G.R. No.

132592

January 23, 2002

AIDA
vs.
GABRIEL B. BAEZ, respondent.

P.

BAEZ, petitioner,

On November 22, 1996, the trial court denied Aidas motion for moral and exemplary damages
and litigation expenses but gave due course to the execution pending appeal. Thus:

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 133628
AIDA
vs.
GABRIEL B. BAEZ, respondent.

In another motion to modify the decision, petitioner Aida Baez sought moral and exemplary
damages, as well as litigation expenses. On October 9, 1996, she filed a motion for execution
pending appeal. Respondent Gabriel Baez filed a consolidated written opposition to the two
motions, and also prayed for the reconsideration of the October 1, 1996 order.

P.

BAEZ, petitioner,

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, the petitioners motion to modify decision
is hereby ordered denied. But, petitioners motion for execution of decision pending appeal is
hereby granted. Consequently, let a writ of execution be issued in this case to enforce the
decision for (1) respondent to vacate the premises of the small residential house situated in
Maria Luisa Estate Park Subdivision, Lahug, Cebu City and for (2) respondent to surrender the
use and possession of said Mazda motor vehicle together with its keys and accessories thereof
to petitioner.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

Atty. Edgar Gica, the Special Administrator, appointed in this case, is hereby ordered to make
the necessary computation of the value of the one-half (1/2) share of petitioner in the net
remaining conjugal assets of the spouses within 10 days from receipt of this order.

These two petitions stem from the decision 1 dated September 23, 1996 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu, Branch 20, in Civil Case No. CEB-16765. The first 2 seeks the reversal of the
Court of Appeals decision dated March 21, 1997, setting aside the orders dated October 1 and
November 22, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court. The second 3 prays for the reversal of the
resolution dated February 10, 1998, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-56265, denying
the motion to dismiss.

The petitioner is hereby ordered to post a bond in the amount of P1,500,000.00 to answer for
all the damages that respondent may suffer arising from the issuance of said writ of execution
pending appeal and to further answer for all the advances that petitioner may have received
from the Special Administrator in this case pending final termination of this present case.5

The antecedent facts, as gathered from the parties pleadings, are as follows:
On September 23, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20, decided Civil Case No.
CEB-16765, decreeing among others the legal separation between petitioner Aida Baez and
respondent Gabriel Baez on the ground of the latters sexual infidelity; the dissolution of their
conjugal property relations and the division of the net conjugal assets; the forfeiture of
respondents one-half share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the common children; the
payment to petitioners counsel of the sum of P100,000 as attorneys fees to be taken from
petitioners share in the net assets; and the surrender by respondent of the use and possession
of a Mazda motor vehicle and the smaller residential house located at Maria Luisa Estate Park
Subdivision to petitioner and the common children within 15 days from receipt of the decision.
Thereafter, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion to modify said decision, while respondent
filed a Notice of Appeal.
The trial court granted petitioner Aida Banez urgent ex-parte motion to modify the decision on
October 1, 1996 by approving the Commitment of Fees dated December 22, 1994; obliging
petitioner to pay as attorneys fees the equivalent of 5% of the total value of respondents ideal
share in the net conjugal assets; and ordering the administrator to pay petitioners counsel,
Atty. Adelino B. Sitoy, the sum of P100,000 as advance attorneys fees chargeable against the
aforecited 5%.4

In turn, in a petition for certiorari, Gabriel Baez elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. On
March 21, 1997, the appellate court rendered its decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Order dated October 1, 1996 and the Omnibus Order dated November 22,
1996, insofar as (1) it authorized the release of the sum of P100,000.00 to private respondents
counsel as the advanced share of private respondent [Aida Baez] in the net remaining
conjugal assets, and (2) granted the motion for execution pending appeal by ordering petitioner
[Gabriel Baez] to vacate the premises of the small residential house situated in Maria Luisa
Estate Park Subdivision, Lahug, Cebu City, and to surrender the use and possession of the
Mazda Motor vehicle to private respondent are hereby SET ASIDE. The writ of execution dated
December 2, 1996 and the Order dated December 10, 1996 granting the motion filed by the
sheriff to make symbolic delivery of the subject house and motor vehicle to the administrator of
the partnership are also SET ASIDE.
As prayed for by petitioner, the Administrator of the conjugal partnership is hereby ordered to
cause the reimbursement by counsel for the private respondent [Aida Baez] of the amount of
P100,000.00 released to him as advance payment of attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.6
On February 10, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied Aidas motion for reconsideration. Hence,
the petition in G.R. No. 132592, filed by herein petitioner.

In the meantime, the trial court gave due course to Gabriels Notice of Appeal and elevated on
April 15, 1997 the entire case records to the Court of Appeals. Aida filed with the Court of
Appeals a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that Gabriel had failed to file with the
appellate court a Record on Appeal. On February 10, 1998, the Court of Appeals decided the
motion, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitionerappellants motion to dismiss filed on
November 3, 1997 is hereby DENIED. The appointment of the petitioner-appellee as
administratix of the conjugal properties is hereby AFFIRMED.
In view of petitioners Motion to Withdraw her own appeal filed on November 27, 1997, and for
failing to pay the required docket fee within the prescribed period under Rule 41, Section 4 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the appeal instituted by the petitioner Aida P. Baez is
hereby DISMISSED.
In continuance of the appeal of respondent-appellant [Gabriel Baez], he is hereby ordered to
file his brief with the court within 45 days from receipt of this resolution. The petitioner-appellee
[Aida Baez] shall file her own brief with the court within 45 days from receipt of the petitionerappellants [Gabriel Baez] brief.
SO ORDERED.

The appellate court also denied herein petitioners motion for reconsideration, hence, the
petition in G.R. No. 133628.
On January 19, 2000, we consolidated the two petitions.1avvphi1 Petitioner Aida Baez now
avers that the Court of Appeals erred:
I. G.R. No. 132592
... IN SETTING ASIDE THE GRANT OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL BY THE
TRIAL COURT OF THE PORTIONS OF ITS DECISION ORDERING RESPONDENT
TO VACATE THE SMALLER RESIDENTIAL HOUSE LOCATED AT THE MARIA
LUISA ESTATE PARK SUBDIVISION, CEBU CITY, AND TO PAY P100,000.00 TO
PETITIONERS COUNSEL AS ATTORNEYS FEES TO BE TAKEN FROM HER
SHARE IN THE NET CONJUGAL ASSETS.8
II. G.R. No. 133628:
... IN NOT GRANTING PETITIONERS MOTION TO DISMISS RESPONDENTS
ORDINARY APPEAL AND/OR NOT RETURNING THE RECORDS OF CIVIL CASE
NO. CEB-16765 TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU.9
In G.R. No. 132592, petitioner manifested that she no longer questions the Court of Appeals
decision on the Mazda vehicle because respondent repossessed it. As to the residential house,
she claimed that being conjugal in nature, justice requires that she and her children be allowed

to occupy and enjoy the house considering that during the entire proceedings before the trial
court, she did not have the chance to occupy it. Further, she posted a bond of P1,500,000 for
the damages which respondent may suffer.10 For these reasons, she asked for execution
pending appeal. The amount of P100,000 as advance payment to her counsel was a "drop in
the bucket" compared to the bond she posted, according to her. She also suggested as an
alternative that she simply be required to put up an additional bond. She also agreed to submit
to an accounting as regular administratrix and the advance attorneys fees be charged to her
share in the net conjugal assets.
In his comment, respondent denied petitioners allegation that she did not have the chance to
occupy the residential house. He averred that she could have, had she chosen to. According to
him, as the inventory of the couples properties showed, petitioner owned two houses and lots
and two motor vehicles in the United States, where she is a permanent resident. Respondent
contended that there was no compelling reason for petitioner to have the judgment executed
pending appeal.
Essentially, the core issue in G.R. No. 132592 is whether execution of judgment pending
appeal was justified.
As held in Echaus vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 381, 386 (1991), execution pending appeal
is allowed when superior circumstances demanding urgency outweigh the damages that may
result from the issuance of the writ. Otherwise, instead of being an instrument of solicitude and
justice, the writ may well become a tool of oppression and inequity.11
In this case, considering the reasons cited by petitioner, we are of the view that there is no
superior or urgent circumstance that outweighs the damage which respondent would suffer if
he were ordered to vacate the house. We note that petitioner did not refute respondents
allegations that she did not intend to use said house, and that she has two (2) other houses in
the United States where she is a permanent resident, while he had none at all. Merely putting
up a bond is not sufficient reason to justify her plea for execution pending appeal. To do so
would make execution routinary, the rule rather than the exception.12
Similarly, we are not persuaded that the P100,000 advance payment to petitioners counsel
was properly granted. We see no justification to pre-empt the judgment by the Court of Appeals
concerning said amount of P100,000 at the time that the trial courts judgment was already on
appeal.
In G.R. No. 133628, petitioner Aida Baez contends that an action for legal separation is
among the cases where multiple appeals may be taken. According to her, the filing of a record
on appeal, pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, 13 is required in this case.
She concludes that respondents appeal should have been dismissed for his failure to file the
record on appeal within the reglementary period, as provided under Section 1-b, Rule 50 of the
Rules of Court.14
Petitioner likewise prays that, in the event that we do not dismiss Gabriel Baez appeal, we
should direct the appellate court to return the records of the case to the RTC of Cebu.
Thereafter, according to her, respondent should file his record on appeal for approval and
transmittal to the Court of Appeals. In the alternative, she prays that the appellate court retain

only the pleadings and evidence necessary to resolve respondents appeal pursuant to Section
6, Rule 4415 and Section 6, Rule 13516 of the Rules of Court, and return the rest of the case
records to the RTC.
In turn, respondent argues that Section 39 of B.P. 129 17 expressly abolished the requirement of
a record on appeal, except in appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule
109,18 and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed. An action for legal separation, he
avers, is neither a special proceeding nor one where multiple appeals are allowed.
Now, is an action for legal separation one where multiple appeals are allowed? We do not think
so.
In Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 186, 194 (1996), this
Court held:
xxx Multiple appeals are allowed in special proceedings, in actions for recovery of property with
accounting, in actions for partition of property with accounting, in the special civil actions of
eminent domain and foreclosure of mortgage. The rationale behind allowing more than one
appeal in the same case is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a
separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final.
In said case, the two issues raised by therein petitioner that may allegedly be the subject of
multiple appeals arose from the same cause of action, and the subject matter pertains to the
same lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. Hence, splitting the appeals in that case
would only be violative of the rule against multiplicity of appeals.
The same holds true in an action for legal separation.1wphi1 The issues involved in the case
will necessarily relate to the same marital relationship between the parties. The effects of legal
separation, such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute
community or conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor children, follow from the decree of
legal separation.19 They are not separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by the court
and become final prior to or apart from the decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere
incidents of legal separation.20 Thus, they may not be subject to multiple appeals.
Petitioners alternative prayers that in case we do not dismiss the appeal, we return the records
to the trial court and require respondent to file a record on appeal, or we return the records to
the trial court and retain only the pleadings and orders relevant to the appeal, are untenable. If
we grant the first, we are effectively saying that the instant case is one involving multiple
appeals, which it is not. If we allow the second, we are effectively applying by analogy, Section
6, Rule 44 and Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court, without petitioner showing support
therefor in law or jurisprudence.21
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED for lack of merit. The decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42663 and CA-G.R. No. CV-56265, respectively, are
hereby AFFIRMED, so that the Order dated October 1, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court
authorizing the release of P100,000 to petitioners counsel; the Omnibus Order dated
November 22, 1996 granting the motion pending appeal; the writ of execution dated December

2, 1996; and the Order dated December 10, 1996 granting the motion by the sheriff to make
symbolic delivery of the house and vehicle are SET ASIDE. Further, the Administrator of the
conjugal partnership is ORDERED to cause the reimbursement by petitioners counsel of the
released amount of P100,000. The Court of Appeals is hereby DIRECTED to give due course
to respondents appeal, and the Division Clerk of Court of this Court is likewise DIRECTED to
promptly remand the record of these cases to the Court of Appeals.
Costs against petitioner.

On the other hand, the petition of Potenciano Ilusorio 9 is to annul that portion of the decision of
the Court of Appeals giving Erlinda K. Ilusorio visitation rights to her husband and to enjoin
Erlinda and the Court of Appeals from enforcing the visitation rights.
The undisputed facts are as follows: Scslx
Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.

G.R. No. 139789. May 12, 2000

ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, JOHN
DOE and JANE DOE, respondents. Mesm
G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal
bliss? The answer is no. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may
not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, 1 or by which
the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto.2 Slx
"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce
the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his capture
and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the court or judge awarding the writ
shall consider in that behalf."3
It is a high prerogative, common-law writ, of ancient origin, the great object of which is the
liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause. 4 It is issued when one is
deprived of liberty or is wrongfully prevented from exercising legal custody over another
person.5
The petition of Erlinda K. Ilusorio6 is to reverse the decision7 of the Court of Appeals and its
resolution8dismissing the application for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband,
lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio and enforce consortium as the wife.

Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property valued at millions
of pesos. For many years, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was Chairman of the Board and
President of Baguio Country Club.
On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived
together for a period of thirty (30) years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for
undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City
when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio
City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.
Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children, namely: Ramon Ilusorio (age 55);
Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age 52); Maximo (age 50); Sylvia (age 49); Marietta (age 48); and
Shereen (age 39).
On December 30, 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from the United States, he stayed with
Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin), alleged
that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg
Zoloft, an antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a consequence,
Potencianos health deteriorated.
On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City a petition 10 for
guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latters advanced
age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment.
On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did
not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati. Slxsc
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to have
the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that respondents 11 refused petitioners
demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo
City.
After due hearing, on April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered decision the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, judgment is hereby rendered:

"(1) Ordering, for humanitarian consideration and upon petitioners manifestation, respondents
Erlinda K. Ilusorio Bildner and Sylvia Ilusorio-Yap, the administrator of Cleveland Condominium
or anywhere in its place, his guards and Potenciano Ilusorios staff especially Ms. Aurora
Montemayor to allow visitation rights to Potenciano Ilusorios wife, Erlinda Ilusorio and all her
children, notwithstanding any list limiting visitors thereof, under penalty of contempt in case of
violation of refusal thereof; xxx

Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the
crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices
he made may not appeal to some of his family members but these are choices which
exclusively belong to Potenciano. He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was not
prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration, and absent any true
restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.

"(2) ORDERING that the writ of habeas corpus previously issued be recalled and the herein
petition for habeas corpus be DENIED DUE COURSE, as it is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
unlawful restraint or detention of the subject of the petition.

With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be
the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right
to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right. Es m

"SO ORDERED."12

The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for
habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right. The ruling is not consistent with
the finding of subjects sanity.

Hence, the two petitions, which were consolidated and are herein jointly decided.
As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention,13 or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled
thereto. It is available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not
merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has
later become arbitrary.14 It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.15 Jksm
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. 16
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action.17 The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective,
not merely nominal or moral.18
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorios liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render
him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but
on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.
After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no unlawful restraint on his
liberty.
The Court of Appeals also observed that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio did not request the
administrator of the Cleveland Condominium not to allow his wife and other children from
seeing or visiting him. He made it clear that he did not object to seeing them.
As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios mental state, the Court of Appeals observed that he was of
sound and alert mind, having answered all the relevant questions to the satisfaction of the
court.

When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also emphasized that the same shall be
enforced under penalty of contempt in case of violation or refusal to comply. Such assertion of
raw, naked power is unnecessary.
The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a parent to visit a
minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to see his
wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty attached to the
exercise of his right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife.
Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs
or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the
man and womans free choice.
WHEREFORE, in G. R. No. 139789, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit. No
costs.
In G. R. No. 139808, the Court GRANTS the petition and nullifies the decision of the Court of
Appeals insofar as it gives visitation rights to respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio. No costs.

mother, Rosenda Genove) all against their father, Nicolas Delizo, and his second wife, Dorotea
de Ocampo, and their nine (9) children, the herein petitioners-appellants, namely Regino,
Crispina, Carmen, Basilio, Hilario, Macario, Sendon, Marciano, and Hermogenes, all surnamed
Delizo.
The aforesaid defendants opposed the partition, claiming that the properties described in the
complaint were those of the second marriage. On May 3, 1957, Nicolas Delizo died and was
substituted by his children in the second m as party defendants. In the meantime, Special
Proceedings No. 1058 (Intestate Estate of the late Nicolas Delizo) was filed by Dorotea de
Ocampo on June 3, 1957. Thereafter, or on August 23, 1971, Severino De died intestate and is
now represented by his children, namely, Federico, Severina, Angelina, Segundina and Brigida,
all surnamed Delizo. Involved are the properties acquired by Nicolas Delizo, among which are
sixty-six (66) hectares of agricultural lands in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija; fifty-eight (58)
hectares of riceland in Muoz of the same province; and a square meter lot at 1056-M P.
Campa, Sampaloc, Manila. The properties are specifically described as follows:
(1) Lots Nos. 210, 211, 388, 389, 390, and 407 of the San Jose Cadastre situation in Rizal, San
Jose with a combined area of about sixty-six (66) hectares covered by OCT No. 6176-N.E.
issued in the name of Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo (Exh. F or 11);
G.R. No. L-32820-21 January 30, 1976
DOROTEA DE OCAMPO VDA. DE DELIZO and her nine (9) children, named REGINO,
CRISPINA, CARMEN, BASILIO, HILARIO, MACARIO, SENDON MARCIANO and
HERMOGENES,
all
surnamed
DELIZO
y
OCAMPO,petitioners-appellants,
vs.
URBANA DELIZO, assisted by her husband, AMBROCIO FLORA, SEVERINO DELIZO and
the Heirs of FRANCISCO DELIZO, namely, RANCIVILLANO SOLTRIFILO, JOSEFINA,
EUPROCINA, AUREA, EDITA and FE all surnamed DELIZO, and ROSENDA GENOVE
VDA. DE DELIZO, respondents-appellees.
Leandro C. Sevilla for petitioners-appellants.
Romeo J. Callejo respondents-appellees.

(2) Lot No. 1915 of the San Jose Cadastre with an area of about 1,056 square meters and
covered by OCT No. 5783 in the name of Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo (Exh.
G or 12);
(3) Lot No. 498 of the San Jose Cadastre with an area of about 3,366 square meters and
covered by OCT No. 5622, N.E. issued in the name of Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de
Ocampo (Exh. H. or 13);
(4) A parcel of land in San Jose, Nueva Ecija containing an area of 13.2948 hectares and
covered by TCT No. 2985-N.E. (Exh. I. or 13-A);
(5) An agricultural land of about 17.4753 hectares situated in sitio Rangayan, Muoz and
covered by TCT No. 5162 (Exh. J or 14);
(6) A parcel of land in Barrio Caanawan, San Jose, with an area of about 14.0354 hectares and
covered by TCT No. 11910 (Exh. K or 10);

ANTONIO, J.:
These two cases involve the partition of the conjugal partnership properties of two marriages
contracted by Nicolas Delizo. The first, was with Rosa Villasfer, which lasted from April 20,
1891 until Rows death on December 7, 1909, or a period of eighteen (18) years; and the
second, with Dorotea de Ocampo, which existed for a period of forty-six (46) years, or from
October, 1911 until the death of Nicolas Delizo on May 3, 1957 at the age of ninety (90) years.
The action for partition was instituted on April 15, 1957 by a daughter and a son of the first
marriage, namely, Urbana Delizo and Severino Delizo, and the heirs of Francisco Delizo,
another son, who died in 1943, specifically, Rancivillano Soltrifilo Josefina, Eufrocina, Aurea,
Edita, and Fe, all surnamed Delizo (the last three being minors were represented by their

(7) A cornland in Barrio Rangayan, Muoz, Nueva Ecija, of about 1,500 square meters and
covered by Tax Declaration No. 5476;
(8) Riceland in Barrio San Andres, Muoz of about 5,083 square meters and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 7083;
(9) Riceland in Barrio Rangayan, Muoz, Nueva Ecija, containing an area of about 17.4755
hectares and covered by Tax Declaration No. 812;

(10) Lot No. 847-a riceland in Barrio Bayan, Muoz, with an area of about 13.0902 hectares
and covered by TCT No. 3585 issued in the name of Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de
Ocampo on April 25,1929 (Exhs. L or 15 & 15-A);
(11) A camarin of strong materials, with galvanized iron roofing in San Jose, Nueva Ecija, about
eight (8) meters by twelve
(12) meters; (12) A residential house and lot at Sanchez Street, San Jose, Nueva Ecija;
(13) Lot No. 1790 of San Jose Cadastre of about 2,840 square meters and covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 8131 in the names of spouses Silvestre Batara and Maria Soriano issued
on November 16, 1927 (Exh. M or 16), superseded by Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT29524 issued in the name of Juan T. Gualberto on May 25,1959 (Exh. N or 17) claimed by the
heirs of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo pursuant to deed of sale (Exh. N1);
(14) An urban lot and coconut plantation in San Fabian, Pangasinan;
(15) A lot and residential house consisting Of a two-door accessoria at No. 1056-58 (formerly
562) P. Campa, Sampaloc, Manila;
(16) A sawmill with accessories, bulldozers, etc. in San Jose, Nueva Ecija (bulldozer is now in
Gordon, Isabels in the possession of Regino Delizo and Basilio Delizo); and
(17) Several heads of carabaos. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment on April 27,
1964, distributing the aforesaid properties as follows: (a) onehalf () pro indiviso to the three
(3) children of the first marriage, namely, Urbana Delizo, Severino Delizo, and the heirs of the
deceased Francisco Delizo, viz.: Rancivillano Soltrifilo Josefina, Eufrocina, Aurea, Edita, and
Fe (b) one-fourth () pro indiviso to the surviving spouse, Dorotea de Ocampo; and (c) onefourth () pro in equal shares to the children of both marriages, nine (9) of whom were
begotten during the second marriage, or into thirteen (13) parts.
From said judgment. petitioners-appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals. On August 12,
1970, the Appellate Court rendered judgment, affirming with modifications the trial court's
decision. The facts as found by the Appellate Court are as follows:
As regards the Caanawan lands situated in Caanawan, San Jose, Nueva
Ecija, comprising some 66 hectares, defendants capitalize on the
undisputed fact that Original Certificate of Title No. 6176 (Exh. F or 11)
issued on August 21, 1924, covering these lands is in the name of Nicolas
Delizo, ma to Dorotea de Ocampo. Defendants further point out that the
testimonies of defendant Dorotea de Ocampo and octogenarian Moises
Patricio prove that these lands were acquired during the second marriage.
However, the fact that the disputed lands situated in Caanawan were
registered in the name of 'Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo's
no proof that the property is owned by the second conjugal partnership.

The phrase 'married to' is merely descriptive of the civil status of Nicolas
Delizo (Gonzales vs. Miller, 69 Phil. 340; De Jesus vs. Padilla, CA-G.R.
No. 12191-R, April 19, 1955; Muoz & Tan Go Inc. vs. Santos CA-G.R. No.
"27759-R, October 3, 1963; Pratts vs. Sheriff of Rizal, 53 Phil. 51, 53).
Neither is the testimony of Dorotea de Ocampo that the said lands were
acquired by her and her spouse, altogether clear and persuasive. For
while the admitted fact is that she and Nicolas Delizo were married in
1911, she declared on the witness stand that the aforesaid properties were
given by Pedro Salvador to her and her spouse in 1908 (t.s.n., p. 288,
March 8, 1963), thereby leading the trial court to infer an admission that
these lands were acquired during the first marriage of Nicolas Delizo. It
may likewise be noted that as per her testimony, she and her father arrived
in Caanawan, San Jose, Nueva Ecija, when Rosa Villasfer was still alive.
That would be sometime before 1911. But she admitted that her father
then was not able to acquire lands from Pedro Salvador, their grantor,
because he had no more lands to distribute to settlers. Accordingly, it is
farfetched that after Rosa's death and the subsequent marriage of Nicolas
Delizo to Dorotea de Ocampo, Pedro Salvador would still have those 67
hectares which defendants claimed were acquired by the spouses Nicolas
Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo by grant from Pedro Salvador (t.s.n., pp.
459-46, March 15, 1963).
Moises Patricio tried to confirm the widow, declaring that Nicolas Delizo
was married to defendant Dorotea de Ocampo, when he was given lands
in Caanawan by Pedro Salvador (t.s.n., p. 493, June 7, 1963). However,
he placed the acquisition sometime during the founding of Barrio Sto.
Tomas, San Jose, Nueva Ecija (Id., p. 492) which took place some four
years after the Spanish-Filipino revolution of 1896 (t.s.n., pp. 548-549,
June 21, 1963), or approximately 1900. Therefore, it could not be Dorotea
de Ocampo, but Rosa Villasfer, who was admittedly still alive and the wife
of Nicolas Delizo at the time of the acquisition.
Ranged against these unreliable testimonies for the defendants, is the
testimony of Lorenzo Delizo, who being a brother of deceased Nicolas
Delizo, stands in equal relationship to the plaintiffs, who were Nicolas'
children by the first marriage, and the defendants, who were children of
Nicolas in his second marriage. His testimony therefore carries great
weight. This witness averred that 16 hectares were acquired as homestead
by his deceased brother, Nicolas Delizo, from Pedro Salvador and
Mauricio Salvador who were then 'cabecillas' distributing lands to
homesteaders in 1905 (t.s.n., p. 12, January 20, 1961); that Nicolas
acquired by sale the 16-hectare homestead of Nicolas Dacquel in 1906,
another 16- hectare homestead of Mariano Antolin in 1907 and the 16hectare homestead of Francisco Pascua in 1908 (id., pp. 14-15). Lorenzo's
declarations are supported by the testimonies of (1) Urbana Delizo, a
daughter of Nicolas by his first marriage and who was already 17 when her
mother, Rosa Villasfer, died in 1909 (id., p. 19); (2) Sabiniano Villanueva, a
son of one of Nicolas' tenants on the controverted Caanawan lands (id.,
pp. 93-168) and (3) Raymundo Eugenio, a former clerk in the municipal
treasurer's office who u to collect taxes on the land belonging to Nicolas

and later became municipal "president of San Jose, Nueva Ecija (t.s.n., pp.
367-368, Jan. 31, 1964), although these Caanawan lands cannot be
traced back to TD 431, Exhibit P-9 issued in 1906, cited by appellants (see
notations at bottom of reverse side of alleged succeeding TDs) aside from
the fact that the notations on the reverse side thereof are suspicious (see
years when tax commenced and when issued) and the discrepancy
between areas (8 Ha. in Exhibit P-9 and 57 Ha. for lots 210 and 211).
Accordingly, we find with the trial court that the Caanawan lands,
comprising lots Nos. 210, 211, 388, 390, 398 and 407.1-under Original
Certificate of Title No. 6176 (Exh. F or 11) were acquired during the
existence of the first marriage of Nicolas Delizo to Rosa Villasfer and there
being no affirmative showing that they belonged exclusively to said Nicolas
Delizo, should therefore correspond to the first conjugal partnership of
Nicolas Delizo and Rosa Villasfer. So with the lot and house at 562 P.
Campa St., Sampaloc, Manila, known as Lot 47, Block 83 covered by TCT
No. 9616-Manila which was ceded during the second marriage in payment
of, or substitution for, the Caanawan property, because the Asiatic
Petroleum Company to which it had been mortgaged as bond for Juan Par
as agent foreclosed the mortgage, when the agent defaulted in his
obligation to the company, Exhibits 6, 7 & 19 (Art. 153 [formerly, 140], par.
1, new Civil Code).
However, with regard to the other properties in question, like lot No. 498 of
the San Jose Cadastre, under Original certificate of Title No. 5622,
likewise issued in the name of Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de
Ocampo'; a parcel of land in San Jose, Nueva Ecija under TCT No. 2985
(Exh. I or 13)' and agricultural land of about 17.4753 hectares in Sitio
Rangayan, Muoz Nueva Ecija under TCT No. 5162 (Exh. J or 14);
another parcel of land in Caanawan, San Jose, with an area of about
14.0354 hectares under TCT No. 11910 (Exh. K or 10); a coin land in
barrio Rangayan, Muoz, Nueva Ecija, of about 1,500 square me '
quarters under Tax Declaration No. 5476; a riceland in barrio San Andres,
Muoz Nueva Ecija, of about 5,083 square meters under Tax Dec. 7083;
another riceland in Rangayan, Muoz, of about 17.4755 hectares under
Tax Dec. No. 812; a riceland, lot No. 847, of about 13.0902 hectares
covered by TCT No. 3585 issued on April 29, 1929 in the name of 'Nicolas
Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo'(Exh. L or 1.5)-, a camarin of strong
materials with galvanized iron roofing in San Jose, Nueva Ecija, about 8
meters by 12 meters; a residential lot at Sanches Street, San Jose, Nueva
Ecija; lot No. 1790 of the San Jose Cadastre consisting of 2,840 square
meters, more or less, under Original Certificate of Title No. 8131 in another
name but claimed by the heirs under deed of sale, Exhibit N1 a sugar cane
mill in San Jose, Nueva Ecija and several heads of carabaos (Exh. 0); Lots
Nos. 495 and 496 of the San Jose Cadastre, possessed by defendants
although adjudicated in the name of Marcelo Tomas and Guillermo Cabiso,
respectively; lot No. 494-A, of the San Jose Cadastre, adjudicated in the
name of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo (RA, pp. 96-97),-there is
no controversy that these were all acquired during the existence of the
second marriage of Nicolas Delizo.

On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment as follows:
But the trial court held that because there was no liquidation of the
conjugal partnership property of the first marriage, upon the death of the
first wife, 'the conjugal partnership was converted into one of co-ownership
between Nicolas Delizo and his children of the first marriage .... Hence, all
the fruits or increase of the properties acquired thereafter shall belong to
such co-ownership.' We cannot agree with this legal conclusion. One-half
of the conjugal properties of the first marriage constituted the separate
property of the husband at the formation of the second conjugal
partnership upon his remarriage in October 1911 (Art. 145, NCC).
Moreover, the fruits of the Caanawan property were acquired through the
labor and industry of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo; and indeed, two
witnesses for the plaintiffs admitted that at the time of the death of Rosa
Villasfer, only about 20 hectares of the Caanawan property had been
cleared and cultivated (pp. 22-23; 113, 117, 383-4, t.s.n.). This property
was practically virgin land, and the rest thereof or about 47 hectares were
therefore cleared and cultivated only during the marriage of Nicolas Delizo
and Dorotea Ocampo. This is impliedly admitted in plaintiffs' complaint that
'from the time of death of the said Rosa Villasfer, the defendants ... have
WORKED upon, TILLED and CULTIVATED, or otherwise offered in
tenancy the whole of the agricultural lands described' (par. 2). The
Caanawan property left to itself could not produce any fruits for they did
not have any permanent improvements thereon. What was produced
according to the evidence was palay, and the production of palay requires
tilling, cultivation, seedlings, gathering, preservation and marketing. It was
thru the labor and industry of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo that
the Caanawan property was able to produce fruits. Whatever it produced
thru the labor and industry of the spouses belongs to their conjugal
partnership. While it is true that to the owner of the land belongs the fruits,
whether natural, industrial or civil (Art. 441, NCC formerly Art. 354, Spanish
Civil Code), this does not mean that all that is produced belongs to the
owner of the land. The owner, according to Art. 443, NCC (formerly Art.
356, Spanish Civil Code) who receives the fruits, has the obligation to pay
the expenses made by a person in their production, gathering and
preservation. When Dorotea Ocampo admitted that the Muoz property
was purchased partly with the fruits of the Caanawan property, she was
referring to the gross production, not deducting therefrom what could have
pertained to the person who produced the fruits. So it seems "that if we are
to determine with mathematical certainty what portion of the Muoz
property and other properties acquired during the second marriage should
pertain to the first marriage as corn spending to the value of its share in
the fruits of the Caanawan property, and what should belong to the second
marriage as corresponding to the value of the labor and industry of the
spouses Delizo and Ocampo, we have to find how much was produced
during the second marriage and determine what will be the share of the
owner of the land what will correspond to the one who produced the fruits.
The burden of proof lies upon the plaintiffs under the rules of evidence.
But, of course, this is an impossibility. For no records have been kept and it
is not in accordance with the Filipino customs for the surviving spouse-

whether he remarries or not-to keep the record of the produce of the

properties left by the deceased spouse. tradition thereto, according to
Dorotea Ocampo, part of the price used in the purchase of Muoz property
was the proceeds of a loan which, together with the properties purchased
with it, belongs to the conjugal partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea
Ocampo. Under these circumstances, it would be impossible to determine
with mathematical precision what portion of the properties acquired during
the second marriage of Nicolas Delizo should belong to the second
conjugal partnership and what portion should belong to the heirs of the first
conjugal partnership, one half of which pertains to the husband. However,
considering that
1. At the time of the dissolution of the first marriage or about five years
after acquisition, according to plaintiffs' evidence, only about 20 hectares
of the Caanawan property had been cultivated, the remaining 47 hectares
were therefore cleared and improved during the second marriage thru the
labor and industry of the spouses Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo for
46 years (1911-1967). These improvements were made in good faith
considering that Nicolas Delizo administered the properties of the first
marriage. The second marriage is entitled to reimbursement for the
increase in value of these 47 hectares (Art. 516, NCC Even the Muoz
property acquired during the second marriage had to be improved by the
spouses Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo.
2. The one-half of the fruits of the Caanawan property which should pertain
to the heirs of Rosa Villasfer refers only to one-half o f the net after
deducting the expenses of clearing the land, cultivating, gathering and
preservation. Forty-seven hectares of the Caanawan property were
cleared and cultivated only during the second marriage. Even under a
liberal apportionment of the produce, the heirs of the second marriage
could not be entitled to more than 30% of the produce.
3. Part of the price used in the purchase of the properties acquired during
the second marriage were the proceeds of a loan. This is conjugal property
of the "second marriage (Palanca vs. Smith, Bell and Co., 9 Phil. 131,133;
Castillo Jr. vs. Pasco, 11 SCRA 102, 106-7).
4. The improvements on 47 hectares of the Caanawan property and on the
Muoz property were made at the expense of the second conjugal
partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo, and thru their labor
and industry which lasted for 46 years, whereas the first conjugal
partnership had the Caanawan property for less than 6 years.

Taking into account all the foregoing circumstances and equities of the
case, an adjudication of 20% of all the properties acquired during the
second marriage, including the Muoz property, to the children of the first
marriage, and 80% to the conjugal partnership of Nicolas Delizo and
Dorotea Ocampo is fair and equitable. So the properties of the estate
should be partitioned thus:
One-half of the Caanawan property and the house and lot at 562 P. Campa
Street, Manila, covered by TCT No. 9616 as the share of Rosa Villasfer in
the first conjugal partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Rosa Villasfer or 1/6
thereof for each child of the first marriage; and 20% of all the other
properties or 1/15 thereof for each such child. To Nicolas Delizo should be
adjudicated one-half of the Caanawan property and the house and lot on P.
Campa, but in view of the death of Nicolas Delizo his share descends to all
the children, both of the first and second marriages and the surviving
spouse, Dorotea Ocampo, and should therefore be divided by the number
of children plus one or 1/26 thereof for each heir. tightly per cent of all the
properties acquired during the marriage of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea
Ocampo constitute the conjugal partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea
Ocampo; one-half thereof is the share of Nicolas Delizo, to be divided
among his heirs in accordance with the preceding statement, or 2/65
thereof for each heir; the other half constitutes the share of Dorotea
Ocampo in the conjugal partnership, or 2/5 thereof.
WHEREFORE, paragraph 1 of the judgment appealed from is hereby
modified as follows:
1. Declaring that (a) of the Caanawan property and the house and lot at
562 P. Campa Street, Manila covered by TCT No. 9616-8139 (1/6 + 1/26)
thereof pro indiviso shall pertain to each of the children of Nicolas Delizo
"of the first marriage, namely: Urbana, Severino and the late Francisco
Delizo (the last represented by his children Rancivillano Soltrifilo Josefina,
Eufrocina, Aurea, Edita and Fe and 1/26 thereof pro indiviso shall pertain
to each of the children of the second marriage and their mother Dorotea
Ocampo; (a) of all other properties required during the second marriage19/195 thereof pro indiviso shall pertain to each of the three children by the
first marriage, 2/65 thereof pro indiviso shall pertain to each of the nine
children of the second marriage, while 28/65 thereof pro indiviso shall
pertain to the widow Dorotea Ocampo. The rest of the judgment
particularly paragraphs 2 and 3 are affirmed; without pronouncement as to
costs in both instances.
From this adverse judgment, petitioners-appellants interposed the present petition for review.
The thrust of petitioners- appellants' petition is that the Appellate Court acted under a
misapprehension of the facts or decided the legal issues in a way which is not in consonance
with law and with the applicable decisions of this Court, (a) since, the 67-hectare Caanawan
properties could not have been properties of the first marriage because they were then public
lands being homesteads, and while the first conjugal partnership may have had possessory
rights over said properties, it was only during the second marriage that the requirements of the

public land law were complied with, resulting in the confirmation, registration and issuance of
the Torrens Title over said properties to Nicolas Delizo and his second wife, Dorotea de
Ocampo; (b) apart from the fact that the legal presumption that all properties of the marriage
belong to the conjugal partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo were not
sufficiently rebutted, these properties were actually. In the adverse possession under claim of
title of petitioners-appellants continuously for a period of 47 years (1911 to 1957), and
consequently, the claim of respondents-appellees for partition should have been considered
barred by acquisitive and extinctive prescription, laches and estoppel; d (c) in any event, there
being serious doubts as to whether. said properties belong to the first marriage, it would have
been more equitable if the said partnership properties were divided between the different
partnerships in proportion to the duration of each and the capital of the spouses,-pursuant to
Article 189 of the Civil Code.
From the findings of the Appellate Court that sixty-six (66) hectares of the Caanawan properties
w ere acquired by Nicolas Delizo as homesteads during the period of the first marriage, thus:
sixteen (16) hectares as a homestead from the Government in 1905; and the 16-hectare
homestead of Nicolas Dacquel, the 16-hectare homestead of Mariano Antolin, and the 16hectare homestead of Francisco Pascua by purchase in 1%6, .1907 and 1908, respectively, it
does not necessarily follow that they should be considered as properties of the first marriage,
considering that being homesteads they were part of the public domain, and it was not shown
that all the requirements of the Homestead Law to warrant the grant of a patent to the
homesteader have been complied with prior to the death in 1909 of Delizo's first wife, Rosa
Villasfer.
Under Act 926, 1 which was then the applicable law, the right of the homesteader to the patent
does not become absolute until after he has complied with all the requirements of the law. One
of the most important requirements is that the "person filing the application shall prove by two
credible witnesses that he has resided upon and cultivated the land for the term of five years
immediately succeeding the time of filing the application aforesaid, and shall make affidavit that
no part of said land has been alienated or encumbered ... (Section 3 of Act 926, italics
supplied). Prior to the fulfillment of such requirement, the- applicant has no complete equitable
estate over the homestead which he can sell and convey, mortgage for lease. 2 Until a
homestead right is established and registered under Section 3 of Act 926, there is only an
inchoate right to the property and it has not ceased to be a part of the public domain and,
therefore, not susceptible to alienation as such. 3 Conversely, when a "homesteader has
complied with all the terms and conditions which entitled him to a patent for a particular tract of
public land, he acquires a vested interest therein and has to be regarded an equitable owner
thereof." 4The decisive factor, therefore, in the determination of whether a parcel of land
acquired by way of homestead is conjugal property of the first or the second marriage, is not
necessarily the time of the issuance of the homestead patent but the time of the fulfillment of
the requirements of the public land law for the acquisition of such right to the patent. 5
As testified to by Lorenzo Delizo, his brother, Nicolas Delizo, and the latter's wife, Rosa
Villasfer, arrived in Barrio Caanawan, San Jose, Nueva Ecija, from Barrio Ungag, Cuyapo,
Nueva Ecija, during the year 1905. It was during that same year that Pedro Salvador and
Mauricio Salvador, who were then the cabecillas were distributing lands to homesteaders in
Barrio Caanawan. Nicolas Dacquel, Mariano Antolin and Francisco Pascua must have received
their respective homesteads from the same officers of the government that same year,
considering that their respective homesteads are all adjacent to the homestead of Nicolas

Delizo and according to the evidence, this was the time when the homesteads in that barrio
were parceled out to the new settlers. Indeed, the Homestead Act was then of recent vintage,
having been enacted by the Philippine Commission by authority of the United States
Government, only on October 7, 1903.
Considering that Nicolas Dacquel must have been in possession of his homestead for barely a
year when he transferred his rights in 1906, Mariano Antolin for about two years with respect to
his homestead in 1907, and Francisco Pascua for about three years in 1908 as regards to his
homestead, at the time of their respective conveyances to Nicolas Delizo, it is, therefore,
obvious that not one of them could have complied with the requirements of Act No. 926 to
entitle any one of them to the issuance of a homestead patent before they sold or assigned
their rights to Nicolas Delizo. The law was quite specific, that "No certificate shall be given or
patent issued for the land applied for until the motion of five year. From the date of the filing of
the application and if, at the expiration of such time or at any time within three years thereafter,
the person filing such application shall prove by two credible witnesses that he has resided
upon and cultivate the land for the term of five years immediately succeeding the time of filing
the application aforesaid, and shall make affidavit that no part of said land has been I alienated
or encumbered, and that he has borne true allegiance to the Government of the United States
and that of the Philippine Islands, then, upon payment of a fee of ten pesos, Philippine
currency to such officer as may be designated by law as local land officer, or in case there be
no such officer then to the Chief of the Bureau of Lands, he shall be entitled to a patent."
(Section 3, Act No. 926, italics supplied). Having neither legal nor equitable title thereon, what
was transferred by them to Nicolas Delizo were, therefore, not rights of ownership, but inchoate
rights as applicants for homesteads over portions of the public domain. Similarly, having
received the homestead only in 1905, Nicolas Delizo could not have perfected his rights
thereon by the completion of the five-year occupancy and cultivation requirement of the law, in
1909. Buttressing the conclusion that Nicolas Delizo could not have perfected his rights to the
four homesteads before 1909 is the specific limitation imposed by section 3 of Act No. 926
which provides that "No person who is the owner of more than sixteen hectares of land in said
Islands or who has had the benefits of any gratuitous allotment of sixteen hectares of land
since the acquisition of the Islands by the United States, shall be entitled to the benefits of this
chapter."
The foregoing sufficiently show that the Appellate Court erred in, holding that the entire
Caanawan properties belong to the conjugal partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Rosa Villasfer.
Considering, however, that about twenty (20) hectares were cultivated and rendered productive
during the period from 1905 to 1909, judgment and equity demand that the rights to said
properties be apportioned to the parties in proportion to the extent to which the requirements of
the public land laws had been complied with during the existence of each conjugal partnership.
II
In connection with the other properties, such as Lot No. 498 of the San Jose Cadastre, under
Original Certificate of Title No. 5622; a parcel of land in San Jose, Nueva Ecija, under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 2985 (Exh. I or 13), and agricultural land of about 17.4753 hectares in
Sitio Rangayan, Muoz Nueva Ecija, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5162 (Exh. J or 14);
a parcel of land in Caanawan, San Jose, with an area of about 14.0354 hectares, under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11910 (Exh. K or 10); a cornland in Barrio Rangayan, Muoz,
Nueva Ecija, of about 1,500 square meters under Tax Declaration No. 5476; a riceland in

Rangayan, Muoz of about 17.4755 hectares, under Tax Declaration No. 812; a riceland, Lot
No. 847, of about 13.0902 hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3585, issued on
April 29, 1929 in the name of "Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo" (Exh. L or 15); a
camarin of strong materials with galvanized iron roofing in San Jose, Nueva Ecija; a residential
lot at Sanchez Street, San Jose, Nueva Ecija; Lot No. 1790 of the San Jose Cadastre,
consisting of about 2,840 square meters, more or less, under Original Certificate of Title No.
8131 "in another name but claimed by the heirs under deed of sale, Exhibit N1 a sugar mill in
San Jose, Nueva Ecija and several heads of carabaos (Exh. 0); Lots Nos. 495 and 496 of the
San Jose Cadastre, possessed by defendants although adjudicated in the name of Marcelo
Tomas and Guillermo Cabiso respectively; and another lot, Lot No. 494A of the San Jose
Cadastre adjudicated in the ' C, name of Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo, the
Appellate Court decision penned by Justice Arsenio Solidum held that "there is no controversy
that these were all acquired during the existence of the second marriage of Nicolas Delizo"

divided among three (3)

The same opinion, however, held that since these properties were acquired from the produce
of the Caanawan properties although such produce is the result of the labor and industry of the
spouses Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo, only eighty per cent (80%) of said properties
acquired during the second marriage should appertain to the second conjugal partnership,
while twenty per cent (20%) thereof adjudicated to the children of the first marriage. The two
concurring Appellate Justices, although of the view that the legal presumption that those
properties acquired during the regime of the second conjugal partnership belong to said
partnership has not been rebutted by respondents-appellees and, therefore, would hold that
such after-acquired properties should belong to the second conjugal partnership, concurred
nevertheless in the result aforesaid, in order to reach a judgment in the case. It would have
been facile to hold that those after-acquired properties belong to the second conjugal
partnership in view of the statutory presumption enunciated in Article 1407 of the old Civil Code
(now Article 160, New Civil Code). 6 There are, however, important considerations which
preclude Us from doing so. There is the established fact that the produce of the Caanawan
lands contributed considerably to the acquisition of these properties, and We have held that the
children of the first marriage, as a matter of equity, should share in the Caanawan properties.
To deny the respondents-appellees a share in such properties would have exacerbated discord
instead of enhancing family solidarity and understanding.

divided into thirteen

Considering these circumstances and since the capital of either marriage or the contribution of
each spouse cannot be determined with mathematical precision, the total mass of these
properties should be divided between the two conjugal partnerships in proportion to the
duration of each partnership. 7 Under this criterion, the second conjugal partnership should be
entitled to 46/64 or 23/32 of the total mass of properties, and the first conjugal partnership. to
18/64 or 9/32 thereof pro indivision. The share of the estate of Nicolas Delizo is one-half (1/2)
pro indiviso of the net remainder 8 of the conjugal partnership of gains of the first and second
marriages, which would amount to 32/64 or 1/2 of the whole estate. This should be distributed
in equal shares to his children of both marriages, 9 with the widow having the same share as
that of legitimate child. 10 The widow. Dorotea de Ocampo, is entitled to one-half () of the net
remainder of the second conjugal partnership and to her share as heir of her deceased
husband which amounts to 23/64 of said properties, plus 1/13 of 32/64 pro indivision. The
share of the heirs of Rosa Villasfer would be 9/64 thereof. The foregoing is recapitulated as
follows:

1/26 = 64/1664]

children
Share of Dorotea de Ocampo, 23/64 of whole estate plus her
2nd wife share in Nicolas
Delizo s estate.
Share of Nicolas Delizo, husband 32/64 of whole estate to be

(13) equal parts.

Whole Estate 64/64
Computation of Sharing
3/64 + 1/26 = 142/1664]
3/64 + 1/26 = 142/1664] - Share of each child of
3/64 + 1/26 = 142/1664] lst marriage
1/26 = 64/1664]

1/26 = 64/1664]
1/26 = 64/1664] - Share of each child of
1/26 = 64/1664] 2nd marriage
1/26 = 64/1664]
1/26 = 64/1664]
1/26 = 64/1664]

Share of Rosa Villasfer, lst wife 9/64 of whole estate to be

1/26 = 64/1664]
23/64 + 1/26 = 662/1664 - Share of Dorotea Ocampo.
32/64 + 13/26= 1664/1664 - Whole Estate
In the partition of the properties, the probate court should take into account the fact that the
respondents-appellees are in possession of the Muoz lands, while the petitioners-appellants
have been in possession of the Caanawan properties as well as the house and lot at 562 P.
Campa Street. Sampaloc, Manila, as directed in the trial court's order of April 23, 1958 record
on Appeal, pp. 76-77). Should it be convenient for the parties, their respective shares should be
taken from the properties presently under their custody.
Having reached the foregoing conclusions. it is unnecessary to resolve the other legal
questions raised in the appeal.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified as herein
indicated. The records of these cases should be, as they are hereby, remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings in accordance with this judgment. No costs.

G.R. No. 119000 July 28, 1997

ROSA UY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of respondent Court of Appeals 1 which
affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 32, 2 finding the accused
ROSA UY guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22 in Crim. Cases Nos. 84-32335 to 84-32340, inclusive,
and acquitting her of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a), of the Revised Penal Code in Crim. Case
No. 84-32334.
Rosa Uy was employed as an accountant in Don Tim Shipping Company owned by the
husband of complaining witness Consolacion Leong. During Rosa's employment she was
regarded by the Leongs as an efficient and hardworking employee. On 15 March 1982, a few
months before she was to give birth, Rosa resigned. In the meantime, she helped her husband
manage their lumber business. The friendly relations between Rosa and Consolacion
continued. The two later agreed to form a partnership with Consolacion to contribute additional
capital for the expansion of Rosa's lumber business and the latter as industrial partner. Various
sums of money amounting to P500,000.00 were claimed to have been given by Consolacion
for the business; however, because of the trust they had for each other, no receipt was ever
issued.
Thereafter a lumber store with warehouse was constructed in Bulacan, Bulacan, with the funds
contributed by Consolacion evidence by various receipts. But, unfortunately, the friendship
between Consolacion and Rosa turned sour when the partnership documents were never
processed. As a result, Consolacion asked for the return of her investment but the checks
issued by Rosa for the purpose were dishonored for insufficiency of funds.

The preceding events prompted Consolacion to file a complaint for estafa and for violation of
the Bouncing Checks Law before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
On 10 December 1984 an Information for estafa 3 and several other Informations 4 for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed against petitioner. The offenses were subsequently consolidated and
tried jointly.
Through Consolacion Leong and Alexander D. Bangit the prosecution tried to establish that
petitioner Rosa Uy employed deceit in obtaining the amount of P500,000.00 from complainant
with respect to Crim. Case No. 84-32334. As regards Crim. Cases Nos. 84-32335 to 84-32340,
Alexander D. Bangit, manager of the Commercial Bank of Manila, Malabon Branch, where
Rosa Uy maintained an account, testified on the following transactions with respect to the six
(6) checks referred to in Crim. Cases Nos. 84-32335 to 84-32840 which were dishonored:
CHECK NO. DATE PRESENTED REASON FOR DISHONOR
(1) 068604 16 December 1983 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund
(DAIF)/Payment Stopped
(Exh. "G")
(2) 068605 16 December 1983 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund
(DAIF)/Payment Stopped
(Exh. "H")
(3) 068603 16 December 1983 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund
(DAIF)/Payment Stopped
(Exh. "F")
(4) 068601 16 December 1983 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund
(DAIF)/Payment Stopped
(Exh. "E")
(5) 043122 3 January 1984 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund
(DAIF)/Payment Stopped
(Exh. "A")
(6) 068660 24 January 1984 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund
(DAIF)/Payment Stopped
(Exh. "I")
For her part, petitioner and her witnesses Fernando Abad and Antonio Sy maintained that no
misrepresentation was committed and that the funds were utilized to construct the building in
Bulacan, Bulacan. With respect to the issuance of the subject checks, petitioner did not deny
their existence but averred that these were issued to evidence the investment of complainant in
the proposed partnership between them.

After a joint trial, the Manila Regional Trial Court acquitted petitioner of estafa but convicted her
of the charges under B.P. Bldg. 22. 5 On appeal, respondent appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
Petitioner now raises the following issues before us in this petition for review on certiorari: (a)
whether the RTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the violations of the Bouncing Checks
Law, and (b) whether the checks had been issued on account or for value. 6
As regards the first issue, petitioner contends that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over
the offenses under B.P. Blg. 22 and that assuming for the sake of argument that she raised the
matter of jurisdiction only upon appeal to respondent appellate court, still she cannot be
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court.
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the
offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory
where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed
therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense
allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. 7 Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court
over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. 8 And
once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the
evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the
court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. 9
In the case at bar, the complaint for estafa and the various charges under B.P. Blg. 22 were
jointly tried before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of
the lower court stating that none of the essential elements constitutive of violation of B.P. Blg.
22 was shown to have been committed in the City of Manila. She maintains that the evidence
presented established that (a) complainant was a resident of Makati; (b) petitioner was a
resident of Caloocan City; (c) the place of business of the alleged partnership was located in
Malabon; (d) the drawee bank was located in Malabon; and, (e) the checks were all deposited
for collection in Makati. Taken altogether, petitioner concludes that the said evidence would
only show that none of the essential elements of B.P. Blg. 22 occurred in Manila. Respondent
People of the Philippines through the Solicitor General on the one hand argues that even if
there is no showing of any evidence that the essential ingredients took place or the offense was
committed in Manila, what is critical is the fact that the court acquired jurisdiction over the
estafa case because the same is the principal or main case and that the cases for violations of
the Bouncing Checks Law are merely incidental to the estafa case.
We disagree with respondent. The crimes of estafa and violation of the Bouncing Checks Law
are two (2) different offenses having different elements and, necessarily, for a court to acquire
jurisdiction each of the essential ingredients of each crime has to be satisfied.
In the crime of estafa, deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense and have to be
established with satisfactory proof to warrant
conviction. 10 For violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, on the other hand, the elements of
deceit and damage are neither essential nor required. Rather, the elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are
(a) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (b) the

maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time of issuance that he does not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and,
(c) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit
or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment. 11 Hence, it is incorrect for respondent People to conclude
that inasmuch as the Regional Trial Court of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the estafa case
then it also acquired jurisdiction over the violations of B.P. Blg. 22. The crime of estafa and the
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 have to be treated as separate offenses and therefore the essential
ingredients of each offense have to be satisfied.
In this regard, the records clearly indicate that business dealings were conducted in a
restaurant in Manila where sums of money were given to petitioner; hence, the acquisition of
jurisdiction by the lower court over the estafa case. The various charges for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 however are on a different plain. There is no scintilla of evidence to show that
jurisdiction over the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 had been acquired. On the contrary, all that the
evidence shows is that complainant is a resident of Makati; that petitioner is a resident of
Caloocan City; that the principal place of business of the alleged partnership is located in
Malabon; that the drawee bank is likewise located in Malabon and that all the subject checks
were deposited for collection in Makati. Verily, no proof has been offered that the checks were
issued, delivered, dishonored or knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in Manila, which
are essential elements necessary for the Manila Court to acquire jurisdiction over the offense.
Upon the contention of respondent that knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the
check of the insufficiency of his funds is by itself a continuing eventuality whether the accused
be within one territory or another, the same is still without merit. It may be true that B.P. Blg. 22
is a transitory or continuing offense and such being the case the theory is that a person indicted
with a transitory offense may be validly tried in any jurisdiction where the offense was in part
committed. We note however that knowledge by the maker or drawer of the fact that he has no
sufficient funds to cover the check or of having sufficient funds is simultaneous to the issuance
of the instrument. We again find no iota of proof on the records that at the time of issue,
petitioner or complainant was in Manila. As such, there would be no basis in upholding the
jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense.
In an attempt to salvage the issue that the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction over the violations of
B.P. Blg. 22, respondent relies on the doctrine of jurisdiction by estoppel. Respondent posits
that it took some five (5) years of trial before petitioner raised the issue of jurisdiction.
The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, under Rule 117, Sec. 3, provides that the accused
may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds: . . . (b) that
the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or over the person of the
accused. Moreover, under Sec. 8 of the same Rule it is provided that the failure of the accused
to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information,
either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion,
shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of . . . lack
of jurisdiction over the offense charged . . . as provided for in paragraph . . . (b) . . . of Section 3
of this Rule. 12

After a careful perusal of the records, it is crystal clear that petitioner timely questioned the
jurisdiction of the court in a memorandum 13 before the Regional Trial Court and thereafter in
succeeding pleadings. On this finding alone, we cannot countenance the inadvertence
committed by the court. Clearly, from the above-quoted law, we can see that even if a party
fails to file a motion to quash, he may still question the jurisdiction of the court later on.
Moreover, these objections may be raised or considered motu propio by the court at any stage
of the proceedings or on appeal. 14
Assuming arguendo that there was a belated attempt to question the jurisdiction of the court
and hence, on the basis of the Tijam v. Sibonghanoy
case 15 in which respondent seeks refuge, the petitioner should be estopped. We nonetheless
find the jurisprudence of the Sibonghanoy case not in point.
In Calimlim v. Ramirez, 16 the Court held that the ruling in the Sibonghanoy case is an
exception to the general rule that the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage
of the proceedings, even on appeal. The Court stated further that Tijam v. Sibonghanoy is an
exceptional case because of the presence of laches. The Court said:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in
decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the
subject matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by
consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine
has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally
from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted,
however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which
were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance
involved Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted
concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored
and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered
the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the
general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle
that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. 17
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned
ruling was held to be barred by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been
raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned
ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. As
defined in said case, laches is failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 18
The circumstances of the present case are very different from Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. No
judgment has yet been rendered by the trial court in this case. As a matter of fact, as soon as
the accused discovered the jurisdictional defect, she did not fail or neglect to file the
appropriate motion to dismiss. They questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court in a
memorandum before the lower court. Hence, finding the pivotal element of laches to be absent,

we hold that the ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy does not control the present controversy.
Instead, the general rule that the question of jurisdiction of a court maybe raised at any stage of
the proceedings must apply. Petitioner is therefore not estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the trial court. 19
WHEREFORE, finding the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 32, to have no jurisdiction over
Crim. Case Nos. 84-32335 to 8432340, inclusive, the assailed decision of respondent Court of
Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court dated 24 September 1991 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate charges against petitioner with the
court of competent jurisdiction when warranted.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No 176556

July 4, 2012

BRIGIDO
B.
QUIAO, Petitioner,
vs.
RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented
by their mother RITA QUIAO, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
The family is the basic and the most important institution of society. It is in the family where
children are born and molded either to become useful citizens of the country or troublemakers
in the community. Thus, we are saddened when parents have to separate and fight over
properties, without regard to the message they send to their children. Notwithstanding this, we
must not shirk from our obligation to rule on this case involving legal separation escalating to
questions on dissolution and partition of properties.
The Case

This case comes before us via Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The petitioner seeks that we vacate and set aside the Order 2 dated January 8, 2007 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Butuan City. In lieu of the said order, we are asked to
issue a Resolution defining the net profits subject of the forfeiture as a result of the decree of
legal separation in accordance with the provision of Article 102(4) of the Family Code, or
alternatively, in accordance with the provisions of Article 176 of the Civil Code.
Antecedent Facts
On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal
separation against herein petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido).3 Subsequently, the RTC
rendered a Decision4 dated October 10, 2005, the dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the legal separation of plaintiff Rita C. Quiao and defendant-respondent Brigido B.
Quiao pursuant to Article 55.
As such, the herein parties shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage
bond shall not be severed.
Except for Letecia C. Quiao who is of legal age, the three minor children, namely, Kitchie, Lotis
and Petchie, all surnamed Quiao shall remain under the custody of the plaintiff who is the
innocent spouse.
Further, except for the personal and real properties already foreclosed by the RCBC, all the
remaining properties, namely:
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;

shall be divided equally between herein [respondents] and [petitioner] subject to the respective
legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities of [P]45,740.00.
[Petitioners] share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in
favor of the common children.
He is further ordered to reimburse [respondents] the sum of [P]19,000.00 as attorney's fees
and litigation expenses of [P]5,000.00[.]
SO ORDERED.5
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period provided for under
Section 17(a) and (b) of the Rule on Legal Separation.6
On December 12, 2005, the respondents filed a motion for execution 7 which the trial court
granted in its Order dated December 16, 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"Wherefore, finding the motion to be well taken, the same is hereby granted. Let a writ of
execution be issued for the immediate enforcement of the Judgment.
SO ORDERED."8
Subsequently, on February 10, 2006, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution 9 which reads as
follows:
NOW THEREFORE, that of the goods and chattels of the [petitioner] BRIGIDO B. QUIAO you
cause to be made the sums stated in the afore-quoted DECISION [sic], together with your
lawful fees in the service of this Writ, all in the Philippine Currency.
But if sufficient personal property cannot be found whereof to satisfy this execution and your
lawful fees, then we command you that of the lands and buildings of the said [petitioner], you
make the said sums in the manner required by law. You are enjoined to strictly observed
Section 9, Rule 39, Rule [sic] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;

5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan
City;

You are hereby ordered to make a return of the said proceedings immediately after the
judgment has been satisfied in part or in full in consonance with Section 14, Rule 39 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.10

6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de

Bugabos, Butuan City;

On July 6, 2006, the writ was partially executed with the petitioner paying the respondents the
amount ofP46,870.00, representing the following payments:

7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;

(a) P22,870.00 as petitioner's share of the payment of the conjugal share;

8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City;

(b) P19,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

(c) P5,000.00 as litigation expenses.11

On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the
petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, 12 asking the RTC to define the term
"Net Profits Earned."
To resolve the petitioner's Motion for Clarification, the RTC issued an Order 13 dated August 31,
2006, which held that the phrase "NET PROFIT EARNED" denotes "the remainder of the
properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the
debts."14 The Order further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall
be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not have any
right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of
the Family Code.15 The dispositive portion of the Order states:
WHEREFORE, there is no blatant disparity when the sheriff intends to forfeit all the remaining
properties after deducting the payments of the debts for only separate properties of the
defendant-respondent shall be delivered to him which he has none.
The Sheriff is herein directed to proceed with the execution of the Decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.16
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 17 on
September 8, 2006. Consequently, the RTC issued another Order 18 dated November 8, 2006,
holding that although the Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory, it
may still consider the Motion for Clarification because the petitioner simply wanted to clarify the
meaning of "net profit earned."19 Furthermore, the same Order held:
ALL TOLD, the Court Order dated August 31, 2006 is hereby ordered set aside. NET PROFIT
EARNED, which is subject of forfeiture in favor of [the] parties' common children, is ordered to
be computed in accordance [with] par. 4 of Article 102 of the Family Code.20
On November 21, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 21 praying for the
correction and reversal of the Order dated November 8, 2006. Thereafter, on January 8,
2007,22 the trial court had changed its ruling again and granted the respondents' Motion for
Reconsideration whereby the Order dated November 8, 2006 was set aside to reinstate the
Order dated August 31, 2006.
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed on February 27, 2007 this instant
Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following:
Issues
I

IS THE DISSOLUTION AND THE CONSEQUENT LIQUIDATION OF THE COMMON

PROPERTIES OF THE HUSBAND AND WIFE BY VIRTUE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL
SEPARATION GOVERNED BY ARTICLE 125 (SIC) OF THE FAMILY CODE?
II
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE NET PROFITS EARNED BY THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP FOR PURPOSES OF EFFECTING THE FORFEITURE AUTHORIZED
UNDER ARTICLE 63 OF THE FAMILY CODE?
III
WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE HUSBAND AND WIFE
WHO GOT MARRIED IN 1977? CAN THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES BE GIVEN
RETROACTIVE EFFECT FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE NET PROFITS
SUBJECT OF FORFEITURE AS A RESULT OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION
WITHOUT IMPAIRING VESTED RIGHTS ALREADY ACQUIRED UNDER THE CIVIL CODE?
IV
WHAT PROPERTIES SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE FORFEITURE OF THE SHARE OF THE
GUILTY SPOUSE IN THE NET CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP AS A RESULT OF THE
ISSUANCE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION?23
Our Ruling
While the petitioner has raised a number of issues on the applicability of certain laws, we are
well-aware that the respondents have called our attention to the fact that the Decision dated
October 10, 2005 has attained finality when the Motion for Clarification was filed. 24 Thus, we
are constrained to resolve first the issue of the finality of the Decision dated October 10, 2005
and subsequently discuss the matters that we can clarify.
The Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory at the time the
Motion for Clarification was filed on July 7, 2006.
Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice
of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.

In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,25 we clarified that to standardize the appeal periods provided in
the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, we held that "it would be
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration."26
In Neypes, we explained that the "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing
appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the RTCs; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA); Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA
and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. We also said, "The new rule
aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order
denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final
order or resolution."27 In other words, a party litigant may file his notice of appeal within a fresh
15-day period from his receipt of the trial court's decision or final order denying his motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration. Failure to avail of the fresh 15-day period from the
denial of the motion for reconsideration makes the decision or final order in question final and
executory.
In the case at bar, the trial court rendered its Decision on October 10, 2005. The petitioner
neither filed a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. On December 16, 2005, or
after 67 days had lapsed, the trial court issued an order granting the respondent's motion for
execution; and on February 10, 2006, or after 123 days had lapsed, the trial court issued a writ
of execution. Finally, when the writ had already been partially executed, the petitioner, on July
7, 2006 or after 270 days had lapsed, filed his Motion for Clarification on the definition of the
"net profits earned." From the foregoing, the petitioner had clearly slept on his right to question
the RTCs Decision dated October 10, 2005. For 270 days, the petitioner never raised a single
issue until the decision had already been partially executed. Thus at the time the petitioner filed
his motion for clarification, the trial courts decision has become final and executory. A judgment
becomes final and executory when the reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is
perfected within such period. Consequently, no court, not even this Court, can arrogate unto
itself appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a judgment that became final.28
The petitioner argues that the decision he is questioning is a void judgment. Being such, the
petitioner's thesis is that it can still be disturbed even after 270 days had lapsed from the
issuance of the decision to the filing of the motion for clarification. He said that "a void judgment
is no judgment at all. It never attains finality and cannot be a source of any right nor any
obligation."29 But what precisely is a void judgment in our jurisdiction? When does a judgment
becomes void?
"A judgment is null and void when the court which rendered it had no power to grant the relief
or no jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties or both." 30 In other words, a court,
which does not have the power to decide a case or that has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter or the parties, will issue a void judgment or acoram non judice.31
The questioned judgment does not fall within the purview of a void judgment. For sure, the trial
court has jurisdiction over a case involving legal separation. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369
confers upon an RTC, designated as the Family Court of a city, the exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide, among others, complaints or petitions relating to marital status

and property relations of the husband and wife or those living together. 32 The Rule on Legal
Separation33 provides that "the petition [for legal separation] shall be filed in the Family Court of
the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six
months prior to the date of filing or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be
found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner." 34 In the instant case, herein
respondent Rita is found to reside in Tungao, Butuan City for more than six months prior to the
date of filing of the petition; thus, the RTC, clearly has jurisdiction over the respondent's petition
below. Furthermore, the RTC also acquired jurisdiction over the persons of both parties,
considering that summons and a copy of the complaint with its annexes were served upon the
herein petitioner on December 14, 2000 and that the herein petitioner filed his Answer to the
Complaint on January 9, 2001.35 Thus, without doubt, the RTC, which has rendered the
questioned judgment, has jurisdiction over the complaint and the persons of the parties.
From the aforecited facts, the questioned October 10, 2005 judgment of the trial court is clearly
not void ab initio, since it was rendered within the ambit of the court's jurisdiction. Being such,
the same cannot anymore be disturbed, even if the modification is meant to correct what may
be considered an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.36 In fact, we have ruled that for "[as] long
as the public respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise
thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or
corrected only by appeal."37 Granting without admitting that the RTC's judgment dated October
10, 2005 was erroneous, the petitioner's remedy should be an appeal filed within the
reglementary period. Unfortunately, the petitioner failed to do this. He has already lost the
chance to question the trial court's decision, which has become immutable and unalterable.
What we can only do is to clarify the very question raised below and nothing more.
For our convenience, the following matters cannot anymore be disturbed since the October 10,
2005 judgment has already become immutable and unalterable, to wit:
(a) The finding that the petitioner is the offending spouse since he cohabited with a
woman who is not his wife;38
(b) The trial court's grant of the petition for legal separation of respondent Rita;39
(c) The dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership;40
(d) The forfeiture of the petitioner's right to any share of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership;41
(e) The award to the innocent spouse of the minor children's custody;42
(f) The disqualification of the offending spouse from inheriting from the innocent
spouse by intestate succession;43
(g) The revocation of provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of
the innocent spouse;44

(h) The holding that the property relation of the parties is conjugal partnership of
gains and pursuant to Article 116 of the Family Code, all properties acquired during
the marriage, whether acquired by one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal
unless the contrary is proved;45
(i) The finding that the spouses acquired their real and personal properties while they
were living together;46
(j) The list of properties which Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC)
foreclosed;47
(k) The list of the remaining properties of the couple which must be dissolved and
liquidated and the fact that respondent Rita was the one who took charge of the
administration of these properties;48
(l) The holding that the conjugal partnership shall be liable to matters included under
Article 121 of the Family Code and the conjugal liabilities totaling P503,862.10 shall
be charged to the income generated by these properties;49
(m) The fact that the trial court had no way of knowing whether the petitioner had
separate properties which can satisfy his share for the support of the family;50
(n) The holding that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7);51
(o) The ruling that the remaining properties not subject to any encumbrance shall
therefore be divided equally between the petitioner and the respondent without
prejudice to the children's legitime;52
(p) The holding that the petitioner's share of the net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children;53 and
(q) The order to the petitioner to reimburse the respondents the sum of P19,000.00
as attorney's fees and litigation expenses of P5,000.00.54
After discussing lengthily the immutability of the Decision dated October 10, 2005, we will
discuss the following issues for the enlightenment of the parties and the public at large.
Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the present case since the parties' property
relation is governed by the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of
gains.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family
Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no
other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as
a result of legal separation.

Offhand, the trial court's Decision dated October 10, 2005 held that Article 129(7) of the Family
Code applies in this case. We agree with the trial court's holding.
First, let us determine what governs the couple's property relation. From the record, we can
deduce that the petitioner and the respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since
at the time of the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the
Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property
relations between the petitioner and the respondent is the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains.55 Article 119 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In
the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the
property relations between husband and wife.
Thus, from the foregoing facts and law, it is clear that what governs the property relations of the
petitioner and of the respondent is conjugal partnership of gains. And under this property
relation, "the husband and the wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property
and the income from their work or industry."56 The husband and wife also own in common all
the property of the conjugal partnership of gains.57
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's marriage the
operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the
applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is
concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The
latter provision is applicable because according to Article 256 of the Family Code "[t]his Code
shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights
in accordance with the Civil Code or other law."58
Now, the petitioner asks: Was his vested right over half of the common properties of the
conjugal partnership violated when the trial court forfeited them in favor of his children pursuant
to Articles 63(2) and 129 of the Family Code?
We respond in the negative.
Indeed, the petitioner claims that his vested rights have been impaired, arguing: "As earlier
adverted to, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the conjugal properties, the same
being owned in common by the spouses. If the provisions of the Family Code are to be given
retroactive application to the point of authorizing the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the net
remainder of the conjugal partnership properties, the same impairs his rights acquired prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code."59 In other words, the petitioner is saying that since the
property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of
Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of
the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides:
"All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and
wife."60 Thus, since he is one of the owners of the properties covered by the conjugal
partnership of gains, he has a vested right over half of the said properties, even after the

promulgation of the Family Code; and he insisted that no provision under the Family Code may
deprive him of this vested right by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code which prohibits
retroactive application of the Family Code when it will prejudice a person's vested right.
However, the petitioner's claim of vested right is not one which is written on stone. In Go, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals,61 we define and explained "vested right" in the following manner:

Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit his or her share of the
conjugal partnership profits, which shall be awarded to the children of both, and the children of
the guilty spouse had by a prior marriage. However, if the conjugal partnership property came
mostly or entirely from the work or industry, or from the wages and salaries, or from the fruits of
the separate property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall not apply.
In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled to all the net profits.

A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon events foreign
to the will of the holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate
and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. The term "vested right" expresses
the concept of present fixed interest which, in right reason and natural justice, should be
protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which
enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.
To be vested, a right must have become a titlelegal or equitableto the present or future
enjoyment of property.62 (Citations omitted)
In our en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer
Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita,63 we also
explained:
The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due
process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is
protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the
enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has
become vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest,
absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. 64 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived of his "vested right," he may
lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was wellaware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be
awarded to her.65 In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the
community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence
warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the
parties.66 Second, when the Decision dated October 10, 2005 was promulgated, the petitioner
never questioned the trial court's ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as "net profits,"
pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. 67 Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being
deprived of his right to due process.
Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the petitioner's "vested right" is one
founded, not only in the provisions of the Family Code, but in Article 176 of the Civil Code. This
provision is like Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on the forfeiture of the guilty spouse's
share in the conjugal partnership profits. The said provision says:

From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis considering that even
under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the conjugal partnership profits may be
forfeited if he is the guilty party in a legal separation case. Thus, after trial and after the
petitioner was given the chance to present his evidence, the petitioner's vested right claim may
in fact be set aside under the Civil Code since the trial court found him the guilty party.
More, in Abalos v. Dr. Macatangay, Jr.,68 we reiterated our long-standing ruling that:
[P]rior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal
assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable
estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a
result of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net
remainder or "remanente liquido" (haber ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs
of the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the
conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or
after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal
obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their
respective heirs.69 (Citations omitted)
Finally, as earlier discussed, the trial court has already decided in its Decision dated October
10, 2005 that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7) of the Family Code. 70 The
petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. Thus, the petitioner is
now precluded from questioning the trial court's decision since it has become final and
executory. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability of a final judgment prevents us from
disturbing the Decision dated October 10, 2005 because final and executory decisions can no
longer be reviewed nor reversed by this Court.71
From the above discussions, Article 129 of the Family Code clearly applies to the present case
since the parties' property relation is governed by the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains and since the trial court's Decision has attained finality and immutability.
The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the fruits of the separate
properties of the spouses and the products of their labor and industry.
The petitioner inquires from us the meaning of "net profits" earned by the conjugal partnership
for purposes of effecting the forfeiture authorized under Article 63 of the Family Code. He
insists that since there is no other provision under the Family Code, which defines "net profits"
earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation, then Article 102 of the Family Code
applies.

What does Article 102 of the Family Code say? Is the computation of "net profits" earned in the
conjugal partnership of gains the same with the computation of "net profits" earned in the
absolute community?
Now, we clarify.
First and foremost, we must distinguish between the applicable law as to the property relations
between the parties and the applicable law as to the definition of "net profits." As earlier
discussed, Article 129 of the Family Code applies as to the property relations of the parties. In
other words, the computation and the succession of events will follow the provisions under
Article 129 of the said Code. Moreover, as to the definition of "net profits," we cannot but refer
to Article 102(4) of the Family Code, since it expressly provides that for purposes of computing
the net profits subject to forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63, No. (2), Article 102(4)
applies. In this provision, net profits "shall be the increase in value between the market value of
the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at
the time of its dissolution."72 Thus, without any iota of doubt, Article 102(4) applies to both the
dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and to the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code. Where lies
the difference? As earlier shown, the difference lies in the processes used under the dissolution
of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and in the processes
used under the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family
Code.
Let us now discuss the difference in the processes between the absolute community regime
and the conjugal partnership regime.
On Absolute Community Regime:
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife
becomes joint owners ofall the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse
brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under
Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple's properties. And when the
couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the
spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established,
irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.73
Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of marriage, an inventory is prepared,
listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of
each; then the debts and obligations of the absolute community are paid out of the absolute
community's assets and if the community's properties are insufficient, the separate properties
of each of the couple will be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance. Whatever is left of the
separate properties will be delivered to each of them. The net remainder of the absolute
community is its net assets, which shall be divided between the husband and the wife; and for
purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture, said profits shall be the increase in
value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the
marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.74

Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the "net profits" requires that we first find the market
value of the properties at the time of the community's dissolution. From the totality of the
market value of all the properties, we subtract the debts and obligations of the absolute
community and this result to the net assets or net remainder of the properties of the absolute
community, from which we deduct the market value of the properties at the time of marriage,
which then results to the net profits.75
Granting without admitting that Article 102 applies to the instant case, let us see what will
happen if we apply Article 102:
(a) According to the trial court's finding of facts, both husband and wife have no
separate properties, thus, the remaining properties in the list above are all part of the
absolute community. And its market value at the time of the dissolution of the
absolute community constitutes the "market value at dissolution."
(b) Thus, when the petitioner and the respondent finally were legally separated, all
the properties which remained will be liable for the debts and obligations of the
community. Such debts and obligations will be subtracted from the "market value at
dissolution."
(c) What remains after the debts and obligations have been paid from the total
assets of the absolute community constitutes the net remainder or net asset. And
from such net asset/remainder of the petitioner and respondent's remaining
properties, the market value at the time of marriage will be subtracted and the
resulting totality constitutes the "net profits."
(d) Since both husband and wife have no separate properties, and nothing would
be returned to each of them, what will be divided equally between them is simply the
"net profits." However, in the Decision dated October 10, 2005, the trial court forfeited
the half-share of the petitioner in favor of his children. Thus, if we use Article 102 in
the instant case (which should not be the case), nothing is left to the petitioner since
both parties entered into their marriage without bringing with them any property.
On Conjugal Partnership Regime:
Before we go into our disquisition on the Conjugal Partnership Regime, we make it clear that
Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies in the instant case for purposes only of defining
"net profit." As earlier explained, the definition of "net profits" in Article 102(4) of the Family
Code applies to both the absolute community regime and conjugal partnership regime as
provided for under Article 63, No. (2) of the Family Code, relative to the provisions on Legal
Separation.
Now, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article 142
of the Civil Code, "the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate
property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the
marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either
spouse during the marriage." 76 From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and

her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those
debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of
capitals.77

below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the
court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide,
taking into consideration the best interests of said children.

Considering that the couple's marriage has been dissolved under the Family Code, Article 129
of the same Code applies in the liquidation of the couple's properties in the event that the
conjugal partnership of gains is dissolved, to wit:

In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in the liquidation of the properties of
the spouses:

Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall
apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal
partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and
obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset
thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the
acquisition of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership
of which has been vested by law in the conjugal partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the
conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be
solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties, in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121.

(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made, separately listing the
couple's conjugal properties and their separate properties. 78 In the instant case, the
trial court found that the couple has no separate properties when they
married.79 Rather, the trial court identified the following conjugal properties, to wit:
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao,
Butuan City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila
de Bugabos, Butuan City;

(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be
delivered to each of them.

7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao,

Butuan City;

(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or
deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to either
spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal
funds, if any.

8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City.80

(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the
profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different
proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there
has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon the
partition in accordance with Article 51.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the
spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children

(b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal partnership during
the marriage is returned in equal amount to the assets of the conjugal
partnership;81 and if the community is enriched at the expense of the separate
properties of either spouse, a restitution of the value of such properties to their
respective owners shall be made.82
(c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the debts of the
conjugal partnership; while the debts and obligation of each of the spouses shall be
paid from their respective separate properties. But if the conjugal partnership is not
sufficient to pay all its debts and obligations, the spouses with their separate
properties shall be solidarily liable.83
(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of the husband and of
the wife shall be returned to each of them. 84 In the instant case, since it was already

established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate

properties,85 there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties
above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains
in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or
their respective heirs.86However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty
party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of
the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be
confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty
party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property
which may be accounted for in the guilty party's favor.
In the discussions above, we have seen that in both instances, the petitioner is not entitled to
any property at all. Thus, we cannot but uphold the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the trial
court. However, we must clarify, as we already did above, the Order dated January 8, 2007.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Ordering the payment of the cash dividends declared on July 1,
1981 amounting to P2,191.62 and those declared on July 25, 1981
amounting to P40,196.12 to Rose Marie Toda as her separate
property. The cash dividends declared on April 25, 1981 amounting to
P37,196.30 (sic) are hereby adjudicated to Benigno Toda, Jr. as his
share in the conjugal partnership assets; the portion of the order
dated November 2, 1981 with respect to the payment of the amount of
P360,095.12 to Rose Marie T. Toda is set aside;
2. Ordering the payment of the amount of P4,1623,982.24 to Rose
Marie Toda representing the balance of P15, 749,135.32 obligated to
be paid as estate taxes by Benigno Toda, Jr.;

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of
Butuan City is AFFIRMED. Acting on the Motion for Clarification dated July 7, 2006 in the
Regional Trial Court, the Order dated January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
CLARIFIED in accordance with the above discussions.

3. Setting aside the order of the lower court dated June 2, 1982
directing Benigno Toda, Jr. to pay interest and non-payment penalty
of 18% and 5%, respectively; and

SO ORDERED.

4. Setting aside the order of the lower court directing the annotation
of lien on the property of Benigno Toda, Jr.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 78583-4 March 26, 1990

BENIGNO
TODA,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ROSE MARIE TUASON-TODA, respondents.

JR., petitioner,

G.R. Nos.78696-7 March 26,1990

ROSE
MARIE
vs.
BENIGNO TODA, JR., respondent.

TUASON-TODA, petitioner,

Bautista, Picazo, Buyco, Tan & Fider for Benigno Toda, Jr. Belo, Abiera & Associates for
petitioner Rose Marie Tuason Toda.

Benigno Toda, Jr. (Benigno for brevity) and Rose Marie Tuason-Toda (Rose Marie for
brevity) were married on June 9, 1951 and were blessed with two children. Individual
differences and the alleged infidelity of Benigno, however, marred the conjugal union
thereby prompting Rose Marie to file on December 18, 1979 in the former Court of First
Instance of Rizal, 2 as Civil Case No. 35566, a petition for termination of conjugal
partnership for alleged mismanagement and dissipation of conjugal funds against
Benigno.
After hearings were held, the parties in order to avoid further "disagreeable
proceedings," filed on April 1, 1981 a joint petition forjudicial approval of dissolution of
conjugal partnership under Article 191 of the Civil Code, docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 9478, 3 which was consolidated with the aforesaid civil case. This
petition which was signed by the parties on March 30, 1981, embodied a compromise
agreement allocating to the spouses their respective shares in the conjugal partnership
assets and dismissing with prejudice the said Civil Case No. 35566, CA-G.R. No. 11123SP of the Court of Appeals and G.R. No. 56121 of this Court. The said petition and the
compromise agreement therein were approved by the trial court in its order of June 9,
1981. 4

REGALADO, J.:
These consolidated cases seek a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on January 29,1987 1 in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 06675 and 07936, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

Thereafter, several orders were issued by the lower court pertaining to the interpretation
and implementation of the compromise agreement, as follows:

1. Order, dated November 20, 1981, ordering Benigno, inter alia, to

pay Rose Marie the cash dividends on the shares declared on April
25, 1981 amounting to P37,126.30; that declared on July 25, 1981
amounting to P40,196.12; that declared on July 1, 1981, given on
September 25, 1981 amounting to P2,191.62; and the payment of
P360,095.12 to Rose Marie which is the balance of P2 million paid on
April 4, 1981; 5
2. Order, dated June 2, 1982, ordering Benigno to pay Rose Marie
interest at 18% per annum on the amounts required to be paid in the
order of November 20,1981, as well as 5% non-payment penalty
should the said order of November 20,1981 be sustained on appeal; 6
3. Order, dated December 9, 1982, denying Benigno's motion to
inhibit Judge Rizalina Bonifacio Vera from hearing the case; 7
4. Order, dated March 1, 1983, ordering the annotation of a lien on
certain properties of Benigno as security for any and all amounts that
he may finally be ordered to pay to Rose Marie under the compromise
agreement; 8 and
5. Order, dated March 14, 1983, ordering Benigno to pay Rose Marie
the amount of P4,623,929.24, with interest and penalties thereon
at the rates stipulated in the compromise agreement from date of at the rates stipulated
in the compromise agreement from date of demand by Rose Marie. 9
The compromise agreement which, as earlier stated, was incorporated in the petition for
dissolution of the conjugal partnership and was approved by the court below, contains
the following stipulaitons:
xxx xxx xxx
4. For the best interest of each of them, petitioners have agreed to
dissolve their conjugal partnership and to partition the assets
thereof, under the following terms and conditions this document, a
pleading, being intended by them to embody and evidence their
agreement;
(a) Petitioners as the parties hereto agree upon the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership during the marriage and further agree to
obtain judicial approval of their said agreement as provided by Article
191 of the Civil Code.
(b) The following shall be adjudicated to petitioner Rose Marie
Tuason-Toda:

(1) Forty Million Peson (P40,000,000.00) to be paid as follows:

(a) Petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr.
shall assume the payment of
the estate taxes, interest and
penalties thereon, pertaining to
the estate of petitioner Rose
Marie Tuason Toda's late
brother Manuel Tuason, Jr. in
the sum of P15,749,135.32 as of
March 31, 1981 all interest
and penalty charges after
March 31, 1981 to be the
responsibility
of
petitioner
Benigno Toda, Jr.
(b) P2,000,000.00 to be paid
within 30 days after signing of
this agreement.
(c) The balance shall be paid
within six (6) months after date
of signing of this agreement. If
not paid when due, the balance
shall bear interest at 18% per
annum until paid and there
shall be a 5% non-payment
penalty. The proceeds from any
sale of or loss with respect to,
Rubicon's shares in Philippine
Air Lines, Inc., shares of
Cibeles Insurance Corporation
or Hermana Mayor shall be
applied when received against
the aforesaid balance, except to
the extent such proceeds are
used to satisfy any other
obligation
under
this
agreement.
(2) All shares of stock in San Nguel Corporation
registered solely in the name of petitioner Rose
Marie Tuason Toda whether stock dividends or
stocks acquired on pre-emptive rights including
those acquired in the names of both petitioners
Benigno Toda, Jr. and Rose Marie Tuason Toda
(whetherjointly or alternately 'and/or'), free from all
liens and encumbrances.

(3) All shares of stock in San Miguel Corporation

acquired whether as stock dividends of or on preemptive zighta pertaining to the shares of stock in
said corporation of petitioner Rose Marie Tuason
Toda's brother the late Manuel Tuason, Jr. (of
course, the original shares of the latter pertain to
petitioner Rose Marie Tuason Toda also), free from
all liens and encumbrances except for the estate
tax lien. Petitioner Rose Marie Tuason Toda hereby
grants petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. an irrevocable
proxy, for three years through the 1983
stockholders' meeting whether annual or special
to elect directors for all shares of stock she owns
directly or indirectly including those from the late
Manuel Tuason, Jr. in San Miguel Corporation.
(4) The Banaba Forbes Park conjugal dwelling and
its contents free from all liens and encumbrances
except that petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. shall
remove therefrom his personal effects including
furniture and appliances in his study room and
T.V. room and, from the family rooin, all antiques,
rugs, paintings of Old Fort Manila, books and
mementos. Petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. commits
that no servant now living in the Tolentino street
apartments shall be evicted.
(5) The San Francisco apartment at Apartment 905,
No. 1750 Taylor Street, San Francisco, California,
U.SA., and its contents, free from all liens and
encumbrances, except that petitioner Benigno
Toda, Jr. shall remove therefrom his personal
effects.
(6) The artifacts already removed by petitioner
Rose Marie Tuason Toda from the Madrid
Apartment at No. 4 San Pedro de Valdivia. She
shall return to it its silver ware, china ware,
paintings and etchings. She may retain the three
fans encased in glass and may remove her
clothes, perfumes and toiletries, the Sansa
painting ofa shell dedicated to her, the painting of
the Madonna and tapestry hanging in her
bedroom, 5 Persian rugs, 1 writing desk and chair
and the 2 lamps thereon and 1 lamp on the night
table, and the statuette given her by Hagedorn.
(7) Jewelry.

(8) Motor vehicles registered in her name.

(9) Within forty-five (45) days from signing of this
agreement, One Million Pesos (Pl,000,000.00) as
attorneys' fees petitioner Rose Marie Tuason
Toda agreeing to hold petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr.
harmless from any claim fo attorneys' fees and
expenses that may be filed against the conjugal
partnership or herself for services rendered to her
in the prosecution of her claims against said
conjugal partnership or against petitioner Benigno
Toda, Jr. or to secure her paraphernal estate.
(10) Two shares with two lots in Valley Golf &
Country Club.
(11) One share in Club Puerta de Hierro in Madrid,
Spain if there is one registered in petitioner Rose
Marie Tuason Toda's name.
(12) Share in Montemar Beach Club in Bagac,
Bataan petitioner Rose Marie Tuason Toda
agreeing to assume the balance of the acquisition
cost thereof.
(c) All other properties of the conjugal partnership of whatever and
wherever located shall be adjudicated to petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr.
even though acquired in the name of petitioner Rose Marie Tuason
Toda or both of them she undertaking to execute the
corresponding deeds of conveyances.
(d) Petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. shall assume the payment of all
conjugal obligations, petitioner Rose Marie Tuason Toda representing
and warranting that she has no pending obligation or incurred no
obligation chargeable to the conjugal partnership except those listed
in Annex 'A' hereof.
If the Rosaria Apartment is subject to a mortgage loan and such loan
is a conjugal debt, petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. shall assume such
loan and shall obtain the discharge of the mortgage.
(e) After the signing of this document:
(1) Each of them shall own, dispose of, possess,
administer and enjoy his or her separate estate,
present and future, without the consent of the
other;

(2) All earnings from any profession business or

industry shall likewise belong to each of them
respectively;

2. In setting aside the order of the lower court dated June 2, 1981
directing Benigno to pay interest of eighteen percent and nonpayment penalty of five percent; and

(3) All expenses and obligations incurred by each

of them shall be their respective and separate
responsibilities.

3. In setting aside the order of the lower court directing the

annotation of Rose Marie's lien on Benigno's property. 12
On the other hand, Benigno contends in his present petition before us that:

(f) With the signing of this document, Civil Case No. 35566 of this
same Court, CA-G.R. No. 11123-SP and SC-G.R. No. L-56121 shall be
deemed dismissed with prejudice as between the parties hereto. 10
The parties then prayed that judgment be rendered:
(a) Approving the agreement for voluntary dissolution and partition of
the conjugal partnership;
(b) declaring the conjugal partnership of petitioners dissolved and
adjudicating to each of them his or her share in the properties and
assets of said conjugal partnership in accordance with the agreement
embodied in paragraph 4 hereof; and
(c) enjoining the parties to comply with the terms and conditions of
the aforesaid agreement.11
Ironically, the said agreement failed to fully subserve the intended amicable settlement
of all the disputes of the spouses. Instead, as lamented by the counsel of one of them,
the compromise agreement which was designed to terminate a litigation spawned two
new petitions, with each party initiating one against the other. Thus, illustrative of the
saying that a solution which creates another problem is no solution, the contradictory
interpretations placed by the parties on some provisions of the agreement resulted in
appeals to respondent court and, eventually, the present recourse to us.
Benigno appealed from the aforestated orders of the trial court of November 20, 1981,
June 2, 1982, December 9, 1982, March 1, 1983 and March 14, 1983 containing the
directives hereinbefore respectively set out. The same were disposed of by the Court of
Appeals as explained at the start of this decision.
Rose Marie now submits that the Court of Appeals erred:
1. In holding that the compromise agreement of the parties herein
became effective only after its judicial approval on June 9, 1981 and
not upon its execution on March 30,1981;

1. The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law when it affirmed

the lower court's award of P4,623,929.24 without trial and evidencetaking and overruled petitioner's claim of violation of his due process
right;
2. The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law and due process
when it upheld the lower court's denial of petitioner's motion for her
inhibition/disqualification;
3. Since the document (the parties' compromise agreement) explicitly
provided for assumption of liability rather than agency to pay and
since there was no evidence-taking, the Court of Appeals finding of
an agency to pay is reviewable as a question of law; and
4. The Court of Appeals on a question of law involving the parol
evidence rule. 13
The award of cash dividends basically depends on the date of effectivity of the
compromise agreement as this will determine whether the same is conjugal property or
separate property of the spouses.
We are in agreement with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the compromise
agreement became effective only on June 9, 1981, the date when it was approved by the
trial court, and not on March 30,1981 when it was signed by the parties. Under Article
190 of the Civil Code, 14 "(i)n the absence of an express declaration in the marriage
settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not
take place save in virtue of a judicial order." Hence, the separation of property is not
effected by the mere execution of the contract or agreement of the parties, but by the
decree of the court approving the same. It, therefore, becomes effective on y upon
judicial approval, without which it is void. 15 Furthermore, Article 192 of said Code
explicitly provides that the conjugal partnership is dissolved only upon the issuance of
a decree of separation of property.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership of Benigno and Rose Marie should be
considered dissolved only on June 9, 1981 when the trial court approved their joint
petition for voluntary dissolution of their conjugal partnership. Conformably thereto, the
cash dividends declared on July 1, 1981 and July 25,1981 in the amount of P2,191.62 and
P40,196.12, respectively, should pertain to Rose Marie; and that declared on April 2,5,

1981 in the amount of P37,126.30 ought to be paid to Benigno, pursuant to Paragraph 4

(c) of the compromise agreement which awards to Benigno the conjugal assets not
otherwise specifically assigned to Rose Marie.

the fixed sum of P40 million, to be paid as follows: (a) Payment by

petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. of the estate taxes, interests and
penalties thereon, pertaining to the estate of the late Manuel Tuason,
Jr. in the amount of Pl5,749,135.32 as of March 31, 1982; (b) P2 million
within 30 days after signing of the Agreement; (c) the balance within
six months after date of signing of the Agreement. This Court notes
that the amount of taxes, interests and penalties is fixed at
P15,749,135.32 and this figure was provided by Benigno Toda, Jr.
There is no provision as contended by petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr.
that the amount was only an assumed liability and that he could
attempt to reduce it by suit or compromise. It is clear that if the
amount of P4,623,929.24 is to be credited to Benigno Toda, Jr. then
the P40 million which petitioner Rose Marie T. Toda is to receive
would be short by that amount. This Court is also of the opinion that
under the Agreement, petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. was constituted as
agent to pay to the government the liability of the estate of the late
Manuel Tuason, Jr. in the fixed amount of P15,749,135.32 and if he
was able to secure a reduction thereof, then he should deliver to his
principal such reduction... 17

With respect to the amount of P360,095.12 which Benigrio deducted from the P2 million
supposed to be paid to Rose Marie, it is not clear from the records where said amount
came from. The Court of Appeals, in holding that it is conjugal and therefore belongs to
Benigno, presumed it to be in the nature of cash dividends declared prior to the
approval of the compromise agreement by reason of the fact that the amount was
deducted by Benigno from the P2 million which he paid on April 14,1981. While no
sufficient proof was adduced to conclusively explain such deduction, there exists the
legal presumption that all property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership
absent any proof that it is the exclusive property of either spouse. 16 Since Rose Marie
failed to prove that the amount forms part of her paraphernal property, it is presumed to
be conjugal property. Consequently, Benigno is entitled to the said amount of
P360,095.12, hence he rightfully deducted the same from the amount due to Rose Marie.
The issue regarding the annotation of the lien on Benigno's properties has been mooted
by our resolution dated Aprjl 3, 1989 wherein, at his instance, we ordered the
cancellation thereof upon his posting of the corresponding bond. In our resolution of
February 26, 1990, we noted Benigno's comphance, approved the bond he filed, and
ordered the cancellation of the hens annotated on the certificates of title of the
propertiesinvolved.
Likewise, the order denying the motion to inhibit Judge Rizalina Bonifacio Vera has
become academic considering that she no longer presides over the court where the
case was filed. Besides, as correctly explained by respondent court, the groundfor
inhibition raised by Benigno is not valid it being merely on the basis of the judge having
acquired knowledge of the facts surrounding the agreement of the parties, hence she
would be a material witness to the issue of the true agreement which is contested by the
parties. However, those facts came to the knowledge of the judge in the course of her
efforts to effect a compromise between parties and are also known to the parties.This is
not a ground for disqualification; on the contrary, said, acts of the judge were in accord
with the rule encouraging compromises in litigations, especially between members of
the same family.
Anent the tax savings of P4,623,982.24 obtained by Benigno, we hold that this forms part
of the P40 million allocated to Rose Marie under paragraph 4 (b) (1) of the compromise
agreement.We give credit to the ratiocination thereon of the trial court as quoted with
approval by respondent court:
The records show that petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. paid only
Pl,125,152.48 in estate taxes, although the amount stated in the m
Compromise Agreement was P15,749,135.32. The balance of
P4,623,929.24 is now being claimed by both parties as aforestated. In
the opinion of this court, the pertinent terms of the Agreement as
quoted, are clear and do not require any interpretation. In brief,
under, the Agreement, petitioner Rose Marie T. Toda is adjudicated

We do not believe that Benigno was denied due process when the trial court resolved
the motion of Rose Marie for the payment of P4,623,982.24 without the benefit of a
hearing. The records disclose that the hearing thereon was postponed twice at the
instance of Benigno, which prompted the court to thereafter consider the motion
submitted for resolution on the basis of the allegations therein and the answer filed by
counsel for both parties. Benigno cannot now be heard to claim that he was deprived of
his day in court. Furthermore, respondent court correctly held that the issue involved
was more of a question of interpretation of a contract rather than a determination of
facts. Benigno failed to make a plausible showing that the supposed evidence he had
intended to present, if any, would not be merely collateral matters.
Considering that the amount of P4,623,982.24 actually forms an integral part of the P40
million (minus the lawful and authorized deductions that may be made therefrom) which
Benigno categorically undertook to pay to Rose Marie, the same must earn interest at
the rate of 18% per annum and 5% non-payment penalty, the same being included in and
within the contemplation of Paragraph 4 (b) (1) (c) of the compromise agreement. Said
provision of the agrdement provides for the payment of the interest and penalty upon
non-payment of the balance of the P40 million after the specific authorized deductions
therefrom. Since the amount of P4,623,982.24 was not to be lawfully deducted by
Benigno, as hereinbefore explained, it constitutes part of the contemplated contingent
balance which might tum out to be due to Rose Marie and, therefore, subject to the
imposition of said increments on Benigno's liability.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification
that Benigno Toda, Jr. is hereby ordered to pay Rose Marie Tuason Toda interest at the
rate of a 18% per annum and 5% non-payment penalty on the tax savings of
P4,623,982.24 from date of formal demand until the same is fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 122134

October 3, 2003

ROMANA LOCQUIAO VALENCIA and CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, petitioners,

vs.
BENITO A. LOCQUIAO, now deceased and substituted by JIMMY LOCQUIAO, TOMASA
MARA and the REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF PANGASINAN, respondents.
x----------------------------x
CONSTANCIA
L.
VALENCIA, petitioner,
vs.
BENITO A. LOCQUIAO, now deceased and substituted by JIMMY LOCQUIAO, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The Old Civil Code1 and the Old Code of Civil Procedure, 2 repealed laws that they both are
notwithstanding, have not abruptly become mere quiescent items of legal history since their
relevance do not wear off for a long time. Verily, the old statutes proved to be decisive in the
adjudication of the case at bar.
Before us is a petition for review seeking to annul and set aside the joint Decision3 dated
November 24, 1994, as well as the Resolution4 dated September 8, 1995, of the former Tenth
Division5 of the Court of Appeals in two consolidated cases involving an action for annulment of
title6 and an action for ejectment.7
Both cases involve a parcel of land consisting of 4,876 square meters situated in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan. This land was originally owned by the spouses Herminigildo and Raymunda
Locquiao, as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 183838 issued on October 3, 1917 by
the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan.
On May 22, 1944, Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao executed a deed of donation propter
nuptias which was written in the Ilocano dialect, denominated as Inventario Ti Sagut9 in favor of
their son, respondent Benito Locquiao (hereafter, respondent Benito) and his prospective bride,
respondent Tomasa Mara (hereafter, respondent Tomasa). By the terms of the deed, the
donees were gifted with four (4) parcels of land, including the land in question, as well as a
male cow and one-third (1/3) portion of the conjugal house of the donor parents, in consideration
of the impending marriage of the donees.

The donees took their marriage vows on June 4, 1944 and the fact of their marriage was
inscribed at the back of O.C.T. No. 18383.10
Herminigildo and Raymunda died on December 15, 1962 and January 9, 1968, respectively,
leaving as heirs their six (6) children, namely: respondent Benito, Marciano, Lucio, Emeteria,
Anastacia, and petitioner Romana, all surnamed Locquiao 11. With the permission of
respondents Benito and Tomasa, petitioner Romana Valencia (hereinafter, Romana) took
possession and cultivated the subject land.12 When respondent Romanas husband got sick
sometime in 1977, her daughter petitioner Constancia Valencia (hereafter, petitioner
Constancia) took over, and since then, has been in possession of the land.13
Meanwhile, respondents Benito and Tomasa registered the Inventario Ti Sagut with the Office
of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan on May 15, 1970.14 In due course, the original title was
cancelled and in lieu thereofTransfer Certificate of Title No. 8489715 was issued in the name of
the respondents Benito and Tomasa.
On March 18, 1973, the heirs of the Locquiao spouses, including respondent Benito and
petitioner Romana, executed a Deed of Partition with Recognition of Rights,16 wherein they
distributed among only three (3) of them, the twelve (12) parcels of land left by their common
progenitors, excluding the land in question and other lots disposed of by the Locquiao spouses
earlier. Contained in the deed is a statement that respondent Benito and Marciano Locquiao,
along with the heirs of Lucio Locquiao, "have already received our shares in the estates of our
parents, by virtue of previous donations and conveyances," and that for that reason the heirs of
Lucio Locquaio were not made parties to the deed. All the living children of the Locquaio
spouses at the time, including petitioner Romana, confirmed the previous dispositions and
waived their rights to whomsoever the properties covered by the deed of partition were
adjudicated.17
Later on, disagreements among five (5) heirs or groups of heirs, including petitioner Romana,
concerning the distribution of two (2) of the lots covered by the deed of partition which are Lots
No. 2467 and 5567 of the Urdaneta Cadastral Survey surfaced. As their differences were
settled, the heirs concerned executed a Deed of Compromise Agreement18 on June 12, 1976,
which provided for the re-distribution of the two (2) lots. Although not directly involved in the
discord, Benito signed the compromise agreement together with his feuding siblings, nephews
and nieces. Significantly, all the signatories to the compromise agreement, including petitioner
Romana, confirmed all the other stipulations and provisions of the deed of partition. 19
Sometime in 1983, the apparent calm pervading among the heirs was disturbed when
petitioner Constancia filed an action for annulment of title against the respondents before the
Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan.20 The record shows that the case was dismissed by the
trial court but it does not indicate the reason for the dismissal.21
On December 13, 1983, respondent Benito filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan aComplaint22 seeking the ejectment of petitioner Constancia from the subject
property.
On November 25, 1985, the Municipal Trial Court rendered a Decision,23 ordering the
defendant in the case, petitioner Constancia, to vacate the land in question.

Petitioners Romana and Constancia countered with a Complaint24 for the annulment
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 84897 against respondents Benito and Tomasa 25 which they
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan on December 23, 1985. Petitioners alleged
that the issuance of the transfer certificate of title was fraudulent; that the Inventario Ti Sagut is
spurious; that the notary public who notarized the document had no authority to do so, and;
that the donation did not observe the form required by law as there was no written acceptance
on the document itself or in a separate public instrument.1a\^/phi1.net
Meanwhile, the decision in the ejectment case was appealed to the same RTC where the case
for annulment of title was also pending. Finding that the question of ownership was the central
issue in both cases, the court issued an Order26 suspending the proceedings in the ejectment
case until it shall have decided the ownership issue in the title annulment case.
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision27 dated January 30, 1989 dismissing the complaint for
annulment of title on the grounds of prescription and laches. It likewise ruled that the Inventario
Ti Sagut is a valid public document which transmitted ownership over the subject land to the
respondents. With the dismissal of the complaint and the confirmation of the respondents title
over the subject property, the RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC in the ejectment
case28.
Dissatisfied, petitioners elevated the two (2) decisions to the respondent Court of Appeals.
Since they involve the same parties and the same property, the appealed cases were
consolidated by the appellate court.
On November 24, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision affirming the
appealed RTC decisions. The appellate court upheld the RTCs conclusion that the petitioners
cause of action had already prescribed, considering that the complaint for annulment of title
was filed more than fifteen (15) years after the issuance of the title, or beyond the ten (10) year prescriptive period for actions for reconveyance. It likewise rejected the petitioners
assertion that the donation propter nuptias is null and void for want of acceptance by the
donee, positing that the implied acceptance flowing from the very fact of marriage between the
respondents, coupled with the registration of the fact of marriage at the back of OCT No.
18383, constitutes substantial compliance with the requirements of the law.
The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration29 but it was denied by the appellate court in
its Resolution30dated September 8, 1995. Hence, this petition.
We find the petition entirely devoid of merit.
Concerning the annulment case, the issues to be threshed out are: (1) whether the
donation propter nuptias is authentic; (2) whether acceptance of the donation by the donees is
required; (3) if so, in what form should the acceptance appear, and; (4) whether the action is
barred by prescription and laches.

The Inventario Ti Sagut which contains the donation propter nuptias was executed and
notarized on May 22, 1944. It was presented to the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan for
registration on May 15, 1970. The photocopy of the document presented in evidence as Exhibit
"8" was reproduced from the original kept in the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan.31
The petitioners have launched a two-pronged attack against the validity of the donation propter
nuptias, to wit: first, the Inventario Ti Sagut is not authentic; and second, even assuming that it
is authentic, it is void for the donees failure to accept the donation in a public instrument.
To buttress their claim that the document was falsified, the petitioners rely mainly on
the Certification32 dated July 9, 1984 of the Records Management and Archives Office that
there was no notarial record for the year 1944 of Cipriano V. Abenojar who notarized the
document on May 22, 1944 and that therefore a copy of the document was not available.
The certification is not sufficient to prove the alleged inexistence or spuriousness of the
challenged document. The appellate court is correct in pointing out that the mere absence of
the notarial record does not prove that the notary public does not have a valid notarial
commission and neither does the absence of a file copy of the document with the archives
effect evidence of the falsification of the document. 33 This Court ruled that the failure of the
notary public to furnish a copy of the deed to the appropriate office is a ground for
disciplining him, but certainly not for invalidating the document or for setting aside the
transaction therein involved.34
Moreover, the heirs of the Locquaio spouses, including petitioner Romana, made reference in
the deed of partition and the compromise agreement to the previous donations made by the
spouses in favor of some of the heirs. As pointed out by the RTC, 35 respondent Benito was not
allotted any share in the deed of partition precisely because he received his share by virtue of
previous donations. His name was mentioned in the deed of partition only with respect to the
middle portion of Lot No. 2638 which is the eleventh (11th) parcel in the deed but that is the
same one-third (1/3) portion of Lot No. 2638 covered by O.C.T. No. 18259 included in the
donation propter nuptias.1awphi1.nt Similarly, Marciano Locquiao and the heirs of Lucio
Locquiao were not allocated any more share in the deed of partition since they received theirs
by virtue of prior donations or conveyances.
The pertinent provisions of the deed of partition read:

That we, the Parties herein, do hereby waive and renounce as against each other any claim
or claims that we may have against one or some of us, and that we recognize the rights of
ownership of our co-heirs with respect to those parcels already distributed and
adjudicated and that in the event that one of us is cultivating or in possession of any one of
the parcels of land already adjudicated in favor of another heir or has been conveyed, donated
or disposed of previously, in favor of another heir, we do hereby renounce and waive our
right of possession in favor of the heir in whose favor the donation or conveyance was made
previously.36(Emphasis supplied)
The exclusion of the subject property in the deed of partition dispels any doubt as to the
authenticity of the earlierInventario Ti Sagut.
This brings us to the admissibility of the Deed of Partition with Recognition of Rights, marked
as Exhibit "2", and the Deed of Compromise Agreement, marked as Exhibit "3".
The petitioners fault the RTC for admitting in evidence the deed of partition and the
compromise agreement on the pretext that the documents "were not properly submitted in
evidence", pointing out that "when presented to respondent Tomasa Mara for identification, she
simply stated that she knew about the documents but she did not actually identify them."37
The argument is not tenable. Firstly, objection to the documentary evidence must be made at
the time it is formally offered.38 Since the petitioners did not even bother to object to the
documents at the time they were offered in evidence, 39 it is now too late in the day for them to
question their admissibility. Secondly, the documents were identified during the Pre-Trial,
marked as Exhibits "2" and "3" and testified on by respondent Tomasa. 40Thirdly, the questioned
deeds, being public documents as they were duly notarized, are admissible in evidence without
further proof of their due execution and are conclusive as to the truthfulness of their contents,
in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.41 A public document executed
and attested through the intervention of the notary public is evidence of the facts therein
expressed in clear, unequivocal manner.42
Concerning the issue of form, petitioners insist that based on a provision 43 of the Civil Code of
Spain (Old Civil Code), the acceptance by the donees should be made in a public instrument.
This argument was rejected by the RTC and the appellate court on the theory that the implied
acceptance of the donation had flowed from the celebration of the marriage between the
respondents, followed by the registration of the fact of marriage at the back of OCT No. 18383.

That the heirs of Lucio Locquiao are not included in this Partition by reason of the fact that in
the same manner as we, BENITO and MARCIANO LOCQUIAO are concerned, we have
already received our shares in the estate of our parents by virtue of previous donations
and conveyances, and that we hereby confirm said dispositions, waiving our rights to
whomsoever will these properties will now be adjudicated;

The petitioners, the appellate court and the trial court all erred in applying the requirements on
ordinary donations to the present case instead of the rules on donation propter nuptias.
Underlying the blunder is their failure to take into account the fundamental dichotomy between
the two kinds of donations.
Unlike ordinary donations, donations propter nuptias or donations by reason of marriage are
those "made before its celebration, in consideration of the same and in favor of one or both of
the future spouses."44 The distinction is crucial because the two classes of donations are not
governed by exactly the same rules, especially as regards the formal essential requisites.

Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument in
which the property donated must be specifically described. 45 However, Article 1330 of the same
Code provides that "acceptance is not necessary to the validity of such gifts". In
other words, the celebration of the marriage between the beneficiary couple, in tandem with
compliance with the prescribed form, was enough to effectuate the donation propter nuptias
under the Old Civil Code.
Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different. Article 127 thereof provides that the form of
donations propter nuptias are regulated by the Statute of Frauds. Article 1403, paragraph 2,
which contains the Statute of Frauds requires that the contracts mentioned thereunder need be
in writing only to be enforceable. However, as provided in Article 129, express acceptance "is
not necessary for the validity of these donations." Thus, implied acceptance is sufficient.

Even following petitioners theory that the prescriptive period should commence from the time
of discovery of the alleged fraud, the conclusion would still be the same. As early as May 15,
1970, when the deed of donation was registered and the transfer certificate of title was issued,
petitioners were considered to have constructive knowledge of the alleged fraud, following the
jurisprudential rule that registration of a deed in the public real estate registry is constructive
notice to the whole world of its contents, as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included
therein.54 As it is now settled that the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of property
allegedly registered through fraud is ten (10) years, reckoned from the date of the issuance of
the certificate of title,55 the action filed on December 23, 1985 has clearly prescribed.
In any event, independent of prescription, petitioners action is dismissible on the ground of
laches. The elements of laches are present in this case, viz:

The pivotal question, therefore, is which formal requirements should be applied with respect to
the donationpropter nuptias at hand. Those under the Old Civil Code or the New Civil Code?

(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or one under whom he claims, giving rise to
the situation that led to the complaint and for which the complainant seeks a remedy;

It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable
thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive
effect.46 Consequently, it is the Old Civil Code which applies in this case since the
donation propter nuptias was executed in 1944 and the New Civil Code took effect only on
August 30, 1950.47 The fact that in 1944 the Philippines was still under Japanese occupation is
of no consequence. It is a well-known rule of the Law of Nations that municipal laws, as contradistinguished from laws of political nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty.48 This
Court specifically held that during the Japanese occupation period, the Old Civil Code was in
force.49 As a consequence, applying Article 1330 of the Old Civil Code in the determination of
the validity of the questioned donation, it does not matter whether or not the donees had
accepted the donation. The validity of the donation is unaffected in either case.

(2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, having had knowledge or notice of
defendants conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;

Even the petitioners agree that the Old Civil Code should be applied. However, they invoked
the wrong provisions50 thereof.
Even if the provisions of the New Civil Code were to be applied, the case of the petitioners
would collapse just the same. As earlier shown, even implied acceptance of a donation propter
nuptias suffices under the New Civil Code.51
With the genuineness of the donation propter nuptias and compliance with the applicable
mandatory form requirements fully established, petitioners hypothesis that their action is
imprescriptible cannot take off.
Viewing petitioners action for reconveyance from whatever feasible legal angle, it is definitely
barred by prescription. Petitioners right to file an action for the reconveyance of the land
accrued in 1944, when theInventario Ti Sagut was executed. It must be remembered that
before the effectivity of the New Civil Code in 1950, the Old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No.
190) governed prescription.52 Under the Old Code of Civil Procedure, an action for recovery of
the title to, or possession of, real property, or an interest therein, can only be brought within ten
years after the cause of such action accrues. 53 Thus, petitioners action, which was filed on
December 23, 1985, or more than forty (40) years from the execution of the deed of donation
on May 22, 1944, was clearly time-barred.

(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant
would assert the right on which he bases his suit, and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant, or the suit is not held barred.56
Of the facts which support the finding of laches, stress should be made of the following: (a) the
petitioners Romana unquestionably gained actual knowledge of the donation propter
nuptias when the deed of partition was executed in 1973 and the information must have
surfaced again when the compromise agreement was forged in 1976, and; (b) as petitioner
Romana was a party-signatory to the two documents, she definitely had the opportunity to
question the donation propter nuptias on both occasions, and she should have done so if she
were of the mindset, given the fact that she was still in possession of the land in dispute at the
time. But she did not make any move. She tarried for eleven (11) more years from the
execution of the deed of partition until she, together with petitioner Constancia, filed the
annulment case in 1985.
Anent the ejectment case, we find the issues raised by the petitioners to be factual and,
therefore, beyond this Courts power of review. Not being a trier of facts, the Court is not tasked
to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess, and weigh them to
ascertain if the trial court and the appellate court were correct in according them superior credit
in this or that piece of evidence of one party or the other. 57 In any event, implicit in the
affirmance of the Court of Appeals is the existence of substantial evidence supporting the
decisions of the courts below.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the assailed decision, the same is hereby
AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996

ANTONIO
A.
S.
VALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZVALDEZ, respondents.

VITUG, J.:p
The petition for new bewails, purely on the question of law, an alleged error committed by the
Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner avers that the court a quo has
failed to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a
situation where a marriage is declared void ab initio because of psychological incapacity on the
part of either or both parties in the contract.

The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by large, not in dispute.
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the
marriage were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of
nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-9212539, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102). After the hearing the parties following
the joinder of issues, the trial court, 1 in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition, viz:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent Consuelo GomezValdez is hereby declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the
ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital
obligations;
(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario
shall choose which parent they would want to stay with.
Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother, herein
respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.
The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are in
the custody of the other.
(3) The petitioner and the respondent are directed to start proceedings on the
liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code,
and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51, and 52 of the same code, within
thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila, for proper recording in the registry of marriages. 2 (Emphasis ours.)
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with
Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no
provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without
marriage." Parenthetically, during the hearing of the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit
expressing their desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdez, herein petitioner.
In an order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following clarification:
Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that
the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to
the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the
parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own
their "family home" and all their properties for that matter in equal shares.

In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by the plaintiff and
defendant, the provisions on ownership found in the Civil Code shall
apply. 3 (Emphasis supplied.)
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family dwelling, the trial
court said:
Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner
and respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of
petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the rules on ownership.
The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application since
Article 102 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership
property and Article 129 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the absolute
community of property. 4
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied on 30 October
1995.
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code
should be held controlling: he argues that:
I
Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are
psychologically incapacitated.
II
Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern
the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab
initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of
the spouses.
III
Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on
the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read
consistently with Article 129.
IV
It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to
stay. 5

The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions
of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a
remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases; 6 it
provides:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and
shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did
not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed
to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof in the former's efforts consisted in
the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of
the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the
party in bad faith in the ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children.
In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their
descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal
impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first
paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male
or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned
in Articles 37 and 38" 7 of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry
shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union
is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto
jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household." 8 Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate
property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in the substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article
144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that

(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act intervivos his or her share in co-ownership
property, without consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the coownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the
common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or
still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination
of the cohabitation 9 or declaration of nullity of the marriage. 10
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not
live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of
them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in
common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and
corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party
who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as
the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is
not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already
heretofore expressed. 11
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common
property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction
to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve
incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that
petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal
shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in
common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and
52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, 12 of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set
up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of
gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until
the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists
between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying
paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article 43, 13 relates only, by its explicit terms,
to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 4014 of the Code, i.e.,
the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void
marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow
recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very
beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring
for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously
contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on
the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in
relation to Articles 41 15 and 42, 16 of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a
subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made
applicablepro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to
have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable
marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of
void marriages, leaving to ordain, on the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject
to the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V,
Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of
the spouses.

WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial court are AFFIRMED. No costs .

G.R. No. L-22383

October 6, 1924

THE
PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL
BANK, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARGARITA QUINTOS E YPARRAGUIRRE and ANGEL A. ANSALSO, defendantsappellants.
Angel
A.
Roman J. Lacson for appellee.

Ansaldo

for

appellants.

VILLAMOR, J.:
The appellants pray for the dismissal of the complaint with costs against the plaintiff, alleging
that the judgment appealed from is erroneous: (1) Because it holds that the document Exhibit A
does not contain anything that makes the plaintiff agent of the defendants; (2) because it finds
without any ground that the defendant were husband and wife when they executed said
document; (3) because upon this finding, it considers unnecessary to discuss whether or not
the obligation evidence by said document is solidary between the defendants (4) because to
maintain such opinion amounts to compelling the defendants to comply with said obligation in a
manner distinct from that stipulated in the contract; and (5) because it sanctions an arbitrary,
unjust and illegal procedure.
The Honorable Pedro Concepcion, judge, who tried this case, rendered decision in the
following terms:
The plaintiff seeks to recover of the defendants the sum of P31,785.96, the amount
of an alleged overdraft against them and in favor of the plaintiff bank, with interest
thereon at 8 per cent per annum from October 1, 1922.
It appears from the evidence that in a document dated June 20, 1918, the Philippine
National Bank granted the defendants a credit to the amount of P31,284, and to
secure the payment thereof, as well as the interest and costs, the defendants
mortgaged and pledged to the bank certain certificates of one hundred fifty-eight
shares of stock of the Bank of the Philippine Islands of the nominal value of P200
each. Later on, a certificate of fifty shares and another of forty were substituted by
others of 10 and 30 shares, respectively. Besides these shares, the defendants
delivered to the bank, as additional securities, fifty shares of stock of the "Compaia
Naviera" of the nominal value of P100 each; eighty shares of stock of the Davao
Agriculture and Commercial Company of P100 each, and 10 second liberty bonds.
These bonds were sold by the plaintiff bank on or before August 19, 1922, having
realized the sum of P2,360 from the sale thereof. (Exhibit 3.)

On August 21, 1920, the herein defendant, Mr. Angel Ansaldo, in his answer to a
letter of the bank addressed to him or to his wife, his codefendant Margarita Q. de
Ansaldo, stated, as may be seen in Exhibit B, that the balance in his current account
in favor of said bank in the sum of P33,558.445 on July 31, 1920, had been
examined by him and found correct. This balance with the interest due from the said
date up to September 30, 1922, amounted to P41,212.05 and after deducting the
credit and deposits from August 1, 1920, to September 30, 1922, which amount to
P9,426.09, there remains a balance of P31,785.96, payment of which is claimed in
the complaint.
And the complaint was filed because between April 2, 1921, and July 22, 192, the
date of the letter Exhibit 6, the defendant Mr. Ansaldo was several times required to
pay his debt, the securities given having been found to be insufficient to secure the
payment of his obligations, but the defendants failed to give the new additional
securities demanded.
The defendants discuss in the first place the nature of the obligation sued on,
maintaining that the same is not of a solidary nature because, say they, there is
nothing in it that expressly determines said character, and therefore it binds only
those who have contacted the same to the extent of their share in said obligation;
and in connection with this point it was attempted to prove that the defendant
Margarita Q. de Ansaldo, making use of the credit granted, has received from the
bank only the sum of P10,000 (Exhibit 5). As an answer to the question raised the
attorney for the bank calls attention to Exhibit A where it appears that the defendant
Angel A. Ansaldo "and or" Margarita A. de Ansaldo, both or either of them
indiscriminately, could sign checks against the bank in their current account.
The court is of the opinion that it is not necessary to discuss whether the obligation in
question is solidary or joint, because in either case this debt is in the last analysis
chargeable to the conjugal partnership of the defendant spouses. According to article
1408 of the Civil Code, all the debts and obligations contracted during the marriage
by the husband, as well as those incurred by the wife in those cases in which she
may legally bind the partnership, are chargeable to the conjugal partnership. In the
instant case, the defendant Margarita Q. de Ansaldo joined her husband in the
execution of the document, evidencing the obligation in question, on June 20, 1918,
Exhibit A. (See Joaquin vs. Avellana, 11 Phil., 249; Fulgencio vs. Gatchalian, 21
Phil., 252; Falcon vs. Manzano, 15 Phil., 441.)
Another question raised, although indirectly, by the defendants is that, this being, as
it is, a case of a loan for an indefinite period of time they were not asked to pay in
accordance with law, articles 313 and 316 of the Code of Commerce. This contention
is untenable. Under the provision of section 33 of Act No. 2938, amending the
charter of the Philippine National Bank, if, from any cause whatsoever, any of the
securities specified for the loans provided for therein, or accepted by said bank as
security for loans should decline or depreciate in market value wholly or in part, said
bank may demand additional securities or may forthwith declare such obligation due
and payable; and it is a fact admitted by the defendants themselves that the
securities given by them have suffered a considerable depreciation and it is a fact
proven that they were required to give additional securities but failed to do so.

If the securities were found to have depreciated in value, say the defendants, "the
plaintiff bank's remedy was the one provided in the document executed by the
defendants in its favor and in accordance with its own charter." According to the
contract, it may hold or sell the securities above mentioned although as an agent
(articles 1710, 1713, 1714, 1718, 1719, and 1796 of the Civil Code); and in
accordance with its charter (section 42, Act No. 2612), said sale may be ordered 15
days after a demand in writing is made upon the debtor to increase the amount
thereof, if in the meantime said debtor should have failed to comply with this
requirement . . . "The plaintiff, say they, cannot be considered authorized to be
negligent, as soon as it shall have learned that the securities had begun to
depreciate, as compared with the value they had when they were delivered; for then
it neither would comply with the agency stipulated in the document in its favor, which
would render it liable, nor could in justice claim from the debtor what by its own
negligence it may have failed to receive." As an answer to this, it may be said that:
". . . it must be borne in mind that it is a recognized doctrine in the matter
of suretyship that with respect to the surety, the creditor is under no
obligation to display any diligence in the enforcement of his rights as a
creditor. His mere inaction, indulgence, passiveness, or delay in
proceeding against the principal debtor, or the fact that he did not enforce
the guaranty or apply to the payment of such funds as were available,
constitute no defense at all for the surety, unless the contract expressly
requires diligence and promptness on the part of the creditor, which is not
in the case in the present action." (Clark vs. Sellner, 42 Phil., 384.
Furthermore, there is nothing in the document evidencing the contract which makes
the plaintiff, as the defendants believe, their agent with the obligation to sell the
securities to the document, has a right, not an obligation, to elect to enforce the
securities in the manner it now does by bringing this action.
As to the amount of the obligation, the defendants argue that the acknowledgment of
the debit balance on July 31, 1920, in the amount of P33,548.55, (Exhibit B), is not
any evidence that may legally bind the defendant Margarita Q. de Ansaldo, who has
not accepted it as correct. The truth, however, is that the defendant Mr. Ansaldo who
gave his conformity with the aforesaid balance is the husband of the other defendant
and the legal manager of the property of the conjugal partnership which is liable for
the payment of this debt.
The interest computed was likewise discussed in this case, the defendants claiming
that the same was not fixed with their consent, nor does there exist, say they, any
proof that it was ever fixed by the Board of Directors of the bank. It appears,
however, from the evidence of the plaintiff that the National Bank had authorized
various officers thereof to fix certain rate of interest on certain occasions; as for
instance, the rate of interest for the months of August to September, 1920, was
raised from 12 to 8 per cent. At all events, we believe that the defendants have no
right to raise this question because they have paid interest at the rate of 9 per cent
per annum, as appears from the document marked Exhibit I.

For all of the foregoing, judgment is rendered sentencing the defendants to pay the
plaintiff bank the sum of thirty-one thousand seven hundred eighty-five pesos and
ninety-six centavos (P31,785.96), with interest thereon at the rate of 8 per cent per
annum from October 1, 1922, until full payment, with the costs; in case of failure to
pay, let the certificates of shares described in Exhibit A be sold, and if the proceeds
of the sale of said shares are not sufficient to cover the whole amount of the debt, let
an execution issue against any property of the conjugal partnership of the
defendants and, in default thereof, against the private property of each of them,
sufficient to cover the whole amount of the balance that may be remaining unpaid.
So ordered.
Manila, P. I., February 5, 1924.
(Sgd.)
Judge

PEDRO

CONCEPCION

As the transcript of the testimony of the witnesses was not forwarded to this court, we cannot,
according to the constant jurisprudence of this court, review the evidence and so we have to
abide by the findings of fact set forth in the judgment of the trial court.
We agree with the appellants that, according to the contract of pledge Exhibit A, attached to the
complaint, the defendants authorized the plaintiff to act as their agent with full power and
authority to dispose of the effects pledged in the manner stipulated in said contract; but it
appears that the plaintiff had also an option, not an obligation precisely, to enforce the
securities given.
The question whether or not appellants executed the aforesaid document Exhibit A as husband
and wife was decided by the trial court in the sense that the defendant appellant Mr. Ansaldo is
the husband of the other defendant Doa Margarita Q. e Iparraugirre. For the reason above
given we cannot alter this finding of the trial court and consequently if the defendants are
husband and wife, it is immaterial whether the debt was contracted by one or the other, for in
either case as the debt was contracted during the marriage of the defendants it must be paid
for the account of the conjugal partnership in accordance with article 1408 of the Civil
Code. 1awph!l.net
After a thorough study of the judgment appealed from, we do not find therein any substantial
error that justifies the reversal thereof and therefore the same must be, as is hereby, affirmed
with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Ostrand and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
DECISION UPON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
December 10, 1924.

VILLAMOR, J.:
In view of the juridical importance of the question raised in this motion, wherein it is maintained
that the obligation of the defendants is chargeable to the conjugal partnership, and not to the
private property of the spouses, and much less to the private property of Margarita Quintos de
Ansaldo, we deem it well to enlarge upon our decision published October 6, 1924.
It will be remembered that the defendants signed a document of pledge in favor of the plaintiff
Philippine National Bank to secure the payment of a loan in current account to the amount of
P31,284. In said document it does not clearly appear that the signers were husband and wife,
although there is proof in the record tending to show their civil status as husband and wife. Nor
does its appear in the said document that the signers have bound themselves solidarily to pay
the debt owing to plaintiff.
The judgment appealed from, affirmed by this court in a decision published October 6, 1924,
sentences the defendants to pay the plaintiff bank the sum of thirty-one thousand seven
hundred eighty-five pesos and ninety-six centavos (P31,785.96) with interest thereon at 8 per
cent per annum from October 1, 1922, until full payment, with the costs; providing that, in
default of payment, the certificates of shares described in Exhibit A must be sold, and in case
the proceeds of the sale were not sufficient to cover the whole amount of the debt, an
execution shall issue against the property of the conjugal partnership of the defendants, and, if
no such property was found, then against any private property of each of them sufficient to
cover the whole amount of the balance remaining unpaid.
There can be no doubt that the property pledged being insufficient, the property of the conjugal
partnership is liable for this obligation in accordance with article 1408 of the Civil Code,
because the same was contracted by the spouses during the marriage; but in default of
property of the conjugal partnership (Article 1401), what is the liability of the spouses as to the
private property (article 1396) of each of them?
In this jurisdiction we do not believe that a similar question was heretofore ever raised and
decided, and so far as the research of the write hereof discloses, it finds no precedent in the
Spanish jurisprudence.
By express provision of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership begins to exist at the
celebration of the marriage, and the separation of the properties between the spouses shall
take place (article 1432) only when it is expressly stipulated in the marriage settlement, or is
judicially decreed, or in the case provided in article 50 of the Code. This conjugal partnership
however, is confined to the properties mentioned in article 1401 of the Civil Code, to wit: ( a)
Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common property
whether the acquisition is made for the community or for only one of them; (b) those obtained
by the industry, salary or labor of the spouses or any of them; (c) the fruits, rents or interest
received or accruing during the marriage, from the common or the private property of each of
the spouses. The partnership does not produce the merger of the properties of each spouse.
Each of them, notwithstanding the existence of the partnership, continues to be the owner of
what he or she had before contracting marriage, as well as of what he or she may have
acquired later by lucrative title, by right of redemption, or by exchange with his or her property,
or by purchase with his or her money.

The ganancial partnership, to use the expression of Mr. Manresa, is the same conjugal
partnership constituted, in its economical aspect, under the system established by the law as
suppletory. It is, therefore, formed by the husband and the wife, each with his or her own
property and with his or her own debts. The legislator does not intend to effect a mixture or
merger of those debts of properties between the spouses. The partnership maintains the
separation of the properties brought by each spouse from those that he or she may substitute
for them, or privately acquire afterwards by lucrative title.
Under the provisions of the Code it appears evident that the conjugal partnership does not
produce the merger of properties, nor does it cause the personality of the wife to disappear; on
the contrary, the law established absolute separation of capitals a complete independence of
the capital account from the account of benefits pertaining to the conjugal partnership, all of
which constitutes a unsurmountable obstacle to the presumption of solidarity between spouses.
The question submitted to our consideration presupposes the insolvency of the conjugal
partnership, and as there is no presumption of solidarity of property between the spouses, the
question may be asked, What liability do the partners have with respect to the debts of the
partnership? The legal provisions about conjugal partnership, contained in chapter 5, title 3,
book 4, of the Civil Code, do not give an adequate answer to this question; so that we have to
resort to other sources for a solution thereof. Mr. Manresa already indicates in his
commentaries on article 1395 that in view of the provisions of the Code regarding conjugal
partnership, "the cases will be rare wherein there would be any need to resort to the suppletory
rule of the contract of partnership; but the law, which does not in any manner pretend having
provided for all the questions that may present themselves in the practice, points out new
sources of law to which resort must be made in order to solve doubtful cases, situations or
circumstances not provided in articles 1392 to 1431." The case now before us is one of them,
which requires, in order to be solved, a resort to the rule on the contract of partnership,
prescribed in article 1698, which provides that the partners are not solidarily liable with respect
to the debt of the partnership, and none can bind the others by a personal act, if they have not
given him any power therefor.
The aforecited provision negativating solidarity in the liability of the partners is a consequence
of the conclusive rule of article 1137, of general application to all kinds of obligation, to the
effect that in obligations created by the will of the parties, solidarity will exist only when it is
expressly determined in the title thereof, giving them such a character. Therefore if solidarity
exists only by stipulation, or by law, it is evident that the partner cannot be solidarity liable for
the debts of the partnership, because, as Manresa says, there is no legal provision imposing
such burden upon him, and because the same is not only not authorized by the contract of
partnership, but is contrary to the nature thereof, for gain being the consideration of the
obligation, the latter cannot be extended beyond the interest that the partner may have therein
which is proportional to his share.
Taking into account that the contract of pledge signed by the defendants does not show that
they have contracted a solidary obligation, it is our opinion, and so decide, that the properties
given as pledge being insufficient, the properties of the conjugal partnership of the defendants
are liable for the debt to the plaintiff, and in default thereof, they are jointly liable for the
payment thereof.

It being understood that the judgment appealed from is modified in the sense above stated, the
motion of the appellants is denied. So ordered.

1. Respondent Eliza Go Tan never gave her consent or conformity to encumber the
title in question;
2. The real estate mortgages, annotated as Entries No. 142475, 146789, 174644,
213699, 247803, and 246959 at the back of TCT No. 52367 covering the questioned
land are null and void because respondent Jose B. Tan had already fully paid the
obligations secured by the mortgages annotated as Entries No. 14275, 146789, and
174644; while the mortgages registered as Entry No. 213699 (amendment of
mortgage, amending a previous loan of P15,000,000 to P25,000,000) and Entry No.
246959 (amendment of mortgage amending a previous loan of P25,000,000
to P40,000,000), as well as any mortgage prior to that registered as Entry No.
213699 was not executed and signed by [respondent Jose B. Tan]. (Underscoring
supplied)
As scheduled, the public auction of the foreclosed properties took place on April 17, 1998
following which the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Misamis Oriental issued a Sheriffs
Certificate of Sale4 in the name of petitioner Metrobank, the highest bidder.
In their Answer5 to the Complaint, petitioners alleged that:

G.R. No. 163712

November 30, 2006

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY and ROGELIO T. UY, Petitioners,

vs.
JOSE B. TAN and ELIZA GO TAN, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On the application for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage filed by herein petitioners
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) and its Vice President Rogelio T. Uy (Uy),
the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Misamis Oriental issued a "Sheriffs Notice of
Sale"1 setting on April 17, 1998 the sale at public auction of four mortgaged parcels of land
including that covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-53267 (the title in question)
registered in the name of herein respondent Jose B. Tan who was referred to in the title as
"JOSE B. TAN, of legal age, Filipino, married to Eliza Go Tan. . . ." 2
A day before the scheduled public auction of the mortgaged properties or on April 16, 1998,
respondent spouses Jose B. Tan and Eliza Go Tan filed a complaint 3 against petitioners, along
with Albano L. Cuarto, Sheriff IV of the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Misamis Oriental, for
removal of cloud on the title in question and injunction before the Regional Trial Court of
Misamis Oriental. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-225.
Respondents cited the following grounds-bases of their complaint:

Plaintiffs [herein respondents], together with their two sons, Ariel and Rey John, obtained
a credit linefrom the defendant bank from which they made availments from time to time. In
time and always upon their plea,the line was gradually increased until it reached P40 million.
There was no separate or distinct loan to speak of; all availments or releases were taken
from one and the same line.
In the same token, the mortgage constituted on the four lots, TCT No. T-53267 included, was
for the entire credit line and not for any particular availment or for a determinate portion of the
credit. As such, the mortgage will be discharged and the four lots released only upon the
termination of the line, which means full payment of the entire loan which plaintiffs never
did.6 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners further alleged that the deeds of real estate mortgage, 7 promissory notes,8 and
credit line agreements9 bore the signature of respondent Jose B. Tan either for himself or as
attorney-in-fact of his son Ariel Tan and, in one of them, his wife-co-respondent Eliza Go Tans
signature appeared.
By way of Counterclaim, petitioners prayed for the award of attorneys fees, compensatory
and/or moral damages, exemplary damages, and other reliefs.10
Crediting the testimony of respondent Jose B. Tan denying having 1) executed and signed the
two amendments of the mortgage, 2) received the amount of P40,000,000, and 3) appeared
before Notary Public Joel Pearanda who notarized 11 the mortgage for P40,000.00, and
likewise crediting the testimony of respondent Eliza Go Tan denying that the signature
appearing on the real estate mortgage dated November 5, 1992 was hers,12 and finding that

. . . the existing loans covered by real estate mortgages annotated at the back of subject TCT
No. T-53267 of the Registry of Deeds for Cagayan de Oro, had been fully paid as of July 1,
1997, defendant Metrobank had no basis to be paid again through the extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings13 (underscoring supplied)[,]

By Decision of November 21, 2003,15 the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision
and accordingly dismissed petitioners appeal. And it denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.16
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari filed on July 7, 2004.17

Branch 38 of the Misamis Oriental RTC, by Decision of March 5, 2001, rendered judgment in
favor of respondents, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs spouses Jose B. Tan and Eliza G. Tan and against the defendants, as follows:
a) Declaring that, because of the fact that the plaintiff Eliza G. Tan did not give her
consent to all the real estate mortgages annotated at the back of her title, TCT No. T53267, of the Registry of Deeds for Cagayan de Oro, all said mortgages
are null and void ab initio;
b) Declaring that, because plaintiff Jose B. Tan did not execute the real estate
mortgages annotated at the back of his title, TCT No. T-53267, of the Registry of
Deeds for Cagayan de Oro, all said mortgages are nulland void ab initio;
c) Declaring the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings taken by the defendant
sheriff , including the sheriffs certificate of sale as null and void;
d) Making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant sheriff,
and the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Misamis Oriental enjoining and restraining
them, their agents, and representatives from issuing a final certificate of sale in favor
of defendant Metrobank covering the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-53267;
e) Ordering the removal of the cloud on the title, TCT No. T-53267, of the Registry of
Deeds for Cagayan de Oro, and the cancellation of all the entries of the real estate
mortgages and amendment of mortgages annotated at the back of TCT No. T-53267,
of the Registry of Deeds for Cagayan de Oro City;
f) Absolving the plaintiffs spouses from financial liability from the null and void
real estate mortgages;
g) Declaring the principal obligations obtained by Rey John Tan through the
annulled real estate mortgages as FULLY PAID by him;
h) Ordering defendant Metrobank to pay attorneys fee and expenses of litigation in
the amount of P100,000 and the costs.
SO ORDERED.14 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners appealed the trial courts decision before the Court of Appeals.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Petitioners assail, in the main, the appellate courts affirmance of the trial courts decision
absolving respondents from liability for the principal obligation obtained by their son Rey John
Tan which was secured by real estate mortgages, including that covered by the title in question,
and declaring such principal obligation of Rey John Tan, who is not a party to the case, to have
been fully paid by him as of July 1, 1997, before the questioned extra-judicial foreclosure and
public auction sale conducted on April 17, 1998.18
Respondent Jose B. Tan19 insisted that he was not a party to the documents bearing on the
grant of the credit line, he pointing to the absence of his signature above his typewritten name
on the Credit Line Agreements, promissory notes, disclosure statements, and an Amendment
of Real Estate Mortgage. Respondents presented in evidence Promissory Notes Exhibits "B2" and "B-4" dated July 1, 1997 and June 24, 1997, respectively; three Credit Line Agreements
Exhibits "B-6," "B-7," and "B-8," 20 dated May 2, 1997; and the Agreement amending the real
estate mortgage Exhibit "B-9,"21 all dated May 2, 1997.
Petitioners, on the other hand, presented six Promissory Notes dated February 26, 1996, May
8, 1996, August 27, 1996, October 8, 1996, October 25, 1996, and November 18, 1996; 22 five
Credit Line Agreements dated September 9, 1991, September 24, 1992, September 2, 1993,
November 3, 1994, and April 25, 1996;23 an Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage
from P15,000,000 to P25,000,000; and October 29, 199624 Amendment of Real Estate
Mortgage from P25,000,000 to P40,000,000.
All document-exhibits of petitioners which are original copies bear the signature of respondent
Jose B. Tan, however, as solidary co-debtor of his sons Rey John Tan and Ariel Tan.25 And
these documents were annotated at the back of the title in question.26
In the absence of proof, nay allegation, that the signatures of respondent Jose B. Tan on the
abovementioned documents were forged, this Court is constrained to uphold their
genuineness.27
As for the claim that respondent Eliza Go Tan did not give her consent to the mortgage of the
title in question, the same is belied by her signature28 on Exhibit "18"-Real Estate Mortgage
which is annotated as Entry No. 174644 at the back of the title. Her bare denial that the
signature was forged, without more, does not lie.
In any event, lack of respondent Eliza Go Tans consent to the mortgage covering the title in
question would not render the encumbrance void under the second paragraph of Article 124 of
the Family Code.29 For proof is wanting that the property covered by the title is conjugal that
it was acquired during respondents marriage which is what would give rise to the presumption

that it is conjugal property.30 The statement in the title that the property is "registered in
accordance with the provisions of Section 103 of the Property Registration Decree in the name
of JOSE B. TAN, of legal age, married to Eliza Go Tan"31 does not prove or indicate that the
property is conjugal. So Ruiz v. Court of Appeals32 instructs:
The property subject of the mortgage is registered in the name of "Corazon G. Ruiz, of legal
age, married toRogelio Ruiz, Filipinos." Thus, title is registered in the name of Corazon alone
because the phrase "married to Rogelio Ruiz" is merely descriptive of the civil status of
Corazon and should not be construed to mean that her husband is also a registered owner.
Furthermore, registration of the property in the name of "Corazon G. Ruiz, of legal age, married
to Rogelio Ruiz" is not proof that such property was acquired during the marriage, and
thus, is presumed to be conjugal. The property could have been acquired by Corazon while she
was still single, and registered only after her marriage to Rogelio Ruiz. Acquisition of title and
registration thereof are two different acts. The presumption under Article 116 of the Family
Code that properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to be conjugal cannot apply in
the instant case. Before such presumption can apply, it must first be established that the
property was in fact acquired during the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during
the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of
conjugal ownership. No such proof was offered nor presented in the case at bar.33 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
On respondents claim of payment, they presented debit memo-Exhibits "G" to "G-11" 34 (of
which only Exhibits "G-6" to "G-11"35 are relevant to the issues) and certifications-Exhibits "H"
and "H-1"36 issued by an accountant, one Glenn Cabading.
Rebutting Exhibits "G" to "G-11" inclusive, petitioners presented credit memos 37 which, to them,
cancelled respondents debit memos. From a comparison of the credit and debit memos with
the bank ledgers38 and especially considering the unquestioned explanation of petitioner Uy on
the reason behind the issuance of these memos, viz:
ATTY. DEL CASTILLO:
Q You said, when a loan is renewed you credit a certain amount. Can you expound that a little
bit?
A Actually, the Banco Central punish[es] if the loan cannot be renewed for several
years without payment. Just to circumvent that policy, we do the credit first and the debit just
for the renewal.

A We credit first the renewed amount and we debit the old promissory note.
Q When you credit, there were other papers accomplished?
A Yes.
Q What are these papers called?
A Credit Memos on loan release.
Q Where do you credit this?
A It is credited on their accounts.
Q On the existing accounts?
A Yes, deposit account.
Q And what is debit memos?
A Debit memos are ones that liquidate the loan so that the whole promissory note will be
distinguished [sic].39(Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
this Court is persuaded by petitioners claim that the debit memos represented "payment" only
in the banks book entries but did not actually involve payment/settlement of the original
obligation.1wphi1
In fine, the extra-judicial foreclosure and subsequent sale of the mortgaged property covered
by the title in question was valid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the appellate court is SET
ASIDE. Civil Case No. 98-225, "Jose B. Tan and Eliza Go Tan v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company, et al.," filed before and raffled to Branch 38 of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis
Oriental, is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED

Q Why is that?
A To show that amount is fully paid and we avail.
Q How is that done?