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LGU officials
Appointments
1 San Juan vs CSC 1991
Facts: The Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal (PBO) was left vacant; thereafter
Rizal Governor San Juan, peititioner, nominated Dalisay Santos for the position
and the latter quickly assumed position. However, Director Abella of Region IV
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) did not endorse the nominee,
and recommended private respondent Cecilia Almajose as PBO on the ground
that she was the most qualified. This appointment was subsequently approved
by the DBM. Petitioner protested the appointment of Almajose before the DBM
and the Civil Service Commission who both dismissed his complaints. His
arguments rest on his contention that he has the sole right and privilege to
recommend the nominees to the position of PBO and that the appointee should
come only from his nominees. In support thereof, he invokes Section 1 of
Executive Order No. 112.
Issue: Whether or not DBM is empowered to appoint a PBO who was not
expressly nominated by the provincial governor.
Held: Under the cited Sec 1 of EO 112, the petitioner's power to recommend is
subject to the qualifications prescribed by existing laws for the position of PBO.
Consequently, in the event that the recommendations made by the petitioner fall
short of the required standards, the appointing authority, public respondent DBM
is expected to reject the same. In the event that the Governor recommends an
unqualified person, is the Department Head free to appoint anyone he fancies?
Petitioner states that the phrase of said law: "upon recommendation of the local
chief executive concerned" must be given mandatory application in consonance
with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution
under Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X, Sec. 2 thereof. He further argues that his power
to recommend cannot validly be defeated by a mere administrative issuance of
public respondent DBM reserving to itself the right to fill-up any existing vacancy
in case the petitioner's nominees do not meet the qualification requirements as
embodied in public respondent DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 31 dated
February 9, 1988.

This case involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and
principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local
autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of
centralized power in Malacaang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the
scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.

The 1935 Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local
governments to "general supervision . . . as may be provided by law." The
President controls the executive departments. He has no such power over local
governments. He has only supervision and that supervision is both general and
circumscribed by statute. The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more
marked in the present Constitution. Article II, Section 25 provides: "The State
shall ensure the autonomy of local governments"
Thereby, DBM Circular is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may
appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the
Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the
Governor explaining why no one meets the legal requirements and ask for new
recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and qualifications.
2 Flores vs Drilon
FACTS: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as
the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent
Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged
with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order. Said provision provides the President the power to appoint an
administrator of the SBMA provided that in the first year of its operation, the
Olongapo mayor shall be appointed as chairman and chief of executive of the
Subic Authority. Petitioners maintain that such infringes to the constitutional
provision of Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "no
elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to
any public officer or position during his tenure," The petitioners also contend that
Congress encroaches upon the discretionary power of the President to appoint.

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ISSUE: Whether or not said provision of the RA 7227 violates the constitutional
prescription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other
government posts.
RULING: The court held the Constitution seeks to prevent a public officer to hold
multiple functions since they are accorded with a public office that is a full time
job to let them function without the distraction of other governmental duties.
The Congress gives the President the appointing authority which it cannot limit
by providing the condition that in the first year of the operation the Mayor of
Olongapo City shall assume the Chairmanship. The court points out that the
appointing authority the congress gives to the President is no power at all as it
curtails the right of the President to exercise discretion of whom to appoint by
limiting his choice.

4 Dimaandal vs COA
FACTS: In 1992, Dimaandal who was holding the position of Supply Officer III,
was designated Acting Assistant Provincial Treasurer for Administration by the
Governor of Batangas. Because of this, he filed a claim for the difference in
salary and allowance for the year 1993 amounting to over P61k. The Provincial
Auditor disallowed P52k of it (only P8.4k was allowed) because: (a) the power to
fill the position given to him was with the Secretary of Finance; (b) the
designation is temporary in nature and does not amount to the issuance of an
appointment to could entitle him to receive the salary of the position. The
Governor himself asked the Provincial Auditor to reconsider, but this was also
denied. Dimaandal appealed to the COA, which agreed with the Provincial
Auditor saying that Dimaandal was just designated with the position in addition
to his regular duties. As such, he is not entitled to receive an additional salary
and going further in disallowing the P8.4 that was allowed since he was not
designated by a duly competent authority. Dimaandal filed a petition for
certiorari with the SC, citing the cases of Cui, et. al. vs. Ortiz, et. al., and Menzon
vs. Petilla which laid down the rule that de facto officers are entitled to salary for
services actually rendered. He says that he is a de facto officer by reason of
services rendered in favor of the Province of Batangas and that to disallow his
compensation would be tantamount to deprivation of property without due

process of law, and impairment of obligation of contracts duly enshrined in the


Constitution.
ISSUE: WON an employee who is designated in an acting capacity is entitled to
the difference in salary between his regular position and the higher position to
which he is designated. (NO) Sub-issues: WON Dimaandal was appointed by a
duly competent authority. (NO) WON Dimaandal was a de facto officer. (NO)
RATIO: The law applicable is Section 471(a) of RA 7160, the Local Government
Code which mandates that:
Sec. 471.
Assistant Treasurers. - (a) An assistant treasurer may be appointed by the
Secretary of Finance from a list of at least three (3) ranking eligible
recommendees of the governor or mayor, subject to civil service law, rules and
regulations. "Section 2077. Compensation for person appointed to temporary
service.
In case of the temporary absence or disability of a provincial officer or in case of
a vacancy in a provincial office, the President of the Philippines or officer having
the power to fill such position may, in his discretion, order the payment of
compensation, or additional compensation, to any Government officer or
employee designated or appointed temporarily to fill the place, but the total
compensation paid shall not exceed the salary authorized by law for the position
filled.
What was extended to petitioner by the Governor was merely a designation not
an appointment. While an appointment is the selection by the proper authority of
an individual who is to exercise the powers and functions of a given office,
designation merely connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law,
upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment.
Designation is simply the mere imposition of new or additional duties on the
officer or employee to be performed by him in a special manner. It does not
entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the
right to claim the salary attached to the position.
The nature of Dimaantals designation and the absence of authority of the
Governor to authorize the payment of the additional salary and RATA without the

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appropriate resolution from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan does not make him a
de facto officer.
A de facto officer is defined as one who derives his appointment from one having
colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose
appointment is valid on its face. It is likewise defined as one who is in possession
of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is
meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so
that the incumbent be not a mere volunteer. Then a de facto officer is one who is
in possession of an office in the open exercise of its functions under color of an
election or an appointment, even though such election or appointment may be
irregular. In the cases cited by Dimaantal, both Menzon and Cui were appointed
with color of authority. Petition DISMISSED.
4 AGUIRRE JR v DE CASTRO 1999
SUMMARY: De Castro, the Chief of the Legal Affairs and Complaint Services of the
Division of City Schools of Manila, was asked by the City Legal Officer to appear
before it for the purpose of conduction of a formal investigation pursuant to a
charge of grave misconduct against her. De Castro filed a MTD alleging that she
reported to the Sec of DECS and not the City Legal Officer. City legal officer
denied her motion. CA and SC reversed, it is the sec of DECS that has power to
discipline.
DOCTRINE: The city legal officer of Manila has no disciplinary authority over the
chief of the Legal Affairs and Complaint Services of the Division of City Schools of
Manila. Inasmuch as the said official was appointed by and is a subordinate of
the regional director of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, she is
subject to the supervision and control of said director. The power to appoint
carries the power to remove or to discipline. The mere fact that her salary is
sourced from city funds does not ipso facto place her under the city legal
officer's disciplinary jurisdiction, absent any clear statutory basis therefor.
FACTS:
1.
Atty. De Castro is the Chief of the Legal Affairs and Complaint Services of
the Div. of City Schools of Manila. She received a letter from Aguirre, City Legal
Officer, with copies of alleged complaints against her. She was reqd to explain
w/in 72h upon receipt why no administrative sanctions shall be imposed upon

her for gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a public officer in violation
of the Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations. She filed her answer-affidavit wc
was found unsatisfactory by Aguirre for wc reason she was summoned to appear
before the said City Legal Officer for the purpose of conducting a formal
investigation.
2.
2 days later, De Castro filed an MTD. She claimed that she was a
subordinate of the DECS Secretary. Thus, the case should be endorsed to the
Office of the DECS Sec/its legal division as nowhere in RA 409, Charter of the City
of Manila is there a provision conferring upon the Office of the City Legal Officer
jurisdiction to try and investigate personnel of the DECS in general, or the Div. of
City Schools where De Castro is under.
3.
MTD denied based on Sec 455 b(1) and (V) LGC and Sec 3(c) of the same
code. De Castro was included in the plantilla of the City of Manila and therefore
her salary derived wholly and mainly from the funds of the City for wc reason
she was subj to the disciplinary authority of the Aguirre. De Castro filed MR wc
was denied.
4.
De Castro appealed to the CA wc ruled that, citing the Admin Code, the
authority to discipline De Castro rests with the regl director for NCR DECS, not
with the city legal officer of Manila and that the LGC did not repeal the pertinent
provisions of the Admin Code. Officers and staff members of the Div of City
Schools were not among those whom the city mayor was authorized to appoint
under the LGC. Hence, De Castro was not an employee of the City of Manila, and
that the city legal officer had no authority to investigate her for administrative
neglect or misconduct in office.
5.
Assuming arguendo that the city mayor was authorized to make a
subsequent appointment to De Castros position should it become vacant, the CA
held that this power was not retroactive and could not apply to her who had
been appointed by the regl director of the DECS.
ISSUE: WON the Office of the City Legal Officer of Manila has jurisdiction to
investigate the complaint for grave misconduct filed against De Castro NO
RULING: Petition dismissed.
RATIO:

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1.
Aguirre contend that De Castro is a city employee under the supervision of
the city mayor, because her salary is paid by the City based on Sec 455 (b-1-v)
LGC, which authorizes the city mayor to appoint city employees whose salaries
and wages are wholly/mainly paid out of city funds; and on Sec 455 (b-1-x), wc
states that the mayor may institute administrative/judicial proceedings against
erring city officials/employees.
2.
SC: Aguirre is not correct. Under Book IV, Chap V, Sec 7(4) Admin Code,
the power to appoint and discipline first-level employees, which include De
Castro, is specifically lodged with the regl director of DECS. This is also clear in
Book V, Sec 47 (2) of the same Code; and in Sec 32 , Rule XIV of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of the Admin Code.
3.
The LGC did not automatically repeal the provisions in the 1987 Admin
Code, contrary to petitioners argument. There is no provision in the LGC
expressly rescinding the authority of the DECS regl director to appoint and
exercise disciplinary authority over first-level employees. On the other hand,
implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and
unmistakable showing of such intention.
4.
Furthermore, De Castros position as senior legal officer in the Div. of City
Schools is not one of the offices covered by the city mayors power of
appointment (Sec 454) under the LGC .
5.
Moreover, petitioners failed to show a specific provision in the LGC
showing that the power to discipline officials in the Div of City Schools has been
devolved from the regl director of the DECS to the city mayor. All that Sec 17 (4)
LGC states is that the city must provide support for education and other such
services and facilities.
6.
Likewise, Sec 455 (b-1-x) LGC, which provides that the city mayor may
cause to be instituted admin/judicial proceedings against any official/employee
of the city, is not necessarily incompatible with the provisions of the Admin Code
authorizing the regl director to discipline natl education employees. Nothing
prohibits the mayor from filing complaints against De Castro before the DECS.
7.
Petitioners cite par 12, Sec 2 (a) of EO 503, which states that devolved
personnel are automatically reappointed by the local chief executive. Since De

Castro was deemed reappointed by the city mayor, it follows that the latter can
exercise disciplinary authority over her.
8.
SC: not convinced. First, the above provision applies to devolved
personnel, and there is no proof whatsoever that De Castro is 1 of them. Second,
even if De Castro can be considered as a devolved personnel, the cited par. of
EO 503 must not be read in isolation from but in conjunction w the other par. in
Sec 2 (a).
9.
Thus, par. 12 -- along with par. 5, 6, 8, 13 and 14 of EO 503 -- deals with
safeguards against termination, reduction of pay and diminution in rank of
existing personnel; it is not about the power of the mayor to discipline personnel
of the Div. of City Schools. In effect, the said provision serves more to limit the
appointing authority of the city mayor, whose acts must be circumscribed by the
aforecited conditions. It is not incompatible and can exist with aforecited
provisions of the Admin Code. Indeed, it cannot be deemed to have divested the
regl director of his disciplining power.
10.
As to petitioners argument that De Castros salary is wholly/mainly paid
out of city funds, suffice it to say that the source of the wages is not the only
criteria in determining whether the payor may be deemed the employer. In fact,
the most important factor is the control test.
11.
Absent any contrary statutory provision, the power to appoint carries with
it the power to remove/to discipline. Since De Castro was appointed by the
regional director of DECS, she may be disciplined or removed by the latter
pursuant to law.
12.
Finally, De Castros primary duty is to conduct investigations of cases
involving teaching and non-teaching personnel of the Div of City Schools of
Manila. The report on the results of her investigations is then submitted for final
evaluation to the DECS regl director, who may approve, disapprove or allow her
to modify it. This fact clearly shows that supervision over her is lodged with the
regl director, not the mayor.

5 CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. ENGR. DARANGINA

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FACTS:Engineer Darangina was a development management officer V in the
Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA). He was extended a temporary promotional
appointment as Director III, Plans and Policy Services. CSC approved the
temporary appointment. New OMA Executive Director terminated the
appointment, ground: Not Career Executive Service Eligible. CSC disapproved
the appointment of the replacement who was also not eligible, and granted that
the Darangina should be paid back wages until the expiration of his 1 yr
temporary appointment.CA reinstated Darangina.
ISSUE/S: Whether Darangina should be reinstated.
HELD: CA REVERSED. Petition GRANTED. No reinstatement & back wages,only
salary from appointment until termination. With the expiration of his term upon
his replacement, there is no longer any remaining term to be served.
Administrative Code of 1987 Book V Title I Subtitle A Chapter 5Section 27.
Employment Status. Appointment in the career service shall be permanent or
temporary. (1)Permanent Status. A permanent appointment shall be issued to a
person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being
appointed, including appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the
provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereof.
(2)Temporary Appointment. In the absence of eligible persons and it becomes
necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, a temp appointment shall be
issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is
being appointed except the appropriate civil service eligibility: Provided, that
such temporary appointment shall not exceed 12 mos., but the appointee may
be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available.
6 Sales vs Carreon
7 Salumbides vs Ombudsman
FACTS: Salumbides and Glenda were appointed as Municipal Legal
Officer/Administrator and Municipal Budget Officer, respectively, of Tagkawayan,
Quezon. On May 13, 2002, herein respondents Ricardo Agon, Ramon Villasanta,
Elmer Dizon, Salvador Adul and Agnes Fabian, all members of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Tagkawayan, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint
against Salumbides and Glenda (hereafter petitioners), the mayor, Coleta, Jason
and Aquino. The administrative aspect of the case charged petitioners et al. with
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Conduct Prejudicial to the

Best Interest of the Service, and violation of the Commission on Audit (COA)
Rules and the Local Government Code. The Office of the Ombudsman denied the
prayer to place petitioners et al. under preventive suspension pending
investigation. By Order dated February 1, 2005, approved on April 11, 2005, it
denied the motion for reconsideration but dropped the mayor and Coleta, both
elective officials, as respondents in the administrative case, the 2004 elections
having mooted the case. The Office of the Ombudsman approved the September
9, 2005 Memorandum absolving Jason and Aquino, and finding petitioners guilty
of Simple Neglect of Duty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of condonation is applicable in this case.
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is affirmed.
POLITICAL LAW: doctrine of condonation
The reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The
Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term
of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect
their officers. When the people elected a man to office, it must be assumed that
they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded
or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any.It is not for the
court, by reason of such faults or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of
the people. Contrary to petitioners asseveration, the non-application of the
condonation doctrine to appointive officials does not violate the right to equal
protection of the law. The electorates condonation of the previous administrative
infractions of the reelected official cannot be extended to that of the reappointed
coterminous employees, the underlying basis of the rule being to uphold the will
of the people expressed through the ballot. In other words, there is neither
subversion of the sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of the electorate to
speak of, in the case of reappointed coterminous employees. It is the will of the
populace, not the whim of one person who happens to be the appointing
authority, that could extinguish an administrative liability. Since petitioners hold
appointive positions, they cannot claim the mandate of the electorate. The
people cannot be charged with the presumption of full knowledge of the life and
character of each and every probable appointee of the elective official ahead of
the latters actual reelection.

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Moreover, as correctly observed by respondents, the lack of conspiracy cannot
be appreciated in favor of petitioners who were found guilty of simple neglect of
duty, for if they conspired to act negligently, their infraction becomes
intentional. There can hardly be conspiracy to commit negligence. Petitioners fell
short of the reasonable diligence required of them, for failing to exercise due
care and prudence in ascertaining the legal requirements and fiscal soundness of
the projects before stamping their imprimatur and giving their advice to their
superior.
The appellate court correctly ruled that as municipal legal officer, petitioner
Salumbides failed to uphold the law and provide a sound legal assistance and
support to the mayor in carrying out the delivery of basic services and provisions
of adequate facilities when he advised the mayor to proceed with the
construction of the subject projects without prior competitive bidding. As pointed
out by the Office of the Solicitor General, to absolve Salumbides is tantamount to
allowing with impunity the giving of erroneous or illegal advice, when by law he
is precisely tasked to advise the mayor on matters related to upholding the rule
of law. Indeed, a legal officer who renders a legal opinion on a course of action
without any legal basis becomes no different from a lay person who may
approve the same because it appears justified.
As regards petitioner Glenda, the appellate court held that the improper use of
government funds upon the direction of the mayor and prior advice by the
municipal legal officer did not relieve her of liability for willingly cooperating
rather than registering her written objection as municipal budget officer. Aside
from the lack of competitive bidding, the appellate court, pointing to the
improper itemization of the expense, held that the funding for the projects
should have been taken from the capital outlays that refer to the appropriations
for the purchase of goods and services, the benefits of which extend beyond the
fiscal year and which add to the assets of the local government unit. It added
that current operating expenditures like MOOE/RMF refer to appropriations for
the purchase of goods and services for the conduct of normal local government
operations within the fiscal year. DENIED.
8 Quinto V. COMELEC
COMELEC issued a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their
certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions.

FACTS: Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution
declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto
resigned from their positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only
copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.
HELD: NO. In the Farias case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006
repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to
elective officials in comparison with appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court
upheld the substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced that there
was no violation of the equal protection clause.
However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on the equal
protection clause was an obiter dictum since the issue raised therein was against
the repealing clause. It didnt squarely challenge Sec. 66.
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials.
Applying the 4 requisites of a valid classification, the proviso does not comply
with the second requirement that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a
governmental position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous
or coercive influence of the electorate. The measure is further aimed at
promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by
eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by
political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is
also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electorate
arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the
performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather
than to their office work.
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without
distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not.
Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered as ipso facto
resigned once he files his certificate of candidacy for the election. This scenario

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is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the
government to wield influence in the political world.

an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the


Constitution.

The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices, whether they
be partisan or non partisan in character, whether they be in the national,
municipal or brgy. level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to
restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale.

He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid


repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the local elections, he
automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States
of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between him
and the US. If he really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could do so
in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation.

QUALIFICATIONS
9 Labo vs Comelec 1989 Loss of Citizenship
FACTS: Herein petitioner, claiming for recognition as a Philippine citizen is a
mayor-elect who, through his marriage with an Australian national, was
naturalized and took an oath of allegiance as an Australian citizen. Said marriage
was found to be bigamous and therefore was annulled. Petitioner claims that his
naturalization made him only a dual national and did not divest him of his
Philippine citizenship.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was divested of his Philippine citizenship.
HELD: Yes, because Commonwealth Act No. 63 clearly stated that Philippine
citizenship may be lost through naturalization in a foreign country; express
renunciation of citizenship; and by oath of allegiance to a foreign country, all of
which are applicable to the petitioner.
10 FRIVALDO VS COMELEC [Naturalization; Reacquisition]
FACTS: Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and
assumed office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC
a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino
citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative
defenses that he was naturalized as American citizen only to protect himself
against President Marcos during the Martial Law era.
ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.
RULING: No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified
voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being

11 MERCADO VS MANZANO
FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates
for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of
votes. However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for
disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen
of the Philippines but of the United States.

From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US
citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for
said elective position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the
disqualification of the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to have
renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority and
registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August
31, 1998. Thus the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office
in the philippines.

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RULING: The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40
(d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance.
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a
result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the
other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some
positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the
Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be
subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear
allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby
terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of
the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced
his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he
renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares
that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition
imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such
renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization
Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The
latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the
Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and
application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed
to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification
he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that
he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of

another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the
Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this
country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and
anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines,
when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood,
received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in
past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking
made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for
declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the denial of entry
into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a
naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and
declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese
national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing
Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does
some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. The petition for
certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
12 TORAYNO VS COMELEC
Facts: Vicente Emano was provincial governor of Misamis Oriental for three terms
until 1995 election and his certificate of candidacy showed that his residence
was in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental. On 14 June 1997, while still governor he
executed a voter registration record in Cagayan de Oro City which is
geographically located in Misamis Oriental, claiming 20 years of residence. He
filed candidacy for mayor in the said city and stated that his residence for the
preceding two years and five months was in the same city. Rogelio Torayno Sr
filed petition for disqualification of Emano fo failing to meet the residency
requirement. Emano won the mayoral post and proclaimed winner. Torayno filed
for annulment of election of Emano. COMELEC upheld its decision.
Issue: Whether or not Emano failed the constitutional residency requirement?

9
Decision: Petition dismissed, COMELEC resolution affirmed. Emano was the
overwhelming choice of the people of Cagayan de Oro. The court find it apt to
reiterate the principle that the manifest will of the people as expressed through
the ballot be given the fullest effect. Emano was actually and physically residing
in CDO while discharging his duties as governor and even paid his community
tax certificate in the same. The residency requirement intends to prevent the
possibility of a stranger unacquainted with the conditions and needs of the
community from seeing an elective office to serve that community.
13 Hayudini vs Comelec

The COMELEC en banc declared him to have been validly disqualified as


candidate and, consequently, set aside his proclamation as municipal mayor.
Hence the petition in G.R. No. 120905, which was filed on July 20, 1995, alleging
grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC on the ground that the decision in the
administrative case against petitioner Reyes was not yet final and executory and
therefore could not be used as basis for his disqualification. Invoking the ruling in
the case of Aguinaldo v. Santos, petitioner argues that his election on May 8,
1995 is a bar to his disqualification.

DISQUALIFICATION 40
14 Reyes vs COMELEC
FACTS:

Dr. Manalo filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan an administrative complaint


against incumbent Mayor Reyes of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. It was alleged
that Reyes exacted and collected P50,000,00 from each market stall holder in
the Bongabong Public Market. Also, that certain checks issued to him by the
National Reconciliation and Development Program of the DILG were never
received by the Municipal Treasurer nor reflected in the books of accounts of the
same officer; and that he took 27 heads of cattle from beneficiaries of a cattle
dispersal program. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan found petitioner guilty of the
charges and ordered his removal from office.
Reyes filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the RTC of
Oriental Mindoro. Later, the Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
issued an order for Reyes to vacate the position of mayor and to turn over the
office to the incumbent vice mayor but he refused to accept the service of the
order.
Thereafter, Reyes filed a certificate of candidacy with the Comelec but a petition
for disqualification was filed against him. Thus, the Comelec canceled Reyess
certificate of candidacy. However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Bongabong unaware of the disqualification of Reyes by the Comelec, proclaimed
him the duly-elected mayor.

Garcia, who obtained the highest number of votes next to Reyes, intervened,
contending that because Reyes was disqualified, he was entitled to be
proclaimed mayor. The Comelec en banc denied Garcias prayer.

ISSUES:
1. WON the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is not yet final because he
has not been served a copy thereof.
2. WON petitioners reelection rendered the administrative charges against him
moot and academic
3. WON the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not
be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified.
HELD: 1. No. The failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to deliver a copy of its
decision was due to the refusal of petitioner and his counsel to receive the
decision. Repeated attempts had been made to serve the decision on Reyes
personally and by registered mail, but Reyes refused to receive the decision. If a
judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for reasons attributable to him,
service is deemed completed and the judgment or decision will be considered
validly served as long as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver it to him
would be valid were it not for his or his counsel's refusal to receive it. Reyess

10
refusal to receive the decision may, therefore, be construed as a waiver on his
part to have a copy of the decision.

Petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision. Rather than resist the
service, he should have received the decision and taken an appeal to the Office
of the President in accordance with R.A. No. 7160 Section 67. But petitioner did
not do so. Accordingly, the decision became final 30 days after the first service
upon petitioner. Thus, when the elections were held the decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan had already become final and executory. The filing of
a petition for certiorari with the RTC did not prevent the administrative decision
from attaining finality. An original action of certiorari is an independent action
and does not interrupt the course of the principal action nor the running of the
reglementary period involved in the proceeding.

Consequently, to arrest the course of the principal action during the pendency of
the certiorari proceedings, there must be a restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction from the appellate court directed to the lower court. In
the case at bar, although a temporary restraining order was issued by the
Regional Trial Court, no preliminary injunction was subsequently issued. The
temporary restraining order issued expired after 20 days. From that moment on,
there was no more legal barrier to the service of the decision upon petitioner.
2. No. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC, in which it was
held that a public official could not be removed for misconduct committed during
a prior term and that his reelection operated as a condonation of the officers
previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.
But that was because in that case, before the petition questioning the validity of
the administrative decision removing petitioner could be decided, the term of
office during which the alleged misconduct was committed expired. Removal
cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was
committed. If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he
can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected for another term. This is
the rationale for the ruling in the two Aguinaldo cases.

The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Here, although petitioner
Reyes brought an action to question the decision in the administrative case, the
temporary restraining order issued in the action he brought lapsed, with the
result that the decision was served on petitioner and it thereafter became final
on April 3, 1995, because petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the
President. He was thus validly removed from office and, pursuant to 40 (b) of
the Local Government Code, he was disqualified from running for reelection.
It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided there was no
provision similar to 40 (b) which disqualifies any person from running for any
elective position on the ground that he has been removed as a result of an
administrative case. The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) could
not be given retroactive effect.
Indeed, it appears that petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to file his
answer. He failed to do so. Nonetheless, he was told that the complainant
would be presenting his evidence and that he (petitioner) would then have the
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. But on the date set, he failed to
appear. He would say later that this was because he had filed a motion for
postponement and was awaiting a ruling thereon. This only betrays the pattern
of delay he employed to render the case against him moot by his election.
3. The candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be
proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. To simplistically
assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to
substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that,
a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority
or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified
candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the
conditions would have substantially changed.
We are not prepared to
extrapolate the results under the circumstances. The votes cast for Reyes are
presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes was qualified and for that
reason cannot be treated as stray, void, or meaningless. The subsequent finding
that he is disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the elections so as to
invalidate the votes cast for him.
Rule 13, 3 and 7 of the Rules of Court provide for the service of final orders
and judgments either personally or by mail. Personal service is completed upon
actual or constructive delivery, which may be made by delivering a copy

11
personally to the party or his attorney, or by leaving it in his office with a person
having charge thereof, or at his residence, if his office is not known. Hence
service was completed when the decision was served upon petitioners counsel
in his office in Manila on March 3, 1995.
In addition, as the secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan certified, service
by registered mail was also made on petitioner Reyes. Although the mail
containing the decision was not claimed by him, service was deemed completed
five days after the last notice to him on March 27, 1995.
If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for reasons attributable to
him, service is deemed completed and the judgment or decision will be
considered validly served as long as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver
it to him would be valid were it not for his or his counsels refusal to receive it.
Indeed that petitioners counsel knew that a decision in the administrative case
had been rendered is evident in his effort to bargain with the counsel for the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan not to have the decision served upon him and his
client while their petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court was pending.
His refusal to receive the decision may, therefore, be construed as a waiver on
his part to have a copy of the decision.
The purpose of the rules on service is to make sure that the party being served
with the pleading, order or judgment is duly informed of the same so that he can
take steps to protect his interests, i.e., enable a party to file an appeal or apply
for other appropriate reliefs before the decision becomes final.
In practice, service means the delivery or communication of a pleading, notice or
other papers in a case to the opposite party so as to charge him with receipt of
it, and subject him to its legal effect.

In the case at bar, petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision.
Prudence required that, rather than resist the service, he should have received
the decision and taken an appeal to the Office of the President in accordance
with R.A. No. 7160, 67. But petitioner did not do so. Accordingly, the decision
became final on April 2, 1995, 30 days after the first service upon petitioner.
15 Rodriguez vs COMELEC

Facts: In 1992, petitioner Rodriguez and respondent Marquez ran for Governor
of Quezon Province. Rodriguez won. Marquez challenged Rodriguez victory via a
Quo Warranto on the ground that there is a charge pending against him at the
Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft, etc.
Thus, he is a fugitive from justice.
COMELEC dismissed the case. Upon certiorari to the Supreme Court, it was
held that: Fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment, but also those who after being charged, flee
to avoid prosecution. The case was remanded to the COMELEC to determine
WON Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice.
In 1995, Rodriguez and Marquez again ran for Governor. Marquez filed a Petition
for Disqualification against Rodriquez on the same ground that he is a fugitive
from justice. COMELEC then consolidated both cases and found Rodriguez guilty
based on the authenticated copy of the warrant of arrest at LA Court and of the
felony complaint.
Rodriguez won again, and despite a Motion to suspend his proclamation, the
Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed him.
Upon motion of Marquez, the COMELEC nullified the proclamation. Rodriguez
filed a petition for certiorari.
Issue: Is Rodriguez a fugitive from justice as defined by the Court in the
MARQUEZ Decision?
Held: No. A fugitive from justice is defined as not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee to
avoid prosecution. This indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling
factor that makes a person leave a particular jurisdiction, and there can only be
intent to evade prosecution or punishment when the fleeing person knows of an
already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction. Intent
to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that
there has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed,
at the time of flight. This cannot be applied in the case of Rodriguez. Rodriguez
arrived in the Philippines on June 25, 1985, five months before the filing of the
felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the
issuance of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court. It was clearly

12
impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest
warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest
warrant much less conviction to speak of yet at such time.
Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be
denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial post. (G.R. No. 120099. July 24, 1996)
16 Salalima vs Guingona
FACTS: This Supreme Court case involves four administrative complaints filed
against Albay Governor Salalima and the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Albay. The complaints seek to hold the petitioners liable for a)
wanton disregard of law amounting to abuse of authority in OP case 5470; b)
grave abuse of authority under Section 60 (e) of the Local Government Code in
OP cae 5649; c) oppression and abuse of authority under Section 60 (c) and (e)
of the Local Government Code in OP case 5471 and d) abuse of authority and
negligence in OP case 5450. Relevant to our discussion on whether or not LGUs
can hire private lawyers in cases filed against it is OP case 5469.
The Province of Albay imposed real property tax against the National
Power Corporation. The latter, claiming that it is tax exempt, refused to pay the
said tax liability. Due to its refusal to pay, the Province of Albay took over the
properties of NPC and sold them in an auction sale. The Province was the sole
bidder. Upon the failure of NPC to redeem the property, the Province sought the
issuance of a writ of possession from the Regional Trial Court. The NPC
challenged this in a petition filed with the Supreme Court. The Province, through
its legal office Atty. Ricaforte, filed its comment on the said petition on May 17,
1989.
On June 2, 1989, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued Resolution No.
129-89, authorizing Salalima to engage the services of a Manila-based law firm
to handle the case. As such, on August 25, 1989, Atty. Jesus Carnago entered his
appearance with the SC as a collaborating counsel. On November 14, 1989,
Atty. Antonio Jose Cortes of Cortes and Reyna Law Firm sent a letter to Salalima,
informing him that Atty. Carnago had filed a memorandum in the SC. He then
proposed that his law firm and that of Atty. Carnago enter into a retainer
agreement with the Province in connection with the case. He charged 50, 000 as
acceptance fee and a contingency fee of 18%. In response to this, the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan passed Resolution No. 01-90 authorizing Salalima to


sign a retainer contract with Cortes and Reyna Law Firm.
On June 4, 1990, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Province. The
latter then paid the lawyers amounting to around 7 million. However, on May 31,
1993, the Provincial Auditor informed the Province that COA had disallowed the
payments for lack of prior written conformity of the Solicitor General and a
written concurrence of COA. An administrative complaint was later on filed
against the petitioners with the Office of the President.
The OP found that the petitioners incurred administrative liability in hiring
private lawyers to defend it in the NPC case.
OPs RATIO
1.
Section 481 of the LGC states that the legal officer of the province has the
duty to represent the LGU in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein the
LGU or any official thereof, in his official capacity, is a party.
2.
In the case Municipality of Bocaue v. Manotok, the Supreme Court ruled
that the LGU cannot be represented by private lawyers and it is solely the
Provincial legal officer or provincial fiscal who can represent it. A private lawyer
has no standing in such a case.
3.
Sec. 481 and Municipality of Bocaue v. Manotok are applicable in this
case. In hiring the private lawyers, the petitioners violated the LGC and the
doctrine laid down by the Supreme court.
4.

Moreover, the transaction was also full of irregularities.

a.
The disbursement of 7M as payment was disallowed by COA for failure to
comply with the prerequisite conformity from the SolGen and the COA.
b.
Resolution 01-90 authorized Salalima to contract with Cortes and Reyna
Law Firm and NOT with Atty. Carnago. Salalima exceeded the authority given to
him in doing so.
c.
Only Atty. Carnago appeared as counsel in the NPC case. It appears that
Cortes and Reyna did not render any form of legal service in relation thereto.

13
d.
The provincial legal officer had already filed a comment in the SC. What
Carnago filed was merely a memorandum. The total attorneys fees of 38 Million
is clearly unconscionable.

Because of these findings, the OP imposed the penalty of suspension for 6


months against Gov. Salalima and Vice governor Azana, while the members of
the SP were suspended for 4 months. The petitioners appealed the case to the
SC. In the meantime, the 1992 elections took place wherein the petitioners were
reelected.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners incurred administrative liabilities in hiring private
lawyers to represent the Province
HELD: Whether or not they incurred liabilities, they can no longer be held to
answer for these in view of the fact that they have already been reelected. Their
reelection operates as condonation of any misconduct committed in their prior
term.
RATIO
In Pascual v. Pascual, the SC ruled that offenses committed or acts done in a
previous term are generally held not to furnish a cause for removal in the current
term of office. This is because each term is separate from other terms and that
the reelection operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to
the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefore. Such a rule is
founded on the theory that an officials reelection expresses the sovereign will of
the electorate to forgive or condone any act or omission constituting a ground
for administrative discipline which was committed during the previous term.
Also, sound policy dictates such a rule. A contrary rule would open the
floodgates to exacerbating endless partisan contests between reelected officials
and their political enemies who may not stop to hound the former during his new
term with administrative cases for acts alleged to have been committed during
his previous term.
RULING: OP Decision imposing penalties is reversed and set aside.
17 Conducto vs Monzon

Facts: Respondent judge was charged with gross ignorance of the law. He
refused to suspend the mayor due to criminal charges against the latter for the
crime of unlawful appointment. The judge opined that an official cannot be
suspended for something that has happened in a previous term. Settled
jurisprudence says this only applies to administrative, not criminal cases.
Held: Fined for P5000. While judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on
account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, it is imperative that
they be conversant with basic legal principles. A judge is called upon to exhibit
more than just cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules; it is
imperative that he be conversant with the basic legal principles and aware of
well-settled and authoritative doctrines. Also, if he did the act deliberately, he
violated Canon 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics directs a judge to administer
his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself,
remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under
the sanction of law. An RTC judge cannot overturn a settled doctrine laid down
by the Supreme Court, otherwise, litigation would be endless.
Facts: On 30 August 1993, complainant filed a complaint with the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of San Pablo City against Maghirang, the barangay chairman of
Barangay III-E of San Pablo City, for abuse of authority, serious irregularity and
violation of law in that, among other things, Maghirang appointed his sister-inlaw, Florian, to the position of barangay secretary on 17 May 1989 in violation of
Section 394 of the LGC. At the same time, complainant filed a complaint for
violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code with the Office of the City
Prosecutor against Maghirang, which was, however, dismissed on 30 September
1993 on the ground that Maghirangs sister-in-law was appointed before the
effectivity of the LGC of 1991, which prohibits a punong barangay from
appointing a relative within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity as
barangay secretary. The order of dismissal was submitted to the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. On 22 October 1993, complainant obtained
Opinion No. 246, s. 1993 from Director Jacob Montesa of the Department of
Interior and Local Government, which declared that the appointment issued by
Maghirang to his sister-in-law violated paragraph (2), Section 95 of B.P. Blg. 337,
the LGC prior to the LGC of 1991. In its Revised Resolution of 29 November 1993,
[4] the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon dismissed the case, but
ordered Maghirang to replace his sister-in-law as barangay secretary. On 20
December 1993, complainant moved that the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman

14
for Luzon reconsider the order of 29 November 1993, in light of Opinion No. 246,
s. 1993 of Director Montesa. Acting on the motion, Francisco Samala, Graft
Investigation Officer II of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, issued
an order[6] on 8 February 1994 granting the motion for reconsideration and
recommending the filing of an information for unlawful appointment (Article 244
of the Revised Penal Code) against Maghirang. The recommendation was duly
approved by Manuel C. Domingo, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. In a 3rd
indorsement dated 4 March 1994,[7] the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
transmitted the record of the case to the Office of the City Prosecutor of San
Pablo City and instructed the latter to file the corresponding information against
Maghirang with the proper court and to prosecute the case. In his Order of 30
June 1995,[9] respondent judge denied the motion for suspension on the ground
that: [T]he alleged offense of UNLAWFUL APPOINTMENT under Article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code was committed on May 17, 1989, during [Maghirangs]
terms (sic) of office from 1989 to 1994 and said accused was again re-elected as
Barangay Chairman during the last Barangay Election of May 9, 1994, hence,
offenses committed during previous term is (sic) not a cause for removal (Lizarez
vs. Hechanova, et al., G.R. No. L-22059, May 17, 1965); an order of suspension
from office relating to a given term may not be the basis of contempt with
respect to ones (sic) assumption of the same office under a new term (Oliveros
vs. Villaluz, G.R. No. L-34636, May 30, 1971) and, the Court should never remove
a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise
would deprieve (sic) the people of their right to elect their officer. When the
people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with
knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his
fault or misconduct (sic), if he had been guilty if any. MR denied. Complainant
then moved that respondent inhibit himself from Criminal Case No. 26240. In his
order of 21 September 1995,[13] respondent voluntarily inhibited himself. The
case was assigned to Judge Adelardo S. Escoses per order of Executive Judge
Bienvenido V. Reyes of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City. On 15 October
1996, complainant filed his sworn letter-complaint with the Office of the Court
Administrator. In his comment dated 14 February 1997, filed in compliance with
the resolution of this Court of 27 January 1997, respondent asserted that he had
been continuously keeping abreast of legal and jurisprudential development
[sic] in the law since he passed the 1955 Bar Examinations; and that he issued
the two challenged orders only after due appreciation of prevailing
jurisprudence on the matter, citing authorities in support thereof.

Issues: 1. WON a criminal offense for violation of Republic Act 3019 committed
by an elective officer during one term may be the basis of his suspension in a
subsequent term in the event of his reelection to office.

Luciano vs. Provincial Governor: the cases of Pascual and Lizares are
authority for the precept that "a reelected public officer is no longer amenable to
administrative sanctions for acts committed during his former tenure" but that
as to criminal prosecutions, particularly, for violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, as in the case at bar, the same are not barred by
reelection of the public officer, since, inter alia, one of the penalties attached to
the offense is perpetual disqualification from public office and it "is patently
offensive to the objectives and the letter of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice
Act . . . that an official may amass wealth thru graft and corrupt practices and
thereafter use the same to purchase reelection and thereby launder his evil
acts."

Punishment for a crime is a vindication for an offense against the State


and the body politic. The small segment of the national electorate that
constitutes the electorate of the municipality of Antipolo has no power to
condone a crime against the public justice of the State and the entire body
politic. Reelection to public office is not provided for in Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code as a mode of extinguishing criminal liability incurred by a public
officer prior to his reelection. On the contrary, Article 9 of the Anti-Graft Act
imposes as one of the penalties in case of conviction perpetual disqualification
from public office and Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code declares that such
penalty of perpetual disqualification entails "the deprivation of the public offices
and employments which the offender may have held, even if conferred by
popular election."

It is manifest then, that such condonation of an officer's fault or


misconduct during a previous expired term by virtue of his reelection to office for
a new term can be deemed to apply only to his administrative and not to his
criminal guilt. As succinctly stated in then Solicitor General (now Associate
Justice) Felix Q. Antonio's memorandum for the State, "to hold that petitioner's
reelection erased his criminal liability would in effect transfer the determination
of the criminal culpability of an erring official from the court to which it was
lodged by law into the changing and transient whim and caprice of the
electorate. This cannot be so, for while his constituents may condone the

15
misdeed of a corrupt official by returning him back to office, a criminal action
initiated against the latter can only be heard and tried by a court of justice, his
nefarious act having been committed against the very State whose laws he had
sworn to faithfully obey and uphold. A contrary rule would erode the very
system upon which our government is based, which is one of laws and not of
men."

He says, as in Baclayon v Mutia, the imposition of the sentence, as well as


the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended

Aguinaldo v. Santos: a public official cannot be removed from


administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to
office operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule,
however, finds no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for
acts he may have committed during the failed coup.

That the order of the trial court date December 18m 2000 terminated his
probation and restored to him all the civil rights he lost as a result of his
conviction including the right to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002
elections.

Thus far, no ruling to the contrary has even rippled the doctrine
enunciated in the above-mentioned cases.
If respondent has truly been
continuously keeping abreast of legal and jurisprudential development [sic] in
the law, it was impossible for him to have missed or misread these cases. What
detracts from his claim of assiduity is the fact that he even cited the cases of
Oliveros v. Villaluz and Aguinaldo v. Santos in support of his 30 June 1995 order.
What is then evident is that respondent either did not thoroughly read these
cases or that he simply miscomprehended them. The latter, of course, would
only manifest either incompetence, since both cases were written in plain and
simple language thereby foreclosing any possibility of misunderstanding or
confusion; or deliberate disregard of a long settled doctrine pronounced by this
Court.

After due
proceedings, the investigating officer recommended that
Moreno be disqualified;

18 Moreno vs COMELEC
1.
Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong
Barangay;

Ground: Moreno was convicted by final judgment of Arbitrary Detention


and was sentence to 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months
imprisonment;
2.
Morenos answer: petition states no cause of action because he was
already granted probation;

That under Section16 of the Probation Law of 1976, the final discharge of
the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a
result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed;

3.
The case was forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor
of Samar;

The recommendation was adopted by the COMELEC First Division;

4.

On MFR, the COMELEC en banc affirmed;

According to it, section 40(a) of the LGC provides that those sentenced by
final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence, are disqualified from running for any elective local position;

Since Moreno was released from probation on December 20, 2000,


disqualification shall commence on this date and end 2 years thence;

The grant of probation merely suspended the execution of his sentence


but did not affect his disqualification from running for an elective local office.

Also, provision of LGC take precedence over Baclayon v Mutica and the
Probation Law because it is a later enactment and a special law setting forth the
qualifications and disqualifications of elective officials;
Morenos contentions:
1.
Disqualification under LGC applies only to those who have served their
sentence and not to probationers because the latter do not serve the adjudged
sentence;

16
2.
Probation Law should be read as an exception to LGC because it is a
special law which applies to probationers;

o
The placing of the comma (,) in the provision means that the phrase
modifies both parts of Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code;

3.
Assuming he is disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong Barangay
constitutes as an implied pardon of his previous misconduct.

o
Courts declaration on the effect of probation there should be considered
obiter; Dela Torre was not even entitled to probation because he appealed his
conviction; the perfection of an appeal is a relinquishment of the alternative
remedy of availing of the Probation Law (the purpose of which is to prevent
speculation or opportunism on the part of the accused);

W/N Moreno should be disqualified. No.

Held and Ratio:

3.

1.

In general and common sense means confinement of a convicted person


in a penal facility for the period adjudged by the court;

No need to rule on whether Arbitrary Detention involves moral turpitude;

Court says this was never raised in petition for disqualification because
what Mejes relied upon and what COMELEC used in its resolution is Morenos
alleged disqualification from running for a local elective office within two (2)
years from his discharge from probation after having been convicted by final
judgment;

Also, its determination is not decisive since the crucial issue being
whether Morenos sentence was in fact served;

2.

Interpretation of within 2 years after serving sentence;

Section 40 cited;

Dela Torre v Comelec (as argued by OSG) not squarely applicable

o
the grant of probation does not affect the disqualification under Sec. 40(a)
of the Local Government Code was based primarily on the finding that the crime
of fencing of which petitioner was convicted involves moral turpitude, a
circumstance which does not obtain in this case
o
the phrase within two (2) years after serving sentence should have been
interpreted and understood to apply both to those who have been sentenced by
final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude and to those who have
been sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment

Meaning of service of sentence

COMELEC allegedly broadened the coverage of the law to include even


those who did not serve a day of their sentence because they were granted
probation; SC seeks to address this;

In Baclayon v Mutia the, the Court said that an order placing the
defendant on probation is not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of
the imposition of sentence; that it suspended the imposition of the principal
penalty of imprisonment as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from
public office and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage;

At case: the accessory penalties of suspension from public office, from the
right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prisioncorreccional in its minimum period
imposed upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.

during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified


from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension
from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation; During the
period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon
him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions
prescribed in the probation order;

The fact that the trial court already issued an order finally discharging
Moreno fortifies his position; Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that [t]he

17
final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights
lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability
for any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was granted; thus
when Moreno was discharged upon finding that he fulfilled the terms and
conditions of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all civil rights
lost or suspended were restored to him;
4.
Assuming there is ambiguity in Section 40(a) of LGC, conclusion remains
the same;

Deliberations on LGC afford no clue as to meaning of the phrase service


of sentence, i.e., whether the legislature also meant to disqualify those who
have been granted probation;

But the Courts function is to interpret and harmonized the Probation Law
and the LGC;

Probation is not a right but a mere privilege which is granted to a


deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty
imposed by law for the offense of which he was convicted; thus the Probation
Law lays out stringent standards regarding who are qualified;

It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the


Local Government Code covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, a penalty which also covers probationable offenses. In spite of
this, the provision does not specifically disqualify probationers from running for a
local elective office. This omission is significant because it offers a glimpse into
the legislative intent to treat probationers as a distinct class of offenders not
covered by the disqualification;

Also, LGC enacted in 1991, 7 years after Baclayon, legislature presumed


to have knowledge of the ruling there on the effect of probation on
disqualification from holding public office;
5.

Probation Law should be construed as an exception to LGC;

While the Local Government Code is a later law which sets forth the
qualifications and disqualifications of local elective officials, the Probation Law is
a special legislation which applies only to probationers.

StatCon: a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing a
prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such
earlier statute
6.

As for Morenos incumbency as Punong Barangay at time of his conviction:

He claims to have obtained a fresh mandate from the people in the July
15, 2002 elections;

SC cites Justice Panganibans (not CJ) words in Frivaldo v COMELEC: it


would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in
complex but little understood legalisms. GRANTED.
19 Jalosjos vs COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to
Australia and acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35,
he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother in Barangay Veterans
Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines and was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of
Philippine Citizenship. He then renounced his Australian citizenship in September
2009.
He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as
voter in the Municipality of Ipil. His application was opposed by the Barangay
Captain of Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was eventually granted by the
ERB.
A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by
Erasmo before the MCTC. Said petition was denied. It was then appealed to the
RTC who also affirmed the lower court's decision.
On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of
Zamboanga Sibugay Province. Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC
on the ground of failure to comply with R.A. 9225 and the one year residency
requirement of the local government code.
COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a
gubernatorial candidate and failed to show ample proof of a bona fide intention
to establish his domicile in Ipil. COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision.

18
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present
ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay.
RULING: The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position
of provincial governor to be a resident of the province for at least one year
before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of
residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only
intend to reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in
such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down
the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence
somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires
a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.
It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that
Jalosjos has met the residency requirement for provincial governor of
Zamboanga Sibugay.
Quezon City was Jalosjos domicile of origin, the place of
taken for granted that he effectively changed his domicile
Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight,
citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia
by operation of law and by choice.

his birth. It may be


from Quezon City to
acquired Australian
became his domicile

When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in
Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his
domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and
renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal
right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And
he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay
despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice

and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man
must have a domicile or residence somewhere.
The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil
since he has merely been staying at his brothers house. But this circumstance
alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held
that a candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his
residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live
there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To
insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a
qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two
things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.
Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village
where he lived and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He
showed correspondences with political leaders, including local and national
party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil
by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay.
While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies
like the COMELEC, this does not prevent it from exercising its review powers to
correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant
considerations. The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
in holding otherwise.
Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for
Zamboanga Sibugay. The Court will respect the decision of the people of that
province and resolve all doubts regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe
life to their manifest will.

Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC.
20 Maquiling vs COMELEC
Facts: 3 Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a
consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of
America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under

19
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in
San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the 4 Republic of the
Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his
Citizenship 5 Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor. On 3 April
2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states: On 30
November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua
(Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or
to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national 9 elections.
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by
the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the 10 nationality of
Arnado as "USA-American." To further bolster his claim of Arnados US
citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated 11 travel
record dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US
Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. On 30 April
2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued 13 an Order requiring the respondent
to personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt
thereof. After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him
in default and to present evidence exparte. Neither motion was acted upon,
having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest
number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for
Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. It was only after his proclamation that
Arnado filed his verified answer, THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION:
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate
of candidacy based on 15 misrepresentation, the COMELEC First Division
considered it as one for disqualification. The First Division disagreed with
Arnados claim that he is a 18 Filipino citizen. The Court ruled that Arnados act
of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03
April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation. Petitioner Casan
Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and
who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections,
intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for
Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnados Amended Motion for
Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly

disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local


Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that
the cancellation of Arnados candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation,
Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of

lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner. RULING OF THE COMELEC EN


BANC: ruled in favor of arnado Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning
the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his
continued use of a US passport, There are three questions posed by the parties
before this Court which will be addressed seriatim as the subsequent questions
hinge on the result of the first.
Issues: 1. whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case. 2.
whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship
amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made. 3. whether or not the rule on
succession in the Local Government Code is applicable to this case. SC: 1.
Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is proper when there
has not yet been any proclamation of the winner. 2. The use of foreign passport
after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of
representation as to ones nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino
citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation
required to qualify one to run for an elective position. Between 03 April 2009,
the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date
he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to
the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign
passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American,
Arnados category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is
acquired through a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from
those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to
take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy
already carries 39 with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. Dual
citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally
renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado
was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American

20
citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under
Section 40(d) of the Local 40 Government Code, he was not qualified to run for a
local electiv . 3. The rule on Succession under LGC is not applicable. Maquiling is
not a second-placer as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the
qualified candidates. Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio
45 v. Paredes which is the jurisprudential spring of the principle that a secondplacer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election contest. This doctrine
must be re-examined and its soundness once again put to the test to address
the ever-recurring issue that a secondplacer who loses to an ineligible candidate
cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the elections. The often-quoted phrase
in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an
ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of 47 the legally cast ballots." This
phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was
comparing "the e
decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or
irregularities in the elections x x x with that produced by declaring a person
ineligible to hold such an office." A proper reading of the case reveals that the
ruling therein is that since the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction to try
a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who obtained the
highest number of votes in the election, its jurisdiction being confined "to
determine which of the contestants has been duly elected" the judge exceeded
his jurisdiction when he "declared that no one had been legally elected president
of the municipality of Imus at the general election held in that town on 4 June
1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to
be elected and to hold the office of municipal president." The Court did not rule
that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer cannot be
proclaimed in his stead. An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number
of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he could not even have
been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or
any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed
upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to
hold himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate.
However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a
candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his
qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office.

The number of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify
with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public office. The
will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the
candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the
deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring 51 and
renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. (Emphasis supplied) It is
imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot
by ensuring that its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign
voice spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory provisions
on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or
republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only
the electorates voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it
precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.1wphi1
With Arnados disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the
election as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified
candidates. We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. 54 55 COMELEC and
Jalosjos v. COMELEC that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect. Thus, the
votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in
determining the winner of an election. Even when the votes for the ineligible
candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and even
more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the
sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of
eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be
respected.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. 56 COMELEC that when the
voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidates
disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible
candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected.
That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting
qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones. The electorates
awareness of the candidates disqualification is not a prerequisite for the
disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying
circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a
candidates disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who

21
placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The
second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified
candidates. That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has
assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a
substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy
voids not only the COC but also the proclamation. The disqualifying circumstance
surrounding Arnados candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the
commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section
68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the
individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from
holding the office. The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his
citizenship. With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his
certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. It could not
have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible
to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to
the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already
proclaimed the winner. Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the
elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is
declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections. Arnado being a
non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This
leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will
not apply.

good reason to warrant execution pendingappeal HELD:A motion for executing


pending appeal on ground of term expiration is not goodreason for
issuance.Sec. 2, Rule 39 Rules of Court: court while it has jurisdiction and
possession of original record in its discretion, order execution of judgment or
final order even before expiration of the period to appeal
Exercise of discretion requires that it is based on good reasons(combination
of 2 or more will suffice):1.PUBLIC INTEREST INVOLVED OR WILL
OFELECTORATE2.SHORTNESS of remaining portion of term of contested
office3.LENGTH OF TIME that election contest has been PENDING
Shortness of remaining term- not good reason for execution of judgment
pending appealRA 8524: extended term of office of Brgy. officials to 5years
(negates claim of FERMO
Upon nullification of writ of execution pending appeal, decision of FERMOs
proclamation as winner was stayedstatus quo (last actual peaceful
uncontested situation preceding the controversy) restored
LAXINA: entitled to discharge functions
22 Calingin vs CA
The antecedent facts, as summarized by the Court of Appeals and borne by the
records, are as follows:

FERMO- filed election protest question results in 4 clustered precincts


onground of massive fraud and serious irregularities.

The Office of the President issued a Resolution[3] dated March 22, 2001 in OP
Case No. 00-1-9220 (DILG ADM. Case No. P-16-99) entitled Vice Governor Danilo
P. Lagbas, et al. versus Governor Antonio P. Calingin (Misamis Oriental)
suspending Gov. Calingin for 90 days. On April 30, 2001, Undersecretary Eduardo
R. Soliman of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), by
authority of Secretary Jose D. Lina, Jr., issued a Memorandum[4] implementing
the said Resolution of the Office of the President. On May 3, 2001, Gov. Calingin
filed before the Office of the President a Motion for Reconsideration.[5]

MTC: ruled FERMO won the contested post (in 1999) and granted amotion for
execution pending appeal. COMELEC reversed on ground thatthe possibility that
the term of contested seat might expire by the timeappeal is decidednot a

The DILG Memorandum bore the authority of the Commission on Elections


(COMELEC) which granted an exemption to the election ban in the movement of

EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL


21 Fermo vs Comelec
FACTS: LAXINA and FERMO- candidates for the position of Punong Brgy. inQC.
(1997 elections) LAXINA was proclaimed winner

22
any public officer in its Resolution No. 3992[6] promulgated on April 24, 2001.
This was in pursuance to COMELEC Resolution No. 3401 which provides in part
that

days from the receipt thereof and that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration
shall suspend the running of the said period[8] in accordance with Section 15,[9]
Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.

Section 1. Prohibited Acts (a) During the election period from January 2, 2001
until July 13, 2001, no public official shall make or cause any transfer/detail
whatsoever of any officer or employee in the civil service, including public school
teachers, or suspend elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay official,
except upon prior written approval of the Commission.

Petitioner further contends that Section 67,[10] Chapter 4 of the Local


Government Code (Rep. Act 7160), which provides that decisions of the Office of
the President shall be final and executory, applies only to decisions of the Office
of the President on administrative cases appealed from the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod of highly-urbanized cities and
independent component cities, and sangguniang bayan of municipalities within
the Metro Manila Area. It does not cover decisions on cases where the Office of
the President has original jurisdiction such as those involving a Provincial
Governor.[11]

On May 7, 2001, Gov. Calingin filed a petition for prohibition before the Court of
Appeals to prevent the DILG from executing the assailed suspension order.
However, on May 11, 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the said petition and
by resolution issued on July 1, 2002, denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal by certiorari where petitioner asserts that the Court of
Appeals erred in
FINDING THAT THE EXECUTION OF THE SUSPENSION ORDER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DURING THE ELECTION
PERIOD IS WITH AUTHORITY FROM THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS.
FINDING THAT THE DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IS FINAL AND
EXECUTORY AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 67, CHAPTER 4, OF REPUBLIC ACT 7160,
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991.[7]

In Lapid v. Court of Appeals,[12] we held that it is a principle of statutory


construction that where there are two statutes that apply to a particular case,
that which was specially intended for the said case must prevail. The case on
hand involves a disciplinary action against an elective local official. Thus, the
Local Government Code is the applicable law and must prevail over the
Administrative Code which is of general application.[13] Further, the Local
Government Code of 1991 was enacted much later than the Administrative Code
of 1987. In statutory construction, all laws or parts thereof which are inconsistent
with the later law are repealed or modified accordingly.[14]

In dispute is the validity of the DILG Memorandum implementing the suspension


order issued by the Office of the President. We are asked to resolve in this
connection two issues: (1) Was the decision of the Office of the President already
final and executory? and (2) Was the exemption from the election ban in the
movement of any public officer granted by COMELEC valid?

Besides, even though appeal to the Court of Appeals is granted under Sec. 1,[15]
Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court, Sec. 12,[16] Rule 43 of the Revised Rules
of Court in relation to Sec. 68[17] of the Local Government Code provides for the
immediate execution pending appeal. Under the same case of Lapid v. Court of
Appeals,[18] we enunciated that the decisions of the Office of the President
under the Local Government Code are immediately executory even pending
appeal because the pertinent laws under which the decisions were rendered
mandated them to be so.

Petitioner contends that decisions of the Office of the President on cases where it
has original jurisdiction become final and executory only after the lapse of 15

In sum, the decisions of the Office of the President are final and executory. No
motion for reconsideration is allowed by law but the parties may appeal the

23
decision to the Court of Appeals. The appeal, however, does not stay the
execution of the decision. Thus, the DILG Secretary may validly move for its
immediate execution.

As to the validity of the exemption granted by COMELEC in its Resolution No.


3992, petitioner claims that the exemption was invalid for being based on a
mere draft resolution. According to him, a draft resolution does not operate as a
final resolution of a case until the proper resolution is duly signed and
promulgated. Petitioner maintains that a draft cannot produce any legal effect.
A perusal of the records, however, reveals that the Resolution in O.P. Case No.
00-1-9220 was approved and signed on March 22, 2001 by Executive Secretary
Renato de Villa by the authority of the President. Hence, the approval was before
the promulgation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3992 on April 24, 2001. The record
also shows that the request to implement the said suspension order was filed on
March 22, 2001 by the Senior Deputy Executive Secretary of the Office of the
President pursuant to the requirements stated in the Resolution.
Moreover, COMELEC Resolution No. 3529[19] which may be applied by analogy
and in relation to Sec. 2[20] of COMELEC Resolution No. 3401 merely requires
the request to be in writing indicating the office and place from which the officer
is removed, and the reason for said movement, and submitted together with the
formal complaint executed under oath and containing the specific charges and
the answer to said complaint. The request for the exemption was accompanied
with the Affidavit of Complaint, Affidavit of Controversion, Reply and Draft
Resolution. The pertinent documents required by the COMELEC to substantiate
the request were submitted. There being a proper basis for its grant of
exemption, COMELEC Resolution No. 3992 is valid.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The assailed
Court of Appeals resolutions dated May 11, 2002 and July 1, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 64583 are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
23 Pecson vs Comelec
Facts: Pecson and Cunanan were candidates for the mayoralty position in the
Municipality of Magalang, Province of Pampanga. Cunanan was proclaimed the
winning candidate, garnering a total of 12,592 votes as against Pecson's 12,531,

or a margin of 61 votes. Cunanan took his oath and assumed the position of
Mayor of Magalang. Soon thereafter, Pecson filed an election protest.
The RTC rendered a Decision in Pecson's favor. Cunanan filed a Notice of Appeal.
The RTC issued an Order noting the filing of the notice of appeal and the
payment of appeal fee and directing the transmittal of the records of the case to
the Electoral Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) of the COMELEC. Pecson,
on the other hand, filed an Urgent Motion for Immediate Execution Pending
Appeal, claiming that Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure in Election
Contests before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials 2
(Rules) allows this remedy. The RTC granted Pecson's motion for execution
pending appeal via a Special Order. Expectedly, Cunanan moved to reconsider
the Order, arguing that the RTC gravely abused its discretion: (1) in ruling that
there were good reasons to issue a writ of execution pending appeal; and (2) in
entertaining and subsequently granting the motion for execution pending appeal
despite the issuance of an order transmitting the records of the case. Thereupon,
Cunanan filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Application of Preliminary
Injunction with Prayer for Status Quo Ante Order/Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) with Prayer for Immediate Raffle. The Second Division of the COMELEC
issued on January 4, 2008 a 60- day TRO but eventually denied Cunanans
petition. It ruled that the resolution of the motion for execution pending appeal is
part of the residual jurisdiction of the RTC to settle pending incidents. On
Cunanan's motion, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution reversing the
ruling of the Second Division insofar as it affirmed the RTC's findings of good
reasons to execute the decision pending appeal. It affirmed the authority of the
RTC to order execution pending appeal; it however nullified the March 11, 2008
writ of execution on the ground that the RTC could no longer issue the writ
because it had lost jurisdiction over the case after transmittal of the records and
the perfection of the appeals of both Cunanan and Pecson (to be accurate, the
lapse of Pecson's period to appeal). The case was elevated to the SC via petition
for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc correctly nullified the writ of
execution on the ground that the RTC could no longer issue the writ because it
had lost jurisdiction over the case after transmittal of the records and the
perfection of the appeals?

24
Held: No. Another legal reality is that the COMELEC is wrong in its ruling that the
RTC could no longer actually issue the writ on March 11, 2008 because it no
longer had jurisdiction to do so after the appeal period lapsed and after the
records were transmitted to the ECAD-COMELEC. That the RTC is still in
possession of the records and that the period to appeal (of both contending
parties) must have not lapsed are important for jurisdictional purposes if the
issue is the authority of the RTC to grant a Special Order allowing execution
pending appeal ; they are requisite elements for the exercise by the RTC of its
residual jurisdiction to validly order an execution pending appeal, not for the
issuance of the writ itself. This is clearly evident from the cited provision of the
Rules which does not require the issuance of the implementing writ within the
above limited
jurisdictional period. The RTC cannot legally issue the
implementing writ within this limited period for two reasons: (1) the cited
twenty-day waiting period under Section 11(b); and (2) the mandatory
immediate transmittal of the records to the ECAD of the COMELEC under Section
10 of the Rules. Also, we reiterate here our consistent ruling that decisions of
the courts in election protest cases, resulting as they do from a judicial
evaluation of the ballots and after full-blown adversarial proceedings, should at
least be given similar worth and recognition as decisions of the board of
canvassers.
11 This is especially true when attended by other equally weighty circumstances
of the case, such as the shortness of the term of the contested elective office, of
the case. In light of all these considerations, we conclude that the COMELEC
erred in nullifying the RTC's Special Order in a manner sufficiently gross to affect
its exercise of jurisdiction. Specifically, it committed grave abuse of discretion
when it looked at wrong considerations and when it acted outside of the
contemplation of the law in nullifying the Special Order.
TERMS OF OFFICE 43

the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and
was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties
thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was contested by his opponent who filed an
election protest. The court rendered a judgment declaring the results of the said
election last May 8, 1995, as null and void on the ground that there was a failure
of election.
In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy
for mayor of San Antonio and was proclaimed winner. Prior proclamation, His
opponent timely filed a petition to disqualify him from running on the ground
that he had served three consecutive terms in the same post.
The COMELEC found that Lonzanidas assumption of office by virtue of his
proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before the expiration
of the term, should be counted as service for one full term in computing the
three term limit under the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Hence,
COMELEC issued a resolution granting the petition for disqualification
Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the COMELEC resolutions
maintaining that he was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and
that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for
the purpose of applying the three term limit for local government officials,
because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995
elections.

The private respondent maintains that the petitioners assumption of office in


1995 should be considered as service of one full term because he discharged the
duties of mayor for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few
months before the next mayoral elections.

24 Lonzanida vs COMELEC
(Local Government, Disqualification: Exception to the 3 term limit rule)

Facts: Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms
as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 1995 elections. In

Issue: WON petitioners assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales


from May 1995 to 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the
purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials.

25
Held: No. Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides that, the term of office of
elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.
Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same rule,
that: No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms
in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
The petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term
because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term.
Pursuant to the constitutional provision above, voluntary renunciation of a term
does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit;
conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the
full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The
petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not
by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of
execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance
from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did
not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
25 Laceda Sr. vs Limena
Facts: Laceda admitted having served as Punong Barangay of Panlayaan for
three consecutive terms. However, he asserted that when he was elected for his
first two terms, Sorsogon was still a municipality, and that when he served his
third term, the Municipality of Sorsogon had already been merged with the
Municipality of Bacon to form a new political unit, the City of Sorsogon, pursuant
to Republic Act No. 8806.
Issue: Thus, he argued that his third term was actually just his first in the new
political unit and that he was accordingly entitled to run for two more terms.
Ruling: While it is true that under Rep. Act No. 8806 the municipalities of
Sorsogon and Bacon were merged and converted into a city thereby abolishing

the former and creating Sorsogon City as a new political unit, it cannot be said
that for the purpose of applying the prohibition in Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 9164,
the office of Punong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan, Municipality of Sorsogon,
would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the
office of Punong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan, Sorsogon City. The territorial
jurisdiction of Barangay Panlayaan, Sorsogon City, is the same as before the
conversion. Consequently, the inhabitants of the barangay are the same. They
are the same group of voters who elected Laceda to be their Punong Barangay
for three consecutive terms and over whom Laceda held power and authority as
their Punong Barangay. Moreover, Rep. Act No. 8806 did not interrupt Lacedas
term.
26 Rivera III vs Comelec
Facts: In the May 2004 elections, respondent Marino "Boking" Morales ran as
candidate for mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term 2004-2007. Petitioner
Dee filed with the COMELEC a petition to cancel Morales Certificate of
Candidacy on the ground that he was elected and had served three previous
consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat. They alleged that his candidacy
violated Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of RA 7160.
Respondent Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the
term 1995-1998 (first term) and 2001-2004 (third term), but he served the
second term from 1998-2001 only as a "caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto
officer" since his proclamation as mayor was declared void by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). He was also preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an anti-graft case from January to July 1999.

Issue:1. Has Morales already served his 3 consecutive term?


2. If so, who should then take his position?

Held: 1. For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply,
two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned
has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post,
and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

26

Respondent Morales was elected for the term 1998-2001. He assumed the
position. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the
RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (Morales) as
mayor (because the trial courts ruling was promulgated only after the expiry of
the 1998-2001 term). Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has
been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break since 1995. In just over
a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12)
continuous years. His assumption of office for the second term constituted
service for the full term and should be counted as a full term served in
contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and
statutory provisions barring local elective officials from being elected and serving
for more than three consecutive terms for the same position.

The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to establish


some safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a result of
consecutive terms. Therefore, having found respondent Morales ineligible, his
Certificate of Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 should be cancelled. Not
being a candidate, the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must
be considered stray votes.

2. The question now is whether it is the vice-mayor or petitioner Dee who shall
serve for the remaining portion of the 2004 to 2007 term. In Labo v. Comelec,
this Court has ruled that a second place candidate cannot be proclaimed as a
substitute winner, thus:
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes
does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of
votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office.
As a consequence of petitioners ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the
contested office has occurred. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor in
accordance with Section 44 of the Local Government Code, to wit:

Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor,


Mayor and Vice-Mayor. (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the
governor or mayor, the vice-governor or the vice-mayor concerned shall become
the governor or mayor. (Rivera III vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 167591. May 9, 2007)
27 Provincial Govt of Cam Norte vs Gonzales 2013
TOPIC: THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SECURITY OF TENURE Both career
and non-career service employees have a right to security of tenure they
cannot be removed from office except for cause provided by law and after
procedural due process. The concept of security of tenure, however, operates
under a different rule for primarily confidential employees due to the nature of a
primarily confidential position.

Furthermore, security of tenure in public office simply means that a public officer
or employee shall not be suspended or dismissed except for cause, as provided
by law and after due process. It cannot be expanded to grant a right to public
office despite a change in the nature of the office held.

FACTS:
Gonzales was appointed as provincial administrator of the Province of Camarines
Norte by then-Governor Roy Padilla on April 1991, with her appointment on a
permanent capacity. After almost 8 years, on March 1999, the then-Governor
Jess Pimentel sent Gonzales a memorandum to explain why administrative
charges should not be filed against her for gross insubordination/discourtesy in
the course of official duties and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest
of the service. After Gonzales submitted her comment, an Ad Hoc Investigation
Committee found her guilty of the charges against her. Therefore, on September
1999, Gov. Pimentel dismissed Gonzales.

This decision of Gov. Pimentel was subsequently appealed to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), which issued a Resolution, which modified the earlier
decision, found Gonzales guilty of insubordination and suspended Gonzales for 6
months. A subsequent appeal from Gov. Pimentel was denied by the CSC. Upon

27
motion for execution, CSC through a Resolution directed the reinstatement of
Gonzales upon clarification of service of the 6-month suspension. Gov. Pimentel
reinstated Gonzales, however she was dismissed the next day for lack of
confidence. Gov. Pimentel then wrote to the CSC of his compliance to the CSCs
order and Gonzales subsequent dismissal as a confidential employee, citing an
earlier CSC Resolution where the CSC held that the position of provincial
administrator was highly confidential and coterminous in nature.

of removal, or without any cause. The CA then enumerated the list of valid
causes for a public officers removal under Section 46, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A
of the Revised Administrative Code, and noted that lack of confidence was not in
the list. The CA concluded that Gonzales dismissal on the ground of loss of
confidence violated her security of tenure, and that she has the right to be
reinstated with payment of backwages. Hence, the petition for review on
certiorari to the SC.

The CSC responded with another Resolution which directed Gonzales


reinstatement, stating that while the LGC (RA 7160) made the position of
provincial administrator coterminous and highly confidential in nature, the
conversion cannot operate to prejudice officials who were already issued
permanent appointments as administrators prior to the effectivity of the LGC.
Gonzales had acquired a vested right to her permanent appointment and is
entitled to continue holding the office despite its subsequent classification. The
conversion should not jeopardize Gonzales security of tenure guaranteed to her
by the Constitution. Therefore, as a permanent appointee, Gonzales may only be
removed for cause, after due notice and hearing. Loss of trust and confidence is
not among the grounds for a permanent appointees dismissal or discipline
under existing laws.

ISSUE/S: WON Gonzales has security of tenure over her position as provincial
administrator of Camarines Norte.

However, in a letter dated February 2005, Gonzales wrote to the CSC alleging
that the then incumbent Governor, Jesus Typoco, Jr., refused to reinstate her.
Hence, the CSC made another Resolution which ordered Gonzales reinstatement
to the provincial administrator position, or to an equivalent position.

As a result, the Province, through Gov. Typoco, filed a petition for review with the
CA. However, the CA sided with CSC and Gonzales, citing Aquino v. Civil Service
Commission, which stated that an appointee acquires a legal right to his position
once he assumes a position in the civil service under a completed appointment.
This legal right is protected both by statute and the Constitution, and he cannot
be removed from office without cause and previous notice and hearing.
Appointees cannot be removed at the mere will of those vested with the power

HELD: NO. Decision of the CA reversed and set aside. The Court supported the
CAs conclusion that the position of provincial administrator has been reclassified into a primarily confidential, non-career position upon the passage of
RA 7160, or the Local Government Code (LGC) which took effect in January 1992.
In making the position mandatory for all provinces, the LGC also amended the
qualifications for the position. Further to this, the LGC made the provincial
administrator position co-terminous with its appointing authority, reclassifying it
as a non-career service position that is primarily confidential. Upon this, the
Court took note of the argument that Gonzales has acquired a vested legal right
over the position of provincial administrator the moment she assumed her duties
in April 1991, hence the argument that she cannot be removed from office
except for cause and after due hearing.
According to the SC, the arguments reflect a conceptual confusion between the
nature of the position and an employees right to hold a position. The nature of a
position may change by law according to the dictates of Congress. The right to
hold a position, on the other hand, is a right that enjoys constitutional and
statutory guarantee, but may itself change according to the nature of the
position. Congress has the power and prerogative to introduce substantial
changes in the provincial administrator position and to reclassify it as a primarily
confidential, non-career service position. When done in good faith, these acts
would not violate a public officers security of tenure, even if they result in his
removal from office or the shortening of his term. Modifications in public office,
such as changes in qualifications or shortening of its tenure, are made in good
faith so long as they are aimed at the office and not at the incumbent.

28
B. The Court also pointed out that Gonzales reliance on the case of Gabriel v.
Domingos dissenting opinion (which stated that a permanent employee remains
a permanent employee unless he is validly terminated) was misplaced. First of
all, the factual differences were pointed out to be dissimilar to the case of
Gonzales, and even granting that they were the same, the cited case (in Gabriel)
of Civil Service Commission v. Javier actually proposes that corporate secretaries
in GOCCs cannot expect protection for their tenure and appointments upon the
reclassification of their position to a primarily confidential position. These officers
cannot rely on the statutes providing for their permanent appointments, if and
when the Court determines these to be primarily confidential.

Further to this, said dissenting opinion in Gabriel cited EO 503, which provided
safeguards against termination of government employees affected by RA 7160s
implementation. According to the dissenting opinion, EO 503 is an obvious
indication of the executive departments intent to protect and uphold both the
national government and the local government employees security of tenure.
However, the Court emphasized that EO 503, however, does not apply to
employees of the local government affected by RA 7160s enactment, as it only
applies to National Government Agencies whose functions are to be devolved to
LGUs.
C. Finally, the Court noted that both career and non-career service employees
have a right to security of tenure. All permanent officers and employees in the
civil service, regardless of whether they belong to the career or non-career
service category, are entitled to this guaranty; they cannot be removed from
office except for cause provided by law and after procedural due process. The
concept of security of tenure, however, operates under a different rule for
primarily confidential employees due to the nature of a primarily confidential
position. Serving at the confidence of the appointing authority, the primarily
confidential employees term of office expires when the appointing authority
loses trust in the employee. When this happens, the confidential employee is not
removed or dismissed from office. The term merely expires and the loss of
trust and confidence is the just cause provided by law that results in the
termination of employment. In the case of Gonzales, where the trust and
confidence has been irretrievably eroded, Gov. Pimentel only exercised his

discretion when he decided that he could no longer entrust his confidence in


Gonzales.
Security of tenure in public office simply means that a public officer or employee
shall not be suspended or dismissed except for cause, as provided by law and
after due process. It cannot be expanded to grant a right to public office despite
a change in the nature of the office held. The CSC might have been legally
correct when it ruled that the petitioner violated Gonzales right to security of
tenure when she was removed without sufficient just cause from her position,
but the situation had since then been changed. In fact, Gonzales was reinstated
as ordered, but her services were subsequently terminated under the law
prevailing at the time of the termination of her service. She was then already
occupying a position that was primarily confidential and had to be dismissed
because she no longer enjoyed the trust and confidence of the appointing
authority. Thus, Gonzales termination for lack of confidence was lawful. She
could no longer be reinstated as provincial administrator of Camarines Norte or
to any other comparable position. This, however, is without prejudice to
Gonzales entitlement to retirement benefits, leave credits, and future
employment in government service.
28 Naval vs Comelec 2014
CASE: A provincial board member cannot be elected and serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari to assail the
(a) COMELEC Second Divisions Resolution granting the petition filed by Julia,
seeking to cancel the COC as Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Camarines Sur of Naval, who is allegedly violating the three-term limit imposed
upon elective local officials; and (b) COMELEC En Bancs Resolution denying
Navals Motion for Reconsideration to the Resolution issued by COMELEC Second
Diviosn.
FACTS: From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Naval had been elected and had
served as a member of the Sanggunian, Second District, Province of Camarines
Sur. On October 12, 2009, the President approved Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9716,
which reapportioned the legislative districts in Camarines Sur. Notably, 8 out of
10 towns were taken from the old Second District to form the present Third
District. The present Second District is composed of the two remaining towns,
Gainza and Milaor, merged with five towns from the old First District. In the 2010
elections, Naval once again won as among the members of the Sanggunian,

29
Third District. He served until 2013. In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anew and
was re-elected as Member of the Sanggunian, Third District.
Julia was likewise a Sanggunian Member candidate from the Third District in the
2013 elections. He filed before the COMELEC a Verified Petition to Deny Due
Course or to Cancel COC of Naval. Julia posited that Naval had fully served the
entire Province of Camarines Sur for three consecutive terms as a member of the
Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had been elected from. Allowing Naval
to run as a Sanggunian member for the fourth time is violative of the inflexible
three-term limit rule enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC, which must be
strictly construed.
Naval alleges: First, Second and Third Legislative Districts of Camarines Sur are
not merely renamed but are composed of new sets of municipalities. With the
separation of Gainza and Milaor from the other eight towns which used to
comprise the Second District, the voters from the Third Legislative District are no
longer the same ones as those who had elected him to office in the 2004 and
2007 elections.
OSG contends: Seeking the denial of the instant petition, OSG contends that
Naval had been elected and had fully served the same local elective post for
three consecutive terms. Naval thus violated Section 78 of the OEC when he filed
his COC despite knowledge of his ineligibility.
COMELEC Second Divisions Resolution: Cancelled Navals COC on grounds:
When a candidate for public office swears in his COC that he is eligible for the
elective posts he seeks, while, in reality, he knowingly lacks the necessary
requirements for eligibility, he commits a false material misrepresentation
cognizable under Section 78 of the OEC.

The new Third District where Naval was elected and has served is composed of
the same municipalities comprising the previous Second District, absent the
towns Gainza and Milaor. The territorial jurisdiction Naval seeks to serve for the
term 2013-2016 is the same as the territorial jurisdiction he previously served.
The electorate who voted for him in 2004, 2007 and 2010 is the same electorate
who shall vote for him come May 13, 2013 Elections. They are the same group of
voters who elected him into office for three consecutive terms.

COMELEC en bancs Resolution: Denied Navals Motion for Reconsideration to the


above. The COMELEC pointed out that absent the verification required under
Section 3, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Navals motion was
instantly dismissible. Nonetheless, according to the COMELEC, it is clear that the
position to which Naval has filed his candidacy for the 13 May 2013 elections is
the same position for which he had been elected and had served for the past
nine (9) years. The enactment of R.A. No. 9716 did not convert Navals post into
one different from what he previously had.
ISSUE: WON Navals, a provincial board member, election to the same position
for the third and fourth time, but now in representation of the renamed district, a
violation of the three-term limit rule.
RULING: YES. With 26 in favor and 17 against, the Constitutional Commission
approved that there is no immediate reelection after three successive terms. For
the Body believed that the imposition of term limits would be tantamount to
squandering the experience of seasoned public servants and a curtailment of the
power of the citizens to elect whoever they want to remain in the office.
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office
and limits an elective officials stay in office to no more than three consecutive
terms. The limitation under this first branch of the provision is expressed in the
negativeno such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
This formulationno more than three consecutive termsis a clear command
suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule. This examination of the wording of
the constitutional provision and of the circumstances surrounding its formulation
impresses upon us the clear intent to make term limitation a high priority
constitutional objective whose terms must be strictly construed and which
cannot be defeated by, nor sacrificed for, values of less than equal constitutional
worth.
In Navals case, the words of R.A. No. 9716 plainly state that the new Second
District is to be created, but the Third District is to be renamed. Verba legis non
est recedendum. The terms used in a legal provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers mean what they say.
The rationale behind reapportionment is the constitutional requirement to
achieve equality of representation among the districts.The aim of legislative

30
apportionment is to equalize population and voting power among districts. The
basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province
and not the number of registered voters therein. It is with this mindset that the
Court should consider Navals argument anent having a new set of constituents
electing him into office in 2010 and 2013.
Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought
about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement
of equality of representation.
Navals ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the three-term limit rule,
does not undermine the right to equal representation of any of the districts in
Camarines Sur. With or without him, the renamed Third District, which he labels
as a new set of constituents, would still be represented, albeit by another eligible
person.
In sum, the Court finds no compelling reason to grant the reliefs prayed for by
Naval. For the Court to declare otherwise would be to create a dangerous
precedent unintended by the drafters of our Constitution and of R.A. No. 9716.
Considering that the one-term gap or rest after three consecutive elections is a
result of a compromise among the members of the Constitutional Commission,
no cavalier exemptions or exceptions to its application is to be allowed. Further,
sustaining Navals arguments would practically allow him to hold the same office
for 15 years.
The Court accords primacy to upholding the will of the voting public, the real
sovereign, so to speak. However, let all the candidates for public office be
reminded that as citizens, we have a commitment to be bound by our
Constitution and laws. Side by side our privileges as citizens are restrictions too.

The drafters of the Constitution recognized the propensity of public officers to


perpetuate themselves in power, hence, the adoption of term limits and a
guarantee of every citizens equal access to public service. These are the
restrictions statesmen should observe for they are intended to help ensure the
continued vitality of our republican institutions. Petition is DENIED. The
Resolutions of the COMELEC are AFFIRMED.
VACANCIES AND SUCCESSION 44-47

29 Docena vs SP of Eastern Samar


FACTS: Petitioner Agustin Docena was appointed to succeed Luis Capito as a
member of SP of Eastern Samar upon the latters death.
His appointment was issued on Nov. 19, 1990 by Sec. Luis T. Santos of the DILG.
The petitioner took his oath of office on November 22, 1990 and assumed office
as member of the SP on November 26, 1990.
However, on November 27, 1990, Sec. Santos appointed respondent Socrates B.
Alar to the position already occupied by Docena.
On December 18, 1990, SPES passed Resolution No. 75 Alars appointment as
legitimate rather than that of Docena. The said Resolution was reversed by Sec.
Santos when he recalled the Nov. 27 appointment of Alar.
On January 8, 1991, the SPES passed another resolution (Resolution No. 1)
reiterating its previous recognition of Alar and declaring the recall order issued
by Sec. Santos as null and void.
Sec. Santos changed his mind again when he issued on February 20, 1991
another order this time addressed to Docena recalling the
appointment
extended to him last November 19, 1990.
Hence this petition for mandamus filed by Docena.
ISSUE: WON Docena is the lawfully appointed member of the SP of Eastern
Samar
HELD: Yes, The appointment extended to Docena on Nov. 19, 1990 was
permanent in nature to fill the permanent vacancy caused by Capitos death. It
was to be valid for the unexpired portion of the term of Capito. The appointment,
having been issued and accepted, and Docena having already assumed office,
had already become complete and enforceable for all legal intents and purposes
at the time it was supposed to have been superseded by the appointment in
favor of Alar.
Docena had already acquired security of tenure in the position and could be
removed only for any of the causes and conformably to the procedure prescribed
in the Local Government Code.

31
Also, the SPES had no discretion to rule on the validity of the decisions of the
Sec. of DILG acting as the alter ego of the President.

no recourse but to merely apply the law. The courts may not speculate as to the
probable intent of the legislature apart from the words.

30 Victoria vs Comelec

Victoria's contention must very well be addressed to the legislative branch and
not to the Court which has no power to change the law. (Victoria vs Comelec,
G.R. No. 109005, January 10, 1994)

Facts: Due to the suspension of Governor Romeo Salalima of the Province of


Albay, Vice-Governor Danilo Azana automatically assumed the powers and
functions of the governor, leaving vacant his post as vice-governor. The Comelec
certified Jesus James Calisin of District 1 as first ranking member with Juan
Victoria of District 2 as second ranking member based on the number of votes
obtained by the Sanggunian members in relation to the number of registered
voters in the district. Pursuant to the Comelec resolution, DILG Secretary Alunan
designated Calisin as acting Vice-Governor.
Victoria claims that the ranking of the Sanggunian members should not only be
based on the number of votes obtained in relation to the total number of
registered voters, but also on the number of voters in the district who actually
voted therein. He further argues that a district may have a large number of
registered voters but only a few actually voted, in which case the winning
candidate would register a low percentage of the number of votes obtained.
Conversely, a district may have a smaller number of registered voters but may
have a big voters' turn-out, in which case the winning candidate would get a
higher percentage of the votes. Applying his formula, Victoria would come out to
be the highest ranking Sanggunian member.
Issue: How shall the ranking in the Sanggunian be determined for purposes of
succession?

31 Farinas vs Barba
Facts: Carlito B. Domingo was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. On March 24, 1994, he resigned after going without leave
to the United States. The Mayor, Angelo Barba, recommended Edward Farinas to
fill the vacancy. He is also recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan of San
Nicolas directed to the Mayor. The resolution regarding to the recommendation
was submitted to Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte in compliance with
Section 56 of the Local Government Code. Sangguniang Panlalawigan
disapproved the resolution for the reason that the authority and power to
appoint Sangguniang Bayan members are lodged to the Governor. On the other
hand, despite the disapproval, the respondent still appointed Farinas. Later on,
he took an oath. On June 14, 1994, petitioners filed with the RTC of Ilocos Norte a
petition quo warranto and prohibition. The Trial Court uphold the appointment.

Issue: Who can appoint the replacement in case of a permanent vacancy in


Sangguniang Bayan caused by the cessation from office of a member who does
not belong to any political part.

Held: Section 44 of the Local Government Code provides that if a permanent


vacancy occurs in the office of the vice-governor, the highest ranking
Sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest
ranking Sanggunian member, shall become vice-governor. "For purposes of
succession, ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the
proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of
registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election."

Held: There is only one governing appointment to Sanggunian Bayan. Any


vacancy therein caused by the cessation from office of a member with or without
a political party must be made by the Governor upon the recommendtion of the
said Sanggunian.

The law is clear that the ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the
basis of the proportion of the votes obtained by each winning candidate to the
total number of registered voters in each district. In such a case, the Court has

Facts: In the 1995 elections, Rafael Coscolluela, petitioner Romeo J. Gamboa, Jr.
and respondents Marcelo Aguirre, Jr., and Juan Y. Araneta were elected Negros
Occidental Governor, Vice-Governor and SP members, respectively. Sometime in
August of 1995, the governor designated petitioner as Acting Governor for the

32 Gamboa vs Aguirre

32
duration of the formers official trip abroad until his return. When the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan held its regular session, respondents questioned the
authority of petitioner to preside therein in view of his designation as Acting
Governor and asked him to vacate the Chair. The latter, however, refused to do
so. In another session, 7 members of the SP voted to allow petitioner to continue
presiding while 4 others voted against with 1 abstention. Respondents filed
before the lower court a petition for declaratory relief and prohibition. In the
meantime, the Governor re-assumed his office. Later, the trial court rendered a
decision and declared petitioner as temporarily legally incapacitated to preside
over the sessions of the SP during the period that he is the Acting Governor.
Petitioner filed a petition for review raising the issue earlier mentioned. Although
this case is dismissible for having become moot and academic considering the
expiration in 1998 of the terms of office of the local officials involved herein, the
Court nonetheless proceeds to resolve this common controversy but novel issue
under the existing laws on local government.
Issue: WON Gamboa, while serving as the Acting Governor, temporarily
relinquished the powers, functions, duties and responsibilities of the ViceGovernor, including the power to preside over the sessions of the SP
Held: YES Ratio Decidendi: What the LGC provides: The LGC provides that the
Vice-Governor shall be the presiding officer of the SP. In addition to such
function, he becomes the Governor and assumes the higher office for the
unexpired term of his predecessor, in case of permanent vacancy therein.
When the vacancy, however, is merely temporary, the Vice-Governor shall
automatically exercise the powers (subject to certain limitations) and perform
the duties and functions of the Governor. But, no such contingency is provided
in case of temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor. Vice-Governor
as Acting Governor: When the Vice-Governor exercises the powers and duties
of the Governor, he does not assume the latter office. He only acts as the
Governor but does not become the Governor. His assumption of the powers,
duties and functions of the provincial Chief Executive does not create a
permanent vacuum or vacancy in his position as the Vice-Governor. Necessarily,
he does not relinquish nor abandon his position and title as Vice-Governor by
merely becoming an Acting Governor or by merely exercising the powers and
duties of the higher office. A Vice-Governor who is concurrently an Acting
Governor is actually a quasi-Governor. This means, that for purposes of
exercising his legislative prerogatives and powers, he is deemed as a non-

member of the SP for the time being. By tradition, the offices of the provincial
Governor and Vice-Governor are essentially executive in nature, whereas plain
members of the provincial board perform functions partaking of a legislative
character. This is because the authority vested by law in the provincial boards
involves primarily a delegation of some legislative powers of Congress. This is
clear from the law, when it provides that local legislative power shall be vested
in the SP, which is the legislative body of the province, and enumerates
therein its membership consisting of the: 1) Vice Governor as presiding officer 2)
regular elective SP members 3) 3 elective sectoral representatives 4) ex-officio
members namely: a) president of the provincial chapter of the liga ng mga
barangay b) president of the panlalawigang pederasyon ng mga sangguniang
kabataan c) president of the provincial federation of sanggunian members of
municipalities and component cities Not being included in the enumeration, the
Governor is deemed excluded and thus, local executive power in the province is
vested alone in the Governor. Consequently, the union of legislative-executive
powers in the office of the local chief executive under the former Code has been
disbanded. Being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor cannot continue to
simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter office, since the nature of the
duties of the provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them.
Conclusion: To repeat, the creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the
Governor creates a corresponding temporary vacancy in the office of the ViceGovernor whenever the latter acts as Governor by virtue of such temporary
vacancy. This event constitutes an inability on the part of the regular presiding
officer (Vice Governor) to preside during the SP sessions, which thus calls for the
operation of the remedy set in Article 49(b) of the Local Government Code
concerning the election of a temporary presiding officer. The continuity of the
Acting Governors (Vice-Governor) powers as presiding officer of the SP is
suspended so long as he is in such capacity. Under Section 49(b), (i)n the event
of the inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at the sanggunian
session, the members present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among
themselves a temporary presiding officer.
33 Navarro vs CA
FACTS:
Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in Lucena City wnet
to the police station to report alledged indecent show in one of the night

33
establishment shows in the City. At the station, a heated confrontation followed
between victim Lingan and accused policeman Navarro who was then having
drinks outside the headquarters, lead to a fisticuffs. The victim was hit with the
handle of the accused's gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist blow,
resulted the victim to fell and died under treatment. The exchange of words was
recorded on tape, specifically the frantic exclamations made by Navarro after the
altercation that it was the victim who provoked the fight. During the trial,
Jalbuena, the other media man , testified. Presented in evidence to confirm his
testimony was a voice recording he had made of the heated discussion at the
police station between the accused police officer Navarro and the deceased,
Lingan, which was taken without the knowledge of the two.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in view
of RA 4200, which prohibits wire tapping.
2. Whether the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat
on the part of the offended party and lack of intention to commit so grave a
wrong may be appreciated in favor of the accused.
HELD: 1. The answer is affirmative, the tape is admissible in view of RA 4200,
which prohibits wire tapping. Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice
recording he had made.
The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private
communications (Ramirez v Cpourt of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 [1995]). Snce the
exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape
recording is not prohibited.
2. The remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the acts of the
accused, constituted sufficient provocation. Provocation is said to be any unjust
or improper conduct of the offended party capable of exciting, annoying or
irritating someone. The provocation must be sufficient and must immediately
precede the act; and in order to be sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a
person to commit the wrong, which must be accordingly proportionate in gravity.
The mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong
must also be considered. The exclamations made by Navarro after the scuffle
that it was Lingan who provoked him showed that he had no intent to kill the
latter.

34 Aratea vs Comelec
FACTS: Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were
candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and
Local Elections. Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or
to cancel Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was
elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4)
consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for the May 2010 elections.
Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material representation in his
certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was eligible
for the office he sought election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code both prohibit a local elective official
from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the
same position.
The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolutionon 18 February 2010
cancelling Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy.
Lonzanidas motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained
pending during the May 2010 elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea
(Aratea) garnered the highest number of votes and were respectively proclaimed
Mayor and Vice-Mayor.
Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Judge of Olongapo. On the same date, Aratea wrote the DILG and requested for
an opinion on whether, as Vice-Mayor, he was legally required to assume the
Office of the Mayor in view of Lonzanidas disqualification.
DILG stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office by reason of his
criminal conviction, and as a consequence, his office was deemed permanently
vacant, and thus, Aratea should assume the Office of the Mayor in an acting
capacity without prejudice to the COMELECs resolution of Lonzanidas motion for
reconsideration.
In another letter dated 6 August 2010, Aratea requested the DILG to allow him to
take the oath of office as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In his response, then
Secretary Jesse M. Robredo allowed Aratea to take an oath of office as "the

34
permanent Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales without prejudice however
to the outcome of the cases pending before the COMELEC.

of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds or offenses
covered under Section 68.

On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution disqualifying


Lonzanida from running for Mayor in the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En
Bancs resolution was based on two grounds: first, Lonzanida had been elected
and had served as Mayor for more than three consecutive terms without
interruption; and second, Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment of 10
counts of falsification under the Revised Penal Code. Lonzanida was sentenced
for each count of falsification to imprisonment of 4 years and 1 day of prisin
correccional as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prisin mayor as maximum.
The judgment of conviction became final on 23 October 2009 in the Decision of
this Court in Lonzanida v. People, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of
candidacy on 1 December 2009.

On the other hand, Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a
certificate of candidacy may be denied or cancelled when there is false material
representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy:

The manner of filling up the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales is dependent upon the determination of Lonzanidas removal.
Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code, or made a false material representation under Section 78 of the same
Code that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, is
determinative of whether Aratea or Antipolo is the rightful occupant to the Office
of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
HELD: Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor
because Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short,
Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes.
Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest
number of votes for the position of Mayor.
The grounds for disqualification for a petition under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code are specifically enumerated.
A petition for disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission
of prohibited acts and possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign
country." All the offenses mentioned in Section 68 refer to election offenses
under the Omnibus Election Code, not to violations of other penal laws. There is
absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that would justify including
violation of the three-term limit rule, or conviction by final judgment of the crime

Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code details the contents of the certificate of
candidacy:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall
state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated
therein and that he is eligible for said office x x x
The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisin mayor,
disqualifies him perpetually from holding any public office, or from being elected
to any public office. This perpetual disqualification took effect upon the finality of
the judgment of conviction, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy.
The penalty of prisin mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law,
the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual
special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary
absolute disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote
in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office.
The duration of temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the
principal penalty of prisin mayor.
On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code, perpetual special
disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any
public office during the period of his disqualification, which is perpetually. Both
temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification
constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office.
A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public
office, and commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate
of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.
Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy
A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid
candidacy, and much less to valid votes.

35
As the Comelec stated in their February 2011 Resolution: Since Lonzanida was
never a candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San Antonio, Zambales, the
votes cast for him should be considered stray votes. Consequently, Intervenor
Antipolo, who remains as the sole qualified candidate for the mayoralty post and
obtained the highest number of votes, should now be proclaimed as the duly
elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or
not qualified to run for Mayor.1wphi1Whether his certificate of candidacy is
cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on
such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his
certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one qualified
candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections - Antipolo, who therefore received
the highest number of votes. Petition dismissed.
JUDICIAL INTERVENTION 4
Rule 63 1997 ROCP
DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS
RA 6770 (1989)
Office of the Ombudsman
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION

autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by the present
Constitution was mere supervisory power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents


alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.

HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the
President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of
investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary
authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, supervision is not
incompatible with disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision
by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of
control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was
emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things
which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. In administration law
supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them
the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties.

35 Ganzon vs CA
Control Power Local Government

Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed
against him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary
of Local Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based on
the merits of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about
600 days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA
affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987
Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend
and remove local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local

Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. But
from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of
supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the
power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so
requires.

The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in


suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by
imposing a 600 day suspension.

36
36 Espiritu vs Melgar
Facts: Ramir Garing filed a sworn letter-complaint with Secretary Luis Santos of
DILG charging Mayor Nelson Melgar of Naujan. Oriental Mindoro, with grave
misconduct, oppression, abuse of authority, culpable violation of the Constitution
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the public service. Melgar
allegedly assaulted Garing and ordered his arrest and detention in the municipal
jail of Naujan without filing any charges until his released the following day. An
identical letter complaint was filed by Garing with Provincial Governor of Oriental
Mindoro Benjamin Espiritu, accusing Melgar of the same violations. A third
complaint filed by Garing with the Presidential Action Center, OP.Mayor Melgar
submitted his answer wherein he said that while he was delivering a speech
during a graduation ceremony, Garing suddenly clapped causing disturbance on
the part of the audience. When the Mayor ended his speech, he instructed a
policeman to investigate Garing. It appeared that Garing was drunk. The mayor
also presented medical certificate proving that Garing was not hurt. A balisong
was then taken from Garing. The mayor informed Garing to go home (he had
sobered up), but he refused to go and only did so the following morning. The
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro passed Resolution No 55,
recommending tothe Provincial Governor that the Mayor be preventively
suspended for 45 days pending the investigation of the administrative
complaint. When the mayor received the order of suspension, he filed a "Petition
for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction with prayer for Restraining Order" in the
RTC of Oriental Mindoro alleging that "the order of suspension was an arrogant,
despotic and arbitrary abuse of power" by the Governor. The RTC judge issued a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Governor Espiritu from implementing the
Order of suspension against Mayor Melgar On appeal, petitioner contends that
the trial judge erred in granting the preliminary injunction since the Governor is
empowered under Sec 63 LGC to place an elective municipal official under
preventive suspension pending decision of an administrative case against the
elective municipal official. Also, under Sec 61 LGC, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan has jurisdiction over the complaints against any municipal official,
while Section 19(c) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1930 withdrew from
RTCs jurisdictions over such cases. Also, the mayor has a remedy of appeal
under Sec 66 LGC.
Issue:WON the governor has the power to suspend the mayor

HELD: YES, Under Section 63 LGC, the provincial governor of Oriental Mindoro is
authorized by law to preventively suspend the municipal mayor of Naujan
anytime after the issues had been joined and any of the following grounds were
shown to exist: 1. When there is reasonable ground to believe that the
respondent has committed the act or acts complained of; 2. When the evidence
of culpability is strong; 3. When the gravity of the offense so warrants; or 4.
When the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses
or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.
There is nothing improper in suspending an officer before the charges against
him are heard and before he is given an opportunity to prove his innocence.
Preventive suspension is allowed so that the respondent may not hamper the
normal course of the investigation through the use of his influence and authority
over possible witnesses. Since the mayor believed that his preventive
suspension was unjustified and politically motivated, he should have sought
relief first from the Secretary of DILG, not from the courts. Mayor Melgar's direct
recourse to the courts without exhausting administrative remedies was
premature. WON the RTC has jurisdiction to stop the provincial governor from
placing a municipal mayor under preventive suspension pending the
investigation of administrative charges against the latter HELD: NO. The RTC had
no jurisdiction over Special Civil Action and gravely abused its discretion in
refusing to dismiss the case. There may exist honest differences of opinion with
regard to the seriousness of the charges, or as to whether they warrant
disciplinary action. However, as a general rule, the office or body that is invested
with the power of removal or suspension should be the sole judge of the
necessity and sufficiency of the cause. So, unless a flagrant abuse of the
exercise of that power is shown, public policy and a becoming regard for the
principle of separation of powers demand that the action of said officer or body
should be left undisturbed. However, in this particular case. since the 60-day
preventive suspension of Mayor Melgar was maintained by the Temporary
Restraining Order which we issued on August 6, 1991, and therefore has already
been served, he is deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the
continuation of the administrative investigation of the charges against him.
37 Miranda vs Sandiganbayan
Good Faith - - Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees

37
FACTS:
The Ombudsman placed petitioner Jose C. Miranda then the mayor of Santiago
City, Isabela, under preventive suspension for six months from 25 July 1997 to
25 January 1998 for alleged violations of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known
as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
Subsequently, then Vice Mayor Amelita S. Navarro filed a Complaint with the
Office of the Ombudsman. Vice Mayor Navarro contended that Mayor Miranda
committed the felony of usurpation of authority or official functions. Mayor
Miranda asserted that he reassumed office on the advice of his lawyer and in
good faith. He also averred that, on the day he reassumed office, he received a
memorandum from DILG Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez instructing him to
vacate his office and he immediately complied with the same. Notably, Mayor
Mirandas counter-affidavit also stated that he left the mayoralty post after
coercion by the Philippine National Police.

On Mar. 07, 2005, the Sangguniang Bayan passed a resolution removing


respondent from office. The Mayor issued an executive order implementing the
resolution to remove respondent. Twenty one days after receiving the order,
Ramon Lacsa filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC of Sorsogon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for certiorari is the proper recourse.
HELD: NO. Respondent should have filed an appeal with the proper body
pursuant to Sec. 67 of the Local Government Code. The conditions that would
afford respondent to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court as he did file one before the RTC that a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law are not here present.

ISSUE: Whether or not good faith may be invoked by the petitioner.


HELD: The court is not a bit persuaded by the posture of the petitioner that he
reassumed office under an honest belief that he was no longer under preventive
suspension. Petitioners pretense cannot stand scrutiny. Petitioners own affidavit
states.Petitioners excuse for violating the order of preventive suspension is too
flimsy to merit even a side-glance. He alleged that he merely followed the advice
of his lawyer. If petitioner and his counsel had an iota of respect for the rule of
law, they should have assailed the validity of the order of suspension in court
instead of taking the law into their own hands.
38 Don vs Lacsa
FACTS:
A complaint was filed in the Sangguniang Bayan of Juban, Sorsogon for grave
threats, oppression, grave misconduct and abuse of authority against Ramon
Lacsa, Punong Barangay of Bacolod, Juban, Sorsogon. A special investigation
committee, created to investigate the case, found sufficient evidence for the
preventive suspension of respondent. Accordingly, a resolution was passed
recommending his preventive suspension. Acting on the recommendation, the
Mayor slapped a two-month preventive suspension against respondent.

REMOVAL FROM OFFICE


39 SB of Brgy Don Mariano Marcos vs Punong Brgy Martinez
THE CONSTITUTION?
40 Hagad vs Goco Dadole
41 Ombudsman vs Rodriguez
THE SANDIGANBAYAN
42 Rodrigo Jr vs Sandiganbayan
43 Llorente Jr vs Sandiganbayan
RECALL
44 Paras vs Comelec
45 Angobung vs Comelec
46 Claudio vs Comelec
HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 169-190

38
RA 6713
PRACTICE OF PROFESSION 90
47 Catu vs Atty Rellosa
443-481
48 Mun of Pillila vs CA
49 Ramos vs CA
LOCAL INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 120-127
RA 6735 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM
AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
50 Garcia vs COMELEC
x
LOCAL TAXATION AND FISCAL MATTERS
INTERNAL REVENUE ALLOTMENT 284-288
51 Prov of Batangas vs Romulo
FACTS:
In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the Program for
Devolution Adjustment and Equalization to enhance the capabilities of LGUs in
the discharge of the functions and services devolved to them through the LGC.
The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed
Resolutions No. OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which were approved
by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The guidelines formulated by the Oversight
Committee required the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for funding under
the portion of LGSEF and submit the project proposals and other requirements to
the DILG for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the
subsequent release of the corresponding funds.

Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare


unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the General
Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they uniformly
earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of P5billion for the Internal
Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund
(LGSEF) & imposed conditions for the release thereof.
ISSUE: Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and
the OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution and the LGC of 1991.
HELD:Yes. The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the
OCD resolutions constitute a withholding of a portion of the IRA they
effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by LGUs and must be struck
down.
According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, the State shall ensure the local
autonomy of local governments. Consistent with the principle of local
autonomy, the Constitution confines the Presidents power over the LGUs to one
of general supervision, which has been interpreted to exclude the power of
control. Drilon v. Lim distinguishes supervision from control: control lays down
the rules in the doing of an act the officer has the discretion to order his
subordinate to do or redo the act, or decide to do it himself; supervision merely
sees to it that the rules are followed but has no authority to set down the rules or
the discretion to modify/replace them.
The entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is
constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or just share of the
LGUs in the national taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the Constitution mandates that the
just share shall be automatically released to the LGUs. Since the release is
automatic, the LGUs arent required to perform any act to receive the just
share it shall be released to them without need of further action. To subject
its distribution & release to the vagaries of the implementing rules & regulations
as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999-2001 and the OCD
Resolutions would violate this constitutional mandate.

The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs IRA
is if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less

39
than 40% of the collections of the 3rd preceding fiscal year. The exception does
not apply in this case.

The Oversight Committees authority is limited to the implementation of the LGC


of 1991 not to supplant or subvert the same, and neither can it exercise control
over the IRA of the LGUs.

Congress may amend any of the provisions of the LGC but only through a
separate law and not through appropriations laws or GAAs. Congress cannot
include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly
enacted in a separate legislation.

A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is


limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate
fiscal unit any provision therein which is intended to amend another law is
considered an inappropriate provision. Increasing/decreasing the IRA of LGUs
fixed in the LGC of 1991 are matters of general & substantive law. To permit the
Congress to undertake these amendments through the GAAs would unduly
infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs.
The value of LGUs as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of
autonomy they enjoy. Our national officials should not only comply with the
constitutional provisions in local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit
and liberty upon which these provisions are based.

52 Accord vs Zamora
Doctrine: Automatic release of IRA
Facts: Pres. Estrada, pursuant to Sec 22, Art VII mandating the Pres to submit to
Congress a budget of expenditures within 30 days before the opening of every
regular session, submitted the National Expenditures program for FY 2000. The
President proposed an IRA of P121,778,000,000. This became RA 8760, AN ACT

APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE,
TWO THOUSAND, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES also known as General
Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Year 2000. It provides under the heading
ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS that the IRA for local
government units shall amount to P111,778,000,000.
In another part of the GAA, under the heading UNPROGRAMMED FUND, it is
provided that an amount of P10,000,000,000 (P10 Billion), apart from the
P111,778,000,000 mentioned above, shall be used to fund the IRA, which
amount shall be released only when the original revenue targets submitted by
the President to Congress can be realized based on a quarterly assessment to be
conducted by certain committees which the GAA specifies, namely, the
Development Budget Coordinating Committee, the Committee on Finance of the
Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
Thus, while the GAA appropriates P111,778,000,000 of IRA as Programmed Fund,
it appropriates a separate amount of P10 Billion of IRA under the classification of
Unprogrammed Fund, the latter amount to be released only upon the occurrence
of the condition stated in the GAA.
On August 22, 2000, a number of NGOs and POs, along with 3 barangay officials
filed with this Court the petition at bar, for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
With Application for Temporary Restraining Order, against respondents then
Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, then Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management Benjamin Diokno, then National Treasurer Leonor
Magtolis-Briones, and the Commission on Audit, challenging the constitutionality
of provision XXXVII (ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS) referred to by
petitioners as Section 1, XXXVII (A), and LIV (UNPROGRAMMED FUND) Special
Provisions 1 and 4 of the GAA (the GAA provisions)
Petitioners contend that the said provisions violates the LGUs autonomy by
unlawfully reducing the IRA allotted by 10B and by withholding its release by
placing the same under Unprogrammed funds. Although the effectivity of the
Year 2000 GAA has ceased, this Court shall nonetheless proceed to resolve the
issues raised in the present case, it being impressed with public interest.
Petitioners argue that the GAA violated the constitutional mandate of
automatically releasing the IRAs when it made its release contingent on whether

40
revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally submitted by the
President, rather than making the release automatic.

In another case, the Court held that the only possible exception to mandatory
automatic release of the IRA is, as held in Batangas:

ISSUE: WON the subject GAA violates LGUs fiscal autonomy by not automatically
releasing the whole amount of the allotted IRA.

if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less
than 40 percent of the collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in which
case what should be automatically released shall be a proportionate amount of
the collections for the current fiscal year. The adjustment may even be made on
a quarterly basis depending on the actual collections of national internal revenue
taxes for the quarter of the current fiscal year.

HELD: Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides:


SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by
law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
Petitioners argue that the GAA violated this constitutional mandate when it made
the release of IRA contingent on whether revenue collections could meet the
revenue targets originally submitted by the President, rather than making the
release automatic. Respondents counterargue that the above constitutional
provision is addressed not to the legislature but to the executive, hence, the
same does not prevent the legislature from imposing conditions upon the release
of the IRA.
Respondents thus infer that the subject constitutional provision merely prevents
the executive branch of the government from unilaterally withholding the IRA,
but not the legislature from authorizing the executive branch to withhold the
same. In the words of respondents, This essentially means that the President or
any member of the Executive Department cannot unilaterally, i.e., without the
backing of statute, withhold the release of the IRA.

This Court recognizes that the passage of the GAA provisions by Congress was
motivated by the laudable intent to lower the budget deficit in line with prudent
fiscal management. The pronouncement in Pimentel, however, must be echoed:
[T]he rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out
within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes
must be carried out by legal methods.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. XXXVII and LIV Special Provisions 1 and 4
of the Year 2000 GAA are hereby declared unconstitutional insofar as they set
apart a portion of the IRA, in the amount of P10 Billion, as part of the
UNPROGRAMMED FUND.

SHARE OF LGUs IN NATL WEALTH 289-294

As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release the
just share of local governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature
not to pass laws that might prevent the executive from performing this duty. To
hold that the executive branch may disregard constitutional provisions which
define its duties, provided it has the backing of statute, is virtually to make the
Constitution amendable by statute a proposition which is patently absurd. If
indeed the framers intended to allow the enactment of statutes making the
release of IRA conditional instead of automatic, then Article X, Section 6 of the
Constitution would have been worded differently.

CREDIT FINANCING 295-303

Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the just share of local
governments is qualified by the words as determined by law, and not the
release thereof, the plain implication is that Congress is not authorized by the
Constitution to hinder or impede the automatic release of the IRA.

In May 1999, the City of Marikina undertook a public works project to widen,
clear andrepair the existing sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision. It
was undertaken by thecity government pursuant to Ordinance No. 59.
Subsequently, petitioner Albon filed a taxpayerssuit for certiorari, prohibition

LOCAL FISCAL ADMIN 304-354


53 Villanueva vs Ople
x
54 Albon vs Fernando
FACTS:

41
and injunction with damages against respondents City Engineer Alfonso Espirito,
Assistant City Engineer Anaki Maderal and City Treasurer NatividadCabalquinto.
According to the petitioner it was unconstitutional and unlawful for respondents
to usegovernment equipment and property, and to disburse public funds, of the
City of Marikina for thegrading, widening, clearing, repair and maintenance of
the existing sidewalks of MarikinaGreenheights Subdivision. He alleged that the
sidewalks were private property becauseMarikina Greenheights Subdivision was
owned by V.V. Soliven, Inc. Hence, the city governmentcould not use public
resources on them. In undertaking the project, therefore, respondentsallegedly
violated the constitutional proscription against the use of public funds for
privatepurposes as well as Sections 335 and 336 of RA 7160 and the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents.
Ordinance No. 59 is a valid enactment.The court recognized the inherent police
power of the municipality and with this it is allowed tocarry out the contested
works. The Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the trial courtstating that
sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision were public in nature
andownership thereof belonged to the City of Marikina or the Republic of the
Philippines following the 1991 White Plains Association decision. Thus, the
improvement and widening of the sidewalks pursuant to Ordinance No. 59 of
1993 was well within the LGUs powers.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the validity of Ordinance
No. 59
HELD: NO. Like all LGUs, the City of Marikina is empowered to enact ordinances
for the purposes set forth in the Local Government Code (RA 7160). It is
expressly vested with police powers delegated to LGUs under the general
welfare clause of RA 7160. With this power, LGUs may prescribe reasonable
regulations to protect the lives, health, and property of their constituents and
maintain peace and order within their respective territorial jurisdictions. Also, in
the exercise of their inherent police power the cities and municipalities have the
power to exercise such powers and discharge such functions and responsibilities
as may be necessary, appropriate or incidental to efficient and effective
provisions of the basic services and facilities, including infrastructure facilities
intended primarily to service the needs of their residents and which are financed
by their own funds. These infrastructure facilities include municipal or city roads
and bridges and similar facilities. Regarding the nature of ownership of the
sidewalks in question, there is also no hindrance in declaring that the sidewalks

are of public dominion. PD 957, as amended by PD1216, mandates subdivision


owners to set aside open spaces which shall be devoted exclusively for the use
of the general public.
55 Altres vs Empleo
x
128-196
Const- Art 10 $3 d5-7
56 Pepsi Cola vs City of Butuan
"The classification made in the exercise of power to tax, to be valid, must be
reasonable ."

FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant Pepsi-Cola sought to recover the sums paid by it under


protest, to the City of Butuan, and collected by the latter, pursuant to its
Municipal Ordinance No. 110 which plaintiff assails as null and void because it
partakes of the nature of an import tax, amounts to double taxation, highly
unjust and discriminatory, excessive, oppressive and confiscatory, and
constitutes an invlaid delegation of the power to tax. The ordinance imposes
taxes for every case of softdrinks, liquors and other carbonated beverages,
regardless of the volume of sales, shipped to the agents and/or consignees by
outside dealers or any person or company having its actual business outside the
City.
ISSUE: Does the tax ordinance violate the uniformity requirement of taxation?
HELD: Yes. The tax levied is discriminatory. Even if the burden in question were
regarded as a tax on the sale of said beverages, it would still be invalid, as
discriminatory, and hence, violative of the uniformity required by the
Constitution and the law therefor, since only sales by "agents or consignees" of
outside dealers would be subject to the tax. Sales by local dealers, not acting for
or on behalf of other merchants, regardless of the volume of their sales, and
even if the same exceeded those made by said agents or consignees of
producers or merchants established outside the City of Butuan, would be exempt
from the disputed tax.

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It is true that the uniformity essential to the valid exercise of the power of
taxation does not require identity or equality under all circumstances, or negate
the authority to classify the objects of taxation. The classification made in the
exercise of this authority, to be valid, must, however, be reasonable and this
requirement is not deemed satisfied unless: (1) it is based upon substantial
distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose
of the legislation or ordinance; (3) the classification applies, not only to present
conditions, but, also, to future conditions substantially identical to those of the
present; and (4) the classification applies equally to all those who belong to the
same class.
57 Philippine Petroleum Corpn vs Pililla
Facts: Philippine Petroleum Corporation is a business enterprise engaged in the
manufacture of lubricated oil base stocks which is a petroleum product, with its
refinery plant situated at Malaya, Pilillia Rizal, conducting its business activities
within the territorial jurisdiction of municipality of Pilillia, Rizal and is in
continuous operation up to the present. PPC owns and maintains an oil refinery
including 49 storage tanks for its petroleum products in Malaya, Pililla, Rizal.
Under section 142 of NIRC of 1939, manufactured oils and other fuels are subject
to specific tax. Respondent municipality of Pilillia, Rizal through municipal council
resolution no. 25-s-1974 enacted municipal tax
ordinance no. 1-s-1974
otherwise known as The Pililla Tax Code Of 1974 on June 14, 1974 which took
effect on July 1, 1974. Sections 9 and 10 of the said ordinance imposed a tax on
business, except for those which fixed taxes are provided in the local tax code on
manufacturers, importers, or producers of any article of commerce of whatever
kind or nature, including brewers, distiller, rectifiers, repackers and compounders
of liquors distilled spirits and/or wines in accordance with the schedule found in
the local tax code, as well as mayors permit sanitary inspection fee and storage
permit fee for flammable, combustible or explosive substances, while section
139 of the disputed ordinance imposed surcharges and interests on unpaid
taxes, fees or charges. Enforcing the provisions of the above mentioned
ordinance, the respondent filed a complaint on April 4, 1986 docketed as civil
case no. 057-T against PPC for the collection of the business tax from 1979 to
1986; storage permit fees from 1975 to 1986; mayors permit fee and sanitary
permit inspection fees from 1975 to 1984. PPC, however, have already paid the
last named fees starting 1985.

Issue: Whether or not the Municipality may validly impose taxes on petitioners
business.
Held: No. While section 2 of PD 436 prohibits the imposition of local taxes on
petroleum products, said decree did not amend sections 19 and 19 (a) of PD 231
as amended by PD 426, wherein the municipality is granted the right to levy
taxes on business of manufacturers, importers, producers of any article of
commerce of whatever kind or nature. A tax on business is distinct from a tax on
the article itself. Thus, if the imposition of tax on business of manufacturers, etc.
in petroleum products contravenes a declared national policy, it should have
been expressly stated in PD No. 436.
The exercise by local governments of the power to tax is ordained by the present
constitution. To allow the continuous effectivity of the prohibition set forth in PC
no. 26-73 would be tantamount to restricting their power to tax by mere
administrative issuances. Under section 5, article X of the 1987 constitution, only
guidelines and limitations that may be established by congress can define and
limit such power of local governments.
The storage permit fee being imposed by Pilillias tax ordinance is a fee for the
installation and keeping in storage of any flammable, combustible or explosive
substances. In as much as said storage makes use of tanks owned not by the
Municipality of Pilillia but by petitioner PPC, same is obviously not a charge for
any service rendered by the municipality as what is envisioned in section 37 of
the same code.
EXEMPTIONS

43