of the
adoption would cause a nullity of
the institution of heirs and the
opening of the estate wide to
intestacy.
Notes:
Before the institution of heirs may be
annulled under article 850 of the Civil
Code, the following requisites must
concur:
1] Cause for the institution of heirs
must be stated in
the will;
2] Cause must be shown to be false;
3] It must appear from the face of the
will that the testator would not have made
such institution if he had
known
the
falsity of the cause.
ISSUE: W/N the will is intrinsically
void for the institution was based on
a false cause - NO
RULING:
Article 850 of the Civil Code is a positive
injunction to ignore whatever false cause
the testator may have written in his will
for the institution of heirs. Such institution
may be annulled only when one is
satisfied, after an examination of the will,
that the testator clearly would not have
made the institution if he had known the
cause for it to be false.
The petitioners imply, from the use of
the terms, "sapilitang tagapagmana"
(compulsory heirs) and "sapilitang mana"
(legitime), that the impelling reason or
cause
for
the
institution
of
the
respondents was the testatrix's belief that
under the law she could not do otherwise.
If this were indeed what prompted the
testatrix in instituting the respondents,
she did not make it known in her will.
Surely if she was aware that succession
to the legitime takes place by operation of
law, independent of her own wishes, she
would not have found it convenient to
name her supposed compulsory heirs to
their legitimes.
Her express adoption of the rules on
legitimes should very well indicate her
complete agreement with that statutory
scheme. But even this, like the

petitioners' own proposition, is highly

speculative of what was in the mind of the
testatrix when she executed her will.
One fact prevails: The decedent's will
does not state in a specific or unequivocal
manner the cause for such institution of
heirs.
We cannot annul the same on the basis
of guesswork or uncertain implications.
Even if we should accept the petitioners'
theory that the decedent instituted the
respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. solely
because she believed that the law
commanded her to do so, on the false
assumption that her adoption of these
respondents was valid, still such institution
must stand.
ON W/N THE TESTATRIX WOULD HAVE
CAUSED THE REVOCATION OF THE
INSTITUTION IF SHE HAD KNOWN
THAT
SHE
WAS
MISTAKEN
IN
TREATING THESE HEIRS AS HER
LEGALLY ADOPTED CHILDREN - The
decedent's will is mute on this point
or at best is vague and uncertain.

The
phrases, "mga
sapilitang
tagapagmana" and "sapilitang
mana," were borrowed from the language
of the law on succession and were used,
respectively, to describe the class of heirs
instituted and the abstract object of the
inheritance.
They offer no absolute indication that
the decedent would have willed her estate
other than the way she did if she had
known that she was not bound by law to
make allowance for legitimes.
Her disposition of the free portion of her
estate (libre disposicion) which largely
favored the respondent Perfecto Cruz, the
latter's children, and the children of the
respondent
Benita
Cruz,
shows
a
perceptible inclination on her part to give
to the respondents more than what she
thought the law enjoined her to give to
them.
There was only a relatively small
devise of land
which the decedent had
left for her blood relatives,
including
the petitioners Consuelo Austria-Benta and
Lauro Mozo and the children of the
petitioner Ruben Austria.
Were we to exclude the respondents
Perfecto Cruz, et al. from the
inheritance, then the petitioners and

Wills and Succession | Rain Catague || Kaye Sorrosa

the other nephews and nieces would

succeed to the bulk of the testate by
intestacy a result which would
subvert the clear wishes of the
decedent.
Notes:
- Testacy is favored and doubts are
resolved on its side, especially where the
will evinces an intention on the part of the
testator to dispose of practically his whole
estate, as was done in this case.
- At all events, the legality of the adoption
of the respondents by the testatrix can be
assailed only in a separate action brought
for that purpose, and cannot be the
subject of a collateral attack.

J.L.T AGRO vs. BALANSAG

Facts:

Wills and Succession | Rain Catague || Kaye Sorrosa

The present controversy involves a parcel of land,

Lot No. 63, which belonged to the deceased Don
Julian L. Teves
During his lifetime he contracted two marriages.
With his first wife, Antonia Baena of which he had
two children, namely Josefa Escao and Emilio
Teves.
After the death of his 1 st wife he married again,
Milagros Donio, of whom he had 4 children,
namely: Maria, Jose, Milagros Reyes and Pedro.
Lot No 63, was originally registered in the
conjugal property of Antonia and Don Julian,
when Antonia died the said Lot was among the
properties involved in an action for patition and
damages.
Thereafter, the parties to the case (Don Julian and
children in the first marriage) entered into a
Compromise Agreement which embodied the
partition of all the properties of Don Julian.
On the basis of the Compromise Agreement. A
tract of land known as Hacienda Medalla
Milagrosa, was declared as a property owned in
common by Don Julian and his two children in the
first marriage. The property was to remain
undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian.
The other properties in Bais was given to the
children
Other properties remained with Don Julian,
including Lot No. 63.
Thereafter, Don Julian, Emilio and

Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment

of Assets with Assumption of
Liabilities in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc.
(petitioner).
Less than a year later, Don Julian,
Josefa and Emilio also executed an
instrument entitled Supplemental to
the Deed of Assignment of Assets with

the
Assumption
of
Liabilities
(Supplemental Deed).
This instrument which constitutes a
supplement to the earlier deed of
assignment transferred ownership
over Lot No. 63, among other
properties, in favor of petitioner.
Don Julian died intestate.
On
the
strength
of
the Supplemental Deed in its favor,
petitioner sought the registration of
the subject lot in its name.
Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her
children had immediately taken
possession over the subject lot after
the execution of the Compromise
Agreement.
They entered into a yearly lease
agreement with spouses Antonio
Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday,
respondents herein.
On Lot No. 63, respondents
temporarily established their home
and constructed a lumber yard.
Subsequently, Milagros Donio and
her children executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate.
In the deed of partition, Lot No. 63
was allotted to Milagros Donio and
her two (2) children, Maria Evelyn
and Jose Catalino.
Unaware that the subject lot was
already registered in the name of
petitioner in 1979, respondents
bought Lot No. 63 from Milagros
Donio as evidenced by the Deed of
Absolute Sale of Real Estate.
At the Register of Deeds while trying
to register the deed of absolute sale,
respondents discovered that the lot
was already titled in the name of
petitioner. Thus, they failed to register
the deed

Whether the Supplemental deed executed by Don

Julian and his two children was tantamount to
preterition of his heirs from the second marriage?
Held:

No.

Manresa defines preterition as the

omission of the heir in the will, either
by not naming him at all or, while
mentioning him as father, son, etc., by
not instituting him as heir without
disinheriting him expressly, nor
assigning to him some part of the
properties.
It is the total omission of a
compulsory heir in the direct line
from inheritance.
It consists in the silence of the testator
with regard to a compulsory heir,
omitting him in the testament, either
by not mentioning him at all, or by
not giving him anything in the
hereditary property but without
expressly disinheriting him, even if he
is mentioned in the will in the latter
case.
But there is no preterition where
the testator allotted to a descendant
a share less than the legitime, since
there was no total omission of a
forced heir.
In the case at bar, Don Julian did not
execute a will since what he
resorted to was a partition inter
vivos of his properties, as evidenced
by the court approved Compromise
Agreement.
Thus, it is premature if not
irrelevant to speak of preterition
prior to the death of Don Julian in
the absence of a will depriving a
legal heir of his legitime.
Besides, there are other properties
which the heirs from the second
marriage could inherit from Don
Julian upon his death.
A
couple
of
provisions
in

Hence this petition.

Issue:

Wills and Succession | Rain Catague || Kaye Sorrosa

the Compromise
Agreement are
indicative of Don Julians desire along
this line.
Hence, the total omission from
inheritance of Don Julians heirs from
the second marriage, a requirement
for preterition to exist, is hardly
imaginable as it is unfounded.

On the issue of partition and the supplemental deed

of assignment (Just in case):

Well-entrenched is the rule that all things,

even future ones, which are not outside the
commerce of man may be the object of a
contract. The exception is that no contract
may be entered into with respect to future
inheritance, and the exception to the
exception
is
the
partition inter
vivos referred to in Article 1080.
For the inheritance to be considered
future, the succession must not have been
opened at the time of the contract. A
contract may be classified as a contract
upon future inheritance, prohibited under
the second paragraph of Article 1347.
The
partition inter
vivos of
the
properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly
valid pursuant to Article 1347.
However, considering that it would
become legally operative only upon the
death of Don Julian, the right of his
heirs from the second marriage to the
properties adjudicated to him under the
compromise agreement was but a mere
expectancy. It was a bare hope of
succession to the property of their
father. Being the prospect of a future
acquisition, the interest by its nature
was inchoate.
Evidently, at the time of the
execution of the deed of assignment
covering Lot No. 63 in favor of

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petitioner, Don Julian remained the

owner of the property since ownership
over the subject lot would only pass to
his heirs from the second marriage at
the time of his death. Thus, as the
owner of the subject lot, Don Julian
retained the absolute right to dispose of
it during his lifetime. His right cannot
be challenged by Milagros Donio and
her children on the ground that it had
already been adjudicated to them by
virtue of the compromise agreement.

10

purported
holographic
will,
petitioners averred that in the event
the decedent is found to have left a
will, the intestate proceedings are to
be automatically suspended and
replaced by the proceedings for the
probate of the will.
The holographic will was quoted as
follows:

Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may

asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St.,
Ermita, Manila at nagtatalay ng
maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay
tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng
lahat at anumang mana ang paganay
kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil
siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin at
isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama
harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si
Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng
loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na
ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang
araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa
ibabaw.

SEANGIO vs. REYES

Facts:

Private respondents (Alfredo, Alberto, Elisa,

Victor, et sl) filed a petition in court for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Segundo
Seangio.
It was opposed by petitionersDy Yieng,

Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed

Seangio.
They alleged that Segundo left a
holographic will, disinheriting one
of the private respondents, Alfredo
Seangio, for cause. In view of the

Wills and Succession | Rain Catague || Kaye Sorrosa

Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang

gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para
makapagutang na kuarta siya at kanya
asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China
Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at
hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito
ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking
kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders
ng China Banking.
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni
Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga
custome[r] ng Travel Center of the
Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng
anak ko si Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na
bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan
kong inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana

11

na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay

hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya makoha
mana.
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng
Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa
harap ng tatlong saksi.
Private respondents moved for the
dismissal
of
the
probate
proceedings primarily on the ground
that the document purporting to be the
holographic will of Segundo does not
contain any disposition of the estate
of the deceased and thus does not
meet the definition of a will under
Article 783 of the Civil Code.
According to private respondents, the
will only shows an alleged act of
disinheritance by the decedent of his
eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else;
that all other compulsory heirs were
not named nor instituted as heir,
devisee or legatee, hence, there is
preterition which would result to
intestacy.
Issue:
Whether preterition exist in the case at bar?
Held:

None

With regard to the issue on

preterition, the Court believes that
the compulsory heirs in the direct
line were not preterited in the will.
It was, in the Courts opinion,
Segundos last expression to bequeath
his estate to all his compulsory heirs,
with the sole exception of Alfredo.
Also, Segundo did not institute an
heir to the exclusion of his other
compulsory heirs. The mere mention
of the name of one of the petitioners,
Virginia, in the document did not
operate to institute her as the

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universal heir. Her name was included

plainly as a witness to the altercation
between Segundo and his son,
Alfredo.
Considering that the questioned
document is Segundos holographic
will, and that the law favors testacy
over intestacy, the probate of the will
cannot be dispensed with.
Article 838 of the Civil Code
provides that no will shall pass either
real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed in accordance
with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless
the will is probated, the right of a
person to dispose of his property may
be rendered nugatory.

Issue on disinheritance:
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng PagAalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed
Segundos intention of excluding his
eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate
for the reasons that he cited therein. In
effect, Alfredo was disinherited by
Segundo.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916
of the Civil Code requires that the same
must be effected through a will wherein
the legal cause therefor shall be specified.
With regard to the reasons for the
disinheritance that were stated by Segundo
in his document, the Court believes that
the incidents, taken as a whole, can be
considered a form of maltreatment of
Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the
matter presents a sufficient cause for the
disinheritance of a child or descendant
under Article 919 of the Civil Code.
Segundos document, although it may
initially come across as a mere

12

disinheritance instrument, conforms to

the formalities of a holographic will
prescribed by law. It is written, dated
and signed by the hand of Segundo
himself. An intent to dispose mortis
causa[9] can be clearly deduced from
the terms of the instrument, and while it
does not make an affirmative
disposition of the latters property, the
disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is
an act of disposition in itself. In other
words, the disinheritance results in the
disposition of the property of the
testator Segundo in favor of those who
would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.

Wills and Succession | Rain Catague || Kaye Sorrosa

13

URETA vs. URETA

Facts:
In
his
lifetime,
Alfonso
Ureta (Alfonso) begot 14 children,
namely, Policronio, Liberato, Narciso,
Prudencia,
Vicente,
Francisco,
Inocensio, Roque, Adela, Wenefreda,
Merlinda, Benedicto, Jorge, and
Andres.
The children of Policronio (Heirs of
Policronio), are opposed to the rest of
Alfonsos
children
and
their
descendants (Heirs of Alfonso).
Alfonso was financially well-off
during his lifetime. He owned several
fishpens, a fishpond, a sari-sari store,
a passenger jeep, and was engaged in
the buying and selling of copra.
Policronio, the eldest, was the only
Wills and Succession | Rain Catague || Kaye Sorrosa

child of Alfonso who failed to finish

schooling and instead worked on his
fathers lands.
Alfonso and four of his children,
namely,
Policronio,
Liberato,
Prudencia, and Francisco, met at the
house of Liberato.
Francisco, who was then a municipal
judge, suggested that in order to
reduce the inheritance taxes, their
father should make it appear that he
had sold some of his lands to his
children.
Accordingly, Alfonso executed four
(4) Deeds of Sale covering several
parcels of land in favor of
Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and
his common-law wife, Valeriana Dela
Cruz.
The Deed of Sale executed, in favor
of Policronio, covered six parcels of
land, which are the properties in
dispute in this case.
Since the sales were only made for
taxation purposes and no monetary
consideration was given, Alfonso
continued to own, possess and enjoy
the lands and their produce.
Except for a portion of parcel 5, the
rest of the parcels transferred to
Policronio were tenanted by the
Fernandez Family. These tenants
never turned over the produce of the
lands to Policronio or any of his heirs,
but to Alfonso and, later, to the
administrators of his estate.
Policronio died on November 22,
1974. Except for the said portion of
parcel 5, neither Policronio nor his
heirs ever took possession of the
subject lands.
Alfonsos heirs executed a Deed of
Extra-Judicial
Partition, which
included all the lands that were
covered by the four (4) deeds of sale
that were previously executed by

14

Alfonso for taxation purposes.

Conrado, Policronios eldest son,
representing
the
Heirs
of
Policronio, signed the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of
his co-heirs.
The Heirs of Policronio allegedly
learned about the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition involving Alfonsos
estate when it was published in
the July 19, 1995 issue of the Aklan
Reporter.
Believing that the six parcels of land
belonged to their late father, and as
such, excluded from the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition, the Heirs of
Policronio sought to amicably settle
the matter with the Heirs of Alfonso.
Earnest efforts proving futile, the
Heirs of Policronio filed a Complaint
for Declaration of Ownership,
Recovery of Possession, Annulment
of
Documents,
Partition,
and
Damages against the Heirs of
Alfonso.
On appeal the Heirs of Alfonso raised
the issue unenforceability, ratification
and preterition, which for the Heirs of
Policronio was only raised for the first
time on appeal, hence, it should be
deemed to have been waived by the
heirs of Alfonso.

determined that the Heirs of

Policronio gave their consent to the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and
they have not been excluded from it.
Nonetheless, even granting that the
Heirs of Policronio were denied their
lawful participation in the partition,
the argument of the Heirs of Alfonso
would still fail.
Preterition has been defined as the
total omission of a compulsory heir
from the inheritance. It consists in the
silence of the testator with regard to a
compulsory heir, omitting him in the
testament, either by not mentioning
him at all, or by not giving him
anything in the hereditary property
but without expressly disinheriting
him, even if he is mentioned in the
will in the latter case.
Preterition is thus a concept of
testamentary
succession
and
requires a will. In the case at bench,
there is no will involved. Therefore,
preterition cannot apply.
1. The deed of sale produce no legal
effect.
2. Thus, the subject properties were
properly included in the Deed of Extra
Judicial partition.

Issue:

Inapplicability of Article 842

Whether the absence of the Heirs of

Policronio in the partition or the lack of
authority of their representative,
Conrado, results in their preterition?

The Heirs of Policronio further

argued that even assuming that the Heirs
of Alfonso have an interest in the Deed of
Sale, they would still be precluded from
questioning its validity. They posited that
the Heirs of Alfonso must first prove that
the sale of Alfonsos properties to
Policronio substantially diminished their

Held:
No preterition!
Their posited theory on preterition is
no longer viable. It has already been

Wills and Succession | Rain Catague || Kaye Sorrosa

15

successional rights or that their legitimes

would be unduly prejudiced, considering
that under Article 842 of the Civil Code,
one who has compulsory heirs may
dispose of his estate provided that he does
not contravene the provisions of the Civil
Code with regard to the legitime of said
heirs. Having failed to do so, they argued
that the Heirs of Alfonso should be
precluded from questioning the validity of
the Deed of Sale.
Still, the Court disagrees.
Article 842 of the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 842. One who has no
compulsory heirs may
dispose by will of all his
estate or any part of it in
favor of any person having
capacity to succeed.
One who has compulsory
heirs may dispose of his
estate provided he does not
contravene the provisions
of this Code with regard to
the legitime of said heirs.
This article refers to the principle
of freedom of disposition by will. What is
involved in the case at bench is not a
disposition by will but by Deed of Sale.
Hence, the Heirs of Alfonso need not first
prove that the disposition substantially
diminished their successional rights or
unduly prejudiced their legitimes.

Wills and Succession | Rain Catague || Kaye Sorrosa

16

property, the will provided:

G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987

CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON.
INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE
COURT (Third Special Cases Division),
VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA
DIONGSON, respondents.
Notes:
Testator - Nemesio Acain
Petitioner - Constantino Acain - Testator's
brother
Instituted as heirs:
- Petitioner
- Petitioner's brothers (Antonio, Flores,
Jose)
Petitioner's
sisters
(Anita,
Concepcion, Quirina, Laura)
Executor of LW&T - Atty. Ignacio G.
Villagonzalo
Oppositors:
- Respondent Virginia - legally
adopted daughter
- Testator's widow - Rosa
FACTS:
Petitioner Constantino Acain filed
a
petition for the probate of the will of the
late Nemesio Acain on the premise that
Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which
petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores
and Jose and his sisters Anita, Concepcion,
Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs.
The will allegedly executed was written
in Bisaya with a translation in English
submitted by petitioner
The will contained provisions on burial
rites, payment of debts, and the
appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G.
Villagonzalo as the executor of the
testament.
On the disposition of the testator's

Wills and Succession | Rain Catague || Kaye Sorrosa

THIRD: All my shares that I may

receive from our properties, house,
lands and money which I earned
jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson
shall all be given by me to my
brother SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino,
widower,
of
legal
age
and
presently
residing
at
357-C
Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In
case my brother Segundo Acain
pre-deceased me, all the money
properties, lands, houses there in
Bantayan and here in Cebu City
which constitute my share shall be
given to me to his children,
namely:
Anita,
Constantino,
Concepcion, Quirina, laura, Flores,
Antonio and Jose, all surnamed
Acain.
Segundo predeceased Nemesio.
Thus it is the children of Segundo who
are claiming to be heirs, with Constantino
as the petitioner
The oppositors (respondents Virginia A.
Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of
the deceased and the latter's widow Rosa
Diongson Vda. de Acain) filed a motion to
dismiss on the following grounds, among
others:
(3) the widow and the adopted
daughter have been pretirited

Petitioner's
contention
(among
others):
(C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid
and must
therefore, be admitted to
probate. The preterition mentioned
in
Article 854 of the New Civil Code refers to
preterition of "compulsory heirs in the
direct line," and does not apply to private
respondents who are not compulsory
heirs in the direct line; their omission shall
not annul the institution of heirs
ISSUE: W/N private respondents have
been preterited.
YES - as to Virgia, the legally
adopted daughter
NO - as to Rosa, testator's widow
(not in the direct line)
(See Article 854 of the Civil Code)
Preterition consists in the omission in

17

the testator's will of the forced heirs or

anyone of them either because they are
not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as
heirs nor are expressly disinherited
Insofar as the widow is concerned,
Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply
as she does not ascend or descend from
the testator, although she is a compulsory
heir.
Even if the surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir, there
is no preterition
even if she is omitted from the
inheritance, for she is not in the direct
line.
Other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez,
whose legal adoption by the testator has
not been questioned by petitioner has
been preterited.
Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603,
known as the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, adoption gives to the adopted
person the same rights and duties as if he
were a legitimate child of the adopter and
makes the adopted person a legal heir of
the adopter.
It cannot be denied that she has totally
omitted and preterited in the will of the
testator and that both adopted child and
the widow were deprived of at least their
legitime.
Neither can it be denied that they were
not expressly disinherited.
Hence, this is a clear case of preterition
of the legally adopted child.
Notes:
- Pretention annuls the institution of an
heir and annulment throws open to
intestate
succession
the
entire
inheritance.
- The only provisions which do not result in
intestacy are the legacies and devises
made in the will for they should stand
valid and respected, except insofar as the
legitimes are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner
together with his brothers and sisters to
the entire inheritance of the testator
results in totally abrogating the will
because the nullification of such institution
of universal heirs without any other
testamentary disposition in the will
amounts to a declaration that nothing at
all was written.
No legacies nor devises having been

Wills and Succession | Rain Catague || Kaye Sorrosa

provided in the will, the whole property of

the deceased has been left by universal
title to petitioner and his brothers and
sisters.
The effect of annulling the "Institution of
heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a
total intestacy (Neri v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185
[1943]) except that proper legacies and
devises must, as already stated above, be
respected.
Intestacy having resulted from the
preterition of respondent adopted child
and the universal institution of heirs,
petitioner is in effect not an heir of the
testator.
He has no legal standing to petition for
the probate of the will left by the deceased
and Special Proceedings No. 591 A-CEB
must be dismissed.
For private respondents to have
tolerated the probate of the will and
allowed the case to progress when on its
face the will appears to be intrinsically
void as petitioner and his brothers and
sisters were instituted as universal heirs
coupled with the obvious fact that one of
the private respondents had been
preterited would have been an exercise in
futility.
It would have meant a waste of time,
effort, expense, plus added futility.
The trial court could have denied its
probate outright or could have passed
upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary
provisions
before
the
extrinsic validity of the will was resolved
(Cayetano v. Leonides, supra; Nuquid v.
Nuguid, supra. The remedies of certiorari
and prohibition were properly availed of by
private respondents.