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Hamza Faisal
27th April 2016
Sir Shehryar Khan
Critical Issues in Pakistan Foreign Relations
The Kashmir Issue
Since the partition of the subcontinent, which resulted in the creation of the two
dominions India and Pakistan, Kashmir has been the apple of discord between the two
nations. Following three major wars, a loss of thousands of innocent lives, immense damage to
property and a massive breach of human rights, the Jammu and Kashmir issue remains
unsettled. There have been major conflicts between India and Pakistan since independence, but
in most cases, they have been solved either through diplomacy or third party intervention.
Unfortunately, in the case of Kashmir, neither Pakistan nor India nor the United Nations has
been able to devise a solution which is generally acceptable to both states.
Currently, Pakistan occupies one-third of the Kashmir territory, known as Azaad
Kashmir while the other major chunk remains under the direct control of India. One of the
solutions proposed by UN Security Council advises the implementation of plebiscite, which
goes in Pakistans favor given the majority Muslim population of Kashmir. On the other hand,
India claims whole of Kashmir to be part of it on basis of the instrument of accession signed
in 1948 with Kashmirs Maharaja Hari Singh, the ruler at that time, which Indians argue gives
them complete right over Kashmir. Since independence, every government coming into power
in both countries, democratic or military, promises to propose a peaceful solution to the
Kashmir issue but none of them has been effective to date. The negotiation process almost
breaks everytime because both the parties are not willing to make a compromise. However, it
can be said that at two instances, Pakistan and India came extremely close to breaking the
deadlock on Kashmir issue, first through the Chenab formula and later through Musharrafs 4

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point formula. This paper examines and scrutinizes both the Chenab Formula and Musharrafs
4 points, providing an analysis for their limitations and explores new paths towards a peaceful
Kashmir.
The Chenab Formula was first coined in the early 1960s but the dialogues could not
make any progress. The Chenab formula, as the name suggests, talked about the division of
Kashmir along the River Chenab, resulting in the transfer of Western parts of Indian occupied
Kashmir from India to Pakistan. It was formally drawn in 1998 when Nawaz Sharif was in
power and the relations between India and Pakistan were at their peak. The positive
development was based on the personal chemistry between Nawaz Sharif and Vajpayee. (20,
Cricket Cauldron). Atal Bihari Vajpayee, then Indian Prime-minister, was on good terms with
Nawaz Sharif; both of them were found meeting on the sidelines at different international
summits where they had shared the need to normalizing bilateral relations. Atal Bihari
Vajpayees historic visit to Pakistan when he arrived in Lahore with his entourage in a bus
raised hopes of improved relations between India and Pakistan. There were clear indications
that both prime ministers wanted to move towards a better relationship that could only be
achieved through the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. (20, Cricket Cauldron). Although
some progress between the two nations was made in the form of the Lahore Declaration, this
progress was soon nullified due to Musharrafs hasty decision to capture areas of Kargil.
Negotiations were consequently called off. As we analyse Chenab Formula in terms of how
realistic the proposal was, an important thing to understand here is that the Chenab formula
suggested giving vast majority of land to Pakistan, a clear victory in its longstanding dispute
with India (BBC, The Future of Kashmir). This even meant that Indus Water Treaty was no
more needed due to a change in Kashmirs political situation. It would have also cause the
water distribution network to alter, where Pakistan would benefit from complete control over
Indus, Jhelum and their tributaries while Chenab, Ravi, Sutlej and Beas would fall under Indian

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jurisdiction. Thereby, interestingly, we see that India indeed had very little to gain from such
an arrangement going forward. In light of such a situation, this paper seeks to establish that
whatever progress was made into the Chenab plan was primarily due to the efforts of the Indian
Prime Minister at the time, Vajpayee. Former Ambassador Shehryar Khan states his point of
view on the case, Personally, I felt that Vajpayee was the only Indian Prime Minister who
could have taken such a daring decision that went against Indias long-established position of
not yielding an inch of Indian (Kashmir) territory to Pakistan (21, Cricket Cauldron). It is
also important to note that acceptance of such a formula could have resulted in tremendous
uproar amongst many members of the Indian population, leading to serious repercussions and
pressures on the Indian government. Moreover, seeing that tensions between the armies of the
two states were prevalent, there was also a huge possibility that the Indian army would have
outright rejected such a deal.
On the other hand, Musharrafs 4 points on Kashmir concentrated more on joint
collaboration to govern the state of Jammu and Kashmir rather than dividing the region. The
points listed were as follows: 1) Self Governance; 2) Demilitarization; 3) Same borders but
free trade and free movement for people within the Pakistani and Indian held Kashmir, India
and Pakistan; 4) Joint management of Kashmir. There is considerable truth in the statement
that these points could have led to the lowering of tensions between the two countries. As the
former Chairman of Hurriyat Conference in Kashmir During Pervez Musharrafs time the
leadership in India and Pakistan had made appreciable progress towards finding a solution of
the Kashmir problem. It is quite important to understand that joint governance can potentially
result in peaceful solutions of disputes of such nature, while dividing the region would
invariably aggravate the problem. Another part of the proposal mentioned that after 7 or 15
or more years it would be discussed to the people and if they agree with it the arrangement will
be deemed as final settlement on the Kashmir problem. But if they say no, then another

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mechanism will have to be advanced to determine the desire of people in all these regions
comprising Jammu and Kashmir and India and Pakistan. The inclusion of the public opinion
in the decision-making process is a vital element of any democracy, and the statement above
reinforces such aspects of the points. It is also important, however, to look at the potential
obstacles that Musharraf could have faced in enforcing these 4 points. Legitimacy of a military
rulers agreement with another rival state would have been questionable as soon as the next
democratically elected government would have come to power in Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif
reportedly said This gentleman Musharraf announces very important things off-the-cuff. He
has the habit of taking decisions in a very casual manner. While In the words of former
Pakistani foreign minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, in 2007 the solution to Kashmir was in
the grasp of both governments. However, looking at it from a different perspective, the outcry
from the Indian people on this backchannel diplomacy could have been very critical. India is a
democracy since its inception and they hold a very narrow view of military where they believe
that no deal can be reached with military personnel. A military dictator represents no one but
himself alone. It can also be argued that these four points are vague in a sense that they propose
less of a solution and are steps to improve the atmosphere between the two bitter neighbours.
Therefore we see that each solution had its own supporters and nay-sayers in the respective
nations in question and the success of each solution can prove very hard to measure as none of
them was actually implemented.

It is safe to assume, primarily from the historical literature available in both countries
with regards to Kashmir, that Kashmir has never really been just a territorial issue. It has always
come down to the pride of the two nations in question. The battle for Kashmir is a battle both
India and Pakistan cannot afford to lose and it is mutually understood that neither side will ever
be willing to compromise more than necessary to reach an agreement. In such a state of
conflicting polar interests, we find that those who are worse off as a result of this situation are

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none other than the Kashmiris. Living in a constant fear within their very own land is bound of
have an adverse effect on the moral and emotional health of Kashmiris. Therefore, this paper
looks to not only take into consideration the benefits Pakistan and India might gain as a direct
result of a solution, but also benefits to the Kashmiris. This makes for an interesting mix of
interests that have to be tackled when looking for a viable solution.
Keeping the above discussed points in mind, this paper establishes that maintaining the
status quo is the only feasible solution to the Kashmir problem inherited by Pakistan and postpartition India. Independent status to Kashmir, as argued for by many regional players, will
fail simply because neither side, Pakistan and India, will benefit from such an arrangement and
all the expenditures to date made mainly in the form of military in Kashmir by both sides will
have gone to waste. Therefore, simply because the benefits for Pakistan and India in granting
independent status to Kashmir are greatly outweighed by the costs incurred over time, neither
side will be willing to reach such a decision. To once again emphasis the importance of
Kashmir to the respective countries, we see that "Although Pakistan has demanded a change in
the status of the Kashmir Valley, it depends on water from the Mangla Reservoir in Pakistaniadministered Jammu and Kashmir and would be unlikely to permit loss of control of the
region." A plebiscite on the other hand, as proposed by the Security Council, will be hard to
even conduct, let alone implement, as India will strongly oppose a plebiscite deciding the future
of Muslim-majority Kashmir as that would be playing into the hands of defeat. Therefore we
can see that none of the above discussed alternate solutions to the Kashmir problem is viable.
The only logical solution therefore remains to be that of the status-quo, at least in the short run.
Some other aspects, in continuation with those discussed above, help understand why
maintaining the status quo is indeed the best decision, at least currently. For one, it is not hard
to argue that currently Pakistan is in no economic or political shape to administer such a large
such of land even if we for the moment assume that such a decision could be reached. It will

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take a long time for Pakistan to develop and progress to a point where it can sustainably govern
Kashmir as a part of Pakistani sovereign territory. Furthermore, time needs to be given to
Kashmir in order for it to improve its local conditions. The people of Kashmir need to be
granted domestic autonomy, something that they have been deprived of for a long time. The
democratic rights of the people too need to be strengthened in order to move towards a truly
democratic and liberal solution to the issue at large. Along with the building of Kashmirs
political institutions, we should also build trust between the two nations i.e. Pakistan and
Kashmir. For this purpose, free movement of migrants from Kashmir to Pakistan should be put
into place as this will unite many families and lead to promotion of good relations between the
nations. Moreover, both Pakistan and India on a bilateral level should ensure that certain
rules and regulations are put into place whilst a solution to the issue is found. Firstly, Human
Rights should be preserved at all levels in Kashmir and both countries should take active
participation in ensuring this. Furthermore, bringing the Kashmir officials onto the table and
listening to their problems and issues will also bring to light many local problems that Pakistan
and India might not even be aware of. Such confidence building measures between the 3
concerned parties will surely ease out tensions and resentments and therefore in the long run
prove beneficial for all concerned parties.
In conclusion, the failure to resolve the Kashmir dispute could lead to severe
repercussions if not handled in a timely manner. History is fraught with instances where an
oppressed people fought for independence through a bloody revolution; this is something best
avoided for the greater good of all. Kashmir has been a point of contention between Pakistan
and India ever since the birth of the two nations; both countries are unwilling to give up what
they consider their sovereign right. The influx of weaponry and proxy-soldiers has no doubt
rendered the area vulnerable, largely due to the tensions between the two nations. Of course,
the advent of 9/11 changed Pakistani foreign policy drastically, with Kashmir no longer a

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priority. This was met with discontent from the general Kashmiri populace, who were hoping
for a resolution of the matter to be given priority. At the end of the day, it is best if both
countries take a cue from history and avoid making any moves that could lead to outright war.
A pragmatic solution, one that doesnt involve violence and bloodshed, should be made a
priority.

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Works Cited
Khan, Shehreyar M., and Ali Khan. "The Call." Cricket Cauldron. N.p.: Harper Sport, n.d. N. pag.
Print.
"The Future of Kashmir." BBC News. BBC, n.d. Web. 12 Dec. 2014.