Mine Operation and

Management of Progressive
Slope Deformation on the South
Wall of the Barrick Goldstrike
Betze-Post Open Pit

J. Armstrong
Barrick Goldstrike Mines Inc.
N.D. Rose
Piteau Associates Engineering Ltd.

Abstract
Slopes experiencing significant deformation and rock quality deterioration may present rockfall and debris runout hazards to
personnel and equipment. This paper discusses the engineering, planning, and operational steps taken at the Barrick Goldstrike Mine,
Nevada, USA to understand and mitigate the risks associated with mining beneath a 450m high pit wall undergoing progressive slope
deformation.
Through a process of geotechnical investigation to update and verify geological, structural, and hydrogeological conditions, detailed
design assessments were carried out to provide comprehensive predictions of slope performance using limit equilibrium and advanced
numerical modeling codes. Monitoring threshold and operational response criteria were developed based on modeling predictions
of surface displacements, displacement rates, and debris runout potential. Assessments of hazard exposure and risks to personnel,
equipment, and ore reserves were carried out to assist with mine planning and scheduling decisions. Contingency plans were
implemented to accelerate the mining rate on the south wall, thereby reducing exposure during spring months that may be subject
to increased pore pressure development from snow melt. The combined results of these assessments allowed slope steepening to be
carried out in the latter stages of mining to maximize ore extraction while managing operational hazards at acceptable levels of risk.

INTRODUCTION
Mining on the south wall of the 11th West Layback of the Betze-Post pit at Barrick Goldstrike, Nevada, USA began in 2006 and
was completed in May 2009. Interramp angles of the south wall range from 38 to 44, defining an overall slope angle of 34 at a
height of 450m.
Early in layback development, a number of multi-bench failures resulted in the incorporation of several stepouts to provide adequate
catchment for rockfall and debris runout. As layback development continued, increasing deformation rates and the appearance of new
tension cracks defining an area of potential instability upwards of 300m prompted geotechnical assessments aimed at understanding
the nature of the deformation as well as any potential risks to safety and production.
This paper covers the engineering, planning, and operational steps taken at Barrick Goldstrike to identify and mitigate potential
safety and production hazards associated with large-scale progressive deformation and bench to multi-bench scale instabilities.
Through comprehensive geotechnical data collection and investigation, management was able to successfully implement slope
steepening from 40 to 44 in the lower levels of the layback to maximize ore extraction at acceptable levels of risk.

BACKGROUND
Engineering Geology of the South Wall
The Betze/Post Deposit occurs in the vicinity of the contact between the Jurassic Goldstrike Stock and metasedimentary and carbonate
rocks of Devonian and Ordovician Age. As summarized in Table I, Devonian rocks on the south wall consist of fractured argillite,
sandstone, and interbedded siltstone of the Rodeo Creek (DRC) Formation and limestone, siltstone, and related rocks of the Popovich
(DP) Formation. The contact between the Popovich and Rodeo Creek Formations on the south wall is comprised of low shear strength
carbonaceous black claystone (CBC).

Slope Stability

Santiago Chile, November 2009

Unit

Lithology

Abbreviation

Lower Rodeo Creek

Lower

Lower RC

Argillite
DP/DRC Contact

CBC

DP/DRC or CBC

Popovich Upper Mud

Upper Mud

DP-UM

Popovich SD

SD

DP-SD

Lower Popovich

Planar, Wispy, LL

Lower DP

Table I Summary of Geotechnical Units on the South Wall

History of Instability and Design Changes during South Wall Development

Significant instability occurred on the south wall over the course of two mining phases between 2005 and 2009. The S-05-B failure
occurred on the 10th West Layback on May 22, 2005, following daylighting of the CBC Layer on the 5200 and 5160 Levels and a series
of rain events that occurred over a ten day period. A description of the instability and prediction of the failure event is included in Case
Example 3 of Rose and Hungr (1).
Starting in late 2006, during the course of mining the 11th West Layback, a series of instabilities were encountered as summarized in
the following:
December 31, 2006: Instability in Zone S-06-A related to daylight of the CBC contact. A 15m wide stepout was left at the toe of the
failure at the 5280 Level.
March 8, 2007: A three bench wedge-type failure in Zone S-07-A between the 5240 and 5360 levels. A 12m wide stepout was
implemented at the 5280 Level.
September 6, 2007: Strong acceleration of prisms located on the 5440 Haulroad. A failure prediction of September 10, 2007 was
forecasted by Barrick Geotechnical using inverse-velocity method after Fukuzono (2). A 60m wide catchment area was constructed
with a 4m high rockfall protection berm on the 4960 Level, based on debris runout assessments performed by Piteau Associates.
September 10, 2007: A 250,000 tonne failure occurred in Zone S-07-B and was contained within the 60m wide catchment area on
the 4960 Level.
January 2008: Slow but steady acceleration of prism monitoring data and widespread tension cracking across the south wall.
February 2008: Two multi-bench bedding-related failures occurred between the 4960 and 4840 levels, immediately west of Zone
S-07-B. A 19m wide stepout was implemented on the 4840 Bench to control rockfall runout.
October 9, 2008: A 100,000 tonne six bench high failure occurred in Zone S-08-B and was contained on the 4840 Level stepout.
June 2008: UDEC modeling study initiated to assess long-term stability of the slope and to optimize slope designs to maximize
extraction.
September 2008: Deceleration noticed in slope monitoring data, as predicted by UDEC modeling results.
October 2008: Interramp slope angle below the 4440 Level was steepened from 40 to 44 based on limit equilibrium and UDEC
modeling predictions.

UNDERSTANDING RISKS
Engineering
Structural Analysis and Kinematics Assessments
In early 2008, review of structural mapping from the November 2007 pit revealed adversely oriented fault and shear sets in the BuzzardDP Domain. As shown on Figure 1, fault sets FC1 and FB1 (shears related to bedding set BB1) define potential for daylight on north facing
slopes with dip/dip direction orientations of 38/315 and 30/048, respectively. Further investigation into these structural sets through
a series of limit equilibrium back analyses and UDEC modeling assessments revealed that the structural continuity of fault set FC1 was
limited to about 225m based on offsetting major faults of set FA1. Bedding discontinuities were found to be even more discontinuous and
exhibited higher shear strengths due to rock bridging effects.
Updated kinematic analyses were carried out to identify possible structurally controlled wedge, plane, and toppling failure mechanisms
that could affect the stability of individual benches and interramp to overall slopes on the south wall. A wedge combination defined
between sets FB1/FC1 defined an apparent plunge of 26 which undercut the 38 to 40 IRA in the Buzzard-DP Domain, likely contributing
the instability in Zone S-07-B. Provided that a nominal cohesion of 50 kPa could be preserved with optimized controlled blasting
measures, no other kinematically possible wedge or plane failures were defined that would limit an interramp slope angle of 44 defined
from bench kinematics assessments for the West Bazza-DP structural domain in the lower slope.

Santiago Chile, November 2009

Slope Stability

Figure 1 Lower Hemisphere Equal Area Projections of Fault and Bedding Discontinuities Mapped
on the Mid to Upper South Wall in the Buzzard-DP Domain

Deep-Seated Stability Assessments

Deep-seated stability assessments for the south wall included a UDEC (3) modeling study to calibrate the deformation behaviour of
the south wall and investigate the long-term stability of the slope. The details of the UDEC modeling investigations are included in Case
Example 4 of Rose and Scholz (4).
Slide (5) limit equilibrium analyses of the south wall were carried out as an alternative assessment to UDEC using anisotropic shear
strength functions to represent the main discontinuity orientations in the slope. Table II summarizes the range of dips for moderate to
strong peak dip orientations defined from surface mapping data that were incorporated in Slide. A range of dips of 3 was simulated
for the peak set orientations based on true dips of each peak structural set except for fault set FC1, which was represented at an apparent
plunge of 42 due to its slightly oblique orientation to the south wall.

Geotechnical
Domain

Geotechnical
Unit

Buzzard-DRC

Anisotropy Dip Range ()

Faults

Bedding

Joints

LRC

80 to 86

12 to 18

n/a

Buzzard-DP

DP-UM, DP-SD, LDP

39 to 45

13 to 19

83 to 89

West Bazza-DP

DP-UM, DP-SD, LDP

n/a

12 to 18

75 to 81

Table II Discontinuity Dip Ranges Incorporated in Anisotropic Slide Analyses

Anisotropic shear strengths representing the various discontinuity orientations were determined based on a series of Slide back
analyses of previous instabilities as well as UDEC modeling results. Figure 2 shows plots of yielded finite difference elements and
sheared discontinuities from the south wall UDEC model described by Rose and Scholz (4). Although the plot of yielded elements
indicates that rock mass yielding is relatively shallow, the plot of discontinuities at shear limit (residual strength) indicates a significant
depth of yielded structure behind the pit wall. The majority of the finite difference elements in the rock bridges between the discontinuous
structures are generally in a yielded state, in the more critical portions of the slope. This supports the selection of a Hoek-Brown
Disturbance (D) factor of 1.0 for limit equilibrium analysis.
Table III summarizes the anisotropic shear strengths for the rock mass and discontinuous bedding and fault set FC1 in the BuzzardDP Domain. The discontinuous bedding and fault shear strengths were calculated based on the weighted average of rock mass
strength versus discontinuity shear strength assuming a friction angle (f) of 25 and cohesion (c) of zero for bedding and a f of 20
and c of 50 kPa for faults. To accommodate the increasing shear path lengths that are generated with increasing slope height, rock
bridge percentages of 20 to 50% were estimated for bedding in the different geotechnical units. A rock bridge percentage of 25%
was estimated for faults of set FC1 based on a maximum continuity of 225m and domain width of 300m.

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Santiago Chile, November 2009

Figure 2 Plots of UDEC Model Finite Difference Zone Plasticity Indicators (left) and Discontinuities at Shear Limit from
South Wall UDEC Model, after Rose and Scholz (4)

Rock Mass
RMR/

sci

GSI

(MPa)

LRC

46.1

24.1

DP-UM

50.6

DP-SD
LDP

Unit

Bedding

FC1 Faults

(kPa)

()

RB

(kPa)

()

RB

(kPa)

()

12

186

29.6

20

37

25.9

n/a

n/a

n/a

38.0

17

278

39.3

30

83

29.3

25

105

24.8

62.3

37.4

16

411

45.6

40

164

33.2

25

139

26.4

62.7

46.8

475

39.7

50

237

32.4

25

155

24.9

mi

Table III Summary of Rock Mass and Discontinuous Bedding and Fault Anisotropic Shear Strengths Based on Rock Bridge (RB) Percentage

Figure 3 shows the Slide stability analysis results for the south wall with the interramp slope angle in the lower slope steepened from
40 to 44. A minimum factor of safety of 1.18 was defined for the overall slope with the back analyzed rock bridge percentage of 25%
in the Buzzard-DP domain. Sensitivity analysis results of rock bridge percentage of 0 to 30% for fault set FC1 defined a range in factor
of safety of between 1.06 and 1.20 which was used to assess the potential risks of encountering large-scale slope failure.
Debris Runout Potential
To improve understanding of runout potential from instability on the south wall, three separate instability scenarios were analyzed using
DAN-W dynamic runout analysis software based on a theory of runout analysis developed by Hungr (7). Prior to performing any forward
runout analyses, the software was calibrated by modeling the S-07-B and S-08-B instabilities, permitting a high degree of confidence in
subsequent forward analyses.

BUZZARD-DRC
DOMAIN

URC
CBC

DP-UM
DP-SD

LDP

BUZZARD-DP
DOMAIN
DP-UM WEST BAZZA-DP
DP-SD DOMAIN

LDP
Figure 3 Slide Sensitivity Analysis Results of Rock Bridge Percentage for Fault Set FC1 in the Buzzard-DP Domain
with a 44 Interramp Angle in the Lower Slope

Santiago Chile, November 2009

Slope Stability

The first scenario examined the runout potential of a 300m deep-seated failure through the S-07-B zone with a failure surface estimated
from previous back analyses in limit equilibrium models. The forward analysis indicated the potential for 120m of debris runout onto the
4220 working level as shown on Figure 4.

Figure 4 Scenario One Pre and Post-Failure Debris Runout Models

Because of the lack of stepouts or containment berms below the 4840 Level, the second scenario examined the runout potential of a
five bench failure occurring below this level. The forward analysis indicated the potential for about 90m of debris runout onto the 4220
working level. The results for scenarios one and two were utilized in a subsequent formal risk assessment.
The third scenario examined the runout potential of a four bench failure occurring above the 4640 switchback near the Shalosky fault
zone. The concern for this area was its proximity to the switchback and the large amount of deformation already experienced by this
section of wall. The runout analysis for this scenario indicated the potential for significant debris to reach the 4640 switchback, which
prompted a decision to berm off and vacate the portion of the switchback that was used for equipment parking and housed an electrical
substation.
Planning
Contingency Planning
To accommodate uncertainties about the behavior of the south wall, stability analyses were carried out by Piteau Associates in late 2008
to investigate the potential improvements that would result if mitigative measures were implemented while mining was at the 4320 Level.
The following six remedial measures were investigated using UDEC and Slide:

Stepout at 4320 Level: Stepout widths of 15 or 30m.

Crest offload to 5520 Level: 60m wide offload cut from 5700 to 5520 Level.
Ramp offload to 5200 Level: Lower south ramp from 5400 to 5200 Level.
Combined crest/ramp offload: Crest offload cut to 5520 Level and ramp lowering to 5200 Level.
Ramp offload to 5000 Level: Lower south ramp from 5400 to 5000 Level.
Waste rock buttressing: Assessment of 90m wide buttresses from the 4220 to the 4460, 4600, and 4840 Levels.

Remedial measures 4, 5, and 6 indicated improvements in the factor of safety of 6%, 9%, and up to 27% (buttress to the 4840
Level), respectively, while the remainder of the measures showed only relatively minor improvements. This information was utilized by
management in its decision to buttress up to the 4840 Level following layback completion.
Formal Risk Assessment
A Formal Risk Assessment (FRA) of the potential hazards associated with continued mining beneath the south highwall was conducted
in early 2009 at the Goldstrike Property using a semi-qualitative style of risk analysis. Participants included key management, planning,
operational, and engineering personnel.
The following three scenarios were identified as posing the most significant risk to mining under the south wall:
Instability induced rockfall injuring a miner on the working level (primarily a safety issue).
Debris runout from a planar or wedge type single to multi-bench instability injuring a miner on the working level (primarily a safety issue).
As there are no stepouts (beyond the standard catch bench design) below the 4840 Level to contain excess rollrock or debris runout,
the focus for scenarios one and two was limited to the benches below this level.
Debris runout from a deep seated instability that adversely impacts 11th West ounce production (primarily a production issue). Although
modeling and prism movement indicated a low likelihood for this type of failure, the presence of significant tension cracks on the 5700
Level, the 5400 Haul Road, the 5200 Stepout, and along the Shalosky Fault warranted consideration of this scenario in the FRA.

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Santiago Chile, November 2009

The contributing factors for the above three scenarios are discussed below.
Scenario One: Contributing factors for a boulder(s) emanating from a single-bench instability below the 4840 Level injuring personnel
on the working level:

Highwall strain in excess of about one meter.

Poor blasting practice resulting in reduced cohesion and inadequate catch bench width.
Adverse geology not accounted for in the geologic model.
Snow melt and ground thaw associated with typical spring warming.
Large storm event leading to a transient increase in pore-water pressure.

Strain in excess of one meter was determined to be the most significant factor due to the observation that highly weathered and fractured
metasediments in the south wall rapidly deteriorate when strained more than this amount. Although this one-meter strain threshold was utilized
as a guideline for potential ground control problems, it was understood to be empirically derived and only served as a rough estimate.
Scenario Two: Debris runout from a multi-bench instability below the 4840 level injures personnel on the working level.
The significant difference between scenarios one and two is the size of the instability and its associated runout; scenario one is
concerned with a single-bench instability while scenario two considers multiple benches. As such, the contributing factors indentified for
both scenarios were essentially the same except that as scenario two required greater highwall strain, it had an increased likelihood of
being detected with robotic prism monitoring.
Scenario Three: Debris runout from a deep seated instability disrupting production of 11th West ore.
Scenario three is distinct from scenarios one and two in that it considers a large deep-seated instability rather than smaller single to multibench instabilities. Additionally, scenario three is primarily concerned with financial risk criteria, rather than safety and health criteria.
The identified contributing factors for this scenario were essentially the same as the previous two, but with greater consequence placed
on an inaccurate geology or geomechanics model. However, the monitoring data combined with confirmation geological mapping and
interpretation confirmed the primary assumptions incorporated into the geomechanics models, which established the factor of safety
against overall slope failure to be above 1.15, as discussed above and in Rose and Scholz (4).
The following recommended actions were proposed at the close of the FRA:
Increase mining rate on south portion of layback, implementing a split design, thereby decreasing risk exposure in high snow
melt/thaw months.
Continue rigorous prism monitoring, and compare 30-day velocities to the UDEC predicted velocities thereby providing continual
model confirmation.
Increase survey prism coverage on south wall.
Initiate lidar displacement scanning to monitor for displacement between survey prism locations.
Install nested piezometers on the 5400 Ramp to monitor pore water pressure.
Develop operating procedures or guidelines that address the exposure of personnel on foot or in light vehicles within 60m of the
highwall.
Determine the movement threshold or triggering scenario(s) that will trigger a layback evacuation.
Initiate backfilling (buttressing) to the 4840 Level upon completion of layback.
Determine the movement threshold or triggering scenario(s) that will initiate consideration of increased monitoring efforts such as
slope stability radar (SSR).
The primary concern with the in-place monitoring network was its potential inability to detect small scale bench displacement between
survey prism locations that could lead to a rockfall or debris runout event. Increased prism density and lidar scanning were recommended
to address this issue; however, it was understood that if upon subsequent evaluation the monitoring network was deemed inadequate,
SSR would be implemented.

MITIGATING RISKS
Operations and Planning
Split Layback
In order to expedite the mining of ore at risk from a potential instability, the 11th West Layback was split by delaying mining on the northern

Santiago Chile, November 2009

Slope Stability

portion of the layback and increasing the mining rate on the portion on the south that was potentially exposed to a highwall failure. Upon completion
of the south portion of the layback in late May, 2009, buttressing of the south wall commenced at the 4220 Level and is planned to continue to the
4840 Level to enhance long-term stability of the wall. The buttress elevation is at the 4320 Level at the time of this paper (August, 2009).
Horizontal Drains and Stormwater Control
In an effort to decrease pore pressure development, seven horizontal drain holes totaling 850m were installed at the 5200 Level targeting
perched water associated with the Buzzard and ELL Faults. Additionally, prior to the anticipated seasonal snow melt, the region behind the pit
crest was graded to channel stormwater to lined stormwater sumps, away from areas of potential recharge. Monitoring of pore pressure was
accomplished by installing three nested piezometers to depths of 30, 80, and 120m below the 5400 Ramp.
Monitoring
Increased Survey Prism Density
Ten additional survey prisms were deployed between the 4840 and 4440 levels to improve detection of potentially roll-rock producing bench
scale failures, as recommended by the FRA. The prisms are surveyed with a Leica TCA 1800 robotic theodolite every two hours. Although a
significant increase in prism density was achieved, the desired prism spacing of 75m was not attainable due to catch bench inaccessibility.
Prism locations on the south wall, at the beginning of June 2009, in relation to major structures, stepouts, and failures are shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5 South Wall Prisms, Instabilities, and Primary Stepouts

Lidar
An Optech ILRIS-3D Lidar was used to perform biweekly scans of the highwall below the 4840 Level. The scans were used to monitor bench
scale deformation between survey prism locations by comparing successive scans to an initial baseline scan using Polyworks version 10.0
software (by InnovMetric Software Inc.). However, the value of the deformation data was limited due to the lidar range constraints, relatively long
processing time, and errors associated with scan alignment. A deformation comparison from March 2 to May 28, 2009 is shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6 Lidar Deformation Scan of South Wall from March 2 to May 28, 2009

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Santiago Chile, November 2009

Slope Stability Radar

On April 18, 2009 while mining was at the 4260 Level, GroundProbe provided Goldstrike with an SSR-X long range high-definition
radar for a one week demonstration of continuous monitoring of the south highwall. The SSR-X is capable of detecting roughly 0.1mm
of displacement at a 1700m distance. The radar was deployed at the 4560 Switchback on the north wall, a distance of 900m from the
intended scan area on the south wall. From this location it took roughly five minutes to scan the south highwall from the ELL Fault westward
to the Shalosky Fault, and from the 5400 Ramp down to the mining level. Figure 7 shows the scan area and a screen capture from the SSR
Viewer software displaying wall deformation. Following the one week trial period, Goldstrike decided to retain the SSR-X for the remainder
of mining under the south wall in order to maintain the enhanced resolution of displacement monitoring provided by the radar.

Figure 7 SSR Scan Area and Viewer Deformation Screen

After three weeks of deployment, because the unit was no longer available for lease, the SSR-X was replaced with an SSR radar which
was deployed at the same location. Although the SSR has a shorter scanning range than the SSR-X, it still provided sufficient monitoring
resolution between survey prism locations.
The deployment of a radar provided deformation data between survey prism locations as well as real-time monitoring of the south wall.
The information obtained from the radar validated the survey prism and lidar data and afforded the requisite level of monitoring to mine
near the base of the highwall at acceptable levels of risk. Figure 8 shows the comparable 15-day average displacement contours from
prism monitoring obtained in late May over the same area as the radar scan.

Figure 8 15-Day Average Velocity Contours (in/day) From Prism Monitoring at the End of Layback Development

Santiago Chile, November 2009

Slope Stability

CONCLUSIONS
This paper demonstrates the value of thorough geologic, structural, and geomechanics models in assessing the hazards and risks
associated with mining large open pit slopes. The effort spent to thoroughly document instabilities and perform comprehensive geologic
and structural mapping early in layback development, combined with quality monitoring data, provided the groundwork for the development
of a functional UDEC model of the south highwall. Additionally, rollrock and debris runout assessments clarified understanding of the
potential hazards to personnel and equipment in the working areas of the layback.
The deformation and stability predictions afforded by the UDEC and Slide models combined with an understanding of potential hazards
at the working areas provided management with the necessary tools to perform an effective assessment of the risks associated with
continued mining beneath the south wall. These early investments of time and resources ensured safe mining in the later stages of layback
development in spite of progressive wall deformation. Ultimately, the confidence in the geomechanics models acquired through rigorous
monitoring and continual confirmation permitted eventual slope steepening to maximize ore extraction at acceptable levels of risk.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors of this paper thank the management of Barrick Goldstrike Mines Inc. for their permission to publish this paper. Thanks are
also given to those who assisted with paper preparation and with the analyses discussed in this paper, particularly R. Sharon, A. Bandler,
and B. McKnight of Barrick, and M. Scholz of Piteau Associates.

REFERENCES
1. Rose, N.D. and Hungr, O., 2007. Forecasting Potential Slope Failure in Open Pit Mines using the Inverse-Velocity Method. International
Journal of Rock Mechanics and Mining Sciences, Volume 44, pp. 308-320.
2. Fukuzono, T., 1985. A new method for predicting the failure time of a slope. Procs. 4th Int. Conf. and Field Workshop on Landslides,
Tokyo, pp. 145-150.
3. Itasca, 2004. Universal Distinct Element Code (UDEC) Users Guide, Version 4.0. Itasca Consulting Group, Inc., Minneapolis, Minnesota,
November.
4. Rose, N.D. and Scholz, M.F., 2009. Analysis of Complex Deformation Behaviour in Large Open Pit Mine Slopes Using the
Universal Distinct Element Code (UDEC). Proceedings of the Slope Stability 2009 Conference, Santiago, November. 17p
5. Rocscience, 2007. Slide 2D Slope Stability Analysis for Soil and Rock Slopes Users Guide. Rocscience Inc., Toronto, Ontario.
6. Hoek, E., Carranza-Torres, C., and Corkum, B., 2002. Hoek-Brown Failure Criterion 2002 Edition. Proc. North American
Rock Mechanics Society Meeting, Toronto, July, 7p.
7. Hungr, O., 1995. A Model for the Runout Analysis of Rapid Flow Slides, Debris Flows, and Avalanches. Canadian Geotech Journal,
Volume 32(4), pp. 610-623.

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Santiago Chile, November 2009