Académique Documents
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FACTS:
De Buyser is the registered owner of a lot contiguous to the lot subject of this dispute. On the other hand,
defendant Tandayags have been occupying this foreshore land under a revocable permit issued by the Director of
Lands. Claiming ownership of the foreshore land, de buyser plaintiff filed an action against spouses Tandayag to
recover possession of this land and the Director of Lands for having illegally issued a revocable permit to the
Tandayags.
ARGUMENTS:
In asserting the right of ownership over the land, plaintiff invokes Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August
3, 1866 which provides:
Art. 4. Lands added to the shore by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the
sea, form part of the public domain, when they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea,
and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries,
or for the coastguard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the
owners of the estate adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof.
ISSUE/S: WON claim of ownership has legal basis.
HELD:
No.
Plaintiffs claim of ownership is bereft of legal basis.
Such alluvial formation along the seashore is part of the public domain and, therefore, not open to acquisition by
adverse possession by private persons. It is outside the commerce of man, unless otherwise declared by either the
executive or legislative branch of the government. 1
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FACTS: Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Marina (should be "Maria") Tancinco Imperial
and Mario C. Tancinco filed an application for the registration of three lots adjacent to their fishpond property.
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FACTS: Petitioner Dionisia P. Bagaipo is the registered owner of Lot which located southeast of Davao river.
While respondent Leonor Lozano is the owner of a registered parcel of land located across and opposite the
southeast portion of petitioners lot facing the Davao River.
On May 26, 1989, Bagaipo filed a complainti[2] for Recovery of Possession with Mandatory Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Damages against Lozano for: (1) the surrender of possession by Lozano of a certain portion of land
measuring 29,162 square meters which is supposedly included in the area belonging to Bagaipo under TCT No. T15757; and (2) the recovery of a land area measuring 37,901 square meters which Bagaipo allegedly lost when the
Davao River traversed her property. Bagaipo contended that as a result of a change in course of the said river, her
property became divided into three lots, namely: Lots 415-A, 415-B and 415-C.
In January 1988, Bagaipo commissioned a resurvey of Lot 415 and presented before the trial court a survey
planii[3] prepared by Geodetic Engineer Gersacio A. Magno which concluded that the land presently located across
the river and parallel to Bagaipos property still belonged to the latter and not to Lozano, who planted some 350
fruit-bearing trees on Lot 415-C and the old abandoned river bed.
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MANUEL T. DE GUIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Former Sixth Division) and JOSE B. ABEJO, represented
by his Attorney-in-Fact, Hermenegilda Abejo-Rivera, respondents.
2003 Oct 8 1st Division G.R. No. 120864
CASE DOCTRINES
Co-owner may file an action against a co-owner; purpose
Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against a third person, but also against
another co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property. In the latter
case, however, the only purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership. The plaintiff cannot
seek exclusion of the defendant from the property because as co-owner he has a right of possession. The plaintiff
cannot recover any material or determinate part of the property.
Co-ownership; right of enjoyment
The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited by a similar right of the other co-owners. A coowner cannot devote common property to his exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership. Hence, if the
subject is a residential house, all the co-owners may live there with their respective families to the extent
possible. However, if one co-owner alone occupies the entire house without opposition from the other coowners, and there is no lease agreement, the other co-owners cannot demand the payment of rent. Conversely,
if there is an agreement to lease the house, the co-owners can demand rent from the co-owner who dwells in
the house.
FACTS:
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Abejo instituted an action for recovery of possession with damages against DEGUIA.
Abejos contentions:
1. he is the owner of the undivided portion of a property used as a fishpond registered Register of Deeds
of Bulacan.
2. ownership over approximately 39,611 square meters out of the FISHPONDs total area of 79,220 square
meters.
For his part, Lozano insisted that the land claimed by Bagaipo is actually an accretion to their titled property.
He asserted that the Davao River did not change its course and that the reduction in Bagaipos domain was caused
by gradual erosion due to the current of the Davao River. Lozano added that it is also because of the rivers natural
action that silt slowly deposited and added to his land over a long period of time. He further averred that this
accretion continues up to the present and that registration proceedings instituted by him over the alluvial
formation could not be concluded precisely because it continued to increase in size.
ISSUE/S: WON there was a change in the rivers course which resulted to avulsion?
HELD:
NO.
The trial court and the appellate court both found that the decrease in land area was brought about by erosion and
not a change in the rivers course. This conclusion was reached after the trial judge observed during ocular
inspection that the banks located on petitioners land are sharp, craggy and very much higher than the land on the
other side of the river. Additionally, the riverbank on respondents side is lower and gently sloping. Th e lower
land therefore naturally received the alluvial soil carried by the river current.iii[11] These findings are factual, thus
conclusive on this Court, unless there are strong and exceptional reasons, or they are unsupported by the evidence
on record, or the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts.
The decrease in petitioners land area and the corresponding expansion of respondents property were the
combined effect of erosion and accretion respectively. Art. 461 of the Civil Code is inapplicable. Petitioner cannot
claim ownership over the old abandoned riverbed because the same is inexistent. The riverbeds former location
cannot even be pinpointed with particularity since the movement of the Davao River took place gradually over an
unspecified period of time, up to the present.
The rule is well-settled that accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: 1) That
the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; 2) That it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and 3)
That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.iv[13] These requisites were sufficiently
proven in favor of respondents. In the absence of evidence that the change in the course of the river was sudden
or that it occurred through avulsion, the presumption is that the change was gradual and was caused by alluvium
and erosion.
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3. DE GUIA continues to possess and use the FISHPOND without any contract and without paying rent to
ABEJOs damage and prejudice.
4. DE GUIA refuses to surrender ownership and possession of the FISHPOND despite repeated demands to
do so after DE GUIAs sublease contract over the FISHPOND had expired.
5. asked the trial court to order DE GUIA to vacate an approximate area of 39,611 square meters as well as
pay damages.
In his Answer, DE GUIA alleged:
1. the complaint does not state a cause of action and has prescribed.
2. the FISHPOND was originally owned by Maxima Termulo who died intestate with Primitiva Lejano as her
only heir.
3. ABEJO is not the owner of the entire FISHPOND but the heirs of Primitiva Lejano who authorized him to
possess the entire FISHPOND.
4. ABEJOs ownership of the undivided portion of the FISHPOND as void and claimed ownership over an
undivided half portion of the FISHPOND for himself.
5. DE GUIA sought payment of damages and reimbursement for the improvements he introduced as a
builder in good faith.
RTC decision: in favor of Abejo.
CA decision: affirmed the RTC.
Issue 1: WON a co-owner may file an action for ejectment against a co-owner.
Ruling:
Article 487 of the Civil Code provides, *a+ny one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. This
article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article 487 includes forcible entry and unlawful
detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de
reivindicacion). The summary actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer seek the recovery of physical
possession only. These actions are brought before municipal trial courts within one year from dispossession.
However, accion publiciana, which is a plenary action for recovery of the right to possess, falls under the
jurisdiction of the proper regional trial court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year. Accion de
reivindicacion, which seeks the recovery of ownership, also falls under the jurisdiction of the proper regional trial
court.
Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against a third person, but also against
another co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property. In the latter
case, however, the only purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership. The plaintiff cannot
seek exclusion of the defendant from the property because as co-owner he has a right of possession. The plaintiff
cannot recover any material or determinate part of the property.
In Hermogena G. Engreso with Spouse Jose Engreso v. Nestoria De La Cruz and Herminio De La Cruz, we
reiterated the rule that a co-owner cannot recover a material or determinate part of a common property prior to
partition as follows:
It is a basic principle in civil law that before a property owned in common is actually partitioned, all that
the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire property. A co-owner has no
right to demand a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common because until division is
effected his right over the thing is represented only by an ideal portion.
As such, the only effect of an action brought by a co-owner against a co-owner will be to obtain
recognition of the co-ownership; the defendant cannot be excluded from a specific portion of the property
because as a co-owner he has a right to possess and the plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate
part of the property. Thus, the courts a quo erred when they ordered the delivery of one-half () of the building
in favor of private respondent.
xxxx
Following the inherent and peculiar features of co-ownership, while ABEJO and DE GUIA have equal
shares in the FISHPOND quantitatively speaking, they have the same right in a qualitative sense as co -owners.
Simply stated, ABEJO and DE GUIA are owners of the whole and over the whole, they exercise the right of
dominion. However, they are at the same time individual owners of a portion, which is truly abstract because
until there is partition, such portion remains indeterminate or unidentified. As co-owners, ABEJO and DE GUIA may
jointly exercise the right of dominion over the entire FISHPOND until they partition the FISHPOND by identifying or
segregating their respective portions.
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Co-owner not required to pay rent upon using the co-owned property; stranger to pay rent
Gaspar de Bartolome, occupied for four years a room or a part of the lower floor of the same house on
Calle Escolta, using it as an office for the justice of the peace, a position which he held in the capital of that
province, strict justice requires that he pay his sister-in-law, the plaintiff, one-half of the monthly rent which the
said quarters could have produced, had they been leased to another person. Xxx even as the husband of the
defendant coowner of the property, he had no right to occupy and use gratuitously the said part of the lower
RICARDO PARDELL Y CRUZ and VICENTA ORTIZ Y FELIN DE PARDELL, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. GASPAR DE
BARTOLOME Y ESCRIBANO and MATILDE ORTIZ Y FELIN DE BARTOLOME, defendants-appellants. 1912 Nov 18
1st Division G.R. No. 4656
CASE DOCTRINES
Hereditary succession gives rise to co-ownership
Co-ownership; extent
"Each co-owner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses them in accordance with their object and
in such manner as not to injure the interests of the community nor prevent the co-owners from utilizing them
according to their rights." (Article 394 of the Civil Code, now Art. 486)
Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a dwelling, in the house of
joint ownership; but the record shows no proof that, by so doing, the said Matilde occasioned any detriment to
the interests of the community property, nor that she prevented her sister Vicenta from utilizing the said upper
story according to her rights. It is to be noted that the stores of the lower floor were rented and an accounting
of the rents was duly made to the plaintiffs.
Each co-owner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and
enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his coow ners, for the
reason that, until a division be made, the respective part of each holder can not be determined and every one of
the coowners exercises together with his other coparticipants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in
addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
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FACTS:
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FACTS:
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They contended that as heirs of Graciana, they have a share in the lot and that intervention is necessary to protect
their right over the property. In addition, they declared that as co-owners of the property, they are allowing
respondents to stay in the lot until a formal partition of the property is made.
CA decision: set aside the RTC and reinstated the MTC decision.
ISSUE: WON petitioner can validly maintain the instant case for ejectment.
RULING:
Petitioner averred that he is an acknowledged illegitimate son and the sole heir of Dominador. He in fact
executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself the controverted property. In ruling for the petitioner, the RTC held
that the questioned January 31, 1962 deed of sale validly transferred title to Dominador and that petitioner is his
acknowledged illegitimate son who inherited ownership of the questioned lot. The Court notes, however, that the
RTC lost sight of the fact that the theory of succession invoked by petitioner would end up proving that he is not
the sole owner of Lot 7226. This is so because Dominador was survived not only by petitioner but also by his lega l
wife, Graciana, who died 10 years after the demise of Dominador on May 28, 1987. By intestate succession,
Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of Lot 7226. The death of Graciana on May 6, 1997, did not make
petitioner the absolute owner of Lot 7226 because the share of Graciana passed to her relatives by consanguinity
and not to petitioner with whom she had no blood relations. The Court of Appeals thus correctly held that
petitioner has no authority to institute the instant action as the sole owner of Lot 7226.
Petitioner contends that even granting that he has co-owners over Lot 7226, he can on his own file the
instant case pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.
This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article 487 includes forcible entry
and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership
(accion de reivindicacion). A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other coowners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners. It should be
stressed, however, that where the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner
and entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the action should be dismissed.
xxx
In Baloloy v. Hular, respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title claiming exclusive ownership of th e
property, but the evidence showed that respondent has co-owners over the property. In dismissing the complaint
for want of respondents authority to file the case, the Court held that
Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. This
article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a reinvidicatory
action. A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as coplaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of
the co-owner will benefit the others but if such judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the
unimpleaded co-owners. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and
entitled to the possession thereof, the action will not prosper unless he impleads the other co-owners who are
indispensable parties.
In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole ownership over the subject property
and praying that he be declared the sole owner thereof. There is no proof that the other co-owners had waived
their rights over the subject property or conveyed the same to the respondent or such co-owners were aware of
the case in the trial court. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the respondent as the sole owner of the
property and entitled to its possession, to the prejudice of the latters siblings. Patently then, the decision of the
trial court is erroneous.
Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the respondent was mandated to implead his siblings, being
co-owners of the property, as parties. The respondent failed to comply with the rule. It must , likewise, be
stressed that the Republic of the Philippines is also an indispensable party as defendant because the respondent
sought the nullification of OCT No. P-16540 which was issued based on Free Patent No. 384019. Unless the State is
impleaded as party-defendant, any decision of the Court would not be binding on it. It has been held that the
absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the
complaint including the judgment. The absence of the respondents siblings, as parties, rendered all proceedings
subsequent to the filing thereof, including the judgment of the court, ineffective for want of authority to act, not
only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
In the instant case, it is not disputed that petitioner brought the suit for unlawful detainer in his name
alone and for his own benefit to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana as he even executed an affidavit of self-
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FACTS:
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CASE DOCTRINES
Section 20, RA 4726 does not ipso facto grants the right to extrajudicial foreclosure of a condominium unit
Clearly, Section 20 merely prescribes the procedure by which petitioner's claim may be treated as a
superior lien - i.e., through the annotation thereof on the title of the condominium unit. While the law also
grants petitioner the option to enforce said lien through either the judicial or extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the
condominium unit, Section 20 does not by itself, ipso facto, authorize judicial as extra-judicial foreclosure of the
condominium unit. Petitioner may avail itself of either option only in the manner provided for by the governing
law and rules. As already pointed out, A.M. No. No. 99-10-05-0, as implemented under Circular No. 7-2002,
requires that petitioner furnish evidence of its special authority to cause the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
condominium unit.
FACTS:
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
Gatmaytan is the registered owner of Fontavilla No. 501 (condominium unit), Marbella I Condominium,
Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, under Condominium Certificate of Title No. 1972 (CCT No. 1972). Inscribed on his title
is a Declaration of Restrictions and a Notice of Assessment.
On November 11, 2003, Marbella Condominium filed with the RTC, through the Office of the Clerk of
Court & Ex-Oficio Sheriff, a Petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the condominium unit of Gatmaytan.
Petitioners allegations:
1. that it (petitioner) is a duly organized association of the tenants and homeowners of Marbella I
Condominium; that respondent is a member thereof but has unpaid association dues amounting to
P3,229,104.89, as of June 30, 2003;
2. the latter refused to pay his dues despite demand.
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FIRST MARBELLA CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. AUGUSTO GATMAYTAN, respondent. G.R.
No. 163196 July 4, 2008
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RTC decision: the request for extra-judicial foreclosure of the subject condominium unit is DENIED. The
MR was also denied.
PROCEDURAL ISSUE: WON petitioners can file a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 based on the
decision of the RTC in the exercise of his administrative function.
RULING:
Only a judgment, final order or resolution rendered by a court in the exercise of its judicial functions
relative to an actual controversy is subject to an appeal to this Court by way of a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The January 7, 2004 Order and March 21, 2004 Order assailed
herein were issued by the RTC Executive Judge in the exercise of his administrative function to supervise the
ministerial duty of the Clerk of Court as Ex-Oficio Sheriff in the conduct of an extrajudicial foreclosure sale; hence,
said orders are not appealable under Rule 45. Rather, the correct mode of appeal is by petition for mandamus
under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 3. Petition for mandamus - When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course o f
law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some
other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the
petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE: WON First Marbella Condominium Association has the right to cause the extrajudicial
foreclosure of its annotated lien on the condominium unit under Section 20 of R.A. No. 4726.
RULING:
xxx petitioner must establish that it has a clear right to the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the
condominium unit of respondent. Under Circular No. 7-2002, implementing Supreme Court Administrative Matter
No. 99-10-05-0, it is mandatory that a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure be supported by evidence that
petitioner holds a special power or authority to foreclose, thus:
Sec. 1. All applications for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, whether under the direction of the
Sheriff or a notary public pursuant to Art. No. 3135, as amended, and Act 1508, as amended, shall be filed
with the Executive Judge, through the Clerk of Court, who is also the Ex-Officio Sheriff (A.M. No. 99-10-050, as amended, March 1, 2001).
Sec. 2. Upon receipt of the application, the Clerk of Court shall:
a. Examine the same to ensure that the special power of attorney authorizing the extra-judicial
foreclosure of the real property is either inserted into or attached to the deed of real estate
mortgage (Act No. 3135, Sec. 1, as amended) x x x.
Without proof of petitioner's special authority to foreclose, the Clerk of Court as Ex-Oficio Sheriff is
precluded from acting on the application for extrajudicial foreclosure.
In the present case, the only basis of petitioner for causing the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
condominium unit of respondent is a notice of assessment annotated on CCT No. 1972 in accordance w ith
Section 20 of R.A. No. 4726. However, neither annotation nor law vests it with sufficient authority to foreclose
on the property.
The notice of assessment contains no provision for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the condominium
unit. All that it states is that the assessment of petitioner against respondent for unpaid association dues
constitutes a "first lien against [the] condominium unit."
Neither does Section 20 of R.A. No. 4726 grant petitioner special authority to foreclose. All that the law
provides is the following:
Sec. 20. The assessment upon any condominium made in accordance with a duly registered declaration of
restrictions shall be an obligation of the owner thereof at the time the assessment is made. The amount
of any such assessment plus any other charges thereon, such as interest, costs (including attorney's fees)
and penalties, as such may be provided for in the declaration of restrictions, shall be and become a lien
upon the condominium to be registered with the Register of Deeds of the city or province where such
condominium project is located. The notice shall state the amount of such assessment and such other
charges thereon as may be authorized by the declaration of restrictions, a description of condominium
unit against which same has been assessed, and the name of the registered owner thereof. Such notice
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FACTS:
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CA decision: reversed the RTC. It held that there is no cause of action for forcible entry in this case
because respondents entry into the property, considering the consent given by co-owner Norma Maligaya, cannot
be characterized as one made through strategy or stealth which gives rise to a cause of action for forcible entry.
Petitioners contention/s:
1. the consent and knowledge of co-owner Norma Maligaya cannot defeat the action for forcible entry since
it is a basic principle in the law of co-ownership that no individual co-owner can claim title to any definite
portion of the land or thing owned in common until partition.
Respondents contention/s:
1. the complaint for forcible entry cannot prosper because her entry into the property was not through
strategy or stealth due to the consent of one of the co-owners.
2. since Norma Maligaya is residing in the house she built, the issue is not just possession de facto but also
one of possession de jure since it involves rights of co-owners to enjoy the property.
ISSUE 1: WON the consent of one co-owner will warrant the dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by another coowner against the person who was given the consent to construct a house on the co-owned property.
RULING:
As to the issue of whether or not the consent of one co-owner will warrant the dismissal of a forcible
entry case filed by another co-owner against the person who was given the consent to construct a house on the
co-owned property, we have held that a co-owner cannot devote common property to his or her exclusive use to
the prejudice of the co-ownership. In our view, a co-owner cannot give valid consent to another to build a house
on the co-owned property, which is an act tantamount to devoting the property to his or her exclusive use.
Furthermore, Articles 486 and 491 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in accordance with
the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent
the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may be changed by
agreement, express or implied.
Art. 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing
owned in common, even though benefits for all would result therefrom. However, if the withholding of the
consent by one or more of the co-owners is clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may afford
adequate relief.
Article 486 states each co-owner may use the thing owned in common provided he does so in accordance
with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or
prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. Giving consent to a third person to construct a
house on the co-owned property will injure the interest of the co-ownership and prevent other co-owners from
using the property in accordance with their rights.
Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the
thing owned in common. It necessarily follows that none of the co-owners can, without the consent of the other
co-owners, validly consent to the making of an alteration by another person, such as respondent, in the thing
owned in common. Alterations include any act of strict dominion or ownership and any encumbrance or
disposition has been held implicitly to be an act of alteration. The construction of a house on the co-owned
property is an act of dominion. Therefore, it is an alteration falling under Article 491 of the Civil Code. There
being no consent from all co-owners, respondent had no right to construct her house on the co-owned property.
ISSUE 2: WON there was valid ground for forcible entry.
Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry filed
against the builder. The consent given by Norma Maligaya in the absence of the consent of petitioner and Luz Cruz
did not vest upon respondent any right to enter into the co-owned property. Her entry into the property still falls
under the classification "through strategy or stealth."
The Court of Appeals held that there is no forcible entry because respondents entry into the property
was not through strategy or stealth due to the consent given to her by one of the co-owners. We cannot give our
imprimatur to this sweeping conclusion. Respondents entry into the property without the permission of
petitioner could appear to be a secret and clandestine act done in connivance with co-owner Norma Maligaya
whom respondent allowed to stay in her house. Entry into the land effected clandestinely without the
knowledge of the other co-owners could be categorized as possession by stealth. Moreover, respondents act of
getting only the consent of one co-owner, her sister Norma Maligaya, and allowing the latter to stay in the
constructed house, can in fact be considered as a strategy which she utilized in order to enter into the co-owned
property. As such, respondents acts constitute forcible entry.
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FACTS:
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held, as descendants of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan they were entitled to one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 1091, pro
indiviso.
CA decision: affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE 1: WON the heirs of Pascul Paulmitan are entitled to share of Lot No. 1091.
RULING:
xxx
From the time of the death of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan to the subsequent passing away of her son
Pascual in 1953, the estate remained unpartitioned. Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides: "Where ther e are two
or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to
the payment of debts of the deceased." Donato and Pascual Paulmitan were, therefore, co-owners of the estate
left by their mother as no partition was ever made.
When Pascual Paulmitan died intestate in 1953, his children, the respondents, succeeded him in the co ownership of the disputed property. Pascual Paulmitan's right of ownership over an undivided portion of the
property passed on to his children, who, from the time of Pascual's death, became co-owners with their uncle
Donato over the disputed decedent estate.
Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa claims ownership over Lot No. 1091 by virtue of two transactions, namely: (a)
the sale made in her favor by her father Donato Paulmitan; and (b) her redemption of the land from the Provincial
Government of Negros Occidental after it was forfeited for non-payment of taxes.
When Donato Paulmitan sold on May 28, 1974 Lot No. 1091 to his daughter Juliana P. Fanesa, he was only
a co-owner with respondents and as such, he could only sell that portion which may be allotted to him upon
termination of the co-ownership. The sale did not prejudice the rights of respondents to one half (1/2) undivided
share of the land which they inherited from their father. It did not vest ownership in the entire land with the
buyer but transferred only the seller's pro indiviso share in the property and consequently made the buyer a coowner of the land until it is partitioned. In Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, the Court, through Justice Irene R.
Cortes, outlined the effects of a sale by one co-owner without the content of all the co-owners, thus:
"The rights of a co-owner of a certain property are clearly specified in Article 493 of the Civil Code. Thus:
Art. 493.Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co ownership.
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will
affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale [Punsalan v.
Boon Liat, 44 Phil. 320 (1923)]. This is because under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other
disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in
the partition of the thing owned in common. [Ramirez v. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528 (1909)]. Consequently, by virtue of
the sales made by Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon which are valid with respect to their proportionate shares, and the
subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale to private respondent Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby
became a co-owner of the disputed parcel of land as correctly held by the lower court since the sales produced the
effect of substituting the buyers in the enjoyment thereof [Mainit v. Bandoy, 14 Phil. 730 (1910)].
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale
of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void.
However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the
property."
Applying this principle to the case at bar, the sale by petitioner Donato Paulmitan of the land to his
daughter, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, did not give to the latter ownership over the entire land but merely
transferred to her the one half (1/2) undivided share of her father, thus making her the co-owner of the land in
question with the respondents, her first cousins.
ISSUE 2: WON redemption by one of the co-owners of the property entitles her the ownership of the entire
property.
RULING:
The redemption of the land made by Fanesa did not terminate the co-ownership nor give her title to
the entire land subject of the co-ownership. Speaking on the same issue raised by petitioners, the Court, in Adille
v. Court of Appeals, resolved the same with the following pronouncements:
16
Page
FACTS:
17
Co-ownership; relationship
In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners is fiduciary in character and
attribute. Whether established by law or by agreement of the co-owners, the property or thing held pro-indiviso is
impressed with a fiducial nature so that each co-owner becomes a trustee for the benefit of his co-owners and he
may not do any act prejudicial to the interest of his co-owners.
Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties in co-ownership is to create an express
trust among the heirs as co-owners of the properties. Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a
trustee for the others.
Page
Lilia Sanchez, constructed a house on a 76-square meter lot owned by her parents-in-law. The lot was
registered under TCT No. 263624 with the following co-owners: Eliseo Sanchez married to Celia Sanchez, Marilyn
Sanchez married to Nicanor Montalban, Lilian Sanchez, widow, Nenita Sanchez, single, Susana Sanchez married to
Fernando Ramos, and Felipe Sanchez.
On 20 February 1995, the lot was registered under TCT No. 289216 in the name of private respondent
Virginia Teria by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale supposed to have been executed on 23 June 1995 by all six (6)
co-owners in her favor.
Lilia Sanchez claimed that she did not affix her signature on the document and subsequently refused to
vacate the lot, thus prompting Virginia Teria to file an action for recovery of possession of the aforesaid lot with
the MeTC.
MeTC decision: in favor of Teria, declaring that the sale was valid only to the extent of 5/6 of the lot and
the other 1/6 remaining as the property of petitioner, on account of her signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale
having been established as a forgery.
RTC decision: affirmed the RTC, because they failed to submit their pleadings.
On 4 November 1998, the MeTC issued an order for the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of private
Virginia Teria, buyer of the property. On 4 November 1999 or a year later, a Notice to Vacate was served by the
sheriff upon petitioner who however refused to heed the Notice.
On 28 April 1999 private respondent started demolishing petitioners house without any special permit of
demolition from the court.
Due to the demolition of her house which continued until 24 May 1999 petitioner was forced to inhabit
the portion of the premises that used to serve as the houses toilet and laundry area.
On 29 October 1999 petitioner filed her Petition for Relief from Judgment with the RTC on the ground
that she was not bound by the inaction of her counsel who failed to submit petitioners appeal memorandum.
RTC decision: denied the Petition and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.
CA (Petition for Certiorari): dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
PROCEDUARAL ISSUE: WON Certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy.
RULING:
As a matter of policy, the original jurisdiction of this Court to issue the so-called extraordinary writs
should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals or before
constitutional or other tribunals or agencies the acts of which for some reason or other are not controllable by
the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of the extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of
Appeals or the Regional Trial Court, it is either of these courts that the specific action for the procurement of the
writ must be presented. However, this Court must be convinced thoroughly that two (2) grounds exist before it
gives due course to a certiorari petition under Rule 65: (a) The tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction; and (b) There is no appeal nor any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Despite the procedural lapses present in this case, we are giving due course to this petition as there are
matters that require immediate resolution on the merits to effect substantial justice.
The Rules of Court should be liberally construed in order to promote their object of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding.
The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to aid the courts in the speedy, just
and inexpensive determination of the cases before them. Liberal construction of the rules and the pleadings is
the controlling principle to effect substantial justice. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their
merits and not on mere technicalities.
xxxx
Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the suspension of the Rules of
the most mandatory character and an examination and review by the appellate court of the lower courts findings
of fact, the other elements that should be considered are the following: (a) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE: WON Lilia Sanchez has a right to the property.
RULING:
Sanchez Roman defines co-ownership as the right of common dominion which two or more persons have
in a spiritual part of a thing, not materially or physically divided. Manresa defines it as the manifestati on of the
18
Page
19
CASE DOCTRINES
Necessary expenses for the preservation of the co-owned property; a co-owner who redeems the co-owned
property does not acquire ownership over its entirety
Necessary expenses may be incurred by one co-owner, subject to his right to collect reimbursement
from the remaining co-owners. There is no doubt that redemption of property entails a necessary expense.
xxx
The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership. While a vendee a retro,
under Article 1613 of the Code, "may not be compelled to consent to a partial redemption," the redemption by
one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in him ownership over it. Failure on the part
of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property and consolidate title thereto
in his name. But the provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property. It does
not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership.
Page
Felisa Alzul is the owner of the parcel of land in question located at Legaspi City. In her first marriage, she
begot a child (Rustico Adille). In her second marriage, her children were Emeteria, Teodorica, Domingo, Josefa and
Santiago, all surnamed Asejo.
Sometime in 1939, Felisa sold the property in pacto de retro. The period of redemption was 3 years. She
was not able to repurchase it because she died in 1942. After Felisas death and during the period of redemption,
Rustico Adille repurchased, by himself alone, and after that, he executed a deed of extra-judicial partition
representing himself to be the only heir and child of his mother Felisa with the consequence that he was able to
secure title in his name alone. Consequently, in 1955, the OCT in the name of his mother was transferred to his
name.
Upon learning this, his half brothers and sisters filed a case for partition with accounting of the property.
RTC decision: in favor of Rustico Adille, sustaining his position as the absolute owner.
CA decision: reversed the RTC.
ISSUE 1: WON by virtue of redeeming the property, a co-owner acquires exclusive ownership over the property.
RULING:
The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to his share alone. While the
records show that the petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, that
did not make him the owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to end the existing state of co-ownership.
Necessary expenses may be incurred by one co-owner, subject to his right to collect reimbursement
from the remaining co-owners. There is no doubt that redemption of property entails a necessary expense.
Under the Civil Code:
ART. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to contribute to the expenses of
preservation of the thing or right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself
from this obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of the
expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co-ownership.
The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership. While a vendee a retro,
under Article 1613 of the Code, "may not be compelled to consent to a partial redemption," the redemption by
one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in him ownership over it. Failure on the part
of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property and consolidate title thereto
in his name. But the provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property. It does
not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership.
20
FACTS:
Page
TEODORA, MARTA, JOSE, SIXTO, RICARDO, ROBERTO, PILAR, VIRGILIO, all surnamed MARIANO and AURORA
EUGENIO, petitioners, vs. THE HON. JUDGE JESUS R. DE VEGA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
BULACAN, BRANCH II, PILAR, REGINA, FELISA and DOMINADOR all surnamed PANGANIBAN, respondents., G.R.
No. L-59974, 1987 Mar 9, 2nd Division
CASE DOCTRINES
Repudiation of co-ownership
Now then, Art. 494 (last paragraph) of the Civil Code provides:.
"xxx
xxx
xxx
"No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."
In view of their lack of a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, duly communicated to the petitioners
(the other co-owners), private respondents cannot acquire the shares of the petitioners by prescription. The
record in the Office of the Assessor is not the sufficient repudiation and communication contemplated by the
21
Neither does the fact that the petitioner had succeeded in securing title over the parcel in his name
terminate the existing co-ownership. While his half-brothers and sisters are, as we said, liable to him for
reimbursement as and for their shares in redemption expenses, he cannot claim exclusive right to the property
owned in common. Registration of property is not a means of acquiring ownership. It operates as a mere notice
of existing title, that is, if there is one.
ISSUE 2: WON Rustico Adille is a trustee of his co-heirs.
RULING:
The petitioner must then be said to be a trustee of the property on behalf of the private respondents. The
Civil Code states:
ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered
a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
We agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that fraud attended the registration of the property. The
petitioner's pretension that he was the sole heir to the land in the affidavit of extrajudicial settlement he executed
preliminary to the registration thereof betrays a clear effort on his part to defraud his brothers and sisters and to
exercise sole dominion over the property. The aforequoted provision therefore applies.
xxx
ISSUE 3: WON prescription has terminated the co-ownership.
RULING:
This Court is not unaware of the well-established principle that prescription bars any demand on property
(owned in common) held by another (co-owner) following the required number of years. In that event, the party in
possession acquires title to the property and the state of co-ownership is ended. In the case at bar, the property
was registered in 1955 by the petitioner, solely in his name, while the claim of the private respondents was
presented in 1974. Has prescription then, set in?
We hold in the negative. Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have
been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain
conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to
the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period required by law .
The instant case shows that the petitioner had not complied with these requisites. We are not convinced
that he had repudiated the co-ownership; on the contrary, he had deliberately kept the private respondents in the
dark by feigning sole heirship over the estate under dispute. He cannot therefore be said to have "made known"
his efforts to deny the co-ownership. Moreover, one of the private respondents, Emeteria Asejo, is occupying a
portion of the land up to the present, yet, the petitioner has not taken pains to eject her therefrom. As a matter of
fact, he sought to recover possession of that portion Emeteria is occupying only as a counterclaim, and only after
the private respondents had first sought judicial relief.
It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but it has likewise been
our holding that the Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that the
act of registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding the longstanding rule that registration operates as a universal notice of title.
HELD: petition is DENIED. /adsum
Page
VIRGILIO B. AGUILAR, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SENEN B. AGUILAR, respondents. G.R. No. 76351
October 29, 1993
CASE DOCTRINES
Co-owners may demand partition at any time; indivisible to be sold and proceeds divided accordingly (Art. 494,
498)
This is resorted to (1) when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the co-owners but
because of the nature of the property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the interests of
the co-owners, and (2) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned
the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners.
Action to compel the sale of a co-owned property which is granted by the court terminates the co-ownership
Since petitioner has decided to enforce his right in court to end the co-ownership of the house and lot and
respondent has not refuted the allegation that he has been preventing the sale of the property by his continued
occupancy of the premises, justice and equity demand that respondent and his family vacate the property so that
the sale can be effected immediately.
xxx
When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the
petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to
enjoy the possession jointly also ceased.
22
Page
23
FACTS:
CASE DOCTRINES
Page
FRANCISCO MEDINA, et al., Petitioners, versus GREENFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent., G.R.
No. 140228, 2004 Nov 19, 2nd Division
24
procedure. Its observance must be taken seriously if it is to attain its objective, i.e., the speedy and inexpensive
disposition of cases.
Moreover, the trial court denied the motion for postponement three (3) days before the scheduled pretrial. If indeed, counsel for respondent could not attend the pre-trial on the scheduled date, respondent at least
should have personally appeared in order not to be declared as in default. But, since nobody appeared for him, the
order of the trial court declaring him as in default and directing the presentation of petitioner's evidence ex parte
was proper.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE 2: WON Virgilio and Senen are co-owners of the house in equal shares.
RULING:
With regard to the merits of the judgment of the trial court by default, which respondent appellate court
did not touch upon in resolving the appeal, the Court holds that on the basis of the pleadings of the pa rties and the
evidence presented ex parte, petitioner and respondents are co-owners of subject house and lot in equal shares;
either one of them may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot object to such
demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally according to their respective interests.
xxx
We uphold the trial court in ruling in favor of petitioner, except as to the effectivity of the payment of
monthly rentals by respondent as co-owner which we here declare to commence only after the trial court ordered
respondent to vacate in accordance with its order of 26 July 1979.
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership,
and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is
concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever the thing is essentially, indivisible and
the co-owners cannot agree that it be, allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold
and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is resorted to (1) when the right to partition the property is invoked
by any of the co-owners but because of the nature of the property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would
prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and (2) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall
be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners. In one case, this Court
upheld the order of the trial court directing the holding of a public sale of the properties owned in common
pursuant to Art. 498 of the Civil Code.
However, being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot without paying any
compensation to petitioner, as he may use the property owned in common long as it is in accordance with the
purpose for which it is intended and in a manner not injurious to the interest of the other co-owners. Each coowner of property held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same
with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners, the reason being that until a
division is made, the respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with
his co-participants joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
Since petitioner has decided to enforce his right in court to end the co-ownership of the house and lot and
respondent has not refuted the allegation that he has been preventing the sale of the property by his continued
occupancy of the premises, justice and equity demand that respondent and his family vacate the property so that
the sale can be effected immediately. In fairness to petitioner, respondent should pay a rental of P1,200.00 per
month, with legal interest; from the time the trial court ordered him to vacate, for the use and enjoyment of the
other half of the property appertaining to petitioner.
When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the
petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to
enjoy the possession jointly also ceased. Thereafter, the continued stay of respondent and his family in the house
prejudiced the interest of petitioner as the property should have been sold and the proceeds divided equally
between them. To this extent and from then on, respondent should be held liable for monthly rentals until he and
his family vacate.
HELD: Petition is GRANTED. /adsum
Page
25
FACTS:
ERNESTO V. YU and ELSIE O. YU, Petitioners, versus BALTAZAR PACLEB, Respondent., G.R. No. 130316, 2007 Jan
24, 1st Division
Page
Possession; requirements
Two things are paramount in possession. First, there must be occupancy, apprehension or taking. Second,
there must be intent to possess (animus possidendi).
26
CASE DOCTRINES
Possession; defined
The Civil Code states that possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. In the
grammatical sense, to possess means to have, to actually and physically occupy a thing, with or without right.
Possession always includes the idea of occupation x x x. It is not necessary that the person in possession should
himself be the occupant. The occupancy can be held by another in his name. Without occupancy, there is no
possession.
Page
27
FACTS:
Page
JAMES ESTRELLER, EDUARDO CULIANAN, GREG CARROS, RAQUEL YEE, JOSELITO PENILLA, LORNA DOTE,
CRESENCIANA CLEOPAS, TRINIDAD TEVES, SONIA PENILLA, ANITA GOMINTONG, CHING DIONESIO, MARIBEL
MANALO, DESIRES HUERTO, and RAYMUNDO CORTES, Petitioners, vs.LUIS MIGUEL YSMAEL and CRISTETA L.
SANTOS-ALVAREZ, Respondents. G.R. No. 170264 March 13, 2009
CASE DOCTRINES
28
himself be the occupant. The occupancy can be held by another in his name. Without occupancy, there is no
possession.
Two things are paramount in possession. First, there must be occupancy, apprehension or taking. Second,
there must be intent to possess (animus possidendi).
Here, petitioners failed to establish that they had prior physical possession to justify a ruling in their favor
in the complaint for forcible entry against respondent.
In the decision in Civil Case No. 741-93 (a case for specific performance and damages against Javier, the
alleged vendor of the lot in question) upon which petitioners based their right to possess in the first place, the trial
court categorically stated:
The [petitioners were never placed] in possession of the subject property on which [was] planned to be [site
of] a piggery, nor [were they] given a clearance or certification from the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer.
The claim that the lot was turned over to petitioners in 1992 was self-serving in the face of this factual
finding. On the other hand, the tax declarations and receipts in the name of respondent in 1994 and 1995
established the possession of respondent. The payment of real estate tax is one of the most persuasive and
positive indications showing the will of a person to possess in concepto de dueo or with claim of ownership.
[P]ossession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter
of the ground before he is deemed in possession. In this case, Ramon, as respondents son, was named caretaker
when respondent left for the United States in 1983. Due to the eventual loss of trust and confidence in Ramon,
however, respondent transferred the administration of the land to his other son, Oscar, in January 1995 until his
return in May 1995. In other words, the subject land was in the possession of the respondents sons during the
contested period.
Petitioners cite an alleged document (Kusangloob na Pagsasauli ng Lupang Sakahan at Pagpapahayag ng
Pagtalikod sa Karapatan) dated March 10, 1995 executed by them and Ramon to prove a turn over of possession.
They also seek to prove their exercise of rights over the land through alleged frequent visits and the designation of
Ramon as their own trustee as declared in a joint affidavit attached to their position paper filed with the MTC.
These instruments, however, fail to convince us of petitioners actual occupancy of the subject land. First,
petitioners themselves acknowledged that Ramon and his wife occupied part of the land as tenants of respondent.
Second, Ramon, a mere tenant, had no authority to sign such document dated March 10, 1995 waiving all rights to
the land. Third, there was no clear proof in the records of the appointment of Ramon as petitioners trustee save
their self-serving statements to this effect. Finally, at the time the Kusangloob na Pagsasauli document was
executed, the caretaker of the land was no longer Ramon but Oscar.
Most important, the title of the land in question (TCT No. T-118375) remained in the name of respondent.
As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of the property, which is one of the attributes
of ownership. The Civil Code states:
Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the
cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be
preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer in possession; if the dates of the possession are the same,
the one who presents a title; and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judi cial deposit
pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings.
In view of the evidence establishing respondents continuing possession of the subject property,
petitioners allegation that respondent deprived them of actual possession by means of force, intimidation and
threat was clearly untenable. In Gaza v. Lim, we held that:
Where a dispute over possession arises between two persons, the person first having actual possession
is the one who is entitled to maintain the action granted by law; otherwise, a mere usurper without any right
whatever, might enter upon the property of another and, by allowing himself to be ordered off, could acquire
the right to maintain the action of forcible entry and detainer, however momentary his intrusion might have
been.
HELD: Petition DENIED. /adsum
Page
Section 2 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 2016, reinforced by P.D. No. 1517, which prohibits the eviction of
qualified tenants/occupants, extends only to landless urban families who are rightful occupants of the land and its
structures, and does not include those whose presence on the land is merely tolerated and without the benefit o f
contract, those who enter the land by force or deceit, or those whose possession is under litigation.
Petitioners claim that they are lawful lessees of the property. However, they failed to prove any lease
relationship or, at the very least, show with whom they entered the lease contract. Respondents, on the other
hand, were able to prove their right to enjoy possession of the property. Thus, petitioners, whose occupation of
the subject property by mere tolerance has been terminated by respondents, clearly do not qualify as "tenants"
covered by these social legislations.
FACTS:
Petition for Review under Rule 45.
Ysmael and Santos-Alvarez (respondents) filed with the RTC of Quezon City, a case for Recovery of
Possession against Estreller et al.(petitioners), claiming ownership of the property subject of dispute, by virtue of a
TCT issued by the Register of Deeds.
Ysmaels allegations:
1. on various dates in 1973, Estreller et al. entered the property through stealth and strategy and had since
occupied the same; and
2. despite demands refused to vacate the premises.
Estreller et al.s counterclaims:
1. Ysmael had no personality to file the suit since he only owned a small portion of the property, while
Santos-Alvarez did not appear to be a registered owner thereof.
2. that their occupation of the property was lawful, having leased the same from the Magdalena Estate, and
later on from Alvarez.
3. the property has already been proclaimed by the Quezon City Government as an Area for Priority
Development under P. D. Nos. 1517 and 2016, which prohibits the eviction of lawful tenants and
demolition of their homes.
RTC decision: in favor of Ysmael and Santos-Alvarez.
CA decision: affirmed in toto the RTC.
ISSUE: WON petitioners are rightful occupants of the property.
RULING:
Finally, petitioners' claim that they are entitled to the protection against eviction and demolition afforded
by P.D. Nos. 2016, 1517, and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7279, is not plausible.
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1517 grants preferential rights to landless tenants/occupants to acquire land
within urban land reform areas, while Section 2 of P.D. No. 2016 prohibits the eviction of qualified tenants/
occupants.
In Dimaculangan v. Casalla, the Court was emphatic in ruling that the protective mantle of P.D. No. 1517
and P.D. No. 2016 extends only to landless urban families who meet these qualifications: a) they are tenants as
defined under Section 3(f) of P.D. No. 1517; b) they built a home on the land they are leasing or occupying; c) the
land they are leasing or occupying is within an Area for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zone; and
d) they have resided on the land continuously for the last 10 years or more.
Section 3(f) of P.D. No. No. 1517 defines the term "tenant" covered by the said decree as the "rightful
occupant of land and its structures, but does not include those whose presence on the land is merely tolerated
and without the benefit of contract, those who enter the land by force or deceit, or those whose possession is
under litigation." It has already been ruled that occupants of the land whose presence therein is devoid of any
legal authority, or those whose contracts of lease were already terminated or had already expired, or whose
possession is under litigation, are not considered "tenants" under the Section 3(f).
Petitioners claim that they are lawful lessees of the property. However, they failed to prove any lease
relationship or, at the very least, show with whom they entered the lease contract. Respondents, on the other
hand, were able to prove their right to enjoy possession of the property. Thus, petitioners, whose occupation of
the subject property by mere tolerance has been terminated by respondents, clearly do not qualify as "tenants"
covered by these social legislations.
HELD: petition is DENIED for lack of merit./ adsum
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FACTS:
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SPS. JUANITO R. VILLAMIL and LYDIA M. VILLAMIL, represented herein by their Attorney-in-Fact/Son WINFRED
M. VILLAMIL, Petitioners, vs. LAZARO CRUZ VILLAROSA, Respondent. G.R. No. 177187 April 7, 2009
CASE DOCTRINES
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CA decision: reversed the RTC. It held that Bomedco only acquired an easement of right of way by unopposed
and continuous use of the land, but not ownership, under Article 620 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: WON Bodemco has acquired ownership of the land by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
RULING:
Under Art. 1137 of the Civil Code
Petitioners claim of ownership through extraordinary acquisitive prescription under Article 1137 of the
Civil Code cannot be sustained.
There is no dispute that the controversial strip of land has been in the continuous possession of petitioner
since 1929. But possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under a claim
of title, that is, it must be adverse. Unless coupled with the element of hostility towards the true owner,
possession, however long, will not confer title by prescription.
xxx
While it is true that, together with a persons actual and adverse possession of the land, tax
declarations constitute strong evidence of ownership of the land occupied by him, this legal precept does not
apply in cases where the property is declared to be a mere easement of right of way.
An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted on the corporeal immovable property of another,
by virtue of which the owner has to refrain from doing, or must allow someone to do, something on his
property, for the benefit of another thing or person. It exists only when the servient and dominant estates belong
to two different owners. It gives the holder of the easement an incorporeal interest on the land but grants no
title thereto. Therefore, an acknowledgment of the easement is an admission that the property belongs to
another.
Having held the property by virtue of an easement, petitioner cannot now assert that its occupancy
since 1929 was in the concept of an owner. Neither can it declare that the 30-year period of extraordinary
acquisitive prescription started from that year.
Petitioner, however, maintains that even if a servitude was merely imposed on the property in its favor,
its possession immediately became adverse to the owner in the late 1950s when the grant was alleged by
respondent heirs to have expired.
xxx
We do not think so. The mere expiration of the period of easement in 1959 did not convert petitioners
possession into an adverse one. Mere material possession of land is not adverse possession as against the owner
and is insufficient to vest title, unless such possession is accompanied by the intent to possess as an
owner.There should be a hostile use of such a nature and exercised under such circumstances as to manifest and
give notice that the possession is under a claim of right.
In the absence of an express grant by the owner, or conduct by petitioner sugar mill from which an
adverse claim can be implied, its possession of the lot can only be presumed to have continued in the same
character as when it was acquired (that is, it possessed the land only by virtue of the original grant of the
easement of right of way), or was by mere license or tolerance of the owners (respondent heirs). It is a
fundamental principle of law in this jurisdiction that acts of possessory character executed by virtue of license or
tolerance of the owner, no matter how long, do not start the running of the period of prescription.
After the grant of easement expired in 1959, petitioner never performed any act incompatible with the
ownership of respondent heirs over Cadastral Lot No. 954. On the contrary, until 1963, petitioner continued to
declare the sugar central railroad right of way in its realty tax receipts, thereby doubtlessly conceding the
ownership of respondent heirs. Respondents themselves were emphatic that they simply tolerated petitioners
continued use of Cadastral Lot No. 954 so as not to jeopardize the employment of one of their co-heirs in the sugar
mill of petitioner.
The only time petitioner assumed a legal position adverse to respondents was when it filed a claim
over the property in 1965 during the cadastral survey of Medellin. Since then (1965) and until the filing of the
complaint for the recovery of the subject land before the RTC of Cebu in 1989, only 24 years had lapsed. Since the
required 30-year extraordinary prescriptive period had not yet been complied with in 1989, petitioner never
acquired ownership of the subject land.
HELD: the petition is DENIED. /adsum
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FACTS:
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IGNACIO WONG, petitioner, vs.HON. LUCAS D. CARPIO, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Davao del
Sur, Branch V and MANUEL MERCADO, respondents. G.R. No. L-50264 October 21, 1991
CASE DOCTRINES
Constructive delivery; general rule; exceptions
General Rule: the execution of a sale thru a public instrument shall be equivalent to t he delivery of the thing.
Exception/s: 1. unless there is stipulation to the contrary or
2. If, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and
material tenancy of the thing and make use of it herself, because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by
another, then delivery has not been effected.
Possession; when acquired
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1. Villarosa is not a purchaser in good faith considering that he has knowledge of the circumstances that
should have forewarned him to make further inquiry beyond the face of the title.
Respondnets contention/s:
1. that he is a purchaser in good faith because before buying the property, he went to the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City to verify the authenticity of Spouses Tolentinos title, as well as to the Express Credit
Financing Corporation to check whether Spouses Tolentino had indeed mortgaged the subject property.
Having been assured of the authenticity and genuineness of its title, he proceeded to purchase the
property.
ISSUE: WON Villarosa is a purchaser for value in good faith.
RULING:
The burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith lies upon one who asserts that status.
An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some
other person has a right to or interest in that same property, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the
purchase or before receiving any notice of another persons claim.
The honesty of intention that constitutes good faith implies freedom from knowledge of circumstances
that ought to put a prudent person on inquiry. Good faith consists in the belief of the possessors that the persons
from whom they received the thing are its rightful owners who could convey their title . Good faith, while always
presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary, requires this well-founded belief.
xxx
Well-settled is the rule that every person dealing with a registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the
certificate to determine the condition of the property. Where there is nothing in the certificate of title to indicate
any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to
explore further than what the Torrens Title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defects or inchoate right
that may subsequently defeat his right thereto.
This principle does not apply when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that
would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect
or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the
status of the title of the property in litigation. One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated an
innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith.
xxx
A forged or fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title if the property has already been
transferred from the name of the owner to that of the forger. This doctrine serves to emphasize that a person who
deals with registered property in good faith will acquire good title from a forger and be absolutely protected by a
Torrens title.
Having made the necessary inquiries and having found the title to be authentic, Villarosa need not go
beyond the certificate of title. When dealing with land that is registered and titled, as in this case, buyers are not
required by the law to inquire further than what the Torrens certificate of title indicates on its face. He examined
the transferors title, which was then under the name of Spouses Tolentino. He did not have to scrutinize each and
every title and previous owners of the property preceding Tolentino.
In sum, Villarosa was able to establish good faith when he bought the subject property. Therefore, TCT
No. 354675 issued in his name is declared valid.
HELD: Petition denied. /adsum
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MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND ELPIDIA,
FELICIDAD, ISABEL, JOSE, EUGENIA, AQUILINA, CONSUELO AND NATIVIDAD, all surnamed LEYVA, and EDUARDA
Vda. de LEYVA, respondents. G.R. No. 71393 June 28, 1989
CASE DOCTRINES
Acts of tolerance; cannot start prescription to run
The provision of Article 1942 of the Civil Code to the effect that acts which are merely tolerated
produce no effect with respect to possession is applicable as much to the prescription of real rights as to the
prescription of the fee, it being a glaring and self-evident error to affirm the contrary, as does the appellant in
his motion papers. Possession is the fundamental basis of the prescription. Without it no kind of prescription is
possible, not even the extraordinary.
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