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CONFLICTS
AND TENSIONS
Edited by
HELMUT K. ANHEIER AND YUDHISHTHIR RAJ ISAR
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CONTENTS
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3
17
Introduction
Y. Raj Isar and Helmut K. Anheier
19
29
Introduction
29
31
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66
80
90
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Regional Realities
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Introduction
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143
10
151
11
162
12
172
13
Capitalism, Conflict and Churn: How the American Culture War Went Global
Ronnie D. Lipschutz
185
199
Introduction
199
Tensions
201
14
201
15
210
16
221
17
232
Values
241
18
Value Patterns in Europe and the United States: Is there a Transatlantic Rift?
Christian Welzel and Franziska Deutsch
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19
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Migration
258
20
258
21
264
22
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Introduction
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23
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24
296
25
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26
313
27
328
INDICATOR SUITES
333
335
349
349
357
361
368
369
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2B Knowledge
Creation
Dissemination
Storage
Innovation and Protection
Digest: Knowledge
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398
403
406
412
420
421
422
427
432
435
436
437
438
439
3A Economy
439
440
444
447
449
453
3B Professions
Cultural Professions
Digest: Cultural Professions
455
456
460
461
462
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469
473
474
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475
476
479
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483
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486
487
488
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513
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515
516
517
519
520
524
526
530
532
536
540
541
542
543
5A Regulatory Frameworks
International Standards
International Regulatory Frameworks
Digest: International Standards
Digest: Regulatory Frameworks
543
544
549
552
553
5B Policy
Cultural Diplomacy and Cultural Observations
Digest: Cultural Observatories
555
556
558
559
560
565
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Piracy
Digest: Arms
Digest: Conflict Resolution & UN Peacekeeping
Digest: Current Conflicts, Issues and Tensions
Digest: Human Rights
Digest: Terrorism
Digest: Transnational Crime
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599
600
601
602
603
604
Source Material
605
Index
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FOREWORD
In a sense, globalization began as a cultural phenomenon. The simultaneous availability of information everywhere on the globe was the seed of world-wide developments economically and politically. Strangely perhaps, the economic and political
consequences of globalization are not only clearly in evidence but have also been
widely studied, whereas few have focused on the cultural consequences of what was
originally a cultural phenomenon. The Cultures and Globalization Series fills this gap,
and for that reason alone it is most welcome.
The financial and general economic consequences of globalization have become a
part of our lives, even if they are variegated and in no sense simple. The political consequences of globalization are with us every day, not least through the threat of the
world-wide interconnections of terrorism. By contrast, the cultural consequences of
globalization are more complex and less visible. Nor are they a set of developments
pointing in one direction only. Globalization has now become widely recognized, that is
to say the simultaneous extension of relevant cultural spaces and growing significance
of more immediate, locally limited sources of cultural identity.
The task of documenting the relations of culture and globalization is thus formidable. It is appropriate that the Series editors, Helmut Anheier and Yudhishthir Raj Isar,
should have enlisted the support of a large number of authors and advisers to accomplish the task. Professor Anheier himself is no stranger to complexity, as his work on
civil society in a variety of countries shows. Professor Isars background in international
cultural policy is equally important to the projects objectives. Thus the project leaders
and the authors from diverse parts of the globe guarantee that this Series will be about
diversity yet usable in many if not all parts of the world.
Such wide utility is strengthened by a methodological feature. The end of ideology
has often been stated when in fact ideological politics had a stubborn way of returning.
Globalization might be assumed to have consigned ideology finally to the rubbish
dumps of history. Yet again we are faced with what has been called, market fundamentalism on the one hand, and with sometimes violent anti-globalization movements on
the other. Fortunately there is also the new trend of evidence-based politics, and one
may hope that it will prevail. This volume is nothing if not evidence-based. It provides
a considerable amount of evidence otherwise unavailable or only accessible in disparate sources. Not the least merit of this Series is that it helps find out what is actually happening. There are valuable beginnings of the development of indices of the
cultural consequences of globalization. In this way, the volume will contribute to making full use of the opportunities of globalization while not ignoring its threats.
Ralf Dahrendorf
London, 2006
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Cultures and Globalization Series has relied on the support, advice and contributions of numerous individuals and organizations. We endeavor to acknowledge all who
have participated in the development and production of this project, and are grateful
for the support, advice and encouragement received. The final publication remains the
responsibility of the editors.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Bardeleben, Elisenda Belda, Franoise Benhamou, Llus Bonet, Jozsef Borocz, Tom
Bradshaw, Craig Calhoun, Esteve Carams, Judit Carrera, Miguel Centeno, Joni Maya
Cherbo, Tyler Cowen, Diana Crane, Diane Dodd, Zahava Doering, Waddick Doyle,
Baykal Eyyubeglu, James Fitzpatrick, Nancy Fuller, Aimee Fullman, Leonore Yaffee
Garcia, Sandra Gibson, Bill Gilcher, Salvador Giner, Faye Ginsburg, Mercedes
Giovinazzo, William Glade, Xavier Greffe, Narayani Gupta, James Herbert, Bill Ivey,
Maria Rosario Jackson, Selim Jahan, Om Prakash Jain, Varun Jain, Arnita Jones,
Hagai Katz, Jonathan Katz, Stanley Katz, Inge Kaul, Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett,
Adam Klausner, Annamari Laaksonen, Sophia Labadi, Marc Leland, Hui Lu, Bob
Lynch, Peter Mandaville, Connie McNeely, Sara Meneses, Tanni Mukhopadhyay,
Francesc Muoz, Mary Ann Newman, Jorge Osterling, Agnieszka Paczynska, Sakiko
Fukuda-Parr, Jordi Pascual, Peter Rantasa, Serge Regourd, Greg Richards, David
Rieff, Aurea Roldan, Dominique Sagot-Duvauroux, Joan Shigekawa, James Allen
Smith, Paul Smith, Kate Stimpson, Andrs Sznt, Nalini Thakur, Stefan Toepler,
Heather Townsend, Anne Vena, Shalini Venturelli, Monica Villegas, Ray Wanner, JeanPierre Warnier, Janine Wedel, Nancy Weiss, Harrison White, Margaret Wyszomirski,
George Yudice.
Additional support
Guest boxes
Researchers
Michael Kyle Behen, Lauren Buckland, Karina Danek, Juliet Gharibian, Amber
Hawkes, Hagai Katz, Aaron Kofner, Ilona Iskandar, Marcus Lam, Margaret Lee, Luis
Medina, Leda Nelson, Aiha Nguyen, Ronaldo Nibbe, Alexander Nino-Ruiz, Cheryl
Samson, Lily Song, Swati Solanki.
Artwork
Emilia Birlo
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xiv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Administrative support
Jocelyn Guihama and Laurie Spivak.
Financial Support
We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the following institutions:
Aventis Foundation
Atlantic Philanthropies
The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation
Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation
Compagnia di San Paolo
The J. Paul Getty Trust
The Prince Claus Fund for Culture and Development
Bertelsmann Foundation
Shell International Limited
Swedish International Development Agency
UCLA School of Public Affairs
In particular we would like to acknowledge the support of Rui Esgaio (Calouste
Gulbenkian Foundation), Els van der Plas (The Prince Claus Fund), Dario Disegni
(Compagnia di San Paolo), Dan Brandstrm, Mats Roln and Carl-Johan Kleberg (The
Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation).
We also wish to recognize the supportive partnership of Forum Cultural Mundial
(World Culture Forum), Rio de Janeiro, and its Director-General, Dieter Jaenicke.
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CONTRIBUTORS
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companies, and grassroots reconciliation associations. She recently presented her
paper Theatre as Social Intervention in Post-Genocide Rwanda at the International
Researching Drama and Theatre Education Conference at Exeter University in April
2005.
Amparo Cadavid is professor of Ethics and Communication for Social Change, and a
senior research fellow at the Faculty of Communications of the Pontifical Javeriana
University, in Bogot, Colombia, since 2003. She has carried out and published several studies on community and citizen media. She is an expert in the design and application of communication strategies within regional development and peace plans, in
zones of high conflict. She has also conducted consultancy and policy advisory work
for the REDPRODEPAZ (National Development and Peace Programs Network), the
Ministry of Culture and several Development and Peace Programs and citizen media
networks in Colombia.
Kathryn A. Carver, a health and human rights lawyer with both a law degree and a
degree in epidemiology, is the Executive Director of The Concord Project. The Concord
Project undertakes research and action programmes to design successful crosscommunity organizations and leadership training in divided communities with longstanding animosity. She has led the Technical Assistance Program of the Ryan White Care
Act while at John Snow, Inc., a public health consulting company. Previously, she was
the Director of the Office of Patient Advocacy of the (U.S.) National Marrow Donor
Program. She is the author of many articles on conflict mediation, womens political
participation, and the rights of Indian children.
Miguel Angel Centeno is Professor of Sociology and International Affairs at Princeton
University and is Director of the Princeton Institute for International and Regional
Studies. He is currently working on a book project, Visualizing Globalization, as well as
an online Historical Atlas of Globalization and the International Networks Archive
(www.princeton.edu/~ina).
Georges Corm is Professor at Saint-Joseph University in Beirut and Consultant to
several international organizations on issues related to the development of the Arab
world and international economic cooperation. His publications and books have
focused on international development issues but also on the contemporary history of
the Middle East and the relations between the Arab Orient and Europe. He is a member of several scientific councils or trustee boards of non-profit organizations in Europe
and the Arab world. His latest book is devoted to a critical examination of the religious
revivals in the Moslem and western worlds.
Beverly Crawford teaches Political Economy at the University of California, Berkeley
and is Associate Director of UC Berkeleys Institute of European Studies. She is the
co-editor of The Myth of Ethnic Conflict: Politics, Economics and Cultural Violence,
(Berkeley: International and Area Studies, 1998), and The Convergence of
Civilizations: Constructing a Mediterranean Region (University of Toronto Press, 2006.)
She recently served as a co-principal investigator on a Ford Foundation project entitled Promising Practices in Information Technology Training for Disadvantaged Adults
and is currently working on a three- volume series entitled Globalization Comes Home:
The Impact of Globalization on the United States.
Franziska Deutsch is a Research Associate and PhD candidate at the School of
Humanities and Social Sciences at the International University Bremen, Germany.
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CONTRIBUTORS
Together with Chris Welzel and Ronald Inglehart (2005) she published Social Capital,
Voluntary Associations and Collective Action: Which Aspects of Social Capital Have the
Greatest Civic Payoff? in the Journal of Civil Society. Her main research interests cover
political participation, political culture, and political and social values.
Janadas Devan is a Singaporean journalist. He was educated at the University of
Singapore and Cornell University. His publications include journal articles on culture
and politics, as well as articles in newspapers and magazines in Singapore, the United
States, Malaysia and elsewhere.
Leo F. Estrada is an Associate Professor of Urban Planning, School of Public Affairs
at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). He is a social demographer with a
focus on the demographic aspects of ethnic and racial populations, planning for multiple publics and urban revitalization. He has publications on the topic of immigrant
adaptation, language access issues and transnational networks.
Anbal Ford is a Distinguished Professor in the Social Sciences Department at the
University of Buenos Aires, where he directed the Communication Studies and
Masters of Communication and Culture program. He currently leads research into the
visual representations of socio-cultural diversity, for the Secretariat of Science and
Technology at the University of Buenos Aires. He has published several books about
communications, culture, and information. His latest publications include: La marca de
la bestia. Identificacin, Desigualdades e infoentretenimiento en la sociedad contempornea; Resto del mundo: Nuevas mediaciones de las agendas criticas internacionales, and the fictional Oxidacin.
Nathan Gardels is editor of National Policy Quarterly, the journal of social and political thought published by Blackwell, as well as the Global Viewpoint service of the Los
Angeles Times Syndicate/Tribune Media, which has 35 million readers in 15 languages. His latest book is The Changing Global Order: World Leaders Reflect
(Blackwell, 1997).
Lord Anthony Giddens has taught at the University of Leicester and subsequently at
Cambridge, where he was Professor of Sociology. From 1997 to 2003 he was Director
of the London School of Economics. He is currently a Life Fellow of Kings College,
Cambridge. He was made a Life Peer in May 2004. He is a Fellow of the American
Academy of Science and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and was the BBC
Reith Lecturer in 1999. He has had a major impact upon the evolution of New Labour
in the UK. He took part in the original BlairClinton dialogues from 1997 onwards. He
is one of the founders of Polity Press, one of the best known publishers in the social
sciences and the humanities.
Alejandro Grimson is Director of the Instituto de Altos Estudios Sociales (Universidad
de San Martin), Buenos Aires, and researcher of the CONICET. He has published books
and articles on migration, border zones, and ethnic and national identities, such as:
Argentina and the Southern Cone. Neoliberalism and National Imagination (with Gabriel
Kessler). He participated in different research projects and international seminars
with Princeton University, Texas University, Social Science Research Council, and other
institutions.
Ronald Inglehart is a professor of political science and program director at the
Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan. He helped found the
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Euro-Barometer surveys and directs the World Values Surveys. His research deals
with changing belief systems and their impact on social and political change. Author of
more than 200 publications, his most recent books are (with Pippa Norris) Rising Tide:
Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World (Cambridge University Press,
2003) and Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (Cambridge University
Press, 2004); and (with Christian Welzel) Modernization, Cultural Change and
Democracy: The Human Development Sequence (Cambridge University Press, 2005).
He also edited Mass Values and Social Change: Findings from the Values Surveys
(Leiden: Brill Publishers, 2003) and Human Beliefs and Values: A Cross-Cultural
Sourcebook based on the 1999-2001 Values Surveys (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 2004).
Yudhishthir (Raj) Isar, an anthropologist by training, is Jean Monnet Professor of Cultural
Policy Studies at The American University of Paris and also teaches at the Institut dEtudes
Politiques (Sciences Po). He is the President of the European Forum for Arts and Heritage
(EFAH), a board member of the Institute of International Visual Arts (inIVA) and of the
Fitzcarraldo Foundation (Turin), Special Advisor to the World Monuments Fund (New York)
and the Sanskriti Foundation (New Delhi). Earlier, at UNESCO, he was Executive Secretary
of the World Commission on Culture and Development, director of cultural policies and of
the International Fund for the Promotion of Culture.
Linda Kaboolian, a sociologist, is a faculty member at the John F. Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard University, where she is the Director of the Labor Program and
Co-Director of the Executive Program for State and Local Officials. Her areas of specialization are conflict mediation, organizational behaviour, labour policy and educational
policy. She is the Co-Principal Investigator of The Concord Project. Her new book,
WinWin LaborManagement Collaboration in Education was published in 2006. She is
also the co-author of Working Better Together: A Practical Guide for Union Leaders,
Elected Officials and Managers.
Dragan Klaic is a Permanent Fellow of Felix Meritis (Amsterdam). He teaches Arts
and Cultural Policy at the University of Leiden and serves as advisor, editor, researcher
and trainer. Klaic has worked as a theatre critic and dramaturge, held professorships
at the University of Arts Belgrade and University of Amsterdam and guest professorships in the USA, led the Theater Instituut Nederland, co-founded the European
Theatre Quarterly Euromaske, and served as the President of the European Network
of Information Centres for the Performing Arts and of the European Forum for the Arts
and Heritage. He was the Moderator of the Reflection Group of the European Cultural
Foundation and author of its final report Europe as a Cultural Project (2005).
Ronnie D. Lipschutz is Professor of Politics, Co-Director of the Center for Global,
International and Regional Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz. His most
recent books are Globalization, Governmentality and Global Politics: Regulation for the
Rest of Us? (Routledge, 2005) and a text co-authored with Mary Ann Ttreault, Global
Politics as if People Matter (Rowman and Littlefield, 2005). His areas of research and
teaching include international politics, global environmental affairs, US foreign policy,
empire and religion, globalization, international regulation, technology and public policy, and film, fiction, and politics.
Willem Henri Lucas (designer) studied at the Academy of Visual Arts in Arnhem in
the Netherlands and worked as an intern and apprentice for Max Kisman. From 1990
to 2002 he served as a professor and chair of the Utrecht School of the Arts Graphic
Design department. In 1998 he designed holiday postage stamps for the PTT (Dutch
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Post and telecom company). In 2003 and 2004 he won a Best Book award and a
nomination from the Art Directors Club in the Netherlands for his catalogue design and
posters series for de 4e salon exhibition for Centraal Museum Utrecht. He teaches at
UCLAs D/MA and has done freelance jobs for Ogilvy and Mather. He is working for the
Museum of Contemporary Art in Los Angeles where he designed The Painting in Tongues
catalogue, and has just finished designing the book Everythinghappensatonce on
video-artist Euan Macdonald for Kunstverlag Nuremberg, Germany.
Brian Min is a graduate student in political science at the University of California, Los
Angeles. He uses formal models and quantitative methods to study the comparative
politics of ethnicity and has conducted field research among the Inuit of the Canadian
Arctic. He holds a BA from Cornell University and a MPP from Harvard University.
Ahmad S. Moussalli is Professor of Political Science at the American University of
Beirut. He was visiting Professor at the Center for MuslimChristian Understanding at
Georgetown University (USA) and University of Copenhagen (Denmark). He is the
author of numerous writings, including: The Islamic Quest for Human Rights, Pluralism,
and Democracy ; Historical Dictionary of Islamic Fundamentalist Movements in the
Arab World, Iran and Turkey ; Human Rights, Pluralism and Democracy in Islam ;
Myths and Realities of Islamic Fundamentalism: Theoretical Aspects and Case
Studies; Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of
Sayyid Qutb ; A Theoretical Reading In Islamic Fundamentalism Discourse.
Barbara J. Nelson, a political scientist, is the Dean of the UCLA School of Public Affairs.
She was previously the Vice President of Radcliffe College. Her areas of specialization
are conflict mediation in civil society, organizational design, and leadership education.
She is the Founder of The Concord Project, and the co-author with Linda Kaboolian and
Kathryn A. Carver of The Concord Handbook: How to Build Social Capital Across
Communities. She is the author of six books including Leadership and Diversity: A
Case Book (UCLA and the Ford Foundation, 2004) and over sixty articles. Active in
community leadership, Dean Nelson is on the Board of Trustees of the United Way of
Greater Los Angeles and See Jane, a US organization dedicated to better presentation of girls and women in electronic media for children under 12.
Pippa Norris is the McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University. Her research compares elections and public opinion, political communications, and gender politics. She has published almost
three dozen books, with a related series of volumes for Cambridge University Press
including, with Ronald Inglehart, Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change
Around the Globe (2003), and Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide
(2004, winner of the Virginia Hodgkinson prize from the Independent Sector). Her most
recent research is for a new book on Driving Democracy: Do power-sharing institutions
work? (for Cambridge University Press).
Francis B. Nyamnjoh is Associate Professor and Head of Publications and
Dissemination with the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in
Africa (CODESRIA). He has taught sociology, anthropology and communication studies at universities in Cameroon, Botswana and South Africa, and has researched and
written extensively on Cameroon and Botswana, where he was awarded the Senior
Arts Researcher of the Year prize for 2003. His most recent books include Negotiating
an Anglophone Identity (Brill, 2003), Rights and the Politics of Recognition in Africa
(Zed Books, 2004), Africas Media, Democracy and the Politics of Belonging (Zed
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Books, 2005), Insiders and Outsiders: Citizenship and Xenophobia in Contemporary
Southern Africa (CODESRIA/ZED Books, 2006).
Silvia Ramos is a social scientist and the area coordinator for minorities, social movements and citizenship at the University Candido Mendes Center for Studies on Public
Security and Citizenship, in Rio de Janeiro. Since 2004 she coordinates the project
Youth and the Police in partnership with the cultural group Afro Reggae. The experience uses music, art and culture as a means of reducing the barriers between the
police and youngsters from slum areas. Silvia Ramos has published Police Stops,
Suspects and Discrimination in the City of Rio de Janeiro (2005) with Leonarda
Musumeci.
Clemencia Rodrguez is Associate Professor at the University of Oklahoma, in the
United States. Dr Rodrguez has conducted research since 1984 on citizens media in
different international contexts including Nicaragua, Colombia, Spain, Chile, and
among Latino communities in the United States. Dr Rodrguez publications on citizens
media include Fissures in the Mediascape: An International Study of Citizens Media
(2001), Citizens Media and the Voice of the Angel/Poet (in Media International
Australia, 2002), Civil Society and Citizens Media: Peace Architects for the New
Millennium (in Redeveloping Communication for Social Change: Theory, Practice,
Power (ed.) Karin Wilkins 2002), and The Bishop and His Star: Citizens
Communication in Southern Chile (in N. Couldry and J. Curran (eds.) Contesting
Media Power: Alternative Media in a Networked World, 17794. Boulder, CO:
Rowman and Littlefield).
James Thompson is Professor of Applied and Social Theatre at the University of
Manchester and a Director of the Centre for Applied Theatre Research. He is currently
the co-director of In Place of War a major research project funded by the UKs Arts
and Humanities Research Council. He was Guest Editor of TDR: the journal of performance studies Social Theatre edition (T183) and is author of Applied Theatre:
Bewilderment and Beyond (Peter Lang, 2003) and Digging Up Stories: Applied
Theatre, Performance and War (Manchester University Press, 2005). He is a theatre
practitioner and has worked in Brazil, Burkina Faso, Rwanda, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the
UK and USA. He has research interests in Applied Theatre, community-based theatre
and theatre and war.
Bassam Tibi, born 1944 in Damascus and educated in Frankfurt, has been, since
1973, Professor of International Relations at the University of Goettingen, Germany
and is, since 2004, A.D. White Professor-at-Large at Cornell University. He is author of
26 books in German and 6 monographs in English, including the recent publications:
The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder,
(University of California Press, 1998, updated edition 2002), Islam between Culture
and Politics, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, enlarged 2nd edition 2005). Tibi lectured at
more than 30 universities in four continents and co-authored dozens of English books
between 1980 and 2006.
Sreten Ugric ic is Director of the National Library of Serbia, Belgrade and is the author
of seven books (theory and fiction). During 19921997, he was a teaching fellow at the
Faculty of Philosophy in Pritina (Aesthetics and Ethics) and from 19972001 he was
programme manager at the Soros Fund (Pritina, Belgrade, Budapest). He is a
member of the Serbian PEN Club, and sits on The European Library Project Executive
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Boxes
5.1
100
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
17.1
104
105
107
109
113
238
Figures
Introduction 1
14
1.1
36
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
67
70
73
75
77
4.1
82
18.1
18.2
18.3
18.4
244
246
248
249
19.1
19.2
256
256
24.1
297
14.1
207
26.1
26.2
26.3
26.4
318
319
322
323
Illustrations
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Tables
Introduction 1
1.1
1.2
23
35
46
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
83
83
85
87
6.1
103
13.1
190
21.1
265
270
21.2
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The issues
As Appadurai (1996), Wolton (2003) and others
have observed, we are in a time of intense culturalism, as cultural difference is consciously mobilized in a politics of recognition and representation,
as a political arm, a bulwark or a refuge for both
individuals and groups. The terrorist attacks on
New York City and Washington DC on September
11, the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq,
heated debates about the cultural dimensions of
migration in Europe, fundamentalist re-assertions
in all major religions that are forms of cultural identification rather than spirituality, are among the
many events and forces that have turned these
articulations of cultural difference into political fault
lines. The fateful militancy (Hartman 1997) which
culture has achieved in political terms is now high
on the policy agenda.
At the same time, immense political pressure
from the West on some regions and countries,
while it ignores others, is met by a general disillusionment about the largely unmet promises of globalization in the Global South, where the majority of
the population lives on less than $2 a day (Stiglitz
2003). One striking cultural response to such
asymmetries has been the rise of cultural diversity
as a leading notion in international cultural politics.
This is no longer simply the diversity that is a given
of the human condition and the stuff of anthropology but a normative meta-narrative, deployed
as the standard-bearer of a campaign to exclude
cultural goods and services from global free trade
rules (Isar 2006). In this guise, the term emerged at
the turn of the present century, as an alternative to
the limited and somewhat negative connotations of
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Recognizing this specificity is also the main purpose of the Convention on the protection of the
diversity of cultural contents and artistic expressions
adopted by UNESCO in October 2005; it is the
sense in which many individuals, non-governmental
organizations, cultural activists and government
officials deploy the term strategically today.
The principle is laudable. The goal is to foster the
dynamism of contemporary cultural production
rather than play a preservationist role. Yet this is a
strategic essentialism built upon unquestioned,
un-deconstructed discourses of nationhood.
Precisely because its object is cultural diversity
among nations rather than within them, it is less
about the negotiation of cultural difference than
about the representation of cultures as islands
unto themselves, fixed and given (Isar 2006). Yet
the key challenge of negotiating difference today is
to give up notions of cultural purity, and search
to uncover the ways in which the meanings and
symbols of culture are produced through complex
processes of translation, negotiation and enunciation (Stevenson 2003: 61).
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Conceptual challenges
To be sure, any attempt at seeking to establish
such a framework in the field of cultures and
globalization faces many challenges. The initial
challenge is that of definition. As a phenomenon,
culture is directly or indirectly related to virtually
every aspect of the human condition; as a concept,
it is even broader and more capacious than economy or society. Kroeber and Kluckhohns 281
famous definitions of 1952, a classic reference,
come to mind immediately; indeed this is not surprising, since within various disciplines anthropology and sociology in particular there have been
many attempts to stabilize meanings in the interest
of a technical vocabulary (Williams 1976). Having
entirely escaped academic control in recent
decades, however, the notion has become even
more protean, especially as cultural difference has
come to be consciously mobilized in political ways
by individuals and groups.
The word culture is thus the object of a complex
terminological tangle. With no single definition generally accepted, differences, overlaps and nuances
in meaning complicate rather than facilitate rigor
and communication in the field. Various disciplines
deal with culture and regard it as their terrain,
however inclusively or exclusively: anthropology,
political science, history, sociology, the law, and, of
course, the humanities including cultural studies
and art history. These disciplines have become
institutionalized as such in the academy, and have
come to function as closed intellectual silos, as it
were, frequently discouraging multidisciplinary
approaches and cross-disciplinary dialogue. Within
each discipline, we typically find multiple approaches
in terms of focus and methodology, such as the split
between quantitative and qualitative sociology, or
between cultural and social anthropology. For
brevitys sake, we will refer to the sum of academic
disciplines concerned with culture as the cultural
disciplines.
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In addition to these themes, there are globalization theories with important implications for our
understanding of culture (see Guillen 2001). For
example, researchers such as Meyer et al. (1997)
argue that a world-culture of institutions such as citizenship, human rights, science and technology,
socioeconomic development, education, religion,
and management has emerged that penetrates virtually all human endeavor. This increasingly global
social organization of rationalized modernity has its
logic and purposes built into almost all nationstates, resulting in a world that shows increasing
structural similarities of form among countries. At
the same time, countries differ in the fit between
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Characteristics
A conceptual framework is neither a theory nor a
fully integrated body of knowledge. Rather, it serves
as a marker of intellectual terrain by identifying
boundaries, major concepts and issues as well as
the relations, de facto or hypothesized, among
them. Several qualities or characteristics are worth
keeping in mind:
Prerequisites
The Series is unlikely to avoid the problems of
definition that are endemic to the cultural disciplines, which are as it were, their conceptual discontents. We do not intend to adopt a single set of
omnibus concepts, much less a single lens. We
know that the various contributors to this collective
endeavor will each work with very different concepts of culture for the reasons already outlined
above. Also, the cultural disciplines, as well as cultural operators, activists and policy-makers, tend to
oscillate permanently between variants of the ways
of life notions of culture and arts and heritage
ones. We nevertheless intend to initiate our work
with an agreed understanding of the terms we ourselves shall be using. In other words, we shall offer
working definitions for key concepts and also state
our methodological approach.
Culture in the broad sense we propose to
employ refers to the social construction, articulation
and reception of meaning. Culture is the lived
and creative experience for individuals and
a body of artifacts, symbols, texts and objects.
Culture involves enactment and representation. It
embraces art and art discourse, the symbolic world
of meanings, the commodified output of the cultural
industries as well as the spontaneous or enacted,
organized or unorganized cultural expressions of
everyday life, including social relations. It is constitutive of both collective and individual identity.
Closely related to culture is the concept of communication, which refers to the ways in which
meanings, artifacts, beliefs, symbols and messages are transmitted through time and space, as
well as processed, recorded, stored, and reproduced. Communication requires media of storage
and transmission, institutions that make storage
and transmission possible, and media of reception.
Globalization involves the movement of objects
(goods, services, finance and other resources,
etc.), meanings (language, symbols, knowledge,
identities, etc.) and people across regions and
intercontinental space. The notion of cultural globalization involves three movements (UNDP 2004):
flows of investments and knowledge; flows of cultural goods; and flows of people. Cultures or
aspects of cultures are globalized to the extent to
which they involve the movement of specified
objects, systems of meaning and people across
national/regional borders and continents. Yet these
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Even though our understanding of the relationships between culture and globalization remains
sketchy and uneven, enough has been thought and
written on the subject to allow us to extract positions, statements and generic hypotheses that
identify, at least initially, key conceptual building
blocks and relationships.
Culture and globalization are complex, multifaceted concepts, and difficult to reduce to one or two
dimensions without conceptual and empirical harm.
Like globalization, culture involves social, economic
and political aspects, and also the artistic-aesthetic
realm. We refer to these dimensions as system, not
in the strict sense of system theory, but only to
emphasize that different aspects of culture can display considerable dynamics of their own, driven by
specific logics, incentives and rewards in terms
of recognition, prestige and power (Geertz 1983).
Thus, to counteract any reductionist tendencies, we
can think of culture as a system of artistic endeavor
and realm of creativity, as a social system of meaning and values, as an economic system of production, distribution and consumption, and as a
political system of positions of power and influence.
Each lens is equally valid and likely brings up different questions, leading to different insights and
implications.
The relationship between cultures and globalization is not only multifaceted from a systemic perspective; in each case, it also involves different
units of analysis such as individuals, organizations,
professions, institutional patterns, communities,
societies, as well as nation-states. The different
units, in turn, may be interrelated and affect each
other over time. In making observations, and in
reaching conclusions about these relationships, it is
important to specify the units of analysis involved.
Importantly, however, given the objectives of the
Series, we generally also put emphasis on units
other than nation-states, national cultures or countries. This would involve in particular units like organizations, communities, and actual networks
among individuals as well as virtual networks like
the Internet.
A. Context
Key understandings
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Imposition, which implies cultural power differences and stratification, hierarchy and unevenness in the establishment and use of institutional
infrastructure across societies, regions, etc.; such
power needs organizational, institutional infrastructure (media, professionals, knowledge).
Diffusion, whereby elements from one culture
find their way into another.
Relativization, whereby cultural elements take
shape relative to other elements.
Emulation, as the creation of a common cultural
arena in which actors can selectively choose
from an increasingly global arsenal.
Glocalization, whereby universal ideas, patterns
values are interpreted differently; refers to the
way in which homogenization and heterogenization intertwine.
Interpenetration, whereby the universalization
of particularism and the particularization of
universalism combine.
Resistance, whereby local culturalist claims and
identities are asserted in reaction to the perceived imposition of the global.
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13
Setting priorities
As suggested at the outset, a clear analytical
framework should spell out the organizing principles and substantive foci of Cultures and Globalization. Thus, in the context of globalization drivers
and processes, we are primarily interested in
describing and analyzing different units of analysis,
cultural identities, patterns, structures and flows,
and the models, theories and policy options they
suggest. We would do so through four lenses that
each highlight specific aspects of culture: artistic,
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Figure I.1
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Economic
globalization
Politicallegal
globalization
Structures:
entities
and patterns
Policy issues
and positions
Culture and
Globalization
Flows:
Processes and
communication
Models and
theories
System Focus
Social aspects of
culture as system
of meaning and
values
Economic aspects
of culture
Political aspects
of culture
Unit of Analysis
Transnational
and global
14
Societies/
Countries/
Communities/
Nations
Institutions/
Organizations/
Professions
Individuals
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15
REFERENCES
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INTRODUCTION
Yudhishthir Raj Isar and Helmut K. Anheier
Behind the concern for culture that is increasingly evoked in contemporary public debate lurks
the specter of conflict: the cultural dimensions of
conflict on the one hand, and the conflictual dimensions of culture on the other. The duality inherent in
this concern is, however, not always overtly stated.
Yet, like so many other phenomena that characterize or are generated by globalization, conflict
culture relationships are inadequately analyzed and
little understood. Hence they are easily politicized
by ideologues of many different types and persuasions. This applies in particular to the question of
cultural identities, both individual and collective,
and their forms of expression, maintenance, representation, recognition, and renewal.
What exactly do we mean by conflict? At one
level, we mean the tensions between individual and
collective values on the one hand and economic and
political interests on the other. These are an integral
part of the human and social condition; they have
always re-asserted themselves in times of accelerated change. Nor are they all inherently negative or
harmful, on the contrary. Many observers make the
point that the arts, for example, flourish during times
of change and tension as tools of critique and dissent. Or take the creative conflicts that sociologists
from Simmel (1983) to Dahrendorf (1994) have written about, or the creative destruction economists
such as Schumpeter (1962) and others identified.
Globalization has given a new edge to such conflicts,
however. Harnessing them through adequate institutions and ways of conflict regulation is now the challenge (see, e.g., Berger 1998).
Yet there are also violent conflicts, including conventional inter-state wars, ethnic strife and religious
riots. Such conflicts are not only hideously wasteful
of social energies and acutely harmful to all their protagonists. They also endanger future generations by
creating a legacy of grievances and a culture of
memory that, as will become clear below, are likely
to sow the seeds of future conflicts as well.
Addressing a broad range of conflicts, their cultural content and their relationships to globalization
processes within and among nations as well as
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INTRODUCTION
21
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Both types of conflicts are variations of the pattern or questions Weber identified: how current
economic and political interests are aligned with
prevailing worldviews, and the extent to which pathdependencies of interests play themselves out in a
world characterized by increased interpenetration.
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Table I.1
Dynamics
of conflict
phases
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Process of manifest
conflicts becoming
resolved
Possibility of
conflict
(disagreement
and perceived
level of threat)
filtered through
worldviews, and
assessed relative
to opportunity
structures, grievance
issues, framing
processes, and
instrumentalization
options; politics of
memory and pathdependencies
Conditions of
communicating,
mobilizing and
organizing,
resources
available and
resource
dependencies
Power
differentials
and technical,
organizational
capacity for
collective
action; range
of complicating
factors,
conflict forms,
channels,
and forums;
learned
conflict
behavior
Conditions
for conflict
balancing and
reaching
settlement,
conflict
outcomes;
of alignment
of outcome
with
worldview
and current
as well as
anticipated
interests
Schiller. And the story has been repeated elsewhere across the world, as a world system
centered on transnational corporate power and
globally-ranging financial markets has taken hold,
generating strong local reactions in worldviews,
sentiments and aspirations. The values of different
ways of life have risen to consciousness to become
the rallying cry of diverse claims to a space in the
planetary culture. Before, culture was just lived.
Now it has become a self-conscious collective project (Sahlins 1994).
As populations shift and societies change, people
turn to cultural distinctions embodied in their traditions to resist what is perceived as a threat to their
integrity and prosperity, even their very survival in
terms of transmission of identities and values. This
recurrent mobilization around group identity has led
to a cultural politics whose stakes include gaining
control of (or access to) political and economic
power. Where ethnic groups have enjoyed relatively
equitable positions, tensions have arisen as soon
as one or several of them has begun to feel that
their relative position is slipping. Such tensions,
often inevitable as economic conditions change,
have led to contentions over rights to land, education, the use of language, political representation,
freedom of religion, the preservation of ethnic identity, autonomy or self-determination.
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Conclusion
The results of our contributors efforts are presented in twenty-seven chapters, organized in four
sections, each with a separate introduction to help
orient the reader. All in all, this is a project based on
great expectations shared by those of us (including
the co-editors and the authors) who believe deeply
in the central importance of the cultural. The theme
this volume addresses, as we have unpacked it in
these introductory remarks, is one that crystallizes,
behind those great expectations, great anxieties
and perhaps equally great illusions. The great anxieties arise from the persistent abuse of culture,
both as a concept and as a reality. The great illusions are the result of overblown visions, of simplifications that are reductive, and readings that are
instrumental. The illusions can be dispelled, the
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INTRODUCTION
Notes
1
25
leads to the idea that culture is a thing that can act and
have causality; that it is uniformly distributed among
members of a group; that an individual possesses but a
single (generally national) culture; that culture is custom, in other words tradition, something fixed and
unchanging; finally, that culture is timeless, as when
some speak of the Arab mind, as though a unitary cognizing element has come down to all Arabs straight from
the Mecca of the Prophet Mohammed (see Avruch
1998).
Worldviews refers to ways of making sense of the world
and accounting for realities so perceived, within prevailing circumstances. We use the term worldview rather
than civilization for two reasons. First, worldview, close
to Weberian thinking, suggests greater plurality and fluidity than the term civilization. Second, the term civilization has become overly politicized through Huntingtons
clash of civilizations thesis and the ensuing debate
around it.
These distinctions and ideas owe much to the sociology
of conflict, in particular the work of Simmel,(1983),
Dahrendorf (1994), Coser (1956), and others.
REFERENCES
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CHAPTER 1
GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURAL CONFLICT:
AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH
Beverly Crawford
Introduction
What is the impact of globalization on social
cohesion and political integration? Does globalization nourish social and political integration and tear
down cultural barriers that divide people? Does it
signal a vital step toward both a more stable world
and better lives for the people in it (Rothkopf,
1997)? Or does it hasten social disintegration and
exacerbate social conflict? Is there really a link
between globalization and cultural conflict or harmony? If so, what is it?
Migratory flows, the tidal wave of global information, and the imperatives of economic liberalization
and fiscal reform the markers of globalization
have reshuffled social relations all over the world.
As the flood of immigrants to the industrial West
has given birth to a nascent heterogeneity in previously homogeneous societies, social pressures
and plummeting income levels accompany it. In
some countries, a spike in hate crimes against
foreigners seems to correspond to the influx of
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Argument
Many analysts (Rothkopf 1997; Sadowski 1998;
Telo 2001; Kuran, 2001; Dutceac, 2004) critique the
idea that economic globalization fuels cultural conflict, arguing that cultural conflicts are found in
almost every society, whether it experiences high
levels of globalization or not. And in fact, these conflicts are likely to be much less lethal in societies
that are receptive to globalization (Bhalla 1994;
Whitehead 1995; Geddes 1994).1 There is evidence
to support this view. For example, Malaysia had
much in common with Sri Lanka in terms of economy, society, and culture, including ethnic composition and inequalities between ethnic groups (Bruton
1992). Unlike Sri Lanka, however, whose economy
stagnated with economic liberalization, Malaysian
prosperity expanded the economic pie through its
participation in the global economy, providing abundant resources to Chinese and Malay alike.
Because the allocative institutions that distribute
these resources in ways that are widely perceived
as fair, rising prosperity denies extremist groups
bent on pitting these two communities against each
other the grievances that could fuel cultural conflict (Athukorala 2001).
The Indian State of Punjab between 1992 and
1998 provides a second example. There, after violence was repressed, the federal government abolished many restrictions, and market-stimulated
growth benefited disgruntled Sikh farmers who
were previously disadvantaged by discriminatory
regulations. But this social harmony may be difficult
to sustain, as the costs of participation in the global
economy outweigh the benefits. By 2002, because
of extreme fluctuations in global agricultural markets,
Punjab experienced both chronic economic crisis,
and the renewed escalation of social unrest.2
The stories of Punjab and Malaysia suggest that
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Austria
% of total population
Belgium
% of total population
Czech Republic
% of total population
Denmark
% of total population
Finland
% of total population
France
% of total population
Germany
% of total population
Greece
% of total population
Hungary
% of total population
Ireland
% of total population
Italy
% of total population
Japan
% of total population
Korea
% of total population
Luxembourg
% of total population
Netherlands
% of total population
Norway
% of total population
Poland
% of total population
Portugal
% of total population
Slovak Republic
% of total population
Spain
% of total population
Sweden
% of total population
Switzerland
% of total population
United Kingdom
% of total population
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
623.0
7.9
909.3
9.0
41.2
0.4
180.1
3.5
46.3
0.9
6 495.8
8.0
94.9
2.7
925.2
1.6
1 281.6
1.0
55.8
0.1
122.7
31.0
757.4
5.0
154.0
3.6
123.6
1.3
393.1
1.0
499.1
5.7
1 213.5
17.6
1 985.0
3.5
689.6
8.6
920.6
9.1
77.7
0.8
189.0
3.6
55.6
1.1
6 878.1
8.5
89.9
2.7
987.4
1.7
1 320.7
1.1
66.7
0.2
127.6
31.8
779.8
5.1
162.3
3.8
131.6
1.3
11.0
0.2
430.4
1.1
507.5
5.8
1 260.3
18.1
2 001.0
3.5
713.5
8.9
922.3
9.1
103.7
1.0
196.7
3.8
62.0
1.2
6 990.5
8.6
137.9
1.3
91.1
2.7
922.7
1.6
1 354.0
1.1
84.9
0.2
132.5
32.6
757.1
5.0
164.0
3.8
157.1
1.6
16.9
0.3
461.4
1.2
537.4
6.1
1 300.1
18.6
2 032.0
3.6
723.5
9.0
909.8
9.0
158.6
1.5
222.7
4.2
68.6
1.3
7 173.9
8.8
139.9
1.4
96.1
2.7
991.4
1.7
1 362.4
1.1
110.0
0.2
138.1
33.4
725.4
4.7
160.8
3.7
168.3
1.7
21.9
0.4
499.8
1.3
531.8
5.2
1 330.6
18.9
1 948.0
3.4
728.2
9.0
911.9
9.0
198.6
1.9
237.7
4.7
73.8
1.4
7 314.0
8.9
142.5
1.4
118.0
3.2
1 095.6
2.0
1 415.1
1.1
148.7
0.3
142.8
34.1
679.9
4.4
157.5
3.6
172.9
1.7
24.1
0.5
539.0
1.4
526.6
6.0
1 337.6
18.9
1 934.0
3.4
732.7
9.1
903.2
8.9
209.8
2.0
249.6
4.7
80.6
1.6
7 365.8
9.0
143.8
1.4
114.4
3.1
1 240.7
2.1
1 482.7
1.2
176.9
0.3
147.7
34.9
678.1
4.3
158.0
3.6
175.3
1.8
24.8
0.5
609.8
1.6
522.0
6.0
1 340.8
19.0
2 066.0
3.6
737.3
9.1
892.0
8.7
219.8
2.1
256.3
4.8
85.1
1.6
7 319.5
8.9
111.0
3.0
1 250.2
2.1
1 512.1
1.2
147.9
0.3
152.9
35.6
662.4
4.2
165.0
3.7
177.8
1.8
27.4
0.5
719.6
1.8
499.9
5.6
1 347.9
19.0
2 207.0
3.8
748.2
9.2
897.1
8.8
228.9
2.2
259.4
4.9
87.7
1.7
3 263.2
5.6
7 343.6
8.9
127.0
1.2
117.8
3.2
1 252.0
2.2
1 556.1
1.2
169.0
0.4
159.4
36.0
651.5
4.1
178.7
4.0
42.8
0.1
190.9
1.9
29.5
0.5
801.3
2.0
487.2
5.5
1 368.7
19.2
2 208.0
3.8
757.9
9.3
861.7
8.4
201.0
1.9
258.6
4.8
91.1
1.8
7 296.8
8.9
110.0
1.1
126.5
3.3
1 388.2
2.4
1 686.4
1.3
210.2
0.4
164.7
37.3
667.8
4.2
184.3
4.1
208.0
2.1
28.3
0.5
895.7
2.2
477.3
5.4
1 384.4
19.3
2 342.0
4.0
764.3
9.4
846.7
8.2
210.8
2.0
266.7
5.0
98.6
1.9
7 318.6
8.9
762.2
7.0
116.4
1.1
151.4
3.9
1 362.6
2.4
1 778.5
1.4
229.6
0.5
166.7
37.5
690.4
4.3
185.9
4.1
223.6
2.2
29.4
0.5
1109.1
2.7
476.0
5.3
1 419.1
19.7
2 587.0
4.4
Note: Data are from population registers or from registers of foreigners except for France and Greece (Census),
Italy, Portugal and Spain (residence permits) Poland (estimates), Ireland and the United Kingdom (Labour Force
Survey). The data refer to the population on 31 December of the years indicated unless otherwise stated.
35
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35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
B
DK
EL
IRL
EU nationals
NL
FIN
UK
EU
Non-EU nationals
36
typically portrayed as being responsible for unemployment and increased public expenditure, as well
as posing a threat to the preservation of Austrian
identity (McClintock 2005). In England, as industry
declined in the early 1980s, and as Margaret
Thatchers policies of state-shrinking took hold,
many industries preferred cheap immigrant labor to
an expensive native workforce. And although
immigrant workers bore the brunt of economic
recession, as indicated by higher than average
unemployment rates, native workers were not protected from rising unemployment by the immigrant
buffer (Money 1997). The immigrant communities
invariably had higher levels of unemployment than
the native workforce and were gradually pushed
into the slums of the cities where they had worked.
But slum removal projects required that slum occupants be housed in public housing. Thus unemployed immigrant slum dwellers leapfrogged over
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39
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Contributions by the diaspora cultural community and other external sources of support to cultural entrepreneurs
The odds of violent ethnic conflict increase when
diasporic communities funnel resources to cultural
entrepreneurs in order to fight an opposing cultural
group believed to be a cause of hardship and suffering. The Tamils fared surprisingly well in the civil
war, despite a ban on the possession of weapons
and the overwhelming power of the Sinhalese
army, because of an infusion of resources from the
diaspora Tamil community. Because diaspora
groups abroad often see their brethren under an
oppressive yoke in their own land from which they
must be liberated, they channel these resources to
those extreme groups who argue for secession or a
form of ethnic cleansing. Ethnic Kosovars living
abroad sent funds directly to the KLA; before the
wars of Yugoslav succession, Croats abroad sent
support to the HDZ, Tudjmans extremist party.
Support from the diaspora is particularly important when distinct cultural communities in their
homeland are excluded from other resources. Local
Abkhaz officials, for example, were cut off from their
patronage networks in Moscow with the Soviet
collapse. Bereft of internal resources, they looked
outward to potential alliances, and received enough
military support from Russia and Trans-Caucasus
alliances to defeat the Georgians. In Sri Lanka,
the Tamil Tigers, with financial help from Tamils
overseas, evolved into a formidable military force,
with technologically sophisticated arms, including
weaponry such as rocket-propelled grenade launchers and night-vision glasses. By 2002, the Tamil
Tigers had created a fighting force of 10,000 men
who used guerrilla tactics that included everything
from suicide bombings to surface-to-air missiles
acquired through Tamil networks abroad.13 Similarly,
in Punjab, radical groups needed money from
abroad to sustain their activities. Many Sikhs living
in Britain, Canada, and the United States had been
campaigning for an independent nation of Khalistan
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45
Radical clerics have become cultural entrepreneurs, whose sermons plant and nourish these
views. They can be found in both local mosques
and in the pages of the Internet. Indeed, radical
Imams in Syria, Jordan, Afghanistan, and Saudi
Arabia can transmit their messages instantly to
the Muslims in Europe, exerting the pull of
pan-Islamism in an effort to unite the diaspora community to oppose Western culture.
And European states themselves often fan these
fundamentalist flames by enacting anti-terror legislation which many view as anti-Muslim, or by banning symbols of Islamic faith, such as headscarves
in schools and the workplace. Holland, once a safe
haven for refugees, will deport 26,000 asylum seekers, many of them Muslim, in an effort to stem the tide
of its burgeoning Muslim underclass. Furthermore,
Muslims in Western Europe are underrepresented in
parliaments, have lower incomes and less schooling
than indigenous Europeans and other immigrant
groups. In public policy, many European countries
have withdrawn financial and legal support for integration of Muslims in their schools. After 9/11 there was
a significant decline in state funding of Islamic schools
in Britain; there was a decline in funding for Islamic
instruction in public schools in Germany, and in
France the hijab was banned in public schools (Fetzer
and Soper 2005: 143f).
Together these factors churn up the volatile mix
of ingredients for violence that I have described
throughout this essay: growing economic suffering
as the welfare state disappears, the uneven distribution of economic hardship, the discriminatory allocation of political and economic resources, and the
rise of radical cultural entrepreneurs, some of
whom are fed by diaspora cultural communities.
But immigrants themselves have rarely perpetrated violence against native populations, and conflict in the form of violent hate crimes perpetrated
against immigrants has not risen significantly in
Europe since the early 1990s. In Table 1.2, I show
the number of reported violent crimes against foreigners in five European countries. In Germany,
where the data seem to be most complete and
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Austriaii
France
Germany
Sweden
Switzerlandiii
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1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
0.44
0.19
0.11
0.08
0.08
0.1
0.87
0.09
1.05
~0.18
0.1
1.20
0.13
1.20
0.09
1.17
0.08
Data based on OECD population data and racial violence statistics from RAXEN (2003); European Monitoring
Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (2003); The Stephen Roth Institute (2003).
ii
Includes anti-Semitic acts.
iii
Foreign population data is available up to 2001. Crime data are available from 2002. Crime statistics for 2001 are
estimated based on average of 2002 and 2003. Includes anti-Semitic acts.
46
Conclusions
Vulnerability to cultural conflict does not automatically bring on cultural violence. When resources are
provided or withheld from groups on the basis of
their cultural identity, cultural entrepreneurs attempt
to mobilize their cultural brethren to protest an unjust
resource allocation or shore up resources for their
own group. If political institutions provide a legitimate
arena for those entrepreneurs to compete and if
resources are abundant and allocated in ways that
are widely considered to be fair, cultural or identity
politics, like other kinds of political competition, can
be legitimate and stable. It is when demographic and
economic changes often brought on by the forces
of globalization undermine the rules of the game,
and lead to perceptions that the balance of political
power is unfair, that identity politics, like other forms
of political competition, can escalate to cultural
conflict and violence. States whose institutions promote social integration are not immune to cultural
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Notes
1
10
11
47
nation-state as the locus of political life and the increasingly undemocratic globalization of political and economic life, sub-national communities governed by
fanatical hierarchies attempt to localize politics. These
groups are also undemocratic, in that they demand loyalty to the group above loyalty to the individual, and
rights are only real for the dominant group. The result is
the decline of democracy and democratic, integrating
nation-states. Barber does not explain why local politics
would take a non-democratic form. (see Barber 1995).
It was widely believed that Sri Lanka had inherited a
highly competitive pluralistic political system, which was
considered an outstanding model of third world democracy (Jupp 1978; Kearny 1973; Wilson 1979).
Eurostat, the European Unions statistical unit, in 1994
began commissioning a series of research studies to
improve understanding of the trends underlying immigration (Salt and Singleton 1995). In 2000, the United
Nations Population Division released Replacement
Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Ageing
Populations? See also Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2004), Trends, in
International Migration 2004 (Paris: OECD) and OECD
Migration database for latest available year, 2002.
In 1955, Sri Lankas per capita income was greater than
that of other major Asian countries, except Malaysia.
South Korea and Thailand continued to lag behind Sri
Lanka in terms of per capita income even by 1960
(Abeyratne, 2002). But between 1965 and 1980, Sri
Lanka achieved a growth rate of only 2.8 percent of GNP
per capita, less than half that of Indonesia, and little more
than half that of Thailand. And between 1990 and 1995,
the percent of GNP per capita growth rate in Sri Lanka
was only 3.2 percent, compared to Thailands growth rate
of 6.3 percent and Indonesias 4.8 percent (World Health
Organization 2002).
This assumption has not been systematically tested. A
good test would compare the intensity of conflict and
level of violence of identity group conflicts with interest
group conflicts, ideological conflicts, class conflicts,
and interstate conflicts.
Susan Bridge (1977: 3457) argues that the structure of
formal political representation throughout the post-war
period discouraged minority participation and representation through the single-member district in both party
and government. But the single member district worked
to the advantage of minorities in two defined regions
where the nationality was a majority of the population.
After the constitutional changes of 1974, Kosovo, with a
majority Albanian population, and Voivodina, with a
majority Hungarian population, gained increasing
autonomy throughout the post-war period and enjoyed
equal participation at the federal level with the same
representative status as the constituent nations. Kosovo
would become a trigger for the wider conflict that
ensued.
The percentage of Tamil students able to gain admission to university medical courses fell from 50 percent
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12
13
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14
15
16
17
REFERENCES
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CHAPTER 2
DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT IN GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURAL
PRACTICE: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE
Rustom Bharucha
In the collusion of languages between postmodernism and neo-liberal globalization theory, conflict
is almost always elided under the spectral energies
of flow. Identities, goods, and practices are imagined to be in a perpetual state of metamorphosis,
flux, and mutation, as they cross borders, circumventing the strictures of trade regulations and the
protocols of nation-states. If there are obstacles
encountered in this seemingly unregulated global
flow, they are invariably absorbed along the way,
with dichotomies and oppositions giving way to
hybrid mixtures and intercultural conversations.
Even when disjuncture (Appadurai, 1990, 1996) is
marked as a central component of such globalization discourse, it is never allowed to disrupt the
momentum of cross-border exchange. If anything, it
catalyzes the exchange without allowing it to
break down under the pressure of irreconcilable
differences.
Against this increasingly hollow utopian scenario,
what makes the insertion of conflict in globalization
discourse so productive is precisely its interruptive
capacity to break the easy equations between the
flow of global capital and its impact on new modes
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59
Conflicting agendas
Returning to the tensions between the Siddi
groups from Bharuch and Ahmedabad, it is clear
that the competition arising from the globalization
of indigenous performance can create new divisions between marginalized people. The disparities, between those who have access to global
resources and opportunities and those who dont,
intensify, when one considers the predicament of
the Siddi of Manchikere, who are still relying on
agricultural labor to earn a meager living, with
no hope for a significantly altered future. Given
these rifts between the Siddi of Karnataka and
Gujarat and I havent begun to inscribe the
middle-class aspirations and apparent acculturation into mainstream Indian society of the Siddi of
Hyderabad how does one build the capabilities
of the Siddi on a more equitable basis across the
inequities of different constituencies and regions?
Before the Siddi of Manchikere can begin to compete in even terms, to adapt Sens normative
recommendation, it would seem necessary that
their context should be infused with new economic and social opportunities and a much wider
communicative network. It is unlikely that the creation of another Siddi Goma troupe in Manchikere
would facilitate this agency in a positive way.
Other more contextualized and material entitlements over goods, services and education would
need to be made available before the capabilities
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which the aspirations of the market can be discriminated at ethical levels, and if necessary, countered
with an alternative value-system?
Severing the possible links of aspiration to the
immediacies of political struggle, it is telling how
Appadurai avoids any engagement with the
processes of democratization that are available
within the national scenario of India. Instead of
exploring the expedient affiliations that large
sections of the poor do adopt in relation to political
parties, electoral politics, the dalit movement, trade
unionism, and the politics of reservations, Appadurai
opts for global cross-border activism whereby local
alliances of NGOs in cities like Mumbai can be
linked to larger global organizations like the
Slum/Shackdwellers International (SDI). While such
alliances operate through the tactics of dialogue and
negotiation, they seem to circumvent the necessity
of oppositional strategies, which Appadurai almost
makes into a virtue. Drawing on the dubious
assumption that the proverbial patience of the poor
could be their biggest weapon (2004: 81), he
somewhat misses the point. Today, Indias increasingly politicized downtrodden communities are
impatient for a significant change in their lives. And,
for the vast majority of them, this impatience is manifest not in forming links with global movements and
NGOs, but in entering the political fray through a
blatantly opportunistic use of the politics of caste
and reservations, in addition to running for elections. The conflicts emerging through this embrace
of the political battleground are harsh, but they are
also potentially lucrative and empowering.
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Notes
1
10
11
12
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65
REFERENCES
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CHAPTER 3
ETHNICITY AND WAR IN A WORLD OF NATION-STATES
Brian Min and Andreas Wimmer
Introduction
Over the last two centuries, periods of global
peace and war have led observers to alternate
between the hope for eternal peace and faith in
institutions that would secure it and the fear that
humanity will never be able break the cataclysmic
cycles of violence that have characterized its
history. In recent years, the end of the Cold War led
to renewed optimism about a coming era of
perpetual peace within a new global world order.
Yet it seems that the end of the Cold War has led
not to a pacific end of history populated by friendly
liberal democracies as Fukuyama (1992) once
envisioned, but to a new global disorder replete
with fundamentalist terrorism (Juergensmeyer
2000), ethnic strife (Chua 2003), guerrilla
insurgencies (Fearon and Laitin 2003), an
intensifying clash of civilizations (Huntington 1996),
and a general increase in domestic and
international political instability.
According to most observers, the violence that
characterizes the post-Cold War era is more
reflective of new imbalances in global and
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B. Civil wars
20
20
15
15
10
10
0
1816
1826
1836
1846
1856
1866
1876
1886
1896
1906
1916
1926
1936
1946
1956
1966
1976
1986
1996
25
1816
1826
1836
1846
1856
1866
1876
1886
1896
1906
1916
1926
1936
1946
1956
1966
1976
1986
1996
25
67
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Brothers against the Qing court of Emperor HsienFeng. While the first half of the twentieth century
indicated some promise of a decline in the rate of
civil conflict, an extraordinary surge in the number
of civil wars began in about the 1960s, peaking in
the late 1980s. While the number of civil wars has
dropped in the 1990s, they are still at historically
high levels compared to the pre-World War II
period. The timing of this surge and decline roughly
mirrors the rise and fall observed for inter-state
wars, leading some observers to link this pattern to
the emergence and later the disappearance of Cold
War rivalry between the superpowers. In 2004,
there were ongoing civil wars in Darfur (Sudan),
Uganda, Colombia, Chechnya (Russia), Nepal, and
Kashmir (India).
What explains these fluctuations in the rates of
war? How can we account for these changes in the
pattern, scope, and purpose of wars? Why has the
rate of inter-state wars declined while that for
civil wars has risen? Among the difficulties in
establishing coherent explanations of war has been
a long-standing division of labor between scholars
and analysts of inter-state wars and of civil wars
(e.g., Levy 1998). This distinction emerged out of
quantitative studies of war that began during the
Cold War. Among the most important of these early
studies were Quincy Wrights A Study of War
(1942) which lists 278 wars of modern civilization
from 1480 to 1940, and Lewis Richardsons
Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (1960) which lists 108
wars from 1820 to 1949. Both works introduced
systematic classification of wars into different
categories of intensity and purpose. Later, the
groundbreaking Correlates of War (COW) project
begun by J. David Singer and Melvin Small (1972;
1982) established an influential threefold typology
of wars that included inter-state wars (between two
or more independent state actors), intra-state wars
(between an independent state actor and domestic
rebels, as in civil wars), and extra-state wars
(between an independent state and a non-state
unit, as in colonial wars). Systematic country-level
data generated by the COW project nourished an
increasingly focused quantitative research tradition
on wars and at the same time fostered a split
between scholars of inter-state war and those
interested in domestic conflicts, with each group
adopting their own approaches, methods, and
explanations.
New wars
In todays globalized world, organized violence
has taken on new forms that differ from the
classic inter-state or civil wars of the past. These
new wars are occurring in greater frequency,
particularly in Africa and Eastern Europe, and
pursue a fluid set of objectives incorporating
traditional violence between governments and
political groups over state power, organized crime
in pursuit of financial gain, and large-scale
terrorizing of the civilian population. The wars are
fought by armed networks of non-state and state
actors, including paramilitary groups, terrorist
cells, organized criminal groups, private military
companies, and mercenaries. These networks tend
to be formed around extreme political ideologies,
often linked to nationalist and fundamentalist
movements. To Kaldor and others, recent conflicts
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, Mozambique, and
the Nagorno-Karabakh in the Transcaucasus typify
the new war, which can be contrasted from wars of
earlier eras in their differing goals, methods of
warfare, and sources of financing.
According to these authors, the new wars are the
results of two interrelated processes of
globalization: the emergence of a global weapons
market and the erosion of the capability of
governments to uphold a monopoly on violence.
The increased availability of weapons is linked to
both the growing interconnectedness of states and
non-state actors in the marketplace, as well as the
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69
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Civil war
80%
60%
Intermediate civil conflict
40%
20%
Minor civil conflict
0%
1940s*
1950s
1960s
1970s
1980s
396
1990s
2000s**
427
263
190
48*
91
1940s*
1950s
1960s
158**
1970s
1980s
1990s
2000s**
**20002004
70
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71
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72
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Figure 3.3
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1985
1975
1965
1955
1945
1935
1925
1915
1905
1895
1885
1875
1865
1855
1845
1835
1825
73
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Figure 3.4
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30
19901995
19561960
20
18211825
19161920
19461950
19711975
10
0
1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Year
Source: Wimmer and Min, forthcoming
75
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Figure 3.5
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5.0%
4.0%
3.0%
2.0%
1.0%
0.0%
1.0%
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
6.0%
For date sources and codings see Wimmer and Min, forthcoming
77
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Conclusion
Without question, the world has been changing
rapidly in recent decades. Globalization is leading to
unprecedented levels of economic, political, and
cultural integration between and within states. Many
observers have linked globalization to the surge in
violent conflicts that has accompanied the end of the
Cold War. Some have maintained that globalization
has weakened the capacity of existing states to
uphold the monopoly of violence. Others believe that
those who lose out in an increasingly competitive and
unsure economic environment turn their frustration
against successful minorities, thus igniting the fires of
ethnic conflict. According to still others, the new states
that have appeared after the end of Communism are
ethnically too heterogeneous to evolve peacefully.
Finally, Huntington has argued that the end of the
REFERENCES
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CHAPTER 4
RESISTANCE TO CULTURAL GLOBALIZATION
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Laura Adams, Miguel Centeno and Charles Varner
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Target
Internal
External
Action
Reactive
Proactive
Scope
Total
Partial
Tone
Offensive
Defensive
82
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Table 4.1
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Cinema
Music Sold
Magazines
Radio
Books
English Language TV
95%
84%
83%
70%
70%
60%
Target
Action
Scope
Tone
Efficacy/impact
has been active in making sure that cultural products are covered by the standard free trade agreements. GATTs 1947 agreement, however, allowed
for national quotas. These battles (largely against
US media if implicitly, not explicitly) continued in the
Uruguay and Doha rounds and are being fought
within the WTO. The extent to which a different set
of rules will apply to cultural products will be a
major point of discussion in the ongoing debate
regarding twenty-first century globalization.
The Canadian experience will no doubt serve as
a major reference point. Earlier than any other country affected by globalizations cultural flows, Canada
83
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Kazakhstan
Official Language
Target
Action
Scope
Tone
Efficacy/impact
85
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Religious laws
Article 160 of the Malaysian constitution defines
Malays to be Muslim and Islam as the state religion
(Mohd and Abas 1986). Muslims are subject to
Islamic law and may not convert to another religion.
The state courts have stated that jurisdiction over
the conversion policy resides solely in the Islamic
courts, which have handed down prison terms for
convicted heretics (US Department of State 2004).
Language laws
Article 152 of the constitution makes Malay the
national language, although laws would be published in both Malay and English. The most debated
laws relate to the language to be used in education.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the government pursued a
gradual approach to convert English schools into
Malay schools (Haque 2003). This policy was
somewhat reactive in its aim to remove the upward
mobility advantage gained by children mostly
Chinese and Indian who had begun to attend
English-language schools (Lim Mah Hui, as cited
by Van der Westhuizen, 2002). Since the language
policy applied only to formerly English schools, it
was partial in scope. Chinese and Tamil schools
could continue to operate. The tone of the policy
was defensive. English was not seen as bad; rather,
proponents thought that Malay should be just as
good for economic pursuits and that ethnic Malays
should not be economically disadvantaged due to
language.
These language policies seem to have been
moderately effective. Most Chinese and Indians
can speak Malay but tend to use their own languages when communicating with co-ethnics
(Haque 2003). In 2002, the government reversed
course and began to require that science and math
courses in all primary schools be taught in English.
Chinese, Tamil, and Malay activists all protested
the removal of their respective mother tongues
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Language
Speech
Media
Target
Internal and
external
Action
Proactive build a
strong Sunni Islam
with state support
Internal Chinese
and Indians who
might challenge
Malay special
position
Reactive
Scope
Tone
Efficacy/impact
Defensive
Moderate Muslims
have been
imprisoned for
heretical beliefs,
but non-Muslims
are generally free
to practice their
own religions
Reactive shifting to
proactive
Total
Proactive
promote
national identity
and global
diversity
Total applies to
any broadcast
received in
Malaysia
Defensive
Offensive
Moderate speech To be determined
(new law and
has been quelled,
content code)
although
emergency
declarations have
been required
several times
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Conclusion
Canadas policy of cultural resistance may be
unique in that while forceful and strictly policed, it is
not based on ethnic animosity or even totalist rejection. The logic behind the Canadian position is the
need to counter the likely popularity of American
cultural products by creating reserves for Canadian
content. The major problem with the Canadian
model is that the failure to subsidize Canadian content in a significant way (and the necessity of this
given the economies of scale involved in a global
market) means that the supply of local culture
does not match its institutionalized demand.
Kazakhstans reactions to the globalization of
culture can be seen to strike out first against the
culture of the former colonizer and then against the
encroachment of other foreign cultures. However,
globalization also facilitates these reactions by
REFERENCES
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CHAPTER 5
CULTURAL EXPRESSION IN GLOBALIZED CONFLICT:
CAUSE OR VICTIM?
Dragan Klaic
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This multifaceted conflict between the commercial interests of the cultural industry on the one
hand and the interests of non-commercial artistic
creativity on the other is the primary ongoing tension within the cultural sector. And it too is driven by
globalization. The two sides are interdependent and
implicated in various ways in each others modes of
operation. Each is driven, however, by distinct motivations and value systems: profit on the one hand
and artistic originality on the other. The more cultural industry becomes globalized and dominant,
the more contemporary creativity becomes forced
into collaboration with it. Cultural industry has
demonstrated great flexibility and absorptive
capacity, to appropriate and integrate artistic
goods, ideas, styles, and modes and turn them into
mass-produced global products. While many artists
like to assert their autonomy and oppose the instrumentalization of the arts, whether at the hands of
the distributors of public subsidy or the market, they
are in fact increasingly dependent on the cultural
industry. If they do not work directly for it, they are
nevertheless affected by the trends, hypes and fads
that the cultural industry orchestrates and the
impact these have on consumer tastes. With the
cultural industry imposing a growing uniformity, it is
becoming more difficult for the artists to assert their
uniqueness and have it recognized as such by the
public. Even when they opt for a nomadic, highly
mobile mode of existence, or choose to operate on
the margins of society and established cultural
realms, artists can hardly escape the ubiquitous
presence of the cultural industry and shelter themselves from its corrupting impacts. They can no
longer seek secluded, isolated zones of comfort
and peace, such as those certain artists colonies in
the south of France or the southwest of the United
States were once able to offer. They cannot step
out of globalization. That is probably why this opposition does not manifest itself as an open conflict
(Smiers 2003).
Within the non-commercial culture, there is also
a tension again not necessarily an open conflict
between cultural heritage and contemporary
creativity. The confrontation between the two may
appear to be just competition for public subsidies,
sponsorship and public appreciation. Behind this
faade of parallel economic interests and shared
vulnerability, however, lie more intricate loyalties
and myth-making manipulations. The unsettling
impact of globalization is visible in the explosion of
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The Memory and Reconciliation Virtual Library (MRVL) is a joint project of three national libraries
located in Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Frankfurt (Germany) and Belgrade (Serbia). The initiative is based on the shared experience and shared memory of wartime destruction.
On 6 April 1941 Nazi Germanys Luftwaffe bombed and completely destroyed the National Library of
Serbia. Thirty-two years later, on 6 April 1973, the new building of the National Library of Serbia was
opened. On 6 April 1992 the three-year Serbian siege of Sarajevo began. On the night of 2526 August
1992 Serbian shells hit the Town Hall and destroyed the National and University Library of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. In a macabre way, the destruction of April 1941 was echoed by that of August 1992. How
could those who experienced the trauma of the first destruction do exactly the same thing to others
several decades later?
Because it was at the center of this double experience, it was the Belgrade library that initiated a project expressly designed to serve a culture of memory, reconciliation and dialogue. In the Founding
Statement for the project, the following statements were made by the library authorities:
It is easier to forgive someone else than to forgive oneself. We shall never forget what we did. We
cannot forgive ourselves. We repent. We sincerely hope that this confession will contribute to others forgiving us. We beg for forgiveness. We believe that true repentance can be the pledge of
true reconciliation. At the same time, we cannot forget what was done to us. But our memory
is of no use if it remains passive. We want that no one ever experiences the misfortune that we
experienced. If we contribute to reconciliation, we contribute to that too. It is harder to forgive
oneself than someone else. The Serbian partner would like to invite the other two partners to
accept this statement and join.
The libraries of Sarajevo and Frankfurt took up this offer. The purposes of this triangular initiative are
both concrete and symbolic. Concretely, it involves the establishment, maintenance and development
of a specialized Internet portal as a multi-dimensional on-line resource, a virtual library based on the
pooled technical and professional capacities of the three partners. Symbolically, it permanently regenerates the spirit of memory, reconciliation and dialogue. Its motto is the words of Danilo Ki: Danger
comes from the conviction gathered from one book only. The following shared dedications connect
and bind the three sides:
to memory
to the good
to the happiness of our descendants and to the heritage of our ancestors
books, reading and understanding of meaning
to trust and mutual esteem
to peace in the world
to the vision of a united Europe and a united world
to truth and dialogue.
Prepared on the basis of information supplied by Sreten Ugricic, Director National Library of Serbia
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REFERENCES
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CHAPTER 6
CONFLICT AND THE DELIBERATE DESTRUCTION OF
CULTURAL HERITAGE
Dacia Viejo Rose
Introduction
The stories that a society tells itself about its past
are often represented and transmitted through the
images contained in the archaeological, architectural, historical and artistic heritage. These objects
of the past are used to define the present and
are today increasingly imbued with an ideological
dimension. This is revealed in stark terms by the
processes of destruction and reconstruction of cultural heritage. By tracing recent trends in this area,
we can infer some lessons about the relationships
between cultural heritage, conflict and globalization.
The cultural heritage in both its tangible and
intangible manifestations physical structures and
objects as well as traditional knowledge, beliefs
and forms of expression has become central to
contemporary perceptions of collective memory. An
increasing number of cultural groups now articulate
their struggles for rights and recognition around the
ownership and representation of their cultural heritage (as Dragan Klaic has just argued). And these
representations or negations of them have often
become conflictual, yoking history and culture to
Destruction
The destruction of buildings and the theft of artifacts appear to be inseparable from violent conflict
throughout recorded history. Often this destruction
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Destructive action
Type of conflict2
Religious building/objects
Civilian building
Museum
Heritage site
Library or archive
Historical monument/site
Cemetery
Official building
Public art
Political memorial/site
Archaeological site
Infrastructure (bridges)
Natural heritage3
A tentative typology
of destruction
A detailed typology of the destruction of cultural
heritage in conflict situations would require parallel
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Box 6.1
Between 780 and 785 AD Abd-al-Rahman I built the Mosque of Cordoba on what is believed to have
been the remains of a Christian building. Many of the 800 columns used in this magnificent building
were pillaged from Roman and Visigothic remains. After the Christian conquest of Cordoba in 1236,
the Mosque was turned into a cathedral. This transformation resulted in the construction of a closedoff choir area. On seeing the results, and despite having given his permission for the modification, the
Holy Roman Emperor and King of Spain Charles V declared: You have built here what you, or anyone
else, might have built anywhere; to do so you have destroyed what was unique in the world. (Quoted
in Fletcher 1992: 3).
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Box 6.2
105
Voskopoj was an important Byzantine metropolis and trading center, which at its peak in 1769
boasted a population of 20,000 and had 26 Orthodox churches with frescoes decorated by some of
the best painters of the time; the forgotten town now has a population of 500 and only five churches
in various stages of collapse. Since 2002 it has been on the World Monuments Fund World
Monuments Watch list of The 100 Most Endangered Sites. While the churches of Voskopoj and the
surrounding villages have undeniably suffered from destruction caused by wars three against the
Ottomans in the second half of the eighteenth century, the Balkan wars of 19121913 and the two
World Wars a totalitarian regime and a rough transition period, neglect is the most serious cause
for their current desperate state. This becomes evident when the state of these churches is compared with that of their equivalents on the other side of the border in Ochrid, Macedonia. The
churches around Ochrid, several of which have frescoes painted by the same artists that worked on
the churches of Voskopoj, are in good condition, having been carefully conserved in the past
decade. The damage suffered by the churches of Voskpoj represents many of the types discussed
in the text, but also includes iconoclasm, official cultural policy and failure to safeguard. Iconoclastic
destruction became political as a result of emperors wanting to reduce the influence of local monks
and saints. Reduced funding, together with the often-disastrous state of conservation, makes this a
prolonged emergency. Today, harsh weather conditions and dampness are the greatest dangers facing
the cultural heritage. Many of the structures are so weakened that neglect is tantamount to
destroying them.
Motivations
It is the importance that we give to cultural heritage and the identity symbols that it embodies that
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Rewriting history
A certain reinterpretation of history accompanies
all regime change, but authoritarian regimes have a
particular predilection for establishing a clean slate
on which to build their visions. Mussolinis urban
renewal involved the sventramento or disemboweling of Rome, a project he initiated personally with a
pickaxe in hand. In the late 1980s, Ceausescu
Box 6.3
107
Protection measures
As early as 1899, the Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land contained
references to the protection of cultural heritage in wartime (Nafziger 2003). However, it was the important destruction of cultural heritage during World War II that spurred the elaboration of a normative
instrument to address the issue. The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event
of Armed Conflict was adopted at The Hague in 1954. This was the first international agreement focusing exclusively on the protection of cultural heritage, both movable and immovable. The repeated
destruction of cultural property in conflicts since the 1980s has revealed the deficiencies of the
Convention. Consequently, a review was undertaken that sought to incorporate some of the lessons
learnt. This effort resulted in the adoption in March 1999 of a Second Protocol to the Convention.
Spurred by the destruction of cultural heritage in the former Yugoslavia and the destruction of the
Bamiyan Buddhas, UNESCO adopted in 2003 a Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction of
Cultural Heritage. The Blue Shield, a non-governmental organization, was created by the International
Council on Archives (ICA), the International Council of Museums (ICOM), the International Council on
Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) and the International Federation of Library Associations (IFLA), to
collect and disseminate information, and coordinate action to protect cultural heritage in crisis situations spurred by natural and complex emergencies (Hladk 2001).
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international normative instruments for the safeguarding of cultural heritage, the increased internationalization of markets and trade and the large-scale
movement of people as immigrants, refugees and
tourists.13
International organizations, UNESCO in particular, have since their inception developed normative
instruments for the protection of culture and
cultural heritage. Since the first meeting in 1978
of UNESCOs World Heritage Committee, a list of
monuments and sites considered the heritage of
mankind has been developed. The translation
of this international standard of valuation to the
local level becomes difficult, however, when it is
contested or disregarded (as in the former
Yugoslavia or Afghanistan).
The internationalization of markets has facilitated
the trade in art and artifacts. While this has had
many positive aspects, it has also facilitated the
illicit trade and made these items notoriously difficult to trace. This illicit trade has reached considerable proportions, comparable in terms of volume
and monetary importance to trade in drugs and
weapons.
The movement of people has had an impact on
cultural heritage in different ways, the most obvious
being perhaps cultural tourism, which each year
dispatches millions of people around the world to
travel and experience the cultural heritage of others
(See the indicator suite on tourism in the data section). For many nations and regions, tourism has
become an essential economic engine. Yet marketing or packaging cultures to attract visitors simplifies them into two-dimensional brochures, thus
encouraging stereotypes and making dialogue outside of this framework difficult (Robinson 1999). In
addition, anti-globalization movements have invoked
cultural rights and the protection of cultural heritage
and traditions as a rallying cry against a perceived
homogenization. This has further accentuated the
ideological exploitation of cultural difference.
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Box 6.4
109
While there are few statistical data on how political instability affects the looting and illicit trade of cultural heritage, there is enough empirical evidence to be able to affirm that there is an obvious correlation. In March 2002, in a visit to UNESCO, the then interim leader of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai,
urged the Organization to help stop the looting of archaeological material and antiquities that was
going on in Afghanistan as the country did not have the resources to prevent it . An issue of the
newsletter Culture without Context covered some of the looting going on in Afghanistan in 200102,
emphasizing that in the wake of the Taliban regime looting was on the rise. This shows that destruction does not only occur during conflict but also in the environment of instability, lawlessness and
poverty that ensues (Culture Without Context, Issue 10, Spring 2002: 1920). The same issue of the
newsletter contains an account of the looting of Javanese cultural heritage since the fall of the Suharto
government in Indonesia in 1998. A more recent issue notes the results of a six-year survey in Pakistan
and Iran indicating that 90 percent of major archaeological sites have been looted and another study
on Israel and Palestine alleging that illegal digging in the Palestinian Authority territory was up 50 percent (Culture without Context, Issue 15, Autumn 2004: 910). Trafficking in material culture is a multimillion industry, second only to trade in narcotics, says George Abungu, former Director-General of
the National Museums of Kenya and president of the International Standing Committee on Illegal
Trafficking in Material Culture (Shipepechero, 2002). He acknowledges that Kenya was a transit country for antiquities from countries in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa that have been
through conflicts in the past 15 years. While Ethiopia and Eritrea were at war, for example, insiders at
the National Museums of Kenya observed how pieces that were highly valued on the international
market made their way from Ethiopia to Nairobi through refugees from both the warring parties.
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The interpretation of cultural heritage is fundamental to this process, but it requires the courage to
address its less benign meanings. In the aftermath of
war, as the symbolic landscape gets rebuilt, the
visual narratives of a societys past and of the conflicts themselves, create a new sense of group
belonging. It is crucial to understand how this happens if long-term peace-building is to result, for a
symbolic landscape can easily be built that carries
the violence of the war into the post-war period,
planting signposts of discord that continue to provoke fear and hatred and work against reconciliation.
Much reconstruction today is in the hands of
foreign NGOs and donors. This is not without its
perverse impact; for these donors tend to advertise
their participation in reconstruction projects and
this branding process creates a new symbolic landscape. When, for example, a large panel thanking
the Greek government stands in front of a rebuilt
Orthodox church, one thanking the Vatican in front
of a Catholic church or a religious NGO and one
thanking Saudi Arabia in front of a mosque, each of
these markers reinforces the respective divides
and takes agency and ownership away from the
local population. In both Bosnia and Herzegovina
and Kosovo a Saudi Arabian aid agency, the Saudi
Joint Relief Committee, has been building mosques
that have little to do with the 400-year-old edifices
of which they are supposed reconstructions.
Reconstruction has meant painting or plastering
over the ancient frescoes that are unique to Balkan
Muslim architecture but run counter to Wahhabi
religious codes. Conversely, in Pristina, Kosovo, an
undamaged eighteenth-century mosque (the Kater
Lula or Four Fountains) was torn down and
replaced with a new one that includes a shopping
mall. In the town of Rahoves, in western Kosovo,
the towns seventeenth-century mosque was torn
down, bulldozed and replaced by one made of reinforced concrete.17
Countries or organizations that offer funding often
earmark their contributions for particular purposes.
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The international community mobilized itself to reconstruct the iconic buildings of the major religions
of Sarajevo: the main Orthodox Church, the Catholic Church, the Mosque and the Synagogue. Yet
beneath this tolerant inter-religious faade lies a reality that fits less with the rhetoric as new symbols
of contention continued to be erected. Notable is the case of the mosque that has been built since the
end of hostilities. It is perhaps the biggest that the city, once known as the city of the hundred
mosques, has ever known. Built largely in concrete, with powerful loudspeakers to announce the call
to prayer, it has been placed strategically, center stage to the amphitheatre of the Serbian neighborhood created by the geography of the river valley. This is echoed throughout the region with the construction of a Catholic church with an enormous bell tower in Mostar, or the construction of an equally
large Orthodox and impossible to ignore church in Banja Luka. Rebuilding the symbolic religious
buildings in Sarajevos old town was a necessary and valuable action but without a parallel effort to
engage with interpretations of destruction and reconstruction, it failed to fully utilize its mediating
potential.
embrace the complexity of post-conflict environments. Consultations can reflect conflicting interests and risk delaying projects if they are held early
on in the planning stages. Yet, in environments
characterized by volatile politics in which leaders
change often, it is necessary to be able to assess
the attitudes of the beneficiary communities.
Otherwise, intervention can adopt a paternalistic
role with echoes of colonialism and sap autonomy
from the very groups it seeks to help. A consultative
methodology that is carefully timed and continued
throughout a project cycle can become a key tool
in developing civil society by giving it a say in
decision-making.19
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Conclusion
In 1453, Mehmed the Conqueror called the task
of reviving Constantinople after its conquest the
mightiest war compared with which the business
of taking it had been merely one of the lesser
wars. (Mazower 2004: 31)
Notes
1
Nicola Lambourne (2001) provides an important blow-byblow account of the destruction to historic monuments during World War II. Her systematic and thorough study shows
how cultural heritage was rarely a deliberate target but
every occasion was taken to portray it as such, making it
of far greater interest to the propaganda machinery than to
the military.
Kreimer, Eriksson, Muscat, Arnold, and Scott (1998).
The World Banks Experience with Post-Conflict
Reconstruction. Washington: World Bank Publishing. The
paper identifies five categories of conflicts with examples; I have developed their categorization a bit further to
account for recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. In
the paper, the authors argue that each category of sociopolitical emergency requires a different post-conflict
reconstruction approach.
German forests were another type of cultural target identified by the British Air Ministry in World War II; the Hartz
mountains and the Black Forest were particularly singled
out as important material and psychological targets
(Lambourne 2001: 143).
Wilhelm Treues now classic book on the topic, Art
Plunder: The Fate of Works of Art in War, Revolution and
Peace, provides a thorough history of wartime looting in
Europe from Antiquity through World War II. Amongst
other accounts, Treue also relates the looting of
Constantinople by the Crusaders and the sack of Rome.
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10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
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REFERENCES
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REGIONAL REALITIES
INTRODUCTION
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CHAPTER 7
CULTURES, CONFLICT AND GLOBALIZATION: AFRICA
Francis B. Nyamnjoh
Introduction
Neither globalization nor cultural conflict is a new
phenomenon in Africa, even if the recent revolution
in information and communication technologies has
greatly intensified both. I shall argue that neither
can be understood divorced from the hierarchies of
race, ethnicity, geography, class, gender and citizenship that continue to inform social relations,
although science and rhetoric both wave the flags
of equality of humanity and opportunity. I shall
demonstrate how encounters with Western colonialism and consumerism have negatively affected
African humanity and creativity, and engineered a
complex set of cultural conflicts. These conflicts are
of various kinds: between indigenous African cultures and Western cultures; between advocates of
cultural autonomy and those who have subscribed
in varying degrees to Western cultures; and among
different cultural associations, movements or
groupings that defend, contest or appropriate hierarchies inherited from colonial classifications. I
shall conclude with a call for cultural differences to
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cultures are expected to penetrate the backwardlooking cultures with their values through a unilinear process of inter-cultural communication
(Oguibe 2004). Everything new is considered to be
progress, as long as it is the uncritical reproduction
of the McDonaldized and CocaCola-ized versions
of society perfected in the West and spearheaded
by the United States of America (Ritzer 1996;
Warnier 1999). Such expectations of westernization have only accelerated with the globalization of
consumerism and of poverty (Nyamnjoh, 2005a
and 2005c).
Globalization to Africans thus entails the celebration of Western achievements, prejudices and
stereotypes. Salvation, comfort or self-betterment
is seen as something possible only with
Westernization, as African civilizations and cultures
are perceived as constrictive and conservative
crushing opponents of progress that must be countered with the assistance of the media and culture
industries as magic multipliers of knowledge, information and propaganda. Globalization has thus
intensified a long-standing tradition of inviting
Africans to devalue themselves, their institutions
and their cultures by cultivating an uncritical empathy for Western economic, cultural and political values which are glorified beyond impeachment by the
hegemonic structures that underpin them. They are
presented as having little chance of progress as
Africans or blacks, and invited to intensify their
assumed craving to become like the whites in
Europe and North America. The rhetoric of tolerance to cultural difference notwithstanding, the
entire paradigm is in reality impatient with alternative systems of thought and practice, and seeks
cultural homogeneity by imposing the Western consumer outlook and approach as the one best way
of achieving betterment (Warnier 1999). Modernity
as hegemonic modes of social life and organisation of European origin (Giddens 1990) thus poses
as a giant compressor determined to crush every
other civilization and culture in order to reduce
them to the model of the industrialized West.
Instead of recognizing and accommodating the
fact that people are fiercely proud of their heritage,
language, customs, religion and traditional ways of
life (Halloran 1993: 4), Western ambitions of dominance have set about suppressing African pride,
creativity and self-esteem through physical conquest, coercion and persuasion, as Vernon
Februarys study of the coloured stereotype in
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Africa under liberal democracy and global consumer capitalism (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000;
Bayart et al. 2001; Englund and Nyamnjoh 2004;
Nyamnjoh, 2005b). Inspired by the global culture
game of obsession with difference (Oguibe 2004),
Africans desperate for recognition and representation at local and global levels, are using various cultural platforms to stake competing and conflicting
claims.
In Nigeria the oil rich Niger Delta minority ethnic
groups who have seen themselves victimized by
the politicization and ethnicization of the resource
allocation process by the Nigerian state and its
elites, have resorted to autochthony to lay claim to
priority and privileged access to oil revenue and
resources, as sons and daughters of the Delta soil.
And when Shell and the Nigerian state have not
heeded their demands, these minorities have
resorted to various strategies, including violence
and the use of cultural associations to seek entitlements and to attract attention and sympathy
(Anugwom 2005). Indeed, not only ethnic minorities
are contesting the idea of one Nigeria under which
independence was obtained. It has been noted that
many of Nigerias constituent units are regrouping
under regional and ethnic cultural umbrellas, often
in violent contestations that threaten the state
(Alubo 2004; Aluko 2003; Owolabi 2003).
Feeding on images of surging global tensions
between Islam and Christianity, relations between
Christian and Muslim communities in Nigeria have
often been conflictual, sometimes resulting in
violent clashes, especially in cases of territorial
encroachment, perceived trivialization, or attitudes
of disrespect vis--vis their respective religious values (Harnischfeger 2004). The media not only
reflect such tensions and conflicts, their coverage
has tended to be biased in favour of this or that religious community, depending on whether ownership
of the media and the journalists involved are
Christian or Muslim. Such politics of belonging and
polarization in the media are well evidenced in and
around the debate on the introduction of Sharia law
in the predominantly Muslim northern states of
Nigeria (Adebanwi 2005). After the September 11th
terrorist attacks against the United States, violence
between Christians and Muslims spread to the city
of Kano. Over 200 people were killed in Kaduna, in
response to a journalists comments in a Nigerian
newspaper This Day regarding the Prophet
Mohammad and the likelihood that he would have
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Conclusion
The way forward from the above scenarios is in
recognizing and providing for the fact that culture
and belonging are processes subject to renegotiation. For one thing, political, cultural, historical, and,
above all, economic realities, determine what form
and meaning the articulation of belonging assumes
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global level. The emphasis should be on the freedom of individuals and communities to negotiate
inclusion, opt out and opt in with flexibility of
belonging in consonance with their realities as
straddlers of a kaleidoscope of identity margins.
Obviously, such flexible belonging is incompatible with the prevalent illusion that the nation-state is
the only political unit permitted to confer citizenship
in the modern world. Nor is it compatible with a
regime of rights and entitlements that is narrowly
focused on yet another chimera the autonomous
individual. Everywhere the price of perpetuating
these illusions has been the proliferation of ultranationalism, chauvinism, racism, tribalism and
xenophobia that have consciously denied the fragmented, multinational and heterogeneous cultural
realities of most so-called nation-states. Almost
everywhere, this narrow model has cherished hierarchies based on race, ethnicity, class, gender and
geography, that have tended to impose on perceived inferior others decisions made by those who
see themselves as more authentic or more deserving of citizenship. Belonging that hails from such a
celebration of insensitivities is not a model for a
future of increased mobility, or for the satisfaction of
its individual and collective victims.
Notes
1
http://por tal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-URL_
ID=11605&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION
=201.html
The drawbacks of cultural globalization by Wole
Akande Yellow Times November 10, 2002. http://global
policy.igc.org/globaliz/cultural/2002/1110cult.htm
Jeremy Seabrook Localizing cultures, in the Korean
Herald January 13, 2004. (http://globalpolicy.igc.org/
globaliz/cultural/2004/0113jeremyseabrook.htm)
Hizkias Assefa Ethnic conflict in the Horn of Africa:
myth and reality. http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu12ee/uu12ee06.htm#2.%20ethnic%20conflict%20in%20the%20horn%20of%20africa:%20myth%
20and%20reality
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CHAPTER 8
REGIONAL REALITIES IN THE ARAB WORLD
Ahmad S. Moussalli
Introduction
Current conditions in the Arab region hold out
little hope either for the increased well-being of
ordinary people or for the greater positive participation of Arab cultures in globalization. Whilst the
latter is seen by a number of thinkers as a phenomenon that promises economic development
and good governance (Yahyawi 1999), many individuals, groups, and states outside the Western
world equate it with the control exercised by the
economy and culture of the West; the political domination of the strong the Western world over the
weak the rest of the world and their cultures
(1999: 17581). The Arab world is a part of the rest
(1999: 188204). In the clash scenario, Arab and
Islamic cultures are portrayed as the primary opponents of Western civilization.
While there is no consensual Arab view on globalization and its effects, three key trends in thinking
will be elaborated below. However, even those individuals and groups who reject globalization, including Arab Islamists, have adopted certain globalized
Western doctrines such as democracy, pluralism
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Globalization, fundamentalism,
and identity
In the cultural arena, fundamentalism is an
attempt to impose certain limits on modernization,
and more particularly on post-modernism. It
attempts to reverse the historical onrush towards
hyper-secular consumerism and pluralism by
providing, paradoxically, a traditional defense of
modernity. The history of Islam revolves in part
around these problems of local and global authority, giving rise to periodic social movements of
Islamization in which the ascetic and literary codes
were imposed upon localist forms (Turner 1991). In
particular, two sets of issues impact the stability of
the region and globalization in the Arab world. First,
religion and history and, therefore, religious claims
and symbolism question the legitimacy and policies
of both Arab governments and Israel, in turn negatively affecting ArabIsraeli relations, internal Arab
and Israeli policies, inter-Arab attitudes and, consequently, long-term world interests and globalization.
Identity questions based upon religion and history
will thus be fundamental issues that will affect ideological and cultural trends for the next few
decades. As much as religious questions over land
and identity have galvanized and divided
public opinion in Israel, Islamic fundamentalism has
opened up questions of legitimacy and the nature
of the state in the Arab world.
Moreover, while the destabilizing effects of globalization started long before September 11, it is
difficult to interpret this event and others like it
unless we understand the structural conditions
of insecurity arising from globalization. People
reaffirm their identity when it is threatened.
Nationalism and religion provide stable discourses
and beliefs because of their ability to give a sense
of security, stability and simple answers. As
Kinnvall observes:
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the economic and technical aspects of globalization while avoiding its political and cultural aspects.
The United Arab Emirates began opening up to
free trade much earlier, encouraging the free movement of labor and forming joint business ventures
long before it became necessary in the postcommunist era. Dubai is leading the way, with the
other Emirates following its lead. The UAE does not
see globalization and liberalization as challenges to
overcome but as opportunities from which to benefit (The UAE 2002). As a result, the Emirates can
claim to be the most globalized country in the
Middle East. By contrast, most other governments
of the Arab world are largely unprepared for the
economic and political impact of globalization.
Another example is Tunisia, where globalization
is interpreted mainly in the economic and social
perspectives. On the political front, only reforms
that will not challenge the predominance of the
ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally led by
President Ben Ali are tolerated. Tunisias stability
rests on what is essentially an authoritarian state,
with very clear limits on pluralism, freedom of
speech and judicial independence. The limits of
political liberalization were highlighted by the constitutional referendum in 2002, which removed the
three-term limit to the presidency and also raised
the age of eligibility to presidential nomination from
70 to 75 years. Nonetheless, Tunisia has become
one of the most rapidly growing economies in the
Arab World, steadily becoming more integrated
with the EU through commercial, social and intellectual linkages as well as cooperation on security
issues (Tunisia 2002).
Yemen was admitted to the World Trade
Organization, a pillar of globalization, as an
observer. Yet key aspects of Yemens relationship
with globalization, namely economic and political
reform, have taken place by default. The economy
was on the verge of collapse through much of the
early 1990s until the multilateral agencies stepped
in to provide advice with various structural reform
processes. In 1995, after the end of the civil war,
the President embarked on a comprehensive plan
of reforms backed by the IMF and World Bank.
However, given the geo-political situation after
September 11, the President may calculate that
such an approach would not create much of a
backlash in the West (Yemen 2002).
Socioeconomic and geo-political globalization
are affecting the way the Palestinian cause is
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Conclusion
At this historical juncture, the Arab and Western
worlds should both make concerted efforts to dispel
the perception of clashes of civilizations and wars
of religions; they need to focus on more dialogue,
justice, development, and freedom. Radical Islamic
fundamentalism is an extreme expression of dissatisfaction with the unjust and materialist modern
globalized world and it is a dangerous embodiment
of religious extremism. Even more explosive issues
are time bombs ready to explode. Muslim minorities
in the West and religious minorities in the Arab
world should not be treated as enemies; for such
actions may deepen the rise of radicalism and terrorism, committed by individuals, groups, or states.
Many dissatisfied and marginalized individuals and
groups may resort to terrorism to bring about what
they ironically believe to be justice and freedom.
Thus, the prospects of future ideological and
political co-existence between globalization and
Islamization through a re-conceptualization of the
role of the state under a limited government, an
open economic system, and a new international
moralism are not very promising. In the contemporary Arab world are to be found both radical Islamic
movements that call for an authoritarian state
power and a controlled economy and moderate
movements that call for a limited state power and a
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141
Notes
1 For Arab scholars interest in globalization, see Ghazi
Qusaybi, Al-Awlama wa al-Hawiya al-Wataniyya (Riyadh:
Maktabat al-Ubaykan, 2002), Abd al-Basit Abd al-Muti,
ed., Al-Awlama (Cairo: Dar al-Kitab al-Jadid al-Mutahida,
2000), Salih Abu Usba and others, eds. Al-Awlama wa
al-Hawiyya (Amman: Manshurat Jamiat Philidaphia,
1999), Al-Awlama wa al-Hawiyya, Conference Proceedings,
Ribat, 1997, Al-Awlama wa al-Thaqafa wa al-Muqawama,
Shuun al-Awsat, Vol. 120, Fall 2005. The whole issue of
the journal is focused on globalization. See also other
citations in this articles footnotes.
2 See also Reimagining the Ummah, by Peter Mandaville
in Islam Encountering Globalization, p. 70.
3 On different local responses to globalization, see
Christopher Merrett, Understanding local response to
globalization: the production of geographical scale and
political identity, National Identities, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2001.
4 On the difficulties facing globalization in the Arab world,
see Robert Looney, Why has globalization eluded the
Middle East?, Strategic Insights, Vol. III, Issue 12
(December 2004). See also Enid Hill, First World, Third
World, Globalizing World: Where is the Middle East?,
Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 21, Issue 3, 1999.
REFERENCES
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CHAPTER 9
GLOBALIZATION AND ASIAN VALUES
Janadas Devan
A thesis
The project-description for the Cultures and
Globalization Series made this observation: The
values of different ways of life, its authors noted,
have risen to consciousness to become the rallying
cry of diverse claims to a space in the planetary
culture. Before culture was just lived. Now it has
become a self-conscious collective project.
This chapter will ask why this should be so. Using
Singapore as a particular case study and ranging
further afield to consider East Asia in general I
will ask why, at this particular moment in history,
when globalization has become a fact of enormous
moment, cultures should insist on their uniqueness,
and why the theory and practice of culture should
become a self-conscious project. I will argue that
that very coincidence the assertion of cultural
uniqueness coinciding with the material fact of
globalization is itself the explanation. Capitalism,
hitherto, had been understood to be continuous
with a particular, namely Western, culture. That
continuity has been broken by globalization.
The very fact that capital is transnational renders
capital in excess not only of nation but also of culture. The threefold link between the rationality of the
Enlightenment, cultural identity and the interests of
capital has become a twofold link between rationality
and capital, with a purely instrumental notion of culture mediating. The fact that Asian values, for
example, can now signify competitive economic
advantage culture on par, as it were, with a welltrained workforce, an efficient infrastructure and
favourable tax structures as much as it does an
assertion of unique identity, is evidence that
transnational capital is also potentially transcultural. Which means to say, the structures, habits
and belief systems transnational capital requires for
its functioning are to a remarkable extent quite
independent of any particular cultural formation or
nation-state.
It is in this context that culture has emerged as a
question of enormous moment. The production of
cultural differences, including all the potential uglinesses as well as affirmations that such differences
involve, is a means of recovering value, including
national sovereignty, in a context where the universal
as such has become the province of transnational
capital. Culture, in other words, has become a selfconscious collectivist project because it is the only
arena left for the assertion of identity and value.
There is a double movement involved in that assertion: (1) a negative refusal of transnational capital
as the sole arbiter of value; and (2) a positive affirmation of particular cultures as repositories of
value, identity and authority.
I have chosen Singapore, in particular, as
the focus of my analysis for a number of reasons.
First, it is the society I know best, since I am a
Singaporean. Second, its relative smallness, both
in terms of its geographical size as well as population, renders it easier to study than larger Asian
countries like China, India and Indonesia. Third,
Singapores ideologues have been unusually influential in the global marketplace of ideas, in part
because of their eloquence, and in part because of
their access to the international media through the
English language. And finally, Singapore, because
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Asian values
The assertion by many Asian leaders and intellectuals that something called Asian values exists
and that these values govern the trajectory of Asian
societies, economically and politically is one
example of how globalized Asian societies have
dealt with the contradictions inherent in globalization. It illustrates, at once, why the category of culture can acquire such self-conscious valency in
precisely those societies that deliberately assume
the modalities of globalization; and how it enables
them to negotiate the conflicting demands of the
local and the global. In psychoanalytic terms, one
might describe Asian values as an apotropaic or
defensive gesture which is not to say it does not
also encompass positive, even challenging and
sometimes aggressive, claims.
Consider Singapore: why would a country that
now has a higher per capita income than the UK,
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Notes
1
2
3
4
5
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10
11
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CHAPTER 10
GLOBALIZATION AND THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL MODEL
Anthony Giddens
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Policy controversies
There is intense debate among policy specialists
about how far in European welfare systems there is
path-dependency, inhibiting mutual learning.
Following the work of Gosta Esping-Andersen
(1989) it is widely accepted that there are three or
four main types of welfare capitalism in Europe.
These are the Nordic type, based upon high taxation and extensive job opportunities provided within
the welfare state itself; the Central European type
(Germany, France), based mainly on payroll contributions; and the Anglo-Saxon type, which supposedly is a more residual form of welfare system,
having a lower taxation base and using more targeted policies. The fourth type, alongside the three
Esping-Andersen originally recognized, is the
Mediterranean one (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece),
which also has a fairly low tax base and depends
heavily upon provision from the family.2
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Lessons to be learned
With these difficulties in mind, let us set out what
the experience of the past few years in Europe
shows us about combining competitiveness and
social justice. We should be cautious about success stories of today they may turn out to be the
failures of tomorrow. But they supply our best
guesses for the moment. As given here, the points
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One
It is right to put growth and jobs at the forefront.
A high level of employment, above a decent minimum wage, is desirable for more than one reason.
The greater the proportion of people in jobs, the
more money is available other things being equal
to spend on social investment and social protection. Having a job is also the best route out of
poverty. The Lisbon aim of getting an average of 70
per cent or more of the workforce into jobs is not in
principle unrealistic. But all depends on the will to
reform in those countries where the employment
ratio is well below this figure.
Many factors, of course, go into creating more
net jobs. However it cannot be accidental that all
the countries that have employment ratios of over
70 per cent in Europe have active labour-market
policies. Such policies provide training for workers
who are unemployed or threatened by unemployment and also try actively to match up workers with
job vacancies. They were first of all introduced in
Sweden many years ago, but since have spread
quite widely. They are not all of a piece. The most
effective combine social partnership and universal
access to benefits that provide for retraining and
resettlement flexicurity.
The Danish example is widely quoted, even if
some have expressed doubts about how far it could
be instituted elsewhere.5 However, many in societies with high unemployment levels are now
expressing interest in such policies, including political leaders. Agenda 2010 in Germany is a prime
example, although of course it has proved politically
extremely difficult to implement. Some reforms
have been introduced in France and it is said that in
that country there is a vogue for the Danish
model , (Barbier 2005).
155
Three
Flexibility in labour markets is an essential part of
the policy framework of the successful states. It
does not mean American-style hire and fire. In an
era of accelerating technological change, however,
employability being willing and able to move on
becomes of prime importance. Moving on often
has to happen within the same job because of the
importance of technological change. It has been
estimated that in the EU15 economies 80 per cent
of the technology in use over the period 19952005
is less than ten years old. However, 80 per cent of
the workforce was trained more than ten years ago.
Flexibility has a bad name, especially among
some on the left. For them it means sacrificing the
needs of the workforce to the demands of capitalistic competition. But the nature of labour-market regulation is at least as important as its extent. Many
labour rights can and should remain. They include
rights of representation and consultation, the regulation of working conditions, laws against discrimination and so forth. Ireland has enjoyed its
phenomenal growth while implementing all relevant
EU labour legislation of this sort (Wickham 2004).
Many employees in fact want flexible working,
and part-time work, in order to accommodate
family demands. Flexibility also meshes to a considerable degree with wider trends in everyday life
in modern societies. Most citizens are accustomed
to a much wider range of life-style choices than a
generation ago, including, if it is feasible for them,
when, where and what work to do.
Four
Two
Those on the right side of the political spectrum
argue that only low-tax economies can prosper in a
world of intensifying competition. Yet the evidence
to the contrary seems unequivocal. There is no
direct relationship between taxation as a proportion
of GDP and either economic growth or job creation.
There probably is an upper limit, as is indicated by
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Five
Seven
Investment in education, the expansion of universities, the diffusion of ICT are crucial parts of the
modernization of the ESM. Finland is an interesting
example of a society in the vanguard of ICT and
also with a strong welfare system. As Manuel
Castells has pointed out, the country shows that
the thesis that a high-tech economy must be
modelled after Silicon Valley in a deregulated environment is mistaken (Castells and Himanen 2002).
Finland has a greater degree of IT penetration than
the US. Its growth rate in 19962000 was 5.1 per
cent. It also ranks near the top of all industrial countries in terms of measures of social justice and has a
high tax base. Finland, Castells concludes, offers
hope for others. Only three generations ago, Finland
was a very poor, heavily rural society.
Six
It is often said that our societies are becoming
more unequal, but in many respects this is not the
case. The position of women, gays and the disabled, for instance, has improved almost everywhere over the past 30 years. Income inequality
has grown in most industrial countries over that
period, but there are signs this process is now
levelling off. Some societies have managed to stay
Eight
Immigration has become one of the hottest of hot
topics across Europe, far too complex to discuss in
any detail here. As societies become multicultural,
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Nine
The ageing population should be seen as an
opportunity, not just as another problem. We know
what has to happen the difficulties in most countries depend upon mustering the political will to make
the changes. We have to invest more in children. We
have to persuade younger people to save more. The
main cause of the ageing society is not that people
on average are living longer although they are it
is the low birth rate. The state has to provide people
with incentives to have more children, and make
sure the right type of welfare measures are in place.
No matter what innovations are made to help or
force people to save, there is only one main way to
solve the issue of unaffordable pensions commitments. We have to persuade or motivate older
people to stay in work longer. Such a goal is surely
not just a negative one. We have to contest ageism
both inside and outside the workplace. If it means
people over 55, or over 65, old age is no longer the
incapacitating factor it once was.
Ten
Continuing reform of the state itself, and of
public services, is just as important to the future of
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Concluding thought
The question is always asked: Can Europe afford
its social model and the culture it embodies? But
perhaps we should turn it the other way around:
Can Europe afford not to have its social model?
The levels of inequality that exist in the US could
cause that country immense problems in the years
that lie ahead. The US, for example, may have the
best universities in the world, but it also has the
highest illiteracy rate among the industrialized
countries. According to the Programme for
International Assessment, 15-year-olds in the US
rank no higher than 24th out of 29 nations compared; and only 24th also in tests of problemsolving skills. At a time when the knowledge economy is itself becoming globalized, a reformed
European social model might mean that Europe
may be better placed than the US.
Notes
1
2
3
4
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CHAPTER 11
LATIN AMERICA: DIVERSITY, INVENTION AND CRISIS IN
CULTURAL PRODUCTION
Anbal Ford1
Introduction
In the pages that follow, I shall explore the
globalization-related tensions in contemporary cultural production in Latin America. At the outset, I
stress that any reflection on the current situation
across this continent requires constant diachronic
revision not only of the way that the countries which
make it up were constituted, but also of the way in
which the very concept of Latin America emerged.
For the latter is a grouping of countries that share
many problems but whose economies are highly
diverse, whose societies are constituted in highly
different ways, and whose institutions and cultural
formations, levels and strategies and conceptions
of development, and relationships with modernity
and the rest of the world vary very greatly.
The term Latin America refers to those countries
on the American continent to the south of the Ro
Grande, i.e. the USMexican border. But the term
itself, which emerged during the nineteenth century
in the midst of complex political discussions and
projects, raises several issues. First, the fact that
from the outset it has encompassed concepts of
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165
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altered the previous panorama in which the importation of U.S. products was the rule and was linked
to the strengthening of the internal audiovisual
market and the increasing consumption of nationally-produced dramatic fare (mainly telenovelas).
(Ortiz 2003: 57) For example, Mexico and Brazil
produce between 15 and 20 telenovelas per year.
This genre, in turn, saw strong growth in the area
of exports (Mazziotti, 2004).27 In this framework of
concentration and convergence of media, of loss
of cultural autonomy, as in the case of publishing,
generally due to purchase by Spanish conglomerates, Latin American production ranges from
examination of critical socio-cultural problems, to
avant-garde productions.
Historically, Latin American film has known many
ups and downs. Unlike the large, profitable production and distribution enterprises of the US, film here
has depended mainly on state aid to develop, and
for that reason it has been affected by political fluctuations, and the lack of subsidies and measures
aimed at regulating the industry. The symbolic
industries are not an important part of the gross
national product as in many central countries
and the conditions of production and the extreme
improvisation, have imposed in Latin America a
poor-man's cinema where scarcity is a sign of
sincerity and spontaneity (Monsivis 2000: 64).
However, in recent decades film has received a significant push forwards.28 Not only in Brazil,
Argentina and Mexico with its long tradition of
cinematographic production but also in Peru,
Bolivia and Cuba, the new Latin American film has
become an important phenomenon. According to
some writers (Daicich 2004), it is based on personal projects, of writer-directors who use film as a
means to communicate their ideas, their emotions,
and their particular aesthetic, and attempt to reflect
the identity of their country. We can also observe
the clear stamp of critical exploration of identity and
socio-cultural issues. Some examples: La virgen de
los Sicarios by Barbet Schoeder (2000), Estacin
Central (1998), Diarios de Motocicleta (2004) by
Walter Salles, Amores perros by Alejandro
Gonzlez Iarritu (2004), Ciudad de Dios by
Fernando Meirelles (2002), Nueve reinas by Fabin
Bielinsky (2000), Luna de Avellaneda by Juan Jos
Campanella (2004), etc. Another type of film
involves the exploration and development of
memory of the horrors of the military processes
for example: Garage Olimpo by Marco Bechis
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Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
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20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
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30
31
32
33
REFERENCES
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CHAPTER 12
MANAGING CULTURAL CONFLICTS: STATE POWER AND
ALTERNATIVE GLOBALIZATION IN CHINA
Yunxiang Yan
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2005). There are, however, various official regulations for associations, and many of these NGOs
have government sponsorship in one way or
another, thus earning them the nickname of
GONGO.
The influx of foreign cultural elements also resulted
in important social changes manifested in the everyday life of ordinary people, such as the rising
demands for romantic love and sexual freedom, the
escalating divorce rate and the emergence of singleparent families, the triumph of consumerism and the
fetish for commodities, the fever for MBA degrees and
to learn English, and the competition to be cool
among urban youths (He 2000).
Another result of the decades-long importation of
foreign cultural products is the so-called cultural
trade deficit, a popular topic discussed in the
Chinese media in 2005. It is interesting to note that
although China has had a favorable economic
trade balance, which has become a major issue in
Sino US relations, the flow of cultural products
constitutes a very different story. China has
imported many more cultural products and has
exported very few. Recent statistics show that in the
book trade, China imported seven times more
books than the number of books it exported; in
copyright trade, the ratio between imports and
exports is 10.3 to 1. The largest gap or deficit, however, is found in the publication of translated books.
In recent years China has authorized publication of
more than 12,000 foreign books in Chinese translation, but only 81 Chinese books have secured foreign publishing rights (Jin and Zhang 2005; see
also Buckley 2005). Chinas weak position in the
cultural flow at the global scale was first mentioned
by Zhao Qizheng, the chief spokesperson of the
State Council, during a high-level roundtable conference in May 2005 (Di and Chen 2005). Zhaos
warning was soon coined by the media as Chinas
cultural trade deficit and it triggered a wave of public discussion. In response to the cultural trade
deficit, a set of new policies was promulgated by
the central government to promote cultural exports
and regulate cultural imports (Buckley 2005).
On the basis of my research in the late 1990s, I
concluded that the Chinese party-state had strategically positioned itself as the ultimate manager of
the globalization process by promoting Chinas
integration into the global economy and international community on one hand and carefully
controlling this process on its own terms on the
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other. As far as the four aspects of cultural globalization are concerned, the party-state has thus far
taken different strategies to maintain control and at
the same time to facilitate growth. The business
elite culture seems to be the least worrisome for
CCP leaders, and the official media have actually
been crucial in promoting a Western-style management system and corporate culture. Popular culture
is another area that the state has seemingly
decided to leave alone, presumably because it can
be used to lessen the social tensions of the post1989 era and to create an image of prosperity and
happiness. In contrast, the state has always closely
watched and tightly controlled areas of intellectual
development and social movement, because the
former pose a direct challenge to the Communist
ideology and the latter may lead to collective action
on a large scale, a source of great fear to the partystate (Yan 2002).
The party-states management role applies to the
transnational companies in China as well. Because
the state still controls many important resources
and, more importantly, access to the Chinese cultural market, foreign companies and cultural agencies have to be careful not to challenge the states
authority and must make necessary concessions,
otherwise they will be denied opportunities to conduct business in China. For example, the Internet is
arguably the most important and efficient domain
for the flow of images, ideas, and information in the
age of globalization. Thus, many in the West have
argued that the Internet will be the most powerful
weapon to bring down various boundaries and
barriers and to transform authoritarian regimes into
democracies (see for example Friedman 2005).
Transnational companies did take a large share of
the vast Internet market in China, reaching more
than 100 million users by 2005. But they hardly had
any impact on the way the party-state controls freedom of speech over the Internet. Instead, the partystate has successfully changed the way these
companies conduct their businesses in China. For
example, Yahoo! has been criticized repeatedly for
providing the Chinese government with key information from its server that led to the arrest of a
Chinese dissident (Ni 2005). Microsoft, Google,
and Cisco all participate in the governmentimposed censorship on the Internet in China
(Gutmann 2004: 127-72), a common practice
that has led the US Congressional Human
Rights Caucus to hold a hearing and conduct an
175
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worried that the party-state might manipulate nationalistic emotions among the younger generations and
utilize political nationalism as a means to maintain the
authoritarian regime. They thus made efforts to prevent the surge of narrow-minded nationalism (see
Xiao 1997; Le 2004). This has changed since the late
1990s. An increasingly large number of intellectuals
have abandoned their previous conviction that China
should adopt the American way of modernization and
many of them have begun to criticize the United
States and the West for trying to block Chinas development. Through lectures, publications, and media
presentations, these intellectuals have had a great
influence on college students, and, through the latter,
on Chinese youth in general. One of the most noteworthy events in the media was the publication of a
series of essays in a widely read newspaper that criticized American arrogance, unilateralism, and the
insidious nature of American values including human
rights, democracy, and freedom of the press (Beijing
qingnian bao 1999; for a detailed analysis of these
essays, see Rosen 2003: 111112). Such a shift to
reassess American culture was also fed by the international discourse on the China threat. Chinese
audiences, especially popular audiences reflected in
the mass media, reacted strongly to the China threat
theory, viewing it as clear evidence that the foreign
powers were conspiring to block Chinas rise as a
modern and powerful nation (Yee and Zhu 2002).
The mass media played a key role in spreading
the intellectual discourse of nationalism to the public, and a series of conflicts in SinoUS and
SinoJapanese relations during the 1990s fueled
the growth of a third form of nationalism popular
nationalism among the ordinary people, especially
the Chinese youth. NATOs accidental bombing of
the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the
collision of an American spy plane with a Chinese
fighter jet off Chinas southern coast in 2001 played
particularly important roles in provoking popular
nationalism, on both occasions resulting in student
protests in major cities (Gries 2004). A number of
surveys have shown that negative views toward the
United States and American culture began to grow
among Chinese youth in the mid-1990s (Yang
1997) and have continued to develop since then.
A 1999 survey of 1,600 high school students, for
example, found that 70 percent of the respondents
gave a negative rating to the United States (Rosen
2003: 108). The most noteworthy development,
however, is not the impression that the US
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model of the Asian values that emphasize selfdetermination and state suzerainty. With its remarkable achievements in economic growth and
increasing military power, China stands out as a
much more attractive model than other East Asian
tigers and thus has had much wider and deeper
influences on some African and Latin American
countries by offering an alternative (Kurlantzick
2005; Thompson 2005). The Beijing Consensus, or
the Chinese model, has changed global diplomacy,
and, in the eyes of American right-wing thinkers,
constitutes a real threat to American superiority
and the Western model of development (Kurlantzick
2005). This in turn reinforces the China threat
theory (Yee and Storey 2002) and increases the
possibility of future conflicts.
Conclusions
Remarking on Chinas effort to enter the world,
the late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping also
commented: When you open the window, flies and
mosquitoes come in. The flies and mosquitoes that
Deng was referring to is the inevitable influx of
foreign mainly Western thoughts and cultural
values that accompany the foreign investment,
technology, and management skills, and which
could pose serious challenges to the Communist
regime by peaceful evolution. Therefore, by nature
this is an inherent tension.
Despite the fear of peaceful evolution and the
repeated attempts to fence off foreign influences,
the Chinese party-state has maintained the opendoor policy and has integrated China much further
into the international community during the last
twenty-five years or so. Consequently, social life
and cultural values in the society have changed to
a great degree, including the rise of individuality,
the popularity of romantic love and no-fault divorce,
the pursuit of individual freedom and privacy, consumerism and a consumer movement, environmentalism, and the mushrooming of NGOs. When
these foreign cultural ideas, values, and behavioral
patterns first entered Chinese society, almost all of
them were regarded as political flies and mosquitoes by the party-state and unhealthy and strange
by conservative citizens; they naturally caused tensions and conflicts with existing Chinese ideas,
values, and behavioral patterns. Yet, as time went
by, the initial tensions and conflicts turned out to be
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183
REFERENCES
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CHAPTER 13
CAPITALISM, CONFLICT AND CHURN: HOW THE AMERICAN
CULTURE WAR WENT GLOBAL
Ronnie D. Lipschutz
Introduction
Every society has its myths, its Golden Ages, its
foundational principles and beliefs, its naturalized
social hierarchy (Morgan 2005). And all societies
undergo periods of stress, change and instability,
leading their members to yearn for the good old
days. A central element of Golden Age mythology
is that everyone was happier and better off, things
and people were in order, and following the rules
offered its just rewards even if such was rarely the
case. Cultural conservatives such as Huntington
believe the American Golden Age was the 1950s,
when the country was prosperous and at peace,
Ike was in the White House, fathers were at work,
mothers were in the kitchen, and everyone who
counted was White and Protestant. For AfricanAmericans, radicals and homosexuals, among
others, that particular decade was hardly a golden
one. And one need only recall the case of the Irish
during the first half of the nineteenth century to recognize that Americans of all races, ethnicities, and
religions have not always been embraced by the
countrys dominant Anglo-Protestant culture. For
other groups, such rejection still remains true today.
Why, then, make patently absurd claims such as
Huntingtons?
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competitive and corporations have moved to outsourcing and offshoring both manufacturing and
services (see, e.g., Cox and Alm 1992; Gereffi and
Korzeniewicz 1994; Boo 2004a, 2004b). For reasons having to do with historical racial and ethnic
exclusions in certain parts of the United States, as
well as pure demographics (Royster 2003), the vast
majority of blue-collar and middle-management
workers are white Protestants.9 The industrial and
corporate reorganizations of the past 30 years have
had a significant effect on them, even though
minorities tend to be first fired and have experienced greater impacts as a result of organizational
change (Rimer 1996). Whatever the numbers say,
the natural order of things has been upset and all
that is solid melts into air.
I should note that although there is a class character to the impacts and consequences of churn,
political and social alliances tend to be based on
cultural relations rather than strictly economic factors (which is why the international proletariat has
never lost its chains). This explains the paradox
noted by Thomas Frank (2004) in Whats the Matter
with Kansas?, a book that asks why those whose
economic interests are so severely affected by
Bush Administration policies have nonetheless
overwhelmingly been supporters of the Republican
Party. Frank invokes religious solidarity (rather than
false consciousness) to account for this phenomenon and, as we shall see below, this is an important
element, although not the only one. Still, in the
United States, when culture and economic interests
cross swords, so to speak, it is often the former that
best explains the odd political coalitions sometimes
observed.
There is a second aspect to globalizations
churn. Depending on political and economic conditions at a given time, the disadvantaged may find it
possible to acquire some economic resources
through exploitation of the very niches in the division of labor to which they have been relegated
as a result of the social hierarchy (Chua 2002).
Improvement in the economic well-being of members of such groups then spills over into the cultural
realm, as the market caters to changing tastes,
growing incomes and accumulated savings.10
Because these new cultural products often differ
from what was previously on offer Gay Days at
Disneyworld, billboards in Spanish they acquire a
high degree of visibility and attention and make disadvantaged groups seem more prominent and
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Great Awakening
Approximate
Dates
First
17301780(?)
Purification movement
against Puritanism and
individual success,
leading to the rise of
Congregationalism
Integration of North
American colonies
into British imperial
system
Second
18301855
Reaction against
Congregationalism and
mainline denominations;
rise of millennialist and
literalist Protestant
sects; abolitionism
Penetration of first
industrial revolution
into US economy;
integration through
rails and roads
Third
18801930
Corporate monopoly,
depressions and
currency crisis,
farm modernization
Fourth
1975present
Growth in evangelical,
premillennial churches,
and their expansion into
the Third World; reaction
against social liberalism
Post-Fordism,
aka, the Information
Revolution,
outsourcing,
downsizing, etc.
Character
Nature of economic
change
190
the 1950s, when racial, religious, and ethnic minorities, in particular, had not yet begun to challenge
the natural order of things (Weyrich 2005; Carlson
and Mero, 2005).
Whether that hegemony is really threatened is
debatable. In particular, by 2005, with a few localized exceptions, the traditionalist coalition had won
resounding political victories across much of the
United States, taking control of all three branches
of the US government, exercising enormous influence over the tone and content of the public media,
and re-instating the authoritative role of religion in
American public life. The opposition, as it were,
appeared to be on the run. Polling data, however,
suggest that victory is far from certain (Fiorina
2005), and the decline in President Bushs fortunes
are, perhaps, indicative of a gradual sea-change
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Notes
1
4
5
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CAPITALISM, CONFLICT AND CHURN: HOW THE AMERICAN CULTURE WAR WENT GLOBAL
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
193
REFERENCES
http://www.thearda.com/RCMS/2000/RCMS_report2000.
asp (17 Dec. 2005).
Bennett, David H. (1988) The Party Of Fear: From Nativist
Movements to the New Right in American History. Chapel
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
Berman, Marshall (1982) All that is Solid Melts Into Air.
New York: Simon and Schuster.
Boo, Katherine (2004a) The churn: creative destruction
in a border town, The New Yorker, March 29, at: http://
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CAPITALISM, CONFLICT AND CHURN: HOW THE AMERICAN CULTURE WAR WENT GLOBAL
195
http://www.bcg.com/publications/publication_view.jsp?pub
ID=791&language=English (20 Dec. 2005).
Lubeck, Paul and Lipschutz, Ronnie D. (Forthcoming) The
clash of global discourses: explaining the relationship
between neo-liberalism and Islamism, Center for Global,
International, and Regional Studies, University of
California, Santa Cruz.
MacErlean, Neasa and Bachelor, Lisa (2005) Lost your job?
Heres how to get back on the road to work, The Observer,
April 24, at: http://money.guardian.co.uk/work/howto/story/
0,1456,1469825,00.html (6 Jan. 2006).
Marx, Anthony (2003) Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of
Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich (1848/1964) The
Communist Manifesto. New York: Pocket Books.
(1932/1970) The German Ideology, C.J. Arthur (ed.).
New York: International Publishers.
Merk, Frederick (1963) Manifest Destiny and Mission in
American History. New York: Knopf.
McConkey, Dale (2001) Whither Hunters culture war? Shifts
in Evangelical Morality, 19881998, Sociology of Religion,
62 (2): 14974.
McLoughlin, William (1980) Revivals, Awakenings and
Reform. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
McMurrer, Daniel P. and Sawhill, Isabelle V. (1996) Economic
mobility in the United States, Urban Institute, Oct. 1, at:
http://www.urban.org/publications/406722.html#tab1a (19
Dec. 2005).
Miller, Perry (1953) The New England Mind: From Colony to
Province. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
(1954) The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century,
2nd edn. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (1st
edn, 1939.)
Moghissi, Haideh (ed.) (2005) Women and Islam: Critical
Concepts in Sociology. London: Routledge.
Morgan, Edmund S. (2005) The other founders, New York
Review of Books, 52 (14): 413.
Northcott, Michael (2004) An Angel Directs the Storm
Apocalyptic Religion and American Empire. London: I.B.
Tauris.
Notes from Nowhere (ed.) (2003) We Are Everywhere
The Irresistible Rise of Global Anticapitalism. London: Verso.
Peterson, Anna (2001) Being Human Ethics, Environment,
and Our Place in the World. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Pew Research Center (2003) Religion and politics: contention and consensus, July 24, at: http://pewforum.org/
publications/surveys/religion-politics.pdf (19 Dec. 2005).
Polanyi, Karl (2001) The Great Transformation, 2nd edn.
Boston: Beacon. (1st edn 1944.)
Quinone, Sam (2005) From sweet success to bitter tears,
The Standard, Jan. 21, at: http://www.thestandard.com.hk/
stdn/std/Focus/GA21Dh01.html\ (6 Jan. 2006).
Rimer, Sarah (1996) A hometown feels less like home, The
New York Times, March 6, at: http://www.nytimes.com/specials/downsize/06down1.html (22 Sept. 2005).
Royster, Deirdre A. (2003) Race and the Invisible Hand: How
White Networks Exclude Black Men from Blue-Collar Jobs.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
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TENSIONS
CHAPTER 14
TENSIONS BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH
Hugo Achugar
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203
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205
A second scenario is staged not just by LatinAmerica but the bulk of countries which are members of the Cairns Group, the G-20, IBSA or similar
groupings of nation-states.7 Or even better, by socalled South-South groups that bring together
countries from various regions whose positions, as
Gary M. Mersham points out when discussing
South AfricanAustralian relations, feed into the
broader SouthSouth versus the North discourse.8
Here EastWest tensions are erased not only culturally and geographically but mainly economically.
Yet this SouthSouth scenario is very heterogeneous. This heterogeneity is different from LatinAmerican heterogeneity (Cornejo Polar 1994) and
is mainly based on economic and productive factors. At the same time, while the economy is the
fundamental cement of transnational alliances it
does not override cultural differences linked to their
traditions, languages and ethnicities.
In this sense, the South itself is heterogeneous.
How to speak, then, of NorthSouth tensions? The
tensions I am referring to here are not only
though fundamentally the ones you can find
between the I or the eye of the center and the
Other or the object of the ethnocentric gaze, but
also the ones revealed by the extremely unequal
distribution of symbolic production, in other words
artistic, scientific and theoretical production. For a
precise and uneven distribution of cultural labor
pervades: the South is viewed by the North as the
locus of exoticism from magical realism, to
primitive or pre -modern cultural artifacts as well
as the site of alternative or non-scientific knowledge and of local as opposed to universal culture.
Although this dichotomy may be supported by
some concrete realities most scientific activity is
indeed produced in the North it is also true that
this hegemony of scientific and technological activity implies a brain drain from the South towards the
North (Pellegrino 2001).
It is not just the absence of acknowledgement, but
a recognition that is performed by the way you identify an exotic Other; an identification that promotes,
as Jess Martn Barbero has observed, a strong
demand for meaning. Today, identities are galvanized
in their struggles by something that is inseparable
from demands for acknowledgement and meaning.
Neither one nor the other is to be thought of in mere
economic or political terms, since both refer to
the core of culture as a realm of shared belonging.
For the Northern gaze, the South is where exotic or
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On representations
It is precisely in the wide field of representations
and symbolic production that one can observe the
conflictive unevenness between North and South. Or,
in other words, the tensions that can be discovered
when we look at what North and South actually
mean in different geo-symbolic places, in the sense
illustrated by Chilean poet Vicente Huidobros apparently incoherent line: The four cardinal points are
three: North and South. Written in the aftermath of
World War I, this idea was shared by other LatinAmerican artists familiar with both Western European
and North American cultural life. In 1935, Joaqun
Torres Garcas map (Illustration 14.1) expressed a
similar view.10 His powerful and eloquent motto Our
North is the South was used as a title for one of the
lectures he gave against Northern cultural hegemony
upon his return to South America after several
decades in Europe and a brief sojourn in New York.
Although Torres Garcas map predates 11 the world
of today it can be understood as a sign of current
NorthSouth cultural tensions.12 In his writings and
paintings, the North is a play on words between two
different meanings: in a purely geographical sense as
well as in an orientation sense. The reversal of orientation proposed by Torres Garca expresses his idea
of putting Europe aside as a model or paradigm while
refocusing Latin-American symbolic production
towards itself; his motto Our North is the South
expresses this cultural turn this moving away from
Europe or the North is a form of symbolic revolution
or artistic resistance.
Current cultural globalization threatens attempts to
preserve local production and liberate the South from
the hegemony on cultural production exerted by
Northern centers. It implicitly favors universalization
of rules and paradigms that determine valid kinds of
symbolic production.Thus, languages, memories and
narratives are challenged and sometimes despised.
In this regard, it is no accident that memory and cultural patrimony have become such salient issues of
international cultural politics in recent years, especially at the level of UNESCO.
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Notes
1
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REFERENCES
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CHAPTER 15
THE WEST VERSUS THE ARAB WORLD:
DECONSTRUCTING THE DIVIDE
Georges Corm
The main geo-political and historical roots of the
sense of divide existing between the Arab world and
the West do not originate in any kind of clash of religious and cultural differences of an essential nature,
but come rather from the different historical traumas
suffered by Europe and the Arab world, both in their
own specific history and in their thorny historical relations. Any attempt to reduce tensions should first
recognize these different traumas. Too often in the
media and the academic world different religious arguments are advocated to analyze purely political issues.
It is only by recognizing the complex historical plight
suffered by both groups that hostility and tensions can
be diffused and reduced. This requires restraint in the
media and the academic world, so that the political
changes needed on both sides of the divide to reduce
tensions and clashes can be encouraged.
World. This divide has become central in international relations. It has been constructed on various
old and new cultural and historical backgrounds
belonging to the respective new mega-identities.4
Globalized communications augment the perception
of threat on both sides of the divide, as epitomized
by Samuel Huntingons clash of civilizations thesis
based on religious identity.5 Recently, President
George Bush has lent credibility to the Huntingtonian
vision by describing what he sees as an all-out war
in which the United States is pitted against Islamic
militants supposedly attempting to establish a radical
Muslim empire from Indonesia to Spain, with the aim
of destroying civilization.6
This chapter will attempt to deconstruct the
mutual feelings of hostility between the Arab World,
Europes next-door neighbor, and the Western
world, whose self-definitions allude increasingly to
Judeo-Christian values. It is to be hoped that
uncovering the roots of hostility and fear may contribute to easing the tensions now being fueled by
most official political discourse.
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The large number of US vetos on draft resolutions presented to the UN Security Council that
condemned Israel for violent and disproportionate acts of reprisal against Lebanon (invasion in
1978 and 1982) or against the Palestinians in
the occupied territories.
The non-implementation of Security Council
resolutions asking Israel to withdraw from occu-
213
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On Iraq
To convince the Arabs that Western decisionmakers are fair in their management of the international system and earnest in preaching democratic
values to the Middle Eastern countries, there
should be a fair and just implementation of international law and of UN decisions and body of laws on
all concerned countries.
The practice of such double standards destroys
the credibility of the democratic values that are so
badly needed in the Middle East. If there is to be a
stable regional order in the Middle East, the core
principles and values embodied in international law
must be implemented consistently with regard to
every country. But many Western decision-makers
do not even appear to be aware of the double standards they practice in this part of the world. This is
one of the biggest threats to the future of international peace, for it leads Arab public opinion to consider that the West merely manipulates general
principles of law and justice against the legitimate
interests of the people of the region. A minority
Arab radical fraction is thus reinforced in its belief
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that Muslims should reject all modern political principles originating in the philosophy of the European
Enlightenment. This same fraction preaches the
most rigid of the many interpretations of the Koran
dating back to the time when the world was effectively divided between Christendom and Islam.
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Notes
1 The Warsaw Pact and COMECON on the one hand and
NATO and the OECD on the other.
2 See the very interesting book by Frances Stonor
Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the
World of Arts and Letters , New Press, New York, 1999.
3 See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last
Man, Free Press, New York, 1992.
4 For the colonial cultural heritage that has shaped
discourse on Islamic societies see Edward Said,
Orientalism, Vintage Books, New York, 1978 and Culture
and Imperialism, Knopf/Random House, New York,
1993; for an historical enquiry into the roots of this new
divide, see Georges Corm, Orient-Occident. La fracture
imaginaire, La Dcouverte, Paris, 2003 (paperback
edition 2005).
5 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the
Remaking of World Order, Simon & Schuster, New York,
1996.
6 See the text of the Presidents speech in October 2005
at the National Endowment for Democracy (www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/print/200510063.html)
7 The best description of the trauma created in European
culture by the long wars between Catholics and
Protestants is in Arnold Toynbee, An Historians
Approach to Religion, Oxford University Press, 1956;
see also the famous book written in 1852 by Edgar
Quinet, Le christianisme et la Rvolution franaise,
Fayard, Paris, 1984.
8 See the classical study of Hanna Arendt, The Origins of
Totalitarianism, Harcourt, New York, 1951.
9 See Zeev Sternhell, The Founding Myths of Israel:
Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State,
Princeton University Press, 1999 and Alain Dieckhoff, The
Invention of a Nation: Zionist Thought and the Making of
Modern Israel, Columbia University Press, 2002.
10 See Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of European Jews,
Homes & Meier, New York, 1985 and The Politics of
Memory: Experiences of a Holocaust Researcher, Ivan
R. Dee, Chicago, 1996.
11 One French writer did not hesitate to make the comparison between the Crusades and the emergence of the
State of Israel, stating that this time everything was done
to secure an eternal Western presence in the Arab East
through the State of Israel. According to this writer, while
the Crusades failed, the West should not allow the Israeli
experience to fail. See Jean-Claude Guillebaud, Sur la
route des Croisades, Arlea, Paris, 1993. This book is a
reprint of a long reportage by the author that had
appeared in a series of articles published by the French
daily Le Monde.
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22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
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CHAPTER 16
ISLAM: BETWEEN RELIGIOUS-CULTURAL PRACTICE
AND IDENTITY POLITICS
Bassam Tibi
The late 20th and early 21st centuries are
characterized by the rise of the Islamic civilization to
the forefront of world affairs. A belief within Islam of a
cross-cultural umma, or a collective civilizational community, has taken hold in response to the perceived
cultural threat of modernity and the forces of structural
globalization. This has politicized culture and religion;
this politicization in turn has given rise to a conflictsaturated discourse of Islamic civilization that causes
tensions amongst Muslims themselves and between
Muslims and non-Muslim others. Within contemporary
Islam, new forms of imagined community, identity
politics, invention of tradition, selective revival of cultural heritage, and construction of collective memories, all serve to reinforce the line drawn between the
self and others. A global democratic peace is needed
that accepts cultural and religious pluralism. Only a
rethinking of Islamic doctrines and precepts may
result in a civil Islam compatible with democratic
peace.
Introduction
When discussing the dynamics of the cultures
conflictglobalization triad across the culturally
diverse world of Islam it is essential to distinguish
between culture and civilization rather than use
the two notions interchangeably. While there is no
scholarly consensus the terminology is unsettled
the working definition of culture I use in regard to
contemporary trends in the Islamic world is the
local social production of meaning (Geertz 1973).
In contrast, I see civilization as a grouping of cultures linked to one another by a family resemblance in terms of values and worldviews (Tibi
2001, updated 2005). This understanding applies to
Islam as both a social reality and a belief system,
shared cross-culturally from Asia through Africa
stretching to Europe (which is now home to 20 million Muslim immigrants). While we speak here, in
the plural, of many diverse cultures, the collective
recourse to Islam and the belief in its imagined
cross-cultural umma as a civilizational community
have become politicized. This politicization has
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CHAPTER 17
EUROPE VERSUS AMERICA: A GROWING CLASH
WITHIN THE WEST?
Nathan Gardels
There has been much talk since 9/11 about how the
clash of civilizations posited by Huntington is really a
clash within Islam. But is there a clash within the West
as well? This essay looks at that growing clash
between America and Europe. Though contrasting
cultures of belief and disbelief might mark the most
dramatic difference between America and Europe
today, there are other dimensions of the divide as well.
Essentially, this clash within the West arises from two
different cultural systems that are coming to grips with
geo-political shifts, globalization and technological
revolution in divergent ways. A largely aging, postnationalist, secular, social and satisfied Europe proposes to cope with the future far differently than a
youthful, largely nationalist, religious, individualist and
aspirational America. The outcome could well leave
Europe in elegant retirement as America joins Asia in
shaping the 21st century.
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That Europe feels besieged by the forces of globalization pushing its member states closer together
was evident in the rejection of the EU Constitutional
Treaty in 2005. Facing the commitments of a constitution many believed would wed their fates to Polish
plumbers and Turkish honor killings, the French and
Dutch ran away from the future their paternal elites
had charted out for them. Instead of saying I do,
they said No.
Perhaps this embarrassing rejection announced
proper anxiety over a step too far more than it
meant a step backward. After all, Europeans will
still be friends, not enemies. They arent about to go
to war, least of all the French and pacifistic Germans.
They will share the same currency, cross-border
cell phones and budget airlines as before. As a
common public opinion, they will continue to
oppose US unilateralism and worry about Asians
taking their jobs.
Certainly the no voters were right to doubt
whether greater centralization in Brussels was the
best way to go in an era of networked and distributed power. What value would another layer of
bureaucracy have added when the trend of history
is, in any case, toward devolution?
Like people everywhere, ordinary Europeans are
incremental creatures with human scale horizons.
They want to get used to each step forward before
moving on, pushing the inexorable shock into the
future as far as possible.
At the time of the vote, there had been just too
much change too quickly for one generation what
with all the fallen walls, reunifications, expansions,
extinguished currencies, ethnic cleansings and
murdered filmmakers. Where once there was Cold
War, understandably now there are cold feet.
The larger issue looming over it all, however, was
the sense of systemic blackmail globalization
brings.
In a New York Times column last June, Tom
Friedman scolded the Parisians from his perch
among the sacred cows and software engineers in
Bangalore: If you don't shed your long lunches and
welfare state you are finito, he told them.You should
give up your 35 hour week to work 35 hours a day
like the Indians, he preached (Friedman, T. 2005).
Whoa! To be sure, Europe needs remodeling.
Productivity and the slow food movement need to
be reconciled. If you want the good life, you have to
pay for it. But demolition is a reckless idea. Is it
really necessary to discard the fruits of over a
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Jean-Joseph Boillot
The following reflections are based on the working hypotheses and preliminary findings of a
socio-economic audit launched recently by the author on behalf of the Acadmie (the French term
for the different regional branches of the ministry of education) of the eastern Paris suburb of
Crteil. This area has been the heartland of recurring violent incidents in recent years; it also has
a school dropout rate of over 50 percent. The audit is designed to lead to a new educational strategy for the integration of the young people concerned.
The extent and violence of the autumn 2005 riots in the French suburbs astonished the entire world
and called to mind those of Americas inner cities in the 1960s. The ethnic origins of many of the rioters and the use of terms such as ghetto, discrimination, racism or minorities in the media coverage of
these events were another striking parallel. The difference, however, was that these rioters were not
only blacks but also young people from North Africa known as Beurs in todays urban slang (or
Robeux as they call themselves in Verlan, the French equivalent to English backslang) as well as
underprivileged indigenous French youths. In other words, they were the Black-Blanc-Beur (BlackWhite-Beur), so called after the composition of the French soccer team that won the World Cup in
1998, itself emblematic of the real heterogeneity of the countrys urban population. In the background
to the violence also hovered the great debate on France and its Muslims, the title of a recently
released report by the International Crisis Group.1 The undeniable resurgence of Islam piety among
some second generation immigrants in France is sometimes represented as a transposition of the
IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Indeed Salafist doctrine does appear to have inspired some of the most
highly educated among them, as revealed by Zacarias Moussaoui during his recent trial concerning
his responsibility as regards the September 11 attacks.
The turmoil caused by the war of the veil, in other words the Islamic headscarf issue, after the
adoption of the 2004 law prohibiting the sartorial display of visible religious symbols in schools, had
already reinforced the impression that the French model of integration was in crisis and needed to be
adapted to the realities of a multicultural society. The appeal of the multiculturalist solution, however, was diminished by the way in which similar urban violence led the Blair government in the United
Kingdom to toughen its legislation on immigration laws and freedom of speech, in particular after the
London bombings of 2005. In short, both these ideal models of integration would seem to be in an
impasse. Yet the search for culturalist explanations of and solutions to the violence in Europes suburbs continues.
The audit now under way takes a different tack. Rather than foreground cultural, ethnic or religious
approaches to the urban violence affecting almost one million pupils and students in the eastern suburbs, our hypothesis is that the economic and social impacts of accelerated globalization in the 1980s
have created a vicious circle in which cultural explanations serve as surrogates for the blockages of
French society in the face of the challenges of globalization. These blockages affect all levels of the
society. There is a parallel between the urban violence and the rejection of the European Constitutional
Treaty in 2005 which was based inter alia on a deep wave of anti-capitalist sentiment among young
indigenous French who are much better off. Ironically, it is the latter who recently took to the streets
in the Spring of 2006 to protest the so-called CPE contract, a liberal new labor law designed to promote employment for workers under 26, only to find themselves attacked during the mass demonstrations by gangs from the suburbs.
Our initial results show that using the prisms of culture, ethnicity or religion leads nowhere and even
generates a vicious circle as demonstrated by the reassertion of economic nationalism in Europe, particularly in France. In the face of the destructive features of economic change, of which globalization
is only one vector, French society is increasingly divided into two distinct groups: not the traditional
ex ante winners and losers, but rather insiders and outsiders. The insiders deploy offensive and
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defensive strategies which effectively exclude the outsiders from the competitive process itself. Urban
space is fractured along the lines of the center-periphery model of the new economic geography la
Paul Krugman and others. The center reinforces itself, capturing all resources, in particular, mobilizing
economic and social capital, by setting up protectionist barriers including the symbolic, for example
through the increasingly stringent scholastic selection, while employment declines. The topography of
an area such as Paris and its region (12 million inhabitants, 30 per cent of the French GDP) is in this
respect very revealing: a Western crescent concentrates modern industries, the new tertiary sector
services, the elites Grandes Ecoles, the centers of R&D and innovation, while the Eastern crescent is
increasingly segregated with the multiplication of urban, education and cultural ghettos. Half of its
young people leave school without any diploma or professional education and their real unemployment rate is as high as 50 percent in the industrial wastelands with no future.
Vis--vis the strategy of avoidance deployed by the insiders and the growing discourse of victimization of the outsiders, who live increasingly assisted lives, the intellectual elites tend to turn to
culture, religion or race in order to explain the emergence of a caste society or a Greek democracy
(the Citizens and the others). France contaminated by communitarianism, as the star soccer player
Lilian Thuram put it recently, is in fact an implicit response of the French elites allied with the white
upper middle class as the French economy declines. However they dont see or dont want to see that
this decline is due precisely to the large-scale waste of human resources since half of the young people in the region around Paris are the offspring of immigrants. Nor do they seem to grasp the negative
impacts, such as the recent riots that the exclusion of these young people has led to, affecting the
attractivity of Paris for millions of tourists. The countrys economic growth has averaged barely 1.5
percent since 1980, in other words a level of quasi-stagnation per capita. And globalizations winners
are reacting like the CAC 40 companies (with the stock exchange rising 30 percent in 2005) as they
move more and more of their business out of France. The best qualified engineers are also leaving
France when, even according to official sources, the number of people living in poverty is increasing
as a result of the unemployment rate of 10 percent of the active population. Unemployment exceeds
25 percent in the suburbs of the large cities and can attain as much as 50 percent among young people
and reach 80 percent in the most affected areas.
Like any crisis, the revolt of the suburbs could hold ways out of the blockages of French society. For
instance, a recent report of the Economic Analysis Council shows how liberalization in some sectors
such as the hotels and restaurant industry alone could create up to 3.4 million jobs, particularly for
less qualified young people, typically those from the suburbs. Similarly, the initiative taken in 2000 by
the director of the prestigious Institut de Sciences Politiques to recruit some of the best students from
the suburbs through affirmative action mechanisms was not only a great media success but also had
positive outcomes. Nearly 200 young people have gained entry to Sciences Po as a result, whereas
the proportion of young people from the lowest income brackets entering the elite educational establishments fell from 29 percent at the beginning of the 1950s to approximately 5 percent today.
But a race is now on between the demons of elitism, racism and negative discrimination which make
globalization, particularly migration, the source of all evil and thus see the solution only in repression
and the modernization of the police. In the same way, the middle path of multiculturalism is likely to
prove illusory, for recent research shows that the deprived young people of the suburbs are essentially
multi-colored (Black-White-Beur). Thus the mechanisms that apply to them are those of the underclass well described by American sociology of immigration. Rather than borrowing from their socalled cultures of origin which they have in fact never known, they produce their own culture, a
sub-culture of adversity which rejects dominant standards and values. Suffice it to observe the boom
in artistic expression Rap yesterday and Slam today and among the hundreds of young people who
congregate at the Caf culturel in Saint-Denis and share poetry in the French language not seen since
that of Franois Villon (1431 ?). This ethnic assertion is that of a composite culture which becomes
violent only against the violence of exclusion to which it is subjected.
1
La France face ses musulmans: meutes, jihadisme et dpolitisation, Rapport Europe No. 172, 9 mars 2006,
International Crisis Group (http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/ index.cfm?id=4019&1=2)
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VALUES
CHAPTER 18
VALUE PATTERNS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES:
IS THERE A TRANSATLANTIC RIFT?
Christian Welzel and Franziska Deutsch
Introduction
It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and
Americans share a common view of the world
Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from
Venus. Robert Kagans (2003) famous first lines
in Of Paradise and Power are typical of recent
debates on transatlantic relations. Following Kagan
and many other voices, it does indeed seem as
if the rift between the US and Europe has never
been wider. The anecdotal evidence at least is
overwhelming. Consider, for instance, Donald
Rumsfelds branding of Germany and France as
Old Europe in reaction to their critical stance on
the US war in Iraq. Further evidence of an Atlantic
rift has been provided by reports saying that
Americans are boycotting French products to
express their anger at the French position in the
Iraq question. On the other side of the Atlantic, hundreds of thousands of people all over Europe
demonstrated against the Iraq war and the Bush
administration in spring 2003. Moreover, European
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VALUE PATTERNS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES: IS THERE A TRANSATLANTIC RIFT?
Value patterns
Value orientations tell us what people want out of
life (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). To be sure, no
society is homogeneous in its value orientations,
simply because different people aspire to different
things in their lives. Societies differ, however, distinctively in the frequency with which one can find
certain value orientations among people. In this
sense, certain value orientations are more typical
of some societies than they are of others. Western
societies have been said to be individualistic in their
value orientations, not because every member of
Western societies is individualistic but because one
can find individualistic values in higher frequency in
Western societies than in other societies (Triandis
1995). Thus, one can use the relative frequency of
particular value orientations to describe the cultural
location of an entire society, disregarding the fact
that the values of relevant minorities will differ from
a societys prevailing value orientation.
As has been demonstrated by Baker (2005) and
Inglehart and Welzel (2005), a societys prevailing
value orientation can be located on the two major
value dimensions mentioned above. If, on the traditional versus secular-rational dimension, a society is
closer located to the secular-rational pole, moral
obligations to such traditionally sacrosanct institutions as the family, religion, and fatherland are less
rigid and looser than in societies that are more
closely located to the traditional value pole. As
Inglehart and Welzel have shown, societies tend to
change their prevailing value orientation from more
traditional (rigid) values to more secular-rational
(permissive) values when the rise of industrial technology increases human control over basic life risks and
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Self-Expression
0.95
0.90
Swe4
0.85
NL4
Den4
Can4
0.75
USA4
Swe2
Austrl3
Ice4 Swit3
Fin2
Nor3
Den1
Austri4
Swit2
Bel4
Swe1 Den2
Fin4
USA3 USA2
GB4
WGer2 EGer3
Fin3 Nor2
GB2 Ita4
Can1
WGer4
Ice2 Lux4 NL1
Ire4
EGer2
GB1
Fra4 Nor1
Ire2
EGer4
Bel2
Ita2
Gree4
Cze4
Iran3
Spai4 Ice1 Fra2
Slove4
Arg3
Jap3
WGer1
Mex3
Uru3
Austri2 Cze3
Arg4
Mex4
Isr4
Jap2
Spai3 Cro4
Ire1
Fra1 Cro3
Spai2
Mex2
Col3
Malt4
Jap1
Bel1 Slova4
Arg2
DoRep3
Chil4
Slove3
Ven4 Bra3 Chil2 Por4
Slova3
SKor4
Bra2
Per4 SAfr2
Arg1
SKor2
Por2
Chn2
Mex1 Chil3
Spai1 Ita1
Per3 Pol2 SAfr1
ELSal4
Slove2
Ind2
Ven3 SAfr4
Bela2 Tai3
Viet4
Lith4
Egy3
Phil3
Lat3
Ind4
Phil4 Ind3 Turk2 Pol4
Bos4 Russ2 Est4
Hun2
Nig2
Bul2
SKor1
SAfr3
Bos3
Mont4
Nig4
Serb4
Uga4
Lith3
Est3
Mac4 Mac3
Indo4
Nig3
Egy4
Hun4 Bul3
Bang4
Bela4
Alb4
Rom4
Rom3
Alg4
Alb3 Arm3 Mol4 Ukr4
Ukr3
Russ4
Jor4
Bela3
Geor3
Russ3
Jor3
Aze3
Zim4
Tan4
Mol3
Pak4
Can2
0.70
0.65
0.60
0.55
0.50
0.45
0.40
0.35
0.30
0.25
Survival
Swe3 WGer3
NL2
0.80
0.20
0.15
0.10
Jap4
0.05
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
Traditional
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
Secular
Source: World Values Survey 19812001. The numbers next to the country abbreviations indicate when the society
participated in the four waves of the world values survey: 1 = 1981; 2 = 199091; 3 = 199598; 4 = 19992001.
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Self-Expression
0.95
0.90
2000
0.85
0.80
Sweden
2000
0.75
2000
1990
1990
0.70
U.S.A.
0.65
0.60
0.50
Argentina
0.45
Japan
1990
1980
2000
South
Africa
1990
1990
Spain
1990
0.40
2000
2000
2000
1980
0.30
1980
1980
1980
China 1990
India 2000
0.25
Survival
1980
1980
0.55
0.35
Canada
1990
0.20
0.15
Russia 2000
0.10
Pakistan 2000
0.05
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95
Traditional
246
Secular
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Absolute beliefs, in %
0.60
Conservative US (South)
1990
Conservative US (South)
2000
West US 2000
U.S. Regions
0.55
0.50
0.45
English-speaking Europe
2000
0.40
West US 1990
Great Lakes US
2000
Progressive US 2000
English-speaking Europe
Anglophone Europe
1990
0.35
Catholic Europe 1990
Catholic Europe 2000
0.30
Continental Europe
0.25
Protestant Europe 2000
0.20
Protestant Europe 1990
0.15
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
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0.75
Conservative US (South)
1990
0.70
West US 1990
Great Lakes US 1990
0.65
English-speaking Europe
1990
0.60
Progressive US 1990
0.55
U.S.
0.50
Conservative US (South)
2000
English-speaking Europe
2000
0.45
West US 2000
0.40
0.35
Progressive US 2000
0.30
Europe
Protestant Europe 2000
0.25
0.20
0.05
0.07
0.09
0.11
0.13
0.15
0.17
0.19
0.21
0.23
0.2
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Conclusion
Is there an Atlantic rift dividing North American
and Western European values into two sharply
separated zones? The answer to this question
varies, depending on what type of values one is
looking at. With respect to individualistic values that
place emphasis on human self-expression, there is
little division, if any, between North America and
Western Europe. In this respect, Europe and
America are pretty much unified as the individualistic West against the rest of the world. As is known
from the analyses of Inglehart and Welzel (2005),
individualistic values are most closely associated
with such institutional features as transparent,
accountable, and responsive government. These
are the core characteristics of liberal democracy
and there is little difference in these characteristics
between Western Europe and North America.
There is no Atlantic rift in matters of democracy.
Yet there is an important internal differentiation
within the Western world when it comes to the role
of rigid traditional moral codes. On the whole, the
US is considerably more religious, rigid, and
absolute in its prevailing values than any society of
continental Western Europe. But one should be
cautious in considering this as an indication of
American Exceptionalism or as an indication of an
AmericanEuropean chasm. For one, the morally
fundamentalist stance is not a specificity of the US
alone. This characteristic is shared by Ireland,
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Great Britain
to a somewhat lesser extent. Thus, a tendency to
moral rigidity is not an exceptionally US American
phenomenon; it is a general characteristic that is
shared (though to different degrees) by all economically advanced Anglophone societies. It is an
Anglophone phenomenon. But what unifies these
societies and makes them so distinct in questions
of moral strictness? Usually, value orientations
become less traditional, sacred, rigid, and absolute
and more permissive, secular, and rational when
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VALUE PATTERNS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES: IS THERE A TRANSATLANTIC RIFT?
251
Notes
1
REFERENCES
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CHAPTER 19
WHY DIDNT RELIGION DISAPPEAR? RE-EXAMINING THE
SECULARIZATION THESIS1
Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris
The publics of virtually all advanced industrial
societies have been moving toward more secular orientations since the 19th century. Nevertheless, the
world as a whole now has more people with traditional
religious views than ever before and they constitute
a growing proportion of the world's population. These
two seemingly contradictory claims are actually
closely related, because secularization is linked with
steeply declining human fertility rates, so that virtually
all rich, secularized countries are now below the
population-replacement level. Another reason that religion has not disappeared is that since about 1990,
subjective religiosity seems to have stopped declining
in advanced industrial societies and a broader type
of spiritual concern has become increasingly
widespread.
Theories of secularization
The idea that the rise of a rational worldview has
undermined the foundations of faith in the supernatural, the mysterious, and the magical predated
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255
Conclusions
Evidence from 80 societies indicates that due to
rising levels of human security, the publics of virtually all advanced industrial societies have been
moving toward more secular orientations.
Modernization (the process of industrialization,
urbanization, and rising levels of education and the
transition from agrarian to industrial and postindustrial society) greatly weakens the influence of
religious institutions making religion subjectively
less important in peoples lives.
Within most advanced industrial societies, attendance at religious services has fallen over the past
several decades; and religious authorities have
largely lost their authority to dictate to the public on
such matters as birth control, divorce, abortion,
sexual orientation and the necessity of marriage
before childbirth. Secularization is not taking
place only in Western Europe, as some critics have
claimed; it is occurring in most advanced industrial
societies including Australia, New Zealand, Japan,
and Canada. Even in America, there has been a
lesser but perceptible trend toward secularization;
the trend has been partly masked by massive immigration of people with relatively traditional worldviews (and high fertility rates) from Hispanic
countries and by relatively high levels of economic inequality; but when one controls for these
factors, even the United States shows a significant
movement toward secularization.
Nevertheless, it would be a major mistake to
assume that religion will eventually disappear
throughout the world. The world as a whole now
has more people with traditional religious views
than ever before and they constitute a growing
proportion of the worlds population. Rich societies
are secularizing but they contain a dwindling share
of the world's population; while poor societies are
not secularizing and they contain a rising share of
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70
64
60
52
50
44
40
34
30
25
34
26
20
20
20
10
0
Pray daily (%)
Figure 19.2
Industrial
Percentage who often think about the meaning and purpose of life
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
US
Sweden
1981
256
1990
Japan
1995
22 nations
2000
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257
Note
1.
This paper appeared in September 2004 in WZBMitteilungen Heft 105, and is available online at:
http://www.wz-berlin.de/publikation/pdf/wm105/s710.pdf
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MIGRATION
CHAPTER 20
MIGRATION, SECURITY AND CULTURE IN THE USA
Leo F. Estrada
Introduction
Migration-caused tensions in North America
have so far revolved around labor and cultural
issues and have concerned immigrants from Latin
America and Asia. As a consequence of 9/11, however, new tensions have arisen regarding Muslim or
Arab or Middle Eastern immigrants. These issues
are located within a new national security context,
in which the US Government has aligned immigration and national security policies. Foreign agencies, social service agencies, citizen patrols, and
even employers have become new actors in this
scenario. It has been a time of reliance on emerging and untested principles of human security. The
emerging new tensions have added sentiments of
fear, unfairness and racism to existing concerns
about employment and cultural identity. The unintended yet hazardous long-term consequences of
these emerging policies will fall more heavily on
some immigrant groups as well as on immigrant
host countries security provision capacities.
It is necessary, therefore, to broaden our understanding of the new migration pressures in the perspective of the security dimension. It will be argued
that global migration-caused tensions are highly
diverse and complex phenomena and that they
require a new conceptualization of international
migration.
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259
Demographic aspects
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quest for religious orthodoxy with its social implications is thus another example of the entanglement of
cultural practices in migrants transnational identities.
The idea that immigrants leave their culture behind
when they move is belied by the growth of home
town associations among Hispanic and Asian
migrants. These home town associations form
permanent linkages with their towns and villages in
their homeland and allow for continuous communication and the development of cross-national projects.
261
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Conclusion
Our point of departure was the security context in
which global migration movements have entered a
new phase and as a result of which new and
increasing tensions are developing. In the United
States, in particular, these tensions could affect
recently arrived immigrants or those communities
perceived as sensitive to national security and influence their interest in and ability to stay in contact
with their homeland ethnic and religious politics.
Both of these processes reverberate through the
communities concerned and challenge their participation in the society at large. Cultural diversity can
only be recognized and flourish if opportunities for
Notes
1 United Nations, International Migration, ST/ESA/
SER.A/219. New York, Population Division, Department
of Economic and Social Affairs, UN Secretariat, 2002.
2 OECD, 1993a.
3 Cornelius, W. and Rosenblum, M. Immigration and politics, The Center for Immigration Studies, University of
California, San Diego.
4 Skilled labor for information technology and semi-skilled
for agriculture and garment industries.
5 Tirman, J., The migration-security nexus, GSC
Quarterly.
6 US Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract, various years.
7 Mann, M. The Sources of Social Power, Vol.1: A History
of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
8 Tirman, J. The migration-Security nexus, GSC quarterly, Vol.13.
9 Now numbering around three to six million immigrants.
10 Exposed by opinion surveys showing the American
public supports more control on Muslim immigration and
civil liberties.
REFERENCES
Kymlicka, Will and Straehle, C. (1999) Cosmopolitanism, nationstates, and minority nationalism: a critical review of recent literature, European Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 7, No. 1.
Lahav, Gallya (2003) Migration and security: the role of
non-state actors and civil liberal democracies. Paper
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CHAPTER 21
MIGRATION: THE EXPERIENCE OF ARGENTINA
Alejandro Grimson
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per cent
1869
1893
1914
1947
1960
1970
1980
1991
2001
2.4
2.9
2.6
2
2.3
2.3
2.7
2.6
2.8
265
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267
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Argentine and migrant population of Buenos Aires City: 1869 and 1914
1869
Argentines
Totals
Men 2045
years old
1914
Per cent of
Non-Argentines non-Argentines Argentines
94,963
11,359
92,163
47,570
49,1
79,6
798,553
139,365
Non-Argentines
Per cent of
non-Argentines
778,044
341,395
49.3
71
Notes
1 This narrative is directly related with the historical experience, in the sense of the percent of migrant population.
2 Indigenous people in Brazil were estimated to number
between 236,000 and 300,000 during the 1990s, representing 0.2 percent of the national population (Ramos
1998: 34). In Argentina, estimates ranged between
250,000 and 450,000, representing between 0.7 and 1.2
percent of the national total (Vzquez 2000: 133-4).
Nonetheless, while the indigenous are excluded from the
national imaginary in Argentina, in Brazil they constitute a
powerful symbol of nationality (Ramos 1998: 4).
3 In 1999, 77 percent of those polled agreed that the admission of immigrants, and their right to remain, ought to be
restricted. Only 51 percent felt this way in 2002. In 1999,
only 18 percent opposed increased restrictions on immigration; 42 percent did so in 2002. In 1999, 45 percent
thought tighter immigration laws would resolve the countrys crime problems while 46 percent thought otherwise.
In 2002, the numbers were 77 percent and 18 percent,
respectively (Casaravilla 2003).
REFERENCES
270
Casaravilla, Diego (2003) Crisis social, discurso y xenophobia, in Buenos Aires. Ciudad con migrants. Buenos Aires:
Direccion General de la Mujer, Gobierno de la Ciudad de
Buenos Aires.
DaMatta, Roberto (1997) Relativizando. Ro de Janeiro: Rocco.
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CHAPTER 22
MIGRATION, CONFLICT AND ILLEGITIMACY:
A MALAYSIAN CASE STUDY
Diana Wong
Introduction
In 2002, the Malaysian flag was burned outside
the Malaysian embassy in Jakarta by Indonesian
demonstrators angered by changes to the foreign
labor policy that had been recently announced by
the Malaysian government, which were seen as
directed against migrant workers from Indonesia.
Leading Indonesian politicians called for action to
be taken against the smaller country. At the height
of the bilateral tensions generated by this migration
issue, the Malaysian government issued a call for
its citizens to refrain from traveling to Indonesia.
Clearly, migration flows and policy changes
have the potential for generating conflict (see the
Introduction, page, for its definition, adopted here,
as a disagreement involving a perceived threat),
not merely within, but also between nation-states.
What needs further exploration, however, is the role
played by culture, and by globalization, in migrationgenerated conflict.
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Conclusion
If indeed globalization, taken to mean the
increased velocity of global flows of finance,
trade, ideas, people etc. is linked to cultural conflict, then flows of people, or migration, are arguably
more likely than the flow of material goods, or of
consumer cultural goods (see Yan in this volume),
or indeed of any other type of flow, to generate
such conflict. For migrants, it could be argued, are
the embodiment and bearers of distinctive cultural
ideas and values, whose existence at a safe distance would be of no immediate import, but whose
proximity could lead to conflict.
The Malaysian case study suggests that longdistance migration flows in response to the mobility
of global capital may be more of an exception rather
than the rule. Domestic labor market scarcity is more
easily met by recruitment of regional sources of
labor, be it through formal or informal channels. Little
evidence was found of cultural conflict per se; the
conflicts which did arise were centered in the big
towns, and in particular around the capital city. They
were essentially localized instances of social conflict
arising out of competition over urban employment,
housing, livelihoods and women between the local
working poor, themselves migrants from the countryside, and the foreign migrants.
In the context of increasing state intervention and
management of the issue however, a politicization
and nationalization of the conflict occurred. Migrant
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REFERENCES
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CHAPTER 23
CREATING CONCORD ORGANIZATIONS: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
FOR BRIDGING ANTAGONISTIC CULTURES
Barbara J. Nelson, Kathryn A. Carver and Linda Kaboolian1
Introduction
Communal violence within countries and regions
has been on the rise since the end of the Cold
War.2 To give two of many possible examples,
60,000 people have died from fighting or its consequences in Ethiopia and Eritrea and 30,000 have
died in Chechnya. Against the drum beat of violence and death, there has also been another, less
visible, trend. Some societies with deep communal
divisions have moved toward greater democratic
accommodation, toleration, and a sense of a
shared future. South Africa, Northern Ireland, Israel
and Palestine in the Oslo period, some troubled
cities in India and the United States, and more
recently the Greek and Turkish enclaves on Cyprus
are all examples of societies moving toward less
violent and more accommodating communal relations. To use the terms popularized by Lipschutz
and Crawford, most of these societies are moving
from the question of Who Dominates? (that is, illiberal states with contested participation) to the
question of Who Belongs? (that is, liberal states
still struggling with constitutive issues).3
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285
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like outside NGOs are unavailable, or when community leaders are not present or willing to engage
with members from other communities.
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287
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Necessary practice:
prevent proselytizing
Successful concord organizations develop techniques where members can hold their views, but do
not seek to impose them on others. Strong norms
against proselytizing are important both organizationally and personally. Organizationally, strong
norms against proselytizing keep the values that
bridge viewpoints in the ascendancy, thus preventing organizations from drowning in the whirlpool of
contested views. An individuals commitment not to
proselytize demonstrates a profound and concrete
recognition of the legitimacy of the people who hold
views fundamentally different from, and often in
opposition to, ones own. It means participants must
restrain themselves from engaging in memory
wars or attempting to gain the upper hand through
a strategy of asserting a hierarchy of oppression:
your group may have a grievance but my group has
been more greatly wronged. This practice also
requires a focus on the current or immediate
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has made the training of leaders for crosscommunity work in the United States one of its
main missions. As its president Sanford Cloud, Jr.
noted, NCCJ's task is transforming communities to
be more whole and just by empowering leaders to
engage in institutional change. Across the ocean,
the Belfast Interface Project enhances leadership
in a different way. It supports the development of
effective mobile phone networks across the city.
Through these networks local community activists
can respond quickly to reports of tension and violence at interfaces. Relevant information can be
passed within, and where possible, between communities as well as to appropriate agencies, reducing rumors and miscommunication. The mobile
phone networks help local activists reduce the
number of incidents at interfaces and lessen the
likelihood that those that do occur will escalate.
291
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Notes
1
11
12
13
14
293
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15
16
17
18
19
20
21
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22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
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31
295
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CHAPTER 24
PERFORMANCE, GLOBALIZATION AND CONFLICT
PROMOTION/RESOLUTION: EXPERIENCES FROM SRI LANKA
James Thompson
This chapter examines performance projects as
they relate to globalization and conflict resolution in
Sri Lanka. It explores the history of the conflict and
relates how competing nationalisms have used cultural programmes to maintain or undermine certain
configurations of the Sri Lankan state. Although the
conflict left many areas of the island isolated, the 2002
ceasefire has increased the impact of globalization.
Three theatre projects are explored to illustrate how
cultural events have been used as part of conflict resolution programmes. One is a traditional performance
project in the eastern war-affected area, one a crosscommunity arts organization and one an activist theatre group from the north of the island. Cultural work
has a complex relationship to the forces of globalization and local national movements.
Introduction
This analysis of theatre or performance initiatives
in Sri Lanka accepts the definitions of culture
and globalization offered in the Introduction to this
volume, while seeking to extend the perspective
that culture is constitutive of both collective and
individual identity. Cultural action is performative in
that it seeks to create a certain form of identity as
much as it represents or constitutes it. Cultural performance in this context becomes as much aspirational as representational seeking to bring about
as much as announce certain inter-group or intercommunal relations. The performance projects discussed here are concerned with developing
change in the conflict and are not only constitutive
or the products of it.
History of a conflict
Sri Lanka has experienced nearly 20 years of
highly destructive civil unrest and violence.1 The
countrys previous history is one of conquest, colonial rule and the influence of competing global powers that have sought to exploit the wealth of its
natural resources and its strategic position in the
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299
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301
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Conclusion
This chapter has examined three examples of
Sri Lankan theatre practice from the context of a
war and recent ceasefire (but not yet post-war)
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Notes
1
2
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305
REFERENCES
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CHAPTER 25
PERFORMING GACACA IN RWANDA: LOCAL CULTURE FOR
JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION
Ananda Breed
This essay examines the Gacaca, a traditional
form of community mediation being used postgenocide in Rwanda, in relation to culture, globalization, and conflict. The Rwandan government
deliberately sought out a time-honored local form of
justice in reaction to the larger global forces impacting Rwanda, prior to and following the genocide.
Although the traditional Gacaca provides a potential
device for reconciliation, the integration of modern
systems of justice into the re-invented version may
limit its effectiveness. Two case studies illustrate the
performance of Gacaca from a local to an international level, displaying the complexities of the internal
socio-political and international forces impacting the
Gacaca courts.
Introduction
The Gacaca is a response drawn from Rwandan
culture to repair the social and judicial fabric of the
nation in the wake of tragedy.1 Rwandas 1994
genocide left the country in a state of devastation:
over 1 million Tutsis and moderate Hutus had been
killed, 400,000 women widowed, and over 500,000
children orphaned in the course of the 100 day long
genocide, with the perpetrators most often coming
from the same village as the victims.2 The
re-invented Gacaca has been established to deliver
justice to the thousands of perpetrators who have
been imprisoned since 1994, while serving as a
restorative device for reconciliation in the larger
community.
The word Gacaca means a grassy place in
Kinyarwanda, a Bantu language that is the official language of Rwanda. The term actually
refers to a pre-colonial form of justice in which
opposed families sat on the grass as the community mediated the conflict. The National
Service of Gacaca Courts defines Gacaca as,
an institution inspired by Rwandan culture,
charged with managing and resolving family
conflicts. Rwandan people used to sit together on
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History of Gacaca
The justice system of Rwanda was shattered
following the genocide. There remained only five
judges and 50 lawyers countrywide.8 Although
the international community established the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
in Arusha, Tanzania to try individuals responsible
for organizing the genocide, only 21 cases had
been passed down by the end of 2004 at the price
tag of two billion US dollars.9 At the same time, in
Rwanda, there was an enormous backlog of cases
and desperately overcrowded jails. As the Rwandan
government struggled to re-establish its justice system, it was estimated that it would take over 150
years to try the over 120,000 prisoners accused of
participating in the genocide.10 The eventual solution to speed up the trial of cases, and to gain more
control over the justice process in Rwanda, was the
Gacaca courts. The pilot phase began in 2002 with
trials in a select 751 pilot courts, while the national
launch of over 1,500 Gacaca courts on a sector
level began on 10 March 2005.11
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Case studies
The following two case studies illustrate the complex interplay of justice and reconciliation in postgenocide Rwanda. The trial of Emmanuel in Gahini
provides an example of how culture is used on
a local level through traditional dance and Gacaca,
potentially serving as a tool for reconciliation
between the perpetrators, the survivors, and the
community at large. By contrast, the second case
study, the hearing of Belgian priest Father Guy
Theunis, illustrates the role of the international
community through the symbolic representation of
the colonization by Belgium, the ambiguous impact
of francophone nations during the genocide, the
globalized marketplace of war, the role of the
media in terms of international impact, the role of
churches in the genocide, and the intervention by
international forces in the internal justice system of
the current Gacaca courts.
Gahini
The Gacaca court in Gahini Province began with
a dance performance by the association Abiyunze
(Kinyarwanda for united).15 The blending of reconciliation and justice took place in the same location,
underneath a giant Umunyinya (acacia sieberiana)
tree in the middle of an open dirt expanse. One person carried the sign Ishyirahamwe Abiyunze Ry
Igahini Dushyigikiye Ubumwe NUbwiyunge (meaning the association of those who are united). The
company was made up of 30 perpetrators, 40 survivors and 60 community members. Drumming
started the performance, and two lead dancers
stepped into the centre of the gathering. Their arms
stretched into the air like birds wings, arms weaving over and under one anothers. Footwork patterns (right foot, left foot, left foot, right foot) kicked
up dust as they circled one another.16 The male
dancer was a perpetrator and the female dancer a
survivor; he had killed the womans uncle during
the genocide. After several dances and songs, the
drumming and singing faded into the more serious
tone of the Gacaca justice court. A single bench
and table were placed in front of the seated audience. Ceremoniously, nine judges walked in a
single-file line across the dirt expanse to the desk,
wearing sashes of the Rwandan flag across their
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Kigali
The trial of Father Guy Theunis represents the
performativity of Gacaca enacted from the local
to the international level. The Belgian Priest was
arrested on charges of inciting genocide through
the media and was brought before a court in central Kigali, the first European to appear before the
Gacaca. Theunis had worked as the editor of a
journal, Dialogue, which published translations of
articles from Kinyarwanda into French for an
international audience. The trial was held on 11
September 2005, and attracted over 1,000
observers and press agents, making the hearing
a high-profile event. The appearance of the
Belgian priest before the Gacaca called into
question the roles of a number of international
actors in the Rwandan genocide of 1994, including the role of Belgium in Rwanda from the time
of colonization onwards. As Theunis was a priest
the affair suggested that the churches played a
role during the genocide, and as he was also a
news writer, the case raised questions about the
role of the media, such as Radio Mille Collines, in
the enactment of the genocide. Over 20
Rwandans testified against Theunis. The sole person to speak in his defense was Alison des
Forges, an internationally-known American specialist on Rwanda from Human Rights Watch,
who highlighted the role he had played as a
human rights advocate and questioned whether it
was possible to incite genocide if the publication
in question was addressed to an international,
rather than Rwandan, audience.19
The staging of the Guy Theunis trial illuminates
critical issues regarding international involvement
in Rwandan politics, before, during and after the
genocide, in other words the role of the international community in the local justice system and
309
Conclusion and
recommendations
The traditional form of Gacaca may allow for
positive community redress, but the reinvented
tradition formulated by the government can inhibit
the natural progression of mediation at a local
level because of stipulations made upon what
can or cant be testified as a crime and the
devices through which nationhood is being performed. There are potential negative impacts
of Gacaca. Instead of offering answers to the
dilemmas that Gacaca raises, I pose some questions to be considered and close with possible
recommendations.
Questions
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Gacaca can be a powerful cultural tool for justice and reconciliation, but the two objectives may
require different structures or mechanisms for
their effectiveness. Gacaca is a process that
occurs weekly from village to village. How the
local community responds to its own problems
will eventually be the deciding factor of its success or failure. In a Gacaca court held in Butare,
a young boy accused a released perpetrator of
genocide ideology.23 A survivor stepped forward in
defense of the perpetrator, stating that the perpetrator had spent 12 years in prison and that it
was the duty of the community to invite him
back respectfully. Moments like this illustrate the
potential of reconciliation through Gacaca,
although justice, in this case, depended on the
personal advocacy of the community for the rights
of the perpetrator to be protected during the
Recommendations
Notes
1 Pronounced (Ga Cha Cha).
2 Norwegian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights (2002)
Prosecuting genocide in Rwanda: the Gacaca System
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights.
http://www.nhc.no.rapporter/landrapporter/rwandrap
3 Republic of Rwanda National Service of Gacaca Courts
(2005), Report on Activities of Gacaca Courts in the pilot
Phase. Unpublished document.
4 There has been rigorous analysis regarding the role of
international aid by Uvin (1995, 2003) and Oomen
(2005).
5 Pottier, Johan (2002) Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict,
Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth
Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 21.
6 Uvin, Peter (2001) Difficult choices in the new postconflict agenda: the international community in Rwanda
after the genocide. Third World Quarterly, Vol 22:
177.
7 For further references regarding the genocide,
see Berkeley (2001), Mamdani (2002), and Prunier
(1995).
8 Daly, Erin (2002) Between punitive and reconstructive justice: the Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, NYU. International
Law and Policy, 34: 35596 (p. 368).
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9 Oomen, Barbara (2005) Donor-driven justice and its discontents: the case of Rwanda, Development and
Change, 36: 887910 (p. 896).
10 Stockman, Farah (2000) The Peoples Court: crime and
punishment in Rwanda, Transition, 9: 2041 (p. 22).
11 The traditional Gacaca dealt with lesser crimes such
as cattle, property, and family disputes. The contemporary Gacaca addresses the crimes conducted in
the genocide that affected groups of people, hunted
down due to their ethnicity, as stated in the Gacaca
Courts Organic Law Article 51 (Organic Law Number
16/2004 of 19th June 2004). On rare occasions of
homicide in traditional courts, the affected family
seeking retaliation would act out their vengeance
upon the trunk of a banana tree with a machete. The
courts are separated into three categories with the
gravest offenses in category 1 for rape and genocide
leadership, to category 3 involving looting and property damage. The cell level courts administer trials for
category 3 and make case files through data gathering courts. The sector level courts try category 2
crimes of genocide according to the case files and
the witnesses in public. Category 1 crimes are judged
at the high court, not the Gacaca courts. Information
was obtained through official reports from the
National Service of Gacaca Courts and interviews
conducted by the author with the Executive Secretary
Domitilla Mukantaganzwa.
12 Lanegran, Kimberly (2005) Truth commissions, human
rights trials, and the politics of memory, Comparative
Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East. 1 (25)
Duke University Press., Vol. 25, No. 1: 111121.
13 Lanegran, Kimberly (2005). p. 116
14 Lanegran, Kimberly (2005). p. 114.
311
REFERENCES
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CHAPTER 26
FROM VIOLENCE TO DISCOURSE: CONFLICT AND CITIZENS
RADIO STATIONS IN COLOMBIA
Clemencia Rodrguez and Amparo Cadavid1
The Colombian internal armed conflict is
considered one of the worst in the world. Colombias
multiple violences emerge from power struggles
engendered by unequal access to material resources.
More than half a century of continuous social and
political violence has had a tremendous impact on
Colombians collective imaginaries and everyday
cultural practices. The mixture of patronclient relationships; an absent, corrupt, or negligent state; and
the presence of armed groups, have normalized a
cultural fabric that privileges individual agency, perceives difference as something to be annihilated, and
favors violent forms of conflict resolution. A network of
15 citizens radio stations operating in a Colombian
region known as Magdalena Medio are succeeding in
changing the cultural fabric and moving conflict from
the realm of violence to the realm of dialogue and
discourse. We analyze how citizens radio stations play
significant roles as mediators in conflicts between
communities, political opponents, communities and
local authorities, and communities and armed groups.
Introduction
The armed conflict in Colombia is considered one
of the worst in the world. Some estimates speak of
35,000 violent deaths, over a thousand kidnappings,
and 800 citizens missing every year; all these with a
staggering impunity rate of over 90 percent (Garca
and Uprimny 1999: 40). In 1990, the homicide rate
per 100,000 in Colombia was 80, four times as much
as in the rest of Latin America (Romero, 2003: 27).
Sixty percent of all murders committed against trade
unionists worldwide take place in Colombia, and the
same is true for journalists (40 have been assassinated in the last five years; thirty Colombian journalists now live in exile) (Gonzlez Uribe 2003). In the
last 40 years, armed conflict has claimed the lives of
200,000 Colombians and has forced two million others to flee their homes in terror (Berrigan, Hartung,
and Heffel 2005).
Unlike elsewhere, (cf. cases from Rwanda,
Sri Lanka, Africa in this volume), social violence in
Colombia is not related to cultural, ethnic, or religious differences. Although Colombia endures a
multiplicity of violences (Snchez 2001) that
includes leftist guerrillas, right-wing paramilitaries,
drug trafficking networks, and common delinquency, all these forms emerge from power struggles engendered by unequal access to material
resources. However, more than half a century of
continuous social and political violence has had a
tremendous impact on Colombians collective
imaginaries and everyday cultural practices. The
mixture of patronclient relationships; an absent,
corrupt, or negligent state; and the presence of
armed groups and their militaristic approaches,
have normalized a cultural fabric that privileges
individual agency, perceives difference as something to be overpowered and annihilated, and
favors violent forms of conflict resolution.
In this chapter we document how a network of 15
citizens radio stations operating in a Colombian
region known as Magdalena Medio [Middle
Magdalena or MM] are succeeding in changing the
cultural fabric and moving conflict from the realm of
violence to the realm of dialogue and discourse.
These Colombian citizens media are moving conflict from the fatal social place of action to the manageable social place of culture.
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Illustration 26.1
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space makes subjects engage in a process of selfreflection about the social image they want to cultivate, thus keeping impulsive hot tempers in check.
Finally, it is clear that the station was not able to
come up with a definitive solution to the conflict;
local authorities had to be brought in. In this sense,
the station is putting pressure on public authorities
to assume their responsibility to protect and defend
citizens rights (such as public spaces). However, if
local authorities do not follow through with the commitments assumed on the radio, the station could
ultimately lose its legitimacy in the community.
319
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In this case, what is to be stressed is the mediating role played by the woman who directed the
program. Originally, the producers of the Forum
had planned to start with 30 minutes in which the
collective would ask questions about the candidates youth, their lives when they were in school
etc.; the remainder of the program was to focus on
more serious subjects such as their political agendas; more mature interviewers were supposed to
take over from the youth collective at this point.
However, during the first part of the interview the
director realized that it is precisely the young interviewers who can enable the candidates to find
common ground around their teenage past. It was
key that at that moment, midway through the program, she made the decision to change the production plan and to allow the young interviewers to
conduct the program for the entire three and a half
hours duration of the Forum.
This type of ad hoc knowledge or communication competence seems to have played a key role
in this situation. We need to emphasize two
elements: first, that the director was able to detect
the emerging bonds of identification and solidarity
among the opponents; and second, that she valued
these as the building blocks of conflict resolution
and peace-building. She envisions peace as the
product of quotidian gestures and interactions
among the members of a collectivity; she understands the nature of these gestures and interactions, including non-verbal expressions, and, as
she begins detecting them among the three political candidates, she takes the necessary decisions
to nurture them. The radio station is simply allowing
this community leader to use her competences and
wisdom to intervene in the public sphere; her wisdom and competences are now part of the social
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321
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322
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323
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Conclusion
The narratives of citizens radio producers of
Magdalena Medio are clear evidence of how
citizens media open communication arenas in
which conflict management has been shifted from
the realm of aggression and violence to the realm
of discourse. We have seen how different types of
conflict, from conflict among community groups, conflict among the community and local authorities,
conflict emerging from political differences, and
conflict with armed groups have found non-violent
resolution thanks to the role played by the stations.
We cannot stress enough that these are not
communication discourses about mediation and
conflict resolution; rather, they are communication
spaces to be used to mediate and interact. The
stations are not sending messages to the community about how to solve conflict in non-violent ways.
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Notes
1
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
325
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REFERENCES
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CHAPTER 27
THE PEDAGOGY OF DRUMS: CULTURE MEDIATING
CONFLICT IN THE SLUMS OF BRAZIL
Silvia Ramos
Poor black young people in the slums and
peripheries of Brazils cities are either protagonists or
victims of the violence that claims at lease 50,000 victims each year. Often, the poverty that is the root
cause of this violence is compounded by police violence and corruption. In the 1990s, a number of artistic and cultural initiatives to combat these scourges
began to be led by young people from the conflict
zones. The Youth and Peace Project, initiated by the
Afro Reggae Cultural Group in Rio de Janeiro together
with the police, is a case in point: an example of how
new mediators can address the issues of endemic
urban violence and work towards a culture of peace.
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331
REFERENCES
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Challenges
The relationships between globalization and
culture are too abstract and multifaceted for direct
observation, and need to be broken down into
dimensions and sub-dimensions. In other words,
we need to make the relationships operational
and prepare them for measurement purposes. In
doing so, we face a number of critical challenges.
It is important to address these issues at the
onset. They are the following: the unit of analysis,
the aggregation problem, indicator selection, data
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337
Different approaches
These challenges, and we could add others as
well, are formidable, to be sure, and some may
question the utility and feasibility of an indicator
and data system on cultures and globalization
altogether. Fortunately, however, a variety of
approaches have been proposed that are useful for
our purposes and from which we can learn and
draw critical lessons.
First, the UNDP approach in the Human
Development Report (2000) was to select indicators and data around the Human Development
Index based on a specific definition of development. Development was defined as extending
choices to permit the kind of life that people
wish to lead. This definition was broken down into
components or dimensions of ability to make
choices: leading a long and healthy life; being
knowledgeable; enjoying a decent standard of living; enjoying personal security; participating in the
life of the community; enjoying the respect of others. In a next step, indicators were selected such
as life expectancy, literacy rates, per capita
income, etc. Finally, under the umbrella of
Monitoring Human Development, the indicators
were integrated in a sequence of tables organized
around a conceptual framework of what human
development means:
Enlarging peoples choices:
Human Development Index
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To acquire knowledge:
Statistics on commitment to education:
public spending
Statistics on literacy and enrollment
Statistics on technology: diffusion and creation
To have access to the resources needed for a
decent standard of living:
Statistics on economic performance
Statistics on inequality in income/
consumption
Statistics on structure of trade
Statistics on rich country responsibilities:
aid, debt relief and trade
Statistics on flows of aid, private capital and
debt
Statistics on priorities in public spending
Statistics on unemployment
While preserving it for future generations:
Statistics on energy and the environment
Protecting personal security:
Statistics on refugees and armaments
Statistics on victims of crime
And achieving equality of men and women:
Statistics on gender-related development
index
Second, in Our Creative Diversity (1996), the
World Commission on Culture and Development
linked culture and development by stating that
development is the opportunity to choose a full
and satisfying, valuable and valued way of living
together, the flourishing of human existence in all
its forms and as a whole. It also set a standard
for evaluating progress around the following key
tenets:
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Tourism flows
Communication
Statistics on Translations:
Translations of books
Translators
Most frequently translated language
Statistics on Cultural Context:
Education
Tertiary education abroad
Human capital
Demographic and health
Economic
Social security
Environment and biodiversity
The result was that the link between culture
and development as postulated by the World
Commission was not in fact fully explored
because the conceptual framework and the empirical level of indicators and data did not match.
Moreover, the distinctions between activities,
practices, trade and communication and translations remained unclear and made the selection
and grouping of indicators appear somewhat
arbitrary.
Third, a different path has been taken by authors
such as Mercer (2002: 601), who have proposed
more systematic indicator sets:
339
Creation: the conditions and capacity for creation and innovation of values in both material
and immaterial forms
Production and reproduction: the transformation
of values into tangible and intangible forms
Promotion and knowledge: activities and capacities to gain wider use and acceptance for
the produced and disseminated value and
product
Dissemination and circulation: the mechanisms,
processes and institutions that put values and
products into public and private domains
Consumption and use: the processes and
capacities for the use and consumption of values and products.
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Value stages/
Indicator sets
Creation
Production
Promotion
and
Knowledge
Dissemination
and Circulation
Use and
Consumption
Vitality,
diversity,
conviviality
Indicator set
Indicator set
Indicator set
Indicator set
Indicator set
Cultural
access,
participation
consumption
Indicator set
Indicator set
Indicator set
Indicator set
Indicator set
Lifestyle and
identity
Indicator set
Indicator set
Indicator set
Indicator set
Indicator set
Ethics,
governance,
conduct
Indicator set
Indicator set
Indicator set
Indicator set
Indicator set
Assumptions
Like the approach underlying UNDPs Human
Development Index (UNDP 2000), measuring the
relationship between globalization and culture must
rest on the premise of parsimony and emphasize a
select number of indicators that can be operationalized, are measurable, and have a reasonable
degree of data availability. This approach implies
that highly complex and demanding models may at
present be of little use, as many indicators cannot
be observed and as data are often not readily available; moreover, complex models can be difficult to
communicate to diverse audiences. Specifically, we
proceed from six assumptions or premises:
Assumption 1 Rather than trying to fill in data
on a wide range of cultural aspects for as many
countries as possible (as UNESCO tried to do), or
for as many indicator matrices for as many countries as possible (as Mercers approach would lead
us to pursue), we suggest that such tasks would be
futile due to the seriousness of the data problems
involved and the extraordinary amount of time and
resources it would take to solve them. Instead, we
proceed from the assumption that only a different
approach could offer a realistic way forward an
approach along the lines of the indicator suites proposed below.
340
Assumption 2 Any measurement of the relationship between cultures and globalization will be
simpler and less perfect than the richness, variety,
and complexity of what it tries to measure. As analytic and operational concepts, globalization and
culture as well as the relationship between them
must necessarily abstract from historical and current variations in their development, and disregard
significant cultural, political, and social differences.
The information presented in the indicator and data
system aims to provide the essential characteristics
of the relationship and its context.
Assumption 3 The relationship between cultures and globalization is a multifaceted, emerging
as well as changing phenomenon that is different in
different parts of the world, hence the indicator and
data system must take account of this essential
characteristic. In particular, some indicators may be
less global in their meaning and relevance than
others. Put differently, not all indicators will be
globalization pure; some will address international
and transnational phenomena that can be limited
to regions of the world that are not necessarily
contiguous geographically, such as diaspora communities or transnational professions.
Assumption 4 As the essence of the relationship between cultures and globalization may vary
with theoretical approach, disciplinary outlook, or
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Figure 1
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Politicallegal
globalization
Culture and
Globalization
System Focus
Social aspects
of culture
Economic aspects
of culture
Sites, events
and flow
Political systems
and culture
Transnational
and global
Societies/
Countries/
Communities/
Nations
Table 2 presents the implementation of the framework. It shows the context of globalization, and the
four systemic views (social aspects of culture;
economic aspects of culture; culture as a system
of sites, events and flows; and culture as a political
system). Each lens is broken down into major
components and sub-components that make up
individual indicator suites. For example, the social
aspects of culture are broken down into values and
institutions, knowledge, and practices and heritage.
In turn, values are further refined in terms of identities (individual and collective), economic, social,
political values, religious values and institutions, and
342
Institutions/
Organizations/
Professions
Individuals
gender. The result is an integrated, thematic hierarchy of indicators on the relationship between culture
and globalization, and contextualized in relation to
other globalization processes and patterns.
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The Context of
Culture
Economic
Globalization
Global Civil
Society
International organizations
rule of law and treaties
Social Aspects of
Culture
Knowledge
Creation
Dissemination
Storage
Innovation and
Protection
Economic
Aspects
of Culture
Economy
Professions
Industries
Artistic and cultural
Global arts market
industries professions
Cultural consumption &
expenditures
Trade in goods and
services
Corporations and
Organizations
Transnational cultural
corporations
Cultural INGOs and
foundations
Sites, Events
and Flow
Political System
and Culture
Regulatory frameworks
International regulatory
frameworks and
agencies
International standards
Policy
Cultural diplomacy
organizations
343
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We arrived at the relatively small number of indicators in a iterative fashion by examining alternative indicators, measures and data suggested in
previous work on the subject or presented by
agencies such as UNESCOs Institute of Statistics.
Taken together, this parsimonious set of indicators
pointed to what seems significant in the context of
culture and globalization: the rise of large publishing corporations in the context of changing technologies and business models. It allowed us to
relate changes in the book industry to the Internet
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Research Question:
What do we
want to know &
why?
Operationalization
Theme
Policy Question:
Multiple,
Alternative
Indicators
Data
Search
Data
Evaluation
Multiple
Datasets
Assessment
Indicator suite
Preparation
gaps in the indicator system. Among the most serious omissions are: indicator suites on human sexuality, food, fashion, design, architecture, performing
arts and theater companies etc. Only lack of
resources and time has prevented us from covering
these topics in this edition of the Series and we are
set to expand coverage in future volumes.
Moreover, for those topics covered that year, it is
important to keep in mind that the assessment and
development of indicator suites is an open-ended
process. It typically involves two, three and often
more cycles of interaction between topic identification and justification, indicator review and selection,
data collection and analysis, and suite construction.
In terms of data gathering, we did not collect
original data, and relied on secondary data exclusively. Virtually all of the data collected for the indicator suites presented here come from the great
wealth and variety of online data sources available
on the Internet. Of course, we are well aware that
while much information is increasingly available
online, much other useful information is not. The
Internet, perhaps less so than more conventional
data repositories, is biased in the information available and retrievable. Like others who have worked
345
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that years topic. In this volume, the focus on cultural conflicts offers information on the frequency
and patterns of different conflicts, including terrorism, and the cleavage structures and fault lines
involved.
Conclusion
An integrated display of indicator suites together
with narrative description and analysis is meant to
provide an overview of the main dimensions and
contours of culture in both the broad and the
narrow senses of the word. The list of indicator
suites and indicators, including their operationalization and justification, is not fixed and will certainly
develop and improve over time, and in consultation
with international and national statistical offices as
well as experts in the field. We hope to garner
encouragement and constructive criticism as our
work continues and as we seek to perfect what is
presently little more than an initial attempt to come
to terms with one of the most vexing of data problems in the social sciences.
Each volume of this Series includes only a portion of the full range of the indicators and data used
in constructing indicator suites, with additional
material available to readers on a dedicated
website, Finally, as each volume takes a particular
thematic focus (e.g., cultural conflicts; the cultural
economy, the arts and creativity etc.), we will place
a special focus on indicator suites that highlight the
dimensions and trends of particular relevance to
Notes
1
REFERENCES
www.gestioncultural.org/boletin/pdf/Indicadores/LBonetIndicadores.pdf.
Brown, B., and Corbett, T. (1997) Social Indicators and Public
Policy in the Age of Devolution, Institute for Research on
Poverty, Special Report No. 71. http//www.ssc.wisc.
edu/irp/ sr/sr71.pdf
Deutsch, K.W. (1963) The Nerves of Government. New York:
The Free Press.
Duxbury, N. (2003) Cultural Indicators and Benchmarks in
Community Indicator Projects: Performance Measures for
Cultural Investment? Canada: Strategic Research and
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1A . THE C ON TE XT O F CULT U R E
EC ON OM IC GL OBAL IZ AT ION
TR ADE FL OWS + TNC s
349
1a+b+c.theCONTEXTofCULTUREDEF.i349 349
1/17/2007 2:40:32 PM
TR AD E FL OWS + T N Cs
1 a.
70 %
AI D I N % OF GNI 1 9 9 4
AI D I N % OF GNI 2 0 0 4
60 %
I NWARD FDI S T OC K I N % OF GDP 1 9 9 4
I NWARD FDI S T OC K I N % OF GDP 2 0 0 4
50 %
40 %
30 %
20 %
10 %
LO W INC O ME
LOW + M I DDLE I NC OM E
8 . 9%
27 . 3%
20 . 5%
0%
14 . 3%
0%
45 . 3%
38 . 5%
5 . 8%
12 . 7%
26 . 4%
1 . 0%
12 . 3%
1 . 4%
65 . 1%
47 . 1%
0%
0%
5 . 3%
0 . 4%
MID D L E IN COME
12 . 0%
0 . 7%
67 . 3%
49 . 2%
0%
0%
2 . 0%
2 . 8%
10 . 0%
4 . 5%
51 . 4%
34 . 1%
0%
HI GH I NC OM E
350
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1/17/2007 2:40:33 PM
- outlook on the global economy - trade blocs: trade in $us millions 2003 + trade blocs: % of world export 2003
- 2003 top ten non-financial tncs worldwide: ranked by total foreign assets + 2003 top ten non-financial tncs
worldwide: ranked by transnationality index - top twenty global companies: rankings by forbes (as of april 2006)
& fortune (as of july 2005)
58.1%
261.5%
46.2%
31.1%
142.3%
69.8%
218.5%
232.5%
44.2%
1800%
123.8%
206.6%
188.0%
160000
270.0%
180000
506.8% 1559.3%
151.4%
156.6%
118.6%
RE MITTA NCES
269.0%
1 b.
140000
1400%
120000
1200%
100000
1000%
80000
800%
60000
600%
40000
400%
20000
200%
H IG H IN C OM E 1 2 8 0 91 .8
6 6 4 8 4. 9
3 0 8 9. 0
7 3 3 8. 5
S U B- S A HA R A N A F RI CA
1 3 8 8. 0
3 1 6 7 0. 9
S OU T H A SI A
3 1 1 1. 5
2 0 3 5 2. 8
MI D D LE E A S T + N O RT H A F RI CA
1 8 9 5. 1
4 1 0 5 0. 5
L ATI N A ME R ICA + T H E CA R I BB E A N
9 7 2 4. 7
1 9 4 3 1. 0
E U R O PE + C E N T R AL A SI A
6 7 6 9. 9
4 1 2 5 0. 0
E AS T A SI A + PA CI F I C
LO W + MI D D LE I N CO ME 2 5 9 7 8. 2
1 6 1 0 93 .7
L OW I N CO M E
M I DD L E IN C OM E 2 2 9 2 8. 9
1 1 7 1 27 .0
0%
3 0 4 9. 3
4 3 9 6 6. 7
I NC OM I NG REM I T TANC ES 2 0 0 4
351
1a+b+c.theCONTEXTofCULTUREDEF.i351 351
1/17/2007 2:40:33 PM
1a+b+c.theCONTEXTofCULTUREDEF.i352 352
0 .4 %
0 .2 %
0 .1 %
0 .3 %
C RO S S B O RD E R IN .
EAC
E C CA S
0 .1 %
0 .2 %
CO M ES A
0 .2 %
1 .4 %
C E MA C
U E MOA
4 .7 %
M E RC OS U R
0 .7 %
2 .8 %
L A IA ( AL A D I )
UDEAC
0 .2 %
G R P O F T H R EE
0 .5 %
0 .2 %
C .A . GR P OF F O U R
SADC
0 .3 %
CAR I C O M
M I DDLE EAS T + AS I A
E C O WA S
0 .8 %
CAC M
0%
3 .3 %
1%
AN D E AN G R P
5%
0 .8 %
2%
AC S
10%
1 .1 %
3%
U MA
15%
2 .5 %
4%
SA A R C
20%
3 .4 %
5%
GCC
25%
1 .5 %
6%
ECO
30%
GA F TA
7%
5 .1 %
35%
2 5 .4 %
8%
EAEG
1 5 .5 %
N A FTA
40%
0 .6 %
3 8 .7 %
EU
9%
BA N G K O K A G RE E ME N T
1 8 .5 %
F TA A
45%
6 .1 %
4 0 .6 %
E MF TA
10%
AS E A N
2 .7 %
C E F TA
50%
AR A B C O. MK T
4 4 .5 %
APEC
2a.
R EG IONA L TR A DE B L OC S :
% OF WORLD EX P ORTS 2003
0%
S UB-S AHARAN AF R I CA
352
1/17/2007 2:40:33 PM
2 5, 30 9
1a+b+c.theCONTEXTofCULTUREDEF.i353 353
8 3 3, 82 9
1 57
1, 04 3
E C O WA S
U E MOA
2 35
3, 07 3
E C CA S
5, 15 9
5 73
EAC
SADC
1, 44 3
C RO S S B O RD E R IN .
UDEAC
1 59
2, 63 8
CO M ES A
1 2, 73 2
C E MA C
M E RC OS U R
1, 64 8
C .A . GR P OF F O U R
3, 36 3
1, 50 0
CAR I C O M
3 9, 83 9
2, 54 2
CAC M
L A IA ( AL A D I )
4, 78 1
AN D E AN G R P
M I DDLE EAS T + AS I A
G R P O F T H R EE
1, 35 2
1 6, 76 6
AC S
4, 77 3
U MA
9, 28 7
GA F TA
GCC
7, 53 9
2 1, 49 7
ECO
SA A R C
9 4 0, 96 3
EAEG
1, 79 7
50000 0
2 1, 73 3
100000 0
BA N G K O K A G RE E ME N T
150000 0
AR A B C O. MK T
200000 0
1 0 4, 87 2
6 5 1, 21 3
250000 0
AS E A N
N A FTA
E U 1 ,7 68 ,9 8 4
F TA A
E MF TA 1 ,9 38 ,8 7 7
C E F TA
A P E C 2 .4 19 ,9 1 2
2 b.
TR A DE B L OC S :
TRADE I N $U S M I LLI ONS 2003
50000
45000
40000
35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
S UB-S AHARAN AFRI CA
353
1/17/2007 2:40:34 PM
1a+b+c.theCONTEXTofCULTUREDEF.i354 354
F RA N C E T EL E C O M F R AN C E (6 2 )
TOTA L F R AN C E (1 6 )
T OYOTA MOTO R CO R P JA PA N (6 8 )
R OYAL D U T C H/ S H E LL G R P U K/ N E TH E RL A ND S (2 2 )
E XX ON MOB I L C O RP U K (3 1 )
B R IT I SH PE T R O LE U M U K (1 0 )
GE N E RA L MOT OR S U S A (9 0 )
FO R D MOT O R C O U S A (7 2 )
VO DAF O N E GR P P LC U K (7 )
G E N ER A L E LE CT R I C US A (7 7 )
88 ,6 2 6
21 ,5 7 4
81 ,3 7 0
60 ,9 3 1
94 ,7 1 0
87 ,8 4 0
89 ,3 1 4
87 ,3 5 3
94 ,1 6 4
10 0 ,0 0 0
12 9 ,8 6 4
11 2 ,5 8 7
53 ,7 4 8
16 6 ,9 2 6
11 6 ,8 5 3
86 ,6 5 0
19 2 ,8 7 5
14 1 ,5 5 1
10 4 ,0 0 0
51 ,6 2 7
15 4 ,4 6 6
13 8 ,6 6 3
60 ,7 6 1
17 3 ,8 8 2
47 ,4 7 3
50 ,0 7 0
24 3 ,8 3 9
15 0 ,0 0 0
54 ,0 8 6
25 8 ,9 0 0
F O RE IG N E MPL OY ME N T
F O RE IG N S A LE S
F O RE IG N A S SE T S
BY $ U S MILLIONS + % OF TOTAL
300 . 0 0 0
250 0 0 0
200 0 0 0
150 0 0 0
100 0 0 0
50000
0
120%
110%
% F O R EI G N S A L ES O F T OTA L
% F O R EI G N A S S ET S O F T OTA L
40 .6 %
41 .3 %
64 .5 %
55 .0 %
80 .2 %
87 .0 %
33 .8 %
58 .6 %
49 .7 %
84 .0 %
64 .4 %
67 .0 %
60 .9 %
70 .4 %
67 .0 %
83 .6 %
82 .9 %
79 .7 %
35 .4 %
27 .8 %
34 .4 %
42 .3 %
37 .0 %
57 .1 %
79 .0 %
83 .6 %
92 .9 %
49 .2 %
40 .3 %
40 .0 %
3 a.
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
R A N K IN G #
TR A NS NAT IO N A L IT Y
BY
I NDE X R AT IN G
354
1/17/2007 2:40:34 PM
1a+b+c.theCONTEXTofCULTUREDEF.i355 355
B Y F OR EI G N A S S E T S
8 6 ,6 5 0
1 9 2 ,8 75
2 1 ,4 5 1
4 ,3 6 7
1 2 ,9 1 9
3 8 ,0 0 0
1 3 ,1 7 2
2 5 ,2 7 5
4 7 ,4 7 3
5 0 ,0 7 0
2 4 3 ,8 39
1 3 6 ,7 50
3 1 ,5 9 4
2 8 ,5 2 4
4 8 ,3 9 0
8 ,8 6 2
1 2 ,8 0 4
5 7 ,3 1 7
2 2 ,7 9 0
4 2 ,9 2 6
3 5 ,6 0 4
1 7 ,7 7 2
5 0 ,8 0 3
5 1 ,6 9 4
1 3 ,0 7 0
1 3 ,1 8 4
3 8 ,3 5 0
7 ,9 4 3
1 8 ,4 1 8
1 4 1 ,5 51
R A N K IN G #
BP U K (5 )
P U BL I C I S GR P S A F RA N CE (8 9 )
AL CAN I N C CA N A D A (5 4 )
VO D F O N E GR P P LC U K (2 )
P H IL I PS E L E C NE T HE R LA N D S ( X X )
CAD B U RY SC H W E P PE S UK (9 2 )
R O CH E GR O U P S W IT Z ERL AN D ( X X )
N E W S C O R P AU S TRA L I A (2 2 )
C RH PL C IR E LA N D (6 8 )
T H OM PS ON C O R P CA N A D A (6 5 )
F O RE IG N E MPL OY ME N T
F O RE IG N S A LE S
F O RE IG N A S SE T S
B Y $ U S MILLIONS + % OF TOTAL
30 0 . 0 0 0
250 0 0 0
200 0 0 0
150 0 0 0
100 0 0 0
50000
0
120%
110%
% F O R EI G N S A L ES O F T OTA L
% F O R EI G N A S S ET S O F T OTA L
83 .6 %
82 .9 %
79 .7 %
61 .0 %
89 .5 %
96 .4 %
77 .6 %
96 .6 %
79 .1 %
79 .0 %
83 .6 %
92 .9 %
83 .2 %
96 .4 %
77 .9 %
86 .7 %
84 .2 %
90 .1 %
87 .7 %
98 .3 %
89 .3 %
92 .5 %
93 .1 %
91 .8 %
95 .3 %
96 .0 %
94 .3 %
98 .3 %
97 .4 %
98 .3 %
3 b.
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
355
1/17/2007 2:40:34 PM
R A NK
VALU E
01
15.8
A C Q U IR E D COMPAN Y
AC QUI RI NG C OM PANY
A B B E Y NATION AL PL C
B ANKING
BANKING
U N IT E D K IN D OM
02
11.1
SPAIN
L IF E INSU R ANC E
U N IT E D S TAT ES
03
10.5
04
9.6
7.8
C H A RT E R ON E FIN AN CIAL
C I T I ZENS FI NL GRP
U N IT E D S TAT ES
C HART E R E D
UNITED STATES
A M E R SH A M PLC
GENERAL ELEC T RI C
JOH N LABATT IN C
4.5
G A G FA H -HOUSIN G
MALT B E VE R AGE S
B R A C O SA
3.9
MALT B E VE R AGE S
3.9
3.7
T X U A U STRAL IA LTD
B ANKING
3.4
SIC O R INC
E L E C T R IC SE R VICES
3.4
3.1
14
2.9
2.8
2.7
2.7
2.6
2.6
S ONGBI RD AC QUI S I T I ON LT D
UNITED STATES
DIAL C O R PS
SOAP, DE T E R GE NTS
HENK EL K GAA
M OO R E WALLACE IN C
C E LLT E C H GROUP PL C
DYNAM IT N OBEL AG
H IDRO CA N TABRICO
VNU WO R LD D IRECTORIES
2.4
JC PE NNY-ECKERD STORES
U N IT E D S TAT ES
**
INVESTORS, NEC
BANKING
INVESTORS, NEC
P HARMACEUTICAL P REPARATIONS
INDUSTRIAL GASES
INVESTORS, NEC
GERMANY
UNITED STATES
UC B S A
BELGIUM
E XPL OSIVE S
UNITED STATES
E L E C T R IC SE R VICES
EDP
ELECTRIC SERVICES
P ORTUGAL
MISC . PU B L ISHING
N E T H E R LA N D S
20
AI R LI QUI DE S A
E XC L . C E ME T E R IES
S PA IN
19
G E R MA N Y
18
S I NGAP ORE P OW ER P T E LT D
U N IT E D K IN G DOM
U N IT E D K IN G DOM
17
BBVA
CANADA
16
I NV ES T OR GROUP
FRANCE
U N IT E D S TAT ES
15
MALT BEVERAGES
ISRAEL
G E R MA N Y
13
I NT ERBREW S A
UNITED STATES
U N IT E D S TAT ES
12
INVESTORS, NEC
SPAIN
A U S T R A LIA
11
UNITED KINGDOM
ME XIC O
10
MALT BEVERAGES
BELGIUM
A U S T R A LIA
09
AM BEV
GERMANY
B R A Z IL
08
BRAZIL
G E R MA N Y
07
UNITED STATES
CANADA
06
LIFE INSURANCE
CANADA
U N IT E D K IN G DOM
05
I NV ES T OR GROUP
INVESTORS, NEC
UNITED KINGDOM
DR U G ST OR E S + P ROP RIETARY
CANADA
356
1a+b+c.theCONTEXTofCULTUREDEF.i356 356
1/17/2007 2:40:35 PM
1B . THE C ON TE XT O F CULT U R E
G LO BA L CIV IL S OC IE T Y
EXTENS I TY + I NTENS I TY
357
1a+b+c.theCONTEXTofCULTUREDEF.i357 357
1/17/2007 2:40:35 PM
1.
2600
BY # OF NGOs
T OTAL NGO s
2400
ROS T ER NGO s
2200
GENERAL NGOs
S P EC I AL NGOs
2000
1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
9 1 3 1 5 4 8 25 9 5
134
2005
9 0 8 1 1 9 7 22 3 6
131
2002
9 1 8 17 0 1
111
1999
672
5 0 0 12 2 6
80
1996
646
969
373
41
1993
555
893
331
36
1990
526
827
299
35
1987
493
712
236
32
1984
444
646
215
31
1981
400
764
203
27
1978
534
651
194
24
1975
433
519
168
17
1972
334
377
116
16
1969
245
368
135
12
1966
221
338
122
10
1963
206
334
119
10
1960
205
299
112
10
1957
177
269
109
9
1954
151
217
92
9
1951
116
69
56
9
1948
0
1945
358
1a+b+c.theCONTEXTofCULTUREDEF.i358 358
1/17/2007 2:40:35 PM
4 10
4 05
3 34
1 09
3 34
0
1 37
0
PAC I F IC
MI D D L E E A ST + N O RTH AF R ICA
SU B- SA H A RA N A FR I CA
S OU T H A SI A
1a+b+c.theCONTEXTofCULTUREDEF.i359 359
8 0 00
300 0
6 0 00
200 0
4 0 00
100 0
2 0 00
0
00
3 18
400 0
N E T HE RL A N D S 0 2 .9 %
1 0 0 00
3 42
500 0
A U ST R A LI A 0 3 .1 %
1 2 0 00
3 52
600 0
SW I T Z E R L AN D 0 3 .2 %
1 4 0 00
3 73
HIGH IN COME
BE L G I U M 0 3 .4 %
3.
3 97
# LOCATIO N
# OF N GO MEETI NGS
SPA I N 0 3 .6 %
BY # OF M EET I NGS
TOK Y O
A M S TER DA M
V I ENNA
R OM E
G ENEVA
155
173
200
216
298
00
353
NEW Y OR K
2 0 00
5 13
500
ITALY 0 4 .7 %
4 0 00
437
10 0 0
WA S H I NG TON DC
6 0 00
701
15 0 0
PA R I S
8 0 00
810
20 0 0
L ONDON
1 0 0 00
5 68
364
AUS T RALI A
25 0 0
U N I T E D K IN GD O M 0 5 .2 %
462
CANADA
1 2 0 00
5 81
544
I TALY
30 0 0
GE R MA N Y 0 5 .3 %
717
S W I T ZERLAND
1 4 0 00
7 98
817
NET HERLANDS
BY C O U NT RY
F R AN C E 0 7 .3 %
987
GERM ANY
FRANC E 1 4 0 5
BELGI UM 1 8 5 6
UNI T ED K I NGDOM 1 9 2 3
UNI T ED S TAT ES 3 2 0 8
35 0 0
U N I T E D STAT E S 1 2. 6% 1 3 84
6 55
9
L AT I N A ME R ICA + CA RI B B E AN
BY RE GIO NS
A SI A 1 0 11
1 0 17
700 0
N ORT H A M ER I CA 1 6 63
1 6 63
E U R O PE + C E N T R A L A SI A 6 1 95
5 3 11
2.
TOP 10:
NGO M EETI NG LOCATI ONS
% OF ALL C OUNT RI ES
359
1/17/2007 2:40:36 PM
# WTO M I NI S TERI AL
# C ONFERENC E ATTENDA N C E
5.
PARALL EL SUMMITS: BY TY P E
OF CON FER ENCE
4 a.
1600
ELI GI BLE
1400
0 6 % G7/G 8 SUMMIT
1200
0 6 % IM F/WB /WT O MEETI NG
1000
0 7 % U N CON FERENCE
800
24 % OTH ER SUMMIT
600
28 % OTH ER NO N OFFICIAL SUM M I T
400
29 % SOC IA L FOR U M
200
961
795
1578
CANC UN 2 0 0 3
631
370
370
DOHA 2 0 0 1
12 % NO RT H AM E R ICA
776
1500
S EAT T LE 1 9 9 9
0 7 % AFRICA
686
153
362
GENEVA 1 9 9 8
128
235
108
159
S I NGAP ORE 1 9 9 6
4 b.
19 % A SIA + O C E ANIA
25% E U RO PE
10 % ST R O NG C ONFLIC T
360
1a+b+c.theCONTEXTofCULTUREDEF.i360 360
1/17/2007 2:40:36 PM
P OLITICA L + L E GAL
G LO BA LIZAT ION
I NTER NATI ONAL ORGANI ZATI ONS
R UL E OF LAW + TREATI ES
361
1a+b+c.theCONTEXTofCULTUREDEF.i361 361
1/17/2007 2:40:36 PM
IN T E RN AT ION A L
ORGAN IZ AT IONS
REC ORD O F TR EATI ES SI GNED OR RATI FI ED
BY T OP AND B OTTO M PER FORM ERS
1.
C OU NT R IE S
COUN TRIES
C OUNT RI ES
C OUNT RI ES
H UM A N R IG H T S, HU M ANI TARIAN +
5 OR FEW ER T REAT I ES
ZERO T REAT I ES
SIN CE 2000
S I NC E 2 0 0 0
S I NC E 2 0 0 0
A U STRIA
AF GHANI STAN
B H U TA N
EL S A LVA DOR
B ELG IUM
AZERBAI JAN
B R U NEI
IRAQ
B ULG ARIA
CAPE V E RDE
IRAQ
S I NG A POR E
C ANAD A
DJI BOUT I
M YA NM A R
U NI TED S TATES
C OLUMBIA
S I NG A POR E
U ZB EK I S TA N
C OSTA RICA
E RI TREA
S OM A L I A
C YP R US
GHANA
TONG A
D E N MARK
I NDONE SI A + EAST TI M OR
U NI TED S TATES
E CUAD O R
L I BE RI A
E STON IA
L I T HUANI A
G ERMANY
G REECE
H UNG ARY
SUDAN
IC ELAN D
SWAZI L AND
IR ELAN D
Y UGOSL AV I A
22
19
19
27
29
18
19
20
21
22
17
16
15
12
11
10
10
14
13
L I TH UAN IA
ITALY
C OU NTR I ES 3 5
30
L U X EMBO URG
MACEDO N IA
25
N E TH ERLAND S
N OR WAY
20
PAN AMA
PARAG UAY
15
R OMANIA
S L OVAKIA
10
S L OVEN IA
S PAIN
S WEDEN
0
T RE AT IE S
U R UG UAY
362
1a+b+c.theCONTEXTofCULTUREDEF.i362 362
1/17/2007 2:40:36 PM
R U LE O F LAW + T RE AT IE S
- record of treaties signed and ratified by top and bottom performers - treaties signed: how many countries
have signed how many treaties? - how many countries have ratified how many treaties since 2000?
- # of countries signing and ratifying specific treaties by region - wef: can the world economic forum solve
our global governance problems? - wef: key players in global governance issues by % of experts rating them
as effective - wbi: average percentile rank on world bank governance indicators 2004 - un budget: size of the
united nations budget in us $ millions - international court: states involved in three or more contentious cases
in the international criminal court - interpol: % increase in communications between interpol and each
region between 2002 and 2004 - interpol: total expenditure of interpol 20002005 in thousands of euros
HO W MA NY COUNTRI ES
HAVE R ATI FIED H OW M ANY
TREATIES SINCE 2000 ?
3.
32
53
29
26
15
10
15
20
CO UN TRIES 6 0
50
40
30
20
10
1a+b+c.theCONTEXTofCULTUREDEF.i363 363
T RE AT IE S
363
1/17/2007 2:40:37 PM
5.
2 6 % UNLI K ELY
1 4 % V ERY UNLI K ELY
ICC
CWC
KP
V C P OL
09
16
09
12
08
21
21
13
23
16
15
16
22
22
17
23
02
01
02
01
07
07
00
04
03
03
03
01
00
15
02
48
48
42
34
48
48
48
46
47
47
35
48
42
38
48
46
46
47
48
48
39
48
04
04
03
07
04
01
03
03
04
05
34
05
01
12
02
04
03
05
04
05
36
02
24
26
21
00
29
29
21
25
27
24
19
26
26
28
29
28
27
27
29
29
28
29
00
00
03
00
03
00
02
03
02
02
18
07
00
08
00
01
01
03
00
00
19
01
15
15
04
02
19
18
16
16
10
09
03
18
15
07
20
16
16
19
19
19
17
19
01
01
01
01
01
05
04
01
01
00
03
04
02
02
00
00
02
03
05
00
17
00
01
02
01
01
02
01
02
02
01
01
01
02
02
01
02
01
01
01
01
02
01
02
00
00
00
01
00
00
00
00
00
00
01
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
01
00
05
05
02
01
07
08
05
07
04
01
01
08
07
04
08
02
02
07
08
08
07
08
00
01
00
00
00
01
00
00
00
01
01
02
00
04
00
00
00
01
01
00
06
02
41
43
28
05
43
43
35
23
42
41
26
39
27
45
46
44
42
39
45
41
33
45
05
06
05
03
05
02
12
03
09
01
24
13
02
26
01
01
02
16
01
03
33
08
56
56
34
06
59
62
44
42
53
51
27
56
42
51
65
54
50
52
64
60
51
64
03
04
04
00
03
04
06
01
08
01
24
09
01
24
01
00
02
10
03
05
30
09
65
67
48
26
74
76
63
63
62
58
43
75
67
61
78
69
69
72
77
77
65
77
05
04
06
07
05
01
06
02
06
05
38
12
01
18
01
04
04
10
05
03
43
01
26
27
21
21
31
30
29
30
25
26
23
31
31
24
33
30
30
32
31
32
26
33
00
00
00
00
01
01
02
01
01
00
22
01
00
01
00
02
01
01
02
00
20
00
UNFC C C
CSR
21
01
C BD
I LO 8 7
16
01
BC
Gen
03
00
Prot 2
CAT
05
01
Prot 1
C EDAW
11
02
Gen eva
C ERD
13
LM C
I C C P R-OP 2
BW C
I C C P R-OP 1
ICCPR
I C ES C R
HUMAN RIGHTS
EU RO PE + C E NT RA L A SIA
L AT IN AM E R ICA + CA R IBBEAN
N O RT H AM E R ICA
S OU T H ASIA
S UB -SA H A R A N A FRICA
L OW INC OM E E C O NOM IE S
H IG H INC O M E E C O NOM IE S
364
1a+b+c.theCONTEXTofCULTUREDEF.i364 364
1/17/2007 2:40:37 PM
2% V ERY L I K E LY
ICCPR
- AS O F J UN E 9 , 2004
I C C P R-O P1 - OP TION AL P ROTOCOL TO T HE I NTERNAT I ONAL COV E NANT ON C I V I L
1 8 % W ORLD S OC I AL FOR UM
1 2 % C LI NT ON GLOBAL I NI T I AT I V E
ICC
CWC
B WC
LMC
7.
C OUNT RI ES BELOW
C OUNT RI ES A B O V E
T HE 1 0 TH P ERC ENT I LE
T HE 9 0 TH P ER C E N T I L E
G e n e va
S OM ALI A
T URK EY
UNI T ED K I NG D O M
P r ot1
- FIRST AD D ITIONAL PROT OCOL T O THE GEN EVA CON VEN TION S A S OF
I RAQ
M ADAGAS CAR
LI EC HT ENS T E I N
- MARCH 2 9 , 2 0 05
M YANM AR
VANUAT U
I RELAND
AUS T RI A
- MARCH 2 9 , 2 0 05
AFGHANI S TAN
EL S ALVADOR
CANADA
HAI T I
GHANA
AUS T RALI A
JAM AI CA
NET HERLAND S
CBD
S UDAN
LES OT HO
S W EDEN
UNFCCC
T UNES I A
NOR WAY
- AS O F MAY 2 1 , 2005
ZI M BABW E
M ALDI V ES
DENM ARK
KP
LI BERI A
ROM ANI A
S W I T ZERLAN D
LMC
UZBEK I S TAN
M ONGOLI A
NEW ZEALAN D
T HAI LAND
LUX EM BOURG
BUR UNDI
S URI NAM E
FI NLAND
C OT E D I V OI RE
BRAZI L
I C ELAND
P r ot2
BC
VCPOL
365
1a+b+c.theCONTEXTofCULTUREDEF.i365 365
1/17/2007 2:40:38 PM
1a+b+c.theCONTEXTofCULTUREDEF.i366 366
IR A N
N E T H E R LA N D S
N O R WAY
S PA I N
N I CA RA G U A
F O RM E R U S SR
L IB YA
15
INDIA
U N I T E D STAT E S
H ON D U R AS
G E R MA N Y
11
D E N MA R K
U N IT E D K I N GD OM
BU LG A R IA
FR A N C E
B E L G IU M
A U S TR A LI A
1,181
1,112
1,112
1,086
1,217
1,090
1,074
1,149
1,409
1,483
1,828
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
10.
1995
8.
S I ZE OF T H E
U NI TED NATI ONS BU DG E T
2000
I N $ U S D MIL L IO N S
1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
16
14
12
10
366
1/17/2007 2:40:38 PM
1a+b+c.theCONTEXTofCULTUREDEF.i367 367
32 , 2 97
28 , 2 65
29 , 5 05
2 0 04
2 0 05
0%
2 0 03
400%
27 , 5 33
600%
12.
2 0 01
24 , 5 58
11 .
2 0 00
5 00 %
500%
T H E A ME RI CA S
250%
200%
300%
A SI A
E U RO P E
15 0%
200%
A FR I CA
90%
100%
N ORT H A FR I CA
MI D D L E E A ST +
208
234
305
305
393
393
539
539
666
731
731
731
801
801
799
799
874
874
1 97 3 2 1 3
1 97 4 2 5 1
1 97 5 2 3 0
1 97 6 2 7 9
1 97 7 2 6 2
1 97 8 3 3 4
1 97 9 3 0 1
1980 327
1 98 1 2 9 7
1 98 2 3 0 7
1 98 3 2 9 7
1 98 4 3 1 3
1 98 5 3 0 2
1 98 6 2 9 5
1 98 7 2 8 5
1 98 8 2 9 9
1 98 9 2 8 6
B E TW EEN 2 0 0 2 AND 2 0 0 4
2 00 3 3 2 6 1 , 4 8 2
2 00 2 3 3 4 1 , 4 8 2
2 00 1 2 9 3 1 , 2 8 0
1 99 9 3 0 2 1 , 2 4 4
1 99 8 1 0 9 1 , 2 4 4
1 99 7 3 1 9 1 , 2 6 6
1 99 6 3 2 7 1 , 2 6 6
1 99 5 3 5 0 1 , 3 1 6
1 99 4 3 6 0 1 , 3 1 6
1 99 3 3 3 3 1 , 1 8 8
1 99 2 2 4 2 1 , 1 8 8
1 99 1 3 2 5 1 , 0 9 4
194
1800
1 97 2 2 0 2
2000
1 97 1 1 9 4
9.
IN $ USD MILLIO NS
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
TOTAL EX P ENDI TU RE O F
I NTERP OL 2000 2 0 0 5
I N TH OU S A NDS O F E U R O S
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
367
1/17/2007 2:40:38 PM
decade; however, this growth is unevenly spread, with the world economy becoming
increasingly concentrated
The scale and role of transnational corporations (TNCs) is now more pronounced;
GLOBALIZATION
OF
SUPPORTERS
REGRESSIVES
REFORMERS
REJECTIONISTS
FOR :
AGAINST:
MIXED:
AGAINST:
cultures should
national culture
welcome multiple
favor protection
interact freely
and identity
identities and
of cultures and
since the end of the Cold War, facilitated by the rise of international nongovernmental
and competition
should be
cultures but
traditions
of ideas, values
cohesive and
conflicts need
The thickening of the international rule of law has continued as well, although
and practices
protected; core
to be managed
are welcome.
values need to
through adequate
be defended
policies
the economic weight of some of the largest TNCs surpasses that of most national
CULTUR E
global governance
WHAT IS GLOBALIZ ATIO N ?
ECO NO MY
FOR:
MIXED:
MIXED:
AGAINST:
As part of
If beneficial to
If leading to
Greater
flows of investments, knowledge, cultural goods, and people across regions and inter-
economic
own country
greater
protection of
liberalism
or group and
social equity
national
infrastructure and are patterned in terms of intensity, extensity and velocity, and show
leading
economies
stakeholders
needed
The notion of cultural globalization involves all three movements: flows of investments
and knowledge; flows of cultural goods; and flows of people. Cultures or aspects of cultures
TECH NO LO G Y
FOR:
MIXED:
MIXED:
AGAINST:
are globalized to the extent to which they involve the movement of specified objects,
As part of open
For in economic
If beneficial to
Technology
systems of meaning and people across national and regional borders and continents.
competition for
broader groups
threatens local
technological
military and
and the
communities and
Cultural products and values are part of a larger process that involves economic
innovation, e.g.
security
marginalized
traditional ways
purposes,
processes across multiple national borders); the emergence of a global civil society
technologists
or environmental
and individuals located primarily outside the institutional complexes of family, state,
purposes
of life
and market and operating beyond the confines of national societies, polities, and
economies); and international law and the emergence of an international legal system
LAW
FOR:
AGAINST:
FOR:
AGAINST:
With emphasis
For if facilitating
Building global
Undermines
on international
national
Todays globalization as the latest phase of historic developments whose major impetus
commercial
solely dependent
sovereignty
originated in the West (i.e., the rise of capitalism in Europe and the Americas), but which
law and
generally
on sovereign
and democracy.
for centuries has spurred, and interacted with specific dynamics in other parts of the
human rights
against.
states.
legislation
Emphasis on
Pronounced role
(e.g., Sub-Saharan Africa). At some level, the spread of rationality and capitalism
strengthening
for International
engendered conflict dynamics, (i.e., colonialism, imperial wars, and struggles for self-
national laws on
Criminal Court
property rights
often economic and political at the surface are also deeply cultural.
and domestic
democracy
P EO P LE
FOR:
MIXED:
FOR:
AGAINST:
of many societies. New political positions have emerged that try to relate globalization
Open border
For immigration
Open policy
Closed border
to existing ideologies. Among them: supporters are largely in the spirit of traditional
policy
for economic
needs but
ers constitute a reformed social democratic movement; and rejectionists favor a return
against people of
other cultures
policy
S o u rce : B a s e d o n K a l d o r e t a l , 2 0 0 3 .
368
1a+b+c.theCONTEXTofCULTUREDEF.i368 368
1/17/2007 2:40:39 PM
tional identities only. What is more, the dual identity is more pronounced among the
vital to the shaping of human behavior. In the context of globalization, a critical issue is
younger cohorts (60%) than Europeans 55 and older (48%); among the well-educated
the impact of an increasingly globalizing world on identity formation and stability. Are
(70%) than less well educated (45%); and higher among the self-employed, managers
some identities being eroded and even pushed aside, while others evolve or dominate?
For example, Huntington (2004) suggests that the erosion of Americas Anglo-Protestant cultural identity is in part due to the problems of assimilation of primarily Hispanic
immigrants. By contrast, Sen (2006) argues strongly against merging identities with
ries on identity and national pride by both attitudinal and macro characteristics, yields
some form of higher purpose as it suggests some illusion of destiny that could be-
the one hand, and low and low-middle income countries on the other:
A P PROAC HE S TO ID E N T I T Y
High income countries are characterized by populations with stronger local and su-
individual identity:
and generally satisfied with life. These are countries with comparatively lower income
inequality, aging and well-educated populations, and greater gender equality.
One is rooted in developmental psychology and sees identity as the result of deep so-
Low and low-middle income countries have populations with stronger national identi-
cialization, i.e., early value-forming experiences and learning processes that make up
ties that express great national pride, are more materialistic, regard religion as less im-
the core personality traits and character dispositions. This psychological understanding
portant, and are less satisfied with their quality of life. These are countries with greater
is close to what could be called the hard-wired aspect of identity as a sense of self-
once formed, it is fairly stable throughout the life course, and relatively persistent to
political, cultural and social changes.
The other understanding of identity is more sociological and cultural in nature, and
sees it as the outcome of on-going search processes. Individuals try to forge, negotiate and reconcile their own worldviews and notions of self with that of society. Given
IS S UES
the multiple roles people perform in modern, diverse societies, this more soft-wired
Four major conclusions emerge in relation to identity: 1) National identities seem stron-
form of identity is not only evolving; it is also precarious and precious. It refers less
ger in weaker economies and more peripheral countries, as seems to be the case with
national pride. By contrast, local and supranational identities seem more pronounced
Subject to a barrage of media, advertising and other images, people learn to confront
3) Globalization has not yet become a major force in changing deep-wired notions of
such dissonances by creating imagined worlds that offer a series of elements (char-
identity, but has the potential of affecting soft-wired aspects by serving as a likely tar-
acters, plots, and textual forms) out of which scripts can be formed of imagined lives,
get for displaced dissatisfaction in countries/regions with lower per-capita income; and
their own as well as those of others living in other places (Appadurai, 1990: 299).
Similarly, Beck (2000: 54) suggests that more people in more parts of the world dream
backlashes there are appear closely tied to persistent political and economic failures,
of and consider a greater range of possible lives than they have ever done before,
1a+b+c.theCONTEXTofCULTUREDEF.i369 369
369
1/17/2007 2:40:39 PM
TA BL E 1: GE OGRAPHIC I D E N T I T I E S, 1 9 8 1 - 1 9 9 9 / 2 0 0 0
1981
LOCAL
1990
NATIONAL
SUPRA-NATIONAL
1999
LOCAL
NATIONAL
SUPRA-NATIONAL
LOCAL
NATIONAL
SUPRA-NATIONA L
SUB-SA H A RA N A F RICA
53%
32%
16%
52%
38%
11%
45%
46%
09%
42%
45%
12%
SOUTH ASI A
52%
39%
09%
02%
53%
05%
51%
46%
04%
58%
37%
05%
44%
42%
14%
45%
39%
16%
REGION
NORTH A M ERICA
67%
07%
27%
49%
36%
16%
47%
35%
18%
WESTERN EUROP E
63%
28%
09%
61%
28%
10%
63%
28%
09%
WORLD BAN K
1981
L OCAL
NATI O NAL
S UPRA-NATI O NAL
L OCAL
NATI O NAL
S UPRA-NATI O NAL
L OCAL
NATI O NAL
S UPRA-NATI O NA L
H IGH - I NCOM E
64%
25%
11%
1990
1999
59%
31%
10%
62%
28%
09%
56%
33%
11%
57%
33%
10%
53%
39%
08%
41%
48%
11%
LOW- INCOM E
51%
35%
15%
50%
42%
08%
370
1a+b+c.theCONTEXTofCULTUREDEF.i370 370
1/17/2007 2:40:39 PM
VALUES
I DENTITY VALU ES
ECONO M I C VALU ES
SOCIA L VALU ES
POL I TICA L VALU ES
REL I GIO U S VALU ES
GENDER
REL I GIO U S I NS TI TU TI ONS
371
2a.values_DEF.indd 371
1/17/2007 8:17:22 PM
ID ENTITY VAL U E S
NAT I ONAL
S UP RA-NAT I ONAL
1 5 -2 4 Y EARS
5 0 .0 %
3 6 .0 %
1 4 .0 %
2 5 -3 4 Y EARS
5 1 .0 %
3 7 .0 %
1 2 .0 %
3 5 -4 4 Y EARS
5 4 .0 %
3 6 .0 %
1 1 .0 %
4 5 -5 4 Y EARS
5 6 .0 %
3 5 .0 %
1 0 .0 %
5 5 -6 4 Y EARS
6 0 .0 %
3 3 .0 %
7 .0 %
6 5 -9 8 Y EARS
6 3 .0 %
3 2 .0 %
6 .0 %
42 %
1 b.
46 %
S UB-NAT I ONAL
5 0 0, 00 0 A N D M O RE
13 %
13 %
1 00 ,0 0 0 - 50 0 ,0 00
50 ,0 0 0 - 10 0 ,0 00
12 %
12 %
31 %
32 %
54 %
56 %
55 %
2 0 ,0 00 - 5 0 ,0 00
10 %
33 %
56 %
1 0 ,0 00 - 2 0 ,0 00
8 %
34 %
5 ,0 0 0 - 10 ,0 0 0
8 %
34 %
58 %
60 %
32 %
2 ,0 00 - 5 ,0 0 0
2, 00 0 A N D L E SS
N AT I ON AL
S U P RA - N AT I O N A L
SU B - N AT I ON AL
7 %
1a.
66 %
27 %
372
2a.values_DEF.indd 372
1/17/2007 8:17:22 PM
F EMALE
U NDE R 25 YEARS
2 5-34 YEARS
3 5-44 YEARS
4 5-54 YEARS
5 5-64 YEARS
65+ YEARS
LE SS T HA N E LEMEN TARY
AT LE AST E LEMEN TARY
AT LE AST SO M E S ECON DARY
AT LE AST SO M E POST-SECON DARY
3 0 h A WE E K OR MORE
LE SS T H A N 30h A WEEK
SE LF EMPL OYED
R E T IR E D / P EN SION ED
HOUSEWIFE
STUD EN T
U NEMPLOYED
OTHER
LOW IN COME
LO W-M IDD LE IN COME
H IG H -M IDD L E IN COME
2.
MALE
HIGH IN COME
41. 2
13. 2
42. 1
12. 1
+
+
+
+
41.3
04.4
42.0
03.8
%
%
%
%
44. 6
14. 7
46. 2
14. 4
43. 0
14. 4
41. 3
12. 6
37. 5
11. 0
37. 3
8. 4
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
36.1
04.6
35.1
04.2
37.5
05.1
41.9
04.2
48.0
03.5
51.5
02.9
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
33. 8
8. 4
38. 8
8. 0
42. 0
12. 8
44. 1
15. 5
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
54.6
03.1
50.8
02.4
41.0
04.2
35.4
05.1
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
43. 6
13. 7
45. 6
14. 0
39. 1
12. 6
37. 2
9. 8
39. 7
8. 3
46. 5
14. 8
42. 3
17. 9
41. 3
12. 4
39. 9
12. 8
41. 5
12. 6
43. 3
12. 4
44. 4
14. 2
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
38.4
04.3
35.2
05.2
44.3
04.0
49.8
03.2
49.6
02.4
34.7
04.0
33.0
06.8
41.1
05.2
43.0
04.4
42.1
03.7
40.4
03.9
36.8
04.6
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
ET HNI C I T Y / RAC E
LOCALI T Y
NAT I ONALI T Y
RELI GI ON
M ALE
1 .1
2 3 .7
5 .1
04 3 .2
2 3 .6
%
%
%
%
%
FEM ALE
0 .8
2 4 .5
5 .5
04 0 .9
2 4 .4
%
%
%
%
%
1 5 -2 5 Y EARS
1 .2
2 2 .5
5 .3
03 8 .7
2 9 .1
%
%
%
%
%
2 5 -3 4 Y EARS
1 .0
2 1 .4
6 .0
04 2 .7
2 6 .0
%
%
%
%
%
3 5 -4 4 Y EARS
0 .9
2 3 .8
5 .1
04 3 .4
2 3 .4
%
%
%
%
%
4 5 -5 4 Y EARS
0 .8
2 5 .6
4 .7
04 4 .0
2 0 .6
%
%
%
%
%
5 5 -6 4 Y EARS
0 .5
2 8 .0
4 .8
04 2 .0
2 0 .3
%
%
%
%
%
6 5 -9 8 Y EARS
0 .4
3 0 .3
5 .7
04 0 .9
1 6 .9
%
%
%
%
%
0 .9
2 4 .1
5 .3
04 2 .0
2 4 .0
%
%
%
%
%
3.
C ONT I NENT
373
2a.values_DEF.indd 373
1/17/2007 8:17:23 PM
EC ON OM IC VAL U E S
- post materialist + materialist values - competition - work attitude - government versus private sector
- work versus leisure - welfare state - income - governmental ownership
1.
2.
4.
M OS T LY M AT ERI ALI S T
LOW I NC OM E
42.8 %
29.6 %
LOW-M I DDLE I NC OM E
44.6 %
26.8 %
HIGH-MI DDLE I NC OM E
46.4 %
25.7 %
HI GH I NC OM E
46.5 %
26.5 %
3.
M OS T LY P OS T M AT ERI ALI S T
OP P OS E C OM P ET I T I ON
FAV OR C OM P ET I T I ON
LOW I NC OM E
16.1 %
62.2 %
LOW-M I DDLE I NC OM E
13.6 %
64.5 %
HIGH-MI DDLE I NC OM E
13.0 %
65.8 %
HI GH I NC OM E
11.4 %
70.6 %
WO RK ATTI TU DE
LOW I NC OM E
39.7 %
62.0 %
L OW-M I DDLE I NC OM E
37.7 %
58.8 %
HIGH-M I DDLE I NC OM E
33.2 %
53.7 %
HI GH I NC OM E
28.5 %
49.8 %
47.8 %
66.2 %
42.9 %
57.6 %
36.8 %
55.1 %
30.3 %
54.7 %
FAV OR P RI VAT E
OW NERS HI P
LOW I NC OM E
35.6 %
37.9 %
LOW-M I DDLE I NC OM E
29.6 %
40.5 %
HIGH-MI DDLE I NC OM E
28.5 %
43.8 %
HI GH I NC OM E
25.2 %
50.6 %
374
2a.values_DEF.indd 374
1/17/2007 8:17:23 PM
LO W I N C OM E
2a.values_DEF.indd 375
55+ YEARS
3 5 - 5 4 Y E A RS
2 5 - 3 4 Y E A RS
U N D E R 2 5 YE A R S
HI G H I N C OM E
H I G H -MI D D LE I N C O ME
L OW- MI D D L E I N C O ME
4 2. 4 %
4 7. 4 %
4 9. 1 %
4 9. 0 %
5 6. 5 %
5 1. 4 %
4 4. 3 %
4 2. 9 %
37.9 %
32.9 %
31.1 %
30.3 %
24.0 %
27.9 %
33.6 %
39.5 %
7.
% O P P O SE E QU A L I TY I N C E N T IV E S TO IN D I VI D U A L E F FO RT S ( 7 - 1 0 )
7 7 .9 %
8 2 .7 %
HI GH I NCO ME
ATTIT UD E: WO RK + L EI SU RE
3 6 .1 %
3 9 .6 %
4 1 .5 %
4 1 .2 %
4 1 .4 %
4 0 .3 %
3 7 .3 %
3 6 .9 %
3 9 .6 %
3 4 .9 %
LOW I NCOME
LOW-M I DDLE I NCOME
HI GH-M I DDLE I NCO ME
HI GH I NCO ME
EM PLOY ER
P ROFES S I ONAL / NON-M ANU A L
M ANUA L
FARM ER / AGRI CULT U R E
ARM ED FORCES
NEVER HAD A J O B
7 5 .4 %
8 1 .0 %
7 1 .0 %
7 9 .2 %
AT LEAS T S OM E P OST-SECONDA RY
LOW I NCOME
7 2 .5 %
AT LEAS T S OM E SECONDA RY
7 2 .4 %
9 4 .3 %
9 3 .5 %
9 2 .9 %
8 9 .7 %
9 4 .6 %
9 1 .9 %
8 7 .2 %
8 8 .8 %
HI GH I NCOME
LOW I NCO ME
AT LEAS T S OM E P OST-SECONDA RY
AT LEAS T S OM E SECONDA RY
IN COME EQUAL I TY
4 5 .9 %
3 9 .2 %
4 8 .6 %
4 5 .7 %
32 %
3 4 .1 %
1 2 .8 %
1 5 .2 %
6 7 .9 %
6 2 .0 %
375
1/17/2007 8:17:24 PM
S OC IA L VA LUE S
- most people can be trusted - tolerance is an important value - importance of family, leisure and work
- level of prejudice based on feelings about neighbours
1.
TR US T
2.
TOLERANC E
H IGH IN COME
36 . 0 %
HI GH I NC OM E
49.8 %
H IG H - M IDD LE IN COME
33 . 0 %
HI GH - M I DDLE I NC OM E
48.2 %
29 . 0 %
LOW - M I DDLE I NC OM E
47.5 %
LOW IN COME
24 . 0 %
LOW I NC OM E
47.1 %
32 . 0 %
50.2 %
26 . 0 %
AT LEAS T S OM E S EC ONDARY
51.7 %
24 . 0 %
50.9 %
LE SS T H A N E LEMEN TARY
24 . 0 %
48.3 %
M ALE
47.8 %
FEM ALE
49.4 %
376
2a.values_DEF.indd 376
1/17/2007 8:17:24 PM
3.
FAMILY
LEI S U RE
WORK
92 . 0 %
36.0 %
65.0 %
H IG H - M IDD L E IN COME
91 . 0 %
32.0 %
67.0 %
90 . 0 %
30.0 %
68.0 %
LOW IN COME
87 . 0 %
28.0 %
67.0 %
89 . 0 %
35.0 %
67.0 %
89 . 0 %
33.0 %
65.0 %
89 . 0 %
29.0 %
64.0 %
LE SS T H A N E LEMEN TARY
89 . 0 %
26.0 %
63.0 %
MALE
88 . 0 %
32.0 %
71.0 %
FEMALE
91 . 0 %
31.0 %
63.0 %
P REJU DI C E
4 . LEVEL OF
BASED ON FEELINGS ABOUT NEIGHBOURS
HI GH I NC OM E
HI GH - M I DDLE I NC OM E
LOW - M I DDLE I NC OM E
LOW I NC OM E
UNDER 2 5 Y EARS
2 5 - 3 4 Y EARS
3 5 - 4 4 Y EARS
4 5 - 5 4 Y EARS
5 5 - 6 4 Y EARS
6 5 + Y EARS
3.7 %
3.5 %
3.2 %
3.0 %
3.2 %
3.4 %
3.7 %
4.5 %
3.2 %
3.3 %
3.4 %
3.4 %
3.6 %
3.7 %
377
2a.values_DEF.indd 377
1/17/2007 8:17:24 PM
1.
LE SS T HA N E LEMEN TARY
27.7 %
47.3 %
51.6 %
31.3 %
47.6 %
45.9 %
36.2 %
49.5 %
32.8 %
36.8 %
57.3 %
36.6 %
LOW IN COME
27.4 %
45.0 %
40.9 %
31.6 %
50.2 %
41.7 %
H IG H -M IDD LE IN COME
32.7 %
54.6 %
37.8 %
HIGH IN COME
37.2 %
60.8 %
34.7 %
UN D ER 25 Y EARS
49.3 %
25 - 3 4 Y EARS
52.7 %
35 - 4 4 Y EARS
52.3 %
45 - 5 4 Y EARS
53.2 %
55 - 6 4 Y EARS
51.8 %
56+ Y EARS
50.7 %
M ALE
52.8 %
FEM ALE
50.9 %
378
2a.values_DEF.indd 378
1/17/2007 8:17:25 PM
% M EM BER PART Y
9 .4 %
7.1 %
3.8 %
2.5 %
7 .1 %
8.6 %
4.5 %
2.8 %
1 1 .4 %
10.3 %
5.4 %
3.2 %
1 7 .5 %
14.6 %
8.8 %
5.2 %
9 .2 %
10.9 %
5.8 %
1 1 .7 %
11.9 %
7.1 %
1 4 .8 %
13.0 %
7.9 %
1 7 .1 %
14.6 %
8.7 %
2.
16.0 %
14.0 %
12.0 %
10.0 %
8.0 %
6.0 %
4.0 %
2.0 %
56+ YEARS
5 5 - 6 4 Y E A RS
4 5 - 5 4 Y E A RS
3 5 - 4 4 Y E A RS
2 5 - 3 4 Y E A RS
U N D E R 2 5 Y E AR S
0%
379
2a.values_DEF.indd 379
1/17/2007 8:17:25 PM
2a.values_DEF.indd 380
4 8 .8 %
4 6 .7 %
4 6 .8 %
5 5 -6 4 Y EA R S
6 5 + Y EA R S
L E SS T H AN E L EM E N TA RY
54 .1 %
50 .5 %
4 5 -5 4 Y EA R S
AT LE AS T S OM E PO S T-S E C ON DA RY
4 7 .1 %
3 5 -4 4 Y EA R S
5 1 .2 %
4 4 .7 %
2 5 -3 4 Y EA R S
AT L E A ST S O ME S E C ON DA RY
4 5 .1 %
U N D E R 2 5 Y E A RS
15.8 %
17.8 %
16.8 %
18.9 %
19.2 %
16.6 %
15.3 %
15.7 %
14.9 %
15.0 %
16.9 %
30.2 %
31 %
37.4 %
37.3 %
34 %
34.6 %
34.2 %
37.2 %
40.4 %
39.9 %
37.9 %
36.5 %
AGE GROUPS :
4 5 .9 %
4 5 .2 %
F E MA L E
AG REEE
AGRE
S OUT H AS IA
E AS T AS IA + PAC IFIC
E UROPE + C E N T RAL AS IA
GE N DE R:
AT L EA S T E L EM E N TA RY
4 8. 8 %
D I S AG R E E
3.
MA L E
1.
2.7
3.8
4 .1
H I G H E S T R E L I G I O U S F R E E D O M R AT E
L O W E S T R E L I G I O U S F R E E D O M R AT E
3.0
4 .8
4 .5
7 .0
R ELIGIOU S VAL U E S
E DUC AT IO N O N L E V E L :
380
1/17/2007 8:17:25 PM
30.3 %
53.3 %
15.5 %
SELF EMPLOYED
49.1 %
37.4 %
13.5 %
30.6 %
50.9 %
38 %
46.5 %
UNWEIGHTED AVERAGES
O F C O U N T R Y R E S U LT S
16.3 %
E M P L OY ED:
2a.values_DEF.indd 381
3 0 h A WEEK OR MORE
1 5.8 %
2.
RELI G IO U S + E T H N IC H AT R E D
18.5 %
52.9 %
33.3 %
HOUSEWIF E
13.7 %
STUD EN T
37.4 %
47.5 %
15.0 %
UN EMPL OYED
40.1 %
43.9 %
16.0 %
OTHER
19.1 %
32.2 %
16.1 %
34.1 %
51.1 %
23.4 %
61.6 %
15.0 %
27.6 %
54.6 %
17.7 %
EUROPE
14.7 %
+ CEN T RAL AS IA
51.7 %
K IND O F JO B :
33.5 %
+ TH E CA R IB B EA N
17.6 %
47.3 %
15.5 %
66.8 %
3 4 . 0 % T H I N K S R E L I G I O U S A N D E T H N I C H AT R E D I S G R E AT E S T T H R E AT T O T H E W O R L D
5 9 . 8 % T H I N K S T H E I R C O U N T R Y S U F F E R S F R O M R E L I G I O U S A N D E T H N I C H AT R E D P R O B L E M S
57.5 % THINKS THE INFLUENCE OF THEIR RELIGIOUS LEADERS IS GOOD
5 8 . 1 % F E E L S R E L I G I O N S H O U L D B E K E P T S E P E R AT E F R O M G O V E R N M E N T P O L I C Y
14.3 %
T H I N K S R E L I G I O U S A N D E T H N I C H AT R E D I S G R E AT E S T T H R E AT T O T H E W O R L D
7 7 . 4 % T H I N K S T H E I R C O U N T R Y S U F F E R S F R O M R E L I G I O U S A N D E T H N I C H AT R E D P R O B L E M S
61.5 % THINKS THE INFLUENCE OF THEIR RELIGIOUS LEADERS IS GOOD
8 4 . 7 % F E E L S R E L I G I O N S H O U L D B E K E P T S E P E R AT E F R O M G O V E R N M E N T P O L I C Y
26.3 %
T H I N K S R E L I G I O U S A N D E T H N I C H AT R E D I S G R E AT E S T T H R E AT T O T H E W O R L D
6 4 . 6 % T H I N K S T H E I R C O U N T R Y S U F F E R S F R O M R E L I G I O U S A N D E T H N I C H AT R E D P R O B L E M S
46.2 % THINKS THE INFLUENCE OF THEIR RELIGIOUS LEADERS IS GOOD
9 0 . 1 % F E E L S R E L I G I O N S H O U L D B E K E P T S E P E R AT E F R O M G O V E R N M E N T P O L I C Y
34.3 %
48.5 %
17.3 %
35 %
46.8 %
18.3 %
40.6 %
31.1 %
44.1 %
15.4 %
53.4 %
15.6 %
A G R ICULTURAL WORKER
63.3 %
25 %
11.7 %
37.3 %
46.5 %
16.2 %
14.6 %
T H I N K S R E L I G I O U S A N D E T H N I C H AT R E D I S G R E AT E S T T H R E AT T O T H E W O R L D
7 7 . 6 % T H I N K S T H E I R C O U N T R Y S U F F E R S F R O M R E L I G I O U S A N D E T H N I C H AT R E D P R O B L E M S
82.2 % THINKS THE INFLUENCE OF THEIR RELIGIOUS LEADERS IS GOOD
8 3 . 3 % F E E L S R E L I G I O N S H O U L D B E K E P T S E P E R AT E F R O M G O V E R N M E N T P O L I C Y
17.8 %
SOUTH ASIA
LOW-MID D L E IN COME
T H I N K S R E L I G I O U S A N D E T H N I C H AT R E D I S G R E AT E S T T H R E AT T O T H E W O R L D
7 1 . 8 % T H I N K S T H E I R C O U N T R Y S U F F E R S F R O M R E L I G I O U S A N D E T H N I C H AT R E D P R O B L E M S
48.9 % THINKS THE INFLUENCE OF THEIR RELIGIOUS LEADERS IS GOOD
7 1 .3 % F E E L S R E L I G I O N S H O U L D B E K E P T S E P E R AT E F R O M G O V E R N M E N T P O L I C Y
E AS T AS IA
16.1 %
+ PAC IFIC
42.4 %
41.5 %
IN C OME :
LOW IN COME
S UB-S AHARAN
AFRIC A
45.8 %
40.5 %
13.8 %
N EVER HAD A J OB
37.9 %
48.1 %
36.5 %
15.4 %
ARMED F ORCES
MIDDLE E AS T
+ N ORT H AFRIC A
18.6 %
T H I N K S R E L I G I O U S A N D E T H N I C H AT R E D I S G R E AT E S T T H R E AT T O T H E W O R L D
7 6 . 9 % T H I N K S T H E I R C O U N T R Y S U F F E R S F R O M R E L I G I O U S A N D E T H N I C H AT R E D P R O B L E M S
58.7 % THINKS THE INFLUENCE OF THEIR RELIGIOUS LEADERS IS GOOD
8 3 . 8 % F E E L S R E L I G I O N S H O U L D B E K E P T S E P E R AT E F R O M G O V E R N M E N T P O L I C Y
36.4 %
48.7 %
14.9 %
31.7 %
53.9 %
14.3 %
381
1/17/2007 8:17:26 PM
HIGH IN COME
T H I N K S R E L I G I O U S A N D E T H N I C H AT R E D I S G R E AT E S T T H R E AT T O T H E W O R L D
7 8 . 5 % T H I N K S T H E I R C O U N T R Y S U F F E R S F R O M R E L I G I O U S A N D E T H N I C H AT R E D
50.6 % THINKS THE INFLUENCE OF THEIR RELIGIOUS LEADERS IS GOOD
6 7 . 8 % F E E L S R E L I G I O N S H O U L D B E K E P T S E P E R AT E F R O M G O V E R N M E N T P O L I C Y
PROBLEMS
83.3 %
16.7 %
YE S
NO
67.4 %
32.6 %
M AL E
FEMALE
89 %
F E MA L E
26.6 %
73.4 %
3 0 .1 %
6 9 .6 %
72 %
3 1 .3 %
6 8 .7 %
6 6 .7 %
U NDER 2 5 Y EA R S
2 5 -3 4 YEARS
12.6 %
87.4 %
28 %
85.7 %
32.8 %
67.2 %
3 3 .3 %
84.6 %
36.6 %
63.4 %
3 3 .9 %
25-3 4 Y EA R S
3 5 -4 4 YEARS
14.3 %
4 5 -5 4 YEARS
15.4 %
45-54 Y E ARS
14.1 %
85.9 %
38.3 %
6 5 + YEARS
13.4 %
86.6 %
43 %
61.7 %
3 0 .9 %
57 %
2 7 .6 %
6 5 + Y EA R S
73.6 %
1/17/2007 8:17:26 PM
11.4 %
88.6 %
38.3 %
AT LE AST SO M E SE C ON DARY
16.2 %
83.8 %
42 %
L E S S T H A N E L E ME N TA RY
61.7 %
2 9 .7 %
58 %
3 7 .6 %
AT L EA S T S OM E S EC ONDA RY
AT L EA ST SO M E POST-SE C ON DARY
83.4 %
16.6 %
AT L E AST POST-SECONDA RY
37.3 %
7 3 .3 %
2 6 .7 %
L ES S TH A N EL EM ENTA RY
AT LE AST E LE M EN TARY
7 2 .4 %
6 5 + YE A R S
26.4 %
6 9 .1 %
7 0 .3 %
6 2 .4 %
AT L E A S T S O ME S E C O N D A RY
62.7 %
3 5 .9 %
6 4 .1 %
E DUC AT IO N O N L E V E L :
92.5 %
7.5 %
6 6 .1 %
4 5 - 5 4 YE A R S
5 5 -6 4 YEARS
LE SS T H A N E LE M EN TARY
AGE GROUPS :
87.2 %
12.8 %
7 2 .3 %
2 7 .7 %
F EM A L E
F EM A L E
U NDE R 2 5 YEARS
MA L E
66.5 %
33.5 %
6 5 .4 %
3 5 .5 %
MALE
11 %
YES
NO
GE N DE R:
MAL E
I S RELIGIO N I MPORTA NT ?
SHOULD CH I LDR EN
YE S
NO
4.
5.
H AVE RE LIGIO US FA I TH ?
6.
382
2a.values_DEF.indd 382
ME N T ION E D /
N OT ME N T ION E D /
82 %
18 %
59 %
41 %
5 9 .3 %
4 0 .7 %
3 0 h A W E E K O R MO R E
13 %
87.0 %
31 %
SE LF E M PL OYED
8.4 %
91.6 %
17.4 %
69 %
3 1 .9 %
6 8 .1 %
82.6 %
2 2 .3 %
7 7 .7 %
50.6 %
3 2 .3 %
6 7 .7 %
82.1 %
1 5 .3 %
E M P L OY E D :
2a.values_DEF.indd 383
3 0 h A WE E K O R MORE
S EL F EM PL OY ED
R E T IR E D / PE NS ION ED
84.4 %
15.6 %
49.4 %
R I TI R ED / PENS I ONED
H O U SEWIF E
95.3 %
4.7 %
17.9 %
8 4 .7 %
HOU S EW I F E
STUD EN T
12.7 %
U NE M P LOYED
13 %
OTHER
25.2 %
H O U S E W IF E
87.3 %
27.4 %
72.6 %
3 0 .4 %
6 9 .6 %
87 %
26.1 %
73.9 %
2 8 .6 %
7 1 .4 %
74.8 %
78.7 %
21.3 %
4 7 .7 %
5 2 .3 %
OTHER
OTH ER
OTHER
19.5 %
80.5 %
33.5 %
66 %
3 9 .9 %
6 0 .1 %
EM P L OY E R , LE SS T HA N 1 0 E M PLOYEES
14.8 %
85.2 %
32.1 %
65.5 %
3 6 .5 %
6 3 .5 %
16.3 %
83.7 %
35.3 %
74.5 %
3 4 .6 %
6 5 .4 %
M L NO N-MAN UAL
22.4 %
77.6 %
55.4 %
82.6 %
4 4 .5 %
M L NON M ANUAL
JL NON-MAN UAL
17 %
M L NON M A NU A L
M L NON M A NU A L
5 5 .5 %
ML N O N - MA N U A L
83 %
36.9 %
68.6 %
3 8 .5 %
6 1 .5 %
16.7 %
83.3 %
36.8 %
72 %
3 6 .7 %
6 3 .3 %
15.1 %
84.9 %
41.3 %
77.1 %
35 %
65 %
9.3 %
90.7 %
27.6 %
73.3 %
25 %
7 5 .1 %
FARMER
7.6 %
92.4 %
13.5 %
68.4 %
1 7 .2 %
8 2 .8 %
FA R M ER
FA R ME R
A G R IC U LT U RA L WORKER
13.9 %
86.1 %
18.5 %
65.9 %
3 3 .1 %
6 6 .9 %
A R M E D FORCES
15.1 %
84.9 %
21.4 %
68.6 %
2 7 .5 %
7 2 .5 %
NE VE R HA D A JOB
3.2 %
96.8 %
2.7 %
66 %
1 0 .7 %
8 9 .3 %
NE V ER HA D A J OB
N E VE R H A D A JO B
88.4 %
11.6 %
69.6 %
30.4 %
7 3 .2 %
2 6 .8 %
L OW I NC OM E
LOW-M IDDLE IN COME
L O W IN C O ME
86.4 %
13.6 %
29.4 %
70.6 %
3 1 .1 %
6 8 .9 %
67.1 %
3 3 .1 %
6 6 .9 %
61.9 %
3 8 .3 %
L OW-M I DDL E I NC OM E
HIG H -M IDDLE IN COME
14.4 %
H IG H I N COME
17.4 %
383
1/17/2007 8:17:27 PM
HI GH I NCOM E
85.6 %
32.9 %
82.6 %
38.1 %
H I G H I NC OM E
6 1 .7 %
H IG H IN C O ME
IN C OME :
LOW I N COME
K IND O F JO B :
EM P L OYE R , 1 0 O R M O R E E M PL OYEES
G EN DER VALU E S
- life expectancy at birth - combined gross enrollment for schools - estimated earned income - literacy rates
2003 I N Y EARS:
M E DI UM DE V EL OPM ENT
AFRI CA
74
70
48
46
48.7
ETH I OPI A 4 6 . 6
42.7
M OZA M B I QU E 4 1 . 1
45.6
R WA NDA 4 2 . 1
HI GH DEV EL OPM E NT
52.4
H A I TI 5 0 . 8
0
50.2
S OU TH A F R I C A 4 6 . 8
10
0
73.5
C H I NA 6 9 . 9
20
10
73.9
S A U DI A R A B I A 7 0 . 1
30
20
75.6
M A L AY S I A 7 0 . 9
40
30
80.8
U NI TED A R A B EM I R ATES 7 6 . 4
50
40
80.6
U NI TED K I NG DOM 7 6 . 0
60
50
85.4
J A PA N 7 8 . 4
70
60
80.0
U NI TED S TATES 7 4 . 6
80
70
64
61
90
80
77
68
90 FEMALE L OW D EVELOPMEN T
EUROP E
64
61
2 0 0 3 I N Y EA R S :
S OUT HEAS T AS I A
77
71
B Y R EG ION
T HE AM ERI CAS
1.
384
2a.values_DEF.indd 384
HI GH DEV EL OPM E NT
O C E A N I A 10 3 %
10 4 %
E U R O PE 10 6 %
10 4 %
78%
83%
AS I A
29%
42%
ET H IO P I A
S OU T H AM E RI CA 11 1 %
10 8 %
38%
48%
MO ZA MB IQ U E
95%
94%
53%
58%
78%
78%
SO U TH A F RI CA
R WA N D A
68%
70%
CH I NA
50%
53%
57%
58%
S AU D I A RA B IA
M E DI UM DE V EL OPM ENT
K E NYA
73%
68%
U N IT ED A RA B E MI RAT ES
M A L AYS IA
0
79%
69%
20
0
13 3 %
UN IT E D KI NG DO M 11 3 %
40
20
83%
85%
60
40
J A PA N
80
60
97%
89%
100
80
U N IT ED S TAT ES
120
100
N ORT H AM E RI CA
140
61%
71%
120
A F RI CA
1/17/2007 8:17:27 PM
69%
83%
99%
99%
99%
10 0 %
54%
70%
51%
73%
99%
10 0 %
88%
95%
45%
71%
88%
90%
99%
99%
96%
99%
84%
91%
81%
89%
D E VE L O PI N G C OU N T RI E S
D E V E LO PE D C O U N T R I ES
C O U N T R I E S I N T R AN SI TI O N
SU B- S A H RA N A F R IC A
A RA B S TATE S
C E NT RA L A S I A
E A S T AS I A + PAC IF IC
S O UT H + W E S T A SI A
L AT IN A ME RI CA + CA RI BB EA N
N. A ME RIC A + W. E U RO P E
CE NT R AL + EA S T ER N EU R OP E
WORLD
D E VE L O PI N G C OU N T RI E S
2a.values_DEF.indd 385
5000
0
0
10000
5 0 00
M I DDLE EAS T
15000
1 0 0 00
98%
99%
20000
1 5 0 00
9,928
15,069
25000
2 0 0 00
OC EANI A
30000
2 5 0 00
35000
3 0 0 00
4,897
9,420
40000
3 5 0 00
AS I A
45000
4 0 0 00
4,277
9,692
50000
4 5 0 00
LAT I N AM ERI CA
5 0 0 00
CE NT R AL + EA S T ER N EU R OP E
1,892
4,046
NORT H AM ERI CA 2 6 , 4 7 0
42,014
AFRI CA
487
931
1,250
2,247
H A I TI
ETH I OPI A
6,505
14,326
S OU TH A F R I C A
N. A ME RIC A + W. E U RO P E 10 0 %
10 0 %
0
96%
95%
20
L AT IN A ME RI CA + CA RI BB EA N
40
20
63%
82%
60
40
S O UT H + W E S T A SI A
80
60
97%
98%
80
E A S T AS I A + PAC IF IC
100
98%
98%
100
C E NT RA L A S I A
FEMALE MALE
72%
84%
3,961
5,976
C H I NA
A RA B S TATE S
2000 2 0 0 4 , % AG E S 1 5 AN D ABOVE:
M OZA M B I QU E
4,440
20,717
S A U DI A R A B I A
F EMALE L OW D EVELOPMEN T
72%
81%
M E DI UM DE V EL OPM ENT
985
1,583
6,075
12,869
M A L AY S I A
SU B- S A H RA N A F R IC A
HI GH DEV EL OPM E NT
R WA NDA
8,448
24,204
K U WA I T
U NI TED K I NG DOM 2 0 , 7 9 0
33,713
99%
99%
C O U N T R I E S I N T R AN SI TI O N
4.
J A PA N 1 7 , 7 9 5
38,612
U NI TED S TATES 2 9 , 0 7 1
46,456
3.
D E V E LO PE D C O U N T R I ES 10 0 %
10 0 %
77%
87%
WORLD
B Y R EG ION
2 0 0 3 PPP U S $ :
2 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 , % AGES 1 5 2 4:
385
1/17/2007 8:17:28 PM
- women should be permitted to work outside the home - seperation of the sexes in the workplace
- women have the right to decide if they wear a veil - women + professions by regions
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
M I DDL E EA S T + C ONF L I C T A R EA
ASIA
AFRICA
AVE RAGE
35%
4 8 . 7%
4 9 . 8%
UGANDA 3 6 %
TANZANI A 4 7 %
S ENEGAL 6 4 %
NI GERI A 3 5 %
M ALI 5 4 %
I V ORY C OAS T 7 0 %
GHANA 3 5 %
I NDONES I A 2 2 %
BANGLADES H 4 8 %
UZBEK I S TAN 7 0 %
T URK EY 6 6 %
PAK I S TAN 3 3 %
LEBANON 6 6 %
JORDAN 1 4 %
M I DDL E EA S T + C ONF L I C T A R EA
ASIA
AFRICA
AVE RAGE
1 7%
2 4 . 7%
2 9%
U G AN DA 2 4 %
TA N Z AN IA 1 8 %
S E N E G AL 1 4 %
N I G E RI A 3 6 %
M A LI 3 8 %
7%
G HA N A
I VO RY C OAS T 3 6 %
5%
I N D ON E SI A
B AN GL A D E SH 2 9 %
U Z BE K IS TA N 4 5 %
TURKEY 25%
PA KI S TA N 3 5 %
L E BA N O N 2 4 %
J O RDA N 1 6 %
386
2a.values_DEF.indd 386
1/17/2007 8:17:28 PM
2a.values_DEF.indd 387
FEM ALE
LEG I S LATORS
SEN I OR OFFI C I ALS
+ M ANAGERS
S EATS I N
PARLI AM ENT
HELD
BY WOM EN
% OF TOTA L B Y R EG I ONS , 1 9 9 2 2 0 0 3
% OF T OTAL B Y R EG I ONS
M ID D LE E AS T 1 6. 4 %
O CE AN I A 4 1. 1 %
E U RO PE + C E N T R A L A S IA 2 9. 2 %
A SI A 1 9. 9 %
L AT IN A ME R I CA 3 1. 1 %
N O RT H AM E R I CA 4 0. 5 %
A FR I CA 2 8. 6 %
M ID D LE E AS T 1 5. 6 %
O CE AN I A 4 1. 0 %
FE MALE
PROFE SSI ONA L
+ T E C HNICA L
W ORKER S
E U RO PE + C E N T R A L A S IA 2 9. 7 %
8.
A SI A 1 9. 9 %
38.7 %
L AT IN A ME R I CA 3 0. 9 %
AF RI CA
37.5 %
N O RT H AM E R I CA 4 0. 5 %
ASI A
AV ER A G E
AF RI CA 2 8. 6 %
MI D D L E E AS T 2 5. 5 %
54.2 %
OC E A N I A 3 8. 7 %
E U R O PE + C E N T RA L A S IA 5 2. 8 %
AS I A 4 2. 3 %
L AT IN AM E R I CA 5 0. 6 %
N O RT H AM E R I CA 5 4. 4 %
AF RI CA 4 6. 4 %
UGANDA 3 4 %
TANZANI A 3 6 %
S ENEGAL 4 7 %
NI GERI A 3 0 %
M ALI 5 2 %
I V ORY C OAS T 5 8 %
GHANA 1 4 %
I NDONES I A 3 0 %
BANGLADES H 4 5 %
UZBEK I S TAN 7 1 %
T URK EY 8 0 %
PAK I S TAN 3 3 %
LEBANON 6 8 %
JORDAN 1 9 %
6.
W OMEN SH OULD
HAVE T HE RIG HT TO DECI DE
IF THE Y WEA R A VEI L
% OF PE OPLE AG R E E IN G, 2002 :
AVERAG E % B Y RE GIO N
% B Y SE LE C T E D C O U NTRIES
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
50
40
30
20
10
387
1/17/2007 8:17:28 PM
3 3 .0 3%
R E LIGIO U S IN S T IT U T IONS
- world religion adherents - catholic hierarchy - dioceses / bishops / cathedrals
2 0 .1 2%
227
200
PALE S T IN E
IS RAE L
68
S PAIN
32
26
72
50
0 . 2 3%
0 . 3 9%
2 . 3 6%
100
C AN ADA
5 . 8 9%
98
150
W O R LD
LD
R EL IG
GIIO
IO
ON
N
A D H E RE
R E N TTS
S:
S:
1.
194
1 2 .0 3 %
250
1 2 .6 1%
1 3 .3 4%
DI OC ES E S/ B I S HOP S/
CATHEDRAL S
HI GHES T % JEW I S H 2 0 0 0
HIGHEST % HIN D U 2000
IRE LAN D
FRAN C E
US A
ITALY
J UDAIS M
S IKHS
AT HE IS T
BUDDHIS T S
N ON -RE LIGIOUS
OT HE R
HIN DUS
MUS LIMS
C HRIS T IAN S
B Y C OU NTRY:
BY COUNTRY:
I S R A EL
0 7 7 . 1%
B Y COUN
N TRY:
NEPAL
0 7 6 . 7%
PA L ES TI NE
0 1 2 . 3%
H O LY SEE
E
100.0 %
I NDI A
0 7 4 . 5%
U NI TED S TATES
0 02 . 0%
MALTA
098.3 %
M AURI TI US
0 4 3 . 9%
G I B R A LTA R
0 01 . 9%
FA EROE ISLAN D S
098.1 %
0 3 8 . 2%
C AY M A N I S L A NDS
0 01 . 7%
C O OK ISLAND
S
S
097.7 %
F I JI
0 3 3 . 3%
M ONA C O
0 01 . 7%
WA LLIS + FUTUNA
097.7 %
GUYANA
0 3 2 . 5%
A R G ENTI NA
0 01 . 3%
PA R AG UAY
A
097.7 %
T RI NI DAD + T OBAGO
0 2 2 . 7%
C A NA DA
0 01 . 2%
G U ATEMALA
097.7 %
BHUTAN
0 2 0 . 5%
U R U G AY
0 01 . 2%
E C UAD O R
097.5 %
SURI NAM E
0 1 7 . 8%
M OL DAV I A
0 01 . 1%
E L SALVAD
A OR
097.5 %
BANGL ADE SH
0 1 2 . 3%
PO LAN D
097.4 %
HI GHES T % BUDDHI S T 2 0 0 0
HIG H E ST % M U SL IMS 2000
B Y C OU NTRY:
BY COUN TRY:
TH A I L A ND
0 8 5 . 3%
SOMALILAN D
099.5 %
C A M B ODI A
0 8 4 . 7%
SAH ARA
099.4 %
B H U TA N
0 7 3 . 9%
MAURITANIA
099.1 %
M YA NM A R
0 7 2 . 6%
MALDIVES
099.0 %
S R I L A NK A
0 6 8 . 4%
TUN ISIA
098.9 %
J A PA N
0 5 5 . 1%
YEMEN
098.9 %
V I ETNA M
0 4 9 . 5%
SOMALIA
098.3 %
L A OS
0 4 8 . 7%
MO RO CCO
098.2 %
M ONG OL I A
0 2 2 . 4%
AFG H AN ISTAN
098.1 %
TA I WA N
0 2 0 . 9%
COMORO S
098.0 %
388
2a.values_DEF.indd 388
1/17/2007 8:17:29 PM
2.
CATHO LI C HI ERAR C H Y
POPE 1 H E A D
TH E L EA DER OF TH E R OM A N C ATH OL I C
C H U R C H , EL EC TED B Y TH E C A R DI NA L S
CARDI NALS
F OR L I F E.
192
TH E C A R DI NA L S A R E TH E EL EC TED
G OV ER NM ENT OF TH E R OM A N C ATH OL I C
4.
PARI S HE S/P R I E S T S
C H U R C H . TH EY EL EC T TH E POPE F R OM
A M ONG TH EI R NU M B ER .
533
2 5 ,8 2 3
R U L E OV ER A L A R G E A R EA C A L L ED
A N A R C H DI OC ES E R ES PONS I B L E F OR
2000 0
BI S HOP S
M A K I NG S U R E TH AT TH E B I S H OPS F OL L OW
22,679
19,309
2500 0
19,835
3000 0
TH E C H U R C H R U L ES .
2 , 4 9 6 DI OC ES ES , C ATH EDR A L S
TH E DI OC ES E I S TH E M A I N A DM I NI S TR ATI V E
U NI T OF TH E C H U R C H . TH E B I S H OP S U PER -
1000 0
R EG U L A R I NTER VA L S A ND I S R ES PONS I B L E
2 1 9 , 5 8 3 PA R I S H ES
74
36
IS RAE L
F OR TEA C H I NG TH E C H R I S TI A N FA I TH I N
PALE S T IN E
IRE LAN D
S PAIN
C AN ADA
FRAN C E
US A
0
ITALY
P RI ES T S
V I S I TS A L L R EL I G I OU S I NS TI TU TI ONS AT
1,367
500 0
3,168
4,958
V I S ES A L L TH E A C TI V I TI ES OF H I S C H U R C H ,
H I S DI OC ES E. B I S H OPS A L S O H AV E
A R ES PONS I B I L I TY TO A R R A NG E W OR K S OF
C H A R I TY I N TH EI R A R EA S A ND TO S PEA K U P
F OR TH E POOR . EA C H DI OC ES E I S DI V I DED
I NTO A NU M B ER OF PA R I S H ES .
CATHOLIC S
1 BI LLIO N M EM B ERS
P ER C E NT RO M AN CAT H O LIC
LE SS T HA N 1 0%
1 0% TO 2 9%
3 0% TO 5 9%
6 0% TO 9 0 %
M O R E TH AN 9 0%
389
2a.values_DEF.indd 389
1/17/2007 8:17:31 PM
6.
A D HE RE NT S BY % O F PO PUL ATION
190 0
195 0
1990
200 0
2 0 25
1900
1950
1990
2000
2025
C HRIS T IAN S
3 7 . 0 9%
3 5 . 4%
3 4 . 9%
3 5 . 0%
3 6 .9 %
MUS LIMS
1 3 . 3 0%
1 5 . 8%
1 8 . 6%
1 9 . 4%
2 1 .0 %
0 . 1 9%
1 3 . 9%
1 7 . 0%
1 6 . 8%
1 5 .6 %
1 3 . 4 9%
1 3 . 6%
1 4 . 0%
1 4 . 1%
1 3 .6 %
BUDDHIS T S
8 . 4 5%
7 . 1%
6 . 1%
6 . 1%
5 .9 %
AT HE IS T S
0 . 0 2%
4 . 2%
4 . 6%
3 . 9%
2 .9 %
2 5 . 2 8%
8 . 7%
3 . 6%
3 . 5%
2 .9 %
J E WS
0 . 8 2%
0 . 5%
0 . 3%
0 . 3%
0 .3 %
S HAMAN IS T S
0 . 7 5%
0 . 4%
0 . 2%
0 . 2%
0 .2 %
C ON FUC IAN S
0 . 0 4%
0 . 1%
0 . 1%
0 . 1%
0 .1 %
BAHA IS
0 . 0 0%
0 . 0%
0 . 1%
0 . 1%
0 .1 %
J AIN S
0 . 0 9%
0 . 1%
0 . 1%
0 . 1%
0 .1 %
S HIN TOIS
0 . 4 5%
0 . 1%
0 . 1%
0 . 1%
0 .1 %
OT HE R
0 . 0 3%
0 . 1%
0 . 4%
0 . 4%
0 .3 %
N ON -RE LIGIOUS
HIN DUS
7.
I NC L . NON-PR A C TI S I NG C H U R C H M E MB E R S
C H RISTIANS W ORLDW ID E
A CT IVE C H R IST IANS 3 2%
CHRISTIAN W ORLD 8 3%
390
2a.values_DEF.indd 390
1/17/2007 8:17:32 PM
8.
C HRI S TI AN MI NI S TRY W O RK ER S
Y EAR
5 0000 0 0
40000 0 0
300000 0
200000 0
100000 0
22 0 0
2000
1800
16 0 0
1400
1200
10 0 0
800
600
40 0
DOM ES T I C
FO R E I G N
M I S S I ONARI ES
M I S S I ON A R I E S
33
200
200
200
63,000
12,600
1 ,4 0 0
400
89,000
17,900
1 ,8 0 0
600
188,000
37,900
3 ,7 0 0
800
115,000
23,200
2 ,4 0 0
1000
88,000
17,900
1 ,8 0 0
1200
280,000
55,800
3 ,8 0 0
1400
410,000
82,100
2 ,4 0 0
1600
868,000
173,700
1 4 ,4 0 0
1700
1,416,000
283,200
1 8 ,9 0 0
1800
1,748,000
349,500
2 9 ,2 0 0
1900
1,736,000
434,000
6 2 ,0 0 0
1995
3,499,400
1,019,000
3 9 2 ,6 0 0
2000
3,969,000
1,135,000
4 2 0 .0 0 0
2025
5,000,000
1,500,000
5 5 0 ,0 0 0
N EEDY 29 %
DESTITUT E 1 3 %
AFFLUENT 1 1%
W ELL OFF 3 7 %
1900s
1800s
1600s
1500s
1400s
1300s
400s
300s
C ENT URI ES
10.
1200s
9.
200
Y EAR
PAS T ORAL
1 1.
C HRI S TI AN RES OU RC E S 20 0 0
41 ,,3 2 3.00
1. 57 7,0 0 0
11,4 8 4,00 0
76 3,0 0 0
3,4 1 8,0 0 0
4,9 0 6,0 0 0
7,2 2 8,0 0 0
5 13,0 0 0
2, 76 1,0 0 0
4 09,0 0 0
53,700,000
3,450,000
105,000
33,800
26,100
8,000
6,500
HOM E M IS SI ON BOARDS
5,800
4,800
FOREIG N M IS SI ON BOARDS
4,000
4,000
1,050
300
391
2a.values_DEF.indd 391
1/17/2007 8:17:32 PM
P ER CE NT E VA NGE LICA L
LE SS TH EN 0 . 5%
FAST
0 . 5% TO 5 %
MOD ERATE
5 % TO 1 0 %
SLOW
1 0% TO 2 0%
N EGATIVE
M OR E TH AN 2 0%
N ON E
392
2a.values_DEF.indd 392
1/17/2007 8:17:33 PM
15.
P ER CE NT E VA NGE LICA L
0 TO 0 . 5
0 . 5 TO 3
3 TO 1 0
1 0 TO 2 0
2 0 TO 4 6 . 3
393
2a.values_DEF.indd 393
1/17/2007 8:17:38 PM
has largely concentrated on transnational economic and financial activity, and the policy
implications they have for national labor markets, corporate strategies, welfare states
FAVOR
and tax regimes (Guillen, 2001). In recent years, several competing theories have been
presented that focus on the interplay between different facets of globalization, in particular cultural and political reactions to economic globalization.
R EG IO N:
FAVOR
FAVOR
FAVOR
AMERICAN
AMERICAN
AMERICAN
AMERICAN
CULTURAL COMBINED
IDEAS
DEMOCRACY
BUSINESS
PRODUCTS
SCORE
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
43%
67%
62%
64%
59%
14%
37%
43%
43%
33%
religion, and managements emerged that penetrates virtually all human endeavors
SOUTH ASIA
13%
25%
28%
16%
21%
(Meyer et al 1997). This global social organization of rationalized modernity has its logic
CENTRAL ASIA
33%
65%
76%
51%
56%
and purposes built into almost all nation states, resulting in a world that shows in-
38%
62%
51%
59%
52%
creasing structural similarities of form among countries. At the same time, countries
31%
50%
49%
58%
47%
differ in the fit between these institutions, their needs and capacities, and therefore
WESTERN EUROPE
30%
44%
33%
68%
44%
produce different social and economic outcomes (Meyer et al 1997). Hence we could
LATIN AMERICA +
expect public attitudes on globalization to be more positive in countries that have man-
THE CARIBBEAN
32%
45%
48%
61%
46%
aged to achieve a balance between formal institutions and outcomes for the economic
NORTH AMERICA
58%
60%
49%
63%
57%
HIGH-INCOME
40%
52%
41%
65%
49%
ments have pursued policies aimed at buffering their citizens from the vagaries of
UPPER-MIDDLE-INCOME
30%
51%
50%
62%
48%
global markets. In the presence of free capital mobility, they accept higher interest
LOWER-MIDDLE-INCOME
30%
44%
47%
54%
44%
rates to keep capital at home, and shield vulnerable industries as well as population
LOW-INCOME
34%
58%
55%
51%
50%
G R A N D TOTA L:
33%
52%
49%
57%
48%
groups. In a study of over one hundred countries during the 1985-1995 period, Garrett
(1999) finds no convergence in government expenditure patterns as a result of globalization, and no systematic shift away from financing the globalization buffer. Hence
we should find more positive public attitudes to globalization in countries that managed
S o u r c e : P e w C h a r i t a b l e Tr u s t - 2 0 0 2 G l o b a l A t t i t u d e s S u r v e y :
According to the Competitive Rankings from the World Economic Forum, the group of
A m e ri ca n i d e a s a n d cu s to m s a re s p re a d i n g h e re , OR i ts b a d th a t A m e ri ca n i d e as an d
countries with positive attitudinal profiles has both highly competitive countries (US,
cu s to m s a re s p re a d i n g h e re .
UK, and Canada) as well as low competitive countries (Mexico, India). What is more, the
same applies to the group of countries with more negative or cautious attitudinal pat-
Q. 6 8 A n d w h i c h o f t h e s e c o m e s c l o s e r t o y o u r v i e w ? I l i k e A m e r i c a n i d e a s a b o u t
terns, with highly competitive countries such as France and Japan, and low competitive
d e m o c r a c y, O R I d i s l i k e A m e r i c a n i d e a s a b o u t d e m o c r a c y.
countries like Argentina or Turkey. What do results suggest about Garrett (1999) who
implies that one should find more positive public attitudes to globalization in countries
Q. 6 9 W h i c h c o m e s c l o s e r t o d e s c r i b i n g y o u r v i e w ? I l i k e A m e r i c a n w a y s o f d o i n g
that managed to shield citizens from potentially negative impacts of volatile world
markets? The results are inconclusive, as social welfare, education and health expenditures do not differ systematically between the two groups above.
Q. 7 0 W h i ch i s cl o s e r to d e s cri b i n g yo u r vi e w- I l i ke A m e ri ca n m u s i c, m o vi e s a n d
te l e vi s i o n , OR I d i s l i ke A m e ri ca n m u s i c, m o vi e s a n d te l e vi s i o n .
394
2a.values_DEF.indd 394
1/17/2007 8:17:42 PM
VALUES
One of the most consistent findings of social research into values and
does traditional Protestant countries (with the US a major exception). The upper left-
attitudes is the stability of peoples value patterns or worldviews over time as op-
hand corner of Map 1 shows the most secularized of todays world: Central and Eastern
posed to the greater volatility of their attitudes. For example, basic values grounded in
Europe, and the Confucian countries of Asia. They are undergoing neither secularization
religion, and convictions about god, liberty or justice, or notions about family, tolerance,
trends (as they are basically highly secular societies already), nor a revival of religios-
or human rights are more stable than political attitudes or opinions about public insti-
ity. Together, this suggests that in the future an increasing secularized Western Europe,
tutions or economic performance. At the same time, values and attitudes are clearly
a more affluent Central and Eastern Europe and North Asia (China, Japan, and South
related: within the boundaries described by value patterns, peoples attitudes and public
opinions are more changeable and can, at times, be quite fickle, even inconsistent.
WH AT A R E FUTUR E TR EN DS ?
Shifts in basic value patterns are relatively rare, and if they happen, they are full of
Value researchers expect that the following trends are likely to take place over the next
consequences and implications-from social and economic behavior and politics to the
institutions of society at large. Typically, values change more between than within
generations, and research attributes major inter-generational changes to differences in
A drifting apart between regions of the world that are experiencing a revitalization
value formation during primary and secondary socialization (parents economic well-
being; changes in educational system etc, role of socializing agents such as religious
institutions), and the impact of major events (wars, recessions, political upheavals)
that, as collective experiences, shape individual value dispositions.
that is not taking place in most other countries, with the exception of globalized
Over the last quarter century, and continuing into the first part of the 21st, major
changes have occurred around three value-related fields: religion, role of government
vs. individual responsibilities, and cosmopolitan values.
Distinct value patterns and political positions are emerging around globalization;
took place between 1970 and the late 1980s. Researchers have used several different
to some extent these positions are fed by domestic concerns and value patterns,
labels (e.g., materialism vs. postmaterialism) to describe this value shift and the precise
extent and sustainability of the changes involved continue to be debated among experts in the field. While there are many sociological correlates to this value shift and
its causation, it is associated with / involves (Inglehart et al, 1998; Inglehart, 2000; van
Deth and Scraborough, 1995):
Decline in reliance on family, change in the role of women,
participatory organizations
Importantly, however, this shift did not involve many other parts
of the world. In particular, developing countries are left out, and
the position of Central and Eastern Europe remains somewhat un-
settled. In drawing world value maps to show major value clusters and fault lines, researchers like Inglehart (2000:14-15) use
two major dimensions, derived from careful analysis of the World
Value Survey:
Traditional authority vs. secular-rational authority (e.g., obedience
2a.values_DEF.indd 395
395
1/17/2007 8:17:42 PM
thermore, the rate of Americans identifying as non-religious between 1990 and 2000
ties, and is central to the shaping of ideas and the production of cultural landscapes.
grew 110%. Likewise, growth rates of other religions grew 170% for Buddhism, 237%
Throughout history, humans have actively defined and maintained sacred practices
and spaces. Different religions are products of their socially constituted contexts and
generate different cultural patterns, including symbols, language, stories, organizations,
In Latin America, while Roman Catholicism remains the dominant religion, the conti-
practices, and resources. The indicator suite is largely based on the World Values Survey
an increasing pluralization of faith. With the traditional Roman Catholic Church fading
as a monolithic religious power, Catholicism in Latin America has restructured itself
Belief in a god is spread equally across all high, middle and low income countries
Men of all ages are more likely to say they are religious versus women of any age group
type of Catholicism, bringing more Protestant elements into its religious sphere (Smith
Expression of religious freedom remains a privilege in most western countries and the
United States, whereas South Asia experiences the lowest rate of 2.7%
Level of education and income greatly determine views on the role of religion in politics
Africa is currently experiencing a revival across faith lines. Christianity is growing faster in sub-Saharan Africa than anywhere else in the world, increasing at a rate of 3.5% a
WH AT IS RE LIGION
year. The growth of Christianity is attributed to two major waves: the rise of indigenous
Defining religion has generated much controversy among theologians and social scien-
churches during the colonial years of the 1950s and 60s, and a more recent prolifera-
tists, and consensus has yet to be reached. Despite the inherent difficulties in defining
religion, there are certain elements of different religions that lend themselves to a
cohesive generalized description. Religion loosely refers to any system of belief and/or
donors from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, amounting in the billions of dollars. Traditional
worship, involving a philosophy of life, beliefs about deities and a code of ethics.
WH AT D O W E K N OW ABOUT R E L I G I O N ?
WH AT A R E TH E IS S UES ?
There are 19 major world religions, which are subdivided into 270 religious groups
As the various chapters in this volume dealing with religion have shown, the issues
surrounding this phenomenon, be they theological, political, economic or social, are too
numerous to be listed here and too complex for treating even a selection adequately.
SACRED TEXT
GROWTH 1
Three key issues are: the continued secularization of the developed world, and the
PLACE OF WORSHIP
% WORLD
The Bible
Church
33.03%
Dropping
Russia, Asia and Africa; the growth of Islam in its role in democratic society; and the
ISLAM (622 A D)
Mosque
20.12%
Growing
events of September 11, 2001 and their aftermath, which have brought the issue of
H IN D U IS M (1500 BC)
Bhagavad-Gita,
Temple
13.34%
Stable
TRIBA L , S H A M A NIS M ,
MO RM ON (1830)
Various
Temple
N O N - REL I G I OUS
BUD DH IS M (523 BC)
12.61%
12.03%
Dropping
05.89%
Stable
02.36%
ATH EIS M
SIKH IS M (1500 A D)
Gurdwaras
00.39%
Synagogue
00.23%
and fuelled popular discourse about a clash of civilizations. However, the conflict is
less between Islam and Christianity as it is between Islam and Western secularism, as
O TH E R:
Source: religioustolerance.org
Approximately three quarters of humanity belong to the four largest organized world religions: Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. Islam is the only growing religion
in the world, relative to overall population growth. Barrett (2001) suggests that Islam
will maintain a stable growth rate from 2004 to 2025, whereas all other major world
religions will continue to decline.
Religious adherence varies widely across cultural and geographical lines. According to
the Pew Research Center, 59% of Americans say that religion is very important in their
lives, as opposed to 11% of French, 21% of Germans, and 33% of Britons. Europe, particularly Western Europe, is experiencing continued secularization, with the exception
of a growing Islamic population. Chadwick (1990) attributes the eroding influence of
the Church to the rise of technology, increasing materialism, urbanization, the media,
and the philosophies of evolutionary science and Marxism (see chapter by Inglehart
and Norris).
Despite the increasing presence of the US as a Christian force in the world, fewer
Americans identify themselves as Christians now than in previous generations. In 1947,
396
2a.values_DEF.indd 396
1/17/2007 8:17:46 PM
K N OWLED GE
CREATION
DI SSEM I NATI ON
STO RA GE
I NNOVATI ON + P ROTEC TI ON
397
2b.knowledge_DEF.indd 397
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C R E ATI ON
- top countries by # of think tanks + staff size - world think tank matrix
- top think tanks by revenue - top think tanks by staff size + % of staff researchers - average enrollment ratio
% of total population in higher education by region 2001 - average tertiary enrollment by region + gender, 2001
- # of female students enrolled in tertiary education by top 10 countries - distribution of fields of study by region
TOP C OU NTRI ES B Y
# OF THI NK TANK S + S TAFF S I Z E
1.
TOTA L # TH I NK TA NK S
3.
TOTA L # S TA F F
UN ITED S TAT ES 7 6
UNI T ED S TAT ES
9032
JAPAN 2 4
JAPAN
5709
UN ITED KI NGDOM 2 0
GERM ANY
1875
GERM ANY 1 3
R US S I A
1342
CANADA
K OREA
838
K OREA
T HAI LAND
837
AUS T RALI A
K UWAI T
764
BU LGARI A
TAI WAN
712
C HI NA
UNI T ED K I NGDOM
622
N ETHER LANDS
C HI NA
571
A US T RI A
CANADA
543
FRANC E
AUS T RI A
321
HUNGARY
I NDI A
318
R US S I A
DENM ARK
275
TAI WAN
I NDONES I A
245
HONG K ONG
M ALAYS I A
237
I TALY
NOR WAY
225
MA LAYS I A
P OLAND
205
P ER U
S I NGAP ORE
193
P OLAND
FRANC E
172
SL OVAK I A
HUNGARY
170
S W EDEN
BULGARI A
161
U N IT E D STAT E S
BROOKIN GS IN STITUTI ON
49.80
ASPEN IN STITU T E
58.00
RAN D CORPORATION 2 5 1 . 0 0
U N IT E D K INGDOM
G E RM ANY
21.20
C ONV ER S I ONS :
13.90
2004 1GBP
= 1.93
USD
B R OOK I NG S , A S PEN
16.80
2 0 0 0 1 DEM
= 0.48
USD
2 0 0 4 R EV ENU ES R EPORTED
7.70
2 0 0 3 1 EU R O = 1 . 2 6
USD
R A ND, I NS TI TU TE F OR DEV EL . S T U D IE S ,
18.10
2 0 0 4 1 EU R O = 1 . 3 6
USD
I NT L I NS TI T. F OR S TR ATEG I E S TU D IE S , O D I,
27.60
2 0 0 4 1 J PY
= 0.0097 USD
J ETR O, M I ZU H O
51.00
2 0 0 5 1 J PY
= 0.0085 USD
2 0 0 0 R EV ENU ES R EPORTED: DI W
J APA N
2 0 0 5 R EV ENU ES R EPORTED:
15.80
2 0 0 3 R EV ENU ES R EPORTED: K I EL IN S T IT U T E
398
2b.knowledge_DEF.indd 398
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- top 500 universities in the world by region - top 100 universities in the world by region - countries with the
most top 100 universities - # of nobel prize winners by top 5 universities in the world since 1904 - # of international students by top 5 universities, 2004-5 - total expenses + revenue in million $USD by top 5 universities,
2004-5 - top 20 countries with the most funding for technology + science - gross domestic expenditure on
2.
N AME :
L OCATI ON:
Y EA R :
A G E:
TOTA L R EV ENU E:
# S TA F F : # R ES EA R C H ER S: ES TI M ATED # PU B L I C AT IO N S *:
USA
1916
9 0 y rs
0 4 9. 8 . 5 m i l l i o n U S $ 2 0 0 5
277
117
5 ,0 1 4
A SPE N INST IT U T E
USA
1950
56
0 5 8. 2 . 5 m i l l i o n U S $ 2 0 0 5
142
31
240
CAT O INST IT U T E
USA
1977
29
0 1 4. 0 . 5 m i l l i o n U S $ 2 0 0 5
130
35
451
USA
1921
85
0 3 2. 0 . 5 m i l l i o n U S $ 2 0 0 5
215
70
321
USA
1973
33
0 3 7. 4 . 5 m i l l i o n U S $ 2 0 0 4
195
61
226
R A ND C OR PO R AT IO N
USA
1948
58
2 5 1. 0 . 5 m i l l i o n U S $ 2 0 0 5
1,600
730
4 ,5 0 9
UK
1968
3 8 y rs
0 0 5 .2 . 5 m i l l i o n G B 2 0 0 4
60
43
318
UK
1966
40
0 1 1. 0 . 5 m i l l i o n G B 2 0 0 4
200
80
939
UK
1958
48
0 0 7 .2 . 5 m i l l i o n G B 2 0 0 4
40
23
152
UK
1960
46
0 0 8 .7 . 5 m i l l i o n G B 2 0 0 4
118
71
439
1925
8 1 y rs
0 1 6. 0 . 5 m i l l i o n U S $ 2 0 0 0
184
GE RM ANY
1949
57
0 1 3. 3 . 5 m i l l i o n Euro 2 0 0 4
165
64
GE RM ANY
1914
92
0 2 2. 0 . 5 m i l l i o n Euro 2 0 0 3
270
65
JAPAN
1960
4 6 y rs
0 5 , 2 6 5. 5 m i l l i o n
2004
232
147
U J F INST IT U T E LT D.
JAPAN
1985
21
0 2 , 0 6 0. 5 m i l l i o n
2005
700
M IT SU B ISH I RE SE A R C H I N STITUTE, IN C.
JAPAN
1970
36
2 5 , 0 0 0. 5 m i l l i o n
2004
767
614
JAPAN
2004
02
0 1 , 6 2 7. 5 m i l l i o n
2004
4,500
347
4.
24
129
70
A SPE N INST IT U T E 1 9 5 0
EQU A L S 2 1 . 8%
R A ND C OR PO R AT IO N 1 9 48
EQU A L S 4 5 . 6%
EQU A L S 4 0 . 0%
EQU A L S 5 7 . 5%
EQU A L S 6 0 . 2%
EQU A L S 3 8 . 8%
EQU A L S 2 4 . 1%
EQU A L S 6 3 . 4%
EQU A L S 8 0 . 1%
EQU A L S 0 7 . 7%
2b.knowledge_DEF.indd 399
399
1/17/2007 2:41:45 PM
AVERA G E
E N R O LLMEN T
RAT IO
5.
9000
3000
2000
2000
1000
1000
NORT H AM ERI CA
AS I A
LAT I N AM ERI CA
S OUT H + W ES T AS I A
EAS T AS I A + PAC I FI C
C ENT RAL AS I A
ARAB S TAT ES
ARAB S TAT ES
1 0 . 9%
3 . 6%
2 7 .7%
2 7.3%
10
4 1 .5 %
2 8 .7 %
2 1 . 6%
20
AV ERA GE
T ERTI ARY
ENR O LLM EN T
RATI O
UK RAI NE 1 , 1 3 9
3000
ARGENT I NA 1 , 1 3 6
4000
P HI LI P P I NES 1 , 3 7 1
4000
40
UNI T ED K I NGDOM 1 , 2 3 8
5000
BRAZI L 1 , 7 5 3
5000
50
I NDONES I A 1 , 4 5 8
6000
I NDI A 4 , 1 3 5
6000
JAPAN 1 , 7 9 0
7000
UNI T ED S TAT ES 8 , 9 6 7
99
86
313
369
940
723
238
282
3,747
4,823
28
21
R US S I AN FEDERAT I ON 4 , 5 5 3
8000
60
30
10.000
# OF FEM ALE
S TU DENT S
ENR O LLE D
6.
7.
BY R EG I ON + G ENDER , 2 0 01
9.
A M E RICA S 4 0%
10.
EUROP E 4 0%
AS I A/PAC I FI C 1 9%
A M E RICA S 5 7%
11.
B Y R EG I ON
B Y R EG I ON
EUROP E 3 5%
AS I A/PA C I F I C 8 %
1 6% HARVARD
3,619
AF R I CA S 1 %
1 4% S TANFORD
3,046
1 2% M I T
2,792
2005 6
9 % T OK YO
2,103
400
2b.knowledge_DEF.indd 400
1/17/2007 2:41:45 PM
2b.knowledge_DEF.indd 401
53
11
U NI T ED K IN G D OM
G E R MA NY
JA PA N
C A NA D A
FR A NC E
S W E DE N
S W IT Z ER L AN D
A U ST R AL I A
NE T H ER L A ND S
A U ST RI A
D E NM AR K
FI NL A N D
IS RA E L
ITA LY
NO R WAY
R U S SI A
12.5
8.5
33.6
5.7
16.0
7.1
4.7
3.5
8.5
15.0
16.3
24.7
5.8
13.9
6.0
3.6
3.0
11.7
14.5
13.2
34.7
10.4
10.7
6.3
2.6
3.0
4.6
C ENT RAL +
EAS T ERN EUROP E
C ENT RAL AS I A
EAS T AS I A +
OTH ER /U NK NOW N
S C I ENC E
13 .
UNI V. OF
NORT H AM ERI CA +
81
CALI FORNI A
49
21.6
14.5
31.1
8.2
5.4
6.8
1.0
4.4
6.9
61
S TANFORD
AFRI CA
40
S UB-S AHARAN
W ES T AS I A
S OUT H +
W ES T ERN EUROP E
1.9
15.5
39.5
13.1
8.6
9.4
0.7
2.4
9.0
12.4
6.0
33.5
8.2
16.3
8.2
0.9
2.1
12.3
T HE CARI BBEAN
LAT I N AM ERI CA +
T HE PAC I FI C
18.1
18.6
27.2
10.4
9.4
6.8
0.4
1.2
7.8
BY REG ION,
UN IT E D STATE S
12 .
ARAB S TAT ES
EDUCAT I ON
20
8.
D I S TRIBUTI O N O F F I ELD O F S TU DY
35
30
25
15
10
B Y TOP 5 U NI V ER S I TI ES I N TH E W OR L D S I NC E 1 9 04
# OF NO BEL P RI ZE W I NNER S
CAM BRI DGE
MIT
HAR VA R D
43
16
B Y C OU NTR I ES
2 1 1 1 1 1 11
401
1/17/2007 2:41:46 PM
2b.knowledge_DEF.indd 402
2 .13 %
2 .11 %
2 .07 %
S IN GA P OR E
CA N ADA
AU ST RI A
1 .60 %
1 .57 %
1 .55 %
N OR WAY
SL O VE N I A
A U S T RA L IA
1 .71 %
2 .17 %
BE L G I U M
1 .86 %
2 .23 %
F RA N C E
LU X E MB O U R G
2 .40 %
D E N M AR K
1 .89 %
2 .65 %
N E T HE R L AN D S
2 .74 %
GE R MA N Y
U N IT E D K I N GD OM
2 .92 %
K O RE A
3 .06 %
U N IT E D STAT E S
3 .08 %
JA PA N
0%
3 .40 %
1%
IC E L A N D
2%
FI N L A N D
3%
4 .27 %
4%
5 .08 %
5%
IS R AE L
6%
SW E D E N
2035.10
2029.50
2500.00
2600.00
2004.68
370.30
2757.40
2800.90
T OK YO
1945.08
642.30
UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA 1 4 5 0 0 . 0 0
3976.50
MIT
S TANFORD
HARVARD
14.
BY TOP 5 U N IVERSITIES 20 04 5
16000
I N M I L L I ON US$
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
15.
T O P 2 0 COU NTRI E S
W I TH TH E M OS T F U NDI N G
402
1/17/2007 2:41:46 PM
DISS EM IN AT ION
publications by select country - estimated # of academic/scholarly journal publishers per select country
- ten largest academic/scholarly journal publishers by # of journals published:UK - ten largest academic/
scholarly journal publishers by # of journals published:USA - largest academic/scholarly journal publishers: # of
e-published journals (as of march 06) - top 5 academic/scholarly journal publishers by # of journal publications
ESTIMATE D #
ACA DEMI C/SCHO LARLY JOU RNAL P U BLI CATI ONS
1.
7000
6000
5000
4500
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
C U B A 0 . 02 9
ISR A E L 0 . 05 3
H O NG K ONG 0 . 05 9
NE W Z E ALAND 0 .1 2 5
A R G E NT INA 0 .1 3 0
SO U T H K OR E A 0 .1 3 4
M E X IC O 0 .1 4 0
SO U T H AFRICA 0 .1 5 5
SWE DE N 0 .1 6 1
BR A Z IL 0 .3 1 4
INDIA 0 .3 6 0
SWIT Z E R LAND 0 .4 2 7
SPA IN 0 .5 4 0
FRA NC E 0 .5 7 6
R U SSIA 0 .5 9 6
AU ST RA LIA 0 .6 4 5
ITA LY 0 .7 9 0
JA PAN 1 , 0 6 9
C H INA 1 , 7 8 6
GE RM ANY 2 , 5 8 8
U NIT E D K INGDOM 4 , 4 5 7
30 0
3 65
73 0
82 3
ITALY
A U ST R A LI A
JA PAN
U N I T E D K IN GD O M
2,9 81
226
INDIA
U N I T E D STAT E S
211
F R AN C E
836
20 2
SPA IN
1,0 6 8
17 5
B RA Z I L
CH I N A
124
R U S SI A
G E R MA N Y
82
10 3
A RG E N T I N A
66
N E W Z E AL A N D
2.
SO U T H AF R ICA
U NIT E D STAT E S 7 , 9 9 0
403
2b.knowledge_DEF.indd 403
1/17/2007 2:41:46 PM
900
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
176
177
214
224
225
323
390
418
BLAC K W ELL
LI P P I NC OT T W I LLI AM S & W I LK I NS
S P RI NGER
ELS EV I ER
805
112
387
S AGE
202
BLAC K W ELL
111
197
S AGE
I EEE
194
P ERGAM ON
W B S AUNDERS
192
U NI TED S TATES
175
159
155
145
U NI TED K I NG DOM
BI OM ED C ENT RAL
1 40 0
1 20 0
1 00 0
80 0
60 0
40 0
20 0
0
SAGE 0.394
E-PU B L I S H ED J OU R NA L S :
S A GE 0 . 3 9 9
BLACKWELL 0.727
B L A C K W ELL 0 . 7 2 0
TAY L OR & F R A NC IS 1 ,1 4 2
EL SEVIER 1,286
EL S EV I E R 1 ,2 1 0
S PR I NGE R 1 ,1 6 0
404
2b.knowledge_DEF.indd 404
1/17/2007 2:41:47 PM
ORIGIN :
DIVISION OF:
S P RI NGER
ELS EV I ER
BLAC K W ELL
S AGE
UNI T ED KI NGDOM
G ER M A NY
U K /NETH ER L A NDS
U NI TED K I NG DOM
U NI TED K I NG DO M
I NF ORM A PL C (UK)
S PR I NG ER S C I ENC E
R EED EL S EV I ER
1 9 1 M I L L I ON G B P
N/A
A ND B U S I NES S M EDI A
E ST IM AT E D REVEN UE 05 :
983.79 M I L L I ON GBP
2005
7 8 3 M I L L I ON EU R OS
1 , 3 6 3 M I L L I ON G B P
2004
1,182
1,450
1,286
727
394
# IMPRIN TS:
70
# C O U NTRY OFFICES:
19
25
1,142
1,160
1,210
720
399
B 2 B & S TM
S TM
H U M A NI TI ES A ND
H U M A NI TI ES A N D
S OC I A L S C I ENC ES ,
S OC I A L S C I ENC E S ,
B2B, ST M
B 2 B , S TM
# TITLES:
M AIN MARKETS:
B I R K H A U S ER , V OG EL ,
S A U NDER S ,
PA U L C H A PM A N , C O R W IN
M OS B Y, C H U R C H I L L
PR ES S , PI NE F O R G E
F OR U M , PR I NC ETON
L I V I NG S TONE,
PR ES S , R ES PON S E
B OOK S , V I S TA A R B O O K S ,
K EY C I R R I C U L U M PR ES S
H EI NEM A NN,
S A G E S C I ENC E P R E S S ,
H A NL EY & B EL F U S
S C OL A R I
EU R OPE, G ER M A NY, U K ,
EU R OPE, U S A
UK, USA,
AUSTRAL I A, I NDI A,
I NDI A , R U S S I A , S PA I N,
A U S TR A L I A , EU R OPE,
SI NGAPORE
TA I WA N, U S A
J A PA N
U K , U S A , I NDI A ,
405
2b.knowledge_DEF.indd 405
1/17/2007 2:41:47 PM
2b.knowledge_DEF.indd 406
1 b.
4 , 3 2 5,5 5 1
4 , 0 0 0,0 0 0
4 , 0 0 0,0 0 0
E ST O N I A
SL O VA K R EPU BL I C
SPA I N
3 , 0 0 0,0 0 0
5 , 0 0 0,0 0 0
ITALY
SW ED E N
5 , 5 0 0,4 7 9
LAT V I A
3 , 3 0 0,0 0 0
5 , 8 8 7,5 9 7
JA PA N
AU ST R IA
6 , 0 0 0,0 0 0
C Z E C H R EP UB LI C
7 , 6 9 9,7 7 5
7 , 0 0 0,0 0 0
PO L AN D
BI B LI OT E K A N A R OD OWA
8 , 0 0 0,0 0 0
AU ST R AL I A
BR A Z I L
B I BL I OT E CA N A C IO N A L
11, 0 0 0,0 00
7 , 3 0 0,0 0 0
FR A N C E
BI B L IOT HE QU E N AT I ON AL E D E F RA N C E
13, 5 0 0,0 00
18, 0 000 ,0 00
2 4, 1 1 6,8 5 5
2 4, 6 1 6,8 6 7
30, 0 0 0,0 00
BE LA R U S
U K R AI N E
V ER N A D S K Y
N AT I ON A L L IB R ARY O F BE LA R AU S
GE RMA N Y
C H IN A
U N I T E D S TATES
D I E D E U T SC H E B IB L I OTH E K
N AT IO N A L LI B R A RY O F C HI N A
0
U N I T E D K I NG DO M
10000000
LI B R A RY O F C ON GR E S S
5000000
42, 0 0 0,0 00
15000000
R U S SI A
20000000
BR I T IS H LI B R A RY
R O SS I IS K AI A G O SU DAR S T VE N N AI A B I BL I OT E K A
S TORAGE
- ranking top 20 countries with largest national libraries - top 10 largest
national libraries - top universities worldwide: total library collection size - top ranked universities worldwide:
total estimated # of library e-journals & e-databases - top ranked universities worldwide: total estimated
# institutions in whole library system - encyclopaedia britannica: revenues 1999 2001 - encyclopaedia
searches per day in millions - share of all visits to search engines by US web users july 2005 - billions of textual
1a .
45000000
BY # OF V OL UM E S
40000000
35000000
30000000
25000000
406
1/17/2007 2:41:47 PM
documents indexed by search engine 1996 2003 - relevance of results by search engine december
mbe 20
200 5
- wikipedia: # of articles and registered users by language march 2006 - wikipedia: total visits per day 200
2002
2004 - wikipedia: new articles created per day 2001 2005 - comparison literature and art archiv
rchives by region
r
2005 - comparison museum archives by region - comparison architecture archives by region - compariso
om arison
religious communities archives by region - notable museums comparison: # of visitors in millionss - notab
notable
museums comparison: # of languages served - notable museums comparison matrix
3.
8000
800
35
7000
700
30
6000
600
25
5000
20
4000
0
OV ERA L L W OR L D R A NK I NG #
090
0 05
027
100
0 5 . M AS S AC HUS ET T S I NS T I T UT E OF T EC HNOLOGY
014
025
0 8 . P RI NC ET ON UNI V ERS I T Y
014
0 07
132
4 0,0 0 0
C H ICA GO
1000
4 5 ,0 0 0
C O LU MB I A
2000
3 0,0 0 0
3000
TOTAL ESTIMATE D #
IN ST ITUTIO NS I N WHO LE
L I BR ARY SYSTEM
4.
MI T
10
U N I VE RS I TY OF CALI FORNI A 7 ,1 0 0
4 ,6 0 0
CA MB R I D GE
730
OX FO R D
HA R VA R D
C H ICA GO
1 1 .0
PR I N C E T O N
7 .0
C O LU MB I A
6.2
2 .6
MI T
10
8 .6
U N I VE RS I TY OF CALI FORNI A 3 4 .3
7.7
STA N F O R D
7.4
CA MB R I D GE
2
1 5. 4
HA R VA R D
1
15
500
40
500
900
4 78
9000
232
45
258
1000
100
10000
I N MILLION S
500
400
300
200
100
407
2b.knowledge_DEF.indd 407
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J U LY 2 0 0 5
GOOGLE 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0
6.
OV ERT URE 1 67 ,0 0 0, 0 0 0
INK T OM I 0 8 0,0 0 0, 0 0 0
GOOGLE 3 9 %
L OOKS M ART 0 4 5 ,0 0 0, 0 0 0
M S N S EARC H 1 5 %
D ECEMBER 2 0 0 5
YAHOO 1 8 %
P RO PO RT IO N O F R E SU LT S
W I T H ZERO RELEVAN CE | WI T H PERFECT REL EVAN CE
DIR 5 0 . 9% / 3 9 . 1 %
GOOGLE I M AGES 3 4 %
FI NDW HAT 0 3 3,0 0 0, 0 0 0
AS K JEEV ES 3 2 %
E X A LE A D 4 0 . 6% / 1 1 . 0 %
YAHOO I M AGES 3 2 %
GO O G LE 2 8 . 6% / 1 5 . 9 %
AS K JEEV ES 0 2 0,0 0 0, 0 0 0
AOL S EARC H 3 1 %
M SN 3 5 . 0% / 1 1 . 9 %
M Y W EBS EARC H 3 1 %
VO ILA 5 3 . 1% / 3 5 . 4 %
ALTAV I S TA 0 1 8 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0
DOGP I LE 3 1 %
YAH O O 2 7 . 7% / 1 5 . 7 %
M Y S EARC H 3 1 %
FAS T 0 1 2,0 0 0, 0 0 0
ONLI NE
IN $ USD MILLIO N S
# A RTI C L ES 2 0 0 4 # K EY W OR DS I N TH OU S A NDS
5.
# OF L A N G U A G E S
WI K IP EDI A
BR ITA N NI CA ON L I NE
$ 22 5
$ 27 5
300
300
300000
250
250
250000
250
200
200000
200
150000
150
408
2b.knowledge_DEF.indd 408
300
5 LANGUAGES
0
3 4 0 ,0 0 0 KE YW O RD S
A RT IC L ES
1 ,0 4 0 ,0 0 0
50000
5 5 ,0 0 0 KE YW O RD S
50
100000
1 2 0 ,0 0 0 A RTI CL E S
50
100
3 1 FR E N C H P U B LI CAT I O N S
100
150
3 7 SPA N I SH P U B LI CATI O N S
150
350
2 0 8 LANGUAGES
4 ,9 2 0 E N G LI S H PU B L ICATI O N S
200
2 0 01 E N C YC L O PA E D I A BR I TA N N I CA
350000
2 0 00 E N C YC L O PA E D I A BR I TA N N I CA
350
1 9 99 E N C Y C LO PA E D I A B RI TA N N I CA
350
$ 27 9
100
50
# A RTI C L ES
1/17/2007 2:41:48 PM
1996 2003
3 .0
2 .5
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2 .0
GOOGLE 0 . 0
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.3
1.0
1 .5
3 .1 5
ALLT HEW EB 0 . 0
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.4
0.6
2 .1 5 2 .1 5
I NK T OM I 0 . 1
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.5
0 .5
3 .0
T EOM A 0 . 0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0 .2
0 .5
ALTAV I S TA 0 . 1
0.1
0.2
0.25 0.4
0.5
0 .7 5 1 .0
1 .5
1.0
0 .5
0
19 9 6
199 7
9.
1998
1999
2000
20 01
20 02
20 0 3
2 0 0 1 2005
J A N U ARY 0 1 0 0 0 ,1
JU NE 0 1 0 0 ,2 3
J A NU A RY 0 2 0 0 ,8 6
JU NE 0 2 0 ,1 6 4
J A NU A RY 0 3 0 .4 2 1
JU NE 0 3 0 ,6 8 6
J A NU A RY 0 4 1 , 4 0 1
JU NE 0 4 2 , 2 0 9
J A NU A RY 0 5 2 , 9 6 1
JU NE 0 5 4 , 7 7 9
D EC EM BE R 0 5 5 , 9 8 2
WIK IPEDIA :
TOTAL V I S I TS PER D AY
10.
11.
2002 2004
1 ,7 5 6
1 4 ,7 1 9
9 ,3 2 5
1 2 ,8 1 5
6 6 ,3 7 0
5 0 ,5 1 5
1 1 5 ,5 9 7
1 0 3 ,6 3 2
OC T OBER 0 2 0 4 4 , 0 0 0
4 1 ,6 9 7
5 4 ,2 9 6
5 5 ,2 0 4
AP RI L 0 3 0 9 7 , 0 0 0
6 0 ,7 8 0
5 5 ,6 6 7
1 2 2 ,7 9 3
5 1 ,0 4 9
1 4 5 ,6 5 9
1 3 ,1 6 2
1 4 6 ,0 0 1
3 2 ,7 2 9
1 5 3 ,1 4 5
4 6 ,1 3 9
1 9 4 ,2 3 1
4 0 ,1 3 8
8 6 ,9 7 2
2 5 8 ,1 1 7
2 2 2 ,4 5 7
2 0 1 ,6 7 9
600000
3 7 4 ,1 7 2
800000
1 ,1 2 5 ,2 84
10 0 0 0 0 0
1 ,0 3 8 ,4 88
12 0 0 0 0 0
0 C T OBER 0 3 2 8 2 , 0 0 0
AP RI L 0 4 5 9 3 , 0 0 0
E SP E R AN T O
FI N N I S H
N O R W E G IA N
C H IN E S E
R U S SI A N
SPA N I SH
PO RT U G U E S E
ITAL I AN
SW E D IS H
DUTCH
JA PA N E S E
PO L IS H
FR E N C H
GE RM AN
200000
E N G LI S H
400000
OC T OBER 0 4 9 1 7 , 0 0 0
409
2b.knowledge_DEF.indd 409
1/17/2007 2:41:48 PM
2b.knowledge_DEF.indd 410
9
5
7
13
N AT I ON A L MU SE U M N E W D E LH I
T OK YO N AT IO N A L MU SE U M
T H E TATE G AL L ER I E S
BR I T IS H M U SE U M
T H E ME T RO P OL I TA N M U SE U M OF A RT
TH E LO U VR E
10
TH E SM IT H SO N I A N
T H E TATE G AL L ER I E S
MU SE E D O R SAY
2. 2
T OK YO N AT IO N A L MU SE U M
T H E S TAT E H ER M ITA G E
5. 2
T H E ME T RO P OL I TA N M U SE U M OF A RT
# OF L ANGUAGES SERV ED
2. 5
T H E S TAT E H ER M ITA G E
2. 6
NOTA BL E
MUS E U M S
CO MPA RI SO N S
MU SE E D O R SAY
1 3.
182
150
17
12
4
2
PAC I FI CA
C ENT RAL + S OUT H AM ERI CA
AS I A
AFRI CA
EUROP E
AFRI CA
NORT H AM ERI CA
35
AFRI CA
44
AS I A
EUROP E
15
NORT H AM ERI CA
80
900
PAC I FI CA
4. 5
25
94
50
EUROP E
75
NORT H AM ERI CA
100
C OMPAR I SON S
L GI OU
U S COM
C M M UNITIE
U T S ARC HIVE S
RELI
ARC HI TEC
C TU
U R E ARCHIVE
C
S
M U S EU
U M ARCHIVE
C
S
LI TERATU
T A U RE + ART
A
ARCHIVE
I S
125
BR I T IS H M U SE U M
150
5. 7
AS I A
175
2 0. 4
PAC I FI CA
200
TH E LO U VR E
45
900
TH E SM IT H SO N I A N
183
EUROP E
NORT H AM ERI CA
1 2.
25
20
15
10
410
1/17/2007 2:41:49 PM
WASHI NGTON DC
10
1 4 3 . 7 MILLION
THE L OUVRE
B R ITISH MUSEUM
O WNER S H I P
EXH I B I T S O R L OA NS
# O F G L O B A L T R AV EL I NG
(# O F P I EC ES )
CO L L EC T I O N S I ZE
2004
# O F L A NG UA G ES S ER V ED
20.4
F O R EI G N V I S I T O R S
V I S I T O R S S TAT Y EA R
T HE S MITHSON IAN
TYPE
L O CAT I O N
MATRIX
# O F V I S I T O R S (MI L L I O NS )
N OTABLE MUSEUMS
CO MPARI SO N
14.
3 . 9 MILLION
NAT IO N A L
(2 0 0 4 )
PARI S
ART
5.7
2003
L ONDON
4.5
3,600,000
35,000
+ 54
NAT IO N A L
2005
6 . 5 MILLION
NAT IO N A L
4,000
NAT IO N A L
3 MILLION
20
NAT IO N A L
2 MILLION +
20
PR I VAT E /
HI ST ORY, C U LTU R E
M U SEE D ORSAY
T H E STAT E HERMITAGE
PARI S
ART
2.6
2004
ST. PE TERSBURG
2.5
2004
400,000
500,000
NE W Y ORK CI TY
5.2
2005
(INTERNATIONAL
LOANS, 2004)
T O K YO NAT IO N AL MUSEUM
NON - P R O F IT
NE W DE L HI
2.2
2004
2,000
NAT IO N A L
TOKY O
2.2
2004
119,474
NAT IO N A L
L ONDON,
ART
6.0
2004
13
65,000
NAT IO N A L
+ 2.400.000
L I V ERPOOL ,
ST. I V ES
411
2b.knowledge_DEF.indd 411
1/17/2007 2:41:49 PM
1.
U NIT E D STATES 43,465
2004
0 4
JAPAN 20,193
GERMAN Y 15,265
FRAN CE 05,183
U NIT E D KIN GD OM 05,039
NE T HERL AN D S 04,222
R E PU BLIC OF KOREA 03,556
SWITZERLAN D 02,877
SWED EN 02,844
CAN ADA 02,111
ITALY 02,198
CHIN A 01,707
F IN LAN D 01,675
AUSTRAL IA 01,839
ISRAEL 01,225
DEN MARK 01,046
SPAIN 00, 822
BEL GIUM 00, 829
AUSTRIA 00, 706
2,492
25
JAPAN
2,021
116
03 . SIE M E NS
GE RM ANY
1,402
21
04 . NOK IA C OR P.
F I NL AND
898
130
05 . R O B E RT B O SC H
GE RM ANY
843
83
06 . INT E L C OR P.
USA
691
141
07 . B A SF G R O U P
GE RM ANY
656
91
USA
603
09 . M OT OR O LA, INC .
USA
580
10 . DA IM LE R C HRYSLE R
GE RM ANY
567
G LO B A L FO RTU N E 5 0 0 RANK
NETHERL ANDS
A PP L ICATI O N S
01 . R OYAL PH ILIPS E LE C.
C O MPA N I E S
O RI G I N
TOP 40 C OM PANI ES B Y
# OF I NTERNATI ONAL PATEN T
AP P LI CATI ONS
3.
2005
1 1 . EAS T M AN K ODAK C O.
USA
531
447
1 2 . HONEY W ELL I NT L I NC .
USA
518
206
1 3 . LM ERI C S S ON
S W EDEN
510
338
1 4 . S AM S UNG ELEC . C O. , LT D.
S . K OR EA
483
39
USA
461
77
1 6 . S ONY C ORP.
USA
449
47
1 7 . M I T S UBI S HI ELEC .
J A PA N
436
158
295
USA
423
188
138
1 9 . T OYOTA
J A PA N
399
2 0 . T HOM S ON LI C . S . A.
F R A NC E
390
412
2b.knowledge_DEF.indd 412
1/17/2007 2:41:49 PM
- resident patent application per capita 2002 - resident patent granted per capita 2002 - # wto patents filed
by technical field 2004 - top 3 countries in subclasses: % of total for subclasses 2004 - sum of all national
applications filed - country comparisons: % share of world total in # of patent applications - innovation performance per group of indicators - innovation performance per capita gdp - typology of innovation demand 2005
2.
21 . Q U A LC OM M INC O R P.
USA
379
G ER M A NY
319
USA
374
20
3 2 . BAY ER
G ER M A NY
310
1 24
23 . FU JIT SU LT D.
JAPAN
358
99
J A PA N
304
24 . H E WLE T T-PAC K A R D
USA
358
28
3 4 . OLY M P US C ORP.
J A PA N
295
25 . NE C C OR P.
USA
353
96
3 5 . CANON
J A PA N
269
1 54
26 . INFINE O N T E C H .
GE RM ANY
345
3 6 . S HARP
J A PA N
269
2 25
343
3 7 . HUAW EI T EC H. C O. , LT D.
C H I NA
249
USA
336
394
3 8 . M EDT RONI C , I NC .
USA
245
29 . LG E LE C T RO NIC S INC.
S. KORE A
332
115
3 9 . P I ONEER C ORP.
J A PA N
240
30 . G E NE RA L E LE C T R IC CO.
USA
321
4 0 . NOVART I S AG
S W I TZER L A ND
227
1 86
413
2b.knowledge_DEF.indd 413
1/17/2007 2:41:49 PM
4.
TOP 1 5 SU BC LASSES:
G06F
336
NE THERL ANDS
A61K
006
C12N
C07D
G01N
0 35
H04L
231
H01L
169
A61B
112
H04N
298
C07C
H04B
092
H04Q
0 45
A61F
002
B65D
00 6
A61M
00 2
G06F
307
JAPAN
A61K
001
C12N
00 6
C07D
G01N
0 35
H04L
234
H01L
138
A61B
039
H04N
276
C07C
00 1
H04B
162
H04Q
0 82
A61F
B65D
00 4
A61M
00 1
414
2b.knowledge_DEF.indd 414
1/17/2007 2:41:50 PM
SIEMEN S
G06F
183
GERM ANY
A61K
003
C12N
C07D
00 1
G01N
0 30
H04L
261
H01L
66
A61B
026
H04N
0 25
C07C
H04B
055
H04Q
160
A61F
B65D
00 2
A61M
00 1
N OKIA CPRP.
G06F
184
F I NL AND
A61K
C12N
C07D
G01N
H04L
332
H01L
0 5
A61B
0 5
H04N
0 53
C07C
H04B
074
H04Q
224
A61F
0 3
B65D
00 1
A61M
00 1
R OBERT BOSCH
G06F
GERM ANY
A61K
20
C12N
C07D
G01N
0 39
H04L
16
H01L
0 21
A61B
H04N
0 7
C07C
H04B
0 6
H04Q
A61F
B65D
A61M
415
2b.knowledge_DEF.indd 415
1/17/2007 2:41:50 PM
2b.knowledge_DEF.indd 416
1 .0 9
0 .9 8
0 .7 2
0 .5 6
0 .4 7
0 .3 7
0 .3 2
0 .3 2
0 .1 9
0 .1 7
0 .1 1
0 .1 1
0 .1 0
0 .0 7
0 .0 6
1 .8 2
0 .8 5
0 .6 3
0 .3 8
0 .2 8
0 .2 7
0 .2 1
0 .1 9
GE R MA N Y
D E N M AR K
U N IT E D K I N GD OM
N E TH E R LA N D S
FR A N C E
IR E L A N D
A U ST RI A
CA N ADA
R U SS I AN FE D E R AT I ON
BE L G I U M
SPA I N
P O RT U G A L
ITALY
GREECE
L IE C HT E N S T E I N
J APAN
RE PU B L IC OF KO R E A
CHINA
SW I T Z E R L AN D
G E R MAN Y
A U ST R A LI A
N E T H E R LA N D S
0 .0 4
0 .0 4
0 .0 3
0 .0 3
CAN A DA
B E L GI U M
GREECE
S PA IN
0 .0 0
0 .0 9
U N I T E D K IN G D O M
0 .0 2
0 .0 9
D E N MA R K
I TA LY
0 .1 0
P ORTU GA L
0 .1 1
7.
I R E LA N D
2. 0
R U S S IA N F E D E R ATI O N
2. 5
HET EROC Y C LI C C OM P OUNDS 3 , 0 7 0
S ELEC T I NG 1 , 3 6 1
T RANS M I S S I ON 1 , 4 3 9
AC Y C LI C OR CARBOC Y C LI C C OM P OUNDS 1 , 4 5 7
M I C RO-ORGANI S M S OR ENZY M ES 2 , 0 3 0
S EM I C ONDUC T OR DEV I C ES 2 , 9 9 3
3. 0
0 .1 5
1 .3 2
S W I TZ E RL A N D
0 .1 8
1 .6 0
A U S T RA L IA
F R AN C E
2 .6 0
R E P U B LI C O F K O RE A
# WT O PATENT S F IL ED B Y
TE C H NI CAL F I ELD 2004
A U S TR I A
2 .9 2
C HI N A
6.
JA PA N
5.
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
P ER C A PI TA 2 0 0 2
1. 5
1. 0
0. 5
416
1/17/2007 2:41:50 PM
2b.knowledge_DEF.indd 417
1 4 ,8 5 6
1 9 ,8 0 9
2 2 ,9 0 0
2 5 ,4 1 9
2 9 ,1 4 3
3 4 ,2 0 9
4 0 ,0 0 8
4 8 ,2 1 8
5 7 ,0 6 4
6 7 ,0 6 2
7 6 ,3 5 8
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
1 2 1 ,7 4 6
1 2 ,5 2 3
1988
2004
9 ,5 6 3
1987
1 1 5 ,1 7 6
8 ,1 0 0
1986
1 1 0 ,3 8 8
7 ,2 9 0
1985
2003
5 ,6 4 8
1984
2002
4 ,8 7 5
1983
9 3 ,2 4 0
4 ,5 6 8
1982
1 0 8 ,2 2 9
4 ,1 0 0
1981
2001
3 ,6 9 4
1980
2000
636
2 ,5 8 6
1979
25000
1978
S ELEC T I NG
T RANS M I S S I ON
AC Y C LI C OR CARBOC Y C LI C C OM P OUNDS
M I C RO-ORGANI S M S OR ENZY M ES
S EM I C ONDUC T OR DEV I C ES
US A 3 9 . 1
8.5
8.4
9.8
9.0
9.0
6.7
GERM ANY
8.2
GERM ANY
7.8
7.3
UK
JAPAN
US A 3 7 . 5
8.8
JAPAN
US A 2 9 . 0
S W EDEN 1 0 . 7
GERM ANY 1 1 . 2
US A 2 8 . 8
6.9
JAPAN
US A 5 5 . 6
S OUT H K OREA 1 4 . 5
JAPAN 1 6 . 4
US A 2 7 . 4
GERM ANY 1 3 . 9
JAPAN 2 1 . 4
US A 2 7 . 7
NET HERLANDS 1 1 . 9
JAPAN 1 8 . 8
US A 3 0 . 1
GERM ANY
JAPAN 2 3 . 1
US A 2 4 . 6
GERM ANY
JAPAN 1 3 . 1
US A 4 3 . 9
JAPAN 1 5 . 4
GERM ANY 1 7 . 4
US A 3 3 . 7
GERM ANY 1 1 . 7
US A 3 0 . 2
JAPAN 3 3 . 6
GERM ANY 1 2 . 1
JAPAN 1 3 . 8
US A 3 1 . 1
GERM ANY
JAPAN 1 3 . 1
US A 2 9 . 8
GERM ANY
JAPAN 1 3 . 4
US A 4 0 . 1
GERM ANY
JAPAN 1 0 . 7
8.
TO P 3 CO U NTRIE S IN S U B C LA S S E S:
60
50
40
30
20
10
125 0 0 0
100 0 0 0
75000
50000
417
1/17/2007 2:41:51 PM
10.
L OW IN NOVAT I ON = 0
0
SWED EN 0.72
SWIT ZERLAN D 0.71
F IN LAN D 0.68
J APAN 0.65
DEN MARK 0.60
U NIT E D STATES 0.60
GERMAN Y 0.58
AUSTRIA 0.51
BEL GIUM 0.50
NE T HERLAN D S 0.48
U NIT E D KIN GD OM 0.48
E U15 0.46
F RAN CE 0.46
ICEL AN D 0.45
LU X EMBOURG 0.44
EU25 0.42
IREL AN D 0.42
N OR WAY 0.40
ITALY 0.36
ESTON IA 0.32
S L OVEN IA 0.32
HUN GARY 0.31
SPAIN 0.30
CYPR US 0.28
PORTUGAL 0.28
LI THUAN IA 0.27
C Z E C H REPUBL IC 0.26
BULGARIA 0.24
POLAN D 0.23
SL OVAKIA 0.21
GREECE 0.21
LATVIA 0.20
MALTA 0.20
ROMAN IA 0.16
TURKEY 0.06
0.10
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0 .7 0
************************************************************************
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************************************************
**********************************************
**********************************************
*********************************************
********************************************
******************************************
******************************************
****************************************
************************************
********************************
********************************
*******************************
******************************
****************************
****************************
***************************
**************************
************************
***********************
*********************
*********************
********************
********************
****************
******
418
2b.knowledge_DEF.indd 418
1/17/2007 2:41:51 PM
11.
EN THUSIASTT
AT T RACT ED
RELUCTANT
ANT I -I NNOVAT I O N
POLAN D
10
27
47
17
LATVIA
10
29
45
16
GERMAN Y
36
39
19
FIN LAN D
34
46
13
LITHUAN IA
33
44
14
GREECE
12
32
34
22
ESTON IA
10
34
47
CYPR US
10
35
34
21
AUSTRIA
37
38
16
PORTUGAL
38
34
20
SPAIN
10
38
33
19
EU25
11
39
33
16
HUN GARY
44
30
19
D EN MARK
12
39
37
12
BULGARIA
10
42
28
20
BELGIUM
10
43
32
15
U NITED KIN GD OM
16
40
33
11
IRELAN D
11
45
30
14
C Z ECH REPUBLIC
12
44
35
SWED EN
17
40
36
NETHERL AN D S
15
43
33
L UXEMBOURG
18
40
32
10
SLOVEN IA
18
41
33
TURKEY
25
34
33
F RAN CE
50
24
18
ITALY
17
43
24
16
ROMAN IA
20
40
30
11
SL OVAKIA
21
41
29
MALTA
18
46
28
419
2b.knowledge_DEF.indd 419
1/17/2007 2:41:51 PM
India, China and Brazil have led recent movements to create sui generis laws. The
and its acquisition and organization. Knowledge can be implicit or explicit, informal or
Indian government has created a Traditional Knowledge Library to collect, patent and
store traditional knowledge on yoga and ayurvedic medicine. For example, the govern-
each of these are separate in content and are going through different global permuta-
ment intends to patent each yoga asana (position) and ayurvedic practice in the attempt
tions and ownership debates, they are all part of what could be called a knowledge
to protect their cultural heritage from increasingly western and commercial versions
(Bellman, 2005). In China and Brazil, in addition to India and many other developing nations, there is a movement towards protecting biodiversity and medicinal plants
These acts involve value judgments for determining what becomes considered knowledge
and drugs. China, in response to biopiracy, and also linked to TRIPs (Agreement on
and worthy of incorporation into explicit (formal recorded and institutional) knowledge
systems and canons. Indigenous knowledge 1 has long been overlooked as folklore or
at the end of the Uruguay Rounds), passed patent laws on traditional medicine us-
age, pharmaceutical products and methods in 1993, and updated them in 2000. This
knowledge of plants and medicines for commercial purposes, there has been a rush
has prompted a huge flood of international patent applications for traditional Chinese
to formalize traditional knowledge. This has proven difficult because of the culture
medicine that has been endorsed by the government to protect Chinese culture and
knowledge, and also enter into international trade agreements and respect of interna-
the concept that information can be stored and codified devoid of context versus a
more traditional holistic concept of knowledge as culture and without separation between
person, community and fact. Further adding to the debate is the construct of intellec-
tual property (IP), which refers to creations of the human mind and their protection by
law, (WIPO). Knowledge then, is intricately intertwined with patent law and protection,
ESTIMATE # OF PATENTS
% GROWTH
and defined by its ability to be codified and patented on a global scale by interested
U SA
45,111
33.60%
03.80%
JAPAN
25,145
18.80%
24.30%
GER MAN Y
15,870
11.80%
04.00%
WHAT D O W E K N OW AB O UT K N O W L E D G E ?
FR AN C E
05,522
04.10%
06.60%
Within the field of knowledge creation is a growing concentration of actors in the pro-
UK
05,115
03.80%
01.50%
SO U TH KO R EA
04,747
03.50%
33.60%
information. The Internet, with online library and archival collections, periodical data-
N ETHER LAN D S
04,435
03.30%
04.70%
SW ITZER LAN D
03,096
02.30%
07.50%
tion, further facilitates this concentration. This trend is especially apparent in scholarly
SW ED EN
02,784
02.10%
-2.10%
academic publishing (print and online) through the acquisition and mergers of smaller
C HIN A
02,452
01.80%
43.70%
C AN AD A
02,315
01.70%
09.80%
publishing houses. Of the top five ranking scholarly publishers worldwide, four are based
ITALY
02,309
01.70%
05.10%
in the UK (Taylor and Francis, Elsevier, Blackwell and Sage) (Ulrichs Periodicals Direc-
AU STR ALIA
02,022
01.50%
10.10%
tory). In 2005, the worlds largest academic publisher, Springer (based in Heidelberg,
FIN LAN D
01,866
01.40%
11.60%
Germany), printed 1,450 titles and owned 70 scholarly imprints, more than any other
ALL O THER S
05,835
04.40%
02.70%
As advanced technology and communication systems spread throughout the globe, the
prevalence of e-journals and online resources crowd out traditional print references.
COUNTRY/REGION
YEAR
CONTENT
AFR IC AN U N IO N
2000
The decreasing number of actors in the cycle of knowledge creation is also evident
B R AZIL
2001
US, Japan and Germany (Table 1). Japan is in the top three countries in every patent
C HIN A
2000
subclass except for Selecting, and the US is number one in all three subcategories except
C O STA R IC A
1998
Protection of Biodiversity
Semiconductors. Four of the top ten companies worldwide with the highest number of
IN D IA
2002
patent applications are from Germany, and three are from the US (WIPO, 2005). Further-
PER U
2002
in patent applications and approvals. Innovations and patents are dominated by the
more, Asian countries outpaced all countries in total growth of patents in 2005 (44%
increase for China, 34% in South Korea, and 24% in Japan.)
PHILIPPIN ES
1997
PO RTU GAL
2002
THAILAN D
1999
U N ITED STATES
1990
between innovation and the rights and protection of traditional knowledge. A growing
urgency to protect traditional and cultural knowledge or practices is further complicated
by the legal standards surrounding IP and debates on whether culture can be copyrighted at all (Brown, 1998). Today, a large majority of indigenous knowledge remains
unprotected by existing IP laws and only a handful of countries are working towards
R e s o u rce s , Tra d i ti o n a l K n o wl e d g e a n d F o l kl o re ( 2 0 0 4 )
identifying indigenous knowledge and traditional cultural expressions to ensure integration into IP legal definitions, or sui generis (items that stand alone and cannot
be categorized due to their unique and/or cultural character). Such treaties and laws
governing the protection of traditional knowledge combine two basic legal concepts:
the regulation of access and the granting of exclusive rights (WIPO).
1
A l s o k n o w n a s t r a d i t i o n a l k n o w l e d g e , r e f e r s t o k n o w l e d g e s y s t e m s t h a t w e r e
d e ve l o p e d a n d m a i n ta i n e d wi th i n a co m m u n i ty i n a l o ca l co n te xt. A cco rd i n g t o t h e
Wo r l d I n t e l l e c t u a l P r o p e r t y O r g a n i z a t i o n , t h i s c a n i n c l u d e a w i d e a r r a y o f t o p i c s ,
including but not limited to, food and agriculture; biological diversity and environment;
innovation and regulation in biotechnology; economic, social and cultural development;
cu l tu ra l p o l i cy; a n d h u m a n ri g h ts .
420
2b.knowledge_DEF.indd 420
1/17/2007 2:41:52 PM
H ER ITA GE + PRAC T IC E S
HER I TA GE P RES ERVATI ON + DES TR U C TI O N
ENVI RO NM ENT
CULTUR AL PARTI C I PATI ON
SPORTS
421
2c.heritage_DEF.indd 421
1/17/2007 6:17:02 PM
1.
M IX E D 2 4 - 3 %
2.
# OF UNESCO WOR LD
HERITAG E PR OPERTIES
3.
% GROWTH I N WORLD
HERI TAGE P ROP ERTI ES
A DDED S I NC E 1 9 9 4 C ULT URAL NAT URAL
70%
30 0
60%
50%
20 0
40%
30%
10 0
20%
10%
2c.heritage_DEF.indd 422
8%
62 %
16 %
N O RT H A ME R ICA
58 %
L ATI N AM E R ICA + CA RI B B E AN 50 %
44 %
E U R OP E 26 %
50 %
A S IA + PA CI F I C 55 %
26 %
AR A B STATE S 25 %
AF R ICA 48 %
25
34
N O RT H A ME R I CA 1 3
33
43
E U R OP E 3 5 2
L AT IN A ME R ICA + CAR I BB E A N 7 8
422
AS IA + PA C I FI C 1 1 2
34
A RA B STAT ES 5 6
0
AF R ICA 3 1
1/17/2007 6:17:02 PM
C U LT U R A L S PA C E S 1 1
2c.heritage_DEF.indd 423
O R A L TR A D I TI O N S 1 6
SO C IA L P RA C T I C E S F O R 2 0 05 O NLY 2 6
RI T U A L S + F ES T I VAL S 2 2
MU S I C + PE R FO R MI N G A RTS 4 6
0
EUROP E 1 3 0
50
100%
40
80%
6.
# OF
I NTA NGIB LE
MASTERPIEC ES
I DENTIF I ED
BY T Y PE
20%
0%
EUROP E 1 9
NORT H AM ERI CA
# OF U NES C O
P ROC LAI M ED
M AS TERP I EC ES
OF TH E OR A L
A ND INTA NG IB L E
H ER ITA G E
OF H U MA NITY
8
5.
AS I A + PAC I FI C 3 0
140
ARAB S TAT ES
20
AFRI CA 1 4
NORT H AM ERI CA
40
AR C H I VE S 6 8 %
10
60
RO MA N CAT HO L I C C H U R C HE S 7 5 %
20
80
D E R V IS H LO D G E S ( T EK K E) 7 5 %
30
LAT I N AM ERI CA + CARI BBEAN 3 5
LISTED AS
UNESCO WORLD
H ERITAGE
P ROP ERT IE S
AS I A + PAC I FI C 2 3
PE R RE GI ON
100
I SLA M IC MOS Q U E S 49 %
120
I S LA MI C S HR I N E S (T U RBE S ) 1 00 %
AFRI CA
# OF C ITI ES
ARAB S TAT ES 2 2
4.
T R AD I T I O N AL K N OW LE D G E + C R A F TM AN SH I P 1 0
DESTR UCTIO N
35
30
25
20
15
10
60%
7.
C U LTU R A L
H ER ITA G E
S ITES
HEAV I LY
DAM AGED O R
DES TROY ED
IN B OS NIA H ER ZEG OV IN A
1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 6
423
1/17/2007 6:17:02 PM
8.
C OU NT RY
HERITAGE SITE
A FG H AN ISTAN
2003
2002
A LG ERIA
TIPASA
2002
A ZERBAIJ AN
2003
B E N IN
1985
1997
C HILE
2005
C TE D IVOIRE
2003
1992
1996
1997
1997
1999
1994
E GYP T
ABU MEN A
2001
E TH IOP IA
1996
G E RMANY
2004
G U IN EA
1992
H ON D URAS
1996
I N DIA
1999
1992
IRAN
2004
IRAQ
2003
1982
N EPAL
KATHMAN D U VALLEY
2003
N IG ER
1992
PA KISTAN
2000
PER U
1986
PH ILIP P INES
2001
S EN EG AL
2000
T U N ESIA
1996
2004
EVERGLAD ES N ATION AL PA RK
1993
V EN EZUELA
2005
Y EMEN
2002
424
2c.heritage_DEF.indd 424
1/17/2007 6:17:03 PM
EN VIR ON M E N T
- world co2 emissions from fuel combustion 2003 - environmental sustainability index: regional average esi
scores - top 15 countries in environmental sustainability - lowest performing countries in environmental
sustainability - world values survey: attitudes toward the environmentprotecting versus economic growth
- types of international conflicts due to water 1950 1999
1.
I NTERNAT IO NAL
KYOTO PARTIE S 8 . 3 - 4 0 %
B U N K ER S 0 . 6 - 3 %
2.
INTERNAT IO NAL
B U N K ER S 0 . 8 - 3 %
TO P 1 5 COUNTR I E S
I N ENVIR O NMENTA L
S USTAINA BIL I TY
3.
70
60
B AS ED ON ES I S C OR E, 2 0 05
50
40
30
20
10
2c.heritage_DEF.indd 425
TAI WA N 3 2 .7
N O RT H K O R E A 2 9 .2
IR A Q 3 3 .6
T U R KM E N I STA N 3 3 .1
H A I T I 3 4 .8
U Z B E K I STAN 3 4 .4
SU DAN 3 5 .9
TR I N I DA D + T O B A GO 3 6 .3
Y E ME N 3 7 .3
K U WA I T 3 6 .6
E T H IO P IA 3 7 .9
S AU D I A RA B I A 3 7 .8
TAJ I K I STA N 3 8 .6
I R A N 3 9 .8
C H I N A 3 8 .6
PA K I STAN 3 9 .9
L AT VI A 6 0 .4
61
N E W Z E A L AN D 6 0 .9
G A BO N 6 1 .7
A U ST R A LI A
B R A Z IL 6 2 .2
A U ST RI A 6 2 .7
G U YA N A 6 2 .9
A RG E N TI N A 6 2 .7
CA N ADA 6 4 .4
SW IT Z E R L AN D 6 3 .7
S W E D E N 7 1 .7
I C E L AN D 7 0 .8
N O R WAY 7 3 .4
U R U G U AY 7 1 .8
FI N L A N D 7 5 .1
425
1/17/2007 6:17:03 PM
2 0 0 5 EN V I RO NMENT
S USTAIN ABIL I TY IN DE X
ATTIT U DE S T O WA R D S
ENV IR O NMENT:
P ROTEC TI NG ENV I RONM E N T
V ER S U S E C O N O M I C G R O W T H
5.
6.
% OF TOTA L F OR S U B C L A S S ES 2 0 0 4
50
70.0
40
30
60.0
20
10
50.0
OC EANI A 6 1 . 0
EAS T AS I A 4 1 . 8
S OUT H EAS T AS I A 4 9 . 1
W ES T AS I A 4 3 . 1
S OUT H AS I A 4 6 . 5
S OUT H AFRI CA 4 7 . 5
NORT H AFRI CA 4 9 . 0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
P OSSIB LE ANSWE R S 1 . PROTECTIN G EN VIRON MEN T / 2. ECON OMY GROW T H AND C REAT I NG
J OB S / 3 . OT HE R ANSWE R
7.
6 . 7%
3 0 . 5%
NORT H AM ERI CA
7 . 0%
6 2 . 8%
8 . 2%
6 2 . 7%
3 4 . 5%
7 . 0%
5 7 . 3%
4 3 . 8%
9 . 3%
4 9 . 2%
4 5 . 2%
8 . 4%
3 0 . 3%
EUROP EAN C OM M UNI T Y
LAT I N AM ERI CA
B . ECO N O MIC G RO W TH AND CREATI NG JOBS SHOUL D BE THE T OP PRI ORI TY, EV EN I F TH E
AFRI CA
4 5 . 4%
4 9 . 3%
4 2 . 3%
EAS T EUROP E 5 2 . 4
W ES T EUROP E 6 3 . 2
S OUT H AM ERI CA 5 9 . 3
NORT H AM ERI CA 5 8 . 7
1950-1999
B ORD ER ISSUES 09
IRRIGATION 05
426
2c.heritage_DEF.indd 426
1/17/2007 6:17:03 PM
BEL ON G
2.
NOT M E N T I O N E D
NO RTH AMERICA
27.5 %
7 2 .5 %
AF RICA
18.7 %
8 1 .3 %
ASIA/OCEAN IA
15.4 %
8 4 .6 %
SO UTH AMERICA
11.4 %
8 8 .6 %
E U R O PE AN COMMUN ITY
10.7 %
8 9 .3 %
7.1 %
9 2 .9 %
1.1 %
9 8 .9 %
GO T O T HE C I NEM A
2.03
GO T O A LI BRARY
1.67
1.65
S P ORT S EV ENT
1.64
1.4
C ONC ERT
1.38
T HEAT ER
1.33
1.2
1.15
1.12
NEV ER
1 -3 TI M ES
4 - 6 T IME S
427
2c.heritage_DEF.indd 427
1/17/2007 6:17:04 PM
4.
YEARLY
MON THLY
W EEK LY
WEST EUROPE
14.9%
17.6 %
2 3 . 4%
14.6%
ASIA/ OCEAN IA
19.3%
MID D LE EAST
15.5%
NORTH AMERICA
24.6%
SOUTH AMERICA
16.8%
AF RICA
12.2%
11.1 %
NOT AT A LL
4 4 .1 %
9 . 6%
15 . 4%
6 4 .6 %
1 1%
12.1%
5 4 .4 %
1 0 . 3%
6 2 .1 %
2 1%
2 3 . 2%
17.1%
3 1 .2 %
1 2 . 3%
16.8 %
5 3 .8 %
1 9%
52%
29.4 %
DAN CED
22.0 %
SUN G
19.8 %
WR IT T E N SOMETHIN G
15.1 %
14.8 %
12.5 %
ACTED
3.8 %
10
15
20
25
30
5.
9.8
8.6
4.9
3.7
2.9
P ERFORM I NG JAZZ M US I C
2.7
1.4
DANC I NG BALLET
0.6
10
428
2c.heritage_DEF.indd 428
1/17/2007 6:17:04 PM
6.
% 0F AD ULTS
M I L L I ONS 0 F ADULT S
AT T ENDI NG / V I S I T I NG / READI NG
1982
199 2
2002
1982
1992
2002
9.6 %
10.6 %
1 0 . 8%
15.7
19.7
22.2
13.0 %
12.5 %
1 1 . 6%
21.3
23.2
23.8
3.0 %
3.3 %
3 . 2%
4.5
6.1
6.6
M U SICAL P LAYS *
18.6 %
17.4 %
1 7 . 1%
30.5
32.3
35.1
N O N - MUSICAL P LAYS *
11.9 %
13.5 %
1 2 . 3%
19.5
25.1
25.2
4.2 %
4.7 %
3.9%
6.9
8.7
8.0
N A
7.1 %
6 . 3%
N. A .
13.2
12.1
A RT MUSEUMS / G ALLERIE S *
22.1 %
26.7 %
2 6 . 5%
36.2
49.6
54.3
39.0 %
40.7 %
3 3 . 4%
63.9
75.6
68.4
37.0 %
34.5 %
3 1 . 6%
60.6
64.1
64.7
56.9 %
54.0 %
4 6 . 7%
93.3
100.3
95.3
A NY B E NC H M AR K AC T IVI TY
39.0 %
41.0 %
3 9 . 4%
66.5
76.2
81.2
C L ASSICAL MUSIC *
O P ERA *
PLAYS:
DA NC E :
B A LLET *
O TH ER DAN CE *
V I SU AL A RT S
H IST OR IC SIT E S
PA RKS / H ISTO RIC BUILD I NGS / NEI GHBORHOODS
L I T E R AT U R E
T Y P E OF AC T I V I T Y
1982
1992
2002
M OV I ES
6 3 . 0%
5 9 . 0%
6 0 . 0%
EXER C I S E
5 1 . 0%
6 0 . 0%
5 5 . 1%
G A R DENI NG
6 0 . 0%
5 5 . 0%
4 7 . 3%
H OM E I M PR OV EM ENTS
6 0 . 0%
4 8 . 0%
4 2 . 4%
A M U S EM ENT PA R K S
4 9 . 0%
5 0 . 0%
4 1 . 7%
3 9 . 0%
4 1 . 0%
3 9 . 0%
S PORTI NG EV ENTS
4 8 . 0%
3 7 . 0%
3 5 . 0%
OU TDOOR A C TI V I TI ES
3 6 . 0%
3 4 . 0%
3 0 . 9%
A C TI V E S PORTS
3 9 . 0%
3 9 . 0%
3 0 . 4%
V OL U NTEER / C H A R I TY
2 8 . 0%
3 3 . 0%
2 9 . 0%
3 . 0%
3 . 0%
2 . 9%
TV H OU R S PER DAY
429
2c.heritage_DEF.indd 429
1/17/2007 6:17:04 PM
2c.heritage_DEF.indd 430
F I NL A ND
S W EDEN
UK
NOR WAY
F IN L A ND 2 :3 5
2 :2 2
2 :4 9
S W ED EN 2 :1 3
2 :0 3
2 :2 2
UK 2 :4 4
2 :3 0
3 :0 0
N O R WAY 2 :1 5
2 :0 1
2 :3 0
0:00
S L OV ENI A
0:28
S LO V EN IA 2 :1 9
2 :0 5
2 :3 2
0:57
H U NG A RY
1:26
H UN G A RY 3 :0 5
2 :5 8
3 :1 4
1:55
F R A NC E
2:24
F R AN C E 2 :3 7
2 :3 1
2 :4 4
2:52
ES TONI A
3:21
E S TO N IA 2 :4 7
2 :3 2
3 :0 5
90
G ER M A NY
3:50
G ER MA N Y 2 :2 1
2 :1 3
2 :2 8
0: 0 0
90
90
83
82
84
0: 2 8
87
86
87
0: 5 7
82
81
83
1: 2 6
86
86
86
J A PA N 2 :2 2
2 :1 7
2 :2 8
NEW ZEA L A ND 3 :0 8
3 :0 3
3 :1 3
C A NA DA 2 :1 2
2 :0 0
2 :2 4
NOR WAY 1 :5 2
1 :3 9
2 :0 6
1: 5 5
85
83
87
88
88
87
77
76
78
86
86
86
78
76
80
84
84
85
AVERAGE
T IME SPE NT
WATCH I NG
TV/VI DEOS OF
TH OSE
WHO SPENT
ANY TI ME
ON TV/VI DEOS
B EL G I U M
10.
BE L G IU M 2 :4 2
2 :3 4
2 :4 8
S W EDEN 1 :4 9
1 :4 0
1 :5 8
F I NL A ND 2 :1 3
2 :0 2
2 :2 5
S L OV ENI A 1 :5 8
1 :4 4
2 :1 2
H U NG A RY 2 :4 3
2 :3 7
2 :4 9
F R A NCE 2 :0 1
1 :5 5
2 :0 8
ES TONI A 2 :2 4
2 :1 1
2 :3 9
G ER M A NY 1 :5 0
1 :4 1
1 :5 9
B EL G I UM 2 :1 6
2 :0 9
2 :2 3
8.
TI M E SPEN T
WATC HING TEL EVI SI ON & V I DEOS
3: 5 0
90 AVE RA G E | FE M A LE | MAL E
3: 2 1
2: 5 2
2: 2 4
11.
P ROP ORTI ON O F
P EOP LE W H O
S P ENT ANY TIM E
WATC H IN G
TELEV I S I O N +
V I DE O S
AV ERAGE | FEM AL E | MA L E
% O F D AY
88
86
84
82
80
78
76
74
72
70
430
2/2/2007 11:42:29 AM
2c.heritage_DEF.indd 431
N OR WAY 5
5
5
UK 6
6
6
S W ED E N 5
5
5
F I N LA N D 6
6
6
S L O VE NI A 4
4
5
H U N GA RY 3
2
3
F R A NC E 4
3
4
E ST O NI A 4
4
4
90
NOR WAY 0 : 0 6
0:06
0:07
UK 0:07
0:06
0:07
S W EDEN 0 : 0 6
0:06
0:05
F I NL A ND 0 : 0 6
0:05
0:06
S L OV ENI A 0 : 0 4
0:04
0:05
H U NG A RY 0 : 0 4
0:03
0:04
F R A NC E 0 : 0 5
0:05
0:05
ES TONI A 0 : 0 5
0:05
0:06
G ER M A NY 0 : 1 4
0:14
0:14
B EL G I U M 0 : 1 0
0:09
0:11
90
G E RM AN Y 9
9
9
B EL G I UM 7
6
8
9.
M I NUTES PE R D AY SPENT ON
E N T E RTAINMENT & CULTU RAL
PARTICI PATIO N
0: 17
AVE RA G E | FE M A LE | MAL E
0: 14
0: 11
0: 08
0: 05
0: 02
0: 00
12.
% P ER DAY
10
AVE RA G E | FE M ALE | MALE
431
1/17/2007 6:17:04 PM
S P O RTS
- worlds most valuable football teams 2006 - fifa revenue - fifa income tv
rights - overview of fifa world cup - host countries 1930 2010 - fifa use of funds by fifa country
associations - ioc revenue generation by program area - olympic games: revenue from broadcast partnerships
- olympics: revenue from top program - olympics: revenue from ticketing - olympics: revenue from licensing
- other popular international sports competitions
W ORL DS MOST
VAL UABLE F OOTBA LL TEAM S 2006
1.
IN $ USD MILLIO N S
FI FA
TV R IG H TS
REV ENU E
3.
1400
1200
1000
800
I N 1 9 8 7 , F I FA G R A NTED TH E TV R IG H T S
F OR TH E TH R EE F I FA W OR L D C U P
600
C OM PETI TI ONS TO F OL L OW (1 9 9 0 - 9 8 )
TO TH E I NTER NATI ONA L C ONSO RT IU M
400
OF PU B L I C S ER V I C E B R OA DC AS T E R S .
TEN Y EA R S L ATER , TH E R I G H TS
200
F OR TH E 2 0 0 2 A ND 2 0 0 6 F I FA W O R L D
C U PS W ER E G R A NTED TO TH E
OTH ER 3 6 - 4 %
B R A N D LICENSING 2 1
Q U A L ITY CON CEP T 6
120
138
141
171
187
189
195
196
208
214
222
263
106
F C PORTO
A S TON V IL L A
EV ERTON
B OR US S IA D O RTM U ND
A JA X A MS TER DA M
GL AS G O W RA N GER S
BAY E R L E V ER KU S EN
VA L ENC I A
C ELTI C
OL M P IQ UE LYO N NA I S
T OT T EN H AM H O TS PU R
1990
0 9 5 M I L L I ON (Swiss Francs)
1994
1 1 0 M I L L I ON
1998
1 3 5 M I L L I ON
2002
1 . 3 B I L L I ON
2006
1 . 5 B I L L I ON
I N C H F MIL L IO N S
F ORE I GN
TV B R OA DC A S TI N G R IG H T S :
EX CHANGE E F F ECTS 70
- 2 0 0 6 F I FA W OR L D C U P 4 2 3
I NTEREST 14
- A DDI TI ONA L F I FA E VE N T S 1 2
I NV E ST M ENT S 2
M A R K ETI NG R I G H T S 1 9 3
F IN E S 4
O T H E R E. G . REN TAL INCO ME,
S A L E OF FILM 5
MA N CH E S TER C I TY
302
324
370
440
504
508
687
769
841
921
2.
A S R OM A
NE W CA S T LE U NI TED
S C HAL K E 0 4
LI V ER POOL
BA RC EL ONA
I NT ER M IL A N
C H EL S EA
J U V ENTU S
BAY ER N M U NI C H
AR SENA L
AC MILAN
R EA L M AD R I D 1 , 0 1 2
K I R C H S PORT G R OU P.
M A NC H ES T ER U NI TED 1 , 3 7 3
H OS PI TA L I TY R IG H T S 6 5
L I C ENS I NG R IG H T S 1 4
432
2c.heritage_DEF.indd 432
OTHER 45
1/17/2007 6:17:05 PM
5, 00 0
OLY M P I C GAM E S :
R EV ENU E F R OM B R OA DC A S T
PA RTNER SH I P
7.
I N $ U S D MIL L IO N S
4,1 2 5
T OTAL 3,7 7 0
8 6 .5
LI C ENS I NG
T I C K ET I NG
DOM ES T I C
S P ONS ORS HI P
P ROGRAM (TOP)
2,2 3 2
66
1200
411
0
625
1400
796
100 0
655
1600
603
200 0
579
1800
BROADCAS T I NG 1,8 4 5
300 0
1000
800
600
400
OV ERV I EW OF F I FA WO RL D C U P
HOST C OU NTRIES 1930 20 10
200
4.
800
IN FRASTR UCTURE
21
700
23
14
22
10
24
600
14
19
21
15
500
11
14
MEN S COMPETITION
26
14
15
18
400
24
26
YOUTH FOOTBAL L
300
2 0 0 4 ATH ENS 1 , 4 9 6
2 0 0 8 B EI J I NG 1 , 7 0 6
898
2 0 0 0 S Y DNEY 1 , 3 3 2
636
1 9 9 6 ATL A NTA
200
100
0
866
202
11
23
T OP 6
2 0 0 1 - 2 0 04
16
603
202
11
10
T OP 5
2 0 0 1 - 2 0 04
31
579
199
11
15
T OP 4
1 9 9 7 - 2 0 00
47
279
197
10
15
T OP 3
1 9 9 3 - 1 9 96
21
175
169
12
16
900
VARIOUS
T OP 2
1 9 8 9 - 1 9 92
96
159
9
T OP 1
1 9 8 5 - 1 9 88
15
E U RO P E
10
OCEANIA
14
S OU TH AM E RI CA
403
1000
N O RT H + C E N TR A L
1 9 8 8 S EOU L
A ME R I CA + CA R IB B E A N
1 9 9 2 B A R C EL ONA
90
FIFA
U SE OF F UN DS
A F RI CA
88
5.
AS I A
287
1990 ITALY
1 9 8 4 L OS A NG EL ES
196 2 C HILE
35
1986 MEXICO
1 9 8 0 M OS C OW
195 8 SWE DE N
18
1982 SPAIN
1 9 7 2 M U NI C H
1 9 7 6 M ONTR EA L
2002 KOREA/JAPAN
195 0 BR A Z IL
10
1974 GERMAN Y
1 9 6 8 M EXI C O C I TY
1998 FRANC E
193 8 FR A NC E
1
1994 UN ITED S TAT ES
1970 MEXICO
1 9 6 0 R OM E
1966 EN GL AN D
193 4 ITALY
1 9 6 4 TOK Y O
193 0 U R U G U AY
433
2c.heritage_DEF.indd 433
1/17/2007 6:17:05 PM
12
2c.heritage_DEF.indd 434
ATP T O U R N A ME N T S
14
+ TE N N I S G R AN D S LA MS 2 0 04
90
11.
MILLION S
3
2 0 0 4 ATH ENS 3 . 6
2 0 0 2 S A LT L A K E C I TY 1 . 5
2 0 0 0 S Y DNEY 6 . 7
1 9 9 8 NA G A NO 1 . 2
1 9 9 6 ATL A NTA 8 . 3
1 9 9 4 L I L L EH A M M ER 1 . 2
1 9 9 2 B A R C EL ONA
1 9 9 2 A L B ERTV I L L E 0 . 9
ORGAN IZIN G C OM M I T T EE 0
1 9 8 8 S EOU L 3 . 3
228
183
551
74
425
26
79
32
36
60
32
14 0
1 9 8 8 C A L G A RY 1 . 6
61.5
23
25
70
# OF LIC E NSE E S
156
2 0 0 4 AT HENS
2 0 0 2 S ALT LAK E C I T Y
52
100
13.9
190
91
125
24
36
17.2
61
18.8
62
1 9 8 4 L OS A NG EL ES 5 . 7
OTHER
POP UL AR
IN TERNATI ONA L
SPORT S
C OMPE TI TIO NS
2 0 0 0 S Y DNEY
1 9 9 8 NAGANO
1 9 9 6 AT LANTA
1 9 9 4 LI LLEHAM M ER
1 9 9 2 BARC ELONA
1 9 8 8 S EOUL
90
T O U R D E FR A N C E 2 0 05
P GA T O U R 2 0 04
9.
10.
20 0
18 0
11
16 0
500
10
12 0
10 0
9
80
400
8
40
20
7
0
300
6
200
4
100
2
REVEN UE TO H OS T C I T Y
0
$US M I L L I ONS
TICKETS SOLD
M I L L IO N S
16
10
15
10
434
1/17/2007 6:17:05 PM
listed heritage sites tend to be located in developing countries and/or politically unsta-
ble areas of the world. On the other hand, the 2006 World Monuments Watch 100 Most
Endangered Sites list compiled by the World Monuments Fund (WMF) includes more
poses new challenges for world heritage. Conflicts, lack of resources and awareness,
developed areas, particularly the United States, and is more architecturally oriented,
and sometimes neglect and incompetence result in the destruction of various heritages
featuring more buildings and villages compared to the UNESCO list, which frequently
UNESCO world heritage sites presently number 812, with 77% being cultural,
Of identified UNESCO world heritage sites, 121 are considered intangible and
The end of the cold war and the fall of the Soviet Union triggered a chain of events
divided along the categories of Music and Performing Arts (accounting for 38%),
around the world, which in some instances burdened the preservation of world heritage.
Social Practices (21.5%), Rituals and Festivals (18%), Oral Traditions (13%),
The war that took place in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995 had devastating
impacts on cultural heritage sites of the area. As a result of the conflict, all Islamic
Europe dominates the allocation of cultural properties (55%) and cities listed as
shrines listed as cultural heritage sites by UNESCO suffered heavy losses, while three-
quarters of Dervish Lodges and Roman Catholic churches, 68% of archives, and almost
half of Islamic mosques were severely damaged. In 2001, the Taliban destroyed the
of the world
colossal 1,500 year old Buddhas of Bamiyan in central Afghanistan with dynamite and
tank barrages, and more recently in Iraq, 8,000 year old artifacts have stood unprotect-
WHAT IS HE RITAGE ?
ed in the midst of war. While damage to world heritage sites is sometimes accidental,
Heritage refers to cultural legacies or traditions that are passed from one generation to
these acts are often deliberate attempts of destruction to eradicate cultural heritage
the next. Physical heritage are tangible in nature, and include buildings, monuments,
and collective memory (Financial Times, 2006). As destruction itself is also a part of
artifacts, and other manufactured cultural products, while natural heritage is com-
history, the decision to rebuild is politically charged, sometimes cleansing history of its
prised of components of the natural environment such as flora and fauna. Intangible heri-
tage come in the form of customs, practices, belief systems, artistic expression, and
languages. As heritage testifies to the socioeconomic, political, ethnic, religious, and
* T h e Wo r l d H e r i t a g e p r o g r a m o f U N E S C O , g e n e r a l l y o n l y d e a l s w i t h t a n g i b l e h e r i t a g e ,
in times of war or political upheaval. Heritage preservation is the theory and practice
( a cce s s e d 6 /1 /0 6 )
435
2c.heritage_DEF.indd 435
1/17/2007 6:17:06 PM
ENVIRONMENT
WH AT A R E TH E IS S UES ?
Culture and the environment are intertwined in complex and changing ways. Globaliza-
tion is challenging this relationship, putting serious pressures on resources, and bringing
economic development around the world; yet, the process of producing and distributing
goods and services carries environmental consequences. Clearing land for agriculture
structures and regulatory frameworks. The indictor suite on the environment shows that:
and burning fossil fuels releases carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases which results in global warming. The effects include a thinning ozone layer, frequency of extreme
In Asia and the Middle East, 49.3% of the population believes that economic growth
and creating jobs should be given priority over the environment; whereas in Latin
America, Europe and North America, over 50% believe that protecting the environment
The US (representing 23% of global emissions in 2003) and China (representing 15%)
contributed the largest shares to the worlds total emissions, accounting for over half
Of the top 15 countries on the 2005 Environmental Sustainability Index Report, four
the growth of emissions between 1990 and 2003, and are not subject to the emissions
are Scandinavian
control mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol compared to most nations of their economic
capability (International Energy Agency, 2005). Countries often fail to implement en-
Between 1990 and 2003, total emissions for countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol
rates. However, the majority of people in Europe (62.7%), North America (62.8%), and
declined by 6%, while emissions for non-Kyoto parties grew by 39% from 11.8 gigatons
Latin America (57.3%) believe that protecting the environment should be given priority,
to 16.5 gigatons
even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs (World Values Survey,
1999-2004).
WHAT IS ME AN T BY E N V I R O N M E N T ?
The environment is the sum of circumstances, objects, and conditions impacting the
Among Kyoto Protocol parties, Russia, Japan, Germany, Canada, and the United King-
dom accounted for 54% of the groups total emissions between 1990 and 2003; thus,
air, water, land, natural resources, flora, fauna, and humans. In recent centuries, human
the overall decline in emissions among Kyoto parties can be attributed to diminishing
emissions among Economies in Transition (EIT) such as Croatia and Slovenia. As mem-
resources being consumed faster than can be replenished. Sustainability refers to the
ber nations update their action plans and industrialized countries attempt to meet set
concept of designing human activity as to actualize the greatest potential in the present
goals, Kyoto parties will increasingly rely on flexibility mechanisms such as emissions
while preserving the natural environment for future generations and their needs.
trading (International Energy Agency, 2005). However, emissions are likely to increase
in EIT countries as they develop their economies, decreasing the supply of emission
credits so that all Kyoto parties will need to implement sustainable energy policies and
As rapid political and economic changes result in clashes over control and access to
valuable natural resources, water is particularly vulnerable given its role as a human
necessity and importance in agriculture, manufacturing, and energy production. According
to the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, between 1950 and 1999, 534 in-
automobiles and consumption of oil. In the last decade, the growing popularity of the
ternational conflicts occurred over water (2005). 62% of these conflicts were over the
Sports-Utility Vehicle raised American gas consumption and pollution rates. Since
2004, oil prices have skyrocketed in the US and other countries due to high demand,
rising crude oil prices and the destruction of oil platforms and refineries by hurricanes.
Still, prices are low compared to Europe, where governments impose higher gas taxes
to regulate use of a limited resource and protect the environment. A major problem
The Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) is compiled by the Yale University Center
in the US, China and India-the three largest and fastest growing energy consuming
for Environmental Law and Policy, Columbia Universitys Center for International Earth
markets in the world-is the absence of a coordinated regulatory framework for pubic
Science Information Network (CIESIN), and the World Economic Forum to gauge the
policy and market incentives to operate synergistically and reconcile short-term needs
the 2005 Environmental Sustainability Index Report were Finland, Norway, Uruguay,
Sweden, and Iceland, while the bottom five scoring nations were North Korea, Taiwan,
Turkmenistan, Iraq, and Uzbekistan. The US ranked 45 out of 146, while Canada placed
TAB LE 1:
6th, Japan 30th, the UK 65th, and China 133rd. With some exceptions, such as the
United States, a countrys environmental sustainability index score positively corre-
YEA R
lated with its degree of democratization: the more democratic countries are, the higher
5- YEA R A N NUA L
YEA R
5- YEA R A N NUA L
MEA N TEMP ER ATUR E
13.77
1980
14.05
The Kyoto Protocol, negotiated in 1997 under the United Nations Framework Convention
1910
13.71
1990
14.25
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), seeks to reduce global climates (Table 1) via carbon diox-
1920
13.75
1995
14.25
ide and other greenhouse gas reduction. Following ratification by Russia in November
1940
14.04
2000
14.37
of 2004, the protocol became legally binding in February of 2005. Although India and
1960
14.01
2005
14.52
China ratified the protocol, the present agreement does not impose any regulations on
their greenhouse gas emissions. Out of the 163 countries that ratified the protocol (as
S o u r c e : C a r b o n D i o x i d e I n f o r m a t i o n A n a l y s i s C e n t e r, G o d d a r d I n s t i t u t e
of April 2006), the United States and Australia rejected ratification for reasons related
to potential economic impacts; furthermore, US President Bush still questions the existence of a Greenhouse Effect. The United States, Australia, China, India, Japan, and
South Korea agreed to respectively curb greenhouse gas emission as signatories of the
Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development in July of 2005; however, the document
has no enforcement mechanisms.
436
2c.heritage_DEF.indd 436
1/17/2007 6:17:06 PM
CULTURAL PARTICIPATION
Recently scholars have noted that globalization has not necessarily benefited domi-
has in a way suffered from contested definitions and a poor information base, in par-
nant cultures disproportionately. They point to the growing diversity available to indi-
viduals within many societies as a result of globalization. This diversity informs and
via education, custom, language, religion, and the acknowledgment of difference in and
has changed participation to include more transnational, and potentially perhaps even
by the mainstream (Lewis and Miller, 2003:1). Thus, cultural participation can be seen
increasingly cosmopolitan, tastes. Whereas in Bourdieus world, one elite culture was
privileged among many, today the privileged person is the one that is informed and can
participate in many cultures (DiMaggio and Mukhtar, 2004).
However, much contemporary scholarship on cultural participation is based on the formation and cultivation of what Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron called cultural capital (1977). Bourdieu (1984) theorized that cultural capital was the result of
a specific socialization process whereby dominant social classes establish cultural
benchmarks in terms of cultural knowledge and expertise, amplified through unequal
access to educational institutions. The nurturing of cultural capital in the children of
elite families (i.e., the appreciation and consumption of high-art or elite-culture by
younger generations) was a way to ensure to reproduction of high social status. Education and the arts, therefore, were crucial to this process and served as signifiers of
achievement and cultural attainment. In this light, the evolution of cultural capital is
linked to issues of acculturation and participation in activities that influence or shape
a so-called cultured individual within society. The suite, therefore, shows primarily
cultural participation in terms of preferences, but also as active participation based on
decisions on how to spend ones time.
A GLIMPSE IN TO C U LTUR A L PA RT I C I PAT I O N W O R L D W I D E
Statistics on cultural participation are gathered disproportionately within countries,
making comparisons across regions and countries difficult. Differing definitions of what
constitutes a cultural activity further complicate data collection and studies. However, recently comparative studies are beginning to emerge, particularly in Europe.
Currently, Canada archives and collects the most comprehensive data on cultural participation of any country, also perhaps as part of its ongoing attempt to shield against
the influence of American popular culture. In fact, 87% of Canadians feel that participation and promotion of Canadian artistic and cultural expression is essential to remain
distinct as a country (Environics Research Group Ltd., 2000). Indeed, understanding cultural participation is in attempt to generate cultural development policies that
strengthen national or collective identities against the infiltration of outside cultures
(DiMaggio and Mukhtar, 2004).
The European Union population study (European Commission, 2004) identified going
to the cinema, library or museum, and attending sporting events as the top cultural
activities participated in by those surveyed. Similarly, in the United States, 60% of
the population also goes to the movies, followed by exercise (55.1%) and gardening
(47.3%) (NEA, 2002). Clearly here, the United States definition of cultural activities
includes leisure or recreation, whereas the European definition is based more on traditional notion of cultural participation.
T HE ISSU E S: C U LTU RAL PA RT I C I PAT I O N & G L O B A L I Z AT I O N
Historically, early concepts of what constitutes culture, and therefore cultural activities,
have privileged western cultures over all others and painted indigenous or traditional
cultures as backward, even uncivil. The institutionalization of these concepts has
indeed permeated theories related to globalization and development; as well as come
into play within policies addressing the global economy. The valuation of Western as
dominant has privileged cultural activities in association with western culture (fine
arts, Hollywood blockbuster movies, popular media, literature, and cultural institutions)
over other forms of non-western art and cultural activities. This has facilitated the
commodification of Western culture through mass media and entertainment as popular
culture, which, in turn, has influenced citizen participation in culture.
437
2c.heritage_DEF.indd 437
1/17/2007 6:17:06 PM
# OF P EOP LE
plex phenomenon, and one that is becoming increasingly lucrative from a business
I N AT T ENDANC E
perspective, as the lines between sports and entertainment are blurring. Like many
other cultural phenomena, sports are affected by globalization in practice (e.g. the rise
AV ERAGE
PER 1 0 0 , 0 0 0
LEAGUE
T Y P E O F S P O RT
such as Manchester United and global spectacles like the Olympics), and structure
NPB (JPN)
23,552
018
Baseball
(e.g., more dominant sports such as soccer crowding out less popular, niche sports in
30,970
009
Baseball
NBA (USA/CAN)
17,558
005
Basketball
35,703
176
Football
Culturally, sport is a vehicle for expressing ideals of health and beauty through exercise,
NFL (USA)
67,593
023
Football
and, in an international context, even peace and human understanding, with the Olympic
18,965
003
Football
movement as the clearest expression. At times, however, sports have been instrumen-
SM-liiga (FIN)
4,609
088
Hockey
talized for political reasons, with the perverted 1936 Olympics, the 1978 Soccer World
Nationalliga A (SWI)
5,495
073
Hockey
Cup in Argentina, and the partially boycotted 1980 and 1984 Olympics as the perhaps
Elitserien (SWE)
6,240
069
Hockey
5,018
049
Hockey
NHL (UCA/CAN)
16,955
005
Hockey
3,900
003
Hockey
Sports are organized game playing, regulated by rules, permitted equipment, and objec-
13,356
328
Rugby
tives. While some sports are cooperative and have no clear winners or losers, most in-
17,336
086
Rugby
volve competition, typically between two opposing teams, or individuals, playing against
Celtic League(IRE/SCO)
4,457
048
Rugby
each other with varying mechanisms for keeping score, and determining a winner.
9,718
016
Rugby
Historically, sports has a complex heritage: linked to the celebration of youth and
Eredivisie (NET)
16,789
102
Soccer
healthy exercise on the one hand, its competitive elements have been used to represent
La Liga (SPA)
28,401
070
Soccer
a country, region, city or a distinct group of people playing for the glory of winning-linking
33,893
056
Soccer
Bundesliga 1 (GER)
37,806
046
Soccer
Serie A (ITA)
25,805
044
Soccer
T HE SCALE AN D RISE O F G L O B A L S P O RT S
Ligue 1 (FRA)
21,392
035
Soccer
Globally, the Olympics and the Soccer World Cup are the most notable world sporting
17,425
029
Soccer
events, both well attended and followed by global audiences. The globalization of foot-
16,799
024
Soccer
ball is linked to the spread of the early British Empire and later to the migration of Brit-
J. League 1 (JPN)
18,765
015
Soccer
ish people to commonwealth states. Between 1850 and 1930, the British successfully
13,630
007
Soccer
introduced competitive football to the United States, Canada, Mexico, South America,
15,108
005
Soccer
of soccer as the pre-eminent global sport), organizations (e.g., the rise of super-clubs
South Africa, Brazil, China, Singapore, Sudan, Russia, Austria, Hungary, Greece, Italy
and Portugal (Goldblatt, 2004). Although the British are largely responsible for the global spread of the game of football, its origins lie in China (10,000 BC), further highlighting
WH AT A R E TH E IS S UES ?
Some sports, soccer in particular, have loyal communities of fans. In such cases, sport
is important for identity formation and maintenance, and has, at times become part
of identity politics. This may range from local hooliganism to international instances,
In 2005, FIFA, the International Football Association, received roughly $750 million in
as was the case for so-called Soccer War between Honduras and Nicaragua. In such
revenue from events, including broadcasting rights for the 2006 Soccer World Cup and
instances, sport serves as a cultural conduit focusing events that allow underlying
the qualifying matches. The revenue generated from broadcast partnerships for the
Olympic Games has grown significantly: in 1996, the Atlanta Games generated $898
million, whereas in Athens in 2004 the sum was almost $1.5 billion, and projected
The globalization of some sports such as soccer has brought about a mismatch be-
tween input markets and revenue markets. While players in major soccer clubs are
increasingly internationally recruited, and now represents around half of the players in
By looking at attendance rates for international sports leagues, we can see that the
major European leagues, the major revenue source through ticket sales remains local,
league and sport with the highest average attendance per game is the National Football
to ticket sales, soccer clubs are turning into commercial franchises, void of their origi-
that the NFL only draws 26 per 100,000 US citizens, whereas Australian football draws
nal cultural roots in particular cities or regions, and the support of local fans. In other
a higher proportion of their population to their games. While soccer is very popular in
words, the globalization sports will make some sports such as soccer more lucrative
438
2c.heritage_DEF.indd 438
1/17/2007 6:17:06 PM
EC ON OM Y
GL OB AL ARTS M ARK ET
CULTUR AL C ONS U M P TI ON + EX P ENDI TU R E S
CULTUR AL I NDU S TRI ES
TR ADE I N C U LTU RAL GOODS + S ERV I C ES
439
3a.economy_DEF.indd 439
1/17/2007 2:41:12 PM
B RA Z I L
CAN A DA
D E N MA R K
3a.economy_DEF.indd 440
INDIA
I R E LA N D
I SR A E L
I TA LY
J APAN
ME X I C O
N E T HE R L AN D S
SO U TH KO R E A
S PA IN
SWEDEN
S W I T Z E R LA N D
F I N LA N D
F R AN C E
I R AN
I R E LA N D
I TA LY
N O R WAY
PO RTU GA L
R U S SI A
SWEDEN
U N IT E D S TAT E S
S W I T Z E R LA N D 1 0
C OLOGNE 1 4
S PA IN 2 2
N E T HE R L AN D S
LONDON 1 9
KO R E A 1 2
GR E AT BR I TA IN
N EW YORK 40
G E R MA N Y 1 4 5
B E L GI U M
D E N MA R K
3.
A U S TR I A 1 5
T H E A RM O RY S HO W 2005:
A U ST R A LI A
U N IT E D STAT E S 7 2
U N I T E D K I N G D OM 1 7
GR E E CE
G E R MAN Y 2 0
2.
F R AN C E 1 0
A U S TR I A
B E L GI U M
G LO BA L A RT S M ARK
KET
- art basel: cities with
the largest # of art gallery exhibitors + art basel partners - galleries per country
unt represented at art cologne
- galleries per country at the armory show - sothebys: net auction sales by yyear - international art auction
MUNICH 5
25
ART C OLOGNE
LO
2005:
20
15
# OF PARTICIPATI
RT
NG G AL LERI ES P ER C OU NTRY
NT
10
440
1/17/2007 2:41:12 PM
market turnover by country 200304 - international art market by period art - us art auction market - uk art
auction market - contemporary art auction sales - index of 20th c. modern artists - index of old masters
works on paper - index of old master paintings
1.
A RT G A LLE RIE S B Y C IT Y
BE RLIN 1 9
PARIS 19
MAD RID 6
M I LAN 7
V I ENNA 6
T OK YO 5
PR OV I DER S
(DEC EM BER 2 0 0 6 )
ART NEX US
M A I N S PONS OR
1 0 CANE R UM
A RT B A SE L PA RT NE RS ( JUN E 2006)
SUPPL I E RS
UBS
P ERRI ER-JOUT
M A IN SP O N SO R
A S S OC I ATE S PONS OR S
C ROBAR
U BS
VITRA
BV LGARI
A SSOCIATE SP O N SO R
UN IPL AN
V CA
B VLGA R I
SAL ATH
BM W GROUP
M U S EU M S
H OST SP ON SO RS
SEMPEX
H OS T S PONS OR S
B A LOISE INSU RA NC E
N E T JE T S E U RO PE
W S OUT H BEAC H
BMW GROUP
OF F I C I A L H OTEL S
ARCHITEKTURMUSEUM BAS EL
S HORE C LUB
T HE M ARGULI ES C OLLEC T I ON AT
B A SLE R Z E IT U NG
DELANO
T HE WAREHOUS E
N E U E Z R C H E R Z E IT U NG
OF F I C I A L NEW S PA PER
L E T E M PS
LISTE 06
T HE M I AM I HERALD
M I AM I ART M US EUM
OF F I C I A L A RT R A DI O
T HE M OORE S PAC E
L E M O NDE
W P S 1 . ORG
OF F I C I A L C A R R I ER
C OR R IE RE DE LLA SE R A
B O LE R O
SCHAUL AGER
L OU NG E H OS TS
N E O2
BLOOM BERG
A NOT HE R M A G A Z INE
TOURI SM I NF ORM AT I ON
DAV I DOFF
B O N M AG A Z INE
BASEL TOURISM
O FFICIAL CARRIER
S T. REGI S
SWITZERLAN D TOURISM
PALM BEACH
441
3a.economy_DEF.indd 441
1/17/2007 2:41:13 PM
SALES IN TH OUSANDS $ US
2 0 0 3 /2 0 0 4 A U C TI ON S EA S ON 1 . 9 BI LLI ON $ 3 . 3 BI LLI ON
4.
6.
19 9 6
1,599,595
19 9 7
1,843,335
19 9 8
1,939,743
19 9 9
2,258,752
20 0 0
1,936,316
I TA LY
4%
20 0 4
2,334,937
20 0 5
2,361,830
0
UK 2 9%
7%
G ER M A NY
3%
R ES T OF TH E W OR L D
3%
2%
3%
A U S TR A L I A /NEW ZEA L A ND
S C A NDI NAV I A
6%
US A 4 3%
R ES T OF EU R OPE
2500000
1,455,970
2000000
20 0 3
1500000
1,552,703
1000000
1,437,214
20 0 2
500000
20 0 1
F R A NC E
TURNOV ER ( I N M I LLI ON ) 1 7 T O 1 8 T H C. 1 9 T H C. 2 0 T H C .
917
S EA S ON 2 0 0 0 /0 1
308
553
1,025
S EA S ON 2 0 0 1 /0 2
262
408
938
S EA S ON 2 0 0 2 /0 3
182
418
836
25000
792
I NDEX OF
2 0TH C . MODERN ARTI S T S
2000
641
1500
564
270
1000
250
S EA S ON 1 9 9 9 /0 0
500
C ON TEMPO RA RY A RT
AUC TI O N S AL ES
5.
S EA S ON 1 9 9 8 /9 9
8.
35 0
30 0
20000
25 0
800
700
20 0
15000
15 0
600
500
10 0
10000
300
200
100
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
0
1982
2 0 0 4 3 8 3 .7 0 2 1 ,7 5 1
2 0 0 3 2 8 8 .2 0 2 2 ,3 0 5
2 0 0 2 2 4 6 .0 0 1 9 ,2 7 9
2 0 0 1 2 1 5 .5 0 1 8 ,9 7 9
9 8 .6 0 1 2 ,5 7 2
1996
2 0 0 0 1 9 2 .0 0 1 7 ,8 0 8
8 9 .8 0 1 1 ,0 7 7
1995
1 9 9 9 1 6 4 .7 0 1 5 ,8 4 5
9 4 .8 0 1 1 ,3 2 5
1994
1 9 9 8 1 5 6 .1 0 1 5 ,3 2 1
9 ,3 1 5
7 8 .2 0
1993
1 9 9 7 1 6 0 .4 0 1 3 ,5 1 5
9 ,0 7 1
1 9 9 2 1 0 5 .6 0
8 ,1 9 0
1 9 9 1 1 1 3 .4 0
1980
50
400
442
3a.economy_DEF.indd 442
1/17/2007 2:41:14 PM
3a.economy_DEF.indd 443
300
20 0
200
10 0
100
2 0 01
30 0
1 9 99
400
1 9 97
40 0
1 9 95
500
1 9 93
50 0
1 9 91
600
1 9 89
60 0
1 9 87
700
1 9 85
70 0
1 9 83
800
1 9 81
1 9 79
IN D EX O F O L D MA S TE R S
W ORKS O N PAPE R
1 9 77
40000
1 9 75
2 0 01
1 9 99
1 9 97
1 9 95
1 9 93
1 9 91
1 9 89
1 9 87
1 9 85
1 9 83
1 9 81
80 0
1 9 79
9.
1 9 77
1 9 75
J A N. -9 2
J U L . -9 2
J A N. -9 3
J U L . -9 3
J A N. -9 4
J U L . -9 4
J A N. -9 5
J U L . -9 5
J A N. -9 6
J U L . -9 7
J A N. -9 8
J U L . -9 8
J A N. -9 9
J U L . -9 9
J A N. -0 0
J U L . -0 0
J A N. -0 1
J U L . -0 1
J A N. -0 2
J U L . -0 2
J A N. -0 3
J U L . -0 3
J A N. -0 4
J U L . -0 4
J A N. -0 5
60. 000
IN US$
50000
1 2 M ONTH AV ER A G E
6 M ONTH AV ER A G E
30000
20000
10000
1 2.
I NDEX O F O LD M A S TER S
PAI NTI NGS
443
1/17/2007 2:41:15 PM
CULTUR AL C ON SU M P T ION +
- government versus household consumption
expenditures % of total consumption by country
& years of comparison: recreation & culture +
1 0 .0 %
8 .0 %
6 .0 %
4 .0 %
1 2 .0 %
2 . 2 6%
2 . 3 6%
1 . 9 8%
2 . 2 2%
2 . 5 4%
2 . 5 8%
2 . 7 2%
4 . 3 7%
2 . 2 5%
2 . 6 9%
2 . 5 0%
2 . 8 7%
0 . 9 5%
0 . 4 2%
3 . 0 0%
0 . 5 8%
3 . 0 5%
5 . 3 0%
4 . 5 8%
1 . 5 2%
2 . 7 6%
DAT E S O F C O M PA R ISO N:
2 . 1 7%
( 1) 1 9 9 2 + 2 0 0 2
( 4 ) 1 995 + 2002
(10) 1996 + 2 0 0 0
( 2) 1 9 9 5 + 2 0 0 1
( 5 ) 1 998 + 2002
(11) 1994 + 2 0 0 2
( 3) 1 9 9 3 + 2 0 0 3
( 6 ) 1 992 + 2001
(12) 1995 + 2 0 0 3
2 . 5 0%
HO U S E H OL D C ON SU MP T I ON E X PE N D IT U R E
YR 2 RE C / C ULT / R E LI % O F T O TAL C ON S UM P T IO N
0 . 3 9%
1 1 . 9 3% UNI T ED K I NGDOM (1 )
9 . 1 4% GERM ANY (1 )
9 . 1 6% FRANC E (2 )
7 . 5 6% I TALY (1 )
6 . 6 5% P ORT UGAL (1 )
8 . 7 1% BELGI UM (1 )
9 . 2 8% NET HERLANDS (1 2 )
1 0 . 3 3% DENM ARK (3 )
1 3 . 0 3% NOR WAY (1 )
1 2 . 1 1% S W EDEN (4 )
1 2 . 2 0% AUS T RI A (4 )
1 1 . 8 8% AUS T RALI A (5 )
7 . 5 8% S OUT H K OREA (6 )
9 . 5 7% JAPAN (1 )
2 . 2 2% S AUDI ARABI A (6 )
1 . 2 6% I NDI A (7 )
5 . 6 1% I S RAEL (4 )
2 . 8 2% M EX I C O (8 )
1 0 . 1 2% LUX EM BOURG (3 )
1 . 9 9% S RI LANK A (9 )
3 . 3 9% I RAN (1 )
0 . 2 1% UK RAI NE (1 0 )
0 . 3 0% AZERBAI JAN (3 )
2 . 8 6% NI CARAGUA (7 )
GO VE RN M E N T C O N S U MPT I O N E X P E N D I T U R E
YR 2 RE C / C ULT / R E LI % O F T O TAL C ON S UM P T IO N
2 .0 %
B Y C OU NTRY + Y EA R S OF C OM PA R I S ON
0%
444
3a.economy_DEF.indd 444
1/17/2007 2:41:16 PM
3 6 .0 %
3 4 .0 %
3 2 .0 %
3 0 .0 %
2 8 .0 %
2 6 .0 %
2 4 .0 %
2 2 .0 %
2 0 .0 %
1 8 .0 %
1 6 .0 %
1 4 .0 %
1 2 .0 %
8 .0 %
1 0 .0 %
6 .0 %
4 .0 %
2 .0 %
0%
1 . 2 7%
0 . 7 0%
0 . 6 4%
0 . 9 4%
1 . 5 1%
0 . 5 7%
7 . 4 9%
0 . 7 7%
0 . 5 8%
0 . 1 3%
0 . 7 3%
2 . 3 8%
5 . 8 3%
2 . 2 5%
0%
2 . 3 5%
3 . 3 0%
3 . 8 5%
0 . 3 9%
1 . 4 9%
0%
1 . 3 3%
3 . 3 0%
1 . 4 0%
8 . 2 4%
EX P ENDITUR ES
1 7 . 6 6%
UNI T ED K I NGDOM (1 )
1 8 . 1 3%
GERM ANY (1 )
2 0 . 5 0%
FRANC E (2 )
2 4 . 6 9%
I TALY (1 )
2 9 . 6 4%
P ORT UGAL (1 )
2 7 . 6 9%
BELGI UM (1 )
3 2 . 6 6%
NET HERLANDS (1 2 )
2 3 . 1 2%
DENM ARK (3 )
2 2 . 2 1%
NOR WAY (1 )
2 3 . 7 7%
S W EDEN (4 )
2 7 . 2 6%
AUS T RI A (4 )
2 0 . 1 7%
AUS T RALI A (5 )
2 6 . 1 1%
S OUT H K OREA (6 )
1 9 . 4 1%
JAPAN (1 )
2 6 . 4 5%
S AUDI ARABI A (6 )
1 6 . 9 9%
I NDI A (7 )
2 3 . 6 6%
I S RAEL (4 )
3 6 . 9 0%
M EX I C O (8 )
2 4 . 0 3%
LUX EM BOURG (3 )
1 3 . 2 5%
S RI LANK A (9 )
5 . 6 0%
I RAN (1 )
2 7 . 2 6%
UK RAI NE (1 0 )
2 9 . 1 0%
AZERBAI JAN (3 )
1 5 . 4 4%
NI CARAGUA (7 )
2 7 . 4 0%
BOT S WANA (1 1 )
9 . 0 2%
2 . 5 7%
1 . 5 7%
UNI T ED S TAT ES
2 7 . 4 6%
UNI T ED S TAT ES
445
3a.economy_DEF.indd 445
1/17/2007 2:41:16 PM
CANADA
C O N S U ME R
S PENDING
2.
3.
U N IT E D S TAT E S 0 .02 %
$25
$20
$15
ON C ULT URE
$10
C OM PA R ED TO OT HER I T EM S
2003
C ONS U MER
S PENDING
ON C U LTU RE
0 . 5 0%
5000
CA NA DA
I N $ B I L L I ON B Y C ATEG ORY
$ 7 .4
$ 1 6 .3
R R S Ps
CULT UR E
GO VE R N ME N T S
4.
$ 2 0 .8
$0
T OBACCO, A L CO H O L +
GAM E S O F CH A NCE
0 . 6 0%
$ 2 2 .8
$5
I N $ B I L L ION S
CULT UR E
C O N S U ME R S
S W E D E N 0 .2 9 %
N E W Z E A L A N D 0 .6 0 %
N E T HE R L A N D S 0 .2 1 %
IR E L A N D 0 .0 7 %
GE R MA N Y 0 .3 6 %
F R A N C E 0 .2 6 %
F IN L A N D 0 .4 7 %
C A N A D A 0 .2 1%
A U S T R A L IA 0 .1 4 %
6000
U N IT E D K IN GD O M 0 .1 4 %
% OF GDP
7000
2 0 03
A RT S U PPL I E S + MU S IC A L
I NS TR U M ENTS $ 1 .0 B IL L IO N
0.40%
4000
4%
A RT W O R K S + E VE N T S
9%
2 0%
R EA DI NG M ATER I A L $4 . 6 B I L L I ON
$ 2 .1 B IL L IO N
9%
+ S ER V I C ES $2 . 1 B I L L I ON
0 . 3 0%
3000
6%
M OV I E TH EATR ES $1 . 3 B I L L I ON
0 . 2 0%
2000
HOM E
$ 1 1 . 8 B I L L I ON
ENT ERTAI NM ENT 5 2%
$1.4
M OV I E TH EATR ES
$1.2
0 . 1 0%
1000
$1.0
B OOK S
$0.8
PER F OR M I NG A RTS
(L I F E)
$0.6
W OR K S OF A RT, C A R V I NG S
A ND VA S ES
S PORTS EV ENTS
$0.4
(L I F E)
$0.2
2003
2002
2001
1999
2000
A DM I S S I ONS TO M U S EU M S
& H ER I TA G E
$0.0
1998
1 ,5 3 0
6
U N I TE D STAT E S
U N I T E D K I N G D OM 2 6 1 ,5 1 8
496
SWEDEN 57
714
598
N E W Z E A L AN D 1 5
33
IR E L A N D
G E R MA N Y 8 5 6 ,8 8 6
F R AN C E 5 7 3 ,2 7 5
460
FI N L A N D 9 1
CAN ADA 4 6 1 ,2 7 2
3a.economy_DEF.indd 446
N E T HE RL A N D S 4 6
446
A U ST R A LI A 2 5
438
1997
0%
1/17/2007 2:41:17 PM
C U LTUR AL IN D US T RIES
10
C U LT U RA L /
C RE AT IVE
I N D USTRIE S
8 % A S % OF GDP
16 %
7%
14 %
$ 5 .2
$ 7 .6
CH I NA
3.
CU LT U RA L
INDU S TRI E S
LARGES T
P RODU C ERS
OF C U LTU RAL GOODS 2 0 0 2
I N $ B I L L I ON B Y C OU NTRY
1.
2.
UNI T ED S TAT ES
UNI TED KI NG DO M
$ B I L L I ONS 0
$ 8 .5
2002 - fortune & forbes rankings for major tncs in cultural industries fields 2005
4.
12 %
5%
0%
10 %
4%
8%
3%
6%
2%
4%
1%
2%
3a.economy_DEF.indd 447
U N I TE D S TAT E S 2 0 06 2 .3 %
SI N G A PO R E 2 00 0 2 .2 %
SO U T H AF R ICA 1 9 98 1 7 .0 %
N E W Z E AL A N D 2 00 2 3 .6 %
CAN ADA 2 0 05 4 .5 %
H O N G K O N G 2 0 02 3 .7 %
A U ST R A LI A 2 0 01 3 .1 %
AR G E N T IN A 2 00 3 2 .9 %
U N I TE D S TAT E S 2 0 04 3 .6 %
SI N G A PO R E 2 00 2 3 .6 %
SO U T H AF R ICA 1 9 98 3 .0 %
N E W Z E AL A N D 2 00 2 3 .1 %
C H I N A 2 0 04 6 .6 %
H O N G K O N G 2 0 02 2 .0 %
B RA Z I L 2 0 02 6 .7 %
CAN ADA 2 0 05 2 .6 %
A U ST R A LI A 2 0 05 2 .4 %
0%
AR G E N T IN A 2 00 3 2 .9 %
0%
L I TH U A NI A
2 . 7%
C Y PR U S
2 . 5%
ES TONI A
3 . 7%
BULGARIA
2 . 1%
B EL G I U M
2 . 3%
F R A NC E
2 . 1%
S PA I N
2 . 0%
NOR WAY
2 . 2%
I C EL A ND
4 . 2%
U NI TED K I NG DOM
3 . 2%
DENM A R K
3 . 1%
H U NG A RY
1 . 9%
I R EL A ND
2 . 7%
EU OV ERALL
2 . 5%
NETH ER L A NDS
3 . 3%
F I NL A ND
3 . 5%
S W EDEN
3 . 3%
G R EEC E
2 . 5%
G ER M A NY
2 . 7%
S W I TZER L A ND
2 . 7%
L ATV I A
1 . 8%
S L OV ENI A
2 . 5%
S L OVA K I A
1 . 4%
C ZEC H R EPU B L I C
1 . 8%
A U S TR I A
2 . 0%
L U XEM B OU R G
1 . 8%
I TA LY
2 . 2%
PORTU G A L
1 . 4%
1%
2%
3%
4%
447
1/17/2007 2:41:17 PM
5.
F ORTUNE GLOBAL 5 0 0
FORBES GLOBAL 2 0 0 0
REV ENUE
P ROFI T S
COUN TRY:
I N M I L L I ONS:
I N M I L L I ONS :
M I CROSO FT
UNI T ED STAT ES
127 (1)
0 0 , 4 7 (1 )
03 6 , 8 3 5
0 08 , 1 6 8
UNI T ED STAT ES
274 (2)
0 , 6 0 8 (8 )
02 1 , 0 3 3
0 0 0 ,1 5 8
C O MP UTER SCIENCES
UNI T ED STAT ES
378 (3)
0 , 4 5 0 (6 )
01 5 , 8 4 9
0 0 0 ,8 1 0
A C CEN TURE
455 (4)
0 , 3 7 8 (5 )
01 3 , 6 7 4
0 0 0 ,6 9 1
0 03 , 3 6 4
C O M PA NY:
UNI T ED STAT ES
100 (1)
0 , 05 1 (1 )
04 2 , 8 6 9
WA LT D ISNEY
UNI T ED STAT ES
159 (2)
0 , 09 9 (2 )
03 0 , 7 5 2
0 02 , 3 4 5
V IACO M
UNI T ED STAT ES
196 (3)
0 , 4 4 8 (1 2 )
02 7 , 0 5 5
-1 7 , 4 6 2
V IVEN D I UN IVERSAL* *
F RANCE
199 (4)
0 , 4 5 4 (1 3 )
02 6 , 6 5 1
0 0 0 ,9 3 8
B ERTELSMANN
GERM ANY
271 (5)
NOT R A NK ED
02 1 , 1 6 4
0 01 , 2 8 4
C O MCAST* *
UNI T ED STAT ES
290 (6)
0 , 1 3 1 (4 )
02 0 , 3 0 7
0 0 0 ,9 7 0
N EW S CO RP.
282 (7)
0 , 1 2 5 (3 )
02 0 , 8 0 2
0 01 , 5 3 3
L A G ARD RE G ROUP E
F RANCE
345 (8)
0 , 4 1 4 (1 0 )
01 7 , 3 8 4
0 0 0 ,4 7 5
D A I N IP P ON P RINTIN G
JAPAN
467 (9)
0 , 4 2 0 (1 1 )
01 3 , 2 5 9
0 0 0 ,5 5 8
T OP PAN P RINTIN G
JAPAN
471 (10)
0 , 6 2 3 (1 6 )
01 3 , 1 5 3
0 0 0 ,3 7 8
JAPAN
018 (1)
0 0 , 2 3 (2 )
100,545
0 06 , 6 0 8
D EUTSCH E TELEKOM
GERM ANY
037 (2)
0 0 , 6 0 (5 )
07 1 , 9 8 9
0 05 , 7 6 4
038 (3)
0 0 , 1 8 (1 )
07 1 , 5 6 3
0 07 , 8 3 1
V OD AFON E
UNI T ED KI NGDOM
053 (4)
06 2 , 9 7 1
-1 3 , 9 1 0
F R AN CE TLCO M
F RANCE
063 (5)
0 0 , 3 6 (3 )
05 8 , 6 5 2
0 03 , 4 6 3
S B C CO MMUN ICATIO N S
UNI T ED STAT ES
102 (6)
0 0 , 4 0 (4 )
04 1 , 0 9 8
0 05 , 8 8 7
T ELECO M ITALIA
I TALY
111 (7)
0 0 , 8 5 (7 )
03 9 , 2 2 8
0 0 0 ,9 7 1
T ELEFN ICA
SPAI N
114 (8)
0 0 , 8 0 (6 )
03 8 , 1 8 8
0 03 , 5 7 9
BT
UNI T ED KI NGDOM
140 (9)
0 , 1 1 2 (9 )
03 4 , 6 7 3
0 03 , 3 6 0
AT& T
UNI T ED STAT ES
162 (10 )
0 , 5 5 6 (3 2 )
03 0 , 5 3 7
-6,469
S PRIN T
UNI T ED STAT ES
192 (11 )
0 , 4 8 9 (2 9 )
02 7 , 4 2 8
-1,012
K DD I
JAPAN
194 (12)
0 , 2 0 5 (1 6 )
02 7 , 1 7 0
0 01 , 8 6 6
TE LE C O M M U NICAT IO NS
0 ,3 7 7 (2 3 )
CHI NA
224 (13)
0 , 1 2 8 (1 0 )
02 3 , 9 5 8
0 04 , 0 7 8
B ELLSOUTH
UNI T ED STAT ES
244 (14 )
0 , 1 0 5 (8 )
02 2 , 7 2 9
0 04 , 7 5 8
MCI
UNI T ED STAT ES
247 (15 )
0 , 7 3 4 (3 6 )
02 2 , 6 1 5
-4,002
CHI NA
262 (16)
0 , 1 6 7 (1 1 )
02 1 , 5 6 2
0 02 , 4 2 2
T ELSTRA
AUSTRAL I A
401 (17 )
0 , 1 8 0 (1 2 )
01 5 , 1 9 3
0 02 , 9 3 9
KT
SOUT H KORE A
414 (18 )
0 , 3 4 7 (2 0 )
01 4 , 9 0 1
0 01 , 1 1 9
B CE
CANADA
416 (19 )
0 , 2 0 6 (1 7 )
01 4 , 8 4 2
0 01 , 2 2 4
R OYAL KP N
NE THERL ANDS
418 (20)
0 , 1 8 7 (1 3 )
01 4 , 8 2 8
0 01 , 8 7 9
UNI T ED STAT ES
451 (21 )
0 07 7 3 (3 8 )
01 3 , 8 0 9
-1,794
UNI T ED STAT ES
463 (22 )
1 , 1 9 6 (5 3 )
01 3 , 3 6 8
0 03 , 0 0 0
N OT E : TABLE IN CLUDES A L L CORPORAT I ONS F OUND ON THE F ORTUNE L IS T. R EPORTED R EV ENU E A ND PR OF I TS A R E F R OM F ORTU NE, W H I C H R A NK S ON R EV ENU E A L O N E .
F ORBES USES A COMP O SI TE RANKI NG F ROM F OUR M ETRI CS: SAL ES, PROF I TS , A S S ETS , & M A R K ET VA L U E
* * M ED IA/EN TERTAINMEN T AND PUBL I SHI NG/PRI NTI NG PRESE NT ED SE PAR ATELY I N F ORTU NE, NOT I N F OR B ES . F ORTU NE I NDU S TRY R A NK I NG S W ER E C OLL A PS ED
* * I N TH IS CATEG O RY.
* * VIVEND I AND COMCAST WERE L I STED AS M EDI A COM PANI E S I N F ORBE S , A ND TEL EC OM M U NI C ATI ONS I N F ORTU NE.
448
3a.economy_DEF.indd 448
1/17/2007 2:41:18 PM
T R AD E IN C U LT U RAL GOODS
+ SERVICES
value of core cultural goods 19942002 (by world economies) - comparison of imports & exports of core cultural goods 2002 (by regions) - top 10 exporters/importers (comparison of both values) - flow chart of 5 countries (export/import) - trade partners of the usas export/imports of core cultural goods 2003 - trade partners
of chinas export/imports of core cultural goods 2003 - trade partners of south africas export/imports of
core cultural goods 2003 - trade partners of brazils export/imports of core cultural goods 2003 - trade partners of egypts export/imports of core cultural goods 2003 - top 30 most valuable brands (as reported in the
financial times, april 2006) - top 3 brands per sector (as reported in the financial times, april 2006)
% OF EX P ORT OF
C U LTU RAL GOODS 2002
1.
2.
6 . 2 % OTH ER EU R OPE
0 . 3 % L ATI N A M ER I C A + C A R IB B E A N
NORT H 1 6 . 9%
AM ERI CA
6 . 2%
0 . 6 % OC EA NI A
3%
0.4% AFRICA
44,920.9
40,651.2
44,944.0
45,288.4
41,779.6
41,113.3
39,437.6
38,256.7
20. 0 0 0
33,136.9
300 0 0
AS I A 2 0 . 7%
1 5 . 6 % EA S TER N A S I A
1 0 . 5 % C ENTR A L A S I A
0
6 ,4 1 1. 1
3 ,0 05 .4
3 29 .0
4 ,5 7 7. 2
1 ,9 99 .3
2 74 .5
4 ,2 5 3. 0
1 ,5 38 .2
4 62 .1
3 ,5 4 6. 3
1 ,7 00 .9
3 49 .0
3 ,1 9 5. 9
1 ,7 46 .5
3 09 .5
2 ,9 8 3. 7
1 ,7 19 .6
2 92 .1
2 ,6 1 6. 4
1 ,6 93 .6
2 25 .6
2 ,1 7 1. 3
1 ,5 10 .8
2 10 .9
1 ,7 3 4. 4
1 ,2 07 .2
1 43 .9
8000
1 4 . 1 % S OU TH EA S TER N A S IA
6000
4000
1 0 . 5 % W ES TER N A S I A
8 . 5 A U DI OV I S U A L M EDI A
1 1 . 3 B I L L I ON U S $ V I S UAL ART S
2000
3a.economy_DEF.indd 449
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
449
1/17/2007 2:41:18 PM
C O M PARI S O N O F E X P O RT S +
3.
03.3 % SPAI N
01.1 % F RANCE
5000000
10000000
15000000
01.1 % I TALY
20000000
01.1 % ANGOL A
25000000
30000000
01.1 % SOUT H AF RI CA
00.8 % GE RM ANY
00.8 % UNI TED KI NGDOM
F R OM EUROP E
3 1 , 677 0 .8
4.4% COLOM B I A
4.3% CHI L E
4.0% ARGENTI NA
3.8% M EXI C O
0.7% PER U
F R OM NORT H AM ERI CA
9 , 222 6 .8
F R OM AS I A
1 1 , 577 7 .5
F R OM LAT I N AM ERI CA
1 , 633 3 .5
F R OM OC EANI A
3 5 1 .6
F R OM AFRI CA
M AIN DE ST INAT IO NS O F
2 0 6 .2
0 3 . 9 % TANZANIA
0 3 . 7 % MALAW I
40.2 % CANADA
0 2 . 5% R EPU B L I C OF K OR EA
0 2 . 4% A U S TR A L I A
0 2 . 6 % NIG ERIA
0 2 . 2% NETH ER L A NDS
0 2 . 6 % MAURITIU S
05.2 % JAPAN
0 1 . 4% C H I NA
0 2 . 5 % CON G O
03.6 % M EXI CO
1 8 . 7% R ES T OF AVA I L A B L E C OU NTR I ES
4.
2000000
4000000
6000000
8000000
10000000
2 . 9 % ANG O LA
0 3 . 3% G ER M A NY
TOP EX P ORTERS /
0 4 . 5 % ZIMBABWE
F R OM U NI TED S TATES
0 2 . 3 % KEN YA
7 , 6 4 8,44 1 4
F R OM U NI TED K I NG DOM
8 , 5 4 8,77 7 2
0 3 . 2% G ERMANY
0 2 . 2% AUSTRALIA
F R OM G ER M A NY
5 , 7 8 8,99 3 1
0 1 . 3% NETH ERLAN D S
17. 3 % REST O F AVAILABLE COUNT RI ES
F R OM C A NA DA
1 , 5 7 7,22 3 0
F R OM F R A NC E
1 , 8 0 5,1 3 3
F R OM C H I NA
5 , 2 4 7,99 0 1
450
3a.economy_DEF.indd 450
0 2 . 4% C A NA DA
0 2 . 3% G ER M A NY
0 2 . 0% A U S TR A L I A
0 6.6 % JAPAN
0 1 . 2% I TA LY
1 1 . 9% R ES T OF AVA I L A B L E C OU NTR I ES
1 , 8 0 5,1 3 3
1/17/2007 2:41:19 PM
M AI N ORI GI NS OF B R A ZI L I A N IMP O RT S
OF C ORE C ULT URAL GOODS 20 0 3
2 8 . 8% U NI TED S TATES
1 6 . 3% U NI TED K I NG DOM
0 8 . 2% S PA I N
0 6 . 6% R ES T OF AVA I L A B L E C O U N T R IE S
I MP O RT S 200 2
0 5 . 2% C H I NA
0 4 . 0% F R A NC E
0 4 . 0% G ER M A NY
40000000
35000000
30000000
25000000
20000000
15000000
10000000
5000000
30,620.7
T O EUROP E
19,173.9
T O NORT H AM ERI CA
9,363.2
T O AS I A
2,291.6
T O LAT I N AM ERI CA
M AI N ORI GI NS OF
0 3 . 6% J A PA N
S OU TH A F R I C A N I M PORTS OF
0 2 . 9% PORTU G A L
0 2 . 9% H ONG K ONG , C H I NA
2 7 . 2% U NI TED K I NG DOM
0 2 . 4% I TA LY
2 1 . 3% U NI TED S TATES
0 1 . 0% S W EDEN
1 0 . 7% I R EL A ND
1 4 . 2% L ATI N A M ER I C A :
06 . 3% G ER M A NY
5 . 2 % A R G EN T IN A
05 . 9% A R EA S , NES
3 . 3 % PER U
05 . 2% C H I NA
3 . 2 % U R U G U AY
02 . 6% NETH ER L A NDS
2.5% CHILE
02 . 1% F R A NC E
01 . 8% A U S TR A L I A
1,560.9
T O OC EANI A
01 . 6% J A PA N
1 5 . 3% R ES T OF AVA I L A B L E C OU NTR I ES
658.1
T O AFRI CA
16000000
1 5 . 0% R ES T OF AVA I L A B L E C O U N T R IE S
14000000
0 1 . 8% S PA I N
0 4 . 2% G ER M A NY
12000000
0 2 . 1% S W I TZER L A ND
1 0 . 5% C A NA DA
10000000
0 3 . 0% M EXI C O
1 0 . 8% F R A NC E
8000000
0 3 . 3% H ONG K ONG , C H I NA
1 1 . 0% U NI TED K I NG DOM
6000000
0 3 . 6% J A PA N
3 0 . 8% C H I NA
4000000
0 4 . 0% I TA LY
2000000
M AI N ORI GI NS OF A M ER I C A N I M PORTS
15,338,583
TO U NI TED S TATES
7,871,902
TO U NI TED K I NG DOM
4,162,120
TO G ER M A NY
3,829,893
TO C A NA DA
3,406,846
TO F R A NC E
1,113,386
TO C H I NA
2,014,174
TO J A PA N
0 6 . 4% J A PA N
2 2 . 2% U NI TED S TATES
0 5 . 7% OTH ER A S I A , NES
1 4 . 7% G ER M A NY
0 4 . 7% I R EL A ND
1 2 . 5% H ONG K ONG , C H I NA
0 3 . 2% F R EE ZONES
1 0 . 2% S I NG A POR E
0 2 . 6% U NI TED K I NG DOM
07 . 1% F I NL A ND
1 0 . 7% R ES T OF AVA I L A B L E C O U N T R IE S
451
3a.economy_DEF.indd 451
1/17/2007 2:41:19 PM
5.
I NT E L
V ODAFO NE
BMW
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TH E F INA NC IA L TIMES :
TOP 3 GLOBAL BRANDS
B Y S EC TOR - A PR IL 2006
6.
18 , 3 03
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VA L U E I N $U S M I L L I ONS
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C H IN A MOB I LE CH I NA 3 9 , 1 6 8
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VO DA FO N E UN I TED KI NG DO M 2 4 ,0 72
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K F C US A 4 , 0 44
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T E SC O U N IT ED K IN G D OM 1 5 ,5 32
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WAL-MART US A 35 , 5 6 7
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M E R CE D E S G E RM A N Y 1 7 ,8 2 0
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452
3a.economy_DEF.indd 452
AP PAREL
CARS
RETAI L
FAS T FOOD
M OBI LE P H O N E
1/17/2007 2:41:19 PM
at one end, economic activities that are highly knowledge and labor-intensive with an
tivities for the creation, production, distribution, and consumption of cultural goods and
emphasis on creativity and innovation; and, at the other, they involve mass production
services, such as fine arts, printing and publishing, multimedia, audio-visual, phono-
and distribution to vast audiences. Overall, the cultural economy is highly concentrated
graphic and cinematographic productions, and crafts and design. According to UNES-
in geographic terms, as globally, cultural goods and services are being exported from
COs Division of Arts and Cultural Enterprise, the cultural economy comprises industries
Europe, the US, China and Japan, but being consumed by almost all other countries.
that combine the creation, production and commercialization of contents which are
Specifically:
intangible and cultural in nature. These contents are typically protected by copyright
and they can take the form of goods or services (UNESCO, 2006).
Global trade in cultural goods and services is dominated by the industrial North and
China. Europe accounts for more than half of the world exports of cultural goods and
Like other parts of the economy, the cultural economy is undergoing a process of glo-
services, and a little under half of the world imports. The UK and Germany are responsible
up complex policy issues in terms of fair trade, cultural diversity, access to information
Asian exports are dominated by China, followed by Japan, and together they are only
and knowledge as well as cultural sovereignty. At the same time, comparative statistics
and indicator systems of cultural activities are underdeveloped, and suffer from major
The largest three global producers of cultural goods are the US, the European Union
and China; with 6.6% of Chinas GDP dedicated to cultural or creative industries, second
only to Canada.
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) covers services ranging from ar-
The global arts market is dominated by European artists, and traded mostly in Europe
and the United States: 72% of international art auctions, measured by yearly turnover,
the largest and most dynamic component of the economy in both developed and de-
are located in the US and the EU; only 5% of the total number of international art auctions
veloping countries. Important in their own right, they also serve as crucial inputs into
the production of most goods. Since January 2000, they have become the subject of
New York, London, Paris and Berlin are the international centers of fine art trade.
multilateral trade negotiations with numerous amendments and special clauses with
Sothebys and Christies are the worlds preeminent fine art auctioneers. Christies
Los Angeles, London, Amsterdam, Geneva, Madrid, Tel Aviv, Milan, Paris, Rome, Zurich,
dedicated to promoting the use and protection of works of the human spirit. These
Hong Kong and Dubai. In addition, Christies has offices in many countries. For example,
works intellectual property are expanding the bounds of science and technology
and enriching the world of the arts. Through its work, WIPO plays an important role in
Cultural industries have expanded over the course of the last five years, with the
enhancing the quality and enjoyment of life, as well as creating real wealth for nations.
highest growth rates taking place in industrial countries (Americans for the Arts, 2005).
(WIPO, 2006). WIPO is one of the 16 specialized UN agencies, with 183 nations as
However, there are notable exceptions in parts of the developing world, Brazil and
China in particular, where growth rates surpass those of the US and Europe.
A major factor in this case is the growth of the home entertainment industry. The
However, lack of data and differences in the classification of goods and services make
Broadcasting Organizations
Accounts report expenditures in the field of culture, mostly from developed countries.
From what limited data exist, there is a clear division between developed and develop-
terms such as cultural economy or creative industries, has its origin in the critique of
ing countries. Unfortunately, the dearth of comparable and more comprehensive data
modern mass culture by members of the Frankfurt School of Sociology, in particular the
continues to handicap the debate surrounding cultural industries, trade and globaliza-
works of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer. They disparaged what they identified
tion. The efforts of the Canadian government to collect data on cultural participation
and cultural industries are a rare exception, as are Australia, New Zealand and a few
quality of the capitalist system (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1947). Culture as artistic
EU member states.
creation and appreciation became increasingly replaced by culture as products manufactured and offered for mass consumption. In this process, according to Adorno and
WH AT A R E TH E IS S UES ?
Horkheimer, art becomes increasingly void of its deeply humane capacity to anticipate,
A basic line of disagreement among experts is the treatment of cultural goods and ser-
and contribute to, a better world, and instead emerges as a conformist, legitimizing
vices in national and international policies. Most argue that culture is different from
tool of capitalism.
lets say machinery or insurance, and should therefore be treated as a category of its
own. While some argue that culture and cultural industries should remain hands-off
The Adorno-Horkheimer thesis has certainly not remained unchallenged, and has been
with regard to economic policy, the majority maintain that it is the role of a sovereign
charged as elitist by some, and as biased against non-Western cultures by others. Yet
debates about how culture and market are to relate to each other continue unabated,
of this debate arises in trade negotiations, whereby the US seeks to exclude all forms
and it is particularly the process of economic globalization that has brought the ques-
of national protection of cultural goods, services and industries to which other coun-
tion of the cultural economy to the forefront. At the center of the debate is whether
tries, especially Europeans and Canadians, object (Raboy, et.al, 1994; Hesmondhalgh
As cultural goods and services become commodified, there is also growing debate
about who is gaining and who is losing out. Many developing countries are unable to
WHAT D O W E K N OW AB O UT C ULT UR A L E C O N O M I E S ?
take part in the international trade of culture, and are becoming more marginalized
From the indicator suite we can see the range and growth of national and transnational
and isolated: Africa, Latin America and Oceania combined only account for roughly 4%
economic activities within the cultural economy. These are very diverse, and involve,
453
3a.economy_DEF.indd 453
1/17/2007 2:41:20 PM
dominate cultural trade and consumption, which is creating fears of cultural hegemony
that might dominate and even erode non-Western cultures.
A counter-movement against the dominance of the West in the commodification of culture
is under way in countries like India, China, Brazil and South Africa. They are at the forefront of creating a system of cultural heritage protection and promotion campaigns that
seek to reconcile preserving indigenous culture and knowledge with capitalizing on
economic values and revenue generation. In India, this includes the patenting of traditional Indian knowledge in fields such as botany; in Brazil, cultural industries are seen
as having the ability to generate revenue by utilizing a wealth of cultural knowledge
and practice that has previously not been commodified nor seen as products suitable
for international marketing and trading.
TA BL E 1: RE PORTIN G ON C ULT UR A L C O N S UM P T I O N E X P E N D I T UR E
IN THE FIE LD OF C U LTUR E I N T H E UN S YS T E M O F N AT I O N A L A C CO UN TS
( SN A ), 2003, BY NUM BE R
C O U N TRIE S ...
Covered in the SNA
185
079
068
050
024
454
3a.economy_DEF.indd 454
1/17/2007 2:41:20 PM
P RO FESSIO N S
CULTUR AL P ROFES S I ONS
455
3b.professions_DEF.indd 455
1/17/2007 6:16:52 PM
% OF TOTAL EM P LOY M E N T
I N S ELEC TED P ROFES S I O N S
2.
% CHAN GE IN EMPLOYMEN T
I N SE LE C TED O CCUPATI ONS
EU1995 1999
1.
B Y S EL EC TED C OU NTR I ES 2 0 00 2 0 0 1
3.0%
2.5%
2.0%
1.5%
1.0%
3b.professions_DEF.indd 456
1 .2
0.5%
S OU T H K O R E A 0 . 5%
0%
0 . 4%
0 . 4%
0 . 2%
G E R MAN Y 2 . 9%
0 . 1%
0 . 3%
0 . 1%
0 . 7%
F R AN C E 2 . 0%
0 . 2%
0 . 4%
0 . 1%
0 . 6%
F I N LA N D 2 . 6%
0 . 3%
0 . 4%
0 . 2%
1 . 2%
C Z E C H RE PU B L IC 1 . 4%
0 . 1%
0 . 3%
0%
0 . 7%
C Y P R U S 2 . 1%
0%
O. 3%
0 . 2%
0 . 4%
0%
B E L GI U M 1 . 5%
0 . 1%
0 . 3%
0 . 1%
0 . 6%
E U E MP LOYM EN T O VE R AL L
- 0 .1
P U BL I SH I N G, PR I N T I N G +
RE P RO D U C T IO N O F R E C O R D E D ME D I A
2 .6
L I BR A R I AN S
AR C H I VI ST S ,
S PO RT A C T I VI TI E S
3 .8
456
RE C R E AT I O N AL, C U LT U R A L +
4 .9
W R I T I N G, C R E AT I VE +
P E RF OR M IN G O PE R AT O RS
S PO RT S PR O FE SSI O N S
ART IS T IC , E N T E RTA I N ME N T ,
5 .4
-1
1/17/2007 6:16:52 PM
3b.professions_DEF.indd 457
U N I T E D S TAT E S 1 . 7%
0%
0 . 7%
0 . 1%
0 . 1%
U N I T E D KI N G D O M 2 . 4%
0 . 2%
0 . 9%
0 . 2%
0 . 8%
T HA I LA N D 0 . 2%
0%
0 . 2%
0%
0 . 1%
S W E D E N 1 . 1%
0 . 3%
0 . 6%
0 . 1%
1 . 3%
S PA IN 1 . 4%
0 . 1%
0 . 5%
0 . 1%
0 . 4%
P O LA N D 1 . 1%
0 . 2%
0 . 5%
0 . 1%
0 . 4%
0%
0%
0 . 2%
0 . 1%
0 . 1%
% S EL F -EM PL OY ED
% C ONTI NU OU S LY EM PL OY ED
% TH EY W OU L D W OR K L ONG H OU R S
% AV ER A G E G R OS S W EEK LY PAY
% U NI V ER S I TY DEG R EE
W ORK ERS
O. 6 %
368
% AV ER A G E L ENG TH OF TI M E
3 9%
1 2%
7 . 3 Y EA R S
7 . 7 YE A R S
% W I TH A H I G H ER
1 . 7%
1 . 8%
10%
0 .4 %
-0 . 9
M ANUFAC T URI NG
T RAV EL ARRANGEM ENT S ERV I C ES
0.1
-0 . 6
LEGAL S ERV I C ES
1.3
RETAI L T RADE
0.8
2.0
EDUCAT I ONAL S ERV I C ES
2.3
HEALT H CARE + S OC I AL AS S I S TANC E
2.5
3.4
3.5
5%
C OM P UT ER S YS T EM S DES I GN
3.9
10%
4.1
15%
4.2
20%
4.3
25%
C ONS T R UC T I ON
6.7
30%
6.8
2 9%
1 4%
9%
3%
2 5%
1 7%
1 8%
1 2%
S ELF-EM P LOY ED
% EM P LOY ERS
A S EC OND JOB
W I TH
% OF W OR K ER S
PART-T I M E JOBS
W I TH
% OF W OR K ER S
T EM P ORARY JOBS
W I TH
% OF W OR K ER S
35%
P HI L I PP IN E S
N E T H E RL AN D S 2 . 0%
0 . 1%
0 . 2%
0 . 1%
1 . 2%
3.
4.
ANNU AL % GROWTH IN
EM P LOY M ENT I N S ELE C T E D
P ROFES S I ONS U S 200 5
-1
K EY S TATI S TI C S ON
C U LTU RAL OC C U PATI O N S
I N THE U K
C ULT URAL
OT HE R S
% W H O S AY
0 .8 %
% EXPER I ENC I NG AT L EA S T
290
457
1/17/2007 6:16:53 PM
3b.professions_DEF.indd 458
P ORTUGAL 1 1 %
25%
ITALY 1 4 %
27%
LU X EM BO URG 2 1 %
31%
A US TRI A 1 9 %
32%
C Z E C H REP UB LI C 1 3 %
33%
S LOVAK I A 1 4 %
34%
SL O VE NI A 1 6 %
34%
L AT V I A 2 5 %
35%
SW I T ZER LAND 2 4 %
36%
G ER MANY 2 3 %
36%
G REEC E 2 4 %
37%
S WE DEN 2 6 %
38%
FI NLAND 3 4 %
38%
N E T H ERLANDS 2 5 %
39%
E U OV ER A L L 2 4 %
40%
IR ELAND 2 9 %
40%
H UN GARY 1 8 %
43%
DENM ARK 2 7 %
43%
U N IT E D K IN GD OM 2 8 %
43%
I C ELAND 2 4 %
44%
NO R WAY 3 4 %
45%
S PAI N 3 1 %
51%
FR ANC E 2 8 %
51%
B ELGI UM 3 5 %
51%
BU LGA RI A 2 8 %
54%
ES TO NI A 3 3 %
60%
C YP R US 3 3 %
65%
L I THU ANI A 5 3 %
79%
6.
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
458
1/17/2007 6:16:53 PM
HE ALT H + WE LFARE
3b.professions_DEF.indd 459
A U ST R A LI A + 7 6 %
66%
N E W Z E A LA N D 5 4 %
37%
22%
78%
56%
8.
E U R OP E 7 7 %
68%
60%
42%
23%
76%
58%
+ C ONST R U C T ION
MI D D LE E A ST 5 7 %
59%
49%
46%
32%
61%
45%
AUS T RALI A + 1 1%
1 2%
NEW ZEALAND 3 7%
1 3%
8%
1 4%
EUROP E 1 1%
1 1%
3 3%
1 0%
1 3%
1 3%
M I DDLE EAS T 1 7%
6%
2 5%
8%
1 4%
6%
AS I A
NORT H AM ERI CA 1 2%
1 3%
4 0%
1 0%
8%
1 1%
LAT I N AM ERI CA + 1 8%
2%
T HE CARI BBEAN 4 1%
1 0%
1 6%
1 0%
BU SINE SS + LAW
A SI A 7 4 %
64%
45%
42%
22%
70%
50%
SOC IA L SC IE NC E S ,
N O RT H A ME R I CA 7 8 %
59%
57%
41%
19%
80%
57%
AFRI CA 1 6%
1 4%
4 5%
1 0%
7%
6%
E DU CAT IO N
L AT I N A ME R I CA + 7 0 %
61%
T HE CA R I BB E A N 5 6 %
44%
28%
67%
53%
AF R ICA 2 3 %
51%
41%
32%
14%
39%
36%
7.
60%
40%
20%
0%
SC IE NC E
OVE RA LL
60%
40%
20%
0%
459
1/17/2007 6:16:53 PM
CULTURAL PROFESSIONS
in employment in cultural occupations. This growth is changing both the types of jobs
available and the nature of the work itself. Growth in cultural occupations is not evenly
has also been significant investment by some governments in growing this sector of
distributed around the world, however, as it is growing most quickly in the more devel-
their economy. France is the most prominent example; another is Denmark where the
employment often takes place on a temporary or part-time basis, or within the context
of self-employment. The indicator suite shows that:
WH AT A R E TH E IS S UES ?
Unsurprisingly, globalization is helping to spark the growth of the cultural professions,
In the EU, from 1995-1999, employment in the cultural professions grew faster than
as cultural workers are highly mobile and are able to cross borders and boundaries
with their most important resource, personal knowledge, intact. The growth of digital
sions, as well as writing and creative or performing arts. Growth did not occur in pub-
media also promotes the spread of ideas and allows people to produce and transmit
lishing, printing, and reproduction of recorded media, which may be due to the rapid
cultural products quickly and widely. Unfortunately, like many aspects of the economy
that are being globalized, the global distribution of cultural professionals is uneven.
Most professional cultural work is being done in more developed countries, particularly
university graduates in cultural employment then general employment in 2002, for all
Europe.
countries with available data. This trend is especially noticeable in economies in transition such as Estonia, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic
The growth of cultural professions means that many people are experiencing new pat-
terns of labor, more self-employment and more flexible work arrangements. Part of
the larger post-Fordian shift, cultural employment tends to be more self-directed and
In the US, employment in cultural professions is also on the rise. Fields such as spe-
cialized design services, architecture, and advertising are growing quickly, while fields
(Milohnic, 2005). As an example of this, cultural workers in the UK are more likely to
such as retail and law are growing at a slower rate, and manufacturing is declining
be self-employed, less likely to want to work longer hours, are more highly educated
Conversely, cultural workers in Europe are more likely to hold temporarily or part-
and are higher paid than other workers (Davies and Lindley, 2003). This has also led to
time jobs, to have a second job, and be self-employed than other workers overall. This
what has been termed the de-gendering of the cultural professions, which includes
suggests that cultural employment is more transitory and insecure than employment
high numbers of women in its ranks (Gottschall and Betzelt, 2001). The table below
in other fields.
shows the growth of select cultural professions in Germany over the 1990s, with the
study across the globe, we find that in every region the highest percentage of students
graduated in social sciences, business and law. Females are highly represented in
tertiary education, and particularly in fields of study likely leading to cultural employ-
ment. In every region, females make up more than half of all graduates in arts and
% WITH
# OF WORKERS
% FEMALE
1993 1999
1993 1999
1993 1999
1993 1999
38.1% 41.9%
32.2% 33.8%
45.5% 49.1%
43.4% 44.2%
42.7% 47.7%
33.0% 45.3%
There is no single definition of what occupations the term cultural professions includes.
JOURNALISTS
The term may include such diverse occupations as those engaged in the creative and
(ISCO 2451)*
COMMERCIAL DESIGNERS
educators, journalists, and clergy. Strictly defined, it may only include those working in
(ISCO 3471)*
the fields of creative and artistic production, and heritage collection and preservation
EDITORIAL WORKERS
76,000 121,000
60,000
79,000
estimated >
% SELF-EMPLOYED
90%
estimated >
UNIVERSITY DEGREES
60%
no reliable data,
those meeting the strict criteria as well as those in knowledge industries, such as
mostly academic
publishing, technology, and education. Many, but not all, cultural professions are professions in the traditional sense. The term professions has typically been reserved
for those occupations that require specialized knowledge and skills, provide significant
autonomy to the worker, and benefit society as a whole and not just single individuals
or corporations. Many cultural professions contain some elements of that definition but
C u l tu ra l P ro fe s s i o n s : B e twe e n D e - G e n d e re d Wo rk a n d R e - G e n d e re d Wo rk a n d Lif eA r r a n g e m e n t s ? P a p e r p r e s e n t e d a t t h e G e n d e r C o n f e r e n c e o n C h a n g i n g Wo r k a n d
WHAT D O W E K N OW AB O UT C ULT UR A L P R O F E S S I O N S ?
L i f e P a t t e r n s i n We s t e r n I n d u s t r i a l C o u n t r i e s , W Z B B e r l i n , S e p t . 2 0 - 2 1 , 2 0 0 1 .
Recent work by Florida (2003; 2005) and others has proclaimed that there is an emerging
A c c e s s e d M a y 2 5 , 2 0 0 6 a t : w w w. z e s . u n i - b r e m e n . d e / ~ k g s / W Z B 9 - 0 1 . d o c .
creative class that is uniquely self-directed and high-achieving, a boon to any economy
that can claim it. According to Florida (2003), who views cultural employment broadly,
there are 32 million Americans in cultural employment, more than 30% of the US workforce. This may be particularly true in Europe, where cultural employment grew by 37%
in France between 1982 and 1990 and 34 percent in the United Kingdom over the same
period (European Commission, 2001). Although this workforce is growing, according to
Florida, in the United States, this emerging creative class is increasingly threatened by
current US immigration laws and the globalization of cities (2005). What has emerged
in this creative age is rising competition for creative individuals and creative talent
on a global scale (Florida, 2005).
460
3b.professions_DEF.indd 460
1/17/2007 6:16:54 PM
C O RPO RATION S
+ O RGAN IZAT ION S
TR ANSN ATI ONAL C U LTU RAL C ORP ORATI ON S
- DISN EY
OT HER M AJOR M EDI A C ORP ORATI ONS
CULTUR AL I NGO s + FOU NDATI ONS
461
3c.corporations_DEF.indd 461
1/17/2007 6:16:40 PM
1 3 , 2 0 7 M I LL IO N U S $
7.587 M I L L I ON U S $
- PRODUCTI ON STUDI OS
- C A B L E NETW OR K S
- WA LT DISNE Y PIC T U RE S
- ES P N
- WA LT DISNE Y FE AT U R E AN IMATION
- EN TERTAIN MEN T
- DI S NEY C HANNEL
- ABC DAY T I M E
- ABC FAM I LY
- PIC T U RE S
- ABC NEW S
- T OON DI S NEY
- H O LLYWOO D PIC T U RE S
- ABC S P ORT S
- S OAP n et.
- M IRA M AX FILM S
- PROD UCTION S
- ABC K I DS
- ANI M AT I ON
- ABC RADI O
- RADI O DI S NEY
- ES P N RADI O
- E! NET W ORK S
- BUENA V I S TA T ELEV I S I ON
- BUENA V I S TA T ELEV I S I ON
- I NT ERNAT I ONAL
- HY P ERI ON BOOK
- WALT DI S NEY I NT ERNET GR O U P
%
17
A
IC
ER
AM
H
RT
NO
AR
IN
E
A F R IC
21
A 17%
LA
RI
TI
BB
EA
AM
15
ER
IC
A
IC
P A C IF
A S IA +
CA
GRANTS DO LLARS
DISN E Y
WI LDL IF E
C ONS ERVAT IO N
FU ND 2 0 0 5
3.
17%
462
3c.corporations_DEF.indd 462
1/17/2007 6:16:40 PM
1.
GLOBAL M EDIA
W ORLD S LARG EST
WORL DS L ARGEST
MEDI A
RECO RD
C OM PA N IES
TIM E WA R NE R IN C.
W OR L D S L A R G ES T
W OR L D S M OS T DOM I NA NT
PU B L IS H ER S
F IL M
COMPAN IES
C OM PANI ES + TH EI R PA R E N T S
P EARS ON PL C
THE NE WS C O R PO R AT IO N LT D.
T I M E WARNER
S ONY C O R PO R AT IO N
EMI GROUP PL C
G ENE RA L E LE C T RIC CO .
V I AC OM , I NC .
V IA C O M, IN C.
B E RT E LSM A NN AG
2.
HOW I T S R UN
C R UDEN
I NV ES T M ENT S
PRIN CE
1 8%
AL WAL EED
6%
5 8%
V OTI NG
ECONOM I C
L IBERTY
MED IA
18%
ECONOM I C
QUEENS LAND
1 2%
P RES S
V OTI NG
36.5 %
INVE STMEN TS
4 2%
43%
BSKYB
80%
GEMSTAR
100%
1 0 0%
NDS P I C
HARP ER
P RI NT
T EC HNOLOGY
C OLLI NS
BUS I NES S
100 %
1 0 0%
I NV ES T M ENT S
80.6%
SK Y LA 40 45 %
SK Y JAPAN 10 %
2 0%
26 %
C NS
1 0 0%
FOX
TV GUIDE
FILM
87.5 %
NAT I ONAL 5 0%
38.2%
HATHWAY
CHAN N EL
P HOENI X
ES P N S TAR
C HI NA
S P ORT S - AS I A
95 %
L A D OD GERS
NEW S
FOX T EL 2 5 %
I NT ERNAT I ONAL
I NDEP ENDENT PA P E R N Z 4 9 .5 %
50%
CABL E
1 0 0%
SPORT S
S TAR T V
100 %
20%
FOX I NC .
1 0 0%
100%
5 0%
100%
TV
NEW
FOX
FOX
FOX
FOX
PROD U C T I ON
REGENC Y
NET W ORK
S TAT I ONS
S T UDI OS
NEWS
464
3c.corporations_DEF.indd 464
1/17/2007 6:16:41 PM
3.
PAR E NT C OMPAN Y
H E ADQUARTERS
REVEN UE
T E L EVISION
CABLE
PRO D UCTION
MOVIES
MUSIC
TIMES WARN ER
TB S : 7 5 %
C NNf n: 7 5%
HBO: 75 %
TNT: 7 5 %
CI NEM AX: 75 %
C A RTOON NETW OR K : 7 5%
TV K O: 7 5%
TU R NER C L A S S I C M OV I ES : 7 5%
W H OL LY A ND PA RTI A L LY OW NED C H A N N E L S
COURT T V: 37.5 %
C NN: 7 5%
I N EU R OPE, A S I A + S OU TH A M ER I C A
H EA DL I NE NEW S : 7 5 %
C A S TL E R OC K
1 3 , 5 0 0 C A RTOONS
L I B R A RY OF 6 , 5 0 0 M OV I ES
TI V O: 1 8%
3 2 , 0 0 0 TV S H OW S
DI G I TA L V I DEO R EC OR DI NG
WARNE R BROTHERS: 75 %
L I B R A RY OF M G M , R K O, A ND PR E-1 9 5 0
NE W L I NE F E ATURES: 75 %
WA R NER B R OS . F I L M S
W F C I NEM A H OL DI NG S : 5 0%
F I NE L I NE F E ATURES: 75%
WA R NER H OM E V I DEO: 7 5%
R H I NO R EC OR DS M A NU FA C TU R ER S +
WARNE R BROS.
C OL U M B I A H OU S E: 5 0 %
ATL ANTI C
M U S I C PU B L I S H ER WA R NER / C H A PP E L L
EL EKT RA
NATI V E DI S TR I B U TI ON A L L I A NC E
L ONDON-SI RE
M AGAZIN ES
IN TERN ET
NE WSPAPER
BOOKS
RAD IO
SPORTS
T HE M E PARKS
OTHER
M ONEY
TH E PA R ENT G R OU P
LIFE
TH I S OL D H OU S E
PEOPL E
TH E TI C K ET
S U NS ET
F ORT UNE
I N S TY L E
S U NS ET G A R DEN G U I DE
AL L Y OU
S OU TH ER N L I V I NG
R EA L S I M PL E
PR OG R ES S I V E FA R M ER
S OU TH ER N A C C ENTS
POPU L A R S C I ENC E
I NSI DE STUF F
C OOK I NG L I G H T
I PC
AM E RI CA ONL I NE
DI G I TA L C I TY
S H OU TC A S T
COM PUSERV E
L EG END: 4 9%
A M A ZON: 2%
NE TSCAPE
M OV I EF ONE
DR . K OOP: 1 0 %
I CQ
M A PQU ES T
R OA DR U NNER C A B L E M ODEM S
S PI NNER . C OM
M USI CNET: 20 %
W I NA M P
WARNE R BROS.
WA R NER FA I TH
TI M E WA R NER A U DI O B OOK S
TI M E I NC .
ATL A NTA TH R A S H ER S
G OODW I L L G A M ES
PH I L L I PS A R ENA
L I C ENS E R I G H TS TO DC C OM I C S
H A NNA -B A R B A R A C H A R A C TER S : 7 5%
465
3c.corporations_DEF.indd 465
1/17/2007 6:16:41 PM
PAR E NT C OMPAN Y
H E ADQUARTERS
REVEN UE
T E L EVISION
149.7 BI L L I ON I N 2005
NBC: 80%
B I OG R A PH Y: 2 5 %
WE
CNBC: 50 %
S NA P TV: 8 0%
I NDEPENDENT F I L M C H A NNEL
M SNBC: 50 %
AMC
MUCH MUSIC
A&E : 25 %
B R AV O
HI STORY: 25%
CABLE
PRO D UCTION
MOVIES
I F C PR ODU C TI ONS
RADI O CI T Y TEL EV I SI ON
NEXT WAV E F I L M S
S ATEL L I TE DB S PR OV I DER
M AGAZIN ES
NBC.COM : 47%
C NB C . C OM : 1 0%
A U TOB Y TEL . C OM : 1 0 %
SNAP: 47 %
S A L ON. C OM : 1 0%
POL O. C OM : 5 0 %
NEW Y OR K L I B ERTY
H A RTF OR D W OL F PA C K
M A DI S ON S QU A R E G A R DEN
NE WSPAPER
BOOKS
RAD IO
SPORTS
TI V O
MUSIC
IN TERN ET
PA XTON: 3 2 %
T HE M E PARKS
OTHER
RANDOM HOUS E 1 0 . 2%
GR UNER + JAHR 1 4 . 3%
TELEVISION
CONTENT
RADI O
NORTH
G ER M A NY
G R EAT
A R G ENTI NA
J A PA N
M A G A ZI NES
M A G A ZI NES
NE W S PA P E R S
CO MPANY
PRODUCTS
BROADCASTS
AM E RI CA
B R I TA I N
S PA I N
G ER M A NY
I NTER -
35
20
12
A U S TR A L I A
U R U G U AY
23
NATI ONA L
NEW ZEA L A ND
V ENEZU EL A
S OU TH A F R I C A C H I L E
7
15
PR IN T IN G
3
M EXI C O
C OL OM B I A
OT H E R
11
466
3c.corporations_DEF.indd 466
1/17/2007 6:16:41 PM
PAR E NT C OMPAN Y
TIMES WARN ER
H E ADQUARTERS
REVEN UE
T E L EVISION
53.8 BI L L I ON I N 2005
T EL EM UNDO: 34%
G A M ES H OW NETW OR K : 5 0 %
SOAP CI T Y: 50 %
M U S I C C H OI C E
8 TV S TATI ONS
COL UM BI A PI CTURES
R EV OL U TI ON S TU DI OS
A OL -TV A ND DI S NEY
SCREEN GEM S
DI S TR I B U TI ON A R M S W H OL LY A ND
L OEW S TH EATER : 4 0 %
15 % OF AL L M USI C SAL ES
R ED DI S TR I B U TI ON:5 0%
PR ES S PL AY PL A NNED M U S I C S I TE
C OL U M B I A H OU S E: 5 0%
W H I TEF I EL D R EC OR DI NG S TU DI O
CABLE
PRO D UCTION
MOVIES
MUSIC
_
SO-NET, JAPANESE I SP
NE WSPAPER
BOOKS
RAD IO
SPORTS
T HE M E PARKS
OTHER
M ANUFACTURER OF BROADCAST A ND
I NS U R A NC E A ND C R EDI T F I NA NC I NG
E L ECTRONI CS EQUI PM E NT
R ETA I L S TOR E I N C H I C A G O
B M G 1 5 . 6%
ARVATO 21.0 %
DI REC T GROUP 1 3 . 2%
N O RTH
EURO P E
ASI A /
SE RV I CES
CL UBS
CLUBS /
CLUBS
ENG L I S H -
B EM U S I C /
OTH ER
A MERICA
32
PACI F I C
59
CE NT RAL +
DI R EC T
ASIA
S PEA K I NG
E-C OM M ER C E
E ASTERN
S A L ES
CLUBS
E UROPE
S OU TH -
12
W ES T
15
10
EU R OPE
11
467
3c.corporations_DEF.indd 467
1/17/2007 6:16:42 PM
PAR E NT C OMPAN Y
TIMES WARN ER
H E ADQUARTERS
REVEN UE
T E L EVISION
37.2 BI L L I ON I N 2005
USA NE TWORK: 93%
C A NA L +: 4 9 %
C A NA L S ATEL L I TE
EC H OS TA R : 1 0%
3 0 I NTER NATI ONA L C H A NNEL S
MOVIES
MUSIC
POLY G R A M H OM E V I DEO: 9 3 %
ST UDI OCANAL : 93 %
PR OPA G A NDA : 9 3%
POLY GRAM F I L M S: 93 %
C A NA L +: 4 9%
M U LTI PL EX B V: 4 9 %
W OR L D S 2 ND L A R G ES T F I L M L I B R A RY
I NTER S C OPE
MCA
F ROM L ABE L S:
G EF F EN
M ER C U RY
A &M I S L A ND
M OTOW N
DEF J A M
M AGAZIN ES
IN TERN ET
NE WSPAPER
BOOKS
LEXPRESS
LEXPANSI ON
M EDI C A L J OU R NA L S
V I VAZZI : 50 %
G ET M U S I C : 5 0%
i W ON. C OM : 4 2%
A ND C Ds
RAD IO
SPORTS
T HE M E PARKS
OTHER
H OTEL S A ND WATER PA R K : 2 5%
S EG A G A M EW OR K S : 1 2%
U NI V ER S A L S TU DI OS J A PA N: 2 4%
U NI V ER S A L S TU DI OS PORT AV ENTU R A : 3 7%
BOT TL ED WAT ER
C OM M ER C I A L A ND I NDU S TR I A L C L EA NI NG
DA PY
2 6 EU R OPEA N R A I L R OA DS
G L OW S TOR ES
TI CKE TM ASTER: 12 %
6 5 , 0 0 0 H EATI NG S Y S TEM S
EL EC TR I C A L A ND M EC H A NI C A L EQU I PM ENT
119 L ANDF I L L SI T ES
M A I NTENA NC E A ND S EC R ETA R I A L S ER V I C ES
S PENC ER G I F TS
468
3c.corporations_DEF.indd 468
1/17/2007 6:16:42 PM
IN G Os + FO U N DAT ION S
ngos - ngos by regional field of activity - arts + culture ngos - international foundations + main activity - # of
foundations - countries with most foundations giving to arts + culture - top foundations in international giving
- top non-us recepients us foundations grants - map international cultural foundations
1.
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
CO M M U NICAT IO N + M E D IA
1,578
1,608
1,478
1,739
1,608
1,565
1,926
1,931
1,951
1,898
3,554
3,617
3 ,6 7 4
E DU CAT ION
3,577
3,643
3,544
3,812
4,006
3,731
4,184
4,182
4,389
4,231
7,388
7,668
7 ,9 0 5
R E C RE AT ION
2,520
2,625
2,344
2,394
2,499
2,212
2,682
2,776
2,861
2,890
5,161
5,317
5 ,4 2 0
R E LIG IO U S PRA C T I CE
1,815
1,878
1,799
1,930
2,016
2,054
2,210
2,251
2,310
2,234
3,555
3,664
3 ,7 0 7
T HE OLOGY
1,540
1,562
1,485
1,575
1,637
1,593
1,818
1,841
1,903
1,868
3,258
3,325
3 ,3 5 5
C U LT URE
964
950
915
971
1,085
1,010
1,125
1,208
1,200
1,138
2,149
1,980
2 ,0 2 8
LA NGU AGE
738
744
713
786
839
774
916
923
942
894
1,565
1,569
1 ,6 2 0
DE SIGN
95
95
85
94
94
89
100
104
107
106
172
176
182
2.
EUROPE
602
371
118
140
170
64
33
AFRICA
210
86
104
91
57
A MERICA
61
0
ED U CAT I O N
75
68
15 32 17 11 0
RECR E AT I O N
LAT IN A MERICA
RELI GI OUS P R A C T I C E
147
85
32 41 37 13 1
THEOLOGY
ASIA
C U LT U R E
176
113
PACIFIC
66
91
43 16 2
LANGUAGE
DESIGN
97
60
26 25 25 8 0
469
3c.corporations_DEF.indd 469
1/17/2007 6:16:42 PM
3c.corporations_DEF.indd 470
1 3 ,5 5 3
JA PA N
2004
CO U NTRI E S WITH
MO S T FOU NDATI O N S
G IVIN G TO ART S +
CU LT U RE
60,000
06.
250
50,000
200
40,000
150
30,000
100
20,000
50
10,000
# OF
FOU NDATI ON S
546
440
I NT ERNAT I ONAL AFFAI RS
421
599
S C I ENC E + T EC HNOLOGY
EC ONOM I C AFFAI RS
722
0
915
200
250
400
M EDI C I NE + HEALT H 1 , 0 6 9
500
S OC I AL W ELFARE + S T UDI ES 1 , 0 5 5
600
2 ,9 8 9
1 4 ,0 0 0
D E N M AR K
EDUCAT I ON 1 , 2 4 5
750
800
N O R WAY
2 5 ,0 0 0
SW E D E N
1000
6 ,0 0 0
5 0 ,2 0 1
U N IT E D STATE S
1000
SPA I N
28
1250
8 ,0 0 0
34
BE L G I U M
70
P HOT OGRAP HY
1200
S W I TZ E RL A N D
35
N E TH E R LA N D S
112
12
BOOK S
1500
8 ,3 1 2
44
CA N ADA
161
11
FI LM
1400
GE R MA N Y
62
S W I TZ E RL A N D
274
31
LI T ERAT URE
1750
8 ,8 0 0
62
SPA I N
291
19
M EDI A
4.
9 ,3 2 6
64
FR A N C E
386
10
M US I C
42
454
RELI GI ON
633
22
646
37
ART S
S P ORT S
C ULT URE 1 5 8 1 , 2 6 5
2005 06
TURKEY
95
ITALY
NG O
ART S + CULTURE NG O s
G R E AT B R ITAI N
111
GE R MA N Y
196
05 .
UNITED KINGDOM
U N IT E D STATE S
IG0
3.
EDUCAT I ON 2 0 8 2 , 0 7 3
2000
I NTERNATI ON A L
FOU NDATI ON S
2 0 0 4 A C C OR DI NG TO M A I N A C TI V I T Y
2004
470
1/17/2007 6:16:43 PM
07 .
S TAT E
WA
$188,260,218
42
NY
$161,511,671
997
DOL L A R A M OU NT
# OF G R A NTS
MI
$1 4 4 , 5 0 4 , 8 9 0
107
NY
$1 4 3 , 2 7 3 , 2 0 9
220
IL
$1 3 8 , 0 3 2 , 0 0 0
124
CA
$1 2 2 , 6 3 8 , 0 0 0
53
NY
$1 2 2 , 5 8 6 , 3 0 0
36
CA
$1 2 2 , 2 7 7 , 8 5 5
MI
$1 1 7 , 5 4 1 , 1 9 0
62
NY
$1 1 8 , 3 7 9 , 6 0 1
MI
$1 1 7 , 5 4 1 , 1 9 0
160
CA
$9 1 6 , 7 2 5 , 7 0 2
68
MI
$9 1 0 , 2 0 0 , 0 0 0
13
CA
7,342,232
15
FL
7,084,739
T OTAL
$6 3 7 , 8 9 8 , 7 9 7
1,903
8.
TO P NO N- U . S. R E C I P I ENT S O F U .S . F OU NDATI O N G R A N T S
00. RECI PI ENT NAM E
C OU NTRY
DOL L A R A M OU NT
# OF GRANTS
S W I TZER L A ND
$969,664,245
24
S W I TZER L A ND
$950,000,000
A R M ENI A
$922,418,266
04. AVI C H A I
I S R A EL
$918,115,167
I NDI A
$912,978,870
A U S TR A L I A
$9 9,792,730
U G A NDA
$9 8 , 1 0 6 , 4 4 1
15
C A NA DA
$9 7 , 1 4 8 , 2 9 1
S W I TZER L A ND
$ 0 06 , 6 7 2 , 8 6 0
PA K I S TA N
$ 0 06 , 5 6 8 , 8 8 8
ENG L A ND
$ 0 05 , 9 2 5 , 0 0 0
S OU TH A F R I C A
$ 0 05 , 7 7 6 , 8 9 0
23
TA NZA NI A
$ 0 05 , 4 6 8 , 3 0 0
ENG L A ND
$ 0 05 , 2 6 0 , 5 8 0
ENG L A ND
$ 0 05 , 1 2 9 , 7 1 3
14.
TOTA L
$239,026,241
90
471
3c.corporations_DEF.indd 471
1/17/2007 6:16:43 PM
0 9.
H EA D QU A RTER
EUROP EAN C ULT URAL FOUNDAT I ON
H EA D QU A RTER
FORD FOUNDAT I ON
H EA D QU A RTER
P RI NC E C LAUS FUND
H EA D QU A RTER
S AS AK AWA (NI P P ON) FOUNDAT I ON
H EA D QU A RTER
CALOUS T E GUI LBERK I AN FOUNDAT I ON
H EA D QU A RTER
H EA D QU A RTER
472
3c.corporations_DEF.indd 472
1/17/2007 6:16:43 PM
The more developed a TV market, the more investment it directs to domestic pro-
a variety of different holdings spanning Internet, publishing, IT, radio, and television
ductions or to local remakes of imported show formats, rather than strictly imported
mediums. Over the past decade, giant transnational cultural corporations (cultural
formats (Financial Times, 2006). In other words, the influence of TNCs reflects inequali-
TNCs) have emerged through considerable consolidation and expansion: today, a rela-
ties in the globalizing world: developed countries are less susceptible to exposure by
tively small number of corporations, typically as diversified holdings, control the major-
foreign, western media and entertainment than poor countries without strong indepen-
ity of formal cultural industries. For example, 80% of commercial music and films in the
dent and local outlets. This has implications for the development of cultural industries
world are distributed by a small number of cultural TNCs (IMCA, 2005). These parent
in these countries.
companies shape media and entertainment offerings, and influence the promotion of
artistic talent and cultural products according to corporate interests.
Cultural TNCs are linked closely with the other TNCs such as Ford, GM or Exxon as
shareholders and overlapping board memberships (Active Opposition, 2003). Disney
W HAT D O W E K N OW AB O UT C ULT UR A L T N C S ?
and McDonalds had an exclusive marketing partnership for 10 years, and until 2006
The statistics show that some of the corporations have revenues that exceed those of
when Disney decided to distance itself from the fast food identity, now increasingly
and had revenues of $24.5 billion USD. Time Warner had revenues of $43.6 billion
USD and General Electric, $149.7 billion USD. Clear Channel owns around 1,225 radio
Cultural TNCs are now moving into web-based spheres, which will have implications
stations in 300 cities and dominates the audience share in 100 of 112 major markets
for the flow and control of information and Internet services. The Internet offers an
in the United States (Perlstein, 2002). CBS and ABC own one-fifth as many stations as
opportunity for more equal access to information and cultural production, and sites
Clear Channel (Perlstein, 2002). These media giants are linked internationally, for in-
that offer blogspots or capabilities to create music and movies, for example, encourage
stance, General Electric owns Telemundo, one of the two largest Spanish broadcasting
local production. Also, new media are increasingly participatory, which offers huge
networks (Khan, 2003). Sony, which made its name through electronics, now has more
opportunities for democratic participation and exchange of ideas. However, with the
growing presence of cultural TNCs on the Internet, local and independent forms of
production may be threatened.
473
3c.corporations_DEF.indd 473
1/17/2007 6:16:44 PM
Globalization shapes
Visual Arts
19%
Audiovisual
09%
operate in many areas, they are also present in the field of culture. Some of these
Performing Arts
17%
Intangible Heritage
09%
organizations have existed for many decades, such the P.E.N Club, an international as-
Literature
11%
New Media
07%
sociation for poets, essayists and novelists, the European Cultural Foundation, or Eric
Cultural Heritage
11%
Community Arts
06%
Arts, a European association at the intersection of cultural policy, arts and research.
Interdisciplinary
11%
Others are more recent, such as the International Federation of Arts and Cultural Agencies, an association of governmental agencies in the field, or the International Network
for Cultural Diversity (INCD), which is made up of artists and cultural groups working
against cultural homogenization.
TAB LE 3: CO R E EUR O P EA N FUNDED A CTIV ITIES IN TH E A RTS
Cultural INGOs and foundations refer to civil society organizations that contribute to
( R e s p o n d e n ts co u l d m a ke m o re th a n o n e s e l e cti o n , th e re fo re d o e s n o t a d d to 1 0 0 % )
the ongoing process of cultural exchange and dissemination. These organizations are
Mobility
14%
13%
20%
Art Education
11%
Production
18%
Acquisition
09%
17%
Distribution
06%
Networking
16%
Other
04%
NGOs play a significant role in the reconstruction of the democratic state and the
Pilot Projects
15%
Residency
03%
14%
Exhibitions
tive and community initiatives. The Council of Europe (2001) suggests the following
Publications/Preservation/Dissemination 22%
24%
NGOs are critical to the process of cultural policy elaboration, necessitating an effec-
WH AT A R E TH E IS S UES ?
The Council of Europe has identified three main issues relevant to the needs and
Arts and culture NGOs have been experiencing considerable growth in recent years.
demands of arts and culture organizations. First, the need to build successful arts and
Between 1992 and 2001, arts and culture NGOs steadily grew from 984 to 1,138.
business partnerships. This can be carried out through the development of education
However by 2002, an exponential growth of cultural NGOs brought these figures closer
to two thousand. In 2004, there were 1,423 cultural NGOs, 158 of which are INGOs, and
attract business sponsorship, and building business networks to support the arts.
In the United States, private and community foundation funding for the arts more than
The second issue is the interface between culture and policy. Cultural organizations
doubled between 1995 and 2001, peaking at $4.2 billion in 2001. This dramatic in-
crease in support for the arts occurred during a period of significant cuts in federal,
state, and local government funding for the arts. Arts funding as a percent of overall
tion portal for the efficient transfer of information relevant to culture and policy (i.e.
funding is around 12-15% (Table 1). In a 2003 study conducted by the Foundation Cen-
yearly reports), creating a cultural policy think tank, and the mobilization of artists to
ter, approximately 8% of foundations allocate at least half of their grant dollars for arts
and culture and approximately 21% allocate at least a quarter to the arts. The majority
of funding is distributed to museum activities and performing arts. In addition, 25 of
The third issue relates to the role of arts and culture in the social inclusion processes.
the largest funders by arts giving accounted for a smaller share of overall arts sup-
port in 2001 compared to earlier years, suggesting that the base of large arts funders
the state and civil society through the development of formal education programs and
has grown and support for arts is growing amongst smaller foundations. Independent
training, distribution of literature documenting the arts as a tool for social inclusion,
foundations provide over three-quarters of arts funding, of which half are family foun-
34%
Historical Activities
Performing Arts
30%
Media Communications
08%
Other
Multidisciplinary Arts
08%
Visual Arts
07%
Total dollars
06%
04%
$1.98 billion
S o u r c e : t h e F o u n d a t i o n C e n t e r, 2 0 0 3
Another survey conducted by the Fitzcarraldo Foundation shows that the distribution of arts
funding In Europe is a departure from American foundation patterns (Tables 2 and 3). While
comparisons are difficult to make due to different methods of measurement, a cursory
observation (Table 2) shows that funding discrepancies can be found in the areas such as
performing arts (30% vs.17%) and humanities and literature (3% versus 11%).
474
3c.corporations_DEF.indd 474
2/2/2007 11:39:45 AM
G LO BA L SITE S + E V E N T S
HO NG K ONG + M U M BAI
NEW YO RK C I TY
L OS A NGELES
LO NDON
GL OB AL EV ENTS
SI GNIF I CANT C I TI ES
SYMB OLI C S I TES
475
1/17/2007 6:16:24 PM
21 .9 6
24 .0 2
28 .3 2
28 .5 7
30 .1 9
29 .7 0
35 .4 4
35 .3 7
48 .4 8
48 .4 6
63 .1 6
63 .9 0
73 .1 4
72 .1 5
82 .1 6
82 .4 9
98 .5 8
1 00 .2 4
1 19 .4 9
1 23 .4 1
1 35 .2 4
1 38 .6 5
1 51 .4 0
1 61 .8 4
1 73 .7 5
1 92 .7 5
1 80 .7 5
1 98 .5 5
1 88 .0 6
2 08 .6 1
1 74 .0 0
1 84 .5 2
1 73 .8 9
1 79 .5 2
2 01 .8 6
2 12 .8 1
1 89 .8 9
2 01 .0 8
2 00 .0 9
2 07 .6 4
2 23 .7 6
2 31 .9 0
1 9 82
1 9 83
1 9 84
1 9 85
1 9 86
1 9 87
1 9 88
1 9 89
1 9 90
1 9 91
1 9 92
1 9 93
1 9 94
1 9 95
1 9 96
1 9 97
1 9 98
1 9 99
2 0 00
2 0 01
2 0 02
2 0 03
8,467
4.
HONG KONG
IN TERNATI O NA L TRA DE
21,811
15,536
11,328
T OTAL
483
306
362
444
417
M ACAO
1,380
946
1,149
1,400
926
1,155
T HE AM ERI CAS
1,665
1,235
1,465
NORT H AS I A
2,078
1,360
1,511
2.
2,075
PAKISTAN I 0 . 2%
O TH ERS 0 . 9%
1,852
2,063
TAI WAN
TH AI 0 . 2%
900
2004 237 + 6 1 7
800
21 .0 1
23 .5 8
2003 188 + 5 9 1
700
3,206
FILIP IN O 2 . 1%
I N D O N ESIAN 0 . 8%
600
21 .8 3
24 .8 0
1999 167 + 4 3 1
500
1 9 81
2 0 0 1 % OF TOTAL POPUL AT I ON
400
C HI NA (M AI NLAND)
CHINE SE 9 4 . 9%
300
0
19 .7 5
22 .4 5
HO NG KO NG
POPULATIO N
BY E THN ICITY
200
50
1 9 80
1.
100
100
15 .1 4
17 .1 3
J APAN ESE 0 . 2%
0
150
1 9 79
IND IAN 0 . 3%
OC EA N V ES S EL S
200
11 .4 5
13 .3 9
BRITISH 0 . 3%
AIRCRAFT
250
1 9 78
H O NG K ON G
- population by ethnicity - visiting arrivals - inward + outward
3.
NEPALESE 0 . 2%
I N T HOUSANDS
476
1/17/2007 6:16:24 PM
PAK I STAN
25 0 0 0 0
2500000
20 0 0 0 0
2000000
15 0 0 0 0
1500000
10 0 0 0 0
1000000
50000
500000
0
139,698
105,994
89,085
82,870
77,172
60,772
I TAL I A N
F RE N CH C R EO L E
YI DD I S H
KO R EA N
P OL IS H
QUEENS
F R EN C H ( In cl. Pa t o is , C aj un )
194,696
3500000
323,517
35 0 0 0 0
R U SS I A N
4000000
1832,402
40 0 0 0 0
CH I NE S E
N Y C T O P 20 COU N TRIE S
O F O RI G I N FO R
FOREIGN -B OR N CITI ZEN S
2.
3.
20 0 0 POPULATION
POPU L ATION > 5 Y RS I N 20 0 0
7 8 7 ,0 4 7
7 7 8 ,6 4 7
3 4 4, 3 1 9
4 2,9 1 4
5 3,5 5 0
2 5 ,0 71
1 9,6 4 4
9 8 2 ,7 2 5
44 6,1 8 9
5 5 6,6 0 5
3391 ,5 0 0
272,795
8 3 5 ,6 1 0
2 6 7 ,3 0 2
4 17 ,8 1 6
144,538
2 2 6 , 06 9
M ANHAT TAN
3,920,797
29,805
32,358
39,165
1 ,0 1 5 ,77 2 8
8 9 8 ,3 5 0
48 7 ,8 7 8
185,818
260,139
BROOK LY N
EN G L IS H O N LY
GREECE
HO N D U RA S
42,865
49,644
BRON X
BA N G L AD E S H
65,999
68,263
69,727
1500000
PH I LI P PI N E S
PO L AN D
INDIA
500000
UKRAINE
1000000
3 98 ,0 0 3
47 5 ,0 0 7
6 4 4 ,77 0 5
40,120
3 4 2,4 7 8
2500000
70,990
72,481
81,408
84,404
88,794
95,580
114,944
BY BOROUGH 2 0 0 1
2,1 299 ,7 6 2
2 ,1 6 00,5 5 4
3000000
KO R E A
ITALY
R U S SI A
C O L OM BI A
T R I N IDA D + T O B AG O
H AI T I
122,550
130,647
178,922
261,551
369,186
3500000
S PAN IS H OR S PA N IS H C RE OL E
478
ECUADOR
ME X I C O
G U YA N A
J AM A ICA
CHINA
D OM IN I CAN R E PU BL I C
4000000
1.
2000000
S TAT EN I S LAND
ALL 5 B O R O U G H S
N Y C DEM OG RAP HI C S:
TO P TEN L AN G U A G E S
S P OK EN AT H OME
1/17/2007 6:16:25 PM
NEW YORK C IT Y
120000000
100000000
4.
foreign-born 2000
80000000
20 0 3 + 2 0 0 4 IN $ US TH OUSANDS
20000000
21,759,978
23,567,061
100,361,018
113,815,426
ALL I M P ORT S
ALL EX P ORT S
T OTAL
20.7
23.6
25.7
25.9
26.0
26.6
27.7
34.9
36.3
43.9
44.4
46.0
60.7
67.8
81.3
94.7
NY C: FO RTU NE 500
C O M PANI E S WITH A Y EA R LY
REV ENU E O V ER 20 B I LLI ON
(2003 )
5.
100
80
60
40
NYC I S H OM E TO MO R E FORTU NE 5 0 0 C OM PA NI ES TH A N A NY O TH ER US CI TY
20
$U S B I L L I ONS
B R IS T O L-M YE RS S QU I B B C O 92
GO L D MA N S AC HS G RO U P I NC 74
N E W YO R K L IF E I N S U R AN C E C O 70
AM E RI CAN E X PR E S S C O 69
T I A A- C R E F 68
VI A C O M I NC 64
ME R RI L L LYN C H & C O I NC 58
MO R G AN STA N L EY 39
M ET L I FE I NC 36
T I ME WAR N E R 27
J PMO R GA N C HA S E 26
P FI Z E R I NC 25
ALTR I A G RO U P I NC 15
VE R I Z O N C O MM U N I CAT I O N S 12
8
C IT I G RO U P I NC
A ME RI CAN IN T ER N AT I O N A L G RO U P 10
479
1/17/2007 6:16:26 PM
45.98
10.76
0.23
9.50
0.31
1.49
68.28
HI S PANI C
AS I AN
PAC I FI C I S LANDER
BLAC K
NAT I V E AM ERI CAN
M ULT I -RAC E
ALL NON-W HI T ES
20
20
10
10
0
0
3.
100000
80000
40000
4 4 .2
2 .0
1 .5
V I ET NAM
I RAN
TAI WAN
ARM ENI A
2 0 ,0 00
1 2 ,0 00
1 1 ,0 00
R A FU S H IM P O (J APA N E SE )
S ER E ECH AI
F R EE CH IN A JO U RN A L
1 .0
UK
HONDURAS
NI CARAGUA
HONG K ONG
C UBA
CAM BODI A
P ER U
1 9 ,1 95
1 2 ,0 00
1 0 ,0 00
8 ,0 0 0
5 ,4 0 0
5 ,0 0 0
3 ,0 0 0
C A L IF O RN IA - S TAATS ZE IT UN G ( G ER MA N )
A SB A RE Z DA ILY ( AR ME N IA N )
UN IO N J AC K (B R IT IS H )
MA G YAR OK VA S AR N AP J A ( H UN G AR IA N )
BI EN ( D AN IS H )
C A LI F OR NI A VE CK O BL A D ( SW ED I S H)
IR IS H N E W S & EN T ERTA IN M E NT
0 .7
C OU NTR IE S O F OR IG I N F O R
FO REI G N-B O RN C I TI ZEN S
0 .7
0 .8
2.
0 .8
0 .8
0 .9
1 .0
1 .0
CANADA
OT HE R
1 .2
I NDI A
1 5 ,0 00
BE IR UT T IM ES
JAPAN
2 .7
2 .8
4 .2
I S RA E L T OD AY 10 0 ,0 00
MI D D L E E A S TE R N
K OREA
2 5 ,0 00
N G UO I VIE T D A ILY NE W S (V IE TN A M ES E )
4 .4
GUAT EM ALA
3 2 ,0 00
W E EK E N D BA L ITA ( F IL I P IN O )
5 .7
C HI NA
4 3 ,5 00
KO R EA TI ME S
480
140000
5 .9
30
7 .3
30
P HI LI P P I NES
40
A S IA N
40
M EX I C O
50
EL S ALVADOR
50
E L C L AS S I FI CA D O 11 0 ,0 00
70
L A OP IN IO N 12 6 ,0 00
SPA N I S H
31.72
W HI T E
L.A. COUNT Y:
R AC IAL PO PUL ATI ON S
1.
L . A . C OU NTY: TOP 20
60
% OF A L L F OR EI G N-B OR N R ES I DENTS OF C OU NTY
1/17/2007 6:16:26 PM
1 2 1 33
1 4 1 41
1 6 1 68
1 7 1 81
1 8 1 91
1 9 1 94
2 6 2 54
2 8 2 84
3 4 3 65
3 7 3 86
3 8 3 93
4 0 4 16
4 3 4 41
4 4 4 44
4 8 4 64
5 2 4 93
OC C I D E N TA L PE T R O LE U M
C O MPU TE R SC I E N C E S
D I R E C T V GR O U P
AM GE N
HE ALT H N E T
E D IS O N I N T E RN AT I ON AL
K B HO ME
FI R ST A M E R ICA N C O R P
D OL E F O OD
JA C O BS E N G I N E E R IN G GR O U P
AVE RY D E N N I S ON
MAT T E L
PA C I FI C L I FE
RY LA N D GR O U P
H I LT ON H OTE L S
S TA N DA RD PA CI F I C
I N G RA M MI C R O
1 1 1 22
N O RT HR O P G R U MM AN
C O U N T RYW I D E FI N A N C I A L
$ US BI L L I ONS 0
28,808.30
6500
30,721.00
13000
72
19500
67
26000
31,944.00
32500
63
WALT D I SN E Y
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
5 9 .7
6 7 .1
6 1 .2
6 6 .7
6 1 .4
6 6 .5
6 2 .3
6 6 .2
6 0 .9
6 5 .1
5 8 .8
6 4 .0
5 8 .4
6 2 .7
5 7 .4
5 8 .8
5 5 .5
5 9 .5
5 6 .4
6 0 .6
5 4 .8
6 2 .0
5 4 .6
6 2 .4
5 2 .2
6 2 .6
LO S AN GELE S
- racial population estimate 2005 - top 20 countries
of origin for foreign-born citizens LA county
70
30
60
50
40
4.
20
L OS A N G EL E S P ORT:
EX P O RT S + I M P O RT S
10
% OF ALL EX P ORT S I N CA
0
% OF ALL I M P ORT S I N CA
5.
CA S TAT E RANK
481
1/17/2007 6:16:26 PM
5 2 .3 8
4 .2 8
5 3 2. 22
5 4 .3 3
7 5 .6 1
2 .0 3
4 3 1. 29
3 3 .1 0
2 7 .8 9
3 .3 4
5 1 .5 5
5 5 .6 7
3 5 .2 0
3 .4 4
5 0 .9 5
3 0 .1 6
4 9 .1 5
0 .8 2
3 3 3. 06
2 5 .3 6
2 2 .6 9
4 .4 6
2 3 .7 2
7 2 .7 4
2 0 .6 6
2 .1 1
3 3 .8 3
4 9 .8 9
47
78
LL OY D S TS B G RO U P
AVI VA
AN G L O AM E RI CAN 1 1 6
B T G RO U P 1 3 6
P R U D E N T IA L 1 6 6
AS T R AZ E N E CA 1 6 7
B R I TI S H A ME R T O B AC C O 1 7 4
4 7 .8 7
5 .9 2
1 ,5 8 7. 06
7 5 .9 9
8 2 4 9. 47
2 2 .6 3
2 0 6. 91
2 2 5. 93
BP
20
482
B A RC LAYS
7 6 .3 8
1 2 .3 6
1 ,2 7 4. 22
1 9 3. 32
F O R B ES RANK
HS B C G RO U P
150
100
50
01%
04%
02%
08%
01%
016%
01%
09%
0 JEW I S H
0 M US LI M
0S I K H
0 ATH EI S T
0 OTH ER
0NON R ES PONS I V E
450
0 HI NDU
500
58%
550
BUDDHI S T
2.
C HRI S T I AN
0 0 .9%
0 6 .1%
0 2 .0%
0 2 .2%
0 1 .9%
0MIXE D : OT H ER
0 A S IA N O R A S IA N B R IT IS H: I NDI A N
0 A S IA N O R A S IA N B R IT IS H: PA KI S TA NI
0 A S IA N O R A S IA N B R IT IS H: B A NG L A DES H I
0 A S IA N O R A S IA N B R IT IS H: OT H ER
01 .1 %
01 .6 %
0CH I NES E
0 O T HE R MIN O R IT Y E T HN IC GR O U P
00 .8 %
0 0 .8%
0 MIXE D : WH I T E + A S I A N
05 .3 %
0 0 .5%
0 MIXE D : WH I T E + B L A CK A F R I CA N
0 B L A C K + B L A C K B R IT IS H: OT H ER
0 1 .0%
0MIXE D : WH I T E + B L A CK CA R I B B EA N
04 .8 %
0 8 .3%
W HIT E : OT H ER
0B L A C K + B L A C K B R IT IS H: A F R I CA N
0 3 .1%
W HIT E : I R I S H
0BL A C K + B L A C K B R IT IS H: CA R I B B EA N
5 9 .8%
W HIT E : B R I T I S H
1.
AP R IL 2 0 0 1
400
350
300
250
200
4.
L O ND O N: TO P
C ITY-B A S ED
G LOBAL TNCs
$ US BILLIO N S 0
IN U S$ B I L L I ONS
1/17/2007 6:16:26 PM
0 0 .7 %
0 1 .0 %
0 1 .1 %
0MIX E D : W HI T E + BL A C K A F RI CAN
0M IX E D : W H IT E + A SI A N
0 M IX E D : OT HE R
0 A S IA N OR A S IA N B RI TI SH : B AN GL A D E SH I
0 A SI A N OR A SI A N BRI TI S H : OT H E R
0 0 .6 %
0 8 .0 %
0B L A CK + B L AC K BR IT IS H : CA RI B BE AN
0 1 .8 %
0 1 .8 %
0 1 .4 %
0B L AC K + BL AC K BR IT IS H : OTH E R
0OT H ER C H I N E SE
0 O TH E R M IN O RI TY E TH N IC G RO U P
BRENT:
SO U TH WA R K :
00.7%
00.6%
01.5%
00.8%
0 M I XED: OT HER
0 A S I A N OR A S I A N B R I TI S H : I NDI AN
0 A S I A N OR A S I A N B R I TI S H : PAK I S TANI
00.5%
01.8%
01.2%
03.4%
0OTH ER C HI NES E
02.7%
0 B L A C K + B L A C K B R I TI S H : AFRI CAN
0B L A C K + B L A C K B R I TI S H : OT HER
00.9%
0 A S I A N OR A S I A N B R I TI S H : OT HER
0B L A C K + B L A C K B R I TI S H : CARI BBEAN
0 A S I A N OR A S I A N B R I TI S H : BANGLADES HI 0 3 3 . 4 %
00.4%
0 M I XED: W HI T E + AS I AN
00.8%
34
45
41
50
35
56
38
50
34
57
61
34
36
57
37
52
49
43
36
56
HARROW
HUNS LOW
LAM BET H
LEW I S HAM
NEW HAM
REDBRI DGE
S OUT HWARK
T OW ER HAM LET S
WALT HAM FORES T
0
HARI NGEY
10
41
44
20
HAC K NEY
30
41
45
40
EALI NG
50
55
29
60
BRENT
L O ND O N :
MOS T D IV ER S E B O R O U G H S
0 B L AC K + B L AC K BR IT IS H : A F R I CA N 0 1 6. 1 %
0 1 .5 %
0 A SI A N OR A SI AN BRI TI S H : OT H E R
0 1 .5 %
0 A S IA N O R A S IA N B RI TI SH : I N D I A N
0 0 .5 %
0 1 .0 %
0 M IX E D : OT HE R
0 A S IA N OR A S IA N BR IT I SH : PA K I S TA N I
0 0 .5 %
0M I XE D : W H IT E + A SI A N
0 A S IA N OR A S IA N B RI TI SH : B AN GL A D E SH I
0 0 .8 %
0 2 .3 %
0 O TH E R M IN O RIT Y E T HN I C G R OU P
0MIX E D : W HI T E + BL A C K A F RI CAN
0 1 .1 %
0OT H ER C H I N E SE
0 1 .4 %
0 1 .6 %
0B L AC K + B L AC K BR IT IS H : OTH E R
0 MI X E D: W H I TE + B L AC K CA RI B B E AN
0 7 .8 %
0 B L AC K + B L AC K BR IT IS H : A F RI CAN
0B L A CK + B L AC K BR IT IS H : CA RI B BE AN 0 1 0. 5 %
0 4 .0 %
0 A S IA N OR A S IA N BR IT IS H : PA K I S TA N I
0 A S IA N O R A S IA N B RI TI S H : IN D I AN 0 1 8. 5 %
0 1 .0 %
0 MI X E D: W H I TE + B LA C K CA RI B BE AN
3.
L ON D ON
%
70T OTA L NO N-WHITE % WHITE BRITISH
TOWER H A ML ETS :
- population
by ethnic group
- religious diversity
- most diverse
boroughs + population
of non-whites
1/17/2007 6:16:27 PM
6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
484
3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
36
31
75
73
121
40
A IC H I -J A PAN ( 2 0 05 ) 2 2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
HA N O VE R ( 2 0 00 ) 1 8 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
13
22
30
21
32
58
141
155
50
TA E JO N ( 1 9 93 ) 1 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
BR I SB A N E ( 1 9 88 ) 1 9 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
OK I N AWA ( 1 9 75 )
O SA K A ( 1 9 70 ) 6 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
MU N IC H ( 1 9 65 )
JE R U SA L E M ( 1 9 53 )
L IL L E -PA R IS ( 1 9 51 )
BR U SS E LS ( 1 9 35 ) 2 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
C H ICA GO ( 1 9 33 ) 2 2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
S AN FR A N C I SC O ( 1 9 15 ) 1 9 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
10
25
20
PA R IS ( 1 9 00 ) 5 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
LO N D O N ( 1 8 51 )
210
60
180
30
30
0
0
6.
60
WORLD FAI RS
25,000
1 ,3 3 1
100000
335,000
S OU TH B Y S OU TH W ES T 2 0 0 6 (U S A )
30
700
188
2 ,0 0 0
2.
M US I C & M ORE
F ES TI VA L I N TH E DES ERT 2 0 0 5 (M A L I )
W ORLD
S A L ZB U R G F ES TI VA L 2 0 0 5 (A U S TR I A )
1 ,5 0 0
1800000
238,463
750,000
1000000
C LAS S I CAL
T EC HNO
L OV E PA R A DE 2 0 0 3 (B ER L I N)
120
220,000
150
1,913,868
2250000
900000
700
10000000
208
10000
JAZZ
901,801
70
100,000
450000
S U M M ER F ES T 2 0 0 5 (U S A )
ROC K
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F U J I R OC K F ES TI VA L 2 0 0 5 (J A PA N)
L U M B I NI
30,000
800,000
BUDDHI S T
4,000,000
W OR L D Y OU TH DAY (2 0 0 5 )
2,000,000
F U NER A L OF POPE J OH N PA U L I I (2 0 0 5 )
C HRI S T I ANI T Y
M EC C A (2 0 0 4 )
I S LAM
U J J A I N (2 0 0 3 ) 7 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0
PR AYA G A (2 0 0 1 ) 7 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0
RE L I GIO US
PILGR I MAG ES
1.
2000
1600
1350000
1200
1000
800
400
0
0
90
- religious pilgrimages
# V I S I T ORS I N M I L L I ONS
- film festivals
- book fairs
- documenta exhibit
- world fairs
- burning man
1/17/2007 6:16:27 PM
7.
BURNING M AN
200
ALT E RNAT IVE , INT E R A CTIVE, + IN TERN ATION ALLY REKN OWN ED ART FES T I VAL 1 0 0
300
4000
2 20
503
800
3 5 ,6 6 4
476,000
615,000
631,000
DOC UM ENTA X (1 9 9 7 )
380,000
DOC UM ENTA 7 (1 9 8 2 )
DOC UM ENTA 8 (1 9 8 7 )
355,000
DOC UM ENTA I X (1 9 9 2 )
220,000
1000
DOC UM ENTA 6 (1 9 7 7 )
DOC UM ENTA 5 (1 9 7 2 )
135
212
179
150
216
100000
80
600
2 5 ,4 0 0
5000
146
600000
600
25000
500000
500
400
315
351
619
TH E VA U LT O F H E AV E N 2 0 0 4
500
466 0
200000
2 ,5 0 0
10000
207,000
1000000
DOC UM ENTA 4 (1 9 6 8 )
200
82
337
300000
200,000
15000
DOC UM ENTA 3 (1 9 6 4 )
1500000
134,000
400
130,000
400000
DOC UM ENTA 2 (1 9 5 9 )
20000
DOC UM ENTA 1 (1 9 5 5 )
1000
40
400
15 ,00 0 0
5.
TH E B ODY
D 2000
226
N OTABLE
INT ERN AT IONA L
BO OK FAI RS
20
2000000
2 4 ,1 4 5
4.
N E B U LO
O U S 19 9 8
800
N O T H E ME 19 9 0
40
392
600
500000
MA IN T HE ME + YE A R:
23,000
150000
639,132
I NTERNATION AL
FILM FE STIVAL S
7,225
250000
600
880
284,838
2500000
339
2,500,000
T O R ON TO I N T E R N AT I O N A L F IL M FE S TI VA L WOR L D S L A R G ES T F I L M F ES TI VA L (C A NA DA , 2 0 0 3 )
50000
800
60
250,000
200
100000
200000
20
186,000
53,000
115,000
21,449
CAN N E S F IL M FE S TI VA L M OS T PR ES TI G I OU S F I L M F ES TI VA L (F R A NC E, 2 0 0 5 )
3.
G LOBAL E VE N T S
DOC U M ENTA EX HI BI T
1955-1997
700000
# V I S I T ORS # ART I S TS
700
300
200
100
0
0
900
700
4 5 ,0 0 0
40500
36000
31500
27000
22500
18000
13500
9000
4500
485
1/17/2007 6:16:28 PM
S Y M BOL IC SI T E S
re ligi o u s
e co no mi c
po lit i ca l
cul t ura l
he ri t a ge
S YMB O LI C C I TIE S
S IG NI F I CA NT C I T I E S
re l i gio us s i te
e co no m i c s i te
po l i t ica l s i te
curre nt c u l tu r a l s i te
he rit a ge s i te
486
1/17/2007 6:16:28 PM
GLOBAL CITIES
WH AT A R E TH E IS S UES ?
loci of political power and cultural influence. The distinct urban cultures of cities like
polymorphous and variegated urban cultures. Such cultures can enrich and strengthen
New York, London, Paris, Berlin, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Shanghai, Buenos Aires, Cairo or
cities, but they can also exclude and be a source of social and cultural divisions. Some
and innovation.
W HAT D O W E K N OW AB O UT G L O B A L C I T I E S ?
What sets the current period apart from the 19th century, when many of todays global
Managing these issues and the potential conflicts they harbor goes beyond the ca-
pacity of conventional urban planning. The pluralistic, diverse, outward looking and
technology make it possible for connections to happen at greater speed, with greater vol-
competitive global city requires a new multi-cultural literacy (UN-Habitat, 2004: 6),
ume and frequency, resulting in complex flows of goods, services, capital, people, and in-
with a greater role allocated to civil society as a participating actor, and information
formation; it also creates greater connectivity among bads such as diseases in the case of
epidemics, and crime, for example, drug trafficking, smuggling, and white collar crime.
According to the National Research Council (2003: 82-3), the worlds urban population
will grow from 2.9 billion in 2000 to nearly 5 billion by 2030. High-income countries
will account for only 28 million out of the expected 2.12 billion increase. On average
TOKYO
35.327
urban areas are growing by about 1 million people a week, and much of this takes place
MEXICO CITY
19.013
in cities with over 1 million people. In 1950, five of the twenty urban agglomerations
18.498
were in developing countries; by 2000, 13 were, and projections for 2015 are that
MUMBAI
18.336
all but five cities on the top twenty will be. Tokyo, New York-Newark, Buenos Aires,
SAO PAULO
18.333
Los Angeles, and Osaka-Kobe, will be the only top 20 cities outside the developing world
DELHI
15.334
(Figure 1). Clearly, such high growth rates in cities like Mumbai or Lagos imply serious
CALCUTTA
14.299
BUENOS AIRES
13.349
JAKARTA
13.194
SHANGHAI
12.665
However, it is not the scale of urban agglomerations themselves that matters for global
DHAKA
12.560
city status. New York was the worlds largest city in 1950, with 12.3 million people,
12.146
followed by Tokyo with 11.1, then London (8.3) and Paris (5.4). Fifty-five years later,
KARACHI
11.819
all top 20 urban agglomerations have more then 10 million people, and London and
RIO DE JANEIRO
11.469
Paris are no longer part of the list (Figure 1). Yet cities like London, perhaps the most
OSAKA-KOBE
11.286
global of world cities, or Paris, occupy a central role in economic, political and cultural
CAIRO
11.146
LAGOS
11.135
merce, politics, and culture that sets them apart from other mega agglomerations (see
BEIJING
10.849
Scott, 2001).
METRO MANILA
10.677
MOSCOW
10.672
UN-Habitat (2004: 22) identified major changes in the spatial structure of cities as a
result of globalization. These patterns are clearly visible in global cities such as New
York, London, Los Angeles, Hong Kong and, to a lesser extent, Mumbai.
01 TOKYO
36.214
First, driven by economic opportunities and considerations, cities are shifting their
02 MUMBAI
22.645
attention away from their geographic hinterlands towards external locations. Many
03 DELHI
20.946
decisions affecting the economy and well-being are made outside city or national
04 MEXICO CITY
20.647
boundaries. Global cities are therefore outward looking for the sake of maintaining
05 SAO PAOLO
19.963
global competitiveness;
19.717
Second, global production patterns are changing from vertical integration of produc-
07 DHAKA
17.907
ers, suppliers, finance and distribution within one location to horizontal integration
08 JAKARTA
17.498
09 LAGOS
17.036
10 CALCUTTA
16.798
Third, business locations are less based on access to local markets and consumers
11 KARACHI
16.155
12 BUENOS AIRES
14.563
13 CAIRO
13.123
12.904
These changes imply many challenges to global cities: additional functions have had
15 SHANGHAI
12.666
to be found for central business districts, and adjacent areas, many with substandard
16 METRO MANILA
12.637
housing stocks. Cities like Paris (the Centre Pompidou and La Defense) and London
17 RIO DE JANEIRO
12.364
(Covent Garden / Southwark and Docklands) have embarked on projects of grand cultural
18 OSAKA /KOBE
11.359
and economic revitalization. The branding of cities as cultural and economic icons has
19 ISTANBUL
11.302
20 BEIJING
11.060
redevelopment has brought gentrification to desirable central locations, and also has
attracted migrants who settled in areas at the urban fringe. In this way, the rising globalization of cities has increased social tensions as populations diversify.
487
1/17/2007 6:16:29 PM
WH AT A R E TH E IS S UES ?
spread of festivals and other symbolic events over recent years mirrors trends of glo-
Large-scale international exhibitions, events, and festivals face the task of organizing
balization, and the simultaneous homogenization and localization of cultures and forms
and making coherent the great diversity of styles, conceptions, and approaches that
of creativity. They are outlets for expression of the values of a particular society or
exist around the world (Weinberg and Pratt Brown, 2006). Who decides what is worthy
societies. The cultural significance of celebrations, festivals, and sites lies in their abil-
ity to promote unity, share knowledge, to confirm values and beliefs, evoke emotional
Documenta exhibit at the end of the 20th century, for example, was criticized because
response, reinforce identity, and to serve as conduits for cross-cultural exchange. Sym-
bolic places are often sites for religious, economic, political, cultural, or heritage-based
events.
The question of who can attend and participate in global events highlights the fact that
many global festivals and events reinforce art and creativity as the realm of a wealthy
elite, while other, usually more local events, provide opportunities for all people in a
According to the International Festival and Events Association, the special events in-
society to participate in expression and celebration. Thus, global events and festivals
dustry includes approximately 1 million regularly reoccurring events around the world.
highlight issues surrounding cultural diversity. In 2001, UNESCO adopted the Universal
Global and local festivals and events attract tourists and media, sometimes branding a
city or place with a certain identity and often having a significant impact on the local
tures... taking into account the risks of identity-based isolationism and standardization
economy. Many global festivals and cultural events around the world surround music,
associated with globalization (UNESCO, 2002). The Convention of the Protection and
art, cinema and other media, or religion and place specific themes and histories. Four
million people were estimated to have made a pilgrimage to witness the funeral of Pope
John Paul II in 2005 and 70 million Hindus participated in the Kumbh Mela religious
festivals in the holy cities of Prayaga and Ujjain (Wikipedia, 2006 and CNN, 2005)
Some charge that globalization has caused a westernization of world cultures, and a
decline of local ceremonies, customs, festivals, and other symbolic traditions. Wheth-
Symbolic cities and sites around the world are notable because of their religious, eco-
nomic, political, historical, and/or cultural significance. Most world cities have signifi-
cance across all of these categories. In the Middle East and Europe many sites and
cities are significant for their religious symbolism, such as Lumbini (the birthplace
the same time that these trends of homogenization are occurring, local and regional
cultural realities are being reaffirmed and given global visibility through festivals and
or Lourdes (the site in France where, in 1958, the Virgin Mary allegedly appeared
like events.
to a young a girl). Religious pilgrimages are performed within and from/to these key
religious sites. The annual Haj to the Muslim holy city of Mecca is among the most
prominent religious pilgrimages worldwide.
World Fairs represent another significant global event. While the main goal of the World
Fair has been entertainment and representation, since its inception in 1851, the Fair
has represented notions of global connectedness, cohesion, and interchange of ideas
and innovation. The numbers of visitors at World Fairs have fluctuated greatly, while
numbers of participating countries have risen steadily. The most recent world fair in
Aichi, Japan drew over 20 million visitors and 121 countries participated (BIE).
World festivals include more traditional and long-standing events along with newer
more alternative celebrations that embrace fringe, non-mainstream forms of expression. Both types of festivals are growing in number; the alternative Burning Man Festival for art, for example, which began in 1986 with 20 people, now attracts over
35,000 participants. Numbers of visitors at Documenta, the worlds largest show of
contemporary art in Kassel, Germany have risen significantly since its inception in
the 1950s; almost five times as many people attended the exhibit in 1997 as did in
1955 (Documenta 12). The Venice Biennale, which began in 1893, includes exhibitions
of international art, architecture, music, theater, and dance, and now draws 320,000
visitors each year. The Edinburgh Festival Fringe, started in 1947, showcases theater,
comedy, music, dance, exhibitions and other events and attracted 1.35 million people
from around the world in 2005.
The main international film festivals are all located in North America or Europe, with
the oldest and most prestigious festivals in Europe. North America boasts both the largest film festival (Toronto International Film Festival) and the largest independent film
festival (Sundance) in the world. Around 4.5 million people attended eight of the most
popular international music festivals throughout 2003 to the beginning of 2006 (see
suite graphics). World book fairs tend to occur in key global cities, while music and film
festivals may be held in more obscure locations, such as the Sundance Film festival in
Park City, Utah or the Montreux Jazz Festival in Montreux, Switzerland, at the foot of
the Alps in the Swiss Riviera.
488
1/17/2007 6:16:30 PM
C O MM UNICAT ION + M E D IA
HUMAN LANGU AGES
PRINT M EDI A
BO OKS
MUSIC
TEL EPHONES
I NTER NET
BL OG S
MOVIES
TV + R ADI O
TV + O NLI NE NEWS
489
4b.communications+media_DEF.indd489 489
1/17/2007 6:15:54 PM
H U MAN LA N GU AGE S
top languages - book translations - language of web users - linguistic diversity - illiteracy
1a.
1b.
WORLD LANGU AG E S
S PEA K ER S A S F I R S T LA N G U A G E
EUROP EAN | M I DDLE EAS T ERN | AS I AN / PA C I F I C
181
167
125
100
78
77
76
70
68
68
66
62
61
60
JAPANES E
GERM AN
K OREAN
FRENC H
JAVANES E
T ELUGU
M ARAT HI
V I ET NAM ES E
TAM I L
I TALI AN
T URK I S H
URDU
16%
R US S I AN
DU T C H ( + FLE M ISH)
207
18%
P ORT UGUES E
ITALIA N
228
28%
322
S PA NISH ( + CATALAN )
ARABI C
800
341
40%
S PANI S H
1000
G E RM AN
366
70%
ENGLI S H
1200
F RE NC H
1 ,2 1 3
98%
HI NDI
1400
ENG LISH
600
400
R USSIAN
6%
S WE DISH
5%
A RAB IC
5%
2.
0
BENGALI
6%
C HI NES E
P O RT U GU E SE
200
4.
LI NGU I S TI C DI V ERS IT Y:
F RENCH
GERMAN
ITAL IAN
C ATA L A N
SPANISH
SWE DISH
HEBREW
SERBIAN
KOREAN
3.
PERSIAN
TIBETAN
J APANESE
PORTUGUESE
RUSSIAN
L AT I N
DANISH
ARABIC
P O L I S H HUNGARIAN
TURKI SH
CZECH
DUTCH
GLG
GREEK(C)
EUSKERA
CHINESE
NOR WEGIAN
MOL DAVIAN F I N N I S H
DENE
ENG LISH
PEN ETRATI ON
35%
26%
C HINE SE
13%
08%
J APANE SE
08%
52%
S PANISH
07%
15%
G ER M AN
07%
57%
F RE NC H
05%
10%
K O R E AN
04%
41%
ITALIA N
04%
49%
P O RT U GU E SE
03%
10%
DU T C H
02%
57%
490
4b.communications+media_DEF.indd490 490
1/17/2007 6:15:55 PM
5.
I L L I T ER ACY
01% - 10%
11% - 24%
25% - 40%
M ALE
FEM ALE
N U M BE R OF LANGU A G E S
ENDANGERED LANGUAGES
1 - 5
1 - 10
6 - 15
11 - 20
16 - 41
42 - 834
21 - 828
491
4b.communications+media_DEF.indd491 491
1/17/2007 6:15:56 PM
P RI N T M ED IA
1.
- top newspapers
(000S) 2005
1 4 ,0 6 7
0 2 . T HE AS AHI S HI M BUN J A PA N
1 2 ,1 2 1
0 3 . M AI NI C HI S HI M BUN J A PA N
0 5 ,5 8 7
0 4 ,6 3 5
0 5 . C HUNI C HI S HI M BUN J A PA N
0 4 ,5 1 2
0 6 . BI LD G ER M A NY
0 3 ,8 6 7
0 7 . S ANK EI S HI M BUN J A PA N
0 2 ,7 5 7
0 8 . CANOK O X I AOX I (B EI J I NG ) C H I N A 0 2 ,6 2 7
- IHT readership
0 9 . P E0 P LE S DAI LY C H I NA
0 2 ,5 0 9
1 0 . T OK YO S P ORT S J A PA N
0 2 ,4 2 5
1 1 . T HE S UN U NI TED K I NG DOM
0 2 ,4 1 9
1 2 . T HE C HOS UN I LBO S OU TH K OR E A 0 2 ,3 7 8
1 3 . US A T ODAY U S A
0 2 ,3 1 0
0 2 ,0 9 3
1 6 . T HE JOONGANG I LBO S OU TH K O R E A0 2 ,0 8 4
3.
BASIC INFORMATION ON
4b.communications+media_DEF.indd492 492
0 2 ,0 5 2
1 8 . NI K K AN S P ORT S J A PA N
0 1 ,9 6 5
1 9 . HOK K AI DO S HI M BUN J A PA N
0 1 ,9 2 2
0 1 ,9 1 1
2 1 . YANGT S E EV ENI NG P OS T C H I NA
0 1 ,7 1 5
2 2 . S P ORT S NI P P ON J A PA N
0 1 ,7 1 1
2 3 . T HE NI K K AN GENDAI J A PA N
0 1 ,6 8 6
2 4 . T I M ES OF I NDI A I NDI A
0 1 ,6 8 0
2 5 . GUANGZHOU DAI LY C H I NA
0 1 ,6 5 0
0 1 ,5 9 7
2 7 . Y UK AN FUJI J A PA N
0 1 ,5 5 9
2 8 . S HI ZUOK A S HI M BUN J A PA N
0 1 ,4 7 9
2 9 . NANFANG C I T Y NEW S C H I NA
0 1 ,4 1 0
U S $ 0 .2 0 0 , 9 9 3
0 1 ,4 0 5
AVERAGE N ET WORTH*
US$ 1,796,440
3 1 . S ANK EI S P ORT S J A PA N
0 1 ,3 6 8
0 1 ,3 5 4
9 4%
3 2 . HOC HI S HI M BUN J A PA N
90%
7 0%
0 1 ,3 0 9
3 3%
3 5 . LI BERT Y T I M ES TA I WA N
0 1 ,3 0 0
09
3 6 . T HAI RAT H TH A I L A ND
0 1 ,2 0 0
9 6%
3 7 . NEW YORK T I M ES U S A
0 1 ,1 2 1
6 4%
0 1 ,1 0 8
3 9 . C HUT I AN M ET RO DAI LY C H I NA
0 1 ,0 8 4
0 1 ,0 5 1
0 1 ,0 4 6
4 2 . X I NM I N EV ENI NG NEW S C H I NA
0 1 ,0 4 5
4 3 . EENADU I NDI A
0 1 ,0 3 9
4 4 . NI S HI -NI P P ON S HI M BUN J A PA N
0 1 ,0 2 5
0 1 ,0 0 9
0 1 ,0 0 1
0 1 ,0 0 0
4 8 . C HI NA T I M ES C H I NA
0 1 ,0 0 0
492
1 7 . T HE DONG-A I LBO S OU TH K OR EA
4 9 . DAI LY S P ORT S J A PA N
0 ,9 9 9
5 0 . T HE HI NDU I NDI A
0 ,9 8 9
1/17/2007 6:15:57 PM
2.
20
18
16
14
12
10
0
INT E R NAT IO NAL H ERAL D TRIBUN E 0.2
PLAYBOY 4.8
TIME 5.2
METRO 6.2
COSMOPOLITAN 9.5
E U R O PE 2 04 ,8 6 9
N O RT H AM ER I CA 5 04 ,5 9 0
U N I T E D K IN G D O M 1 53 ,1 8 4
MI D D L E E A ST 0 24 ,9 3 6
BREAK DOW N
A SI A / PA CI F I C 1 09 ,1 7 8
E U R O PE 15 0 ,0 5 8
AM E R I CA S 00 8 ,5 1 6
(JULY-DEC EM BER 2 0 0 4 )
BREAKD OWN
AS IA / PA C I F IC 08 0 ,8 0 3
T HE EC ONOM I S T 1 , 0 0 9 , 7 5 9
(2002)
MI D D L E E A S T / A FR I CA 00 5 ,8 4 6
LAT I N A ME R I CA 0 13 ,0 0 2
493
4b.communications+media_DEF.indd493 493
1/17/2007 6:15:57 PM
T O P MARKETS
4b.communications+media_DEF.indd494 494
433
A RG E N TI N A
INDIA
439
CH I N A
SO U T H AF R ICA
2,596
2,280
2,480
2,590
2,272
2,441
1,402
1,657
1,579
1,220
1,384
1,357
FRANC E
TAI WAN
CANADA
3,529
3,418
3,729
S PAI N
0
3,462
3,069
3,358
10000
I TALY
UK
4,228
4,628
5,566
2 b.
C HI NA
9,140
7,824
7,915
3 6 9 ,1 8 7
3 2 9 ,5 2 0
3 4 4 ,6 6 3
2 8 8 ,8 7 3
3 0 6 ,0 1 7
3 2 3 ,8 0 4
BRAZI L
UK
S PAI N
2 4 6 ,9 8 1
2 1 6 ,8 3 2
2 3 4 ,7 0 0
2 8 2 ,8 0 0
2 7 2 ,8 3 5
2 6 4 ,7 5 0
3 6 3 ,6 9 0
3 8 1 ,8 8 0
4 1 2 ,6 7 6
FRANC E
I TALY
4 9 2 ,7 1 3
4 8 4 ,0 2 4
4 7 9 ,0 5 8
GERM ANY
1 ,5 1 6 ,2 7 0
1 ,4 2 1 ,1 6 0
1 ,4 0 2 ,6 4 8
2 ,5 7 2 ,1 9 3
2 ,6 5 5 ,9 8 3
2 ,5 5 0 ,9 5 4
3 8 9 ,3 0 3
4 5 3 ,5 1 8
4 9 4 ,4 0 0
R US S I A
JAPAN
2000000
47
US
4000000
201
24
TAI WAN
20000
11,361
12,949
10,945
6000000
TURKEY
351
SW IT Z E RL A N D
$US D M I L L I ONS
JAPAN
7 ,7 1 1 ,3 4 4
7 ,0 4 1 ,1 5 6
7 ,1 0 2 ,7 5 5
2a.
T H A IL A N D
97
C HI NA
. 0 0 0 BOOK S
706
40000
30,918
34,360
34,920
1.
R U S SI A
US
6%
2%
2%
4%
4%
5%
5%
5%
7%
8%
1 2%
1 3%
27%
8000000
S IN G A PO R E
92
465
P OL A N D
63
398
ME X I C O
63
278
K OR E A
PAK IS TA N
308
JA PAN
0 T HERS
S W EDI S H
DUT C H
I TALI AN
K OREAN
P ORT UGUES E
R US S I AN
JAPANES E
S PANI S H
FRENC H
GERM AN
C HI NES E
ENGLI S H
PH I LI P PI N E S
173
H U N G A RY
IN D O N E SI A
147
1 ,2 1 7
F R AN C E
H ON G K O N G
1 ,2 1 7
F R AN C E
32
1 ,8 4 6
N E W Z E AL A N D
GH A N A
1 ,9 0 0
G E R MA N Y
358
2 ,0 0 4
SPA IN
B R A Z IL
2 7 ,3 2 4
A U ST R A LI A
199
3 0 ,4 5 6
UK
3.
B E L GI U M
2 0 7 ,3 1 8
A MO U N T OF P U B L IS H ER S :
USA
B O OK S
- books published by languages - top book markets - # of publishers
30000
EM ER G I NG M A R K ETS
494
1/17/2007 6:15:58 PM
T HE BIG 5:
L ARGEST PUBL I SHER S
WORLDWI D E 2004
NU
VE
NT
RE
RE
PA
TA
CO
TO
E
NT
AR
PA
RE
PA
AR
PA
NU
AR
TO
TA
PA
RE
NT
CO
PA
NY
RE
VE
21
(PE ARSON)
7 2 .7 %
1 9 .2 %
8 .1 %
SH
1540
AR
TO
TA
PA
RE
NT
CO
13
7 6 .5 %
1 5 .2 %
8 .3 %
NY
SH
HARPERCOLLINS
13 2 9
RE
VE
TO
NU
TA
PA
RE
NT
CO
17
(V I ACOM)
8 3 .6 %
1 6 .4 %
NY
SH
750
AR
VE
TO
NU
TA
( TI M E WARNER)
7 9 .7 %
2 0 .3 %
RE
SH
3%
465
NY
PA
ESTIMATED
PARE NT C O M PA NY NOT E D IN PAREN THESIS + % SHARE + REVEN UE
% S HARE OF BOOK M AR K E T
B Y A R EA 2001- 20 0 2
CO
PA
NY
RE
VE
NU
4.
2 7 .5 %
6 6 .5 %
6%
SH
R AN D OM HOUSE
.2
2200
$U SD MILLIO N S
5.
10
( BERTEL SM ANN)
300
600
900
1200
1500
1800
2100
% TOTA L R EV ENU E O F R E G IO N
*Estimated Values
# OF IM PRINT S:
E XA MP LE H OLDING S:
RA N D OM HOUSE
HARP ER C OLLI NS
S I M ON & S C HUS T ER
T I M E WARNER BOO K G R O U P
( BERTEL SM ANN)
(PEARSON)
(V I A C OM )
(TI M E WA R NER )
250
17
29
20
25
A L L S I M ON & S C H U S TER
TI M E L I F E B OOK S ,
PUTNAM , PUF F I N, V I K I NG ,
W I L L I A M M U R R OW, AV ON
S U B S I DA R I ES , M TV B OOK S
L I TTL E B R OW N, S U N S E T
# O F M AIN
M A R K ET C OU NT R IE S:
ROUGH GUI DE S
10
10
G ERM ANY
AUSTRAL I A
USA
A U S TR A L I A
USA
USA
CANADA
C A NA DA
C A NA DA
UK
UK
I NDI A
UK
UK
CANADA
I REL AND
A U S TR A L I A
CH IL E
JAPAN
NEW ZEA L A ND
KOREA
NE W ZEAL AND
I NDI A
IN D I A
SI NGAPORE
AUS T RAL I A
AF RI CA
UK
SOUTH AF RI CA
USA
4b.communications+media_DEF.indd495 495
495
1/17/2007 6:15:58 PM
M U S IC
- recorded music retail sales - % change in value of units of recorded music sold
2 1 .2
R US S I A
2 5%
2 1 .5
M EX I C O
2.
2 0%
1 5%
1 0%
5%
0%
4.
M U SICAL A C T
COUN TRIES
$16,000,000
50 CENT
US AN D CAN ADA
ANOUK
COLDPLAY
BELGIUM, N ETHERL AN D S AN D UK
GREEN DAY
MICHAEL BUBL
S HNE MANNHEIMS
GERMAN Y AN D AUSTRIA
S W EDEN -2 0 . 3 0
NET HERLANDS -1 9 . 8 0
BRAZI L -1 6 . 5 0
I TALY
AUS T RALI A
NOR WAY
AUS T RI A
JAPAN
BELGI UM
-2 5%
S PAI N -1 5 . 7 0
-1 2 . 3 0
-5 . 8
GERM ANY
-1 1 . 8 0
-5 . 3
US A
-1 0 . 4 0
-4 . 6
CANADA
-9 . 6 0
-4 . 2
DENM ARK
-2 0%
-9 . 2
-4 . 0
UK
-8 . 9
-2 . 7
FRANC E
-1 5%
-2 . 4
-1 0%
I NDI A
-5 %
3.
$ 1 2 ,1 5 4 ,0 00
$ 1 1, 85 4 ,0 00
$ 12 ,6 1 4 ,0 0 0
$ 1 3 ,7 4 0 ,0 00
$ 1 4 ,3 23 ,0 0 0
$ 14 ,5 8 4, 00 0
$ 1 2 ,2 3 6 ,0 00
$8,000,000
$ 12 ,5 3 3 ,0 0 0
$10,000,000
$ 1 2 ,3 2 0 ,0 00
$12,000,000
$ 1 3 ,7 2 3 ,0 00
$14,000,000
$6,000,000
$4,000,000
$2,000,000
$0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
496
4b.communications+media_DEF.indd496 496
1/17/2007 6:15:58 PM
1.
TOP 5:
USA $ 4,783
I TA LY $ 2 7 8
JAPAN $2,258
CANADA $ 2 6 3
UK $ 1,249
AUS T RAL I A $2 6 0
GE RMAN Y $886
S PAI N $2 3 2
FRAN CE $861
NET HERLAND S $ 1 9 0
R US S I A $ 1 8 8
M EX I CO $ 1 8 8
BRAZ I L $ 1 5 2
AUS T R I A $ 1 2 1
S W I T ZERLAN D $ 1 1 6
BELGI U M $ 1 1 5
NOR WAY $1 0 3
S W ED E N $ 9 9
INDIA $79
DENM A R K $ 7 3
:
% OF MUSIC PUR CHA S ED
AT US L OCATIO NS:
5.
60%
% OF TOTAL U S S ALES B Y
TY P E OF M U S I C :
6.
ROCK
OT HER S T ORE
4 0%
3 5%
C O U N T RY
I NT ERNET
3 0%
REL I G I O U S
50%
2 5%
40%
2 0%
30%
1 5%
20%
1 0%
10%
5%
RAP /HI P - H O P
0%
0%
1 9 9 5 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
497
4b.communications+media_DEF.indd497 497
1/17/2007 6:15:59 PM
P HO NES
IR
T RAFFIC FL OWS
E UROPE
LATI N AM E RICA
ASI A
4.
498
4b.communications+media_DEF.indd498 498
1/17/2007 6:15:59 PM
4b.communications+media_DEF.indd500 500
5%
0%
N ORTH A ME R I CA 10 8 .9 %
10 %
O C E A N IA + A U ST RA L I A 13 2 .2 %
E U R O PE 17 6 .1 %
15 %
W OR LD T OTA L 18 2 .0 %
20 %
A SI A 21 8 .7 %
G RO WTH I N
BR OADB AN D U S E
L AT IN AM E R I CA + CA R I B BE A N 33 7 .4 %
3a .
A FR I CA 40 3 .7 %
4.7
12.8
15.0
14.9
14.5
JAPAN
FI NLAND
NOR WAY
S W EDEN
9.8
LUX EM BOURG
0.8
GREEC E
0.4
0.7
M EX I C O
1.6
1.1
T URK EY
3.4
2.1
P OLAND
I RELAND
HUNGARY
NEW ZEALAND
3.6
8.1
7.7
I TALY
AUS T RALI A
8.4
8.2
GERM ANY
P ORT UGAL
8.4
AUS T RI A
S PAI N
10.5
10.2
UNI T ED K I NGDOM
10.6
FRANC E
UNI T ES S TAT ES
1 5 .6
15.0
BELGI UM
1 7 .8
1 7 .3
CANADA
S W I T ZERLAND
1 8 .8
1 8 .3
0
I C ELAND
DENM ARK
10
MI D D LE E A S T 45 4 .2 %
N ET H ER L A N DS 1 0 .5 %
PO RT UG AL 1 1 .6 %
SW I TZE R LA N D 1 3 .0 %
F R A NC E 1 3 .5 %
I ND IA 1 3 .9 %
NO R WAY 1 4 .9 %
F I NL A N D 1 6 .2 %
UN IT E D K I N GD O M 1 6 .5 %
M E XI CO 1 7 .7 %
A U ST R AL I A 1 8 .3 %
A S IA + PA C IF I C 5 6 .6 %
15
1 9 .0
K OREA
20
NET HERLANDS
2 4 .9
2.
AM E RI CAS 0 7 .6 %
E U R O PE + MI D D L E E A S T + A FR I CA 1 2 .2 %
IN TER N ET
- countries and wireless access points + cities and wireless
access points - world wireless access points - broadband + growth - internet users - google
30
25
3 b.
GROWTH IN
I NTERNET U S A G E
4 0 0%
2 0 00 2 0 0 5
3 5 0%
3 0 0%
2 5 0%
2 0 0%
1 5 0%
1 0 0%
5 0%
0%
500
1/17/2007 6:16:03 PM
1.
BY REGI ON
40 %
30 %
20 %
10 %
N ORTH AMERI CA 3 8%
00 %
EUROP E 3 7%
EAS T AS I A 2 0%
LATIN AMERI CA +
CARIBBEAN 3%
M I DDLE EAS T +
NORT H AFRI CA 0 %
3 c.
% OF WO RL D PO PUL ATI ON V ER S U S
W ORLD INTERNET USERS
AFRI CA 0 %
PA C I F I C 2%
BY C OUNT RI ES:
B Y RE GIO N ( DE C 2005)
20%
W O R LD T OTA L
A S IA
L AT I N A ME R I CA + CA R I B BE A N
A FR I CA
MID D L E E AS T
0%
1 . 8%
2 8 . 5%
1 0 0%
12.4%
0.5%
O C E A N I A + A U ST RA L I A
60%
E U R O PE
1 0 0%
W O R L D P O PUL AT I ON
80%
W O R LD I N T E R N ET U S ERS
3 5 . 7%
7 . 8%
56.4%
8 . 5%
2 . 2%
1 . 8%
14.1%
2 . 9%
10 0 %
BY CI T I ES:
UNI T ED S TAT ES
3 7 ,4 59
SEOU L
0 2 , 056
UNI T ED K I NG DOM
1 2,6 6 9
TOK YO
0 1, 7 9 9
S OUT H KO REA
0 9 ,4 1 5
L OND ON
0 1, 6 2 4
GERM ANY
0 8 , 59 3
PA R I S
0 8 ,8 95
JAPAN
0 5 ,97 8
SA N F R A NC IS C O
0 5, 8 0 4
FRANCE
0 3 ,8 8 8
DA EG U
0 3, 7 87
I TALY
0 1 , 76 9
NEW Y OR K
0 1 ,6 4 3
NET HERLANDS
0 1 , 70 3
SI NG A PO R E
0 1 ,6 2 0
TAI WAN
0 1 ,4 7 5
BUSAN
0 1, 6 17
CANADA
0 1 ,3 9 7
H ONG KONG
0 1 ,6 0 5
S W I T ZERLAND
01,294
A US T RALI A
0 1 ,2 8 3
S PAI N
0 1 ,1 8 6
BRAZI L
01,167
BELGI UM
0 1, 9 77
DENM ARK
0 0, 9 1 7
AUST RI A
0 0, 8 5 3
HONG K ONG
0 0, 7 61
S I NG APORE
0 0, 6 8 3
S W EDEN
0 0, 6 5 7
MEX I C O
0 0, 5 6 6
501
4b.communications+media_DEF.indd501 501
1/17/2007 6:16:04 PM
3 ,2 1 0 ,0 8 1
3 ,1 6 3 ,3 4 9
2 ,8 4 7 ,7 6 3
2 ,7 7 7 ,0 8 5
2 ,6 8 6 ,1 1 9
BRAZI L
AUS T RALI A
TAI WAN
GERM ANY
1 6 ,1 1 0 ,0 0 0
CANADA
1 8 ,4 8 1 ,0 0 0
CANADA
4 ,5 1 8 ,2 2 6
1 8 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0
I NDI A
UNI T ED K I NGDOM
2 1 ,9 0 0 ,0 0 0
I TALY
1 2 ,9 6 2 ,0 6 5
2 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
FRANC E
NET HERLANDS
2 9 ,2 2 0 ,0 0 0
UNI T ED K I NGDOM
2 2 ,0 0 0 ,4 1 4
3 9 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
S OUT H K OREA
JAPAN
5 7 ,2 0 0 ,0 0 0
GERM ANY
1 1 5 ,3 1 1 ,9 5 8
9 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
JAPAN
UNI T ED S TAT ES
1 5 9 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
C HI NA
180000000
B Y C OU NTRY:
UNI T ED S TAT ES
BY COUNT RY:
4.
160000000
140000000
120000000
100000000
80000000
60000000
40000000
20000000
0
729,752,000
736,914,000
950,534,000
1, 1 5 8 , 2 5 5 , 0 0 0
1, 2 0 6 , 8 4 5 , 0 0 0
1, 8 1 6 , 2 2 6 , 0 0 0
1, 8 5 5 , 1 9 4 , 0 0 0
3, 3 3 0 , 1 4 0 , 0 0 0
3, 6 0 3 , 1 8 0 , 0 0 0
40000000
35000000
,B I Z 0 1 ,2 89 , 9 3 4
,I N FO 0 2 ,4 00 , 7 6 4
OT H ER
SH
S O PPI N G & AU C T I ON
GAM ES
EN T ERTAIN M ENT
SP
PO RT S & RE CREAT I ON
0
FIN ANC E
5000000
0
G E N E R A L / N AT I ON AL N EW S
10000000
2 000000000
15000000
4 000000000
E-M AI L
20000000
6 000000000
G EN E R AL C O MM U NI T Y
25000000
,O R G 0 4 ,4 49 , 8 0 4
30000000
S EPT E M B E R 9 8 G O O G LE OPE NS
2001
G OOG L E I M A G E S EA R C H A ND C ATA L OG S EA R C H A R E L A U NC HE D
2002
5 0 0 , 0 0 0 QUE RI ES A DAY
2003
FEBR UARY 0 4
AP RI L 0 4
L OC A L S EA R C H A ND G M A I L A R E L A U NC H ED
AUGUS T 0 4
G OOG L E B EC OM ES PU B L I C
OC T OBER 0 4
S EPT E M B E R 9 9 3 MILLIO N QUERI ES A DAY AF TER AOL /NE TSCAPE SE L ECT G OOG L E F OR
45000000
8 000000000
GOOGLE
TIMELIN E
J UNE 0 0
# DOM AI N NAM ES
B Y C OU NTRY:
1 000000000
6.
F EB R U A RY 9 9
5 b.
, N E T 0 6 ,9 36 , 1 9 6
1 2 000000000
1 0, 7 3 2 , 5 9 8 , 0 0 0
,C O M 4 6 ,6 80 , 4 2 8
5 a.
OV ER TH E Y EA R
2005
ASIA AN D L AT I N AM E RI CA
502
4b.communications+media_DEF.indd502 502
1/17/2007 6:16:06 PM
BLO GS
1.
- blogs by region - blog writers profile - blog hosting sites - growth of # of blogs
% OF BLOGS BY R EGIO N:
J ULY 2 0 0 5
40%
300 %
20%
20
10%
10
%
00%
N ORTH AMERICA 39 %
AS I A 4 3%
MID D L E EAS T +
N ORTH AFRI CA 0%
4b.communications+media_DEF.indd503 503
1 1 ,000 ,0 0 0
9 ,500 ,0 0 0
6 ,000 ,0 0 0
3 ,000 ,0 0 0
2 ,500 ,0 0 0
1 ,000 ,0 0 0
197 ,0 0 0
1 ,200 ,0 0 0
3 ,070 ,0 0 0
7 ,300 ,0 0 0
2 1 ,000 ,0 0 0
S IX APA RT
PL AN E T W E B LO G
YA HO O B LO G S K OR E A
S K YB L OG
G RE ATE ST J OU R N A L
2 0 00
2 0 01
2 0 02
2 0 03
2 0 04
5 3 ,400 , 0 0 0
1 4 ,000 ,0 0 0
CY W OR L D
2 0 05
1 5 ,000 ,0 0 0
0
B LO G GE R
5000 0 0 0
0%
B Y # END OF Y EA R 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 5 :
4 0 ,000 ,0 0 0
10000 0 0 0
10%
50 +
15000 0 0 0
20%
40 49
20000 0 0 0
30%
30 39
25000 0 0 0
40%
20 29
30000 0 0 0
50%
13 19
35000 0 0 0
60%
M AL E
40000 0 0 0
70%
F E M AL E
45000 0 0 0
80%
GROWTH # B LO G S
X A N GA
50000 0 0 0
90%
4.
MSN SPAC E S
0 .3 %
1 .1 %
BY # OF U S ER S :
4 .4 %
58 .3 %
36 .0 %
BY AGE:
68 .1 %
100%
3.
B Y GE NDE R :
31 .9 %
2.
503
1/17/2007 6:16:06 PM
M O VIES
1.
IN MILLIONS 200304
01. IN D IA
M OV I E T I CKE TS SOL D
2 , 8 6 0 M I L L I ON
F I L M I NV ES TM ENT
0 0 .1 9 2 M I L L I ON [ 0 8 . ]
M OV I E T I CKE TS SOL D
1 , 4 2 1 M I L L I ON
F I L M I NV ES TM ENT
1 4 , 6 6 1 M I L L I ON [ 0 1 . ]
03. IN D ON ESIA
M OV I E T I CKE TS SOL D
0 .1
. 9 0 M I L L I ON
04. F RAN CE
M OV I E T I CKE TS SOL D
0 .1
. 5 5 M I L L I ON
F I L M I NV ES TM ENT
0 0 .8 1 3 M I L L I ON [ 0 4 . ]
05. GERMAN Y
M OV I E T I CKE TS SOL D
0 .1
. 4 9 M I L L I ON
F I L M I NV ES TM ENT
0 0 .6 8 7 M I L L I ON [ 0 5 . ]
06. J APAN
M OV I E T I CKE TS SOL D
0 .1
. 4 5 M I L L I ON
F I L M I NV ES TM ENT
0 1 , 2 9 2 M I L L I ON [ 0 2 . ]
M OV I E T I CKE TS SOL D
0 .1
. 3 9 M I L L I ON
F I L M I NV ES TM ENT
0 0 .8 2 5 M I L L I ON [ 0 3 . ]
08. SPAIN
M OV I E T I CKE TS SOL D
0 .1
. 3 1 M I L L I ON
F I L M I NV ES TM ENT
0 0 .3 0 4 M I L L I ON [ 0 6 . ]
09. MEXICO
M OV I E T I CKE TS SOL D
0 .1
. 2 0 M I L L I ON
M OV I E T I CKE TS SOL D
0 .1
. 1 3 M I L L I ON
F I L M I NV ES TM ENT
0 0 .1 3 3 M I L L I ON [ 1 0 . ]
ITALY
F I L M I NV ES TM ENT
0 0 .2 4 7 M I L L I ON [ 0 7 . ]
SOUTH KOREA
F I L M I NV ES TM ENT
0 0 .1 3 4 M I L L I ON [ 0 9 . ]
S OL D M OV I E TI C K ETS 1 0 0 M I L L I ON
F I L M I NV ES TM ENT 1 0 0 M I L L I ON
504
4b.communications+media_DEF.indd504 504
1/17/2007 6:16:07 PM
AD MISSION IN TH OUSANDS
4b.communications+media_DEF.indd505 505
S W I T Z E RL A N D
H O N G K ON G
BE LG I U M
SO U TH A F RI CA
AR G E N T I N A
R U SS I A
SO U T H K O RE A
BR A Z I L
AU S T R AL I A
CA N A DA
I TA LY
SPAI N
MEXICO
50000
J APAN
5 00000
UK
100000
GE RM AN Y
1 0 00000
20,800
21,218
24,205
31,050
35,422
44,720
66,420
72,760
92,326
100,331
113,850
131,443
137,550
144,478
147,488
156,313
170,048
200.000
F RA N C E
F R AN C E
1 5 00000
1 ,4 35 , 0 0 8
1 ,5 6 9 , 4 4 7
2 0 00000
U SA
CH I N A
IN D I A
T OTA L
27,271
25,808
30,228
42,318
51,530
63,651
84,052
121,307
108,403
122,153
142,877
143,752
176,806
200,325
179,734
195,213
195,388
2,145,000
2,488,570
3,296,720
3,769,437
2.
IN MILLIONS 200304
3.
TO P 20 C OU NTRI ES RANK ED
BY # OF A DMIS S IONS 2001 + FORECAST 2010
150000
FORECAS T Y EA R 2 01 0
Y EA R 2 0 0 1
505
1/17/2007 6:16:08 PM
US
4b.communications+media_DEF.indd506 506
A U ST R I A
C H IN A
TA I WA N
BE L G IU M
10 %
0. 54%
0. 55%
0. 57%
0. 64%
0. 77%
0. 79%
0. 82%
15 %
SW E D E N
BR A Z I L
S W I T Z E R LA N D
0. 84%
0. 87%
1. 99%
2. 58%
2. 67%
2. 71%
2. 94%
3. 12%
3. 31%
4. 40%
0. 96 %
0. 98 %
1. 01 %
1. 14 %
1. 37 %
1. 39 %
1. 44 %
1. 49 %
1. 53 %
3. 51 %
4. 56 %
4. 72 %
4. 78 %
5. 19 %
5. 51 %
5. 84 %
7. 77 %
8. 99 %
N E T HE R L AN D S
R U SS I A
M E X I CO
AU ST R AL I A
SO U T H K O R E A
I TA LY
INDIA
CA N A DA
S PAI N
G E RM AN Y
5. 09%
5c.
FR A N C E
C OUNTRY BO X OF FICE S
9 . 6%
7 . 6%
7 . 3%
5 . 9%
5 . 6%
5 . 0%
4 . 8%
4 . 3%
3 . 8%
S PAI N
I S RAEL
HONG K ONG
HUNGARY
GERM ANY
AUS T RALI A
I RELAND
JAPAN
C ZEC H REP.
2 . 0%
3 . 7%
1 0 . 3%
S I NGAP ORE
1 0 .4 %
5 .7 %
4 .8 %
4 .2 %
3 .2 %
2 .1 %
0 .5 %
0 .2 %
DREAM W ORK S S K G
NEW LI NE
M I RAM AX / DI M ENS I ON
LI ONS GAT E
M GM / UA
W EI NS T EI N C OM PANY
I M AX
EROS
I FC
NEW M ARK ET
M AGNOLI A
N WAV E
T HI NK FI LM
0 .1 %
0 .1 %
0 .1 %
0 .1 %
0 .1 %
0 .2 %
0 .2 %
1 1 .1 %
BUENA V I S TA
I DP
1 1 .4 %
S ONY
1 6 .9 %
1 1 .6 %
0%
UNI V ERS AL
5%
1 6 .5 %
1 0%
PARAM OUNT
1 5%
WARNER BROS .
% GR OWTH BO X O FFI C ES
9. 79 %
1 5 . 0%
I TALY
2003 2004
5. 54%
1 6 . 4%
FRANC E
1 5 . 0%
UK
1 8 . 5%
M EX I C O
M A R K ET S H A R E%
14 . 6 %
2 8 . 8%
BRAZI L
UK
8. 01%
3 8 . 7%
R US S I A
2005 TO P 2 0
FILM PRODUCTI ON STUDI OS :
J A PAN
4 2 . 6%
TAI WAN
4.
0.4%
0.6%
0.6%
4 6 . 7%
P OLAND
AR G E N T I N A
N O R WAY
I R E L AN D
0.6%
0.6%
0.8%
0.9%
0.9%
1.3%
1.3%
2.4%
3.2%
3.4%
3.5%
4.1%
5 0 . 0%
0%
C HI NA
5 0%
ARGENT I NA
2 0 . 0%
HO N G K O N G
P OL A N D
N E T H E RL A N D S
TAI WA N
C H IN A
B R A Z IL
R U SSI A
ME X I C O
A U S T RA L IA
CA N ADA
ITALY
SPA I N
5.3%
6.8%
6.9%
5 a.
G E R MA N Y
UK
9.4%
45 . 8 %
5 b.
FRANCE
JA PA N
1 0 0%
20 %
2003 BY % SHARE
EX
EXC
CLUDING US
INCLUDING US
5%
0%
506
1/17/2007 6:16:09 PM
4b.communications+media_DEF.indd507 507
4 ,6 0 1 .4 0
4 ,9 7 4 .0 0
5 ,4 2 8 .4 0
4 ,4 5 2 .0 0
4 ,2 9 5 .0 0
4 ,8 7 8 .0 0
4 ,9 7 7 .0 0
4 ,9 9 3 .0 0
5 ,2 8 0 .2 0
5 ,3 5 2 .3 0
6 ,0 4 6 .8 0
6 ,1 4 5 .6 0
6 ,1 6 6 .1 0
8 ,9 3 9 .0 0
9 ,0 8 8 .0 0
9 ,4 4 6 .5 0
1 0 ,3 0 8 .8 0
1 2 ,1 8 2 .6 0
1 5 ,8 2 4 .8 0
1 6 ,2 4 5 .6 0
1 6 ,9 8 8 .2 0
1 8 ,4 0 1 .6 0
3 0 ,4 6 6 .4 0
YE A R 2 0 0 3 YE A R 2 0 0 4
3 ,8 3 6 .4 0
5 ,1 0 1 .1 0
BS K Y B L ONDON
ADELP HI A DENV ER
6 ,0 4 6 .8 0
9 .0 8 8 .0 0
7 ,7 5 0 .9 0
6 ,0 4 6 .5 0
1 1 ,2 6 8 .4 0
1 9 ,5 0 7 .7 0
1 6 ,1 4 6 .2 0
1 7 ,2 5 2 .8 0
1 8 ,1 7 1 .1 0
3 1 ,4 1 4 .2 0
BBC L ONDON
20000
3 ,2 8 9 .4 0
CO UNTRY B OX O FF I C ES
ARD H A M B U R G
5000
6 ,5 2 1 .9 0
10000
CABLEV I S I ON B ETH PA G E, NY
15000
8 ,2 7 4 .4 0
91. 3
A R G E N T IN A
DI REC T T V L OS A NG EL ES
S ONY TOK Y O
C OM CAS T PH I L A DEL PH I A
V I AC OM NEW Y OR K
WALT DI S NEY L OS A NG EL ES
T I M E WARNER NEW Y OR K
20000
1 17. 7
1 88. 2
N E T HE R L AN D S
H ON G K ON G
2 62. 1
BR A Z I L
1 18. 7
2 67. 2
R U SS I A
1 26. 5
5 05. 0
M E X IC O
N OR WAY
6 68. 2
A U S T RA L IA
I R E LA N D
6 99. 1
1 26. 5
7 18. 3
CA N ADA
P OL A N D
8 55. 9
I TALY
5 d.
1 78. 5
1, 11 0 .6
SPA I N
E U ROS M I L L I ONS
1 81. 2
1, 41 0 .7
GE RM AN Y
25000
C H IN A
1, 43 0 .5
UK
30000
TA I WA N
1, 95 0 .2
F RA N C E
0
9, 53 0 .0
$U S D M I LLION S
JA PA N
5000
2 0, 77 9 .9
10000
US
15000
T OTA L
6.
35000
507
1/17/2007 6:16:09 PM
T V + R AD IO
112000
2 00
1 0 ,55 0 0 *
TOP 25 C OU NTRI ES
WI TH THE LARGES T # OF
TELEV I S I ON S TATI ONS
1.
7 ,3
, 06
10000
00 00
8000
3,240
4000
2,791
6000
117
115
120
S W I T ZERLAND
138
FI NLAND
S AUDI ARABI A
150
169
BRAZI L
179
S W EDEN
211
P OLAND
224
JAPAN
225
S PAI N
228
P HI LI P P I NES
236
UNI T ED K I NGDOM
358
M EX I C O
422
S OUT H K OREA
360
556
S OUT H AFRI CA
I TALY
562
I NDI A
373
584
FRANC E
NOR WAY
635
T URK EY
GERM ANY
771
S ERBI A + M ONT ENEGRO
2000
67.5%
30.0%
78.1%
60.2%
99.0%
10.1%
91.2%
57.1%
89.0%
34.2%
140.000.000
63.7%
40.0%
4.
93.8%
35.5%
3.
49.5%
22.2%
C HI NA
R US S I A
UNI T ED S TAT ES
120.000.000
100%
L ESS T H A N 1 % BE T WE E N 1 5% 5 10 %
10 30%
OVER 3 0%
J AM A ICA
Z IM B A B WE
SL OVAKIA
ETHIOPIA
CAM EROON (U )
USA
E GYPT
BARBAD OS
40%
C HINA
JOR DA N
ECUAD OR
GHAN A
N IGERI A
20%
J APA N
B U LGA R IA
AZERBAIJAN
MOZAMBIQUE
SUDAN
A U ST RA LIA
M AC E DON IA
BELAR US
SEN EGAL
TANZANI A
M ALAYSIA
PO LAND
IN D IA
ZAMBIA
THA ILAND
R O M ANIA
SRI LAN KA
AL BAN IA
S I NG A PO R E
T U RK E Y
VIETN AM
SERBIA +
P HILIPPINE S
M E X IC O
K OR E A
PE R U
GUYAN A
TA IWA N
T RINIDAD +
GEORGIA
T OB A G O
E ST O NIA
PAKISTAN
K YR G H YZSTAN
N EPAL
80%
60%
0%
W OR L D AV E R AG E
S U B -S A HA R A N A F RI CA
N O RT H A ME R I CA + CA R I BB E A N
N O RT H AF R ICA + M ID D L E EA S T
E U R OP E
V ERY H IG H
C EN T RA L + SO U T H AM E RI CA
M ODERATE HI GH
A U ST R A LI A + PA C I FI C
LO W
A SI A
VERY LO W
LAT VIA
LIT H U A N IA
U K R A INE
U Z BE K IS TAN
R U SSIA
508
INDO NE SIA
4b.communications+media_DEF.indd508 508
1/17/2007 6:16:10 PM
4b.communications+media_DEF.indd509 509
859
20
40
60
601
6.
80
515
456
C OLOM BI A
EQUADOR
544
605
TAI WAN
T HAI LAND
608
S OUT H AFRI CA
632
AUS T RALI A
653
GUAT EM ALA
656
UNI T ED K I NGDOM
673
C HI NA
NOR WAY
804
792
I NDONES I A
P OLAND
833
CANADA
842
923
P ER U
GERM ANY
924
S PAI N
R US S I A
3,543
8000
20,000,000
1,180
957
1,256
JAPAN
P HI LI P P I NES
1,410
M EX I C O
ARGENT I NA
0
1,822
2000
BRAZI L
4000
FRANC E
4 ,7 0 9
6000
I TALY
UNI T ED S TAT ES
10000
R A D I O A U ST R A LI A
15,000,000
B B C W O R LD SE RV I CE
0
8 , OOO, 0 0 0
40000000
R A D I O CA N A DA IN TE R N AT IO N A L
20OOO000
65,000,000
60000000
D E U T SC HE W E LL E
80000000
45,000,000
100000000
R AD IO FR A N C E I N T E R N AT I ON AL E
120000000
140,000,000
5.
V OI C E O F A M ER I CA (VO
( A)
12000
2.
TOP 25 C OU NTRI ES
WI TH THE LARGES T # OF
RADI O S TATI ONS
RA DI O STATIO
S A
NS WI TH THE
H E LARGES
S T # OF LI S TENE R S
140000000
BBC RA D IO
A F R I C A + M I DDL E EA S T
G L OB A L L I S TENER S
A S I A + PA C I F I C
A M ER I C A S
EU R A S I A
EU R OPE
509
1/17/2007 6:16:10 PM
1 3 ,8 2 2 *
T V + O N LIN E N E WS
1.
127
102
80
101
2002
2004
60
2001
140
AL JA ZEERA A UDIENCE
PROFI LE:
4.
2003
50
52
1998
2000
41
1997
1999
38
1996
120
100
80
60
B Y AG E :
BY AREA:
BY RELIGION:
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
0 . 2%
0
M I L L I ONS OF H OM ES
2.
2005
9 6%
2 . 4%
6 7%
6%
2 7%
21%
20%
20
1 0%
% M A L E + 1 1% F EEM A L E
80%
1 0%
% M A L E + 1 0% F EEM A L E
90%
1 0%
% M A L E + 1 3% F EEM A L E
10 0 %
23%
40
20%
H EA D QU A RTER S
10%
BBC WORLD
0%
V I EW ER S H I P
UNI T ED K I NGDOM
LANGUAGES
3 7 . 6 M I L L I ON
43
JEW I S H
1 7%
1 1%
80%
02
04
70%
60%
100000000
50%
80000000
40%
60000000
30%
4b.communications+media_DEF.indd510 510
R E U T E R S 0 2 ,1 0 0 ,0 0 0
U SA T O DAY 0 9 ,1 8 6 ,0 0 0
C N N 2 2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
B B C 4 8 ,1 0 0 ,0 0 0
U N S PE C I F I ED
10K +
8K 10K
4 K 8K
N E W YO RK T IM E S 1 1 ,2 5 5 ,0 0 0
510
U P T O 4K
0
U N IV E R SI T Y +
0%
PR IM A RY
10%
MS N 8 8 ,6 3 1 ,0 0 0
40000000
2 0 O0 0 0 0 0
SE C O N DA RY
40 +
7 5 . 6 M I L L I ON
YA H O O 9 6 ,9 3 0 ,0 0 0
1 0% MA L E + 1 1% FEM AL E
1 0% MA L E + 1 0% FEM AL E
1 0% MA L E + 1 3% FEM AL E
3.
90%
20%
30 - 39
4 0 . 0 M I L L I ON
NOV. 0 4
100%
15 - 29
QATAR
U NK NOW N TI M E F R A ME
1 0%
M US LI M
C HRI S T I AN
3 5%
2 9%
2 7%
URBAN
R URAL
BY IN COME:
34%
S UBURBAN
AL JAZEERA
CNN
BY ED UCTION :
3 7%
40 +
21%
30 - 39
20%
25%
15 - 29
U K A L ONE DEC . 0 4
1/17/2007 6:16:11 PM
HUMAN LANGUAGES
they set in motion a complex process of merging with, and displacement among
and fast-changing mosaic that is becoming more consolidated, with many smaller
languages dying out, and differentiated at the same time, as larger languages such as
English are undergoing differentiation processes. The graphs in this suite show that:
Consequently, English in particular has achieved a status as the lingua franca of the
21 st century, influencing and even infiltrating many languages around the world.
The worlds international leadership is polyglot, with English as the central medium.
fewer languages for reducing transaction costs on the one hand, and the social and
cultural identity of those speaking one or more of the worlds other thousands of
WH AT IS LA NGUAGE ?
languages on the other. English is clearly on the rise as the worlds lingua franca of
business, technology and academia, not only among elites but the population at large
instead of biologically inherited. While many definitions exist, language can formally
in many countries, particularly young people. However, this is unlikely to lead to a mono-
lingual world, at least in the short to medium term, as the most globalized regions and
cities of the world are also those with the greatest diversity in language use.
gestures and other symbols when using languages to represent objects, concepts,
emotions, ideas, and thoughts. Languages are rarely discrete units with clearly defined
Nonetheless, as language use is not only driven by economics but also shaped by
boundaries but typically extend across geographic, cultural and social space. What
languages such as English. Some countries, such as France, have tried to use policy
measures to stem the influence of English (Franglais), while other like Germany,
identitywhich is why language is so often part of, or invoked in, communal, regional,
the Netherlands and Mexico have a chosen more laissez-faire attitudes. As a result,
national and international conflicts of many kinds. Not surprisingly, the process of
mixed use of such languages leads to the rise of Spanglish (Spanish and English) and
Denglish (German and English), suggesting the beginning of what could become more
profound differentiation processes among dominant languages.
WH AT D O WE K NOW A B O U T L A N G UAG E S ?
At first, estimates of the number of languages at 6,000 and 7,000 suggest an image
Many countries have some form of language policy in place which is typically tied
to domestic rather than international issues, and is often tied to political conflicts,
number of languages are dominant in terms of number of speakers. The thirty most
actual and potential, past and present. These language policies range from assimilation
spoken languages make up nearly two-thirds of the worlds population, and the fifteen
policies aiming at greater language homogeneity by trying to reduce the number and
most spoken ones about half. Chinese (Mandarin, Cantonese, Wu, Min Nan, Jinyu),
Hindi, English, Spanish, Arabic, Bengali, Portuguese, Russian, Japanese, and German
two or more languages inside a state (e.g., Belgium), to valorization policies that favor
are spoken by 100 million speakers as first language. About 97 percent of the worlds
population speak about four percent of the worlds languages; and conversely, about
process of globalization, domestic language policies are likely to come under pressure,
96 percent of the worlds languages are spoken by about three percent of the worlds
as are the language regulatory agencies and norm setting institutions of many countries
people (Bernard, 1996, p. 142). According Crystal (2001), 500 of the worlds languages
have less than 100 speakers, and 1,500 have less than 1,000.
Education, nation-building, economic and technological development tends to privilege
larger, dominant languages over minority languages, in particular those not codified in
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
written form. The current wave of language concentration is linked to the long-term
A REA
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LIVIN G LA N G UAG ES
count
50 percent of the worlds languages are losing speakers, and UNESCO estimates that
percent
count
N U MB ER O F SP EAKERS
percent
mean
median
about 90 percent of the languages may be replaced by dominant languages by the end
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
of the 21 st century.
AFR IC A
2,092
30.3
675,887,158 11.8
AMER IC AS
1,002
14.5
047,559,381 00.8
0047,464 002,000
Much of the diversity of languages is in the Pacific, the Americas and to a lesser extent,
ASIA
2,269
32.8
3,489,897,147 61.0
1,538,077 010,171
0323,082 025,391
Africa, where languages are relatively numerous and average fewer speakers (Table 1).
EU R O PE
239
03.5
1,504,393,183 26.3
6,294,532 220,000
PAC IFIC
1,310
19.0
6,124,341 00.1
0004,675 000,800
Additionally, with the exception of North America, there is a close relationship between
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
linguistic diversity and illiteracy, particularly in Africa, South America and Asia-Pacific.
TO TALS
6,912 100.0
5,732,861,210 100.0
828,105 007,000
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, there is a divergence between the number of speakers and multiple media
usage (spoken, print, broadcasting, electronic), domain uses (tourism, business, diplomacy, academia, etc), and translations. English, German, French, Spanish and Italian
are central in the network of translations, with Chinese, Hindi, Arabic, Bengali, and
Portuguese much less so. English, Chinese, Japanese, Spanish, German and French
dominate the Internet. Smaller languages such as Catalan and Dutch are more visible
in print and electronic media than larger languages such as Urdu, Russian or Arabic. In
this way, it is seen that economic development and higher average levels of education
add clout to languages even though they may have fewer speakers.
Some languages like English, Spanish and French have a greater presence in more
countries and media outlets for other reasons, as well. First, a delayed result of
colonialism. When these languages were imposed on colonies and adapted by elites,
4b.communications+media_DEF.indd511 511
511
1/17/2007 6:16:11 PM
P RINT MEDIA
Because of the movement towards non-traditional print formats by both readers and
nals, magazines, printed mail, signs, and other ink-press forms. Today, the realm of
advertisers, 1 printers and media companies are crossing over in order to retain and
print media is experiencing rapid growth, but is recently challenged by emerging web-
capture new clienteles. By 2003, about 60% of all publishers and printers were in-
based news outlets. The expansion of the Internet and growing generations of youth
exposed to computer and online technology not only threatens the existence of tradi-
(Graphic Arts Monthly, 2003). As costs and loses rise, print media companies that can-
tional print media, but also the oligopolies that have enjoyed control of the news print
not compete by changing their services and streamlining their production are at an
Newspaper readers tend to be more frequent among older adults (European Report,
80% of the top 50 circulated world newspapers come from Asia (Japan, China,
2005), whereas younger readers choose alternative (internet, television) news sources.
This generational effect further contributes to the declining growth in the sector in
Readers Digest has the largest global magazine circulation of 23 million, followed
much of the developed world, and to its growth limits in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
Indeed, there is an emerging consensus among experts that future growth will come
No newspapers from the Middle East, South America, and Africa are included in the
from the Internet and the electronic advertising options it offers (Middle East Company
top 50 circulated world newspapers. Al-Ahram, Egypt, is the most circulated Middle
placement of traditional media products and processes with new technologies, models,
outlets, and ways of distribution. This will clearly challenge current business models
first and foremost, and with it the oligopolies of print media conglomerates that ac-
come countries (between 1.8% and 3.4%) lower than in low-income countries (between
count for a large share of global newspaper and magazine production and distribution.
12.3% and 14.3%). Conversely, nearly 93% of all exported newspapers and periodicals
These questions guide the industry as it moves forward, searching for new and sus-
come from high-income countries and 67% of all newspapers and periodicals traded
to change.
In recent years, the print media industry has grown in many Asian countries, while it
has declined in most western countries, especially the US and Germany. In 2002, for
example, weekday circulation of US newspapers dropped 11% from levels twelve years
ago (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2005) and the gross advertising expenditures of Ger-
REGION
man newspapers fell by almost 3% (The Business, 2003). China, India, and Japan are
ASIA
4.1
currently the top Asian newspaper markets, while Singapore and Indonesia have been
SO U TH AMER IC A
6.3
01.1
growing significantly over the past five years. Newspaper circulation in India increased
AFRICA
10.4
approximately 24% (both between 2001 and 2002, and 2003 to 2004) and the reader-
EU R O PE
(-1.4)
01.3
N O RTH AMER IC A
(-0.2)
04.1
(-0.1)
01.4
Despite recent growth in Asian countries, countertrends of slowed growth, even decline are beginning to occur. In Japan, though circulation and advertising sales are
S o u r c e : T h e Wo r l d A s s o c i a t i o n o f N e w s p a p e r s A n n u a l S u r v e y o f Wo r l d P r e s s Tr e n d s
on the rise, many young readers increasingly turn to the internet for their news and
re l e a s e d i n 2 0 0 5 . I n cl u d e s d a ta fro m th e 2 1 5 co u n tri e s a ro u n d th e wo rl d wh er e n ew s -
information. In both Japan and China, the increasing prevalence of free sheets adds
p a p e r s a r e p u b l i s h e d . w w w. w a n - p r e s s . o r g / a r t i c l e 7 3 2 1 . h t m l
pressure on traditional paid newspapers. Russia and Turkey are two other emerging
markets; the Russian print media market is expected to double by 2008 (RosBusiness
Consulting Database, 2005). Table 1 shows growth and decline by continent between
2000 and 2004.
WHAT ARE THE ISSU E S ?
Similar to the book industry and traditional publishing in general, the world of print
media is facing competition from new electronic sources of information and communication. Digital technologies allow for more immediate, searchable, personalized, and
instantaneous news media, and many of these information sources are free, posing
further barriers to traditional print media. Equally, the proliferation of technologies that
allow for self-publishing, so called Zines (small printed booklets that usually contain
satire, poetry, rants, ideas, political and social commentaries, etc.) and other independent newspapers and magazines, are quickly gaining popularity.
To attract new advertisers, media companies are branding publications and creating
niche products. In order to streamline production, more and more newspapers, such
as the New York Times and the Boston Globe, are outsourcing to free-lance journalists, designers, editors and presses. Some critics have complained that outsourcing
and commodification of print media have caused a tabloidization of the industry, and
reduced its capacity as a watch-dog of public affairs.
512
4b.communications+media_DEF.indd512 512
1/17/2007 6:16:11 PM
tions. This process of concentration began in the 1980s, driven by greater economies of
scale in publishing and later with the incorporation of other types of media (e.g. music,
on the concept of the books content as private or public property. While e-books have
ously occurring due to innovations in information technology that create new opportuni-
not yet found full acceptance by the reading public, it is an expanding market (Table
ties for self-publishing and public access to various print mediums. These developments
1) that offers new opportunities for preserving, updating, and disseminating texts. At
have raised questions regarding intellectual property rights and information flows, and
the same time, because information in the Web age is tied to a boundless space, it can
have changed understandings and uses of books around the world. The indicator suite
be easily copied and altered, often without regard to ownership and copyrights. The
shows that:
ongoing Google project to scan millions of books from libraries in the US and the UK
in order to increase access to printed materials illustrates this issue. Some view this
Five publishing houses dominate the global book publishing market; in 2003 their
others see it as an attempt to replace traditional books, which devalues creativity and
Random House, the largest publisher worldwide, accounts for 35% of the total
disrespects ownership.
Similarly, while technologies for transmitting, reproducing, and storing data make access
to books easier and often more interactive, issues such as piracy, pose challenges for
The number of publishers in the United States is over twice the number located in
the book industry where definitions and practices of intellectual property vary across
the other six top markets combined (i.e., UK, Australia, Spain, Germany, New Zealand,
and France).
mon practice with local presses and individuals. Textbook piracy is most pronounced in
Over half of all books published worldwide are published in English, Chinese or
Asia where college attendance is increasing, the use of English in education is wide-
German-in 2004, 375,000 new books were published worldwide by five main English-
spread, and where less expensive and high quality printing services abound. Lower
speaking countries, i.e., US, Canada, UK, Australia, and New Zealand (Bowker, 2005).
prices in developing countries create flows of illegal copies back into richer nations
via the Web.
Many developing countries rely on book imports, which bring with them elements of
cal, journal or magazine. Today, books also include e-books, which are electronic ver-
outside cultures into local contexts. Book shortages, lack of infrastructure, illiteracy,
sions that can be found on the Web. The term publishing refers to the issuing of copies
few local publishers and the prevalence of English books exacerbate inequities be-
tween developing and developed countries. In this light, books are both tools for cul-
are also available on the Web. Globalization has profoundly affected the book industry;
tural enrichment, education and empowerment, and tools for sustaining the global
beginning in 1891 when international copyright laws were created, authors and print-
the publishing industry are key social indicators of how books are used and viewed in
a broader context.
WHAT D O W E K N OW AB O UT B O O K S ?
Books represented approximately 19% of $11.3 billion in trade of cultural goods in
Banning and censoring of books is perhaps as old as the field of publishing itself.
2002, directly behind recorded media, the leading category. Books and other print media
Many countries also have strict control over the publishing process, which limits the
grew 3.7% between 1994 and 2002, with slower growth in high-income countries (be-
types of books being published and distributed. The Beacon for Freedom of Expression
tween 1.8% and 3.4% from 1994 to 2002), and higher rates in low-income countries
(12.5% on average). Despite this large increase, the share of low-income countries in
over 500,000 books and newspapers that have been censored through the better half
the global book trade remains small. About 87% of all book exports in 2002 came from
cess that challenges the very definition of what constitutes a book, its purpose, cultural
Asia and limited participation by Africa. The top book producers at the end of the 20th
relevance and form. Will the book gradually be replaced by some new form or model
century were the UK, Germany, the US, Spain, and Japan with between 111,000 and
for storing and retrieving, presenting and disseminating, as well as selling and buying
56,000 books produced each year; and Burkina Faso, Togo, Ghana, Benin, and Gambia
at the other extreme, with between 5 and 10 books produced a year (UNESCO, 2005).
Losses due to illegal copying of copyrighted books exceeded $15.8 billion in 2005, with
copyright infringements most prevalent in Russia, China, and South Korea (Publishers
Weekly, 2006b).
A MO UN T 2005
In 2005, US book sales reached $25.1 billion and book publishers spent about $232
$0,484,933
$3,182,499
books were published per year by the end of the 20th century; in China, a rapidly
% CH A N G E FR OM 2004
1,024
36%
69%
24%
emerging market for books, over 100,000 new titles are published, representing a tenfold increase over the past decade (Goff, 2006). Worldwide, used-books sales increased
heavily, thanks in part to the proliferation of websites that sell them (internet sales of
h t t p : / / w w w. i d p f . o r g / d o c _ l i b r a r y / s t a t i s t i c s / Q 2 2 0 0 5 . h t m
4b.communications+media_DEF.indd513 513
513
1/17/2007 6:16:12 PM
MUSIC & MOVIES While music is an integral part of human history, reflecting
WH AT A R E TH E IS S UES ?
deeply cultural, often religious roots, its modern understanding is much more in line
Digitalization (i.e., the electronic construction of sound and video through binary codes)
with that of movies-recorded and commercially produced products that are part of a
not only implies profound changes for the entertainment industry, it also changes the
growing cultural economy. Similar to book publishing, the global industry around music
way we think about music and video-we now can listen to and watch music and movies
are able to access and download music and video files through the internet and broad-
(Scott, 2005), even though the corporate headquarters of the five largest film enter-
band connections, changing the nature of music and video from a tangible object (e.g.,
tainment companies are in New York (Time Warner, Viacom), Los Angeles (Walt Disney),
and at anytime.
In light of the profound influence of popular music and movies on national and regional
The proliferation of piracy and illegal downloads has created a revenue crisis in recent
years for both music and film industries. The music industry has been hit particularly
growing. Not surprisingly, the US leads the world in production and revenue generated
hard by piracy, but is collaborating with national governments to crack down on illegal
from film and music. Propelled by financial resources and economies of scale, Hollywood
file sharing. Technological and marketing innovation has also helped to bring the music
has created a globalizing trend in both movies and music, yet that is increasingly threat-
industry out of near ruin in 2005 through the success of legal purchased downloads.
ened in the era of the Web. The suites on Music and Movies illustrate the following:
In addition, a number of high profile court cases levied against file sharers have been
successful in stemming Peer-2-Peer networks and illegal sharing in the US and much
In 2005, six film studios control nearly 80% of global market share, of these five
of Western Europe (Table 2). Yet, it remains harder to control piracy in some areas, for
are US companies
The US alone accounts for 46% of the global film entertainment market
US feature films are responsible for more than half of domestic box office revenue
Piracy, illegal reproductions and downloads have adversely affected Hollywood as well.
internationally
By contrast, Bollywood and Nollywood (Nigeria), though also affected, have chosen to
The value of the recorded music retail sales in the US tops the world and is nearly
combat falling revenue in different ways. Average production costs and cycles in India
and Nigeria are much lower than in the US, requiring smaller absolute revenue to gen-
From 2004 to 2005, only Mexico and Russia experienced a positive increase in
erate a profit and allowing for a constant flooding of local markets. Nollywood films are
music sold
produced within a month (McLaughlin, 2005), and new movies are available on video
or DVD within a week of release (Ruigrok, 2006). Additionally, Bollywood works closely
WHAT D O W E K N OW AB O UT M US I C A N D M O V I E S ?
with the music industry to release movies and soundtracks together, generating media
The music industry has experienced rapid concentration in the past 10 years (Oligopoly
France and Canada have been instrumental in sparking international debate over cul-
Sony, EMI Records, and BMG). With the merger between Sony and BMG music (a.k.a.,
tural heritage protection as a means to limit and guard against the infiltration of foreign,
Bertelsmann AG) in 2004, the Big Five became the Big Four (Table 1). Despite the
(i.e. American) music and film. Uganda and Ghana have felt that Nollywoods proliferation
existence of smaller labels, most are owned by or in contractual agreements with the
into their countries have undermined their own fledging film markets (McLaughlin,
Big Four. Overall, the global pop music industry is valued at $30 billion, where 89% of
2005). In the music industry the backlash is not quite as strong against US dominance,
all recorded music is bought in the top 10 markets. In 2005, seven of the top 10 global
but many countries have regulations reserving certain percentages of radio and TV air-
Internationally, CD sales have slumped since 1999, which is attributed to the rise of
pirated CDs and illegal downloads from file sharing and Peer-2-Peer networks. In 2005,
music revenues recovered somewhat with the increase in websites offering legally purchased digital downloads to computers, MP3 players and mobile phones. Similar to the
% WORLD SHARE
motion picture industry, the global music industry remains dependent on international
25.5%
21.5%
EMI Group
13.4%
Since 2004, global motion picture revenue has dropped $1.4 billion due to declining
11.3%
admission rates and increasing piracy of DVDs (Informa Telecoms and Media). Rising
Independent Labels
28.3%
ticket prices to offset declines in attendance have not yet closed the gap. Although
India and China dominate admission rates internationally, low ticket prices indicate
that the influence of movie-goers at the box office is not as noticed as in the US, Japan
or Europe.
TAB LE 2: P IR A CY G R O WTH 2000-2004
The emergence of digital music, Peer-2-Peer file sharing, and broadband connections
make both music and movies easier to access, copy and distribute; thus, challenging
YEAR
the fundamentals of the business models underlying the entertainment complex. What
2000
0,640
is more, these new technologies have decreased production and distribution costs,
2001
0,950
48.4%
opening up opportunities for musicians, singers, composers, directors and actors, lo-
2002
1,085
14.2%
cally and internationally. As major media conglomerates compete and struggle to stay
2003
1,130
04.1%
afloat, other film and music industries are rising. Today, Bollywood, located in Mumbai,
2004
1,155
02.2%
is the most prolific feature film producer in the world, followed by the US, with Japan,
China, and France as other major international movie hubs (McLaughlin, 2005). In fi-
Producers, 2005
514
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Communication has
ments. MySpace.com and similar social networking websites are known to target users
evolved since the age of Morse code to todays elaborate networks of analogue and
for commercial advertisement, consumer choice and practice data, and to track trends
digital cables sending and receiving emails, voice and instant messages over computers
in fashion and music (Hempel, 2006); thus, highlighting the tension between public
and other wireless technology. The Internet, or the Web, is a complex system of inter-
access and use of a highly effective form of mass communication to the benefit of
connected computer systems, largely via fiber-optic broadband cables. Blogs are public
online journals posted by individuals expressing unedited views and opinions. Of particular notice, Blogs have played an important role in evolving the Internet into partici-
Another facet of the ownership and privacy debate is the origin of dominant Internet
technologies. Google and Yahoo remain the top two search engines used worldwide, as
is evidenced by their infiltration into quotidian language, such as do you Yahoo? and
Telephones and now, the Internet, both spread through globalization as well as facilitate
just Google it. This popularity coupled with the birth of the Internet in the US has lead
a globalizing process, bringing people, locations, and economies closer. In spite of this,
the creation of a rival Google search engine called Quaero, a joint investment be-
regions or communities. Today, the infiltration of the Internet in all aspects of commu-
tween the French and German governments. Plans for Quaero are solely as a government
funded project instead of a privately owned business venture. While Quaero is not yet
space and policy solutions to a growing global digital divide. The suites on Phones, the
online and functioning, it has sparked widespread discussion about the need for a true
public entity search engine based outside of the US (OBrien, 2006). However, in light
of the recent revelation of widespread wire tapping by the United States government
Europe and North America account for almost 80% of all public wireless access
on its own citizens, there is also concern for the widespread use of governmentally
Asia and North America account for more than 80% of all Internet blogs
Women blog more than twice as often as men
Blogs remain the ultimate space of free speech for the global public at large. Blogs
Over 90% of all blogs are written by people under the age of 30
and wikis, public web-encyclopedias, are allowed to be changed by users and are
not monitored by anyone in particular, but the reading population in general; thereby,
WHAT D O W E K N OW AB O UT P H O N E S , T H E I N T E R N E T A N D B L O G S ?
raising issues of information control. South Korea has the only successful wiki online
Land-based telephone lines are increasingly replaced by cell phones; for instance,
newspaper called Ohmy News, which relies entirely on citizen posts and edits. While
in some countries there are 500% more cell phones in use than traditional landline
this phenomenon of participatory conversations about news and current events has
worked to influence South Koreas traditional news sources, Ohmy News is a very rare
case. Other large media sources have tried to establish online citizen created participa-
and affluence make cell phone ownership attainable to most citizens. Telephone usage
tory newspapers but have been forced to shutdown because of Internet vandalism
remains dominated by flows from North America to Asia and Europe; whereas phone
and misuse as platforms to further biased, inaccurate and, at times, hateful content
(Kluth, 2006).
Today, Internet usage reaches nearly 16% of the world population, accounting for a
A pressing issue connected to access to the Internet and blogs is the rampant use of
little over 1 billion people worldwide; however, this is unequally spread, with heavy
cyberspace for pornography. This reflects a growing international governance and law
bias in industrialized countries in Asia, Europe and North America. Nearly 80% of global
wireless connections are located in North America and Europe. This growing global
digital divide is the result of unequal access to computers, Internet network technol-
ogy, computer literacy, and costs associated with purchasing and owning computers
that can connect to the Internet. Worldwide, South Korea has the largest percentage
of households with broadband connection (Mueller, 2006). Elsewhere, for the nearly
% POPULATION
WORLD REGIONS
OF WORLD
% INTERNET USAGE
% USAGE
% USAGE GROWTH
OF POPULATION
OF WORLD
(2000-2005)
three billion people that live on less than two dollars a day (Shah, 2006), access to the
Internet remains illusive.
AFRICA
014.1
02.6
002.3
423.9
ASIA
056.4
09.9
035.6
218.7
While blogging is most common in Asia and North America, the global popularity of
EUROPE
012.4
36.1
028.5
177.5
blogging is spreading, with new blogs entering the Internet everyday. The total number
MIDDLE EAST
002.9
09.6
001.8
454.2
of blogs online is not completely certain, but blog search engines (such as Technorati.
NORTH AMERICA
005.1
68.6
022.2
110.3
com) claim searches through as many 41.4 million sites with 2.4 billion links. Most
LATIN AMERICA +
blogs attract small audiences and focus on local topics; though in contrast, some blogs
CARIBBEAN
008.5
14.4
007.8
342.5
have audiences upwards of 3,000 readers. Bloggers use the public space of the In-
OCEANIA +
ternet to rate, write about, or comment on daily journals, original art works, favorite
AUSTRALIA
000.5
52.6
001.7
134.6
restaurants, music or movies. Additionally blogs are used to share political and social
WORLD TOTAL
100.0
15.7
100.0
183.4
viewpoints. In China, the spread of blogs has been cited as one of the main sources for
spreading public news and current events outside the realm of government control. Not
source: Internetworldstats.com
only do blogs include the traditional written word, but video blogs or vlogs are also
increasing for both news related stories and amateur video production (Kluth, 2006).
WHAT ARE THE ISSU E S ?
Concerns regarding the communications industry center on censorship, ownership,
privacy and access. The recent controversy surrounding Googles decision to censor the
content of Google-China at the request of the Chinese government provoked heated
discussions about censorship on the Internet and the right to control the use of cyberspace (Mills, 2006). Similarly, the recent acquisition of MySpace.com by News Corporation
(owned by media tycoon Rupert Murdoch) has raised questions about the ramifications
of corporate ownership of the Internet and potential privacy and free-speech infringe-
4b.communications+media_DEF.indd515 515
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TV + RADIO
Tanzania have three; and Cameroon has one. Interestingly, these five countries have
transnational scale. To a large extent, these flows, their content, as well as access to
the highest percentage of international short wave listeners followed by a dozen Af-
them, both reflect and perpetuate global power structures. The result is an amalgama-
rican, Middle Eastern, Eurasian, and South Asian countries that also tend to have few
tion of perspectives and imbalanced formation that favor the developed world and
television stations. Further, North Africa, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa are
exclude many voices, viewers and listeners in the Global South. The indicator suite,
the only regions where the majority of households have short wave radio, compared to
the world average of 30%. However, only a few countries in these regions have international broadcasting stations themselves.
Of all the countries, the US has both the largest number of television stations
Likewise, countries with low television ownership and cable television subscription
Western radio stations dominate the global market with the largest number
rates tend to have higher volumes of international short wave radio listeners. Compared
of listeners
to the United States, which has 938 television sets and 255 cable subscriptions per
Among world regions, North Africa, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa have the
1000 people, the five African countries with the highest percentage of international
largest percentage of households with short wave radio access-an indicator of limited
short wave listeners average a total of 127 television sets and 0.3 cable subscriptions
per 1000 people. The Democratic Republic of Korea has low television and radio owner-
ship and cable television subscription rates along with a high number of radio stations
WHAT IS TV AN D RAD IO ?
Television is a system for transmitting, receiving, and reproducing audio and visual
information from one place to another via wires and radio waves. Considered the most
Unequal access and control of content are critical issues. As television and radio pro-
grams are developed and aired by networks, they not only provide information, but
is a major industry. Prior to the advent of television, radio broadcasting was the pri-
also inculcate certain viewpoints and opinions. Those located in developing parts of
mary means for news and communication over long distances. Radio is a system that
the world have fewer options for information access and largely consume what others
culture; thus, television and radio function as a reflection and medium of dominant
between 3 and 30 MHz, can reach longer distances than AM/FM radio, but vary greatly
paradigms and power imbalances. The West dominates world TV and radio with respect
to volume of stations and listeners; moreover, in other parts of the globe such as Asia
wave in a range of frequencies and languages. Not subject to local regulation, short-
Pacific, Latino America, and Africa, the West commands a large share of television,
wave radio can add to political diversity in countries with limited freedom of informa-
radio programming and content, thus more or less subtly affecting regional cultures.
and European content) as the popularity of Brazilian TV novellas in South and Central
The United States currently has the largest share of the worlds number of televi-
sion and radio stations. Europe is also highly represented among the top 25 countries
with the largest number of television stations, as is the Asia Pacific region with China
strategies of media giants like MTV (Santana, 2003). Founded and launched in the US
(#3), India (#8), South Korea (#10), the Philippines (#16), and Japan (#18) represent.
in 1977, MTV quickly spread to Europe and first entered Asia via Japan in 1992. In Asia,
South Africa (9) is the only African nation to place in the top 25, as is Mexico (14) for
MTV found that merely bringing American and European pop culture to various reaches
Latin American. Whereas a greater number of Latin American countries are represented
of the globe was inadequate and began considering the integration of local culture
within the top 25 countries with the largest number of radio stations, South Africa
indigenous artists and created local programs, sustaining regional broadcasts in some
areas (i.e. Malaysia and Singapore) while individualizing stations in other countries (i.e.
Western radio stations command the highest volume of listeners around the world.
Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia). The network additionally highlights new artists on
The British Broadcasting Company (BBC) World Service has the largest international
audience at 153 million with programs offered in 43 different languages, while Voice
of America follows next with an audience of 140 million and a total of 55 languages.
Radio Deutsche Welle has less than half the number of listeners at 65 million (in 30
languages), followed by Radio France Internationale with 45 million (in 19 languages),
Radio Australia with 20 million (in 6 languages), and Radio Canada Internationale with
8 million (in 5 languages).
While international broadcasting is dominated by the West, its audience largely derives
from the remaining parts of the world. Over 44% of BBC Radios average weekly audience is located in Africa and the Middle East, while Asia Pacific accounts for over 35%
of BBCs average weekly listeners, together comprising 80% of BBCs total audience.
On the other hand the Americas account for less than 8% of BBC Radios audience,
where as Eurasia make up less than 7%, and Europe around 5%.
Countries with fewer television stations and radio broadcast stations tend to have
higher numbers of international short wave radio listeners. The majority of African,
Middle Eastern, Eurasian, and South Asian countries have three or less television stations, while Kenya only has eight options as far as radio stations; Nigeria, Sudan, and
516
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TV + ONLINE NEWS
as media sources for news in terms of access and use. Online news is steadily re-
gramming, is the fourth largest global television network available around the world
claiming a portion of the audience that print media lost to television news, but it is
after MTV, CNN and BBC World (Wikipedia, 2006). TV5MONDE is the only digital, global
also growing of its own accord via news portals. TV news refers to the broadcast of
French language network, broadcasting 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, to more than
information regarding current events and happenings through the medium of television.
160 million households in 200 countries worldwide, making it the second largest global
The majority of news stories are pre-recorded reports edited and pieced together by the
television networks, while live reports are presented by reporters on the scene, often
with the help of a studio reporter. Producers determine what stories are included or
Of online news sites, Yahoo News has the highest number of unique monthly users
excluded, and they thereby influence the outcome of a newscast. Thus, news is shaped
(almost 97 million), followed by MSN (86.5 million), BBC (48 million), CNN, (22 million),
the New York Times (over 11 million), USA Today (over 9 million), and Reuters (2.1
million). Yahoo News monthly users exceed the reported number of CNN viewers (75
Online news describes the practice of disseminating current events via the Internet and
million). Over ninety-five percent of BBCs unique users access the TV news site as
is rooted in the tradition of print media, which monopolized the mass media market be-
opposed to the radio news site, and 83% of Reuters users visit their website at least
fore technological advances helped make radio and television the primary media. The
once a day, spending an average of 5 minutes and 16 seconds per visit. In the US, 21
advent of the Internet allowed the print media industry to reverse the trend of declining
percent of web users consume news through online news sites, where as 7 percent
readership because it was able to reach more readers, generate additional revenue
read both online and print news. In addition to the New York Times and USA Today, other
through advertisement, and promote the print product. Also, online sites enabled TV
American news publications like the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and the
news networks to post programs online after broadcasting. While established news
San Francisco Chronicle, receive a high volume of unique monthly visits (around 7.4
providers (print media and television) including the New York Times, CNN, and Business
Week were the first to create online news sites, internet-based portals like Yahoo soon
followed suit and now see the highest rates of usage by those seeking online news.
WH AT A R E TH E IS S UES ?
Today, all major newspapers and weeklies maintain websites, as do many radio and
CNN, Al Jazeera, and BBC have each received charges of biased reporting in the past.
television stations.
The indicator suite shows wide and expanding reach of TV and Online news:
on Terror. In its coverage of the Iraq War, CNN allegedly depicted violent images and
The Cable News Network (CNN) reaches over 75 million viewers, while Al Jazeera
focused more on human interest stories, with a systematic bias in favor of the US
has approximately 40 million, and the British Broadcasting Company (BBC), around
38 million.
pro-Pakistani bias.
The majority of Al Jazeeras audience comes from urban areas, identifies as Muslim,
is male, has at least a high school degree, and earns an annual income of $1,000
Al Jazeera has been criticized by countries including Algeria, Bahrain, Morocco, and
USD or more. *
Spain for purported biased reporting and has received accusations of anti-American
Over the last decade, BBC Global has experienced a steady increase in distribution
bias since airing video statements by Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders
to homes with 24-hour reception, growing more than threefold from 38 million house-
following September 11. With regard to the Iraq War, Al Jazeera has faced allegations
* Yahoo News has the highest number of unique monthly users, followed by MSN.
received both accusations of being against and for the ruling British party, as well
as being anti-Israel and also overly sympathetic to the enemy during British military
WHAT D O W E K N OW AB O UT T V A N D O N L I N E N E W S ?
campaigns. In the past, several countries including Uzbekistan, China, Zimbabwe, Sri
The Cable News Network (CNN, owned by Time Warner), British Broadcasting Company
Lanka, and Pakistan have banned BBC news as a result of reporting that antagonized
(BBC), and Al Jazeera currently dominate the share of TV news viewers around the
ruling parties.
world. Founded in 1980 by Ted Turner, CNN is a private news network based in Atlanta
with 42 bureaus and more than 900 affiliates worldwide that presently maintains net-
The absorption of local TV news outlets into large media companies poses questions
that began broadcasting in 1996 with a $150 million grant from the Emir of Qatar.
all-news channels [is being] ignited by two critical forces: the falling cost of technology
and televisions power in the international marketplace (Carvahal, 2006). 24-hour all-
channels, Al Jazeera is the most frequently viewed news channel in the Middle East,
news network seem to be emerging in various regions, including France, which hopes
and its exclusive interviews and footage have been rebroadcast by the western media.
to launch its own all news channel with government funding. A Pan African channelto
BBC is a public broadcasting network that aired its first TV bulletin in 1954. Currently,
ternational television news) has often resulted in unsound policy, by prompting public
foreign broadcasting. DW-TV does not charge stations for use of its programming, and
figures and governments to act hastily in order put on the appearance of effective
as a result, its News Journal and other programs are rebroadcast on numerous pub-
lic broadcasting stations in several countries such as the United States and Australia
policy agenda setting agent, (2) an impediment to the achievement of desired policy
(Wikipedia, 2006). Started in 1953 as a short wave radio service, in 1994 Deutsche
goals, and (3) an accelerant to policy decision making (Livingston, 1997). Aware of the
Welle became the first public broadcaster in Germany with a World Wide Web presence.
publics instant and easy access to information about current events including strategic
In 2003, the German government passed the Deutsche Welle Law, which defined the
decisions and actions, global leaders may act to appease public criticism and response,
thereby catering their decisions to the segment of the population who can afford televi-
with DW-TV and DW-RADIO. The spirit behind the Act is to present German as a cul-
tural and democratic state and to promote intercultural exchange, including presenting
points of view from other regions and cultures. In 2005, Deutsche Welle started to
provide newscasts anchored by Arabic-speakers, the first European station to do so. Its
television programming provides content in German, English, French and Arabic, while
its radio and web presence provide content in 30 languages.
517
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1/17/2007 6:16:12 PM
While a handful of large companies dominate online news, there are other more informal sources that many argue offer less-biased information because they are free from
corporate control and are often contributed to by freelance journalists and volunteers.
Because online news production is very cost-effective, it has an economic advantage
over more traditional news sources that rely on advertising revenues.
As the Internet grows as a news source in developed countries, traditional print media
and TV news viewing have declined. From 1984 to 2005 in the US for example, the
audience for television evening news fell by almost 38 percent, and newspaper circulation declined by 15 percent (Ahlers and Hessen, 2005). While these figures suggest a
continued loss of importance of traditional and TV news sources, internet news sources
may instead be used in tandem with other sources. Furthermore, emerging linkages
between traditional and new technologies are creating innovative news sources and
outlets, such as online news webcasts. Another noteworthy trend is that younger cohorts are turning to the internet for news and information, compared to older adults,
who tend to read newspapers.
* T h e s e a r e r o u g h e s t i m a t e s a n d i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h r e s p e c t t o t i m e a n d m e t h o d o l o g y.
518
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1/17/2007 6:16:12 PM
M O VEM ENTS + C OM M U N IT IE S
MI GR AT I ON
REF UG EES + AS Y LU M S EEK ERS
TOURIS M
TR ANSN ATI ONAL C OM M U NI TI ES
TR ANSN ATI ONAL M OV EM ENTS
TR ANSP ORTATI ON AI RP ORTS
519
4c.movements+communities_DEF.ind519 519
1/17/2007 8:03:14 PM
154
1 7 4 .9
9 9 .8
8 1 .5
M I G RATION
1a .
# 0F I NTERNATI
N
T ONAL M I GRANTS
T WORLDW
L
ID E
I N MIL L IO N S
1970
7 1980 1990 2000
125
100
29.5
3.3
30.3
3.1
32.8
26.3
22.2
5.8
4.8
3.8
18.7
40.8
27.6
13
18.1
5.9
6.1
28.1
43.8
41.8
5.8
16.3
16.2
9.9
25
14.1
50
32.3
75
0
WOR LD
LAT I N AM ERI CA
NORT H
T HE CARI BBEAN
AM ERI CA
OC EANI A
EUROP E
1 0 . 2%
30.3
3.3
6 . 4%
26.3
22.2
4 . 1%
1 . 1%
6.1
2 . 0%
41.8
1 . 2%
32.3
1 . 3%
16.2
2 . 0%
14.1
2 . 8%
2 . 9%
154
99.8
2 . 2%
10
1 . 3%
4.8
1 8 . 8%
3.8
1 5 . 6%
27.6
1970 2000
1 2 . 9%
BY REG IO N S
15
(FORM E R ) U S S R
IN TERNATIO
R
NAL MIG R
RA NTS % OF TOTAA L POPU L ATION
5 . 6%
20
ASIA
18.1
1 b.
AF RICA
0
AF RICA
LAT I N AM ERI CA
NORT H
T HE CARI BBEAN
AM ERI CA
1 6 .8 %
3 0 .3
3 .3
3 .8 %
1 8 .7 %
2 6 .3
2 2 .2
2 2 .9 %
2 7 .6
2 3 .3 %
1 8 .1
1 5 .9 %
41 .8
4.8
3 . 3%
3.8
3 . 7%
3 .4 %
10
6 .1
7 .1 %
154
9 .3 %
9 9 ..8
(FORM E R ) U S S R
1970 2000
30
1 2 .1 %
EUROP E
25 .0 %
40
20
OC EANI A
% DISTRIB
I
UTI ON OF WORLD M I GRANTS
N
B Y R EEG IO N S
34 .5 %
1c.
ASIA
32 .3
WOR LD
520 WOR LD
AF RICA
4c.movements+communities_DEF.ind520 520
ASIA
LAT I N AM ERI CA
NORT H
T HE CARI BBEAN
AM ERI CA
OC EANI A
EUROP E
(FORM E R ) U S S R
1/17/2007 8:03:14 PM
200
U NIT E D STAT E S
GERMAN Y
4c.movements+communities_DEF.ind521 521
100
CAN ADA
4 2.2
4 4 .0
4 3.1
5 3 .9
8 2 .2
1 2 0 .1
3 6 .2
49.5
8 2 .7
5 9 .2
.
5 0. 1
4 5. 3
2 9 .3
3 5.1
2 5 .6
46 . 5
43. 5
3 7 .8
FRANC E
S W I T ZERLAND
1 . 4%
1 . 0%
11.9
1 . 1%
11.9
1 . 1%
JORDAN
UNI T ED S TAT
AT ES
E 3 5 M I LLI ON
2 . 6%
1 . 2%
C HINA 3 5 M ILLIO N
P OLAND
R US S I AN
N FEDERA
FEDERAT I ON 1 3.3 M I LLION
1 . 7%
1 . 3%
I N DIA 20 M ILLION
I S RAEL
1 . 4%
1 . 3%
C OT E D I V OI RE
GERM
GER
M ANY 7 . 3 M I LLI ON
11.9
1 . 3%
2 . 1%
1 . 5%
PHILIPPINES 7 M ILLION
I R AN (I S L AM I C R EPU B L I C OF )
11.9
1 . 7%
K AZAK HS TAN
3 . 6%
2 . 3%
UNI T ED K I NGDOM
11.9
3 . 0%
S AUDI ARABI A
6 . 3%
2 . 4%
4 . 0%
3 . 3%
CANADA
PAK I S TAN
1 1 . 2%
3 . 6%
I NDI A
3 . 0%
2 . 7%
6 . 4%
3 . 6%
FRANC E
AUS T RALI A
6.3
4 . 0%
1 1 . 9%
2 0 . 0%
UK RAI NE
5
3 . 2%
4 . 2%
10
GERM ANY
15
3 . 8%
7 . 6%
20
R US S I AN FEDERAT I ON
UNI T ED S TAT ES
1,004.7
TOP 3 MIG RA NT
SEN D IN G COUNTR I ES
1 25. 2
1 1 2 .2
1 1 1. 6
1 1 2. 3
70 . 8
86.3
400
9 5 .3
1 2 6.3
1 0 9.8
1 2 2 .3
1 5 0 .0
12 8. 1
5.
21 7 .3
1 5 5 .6
1 34.5
21 4 .6
1 41 . 6
5 73 .7
888.8
2 0 0 0 + 1 9 70 R AN KINGS
1 1 6.2
46 3 .1
600
2 5 9 .2
3 0 2.8
29 1 .3
500
4 3 4. 1
4.
1 86 .7
1 554 . 5
1 7 9 .9
300
2 40 .3
2.
3.
AUS T RALI A
UNI T ED K I NGDOM
NET HERLANDS
SWEDEN
521
1/17/2007 8:03:15 PM
4c.movements+communities_DEF.ind522 522
10 %
5%
0%
$10
0
0
M I GRANT S OURC E
$1 1 . 4 3
$7 . 3 0
$4.13
$1.57
$19.53
GERM ANY
$20
R US S I AN FEDERAT I ON
10
$ 3 6 .2 6
$ 4 5 .4 6
$30
$2 9 .0 2
15
UNI T ED S TAT ES
$40
N AT I V E B OR N M E N
N AT I V E B OR N W O
OM E N
F O R EI G N BO R N M EN
F O R EI G N BO R N W O M EN
20
I NDI A
$50
FA R MI N G , F O RE ST RY
& F I SH I N G
30
$5.41
$3.21
7.
$5.98
$3.96
1 1 .9
1 2 .4 %
4 .4 %
FO REI G N B O RN L AB O R FO R C E
P HI LI P P I NES
C HI NA
UNI T ED S TAT ES
UNI T ED K I NGDOM
5 .0 %
1 8 .9 %
6 .3
8 .8 %
6 .0 %
O PE R AT O R S
FA B R ICAT O RS A N D
L AB O R E RS
9.5
14.8
12.2
26.9
20 %
PR O D U C T I O N C R A FT
A N D RE PA IR
1 8. 8
6 .1
2 2. 7
1 3. 5
25 %
9.5
16.4
13.4
26.9
3 .3
1 .1
6 .3
1 .6
1 5 .8
1 4 .8
9 .8
1 0 .0
30%
SE RV I CE
522
13 .6
6. 5
12 .9
9. 5
15 %
P RO F E SS IO N A L
S PE C I A LI Z ATI O N
E X E C U T IV E
AD M IN IS T R AT IV E
& MG R .
S W EDEN
NEW ZEALAND
GERM ANY
FRANC E
1 9 .2 %
2 4 .5 %
6.
CANADA
AUS TARLI A
foreign born labor force - income gap top 3 sending & receiving countries - % perspective labor force us
top 20 countries receiving remittance - top 20 countries sending remittance - remittage sent by workers in us
I N C O M E G AP M EN & WO M E N
M I GRANT HOS T
8.
% LA B O R F O R C E IN TH E
U N IT ED STATES 2000
1/17/2007 8:03:15 PM
4c.movements+communities_DEF.ind523 523
INDIA
ME X IC O
PH I LI P PI N E S
CH I N A
TURKEY
E G Y PT
SPA I N
P O RT U GA L
MO RO C C O
BA N G L AD E S H
J OR DA N
E L SA LVAD O R
30
600
20
15%
8%
8%
8%
6%
5%
4%
4%
3%
2%
2%
2%
2%
7 3%
3 4%
4 3%
4 3%
2 7%
3 5%
2 0%
1 9%
2 0%
1 2%
1 7%
9%
9%
2000
D O M IN I CAN R E PU B L IC
10
1 0%
20
2%
T O P 2 0 CO UNTRIE S
R E C EIVIN G R EMI TTANCE 2001
GREECE
1 1.
6 5%
S R I L A NKA
CH I NA
T H A I L A ND
F ORM ER Y UG O S L AV I A
ECUA DO R
B R A ZI L
I TA LY
J A PA N
S PA I N
KUWA I T
O MA N
NET H ER L A NDS
BAHRAIN
UNI T ED KI NG DO M
DENMA R K
CZECH R EP UB L I C
V ENEZUEL A
NO R WAY
2 .2
1 .8
1 .5
1 .5
1 .3
1 .3
0 .7
0 .7
0 .7
0 .7
L UXEMB O UR G
2 .3
F R A NCE
3 .1
I S R A EL
S WI T ZER L A ND
3 .9
2 .6
B EL G I UM
8 .1
G ER MA NY
8 .1
S A UDI A R A B I A
8 .2
UNI T ED S TAT ES
1 5 .1
1 .1
1 .2
1 .3
1 .4
1 .4
1 .5
1 .5
1 .5
1 .8
1 .9
2 .0
2 .0
2 .1
2 .3
2 .8
2 .9
3 .3
6 .4
9 .9
1 0 .0
2 8 .4
1 2%
7.0
7.9
8.5
8.5
8.9
8.9
PA KI S TA N
Y EMEN
CO L O MB I A
EL S A LVA DO R
DOM I N I CA N R EP UB L I C
J O R DA N
B A NG L A DES H
L EB A NO N
T UR KEY
EG Y P T
MO R O CCO
P H I L I P P I NES
2%
S RI LANK A
EC UADOR
UGANDA
HONDURAS
P HI LI P P I NES
VANUAT U
9.3
9.7
12.8
13.5
13.6
13.8
13.8
15
16.1
16.2
17.0
22.8
I NDI A
MEXI CO
N I GE RI A
900
2%
2 03
2 80
3 07
3 85
3 97
M OROC C O
F O RM ER Y UGOS LAV I A
JAM AI CA
CAP E V ERDE
EL S ALVADOR
LEBANON
M OLDOVA
Y EM EN
NI CARAGUA
ALBANI A
JORDAN
26.5
37.3
10
YEMEN
D O MI N I CA N R E PU B L IC
E L S ALVA D O R
E GY PT
ME X I C O
P H IL I PP IN E S
5 62
7 90
AVE RAGE
B A N G LA D E S H
PA K I STA N
REMIT TAN C E S
SENT BY
M IGRAN TS
I N T HE US
1 1 04
12.
IN D I A
T ONGA
40
LES OT HO
10.
(BY VA LU E IN $U SD B ILLION S)
10
15
20
30
30
1 3.
R EM I TTAN C E S T O S ELE C T
M AJOR REC I P I EN T C OU NTR IE S
0
( % SHARE W ORLDW I DE & REGI ONW I DE )
80
70
60
50
1200
40
300
10
523
1/17/2007 8:03:16 PM
PA K I S TA N
960,041
I S L A M I C R EPU B L I C OF I R A N
952,802
G ER M A NY
038,576
TH E NETH ER L A NDS
025,907
U NI TED K I NG DOM
022,494
C A NA DA
015,242
U NI TED S TATES
009,778
I NDI A
009,761
A U S TR A L I A
008,037
DENM A R K
006,437
U ZB EK I S TA N
0 05 , 2 3 8
REFUGEES HO STED +
P ER CAP I TA INCO ME
OF HOST NATIO NS 2004
3.
5%
24%
71%
CHAD
224,924
U G A NDA
214,673
ETH I OPI A
090,451
K ENYA
067,556
045,226
C ENTR A L A F R I C A N R EPU B L I C 0 1 9 , 4 7 0
U NI TED S TATES
017,994
EG Y PT
01 4 , 9 0 4
A S O F D E C .3 1 2 0 0 4
1.
F OR M ER PALES T I NE
P RI NC I PAL S OU RCE
C OF RE F UGEE E S
R EFUGEE S + AS YLUM
S E E KERS
AFGHANI S TAN
S UDAN
M YANM AR
BUR UNDI
C ONGO-K I NS HAS HA
I RAQ
LI BERI A
S OM ALI A
V I ET NAM
C OLOM BI A
ANGOLA
ERI T REA
C ONGOLES E AS Y LUM LOCAT I ONS :
U NI TED R EP. OF TA NZA NI A
153,474
ZA M B I A
06 6 , 2 4 8
C ONG O
058,834
B U R U NDI
048,424
R WA NDA
045,460
U G A NDA
014,982
A NG OL A
013,510
S OU TH A F R I C A
0 09 , 5 1 6
F R A NC E
007,665
G ER M A NY
006,668
U NI TED K I NG DOM
0 05 , 9 7 3
C A NA DA
0 05 , 0 6 9
C HI NA
BHUTAN
NORT H K OREA
NEPAL
S RI LANK A
C ROAT I A
P HI LI P P I NES
R WANDA
TAJI K I S TAN
C HAD
ET HI OP I A
524
4c.movements+communities_DEF.ind524 524
1/17/2007 8:03:16 PM
36 6 , 1 0 0
AZ ERBAI JAN
528,000
32 8 , 3 0 0
COTE DI V OI RE
500,000
32 4 , 9 0 0
I NDI A
500,000
31 0 , 3 0 0
I NDONESI A
500,000
26 3 , 6 0 0
L I BE RI A
464,000
22 3 , 3 0 0
ALGE RIA
400,000
20 4 , 2 0 0
SOM AL IA
400,000
15 8 , 1 0 0
KE NYA
360,000
12 0 , 5 0 0
S RI L ANKA
353,000
10 1 , 9 0 0
T URKE Y
350,000
10 1 , 4 0 0
R USS I A
339,000
88,200
309,200
70,400
L E BANON
300,000
66,200
GEORGI A
260,000
59,300
225,000
56,200
CENTR AL AF RICAN RE PU BL IC
200,000
54,200
NI GERIA
200,000
52,100
JORDAN
168,000
R EF U G EE S + I DPs
BY REGI ON
2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 (I N M I L L IONS )
10.0
8.0
2 .1
550,000
6.0
4.0
5. 2
MYANM AR
2.0
0.0
MI D D L E E A ST
46 9 , 1 0 0
3 .0
1,000,000
1. 6
I RA Q
E U R O PE
48 2 , 2 0 0
3 .3
1,330,000
3. 2
UGANDA
A SI A + PAC I F IC
69 1 , 8 0 0
3 .7
2,330,000
0. 1
CONGO-KI NSHAHSA
A ME R I CA S
70 3 , 5 0 0
1 3 .2
2,900,000
3. 5
COL OM BIA
A F RI CA
2, 0 8 8 , 2 0 0
A S OF DEC . 3 1 2 0 0 4
5,300,000
SUDAN
2.
2, 9 8 5 , 5 0 0
525
4c.movements+communities_DEF.ind525 525
1/17/2007 8:03:17 PM
T OU RISM
tourist destinations 2004 + 2020 - tourism spenders - tourist receipts - travel & tourism total global demand
1.
DE PARTURES I N M I L L I ONS
FROM EUROPE
257.9
388.2
431.3
FROM ASIA + THE PACIFIC
62.2
124.1
151.2
FROM THE AMERICAS
96.9
129.1
127.7
FROM AF RICA
9.5
15.5
TO P 1 0
T OU RI S M REC EIP T S
18.2
5.
22.0
80
80
W ORLDW I DE REC EI P T S 2 0 0 4 $6 2 3, 0 0 0, 0 0 0
80
ORIGIN N OT SPECIFIED
17.4
70
70
15.9
12.9
60
60
50
50
40
40
30
30
TOP 10
T O U R I S M S P ENDER S
4.
20
10
20
10
13
3 5 .7
I TA LY
1 5 .4
4 0 .8
F RA N C E
AU ST R IA
4 5 .2
S PAI N
A U ST RA L I A
7 4 .5
U N IT E D STAT E S
1 5 .9
1 5 .3
1 5 .7
R U S SI A N F E D E R AT I ON
TU R KE Y
1 2 .9
1 6 .0
CA NADA
2 5 .7
1 3 .4
1 6 .5
TH E N E T HE R L AN D S
CHINA
1 4 .6
C H IN A
2 7 .3
2 0 .6
2 0 .5
4c.movements+communities_DEF.ind526 526
2 7 .7
2 3 .6
2 8 .6
I TA LY
526
G E RM AN Y
2 8 .8
3 8 .1
4 7 .9
5 5 .9
UNITED KINGDOM
J APAN
5 7 .4
6 5 .6
U N IT E D S TAT E S
F RA N C E
6 4 .7
7 1 .0
GE RM AN Y
UNITED KINGDOM
1/17/2007 8:03:17 PM
T O EUROP E
264.8
384.1
416.4
TO ASIA + THE PACIFIC
57.7
114.9
152.5
TO THE AMERICAS
92.8
128.2
125.8
TO AFRICA
15.2
A R R I VA L S I N M I L L I ONS
28.2
33.2
F R A NC E
T O MID D L E EAST
10.0
75.1
S PA I N
53.6
U NI TED S TATES
25.2
46.1
C H I NA
35.4
41.8
I TA LY
37.1
U NI TED K I NG DOM
H ONG K ONG
M EXI C O
G ER M A NY
A U S TR I A
27.8
21.8
20.6
20.1
19.4
C H I NA 1 3 7 . 1
U NI TED S TATES 1 0 2 . 4
F R A NC E
S PA I N
H ONG K ONG
59.3
I TA LY
T OTAL G LOBAL ACTIVITY GENE RATED
B Y TO URISM = $ 6 , 2 0 1 , 5 0 0,000
R U S S I A N F EDR ATI ON
EUR O PE
2,272.0 $US BI L L I ON
N O RT H AM E R ICA
1,880.2
N O RT H E A ST A SIA
0 974.2
S OU T H E A ST A SIA
0 165.5
L AT IN AM E R ICA
0 133.2
M IDDLE E AST
0 128.6
S OU T H ASIA
00 59.3
N O RT H AFRICA
00 47.3
CAR IB B E AN
00 45.5
52.9
U NI TED K I NG DOM
M EXI C O
C ZEC H R EPU B L I C
93.3
71.0
52.8
48.9
47.1
44.0
527
4c.movements+communities_DEF.ind527 527
1/17/2007 8:03:17 PM
- international tourist destination change - asian + pacific tourist market affected by sars - tsunami effect on
passenger travel arrivals at phuket airport, thailand
1.
2 . 5% 2 . 5%
9 . 5% 9 . 5%
1 0 . 5% 2 . 7%
4 0 . 4% 2 . 9%
-6 . 4% 4 . 9%
1 2 . 3% 3 . 6%
40
2 6 . 7% 5 . 5%
1 1 . 8% 6 . 0%
3 . 4% 7 . 0%
0 . 1% 9 . 8%
35
40
30
25
30
20
15
20
10
0
A U S T RI A
GER MA NY
M
MEX I C O
H ON G K ONG
-5
2 .6 %
2 .6 %
- 5 .1 %
2
- 6 .2 %
2 .2 %
U N I T ED K I NG DOM
ITALY
C HI NA
- 0 .5 %
- 5 .4 %
- 0 .9 %
-15
- 2 .6 %
-10
-1 0 .4 %
U N IT E D S
STAT ES
-5
SPA I N
FFRA NC E
-1 5
528
4c.movements+communities_DEF.ind528 528
1/17/2007 8:03:17 PM
4c.movements+communities_DEF.ind529 529
2 .9 %
1 5. 4%
- 2 4. 5%
- 1 8. 5%
- 2 0. 4%
- 1 1. 1%
-5
-10
-15
-20
-25
1 4 1 ,3 86
JUNE
MAY
10
100000
-80
50000
-100
0
-110
NEW ZEALAND
A
I NDI A
TAI WAN
S I NGAP O
ORE
M ALAYS
SIA
K OREA R
REP UBLI C
7.1%
-6 . 0 %
5.2%
4%
4%
3.9%
9 0 , 4 9 7 -3 6 . 0%
9 2 , 5 6 5 -3 7 . 7%
1 1 2 , 0 3 9 -3 6 . 5%
1 3 8 , 0 0 6 -2 2 . 0%
1 0 6 , 8 7 6 -4 3 . 7%
7 7 , 6 4 2 -6 8 . 0%
250000
1 4 8 ,4 81
-60
-2 . 3 %
25
AP RI L
150000
I NDONES
SIA
3 0 OOOO
1 7 6 ,5 13
15
20.7%
30
M ARC H
-40
HONG K O
ONG
1 7 7 ,0 36
200000
-8 . 7 %
M OS T AFFE C TED BY S A R S
1 8 9 ,8 28
FE B R UA RY
2 4 2 ,4 68
J A NUA RY
- 1 1. 3%
-6 .2 %
20
GUAM
11%
40
C HI NA
35
- 1 4. 1%
- 1 0. 4%
2.
40
40
-20
3.
TS U NAM I EFFE C T
O N PA S S EN G ER S TRAV E L
ARRI VAL S AT PH U K ET A IR P O RT
529
1/17/2007 8:03:18 PM
4000
100
9 .2 % O F T O TAL P O PU L ATI O N
4c.movements+communities_DEF.ind530 530
3.
E ST IMAT ED S IZE OF
KURDISH DI AS P ORA
40
SEL ECTED COUNT RI ES BY T HOUS ANDS
120,000
25,000
20,000
20,000
17,000
13,000
12,000
10,000
5,000
R WAN DAS I N DC R
CO L O MB IA N S I N C OS TA R I C A
C OL O MB IAN S I N PA NA M A
K A SH MI R IS I N PA K I S TA N
ME SK H E TI A N TU RK S I N R U S S I A
E T HI O PI ANS I N S U DA N
S U DAN ESE I N ETH I OPI A
G EO R G IAN S I N U K R A I NE
150,000
50000
B I DO ON I N K U WA I T
100000
159,000
150000
C O LU MBI ANS I N U S A
15
U N IT E D STATE S 2 0 0 3
200000
250,000
40
G E OR G I A 1 9 9 6
250000
B I H A RI S I N B A NG L A DES H
50
T U RK M E N I STAN 1 9 9 6
3 0 OOOO
300,000
70
T H E N E T H E RL A N D S 2 0 0 3
40
K U RDS I N S Y R I A
75
AZ E R BA I JA N 2 0 0 5
I RAQ I S I N J OR DA N
75
L E BA N O N 2 0 0 1
0
100
AR ME N IA 2 0 0 5
100
100
200
U N IT E D K I N GD OM 2 0 0 5
300
150
530
400
FR A N C E 2 0 0 5
500
200
6OO
SW E D E N 2 0 0 5
BY T H O U SA N D S
600
1 ,3 0 0
S Y RI A
2.
ESTIMAT ED
POP ULAT IO N
OF K URDS
W ITHIN
K URDISH
TERRITORY
GE R MA N Y 2 0 0 0
4 ,4 0 0
I RA Q
8000
1 2. 4 % O F TOTA L POPU L ATI ON
120OO
6 ,6 0 0
40
I R AN
T U R K E Y 1 3 ,7 0 0
TRAN SN ATION AL
CO MM UN ITI E S
- people in refugee-like situations - estimated
population of kurds - estimated size of kurdish diaspora - # of roma in europe - estimated jewish population
1.
P EOP LE IN REFU G E E
LI K E S I TU ATI ONS
ES T I M AT ED # NOT F OR M A L LY R EC OG NI ZED B Y
1/17/2007 8:03:18 PM
8 ,2 7 1 ,1 0 0
6 ,4 7 6 ,3 0 0
1 ,5 5 8 ,5 0 0
5 ,0 6 9 ,9 0 0
8 7 ,2 0 0
1 0 4 ,2 0 0
A ME R I CA S
E U R OP E
A SI A
AF R ICA
OC E A N I A
W O R LD 1 3 ,2 9 6 ,1 0 0
D I A SP OR A
ESTI M AT ED
JE W ISH
POPULAT IO N
2002
1000000
800000
600000
400000
4c.movements+communities_DEF.ind531 531
M I DDL E EA S T
ASIA
EU R OPE
A M ER I C A S
538
SU DAN
861
1,103
1,849
A N G OL A
N I GE R I A
2,552
U N I T ED STATES
11,078
U N I T E D K I N G DO M
CAN ADA
3,696
12,123
27,151
I TALY
16,444
TA IWA N
I R E LA N D
32,210
S I N G AP O RE
54,477
J APA N
43,970
U AE
15,672
112,295
SA U D I A R A BI A
COUNTING
TH E R OM A
I N EURO P E
H O N G K O NG
20,945
1200000
Q ATA R
11,746
275,000
C Z E C H R EP U B LI C 2 001
1400000
K U WA IT
1 . 7 % OF TOTA
A L POPU LLATI ON
9 . 0% OF TOTA L POPU L ATI ON
6 . 5% OF T O TA L PO PU L AT IO N
160OOOO
4 . 7% OF TTOTA L POPU
O L ATI ON
7 . 0% OF TOTA L POPU L ATI ON
89,920
48,000
600 0 0 0 0
SL O VA K R E PU BL I C 2 001
800 0 0 0 0
1 . 3 % OF TOTA
O L POP U L ATION
5 . 0% OF TOTA L POPU L ATI ON
100 0 0 0 0 0
120,208
456,656
120 0 0 0 0 0
H U N G A RY 2 001
0
365,797
600,000
200000
B U LG A R I A 2 001
409,732
1,500,000
140 0 0 0 0 0
1. 8 % OFF TOTA L PPOPU L ATI ON
5.
R OMA N I A 1 992
4.
LARGES
A
T # OF
OV ERS EAS
E
FI LI
L P I NO
O WORK E R
P OP U LATI
A ON
N
6.
160000
140000
120000
100000
80000
60000
40000
20000
400 0 0 0 0
A F R IC A
200 0 0 0 0
531
2/2/2007 11:53:47 AM
rum events - thoughts on global consumerism and culture - thoughts on international financial institutions
- thoughts on globalization - financial sponsors wsf - growth of social forums
WORLD S OC I A L
FOR U M EV EN T S
2.
W HAT D O CI TIZENS RA NK
A S T HE GREATEST DA NGER
FACIN G T HE WO RL D?
1.
250000
100000
LAT I N AM ERI CA
75,000
111,000
I NDI A 2 0 0 4
155,000
200,000
27,000
100,000
BRAZI L 2 0 0 3
BRAZI L 2 0 0 5
12,274
68,000
BRAZI L 2 0 0 2
4,700
20,000
BRAZI L 2 0 0 1
JAPAN
AS I A
AFRI CA
50000
G OV ER NO DO R I O DE G R A NDE D O S O L
S PONS OR S OF W S F PR OC ES S & W S F
I NTER C H U R C H OR G . F OR DEV. C O -
I N B R A ZI L
OPER ATI ON
M U M B A I, INDIA 2 0 0 4
GL OBAL I ZATI ON
B A NC O DO B R A S I L
I NF R A ER O, B R A ZI L I A N A I R PORT S
S P O N SO RS OF W SF P ROCESS
B R A S I L G OV ER NO F EDER A L
B R P ETROBAS
B R PETR OB A S
C A IX A D O BRASIL
C A I XA DO B R A S I L
PER F EI TU R A DO M U NI C I PI O DE P O RT O
C ORREIO S
C OR R EI OS
A L EG R E
F O RD FO UN D ATION
C H R I S TI A N A I D
R OC K EF EL L ER B R OTH ER S F U N D
C A F OD
S P O N SO RS OF W SF IN MUM BAI
C OM I TE C ATH OL I QU E C ONTR E L A FA I M
* I nf o rm a t i o n f o r 2 0 0 5 do e s n o t
A CTION AID
di st i ngui sh be t w e e n t ho se w h o
EL EC TR OB A S
AT TAC, N O R WAY
F OR D F OU NDATI ON
TI DE S F OUNDAT I ON
F U NDA C A O B A NC O DO B R A S I L
C HRISTIAN AID
F U R NA S
532
4c.movements+communities_DEF.ind532 532
1/17/2007 8:03:18 PM
W HAT DO CI TIZENS TH I NK
ABOUT GLO BA L CONSUMERI S M
AN D C ULTURE?
3.
4.
S OM EW H AT B A D / V ERY B A D?
% W HO RES P ONDED V ERY GOOD / S OM EW HAT GOOD
AMERICAS
W. + E . E UROPE
AF RI CA
ASI A
M I D. EA S T
24%
23%
81%
T URK EY
57%
P HI LI P P I NES
32%
50%
JAPAN
PAK I S TAN
70%
I NDI A
ASIA
JORDAN
42%
53%
C HI NA
68%
TANZANI A
AFRICA
BANGLADES H
69%
42%
S OUT H AFRI CA
66%
R US S I A
W. + E. EU R OPE
M ALI
66%
GERM ANY
59%
67%
30%
M EX I C O
FRANC E
16%
BRAZI L
A M ER I C A S
UNI T ED K I NGDOM
60%
ARGENT I NA
T URK EY
PAK I S TAN
JORDAN
P HI LI P P I NES
JAPAN
I NDI A
BANGLADES H
TANZANI A
S OUT H AFRI CA
0
M ALI
0
R US S I A
20
GERM ANY
20
FRANC E
40
UNI T ED K I NGDOM
40
M EX I C O
60
BRAZI L
60
ARGENT I NA
80
UNI T ED S TAT ES
80
UNI T ED S TAT ES
3 3%
3 1%
4 5%
3 6%
5 0%
5 3%
2 7%
6 5%
4 5%
5 7%
3 7%
5 5%
6 3%
5 2%
6 4%
4 6%
5 8%
1 OO
4 6%
1O O
M ID . E A S T
5.
4 5%
6 3%
PH I LI PP I N E S
3 3%
5 3%
J APAN
PAK I STAN
4 5%
INDIA
2 7%
7 6%
CHINA
J OR DAN
6 3%
4 7%
TA N Z A N I A
BA N G LA D E S H
7 0%
S OU T H AF R ICA
3 1%
R U S SI A
4 2%
6 7%
G E R MAN Y
M AL I
6 0%
4 5%
ME X I C O
F R AN C E
6 6%
B RA Z I L
6 8%
3 5%
U N I T E D K I N G D OM
6 2%
R E GIO NAL/T HE M AT IC
A RG E N T I N A
7.
U N I T E D S TAT E S
GROWTH OF
S OCIAL FO R UMS
20 0 1 -2 0 04
1 OO
80
60
40
744
80 N AT IO NAL
20
60
L OCAL
60
12
2004
2003
2002
2001
4c.movements+communities_DEF.ind533 533
A M ER I C A S
W. + E. EU R OPE
AFRICA
ASIA
TURKEY
24
14
11
6
3
0
2
20
23
30
0
40
MID. EAST
533
1/17/2007 8:03:19 PM
7.
GRO WTH O F PA RA LL EL
SUMM ITS
8.
1,000
10,000
5,000
13,000
JOHANNES BURG
HONG K ONG
20,000
M EX I C O C I T Y
T OK YO
25,000
VANC OUV ER
35,000
C OP ENHAGEN
60,000
S T OC K HOLM
65,000
BUENOS AI RES
75,000
S AN FRANC I S C O
100,000
AM S T ERDAM
100,000
LOS ANGELES
150,000
PARI S
200,000
M ONT REAL
250,000
S EV I LLE
500,000
S Y DNEY
660,000
250000
BERLI N
10 0 0
1,000,000
500000
M ADRI D
20 0 0
1,300,000
7 5 0 0 OO
LONDON
30O O
3,000,000
1000000
< 200
40 0 0
LOS ANGELES
1250000
> 200
50 0 0
M ADRI D
1500000
600
60 0 0
WAS HI NGT ON DC
1750000
LONDON 1 0 . 0 0 0
70 0 0
ROM E
2000000
BARC ELONA
80 0 0
U S I M A G E B EF O R E + AFTER
I NVAS
N A I ON
O OF
O I RAQ
Q
9.
25 %
100%
20 %
80%
15 %
6 O%
10 %
40%
5%
20%
0%
0%
4c.movements+communities_DEF.ind534 534
SO U T H K O RE A 4 6 %
PAK IS TA N 1 3 %
58%
53%
I N D O N E SI A 1 5 %
52%
30%
12%
TURKEY 15%
23%
10%
R U SSI A
FR A N C E
GE R MA N Y
I TA LY
G R E AT B R ITAI N
B R A Z IL 3 4 %
75%
61%
83%
75%
48%
70%
76%
70%
34%
60%
78%
61%
25%
45%
62%
63%
31%
43%
37%
61%
28%
36%
56%
52%
2 0 02 2 00 3 3 1 %
F IR ST T H RE E MO N TH S
534
2001 19%
2000 16%
1 9 96 1 99 9 1 6 %
1 9 92 1 99 5 1 3 %
1 9 88 1 99 1
6%
% FAV ORABLE
L V I EW OF US BY
Y S ELEC T ED C OUNT RI ES
1/17/2007 8:03:19 PM
GLOBAL G REEN
FE D E RATIO N
10.
11.
# OF PART IE S BY REGION
3000000
3000
10
2500000
2500
2000000
2000
1 5 0 0 0 OO
1500
30
3,011
3,077
2,732
500000
1000
979
1000000
EUROP E
500
2002
2001
0
2000
0
1990
AS I A + PAC I FI C
AM ERI CAS
AFRI CA
2,579,031
15
2,647,735
3500
2,478,727
3500000
3,937,370
20
13
4000
10
4000000
15
25
TRANSPAR ENCY
IN TERNATI ONA L:
I NTERNATI ONAL C OM M I TT E E
FOR THE RED C ROS S :
6 ,5 00
6 ,4 2 1
5 ,8 8 4
5 ,2 2 1
13.
70
7000
70
60
6000
60
12000
50
5000
50
10000
40
4000
40
8000
30
3000
30
6000
20
2000
20
4000
10
1000
10
2000
14000
2 00 4 8 0
2 00 2 6 3
0
2 00 0 6 0
2 00 4 7 1
2 00 3 7 1
2 00 2 6 1
2 00 1 6 0
2 00 0 4 9
4c.movements+communities_DEF.ind535 535
0
1 99 5 5 8
0 I N E UROS
CHAPTERS 0
1 3 ,2
, 81
16000
1 1 ,8 7 3
80
1 0 ,2 3 6
8000
7 ,0 0 0
80
4 ,0 7 5
12.
535
1/17/2007 8:03:20 PM
4c.movements+communities_DEF.ind536 536
6
2.
36 + 00
6 + 30
8 + 27
8 + 25
(HK G)
(I AH)
(P EK )
(S FO)
H ONG K ONG, C N
H OU S TON, TX
DETR OI T, M I
B EI J I NG, C N
S A N F R A NC I S C O, C A
(H K G ) 3 6 .1 %
( IA H )
( DT W )
3
( P E K) 4 3 .2 %
1
PH I L A DEL PH I A , PA
R OM E, I T
(Y YZ )
( PH L)
(F CO )
TOR ONTO, C A
MIAMI, FL
(S E A)
14 + 16
S I NG A POR E, S G
( SI N) 2 3 .1 %
S EATTL E/TA C OM A , WA
TOK Y O, J P
(MI A )
29 + 00
(S I N)
(M I A)
OR L A NDO, F L
(N RT)
(FC O)
(P HL)
(Y Y Z)
(S EA)
(NRT )
(M C O)
9 + 23
15 + 13
4 + 24
16 + 13
2 + 26
27 + 01
2 + 29
27 + 04
(L G W ))
(LGW )
L ONDON, G B
( EW R)
(EW R)
NEWA R K , NJ
3 + 32
2 + 35
( S F O)
(DT W )
(M S P )
17 + 20
M I NN EA POL I S /S T PA U L , M N
(M S P)
(JFK )
26 + 10
2 + 38
20 + 18
(M AD)
M A DR I D, ES
(BK K )
1 + 40
(P HX )
PH OENI X, A Z
B A NG K OK, TH
B Y % PA S S ENG ER G R OW TH
NEW Y OR K , NY
1 + 41
(LAS )
L A S V EG A S , NV
1.
(J F K )
42 + 00
(DEN)
DENV ER , C O
70
(B K K) 2 5 .8 %
46 + 05
F R A NK F U RT, DE
(C DG)
(FRA)
D AL LA S / F T W ORTH A I R PORT, TX
(AM S )
5 + 54
43 + 07
(DFW )
L OS A NG EL ES , C A
PA R I S , F R
1 + 62
16 + 44
(LAX )
TOK Y O, J P
A M S TER DA M , NL
60 + 07
(LHR)
(HND)
L ONDON, G B
6 + 77
11 + 64
(AT L)
(ORD)
ATL A NTA , G A
C H I C A G O, I L
- top 50 world airports total passengers - top 10 airports passengers growth - total online travel sales
80
60
50
40
30
20
10
MILLIO N PA SSENGE RS 0
TOP 10 WORLD AI RP O RT S
536
2/2/2007 1:02:03 PM
4c.movements+communities_DEF.ind537 537
87 7
2 ,0 3 2
3 ,3 2 8
23 1
45 1
79 1
64 0
1 ,1 1 3
1 ,9 1 5
30 4
50 0
93 0
G E MA NY
S PA IN
S CA N DI NAV IA
OTHER
1 ,9 0 0
3 ,1 0 0
5 .0 0 0
F RA N CE
10
(K UL ) 2 0 .4 %
( P VG ) 3 9 .5 %
( MA N )
(D X B) 2 0 .2 %
( CV G )
( IA D) 3 5 .1 %
( ME X)
(O RY )
( IC N) 2 5 .6 %
(C V G)
(DX B)
(M AN)
(P V G)
(K UL)
(FLL)
(S T N)
(BW I )
DU B A I , A E
M A NC H ES TER , G B
S H A NG H A I, C N
K U A L A L U M PU R, M Y
F ORT L A U DER DA L E, F L
L ONDON, G B
B A LTI M OR E, M D
S EOU L , K R
C I NC I NNATI , OH
(I C N)
NEW Y OR K , NY
(I AD)
(LGA)
B A R C EL ONA , ES
WA S H I NG TON, DC
(BC N)
C H A R L OTTE, NC
M EXI C O C I TY, M X
(C LT )
J A K A RTA, I D
(ORY )
(C GK )
B OS TON, M A
(M EX )
(BOS )
M U NI C H , DE
PA R I S , F R
(S Y D)
(M UC )
S Y DNEY, A U
10500
3 ,7 0 0
5 ,5 0 0
7 ,3 0 0
9 + 18
1 + 19
18 + 03
2 + 19
12 + 08
13 + 08
18 + 03
21 + 00
1 + 21
5 + 18
8 + 15
11 + 13
24 + 00
1 + 23
13 + 11
2 + 23
5 + 19
4 + 22
18 + 09
12000
U N IT ED K I NG D O M
28 ,7 1 0
U NI TE D S TAT ES 39 ,3 5 8
52 ,7 7 1
5
(B CN )
( CLT)
( CG K) 3 2 .0 %
(M UC )
( SY D )
S OU TH W ES T PA C I F I C
EUROP E +
M I DDL E EA S T
S OU TH W ES T PA C I F I C
AFRI CA +
M I DDL E EA S T
FA R EA S T
S OU TH W ES T PA C I F I C
FA R EA S T
0
NORT H AM ERI CA +
M I DDL E EA S T
EU R OPE
S OU TH A M ER I C A
C ENTR A L A M ER I C A
S OU TH A M ER I C A
1 5 ,3 7 2
1 8 ,0 2 2
3 ,7 3 7
1 5 ,6 8 9
2 9 ,3 7 3
397
1 ,0 2 6
5 ,5 5 6
2 5 ,5 6 2
4 ,1 0 1
1 2 ,6 7 1
1 8 ,6 8 6
4.
I NTER-REGI ON FLIG H T S
2004
B Y R EG I ON PA I R
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5 0 OO
FA R E A S T +
3.
TOTAL
ONLI NE TRAV EL S ALES :
U NI TED S TATES $US D M I L L I ONS + EU R OPE EUROS M I L L I ONS
9000
7500
6000
4 5 OO
3000
1500
M I L L I ONS 0
537
2/2/2007 1:02:04 PM
4c.movements+communities_DEF.ind538 538
40%
1500
30%
1000
20%
5OO
10%
0%
DECEMBER
2000
N OV E MB E R
50%
O C T OB E R
2500
S E PT E MB E R
60%
7 9 . 5%
7 7 . 6%
8 0 . 7%
8 2 . 8%
8 5 . 0%
70%
AUGUST
PASSEN G ER # IN TH OUSANDS
8 6 . 2%
80%
J U LY
RE GION AL TR ENDS
EUROPE - NO RTH A MERICA
DEC EM BER
NOV EM BER
OC T OBER
S EP T EM BER
AUGUS T
JULY
JUNE
0%
8 7 . 8%
JUNE
10%
M AY
5 OO
8 1 . 3%
20%
MAY
1000
AP RI L
30%
8 2 . 7%
1500
A PR I L
40%
M ARC H
2000
8 3 . 1%
50%
MAR C H
2500
FEBR UARY
6 0 .0 %
5 9 .9 %
6 8 .8 %
7 1 .8 %
7 2 .0 %
7 2 .6 %
7 0 .4 %
6 7 .2 %
6 9 .0 %
6 3 .5 %
6 0 .0 %
5 5 .3 %
70%
7 0 . 5%
3000
JANUARY
1 ,1 1 7
1 ,0 2 0
954
1 ,0 3 8
1 ,0 0 8
1 ,0 5 1
1 ,0 2 4
1 ,0 6 5
1 ,1 1 8
1 ,1 4 8
1 ,3 0 2
1 ,3 0 4
1 ,2 9 5
1 ,3 2 5
1 ,5 9 5
1 ,6 5 8
2 ,2 2 4
2 ,2 0 5
PASSEN G ER # IN TH OUSANDS
7 4 . 4%
PARI S - ROM E
LONDON - M UNI C H
LONDON - ZURI C H
LONDON - M I LAN
LONDON - M ADRI D
M ADRI D - PARI S
LONDON - PARI S
2 ,3 7 8
2 ,3 6 1
80%
F E B R U A RY
805
826
872
884
931
966
885
970
764
1,010
986
1,121
1,045
1,147
1,200
1,326
1,248
1,400
AM S T ERDAM - LONDON
REGION AL TRENDS
WI THI N EUR OPE
JA N U A RY
L ON D ON - MI AM I
B OS T O N - LO N D ON
N E WA R K - LO N D O N
L ON D ON - SA N F R AN C I S C O
L ON D O N - T OR O N T O
N YC - PA RI S
LO N D O N - WA SH I N GT O N
L O S A N G E LE S - L O N D ON
538
2,371
2,675
3000
CH I CA G O - L ON D ON
L ON D O N - N YC
5.
60%
2/2/2007 1:02:04 PM
4c.movements+communities_DEF.ind539 539
60%
2500
50%
2000
40%
1500
30%
1000
20%
5 OO
10%
0%
DECEMBER
7 4 . 3%
7 5 . 6%
N OV E MB E R
7 9 . 8%
7 9 . 8%
O C T OB E R
S E PT E MB E R
3000
7 8 . 2%
70%
AUGUST
PA SSEN G ER # IN TH OUSANDS
7 9 . 0%
80%
J U LY
R E GION AL TRENDS
EUROPE - TH E FAR EA ST
7 5 . 3%
DEC EM BER
NOV EM BER
OC T OBER
S EP T EM BER
AUGUS T
JULY
JUNE
0%
JUNE
0
M AY
10%
7 0 . 3%
5 OO
MAY
20%
AP RI L
1000
7 4 . 7%
30%
A PR I L
1500
M ARC H
40%
7 6 . 5%
2000
MAR C H
50%
FEBR UARY
2500
7 6 . 4%
3000
JANUARY
700
954
637
985
788
1 ,0 0 5
949
1 ,2 4 6
1 ,1 2 3
1 ,3 8 7
1 ,2 7 4
1 ,4 9 2
1 ,4 5 6
1 ,7 9 9
1 ,7 2 5
2 ,0 5 0
1 ,9 8 5
2 ,0 7 1
3 ,0 1 4
4 ,2 5 8
6 9 .6 %
7 0 .8 %
6 6 .3 %
6 8 .0 %
6 8 .7 %
6 4 .6 %
6 2 .5 %
5 8 .9 %
6 0 .8 %
6 1 .8 %
6 2 .9 %
6 6 .0 %
70%
7 5 . 3%
BANGK OK - TAI P EI
TAI P EI - T OK YO
BANGK OK - T OK YO
HONG K ONG - T OK YO
S EOUL - T OK YO
F E B R U A RY
321
412
360
412
517
443
358
458
559
584
490
627
569
635
822
866
827
948
968
1,216
80%
JA N U A RY
BE IJ I N G - FR A N K U RT
B A N G K O K - PA RI S
K U AL A L U MP U R - L ON D ON
F RA N K F U RT - HO N G K O N G
F RA N K F U RT - T OK YO
B AN GK O K - F R AN K F U RT
B AN G K O K - L ON D ON
PA R IS - T O K YO
LO N D O N - T O K YO
HO N G K O N G - LO N D O N
539
1/17/2007 8:03:21 PM
TRAVEL Examination of the travel and tourism industry provides key insights into
Similarly, after the SARS epidemic surfaced, tourist arrivals to Taiwan decreased over
the process of globalization. The transportation sector is one of the worlds largest in-
2003 by almost 25%, whereas the country had previously been registering an increase
dustries and includes the movement of people and materials via airplanes, boats, ware-
of almost 5%. In Malaysia and Singapore, tourist arrivals dropped by 20.4% and 18.5%
houses, pipelines, trucks, etc., and the logistical services that support this movement.
respectively (World Tourism Organization, 2004). New Zealand and India were the only
In the US, the transportation industry employs about 16% of all of the nations workers
two countries in Asia and the Pacific to report positive increases in percent change of
(Plunkett Research, Ltd, 2005/6) and at the end of the 20th century, it accounted for
tourist arrivals, between 2002 and 2003 (World Tourism Organization, 2004).
10% of all jobs globally (The International Ecotourism Society, 2000). Tourism can be
defined as travel for recreational, business, academic or other personal purposes and
the provision of services for either type of travel. There are two main bodies that
Forces of globalization and related world trends are affecting travel and tourism in
govern, investigate, and monitor global tourism: the World Tourism Organization (WTO),
several ways. First, the industry is experiencing consolidation through mergers and ac-
which is part of the United Nations, and the World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC).
quisitions. Second, low cost carrier airlines are one of the fastest growing forms of air
The WTO defines a tourist as someone who travels at least 50 miles from their home.
travel, displacing traditional market carriers. Also, the information age has offered the
travel and tourism industry huge perks for tracking travel, outsourcing, and increasing
efficiencies. Today, online travel sales are booming. Along with being affected by globalization, travel and transportation networks are facilitating globalization by linking
and connecting businesses and individuals. The recent ease of travel facilitates the
Between 2000 and 2004, outbound and inbound tourism increased globally, except
in the Americas where both outbound and inbound tourism levels declined slightly
France, Spain, and the United States were the top three tourist destinations in 2004,
though China is expected to surpass France as the number one tourist destination
Global travel and tourism activity is expected to grow by 4.2% per year in real terms
by 2020
between 2007 and 2016 (World Travel and Tourism Council, 2006). New world dynamics
Tourism from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa (73%, 22% and 17%, respectively)
and emerging economies have shifted the focus to Asian countries as both origins and
destinations for travelers. Demands for tourism are especially strong and growing in
emerging and growing economies, because of increasing levels of disposable income.
WHAT D O W E K N OW AB O UT T R AV E L A N D T O UR I S M ?
These trends are expected to increase and increasing flows of travelers bring environ-
In 2004, air transportation accounted for 43% of all arrivals around the world and
mental consequences, which are becoming more and more important to confront. Grow-
road/land travel accounted for 45% (World Tourism Organization, 2005b). International
ing travel consumption means that pollution related to air travel is on the rise.
tourist arrivals climbed to 808 million in 2005 (Xinhua General News Service, 2006).
Most travel purposes were for leisure, holiday and recreation (52%), while 16% of trips
The fear of terrorism after 9/11 have dramatically affected the travel industry, specifi-
cally via massive losses and restructuring, and increases in airport security.
Tourism in Asia and the Pacific, and the Middle East accounted for much of the new
growth in the sector since 2004, increasing by 28% and 18% respectively (World Tourism Organization, 2005b). Since the SARS epidemic, Asian destinations have rebounded
540
4c.movements+communities_DEF.ind540 540
1/17/2007 8:03:22 PM
growing tensions about immigration, citizenship and national security. Countries such
and changed the face of commerce and trade, politics, culture, art and society. The
as the United States, France, Germany or the United Kingdom have seen heated debates
indicator suite on migration, refugees and asylum seekers, and transnational communities, shows that the worlds population is increasingly becoming migratory, creating
Scholars such as Huntington (2004) argue that current waves of migration to the US,
in particular the influx of Hispanic immigrants, are eroding the underlying Protestant
values the country was founded on, gradually changing it to a bilingual, multicultural
society. Moreover, the recent protests and rallies held across the US by immigrant,
At the global level, migration has doubled between 1970 and 2000, affecting all
migrant and undocumented workers shed light on the growing influence of migrant and
In 2004, the top three migrant sending countries were the Philippines, India
case reveals the reliance of modern economies on the cheap labor migrants provide,
and China
the riots in France in 2005 brought to the open the failure of including migrants into
In 2004, the top three migrant receiving countries were the United States,
Growing labor migration has increased the flow of remittances, which for long have
in 2001
The United States (Jews), Germany (Kurds), and Saudi Arabia (Filipino) host the
States use small-town associations to direct their monies into local communities back
home. These channels of transferring money avert the high rates charged by banks and
private money transfer companies.
WHAT IS D IASPORA?
The term diaspora comes from the Greek meaning to scatter and to sow. Before the
1960s, the term was primarily used in reference to Jewish communities outside of Pal-
veloped regions of the world has created a phenomenon known as the brain-drain,
estine, yet today, diaspora continues to resonate as a term used to define the displace-
e.g. nurses from South Africa moving to Britain, from the Philippines to Britain to Nor-
ment and laying down of roots of modern-day migrants, refugees and asylum seekers
the US. However, the counter-flow against a brain-drain is the brain-gain that occurs
when students return as professionals after having been educated abroad, bringing
foreign lands and contested cultural, economic, and political boundaries in a globalized world, or what anthropologist James Clifford calls, the contact zones of nations,
cultures, and regions (Clifford, 1994). Because of these contact zones, diasporic
communities are inextricably tied to issues of race, class, gender, religion, language,
culture, ethnicity, labor, welfare, nationhood and the transnational; and therefore, often
i.e. highly skilled professionals that move across countries and regions following post-
T HE MY THS AN D RE ALI T I E S O F M I G R AT I O N
A majority of refugees and asylum seekers do not flee to rich countries; they are
mostly hosted in countries with a per capita income below $2,000 (USCRI, 2004)
Many people exist in refugee-like situations, but are not formally recognized by
governments as refugees, denying them entry into countries, residency and citizen-
O P P O RTUN ITIES
TH R EATS
(i.e., in Germany and Australia, for every 3 persons moving into the country, 2 moved
action campaign
confusion
takes on new dimensions as they rival aid and foreign direct investment into
developing countries
and technology)
While it remains uncontested that many migrant sending countries must address
the factors that push people out of their homelands (i.e., poverty), migrant receiving
countries must address their roles in creating the pull factors that lead people in (i.e.,
cultural communication
regional level
home countries and diaspora communities that fill gaps of information and skilledbased knowledge created by the brain-drain phenomenon (IOM, 2005)
Migration is primarily caused by global economic and social inequalities, and driven
culture, and knowledge, as well as aspects of identity and identity politics in sending
and receiving countries alike. Ongoing issues about how to define legal and illegal
migrants, asylum seekers and internationally displaced peoples occur in a context of
4c.movements+communities_DEF.ind541 541
541
1/17/2007 8:03:24 PM
TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENTS
Awareness and information sharing are essential to issue formation for any social
movement, yet for transnational movements, the connection of issues across boundar-
once an umbrella term of many movements along similar goals, agendas or messages
ies and global spheres is imperative. These movements are characterized by over-
(e.g., the uniting of poverty alleviation and debt relief campaigns), as it is part of a
lapping agendas and themes, thereby giving rise to a collective identity and ability
new internationalism, whereby the movement models being a part of a greater inter-
to mobilize around an overarching goal (Ghimire, 2005). This was exemplified by the
national society of activists, reformers, politicians and local organizers. It is thus a trans-
successful turnout of the International Day of Protest on February 15th (or F15), when
demonstrators protested worldwide in over 800 cities (see Suite). The attacks of September 11th and the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003, enabled the anti-globalization
As globalization and the consolidation of economic and political actors places a larger
reaching policy issues, stakeholders at both the local and regional levels must seek
out ways to influence these world governing bodies to further their causes (Smith and
WH AT A R E TH E IS S UES ?
Wiest, 2005). Not surprisingly, the rapid succession of globalization and the changes it
The formation of transnational networks and movements does not come easily, nor is
has brought about have also fomented an increase in transnational movements and the
it necessarily ensured success (Table 1). While the range of stakeholders is seen as
a positive element, this diversity and the horizontal structure of transnational movements can make for an unstable or fragile alliance (Ghimire, 2005). Alliances are also
threatened by a North-South structure within the movement that resembles the global
economic and political hierarchy organizers seek to change. However, Smith and Wiest
(2005) point out that a countrys link to global financial institutions is not the only agent
More than 50% of citizens in Argentina, Mexico, France, Germany, Mali and Tanzania
of transnational networking, but ties to the global polity (common amongst develop-
ing countries) are also essential to transnational organizing. In this light, Smith and
At the same time, more than 50% of citizens in the US, Brazil, UK, France,
Wiest argue that transnational movements have both the potential to support world-
Germany, South Africa, Bangladesh, China and the Philippines view globalization as
system stratification, as well as help sow the seeds for its transformation.
a positive force
Parallel summits have grown since the late 1980s, the largest growth of 31% seen
Despite these challenges, transnational movements have enjoyed some success. Criti-
cisms of the anti-globalization movement as purpose driven and without a plan for
action have been undercut by the efforts for debt relief stakeholders to be integrated
environmental NGOs
into important decision-making processes, and the subsequent approval by G8 nations to excuse the debts of some of the most impoverished nations. Yet, the future of
the debt relief campaign, among others, remains elusive and the question of whether
WHAT D O W E K N OW ?
these transnational movements can overcome the traditional cycle of social movements
Transnational movements are both hindered and facilitated by the processes and insti-
(whereby they are born, grow, achieve success and then dissolve) remains in question.
tutions of globalization. These movements are of civil society and movements for civil
society; hence, intrinsically linked to civic participation, democracy, public conscious-
The answer appears to lie in the nature of civil society and the inter-dependence between
ness and knowledge formation within nation states (Smith and Wiest, 2005). Recent
a movement and people. The longevity of a campaign seems predicated on the stability of
surveys, such as the World Values Survey or Pew Global Attitudes Project, highlight
civil society to maintain a healthy momentum, without imploding or erupting into violence.
some of the opinions and issue awareness worldwide (see Suite). The escalation of
The protests surrounding the Danish cartoons (Figure 1) exemplifies this delicate relation-
parallel summits is further evidence of a growing transnational movement that calls for
ship and sheds light on the looming uncertainty of transnational movements to prevent and
542
4c.movements+communities_DEF.ind542 542
1/17/2007 8:03:24 PM
543
1/17/2007 7:13:21 PM
I S O: ANNU AL P RODU C TI O N :
# OF NEW PAGES O F
I NTERNATI ONAL S TANDAR D S
2.
1.
3.
49,795
41,112
59,298
59,527
61,269
2002
2003
2004
2005
0
2001
46,998
10000
2000
200
42,422
20000
1999
400
2005
30000
2004
600
2003
40000
2002
800
2001
50000
2000
1000
1999
60000
1998
1200
41,221
1 9 98 2 0 0 5
70000
1998
1,240
1,247
995
889
813
961
1,058
986
1998 2005
1400
2%
2%
3%
6%
3%
4%
5%
9%
8%
11%
11%
16%
17%
25%
21%
26%
30%
544
1/17/2007 7:13:21 PM
- iso 9001: 2000 quality management systems - worldwide total of iso 9001: 2000 certificates - annual
growth of iso 9001: 2000 certificates - top 10 countries for iso 9001: 2000 certificates - iso 14001:
environmental management sysytems - worldwide total of iso 14001 certificates - annual growth
of iso 14001 certificates - top 10 countries for iso 14001 certificates - isbn allocated worldwide
until 2005
30 %
CHAN GE I N
% OF PORTF OL I O O F
I S O IN T E RNATIO NAL
STAN DARDS
25 %
19 9 8 2 0 0 5
20 %
B.
4.
A.
15 %
C.
D.
10 %
E.
G.
5%
F.
H.
I.
0%
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
22.4%
22.9%
23.3%
23.6%
24.2%
24.4%
25.9%
3 0 .5 %
29.4%
29.1%
28.9%
28.5%
26.3%
26.5%
25.7%
2 1 .4 %
14.6%
14.8%
14.8%
15.0%
15.8%
15.4%
15.3%
1 6 .5 %
10.7%
10.6%
10.5%
10.6%
10.9%
10.9%
10.8%
1 0 .6 %
09.2%
09.1%
09.0%
09.0%
09.2%
09.2%
09.1%
0 7 .9 %
03.7%
03.8%
04.0%
04.0%
04.2%
04.4%
04.2%
0 4 .8 %
06.9%
06.7%
06.6%
06.4%
06.4%
06.3%
06.2%
0 3 .5 %
02.1%
02.0%
02.0%
02.0%
02.1%
02.1%
02.0%
0 3 .3 %
01.0%
01.0%
00.9%
00.9%
00.9%
00.8%
00.8%
0 1 .6 %
545
1/17/2007 7:13:22 PM
5a .
WORL D RESULTS
D EC . 2 0 0 0
DEC . 2 0 0 1
DEC . 2 0 0 2
DEC . 2 0 0 3
DEC . 2 0 0 4
WORL D TOTAL
408,631
044,388
167,210
497,919
670,399
122,822
330,709
172,480
0 0 0 .1 3 4
0 0 0 .1 4 9
0 0 0 .1 5 4
WORLD GROWTH
0 0 0 . 09 8
A ND ECO N O MIES.
WO RL DWI DE TOTAL
OF I SO 9001: 2000
CERTI FICATES
ANNU AL GROW T H
OF I S O 9001: 200 0
C ERTI FI CATES
172,480
D E C E MB E R 20 0 4
330,709
50000
D E C E MB E R 20 0 3
100000
122,822
100000
D E C E MB E R 20 0 0
200000
670,399
150000
D E C E MB E R 20 0 4
300000
497,919
200000
D E C E MB E R 20 0 3
400000
167,210
250000
D E C E MB E R 20 0 2
500000
44,388
300000
D E C E MB E R 20 0 1
600000
408,631
350000
D E C E MB E R 20 0 0
700000
D E C E MB E R 20 0 2
5c.
D E C E MB E R 20 0 1
5b .
TOP 10 CO UNTRIES
FOR ISO 9001:2000 CERTI FI CATES
5 0 ,8 8 4
4 8 ,9 8 9
4 0 ,9 7 2
3 7 ,2 8 5
2 7 ,1 0 1
2 6 ,6 5 4
1 7 ,3 6 5
UK
J APAN
S PA IN
USA
F R AN C E
G E R MAN Y
A U ST R A LI A
1 2 ,5 5 8
8 4 ,4 8 5
I TA LY
INDIA
1 3 2 ,9 2 6
CHINA
5 d.
546
1/17/2007 7:13:22 PM
6 a.
ISO 1 4 0 01
DEC . 1 9 9 9 `
DEC . 2 0 0 0
DEC . 2 0 0 1
DEC . 2 0 0 2
DEC . 2 0 0 3
DEC . 2 0 0 4
WORL D TOTAL
14,106
22,897
36,765
49,449
66,070
90,569
WORL D GROWTH
06,219
08,791
13,868
12,684
16,621
24,499
# OF COUN TRIES /
0 0 . . .8 4
0 0 . 09 8
0 0 .1 1 2
0 0 .1 1 7
0 0 .1 1 3
0 0 .1 2 7
E CON O MIES.
ECON OMIES
WO RL DWI DE TOTAL
OF I SO 14001
CERTI FICATES
ANNU AL
GROWTH OF
I S O 14001
C ERTI FI CATES
13,868
12,684
16,621
24.499
D E C E MB E R 20 0 2
D E C E MB E R 20 0 3
D E C E MB E R 20 0 4
D E C E MB E R 20 0 1
8,791
2000
D E C E MB E R 20 0 0
10000
90,569
4000
D E C E MB E R 20 0 4
20000
66,070
6000
D E C E MB E R 20 0 3
30000
49,449
8000
D E C E MB E R 20 0 2
40000
36,765
10000
D E C E MB E R 20 0 1
50000
22,897
12000
D E C E MB E R 20 0 0
60000
14,106
14000
D E C E MB E R 19 9 9
70000
6,219
6b .
D E C E MB E R 19 9 9
6 c.
TOP 10 COUNTR I ES
FOR ISO 14001 CERTI FICATES
1 9 ,5 8 4
8 ,8 6 2
6 ,4 7 3
6 ,2 5 3
4 ,7 8 5
4 ,7 5 9
4 ,3 2 0
3 ,4 7 8
2 ,9 5 5
2 ,6 0 9
J APAN
CHINA
S PA IN
UK
I TA LY
USA
G E R MAN Y
SWEDEN
F R AN C E
KOREA
6 d.
547
1/17/2007 7:13:22 PM
IS BN ALLOCATED WORLDWI DE
UN TI L 2005
4%
2%
2%
1%
1%
1 4 ,4 1 0
1 1 ,6 3 4
8 ,8 8 0
5 ,4 5 7
9 5 ,2 5 7 1 3 %
EAS T ERN EUROP E
3 0 ,2 2 8
11 6 ,3 8 7 1 6 %
AFRI CA + S UB-S AHARAN
5%
17 1 ,4 3 7 2 4 %
NORT H AM ERI CA
3 4 ,5 4 1
22 7 ,8 4 8 3 2 %
W ES T ERN EUROP E
7.
OC EANI A
S OUT H AS I A
C ENT RAL AS I A
EAS T AS I A + PAC I FI C
2.
1 9 84 2 0 0 5
1.
2005 2
2003 1
2001 1
1 99 7 1
1 98 9 1
1 98 7 1
1 98 2 1
1 98 1 1
1 97 9 1
1 97 8 1
1 97 6 2
1 97 4 1
1 97 2 1
1 97 1 5
1 97 0 1
1 96 2 1
1 96 1 1
1 96 0 1
1 95 8 2
1 95 4 2
1 95 2 2
1 95 0 1
1 94 8 1
UN ESCO CO NVENTIO NS
C ODE
A FI
- Agr eem ent for Fa ci l i ta ti ng th e I n te rn a ti o na l Ci rcul a ti o n o f V i sua l a nd A udi t o r y M a t e ri a l s o f a n Educ a t i o na l , S c i e nt i f i c a nd C ult ura l c ha ra c t e r w i t h Pro t o c o l
Y EAR OF A D O P T I O N
1948
AI
- Agr eem ent on th e I mp o rta ti o n o f Educa ti o na l , Sci e n ti fi c a nd C ul t ura l M a t e ri a l s, w i t h A nne x e s A t o E a nd Pro t o c o l a nne x e d
1950
P3
- P r otoc ol 3 annexe d to the Un i ve rsa l Co p yri g ht Co n ve nti o n co n c e rni ng t he e f f e c t i v e da t e o f i nst rum e nt s o f ra t i f i c a t i o n o r a c c e pta nc e o f o r a c c e ssi o n t o
- tha t Convention
1952
U CCA
1952
CPC
- Conv ention for th e Pro te cti o n o f Cul tura l Pro p e rty i n th e E ve nt o f A rm e d C o nf l i c t w i t h R e gul a t i o ns f o r t he Ex e c ut i o n o f t he C o nv e nt i o n
1954
P CP
1954
C EO
1958
CIEP
1958
CDE
1960
ICP
- Inter na tional Con ve nti o n fo r th e Pro te cti o n o f Pe rfo rme rs, Pro duc e rs o f Pho no gra m s a nd B ro a dc a st i ng Orga ni z a t i o ns
1961
PIC
- P r otoc ol Ins tituti n g a Co nci l i a ti o n a n d Go o d Offi ce s Co mmi ssi o n t o be R e spo nsi bl e f o r S e e k i ng t he S e t t l e m e nt o f a n y Di sput e s w hi c h m a y A ri se be t w e e n
- Sta tes Par ties t o the Co n ve nti o n a ga i nst Di scri mi na ti o n i n E duc a t i o n
1962
C MPP
- Convention on the M e a n s o f Pro hi bi ti ng a n d Pre ve nti ng th e I ll i c i t I m po rt , Ex po rt a nd Tra nsf e r o f Ow ne rshi p o f C ul t ura l Pro pe rt y
1970
C P PP
- Convention for the Pro te cti o n o f Pro d uce rs o f Pho no gra ms a ga i nst U na ut ho ri z e d Dupl i c a t i o n o f t he i r Pho no gra m s
1971
CWI
1971
P 1-SR
- P r otoc ol 1 annexe d to the Un i ve rsa l Co p yri g ht Co n ve nti o n co n c e rni ng t he a ppl i c a t i o n o f t ha t C o nv e nt i o n t o t he w o rk s o f st a t e l e ss pe rso ns a nd re f uge e s
1971
P2
- P r otoc ol 2 annexe d to the Un i ve rsa l Co p yri g ht Co n ve nti o n co n c e rni ng t he a ppl i c a t i o n o f t ha t C o nv e nt i o n t o t he w o rk s o f c e rt a i n i nt e rna t i o na l o rga ni z a t i on s
1971
548
1/17/2007 7:13:22 PM
IN TERN ATION AL RE GU L AT O RY
FR AM EW ORK S
- unesco conventions - # of adopted unesco treaties per
year 19842005 - total # of countries signing per unesco treaty - timeline of unesco treaties adopted - frequency
of treaty support by enesco members: average # of countries signing each year since adoption - frequency of treaty
support by unesco members: proportion (%) of unesco membership signing each treaty - how many countries
ratified how many treaties
3.
200
160
120
80
40
CPU
CPPD
ICD 10
M CA
CTV 15
I C RS 1 6
PIC 37
C DP 2 8
P C W 6 -7 3 8
AFI 4 0
S P HC 4 0
C RQ 4 3
P3 48
PA I 4 3
CSI 50
PCW 50
C EO 5 6
C I EP 5 1
UC C 6 1
RC R 6 3
P 1 -S R 6 6
P2 72
C RS 6 6
ICP 82
CPPP 77
PCP 94
AI 1 0 0
C DE 9 9
UC CA 1 0 1
CMPP 117
CWI 161
CPC 118
CPW 190
C ODE
U CC
- Univer s al Copyri ght Co n ve nti o n a s re vi se d o n 24 Jul y 1971, w i t h A ppe ndi x De cl a ra t i o n re l a t i ng t o A rt i cl e XV I I a nd R e so l ut i o n c onc e rni ng A rt i cl e XI .
1971
CPW
1972
CDP
- Conv ention r ela ti ng to the Di stri buti o n o f Pro g ra mme -Ca rr yi ng S i gna l s Tra nsm i t t e d by S a t e l l i t e
1974
I C RS
- Inter na tional Co nve nti o n o n th e Re co g ni ti o n o f Stu di e s, Di p l o m a s a nd De gre e s i n H i ghe r Educ a t i o n i n t he A ra b a nd Euro pe a n S t a t es bo rde ri ng o n
- the Mediter r anea n
Y EAR OF A D O P T I O N
1976
PAI
1976
C RS
1978
M CA
- Multila ter al Conve nti o n fo r th e Avo i d a nce o f Do u bl e Ta xa ti o n o f C o py ri ght R o y a l t i e s, w i t h m o de l bi l a t e ra l a gre e m e nt a nd a ddi t i ona l Pro t o c o l
1979
RCR
1981
P CW
1982
PCW 6-7 - P r otoc ol to am end a rti cl e s 6 a n d 7 o f the Co n ve nti o n o n We tla nds o f I nt e rna t i o na l I m po rt a nc e e spe c i a l l y a s Wa t e rf o w l H a bi t a t
1987
C TV
1989
C RQ
1997
S P HC
1999
CPU
2001
CSI
2003
C P PD
2005
ICD
2005
549
1/17/2007 7:13:23 PM
8%
5%
PCW 26%
RC R 3 3 %
M CA
CRS 35%
ICRS
PAI 2 3 %
CD P 1 5 %
CPW 99%
UCC 32%
P1 - SR 3 5 %
P2 3 8 %
CP P P 4 0 %
CWI 84%
C MP P 6 1 %
PI C 1 9 %
ICP 43%
CDE 52%
C IE P 2 7 %
CEO 29%
PCP 49%
C PC 6 2 %
P3 2 5 %
U C CA 5 3 %
8%
4%
5%
1%
ICD
C PP D
C SI 2 6 %
CPU
S PH C 2 1 %
CRQ 23%
CTV
PC W 6 -7 2 0 %
550
AI 5 2 %
A FI 2 1 %
9
7
5
3
1
1
C RQ
S P HC
CPU
CSI
ICD
CPPD
CTV 17
P C W 6 -7 1 9
PCW 24
RC R 2 5
M CA 2 7
C RS 2 8
I C RS 3 0
PA I 3 0
C DP 3 2
CPW 34
UC C 3 5
P 1 -S R 3 5
P2 35
CPPP 35
CWI 35
CMPP 36
PIC 44
ICP 45
C DE 4 6
C I EP 4 8
C EO 4 8
PCP 52
CPC 52
P3 54
UC CA 5 4
AI 5 6
AFI 5 8
10
17
4.
5.
50
40
30
20
10
6.
80 %
60 %
40 %
20 %
0%
1/17/2007 7:13:23 PM
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
TRE AT Y:
AFI
40
1 .4 5
AI
100
0 .5 6
U C CA
1 01
0 .5 3
P3
48
1 .1 3
C PC
118
0 .4 4
PC P
94
0 .5 5
CEO
58
0 .8 3
C IE P
51
0 .9 4
C DE
99
0 .4 6
IC P
62
0 .7 3
PIC
37
1 .1 9
C M PP
117
0 .3 1
C WI
16 1
0 .2 2
C PPP
77
0 .4 5
P2
72
0 .4 9
P1 -SR
66
0 .5 3
UCC
61
0 .5 7
C PW
190
0 .1 8
C DP
28
1 .1 4
PAI
43
0 .7 0
IC R S
16
1 .8 8
CRS
66
0 .4 2
M CA
4 .5 0
RC R
63
0 .4 0
PC W
50
0 .4 8
P C W 6 -7
38
0 .5 0
CTV
15
1 .1 3
C RQ
43
0 .2 1
SPH C
40
0 .1 8
C PU
0 .7 1
C SI
50
0 .0 6
IC D
10
0 .1 0
C PPD
1 .0 0
50
HO W MANY C OU NTRI ES
RATIF I ED
HO W MAN Y TREATI ES
40
7.
30
20
10
20 24 22
15 19 30
10 14 43
1 5 09 4 5
0 04 5 2
# O F C OU N T RI E S
551
1/17/2007 7:13:23 PM
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
ments on common technical approaches that are used worldwide. Typical examples
are: Internet standards such as HTTP, SMTP, or HTML; units of measure of electrical
power; battery sizes; GSM standard for mobile phones; or paper sizes like A4. While,
the worldwide use of the ISBN system. ISBN is a unique machine-readable identification
until recently, global standards applied primarily to technical fields and issues, they
number, which marks any book unmistakably. This number is defined in ISO Standard
2108. The number has been in use now for 30 years and has revolutionized the inter-
national book-trade. 166 countries and territories are officially ISBN members (http://
www.isbn-international.org/en/whatis.html).
Together, such standards have very profound impacts on human and organizational
The International Standard Music Number Agency promotes, coordinates and supervises
behavior across cultural and national boundaries. They are often very subtle forces of
the world-wide use of the ISMN system. It acts as the registration authority for this ISO
globalization in the sense that they shape everyday behavior and penetrate virtually
all aspects of human endeavor. Standards are therefore part of the increasingly global
standardizes and promotes internationally the use of numbers of printed music publi-
cations in order that one edition of a title or one separate component of an edition can be
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is the major international standard-setting body. Composed of representatives from national bodies, the organization
was founded in 1947 to produce and disseminate worldwide industrial and commercial
standards, the so-called ISO standards. While ISO is a non-governmental organization
(NGO), its ability to set standards makes it a powerful actor as these standards often
become accepted internationally through treaties and find their way into national legislation. The ISO works closely with international organizations, national governments,
and corporations. For example, ISO cooperates with the International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC), which is responsible for standardization of electrical equipment and
major transnational corporations in the field of consumer electronics and communication technology.
WHAT D O W E K N OW ?
As the indicator suite on international standards shows, ISO has typically produced between 800 and 1200 standards, most of them in the field of engineering and technology.
In terms of output, ISO has issued around 60,000 printed pages of standards annually
since 2003. Important non-technical standards are ISO 9000 and ISO 14000:
ISO 9000 is concerned with the quality of management, customer satisfaction, and
552
1/17/2007 7:13:24 PM
REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS
While its adaption was appased by the US government, this new Convention has
force a year after its signing on November 16, 1945, with the mandate to contribute to
crystallized many anxieties, hopes and asirations eleswhere countries like Canada or
peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education,
France see the Convention as a quantum leap forward towards a more comprehensive
science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law
and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples
administration questions the very assumptions underlying the Convention and voices
of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by the Charter of
opposition to full implementation others believe that the Convention, like many that
were adopted in the past, may ultimately find only limited real support by governments
in terms of policymaking and regulations in the arena of culture.
To this end, UNESCO (a) collaborates in the work of advancing the mutual knowledge
and understanding of peoples, through all means of mass communication and to that
free flow of ideas by word and image; (b) gives fresh impulse to popular education and
to the spread of culture; and (c) maintains, increases and diffuses knowledge (www.
unesco.org).
A r t icle 1 O bject ives
A major part of UNESCOs work is the process of creating, negotiating, implementing
and governing international regulatory frameworks for education, science, and cul-
b) to create the conditions for cultures to flourish and to freely interact in a mutually
States. They define rules with which the States undertake to comply in particular fields
beneficial manner;
such as broadcasting or specified issues such as cultural diversity. The General Conference considers the draft texts submitted to it and, if it sees fit, adopts the instrument
c) to encourage dialogue among cultures with a view to ensuring wider and balanced
Recommendations are instruments that formulate principles and norms for interna-
tional regulation and invite Member States to take whatever legislative or other steps
may be required in conformity with the constitutional practice of each State. Recom-
mendations are not subject to ratification; however, Member States are invited to apply
them in policymaking and legislation.
e) to promote respect for the diversity of cultural expressions and raise awareness of
its value at the local, national and international levels;
Declarations are formal and solemn instruments that set forth universal principles
and express great and lasting importance, such as the Declaration of Human Rights.
f) to reaffirm the importance of the link between culture and development for all
The regulatory framework built by UNESCO has achieved great scope and complexity
since the 1950s, and now spans a wide range of academic, educational, cultural and
g) to give recognition to the distinctive nature of cultural activities, goods and ser-
artistic aspects from a Universal Copyright Convention (1952), and the Convention
h) to reaffirm the sovereign rights of States to maintain, adopt and implement policies
and measures that they deem appropriate for the protection and promotion of the
As the indicator suite shows, this framework continues to expand and thicken in
terms of the number of conventions; yet, it does so at a slower pace than in the 1960s
and 1970s. Only five treaties were adopted since 1990, as opposed to 12 in the 1970s
alone. There is also a slow-down in the way countries become signatories of treaties
once negotiated and accepted. Only nine of the over 30 treaties are signed by more
than 80 member states; the majority of treaties are signed by between 40 and 80
members, and nine by less than 40. As result, a major problem of the international
regulatory framework is its patchy structure and unevenness by which member states
become signatories and parties of treaties through ratification and, ultimately, imple-
pressions has become one of the most celebrated in the organizations history. It builds
the ability of individuals to choose cultural expressions, are guaranteed. No one may in-
upon ideas in the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, which UNESCO adopted
voke the provisions of this Convention in order to infringe human rights and fundamental
in 2001. For example, in Article 8 of the Declaration, fundamental principles are estab-
In the face of present-day economic and technological change, opening up vast pros-
2. Principle of sovereignty
pects for creation and innovation, particular attention must be paid to the diversity of
the supply of creative work, to due recognition of the rights of authors and artists and
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles
to the specificity of cultural goods and services which, as vectors of identity, values
of international law, the sovereign right to adopt measures and policies to protect and
553
1/17/2007 7:13:24 PM
554
1/17/2007 7:13:24 PM
P OLICY
CULTUR AL P OLI C Y +
DI PLO M AC Y ORGANI ZATI ONS
555
5b.policy_DEF.indd 555
1/17/2007 4:43:30 PM
C U LTUR AL P OLIC Y +
D I PLOM AC Y ORGAN IZ AT ION S
1.
# OF UNESCO GL OB AL
ALLIANCE PA RTNERS
# OF C REATIV E
EX C HANGE PARTNER S
3.
BY RE GI ON
B Y R E G IO N
160
400
# OF I FAC CA
CU RRENT M EM BERS
2006
140
2.
120
100
350
300
250
MI D D LE E AS T
50
EU ROP E 3 6 2
10
N O RT H AM ERI CA 6 9
20
LAT I N AM ERI CA 1 7
100
OC EA NI A 1 8
12
AS I A 4 7
40
AR A B S TAT ES 2 0
150
A FRI CA 7 7
14
A SI A + T H E PA C I FI C 7 7
60
L AT I N A MER I CA 6 3
200
N ORTH AM ERI CA 6 5
16
EUR OP E 1 6 0
80
AF RI CA 7 2
B Y TY PE A ND R EG I ON
LAT I N AM E R ICA + TH E CA RI B B E AN
5
N ORTH A ME R ICA
15
EU R OP E
12
8
OC EA N I A
8
6
A SI A
AF R ICA
556
5b.policy_DEF.indd 556
1/17/2007 4:43:30 PM
- # of unesco global alliance partners by region - # of international federation of arts councils and culture
agencies (ifacca) current members by type and region, 2006 - # of creative exchange partners by region
- locations of cultural diplomacy organizations by region - # of locations of british council by region
# OF LOCATI O N S
OF BRI TI S H C OU N C IL
5.
LOCATIO NS O F CULTUR AL
D IPLOM A CY O RG ANIZATI ONS
4.
B Y R E G IO N
40
10
100
75
50
25
GOET HE-I NS T I T UT G ER M A NY
I TALI AN C ULT URAL I NS T I T UT E I TA LY
64
63
4
AR A B S TAT E S
I NS T I T UT O C ERVANT ES S PA I N
E U R OP E
N O RT H A ME R ICA 2 3 7
26
47
12
L AT I N A ME R I CA
38
24
OCEANIA 129
11
3
A F RI CA 2 3 3
20
8
7
A SI A
71
31
MI D D LE E AS T 1 3
125
EU ROP E 3 9
15
150
N O RT H AM ERI CA
20
LAT I N AM ERI CA 1 0
175
25
OC EA NI A
200
AF RI CA 2 3
30
CE N TRA L AS I A
225
AS I A 2 3
35
BY REG ION
250
557
5b.policy_DEF.indd 557
1/17/2007 4:43:30 PM
expressly monitor, analyse and act as clearing houses for activities, development and
policies in the cultural field (as distinct from organizations whose work includes some
information, art, lifestyles, value systems, traditions, beliefs and other aspects of cul-
such functions). The idea now is that such dedicated bodies can collectively provide
ture between different countries, regions and groups to achieve rapport and under-
an information infrastructure for the purposes of comparison and cooperation not just
within nations but also across boundaries. The movement began at the national level
to negotiating treaties, alliances, shaping policy, etc., but today it increasingly includes
with the creation in 1989 of the Observatoire des Politiques Culturelles in Grenoble,
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and networks. Indeed there has been a pro-
France, and the term has now spread across the world (see the non-exhaustive list be-
liferation of actors in the field of cultural diplomacy, with expanding networks linking
UNESCO has not materialized, the latter has an Observatory on the Information Society.
soft power that stresses relations among countries by way of culture, art and educa-
In 2002 the Observatory of Cultural Policies in Africa was set up in Mozambique, while
Some countries such as France consider cultural policy to be the third pillar of foreign
and consulates typically include a specialized cultural affairs office. Above the bilateral
governmental system, a new multi-lateral network of inter-governmental cooperation
is taking shape. This network includes prominently, not only UNESCO and related organizations, but also the International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies
Asia-Europe Foundation
(IFACCA) which aims to benefit artists, arts organizations and communities worldwide.
h ttp : //www. a s e f. o rg /
IFACCA is a network of mostly governmental agencies in the field of arts and culture.
According to the IFACCA website, its vision is a dynamic network, sharing knowledge
Boekmanstichting
h ttp : //www. b o e km a n . n l /
and creating understanding to enrich a world of artistic and cultural diversity, in which
IFACCA seeks to:
strengthen the capacity of arts councils and national culture agencies to meet the
Creative exchange
h t t p : / / w w w. c r e a t i v e x c h a n g e . o r g /
Development
h ttp : //www. cu l tu re l i n k. o rg /
ERICArts - European Research Institute for Comparative Cultural Policy and the Arts
h ttp : //www. e ri ca rts . o rg /
structures. These agencies not only promote the language and cultural heritage of
the country they represent, but should seek greater levels of cooperation to facilitate
dialogue and encourage understanding and appreciation of cultural differences. They
EUCLID International
h ttp : //www. e u cl i d . co . u k/
typically try to present and further the interests of a national culture in an increasingly
international and global context. An example is the British Council which works in 110
countries and collaborates in nearly 2,000 arts events annually:
Our purpose is to build mutually beneficial relationships between the people of the UK
and other countries and increase appreciation of the UKs creative ideas and achieve-
Similarly, the Goethe Institut promotes the study of German people and culture abroad
and encourages international cultural exchange. We draw from the many sections of
our cosmopolitan society and culture combining the experience and ideas of our partners
development
h t t p : / / w w w. p a c i f i c a s i a o b s e r v a t o r y. o r g /
globalization (Goethe Institut, 2006). Like the British Council, the Alliance Francaise, the
Instituto Cervantes, or the Italian Cultural Institute, the Goethe Institut maintains a
from official government budgets and policies, with the Goethe Institute being the
h ttp : //www. b u d o b s . o rg /
most independent.
UNESCO Observatory on the Information Society
Another layer of the growing infrastructure of international cultural diplomacy are alli-
ances between the UN and NGOs organizations, with UNESCOs Global Alliance partners
D O_ T OP I C & U R L _ S E C T I ON =2 0 1 . h tm l
as a prime example, whereby their primary purpose is, to strengthen cultural industries in developing countries by encouraging knowledge-sharing, capacity building,
good practice and mentoring between our members (UNESCO, 2006).
558
5b.policy_DEF.indd 558
1/17/2007 4:43:30 PM
559
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 559
1/17/2007 7:08:22 PM
A R MS
estimates 19952004 - us companies with largest department of defense contract awards for work in iraq
2002june 2004 in $usd current 2004 millions - 15 countries with the highest military expenditures by purchasing
power parity 2004 - nations with highest military expenditures 25 % of gross domestic product 2004 - 20 nations
with largest total armed forces 2002 - leading suppliers of arms transfer agreements with developing nations
19972004 - network analysis: global trade in arms - leading developing nation recipients of arms transfer
agreements 19972004
1.
IN USD$ MILLIONS
2500 0
2250 0
2000 0
1750 0
1500 0
1250 0
1000 0
750 0
500 0
250 0
2 ,9 7 0
3 ,9 2 0
HA L LI B U RT O N
R OL L S R OY C E
4 ,4 8 0
L - 3 C O MMU N ICAT I O N S
3 ,7 0 0
5 ,2 9 0
F I N ME C CA N I CA
SA I C
6 ,2 1 0
U N I T E D T E C H N OL O GI E S , U T C
3 ,7 8 0
8 ,0 1 0
EADS
CO M PU T E R S C I E N C E S C O RP., C SC
8 ,3 5 0
T H A LE S
G E N E R A L DY N A MI C S 1 3 ,1 0 0
RAY T H E ON 1 5 ,4 5 0
B AE SYS T EM S 1 5 ,7 6 0
N ORT H R OP G R U MMA N 2 2 ,7 2 0
B O E I N G 2 4 ,3 7 0
L OC KH E E D MA RT I N 2 4 ,9 1 0
560
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 560
1/17/2007 7:08:23 PM
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 561
3 ,0 5 1
2 ,5 2 5
2 ,3 2 5
1 ,5 4 2
1 ,5 4 2
1 ,5 2 9
1 ,5 0 0
1 ,5 0 0
1 ,4 7 9
1 ,4 7 5
1 ,4 7 5
1 ,2 0 0
628
402
165
159
SH AW G RO U P
P E R I N I C O RP.
CO N T R A C K I N T E R N AT I ON AL
T E T R A T EC H I N C .
U S A E N VI R O N ME N TAL
C H2 M H IL L
A M E RI CAN I N TE RN AT I O N AL CO N T R A C TO R S
OD E B R E C H T- AU ST I N
Z A PATA E N GI N E ER I N G
E N V IR O N M E N TAL C H E MI CA L C OR P.
E X PL O SI V E O RD IN AN CE T EC H.
S TA N LE Y B A K E R H IL L
I N T E R N AT I ON AL A ME RI CA N P R OD U C T S
T ITAN
HA R RI S
S A IC
1200 0
3 ,1 3 3
236
136
141
138
50
40.1
39.1
43
X 8.8
X
X 8.5
X
340
25 0
X
X
237
234
X
X
8.7
X
X
X
X
X
135
137
46.5
9.3
X
X
341
353
358
398
X
X
X
X
239
243
244
250
X
X
X
147
151
151
46
51.7
10.3
X
X
55.3
10.8
11
X
X
158
52.9
54.4
11.6
X
2004
40 0
2003
X
347
2002
2001
15 0
347
2000
237
1999
X
X
1998
367
1997
WA SH I N GT O N G R O U P I N T E R N ATI O N A L
10 0
1996
20 0
2 ,7 5 5
30 0
FL U O R C O RP.
35 0
5 ,2 8 6
1995
45 0
PA R SO N S C O RP.
K B R ( H A L LI B U RT O N ) 1 0 ,8 3 2
50 0
2.
X
A ME R IC A S
446
488
X
EUROPE
256
254
X
X
A S I A + O C E A N IA
164
M I DDL E E A S T
5 6 .1
X
11.7
X
X
1 2 .6
A F R IC A
3.
1000 0
800 0
600 0
400 0
200 0
561
1/17/2007 7:08:42 PM
4 5 5 .3
500
450
NATIONS WITH
LARGES T M I LI TARY
EX P ENDI TU RES 2004
500
5.
450
400
16.0
A S % OF G R OS S DOM ES TI C PR ODU C T
14.0
300
12.0
250
10.0
200
8.0
1 6 1 .1
350
5.3%
5.1%
5.0%
4.9%
4.9%
BR UNEI
M OROC C O
PAK I S TAN
S I NGAP ORE
6.0%
5.3%
6.3%
BUR UNDI
T URK EY
6.5%
BAHRAI N
5.5%
7.8%
ARM ENI A
K UWAI T
8.7%
Y EM EN
5.9%
10.0%
I S RAEL
M ALDI V ES
10.0%
S AUDI ARABI A
6.0%
10.6%
QATAR
S Y RI A
11.4%
ANGOLA
M AC EDONI A
13.4%
OM AN
14.6%
JORDAN
I RAN
PAK I S TAN
BRAZI L
S OUT H K OREA
T URK EY
S AUDI ARABI A
I TALY
JAPAN
GERM ANY
FRANC E
UNI T ED K I NGDOM
I NDI A
R US S I A
C HI NA
0.0
UNI T ED S TAT ES
2.0
ERI T REA
16.1
18.5
23.1
20.7
29.1
24.3
35.2
34.5
36.9
50
4.0
51.2
100
46.2
81.8
6.0
66.1
150
= 100
C HI NA
UN ITE D S TAT ES
I NDI A
REPUBLIC OF K OREA
PAK I S TAN
I RAN
T URK EY
V I ET NAM
MYANM AR
EGY P T
S Y RI A
T HAI LAND
UK RAI NE
IN DONES I A
GERM ANY
BRAZI L
FRANC E
ET HI OP I A
JAPAN
I TALY
562
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 562
+ 70
+ 14
+ 98
2 ,2 7 0
1 ,4 1 4
1 ,2 9 8
+ 86
0 ,6 8 6
+ 20
0 ,6 2 0
+ 20
0 ,5 2 0
+ 15
0 ,5 1 5
+ 84
0 ,4 8 4
+ 44
0, 444
+ 43
0, 443
+ 19
0, 319
+ 6
0, 306
+ 2
0, 302
+ 97
0, 297
+ 96
0, 296
+ 88
0, 288
+ 60
0, 260
+ 53
0, 253
+ 40
0, 240
+ 17
0, 217
1/17/2007 7:10:53 PM
29,909
R U SSIA
14,900
FR A NC E
9,500
C H INA
4,800
G E RM ANY
4,400
U NIT E D K INGDOM
3,100
SWE DE N
2,400
ISR A E L
1,700
U K RA INE
1,300
B E LA R U S
1,100
NORT H K OR E A
1,100
U NIT E D STAT E S
28,361
R U SSIA
20,700
4,100
FRA NC E
2,600
ISR A E L
2,500
C H INA
2,300
U K RA INE
2,000
ITA LY
1,100
NE T HE RLANDS
1,100
POLAND
900
SO U T H AFRICA
600
7b .
VA L U E OF A G R EEM ENTS 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 4
C HI NA 1 0 , 4 0 0
INDIA
7,800
I NDI A
7,900
E GYPT
6,300
EGY P T
6,500
SO U T H AFRICA
5,100
S AUDI ARABI A
5,600
ISRA EL
5,000
I S RAEL
4,800
SAU DI A R A B IA
4,900
S OUT H K OREA
3,300
C H IN A
4,900
M ALAYS I A
2,900
SOU T H K OR EA
4,900
PAK I S TAN
2,500
SINGA PO RE
3,000
K UWAI T
2,300
M ALAYSI A
2,500
OM AN
2,200
563
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 563
1/17/2007 7:11:00 PM
8.
= A R M S S EL L ER S
= TR A DE DI R EC TI ON
AM ERI CAS
USA
I S RAEL
ASIA
S W EDEN
R U SSIA
OC E A N I A
U K R A INE
G E R MA N Y
UK
A FRICA
CHIN A
EUROP E
FRAN CE
CANADA
M I DDLE EAS T
564
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 564
1/17/2007 7:11:00 PM
1.
2003
2004
2005
16
C ON SIDERED TO BE A LATENT CONF L I CT I F RESPE CTI V E DEM ANDS ARE A RTI C U L ATED B Y
O NE O F TH E PARTIES AND PERCEI V ED BY THE OTHERS AS SUCH.
M A N IF ES T
23
13
23
- A MAN IFEST CON FLICT INCL UDE S T HE USE OF M E ASURES THAT ARE L O C ATED I N TH E PR EL I M I NA RY S TA G E TO
V I OLEN T FORCE. TH IS INCL UDE S, F OR EXAM PL E , V ERBAL PRESSURE, T HR EATENI NG EXPL I C I TLY W I TH V I OL ENC E,
O R TH E IMP O SITION OF EC ONOM I C SANCTI ONS.
16
11
10
28
11
565
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 565
1/17/2007 7:11:03 PM
2.
325
300
X
X
275
250
225
200
175
150
125
X
100
XX
X
X
75
XX
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
XXX
X
X
XX
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
XX
X
X
X
X
X
X
XX
XX
X
X
XX
X
XX
X
X
XX
X
XX
50
X
25
1990
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
ARM S
81
94
100
108
118
125
130
137
134
137
198
215
219
C ON F LIC T
75
87
88
99
122
146
149
141
144
140
192
197
207
WAR
116
124
128
135
139
116
142
139
144
144
210
219
223
P EAC E-KEEP IN G
37
69
80
93
104
111
131
153
171
173
255
279
292
DIS ARMAM EN T
95
99
106
108
111
324
115
111
122
123
199
207
210
DIPLOMAC Y
99
104
107
106
114
102
121
127
128
134
203
205
216
13
11
13
16
16
19
19
21
18
28
29
29
3.
# O F PEACE MI SS I ONS
UN ITED N ATION S
566
REGION AL
ORGAN IZATION S
N ON-S TANDI NG
OR AL LIAN CES
M U LTI LATER A L
P EAC E M I S S I ONS 2 0 0 4
4.
COALI T I ONS
C ENTR A L A M ER I C A + C A R I B B EA N
1995
26
16
S OU TH A M ER I C A
1996
24
18
NORTH A F R I C A
14
1997
23
22
S OU TH A F R I C A
1998
21
26
M I DDL E EA S T
1999
24
30
ASIA
2000
22
25
S OU TH C ENTR A L A S I A
2001
18
26
W ES T EU R OPE
2002
20
21
EA S T EU R OPE
2003
18
26
S OU TH EU R OPE
11
2004
21
29
OC EA NI A
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 566
B Y R EG IO N 2 0 0 4
1/17/2007 7:11:04 PM
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 567
L I BE RI A
4 2 .9
3 5 .1
H AI T I
50
4 2 .9
20
INDIA
100
4 6 .3
40
K E N YA
150
N O RTH K O R E A
60
5 0 .4
200
6 6 .6
80
E R IT R E A
250
AF G HA N I STA N
100
7 0 .4
300
7 1 .6
120
A N G OL A
140
U G A N DA
140
27 1 .0
28 6 .5
1995
2004
2003
2002
S U DAN
2004
10,462,625.10
1,7 2 9 ,5 5 4
1 , 5 4 0 ,4 7 6
2000000
E T H I OP I A
3 0 .1
3 1 .5
3 4 .4
4 4 .7
19,550,970.21
60000000
S U DA N
BA N G L AD E SH
H A IT I
5 0 .0
2003
8 1 ,9 8 1 ,8 5 0
2500000
2 ,3 7 3 ,7 9 1
1 1 7 ,1 8 3 ,0 2 6
1 5 0 ,9 3 7 ,5 3 4
16000000
AN G O L A
6.
5 4 .5
20000000
P ER U
40000000
7,854,304.89
120000000
5 4 .9
5 8 .0
B OS N IA & H E R ZE G OV IN A
2002
140000000
E TH IO P I A
10 6 .1
12 9 .1
80000000
IN DI A
100000000
R WAN D A
5.
COM PA R IS ON OF
ACTI V E P EAC EK EEP I NG I NGOs
BY REV ENUE 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 4
1500000
1000000
500000
SOUTH AF RI C A R EV ENU E I N R A ND
567
1/17/2007 7:11:11 PM
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 568
UNT S O
45 , 8 1 5
47 , 1 0 8
600 0 0
1,174
413
G EORGI A
BUR UNDI
HAI T I
COT E D I V OI RE
LI BERI A
E TH I O PI A / ERI T REA
2,457
3,906
4,241
6,272
6,912
6,288
9.005
B A NG L A DES H
I NDI A
NEPA L
ET H I O P I A
G H A NA
J O R DA N
NI G ER I A
UR UG UAY
S O UT H A F R I CA
8 ,0 2 4
3 ,9 1 2
3 ,4 5 1
3 ,4 3 2
3 ,3 2 2
2 ,9 5 0
2 ,8 9 0
2 ,4 9 2
2 ,3 3 1
2 3 ,7 7 6 A L L O T HE R S
PA KI S TA N
8 ,1 4 0
1 7 ,5 5 7
1 8 ,5 3 0
C ONGO
S IER RA LEONE
K OS OV O
455
W E ST ER N S AHARA
TOTAL T RO OP STRENG TH OF
UN PEACEKE EPING O PERATI ONS
L EBANON
1,077
UNDOF
116
374
64,720
801 ,9000
9050 2 0 0 4
C Y P R US
I N D I A / PAK I S TAN
39 ,6 5 2
3 7, 77 3
700 0 0
2004
2003
2002
1 8, 46 0
500 0 0
2001
2000
1999
1 4, 34 7
1998
100 0 0
1 4 ,8 79
200 0 0
1997
300 0 0
2 4, 91 9
3 1, 03 1
400 0 0
1996
1995
8.
7.
9.
568
1/17/2007 7:11:12 PM
C U RREN T C ON F L IC T S +
ISSUES / TENS ION S
- the peace and conflict ledger 2005 - global trends in political discrimination 19502003 - global trends in
economic discrimination 19502003 - global trends in political discrimination of minorities 19502003
- global trends in violent conflicts 19462004 - type of armed conflict worldwide 19462004 - evolution of
different types of armed conflicts from 1964 to 2004 - levels of internationalized internal armed conflict
19462004 - # of deaths current ongoing conflict through 2005 - top 15 conflicts: average # of casualties per
year through 2005
1.
The Peace and Conflict Ledger lists the 161 larger countries in the worldall those
ing (low, medium, or high intensity) major armed conflict in early 2005; a yellow icon
with populations greater than 500,000 in 2005and rates each country on seven
indicators of capacity for building peace and managing potentially destabilizing political
2005 or an armed conflict that was suspended or repressed between early 2001 and
early 2005. Episodes of political violence must have reached a minimum threshold of
avoid outbreaks of armed conflicts while providing reasonable levels of human secu-
1,000 battle related deaths to be considered major armed conflicts. New episodes of
political violence that have emerged in the past two years, in which there have been
substantial numbers killed but, which have not yet reached the 1,000 death threshold,
and is free of serious threats from its neighboring countries. Countries are listed by
world region and, within each region, first, according to countries with current or
recent episodes of armed conflict and, second, from lowest (red) to highest (green)
peace-building capacity. Because many global trends in the qualities of peace have
steadily improved since the early 1990s, some minor changes have been made to
the Ledger to increase our ability to report differences among countries on certain
indicators. These changes do not affect comparison of the current Ledger with
previous editions of Peace and Conflict.
The summary indicator of peace-building capacity is located on the far left side of
the ledger. It summarizes the seven component indicators listed on the right side of
the ledger and described below. The ranking is used to classify the countries in each
over a more limited span of time. Countries that have had some human security problems
but not at the higher levels noted above are left blank on this indicator (a neutral
value). Green icons indicate countries that have performed well and experienced little
or no human security problems during the previous ten-year period.
geographical region according to a single global standard. The armed conflict indicator,
also located on the left side of the ledger, is not used in the calculations but is used
The icons in this column take into account the success or failure of governments in
to highlight countries with major armed conflicts in recent years. Red and yellow
icons on the seven component indicators are evidence of problems whereas green
summarized in Appendix tables 11.2 and 11.3. Red icons signify countries challenged
icons signal a capacity for managing conflict without resorting to serious armed con-
by violent conflicts over self-determination in early 2005. Yellow icons flag countries
flict. Weighted values are assigned to each of the seven indicators (-2 for red, -1 for
with one of these two patterns: either (a) non-violent self-determination movements
yellow, +1.5 for green) and averaged for the number of icons listed (a blank indicator
in early 2005 but no track record of accommodating such movements in the past 20
value is not used in the calculation). Countries with an average less than -1 have red
years; or (b) violent self determination movements in early 2005 and a track record of
icons on the summary indicator of capacity and yellow icons signal an average score
accommodating other such movements in the past 20 years. Green icons signify coun-
between -1 and 0. Countries with an average greater than 0 are given green icons.
tries that have successfully managed one or more self-determination conflicts since
1985, including countries with current non-violent self-determination movements.
CO L UM N 2: ARME D C ON F L I C T
Countries with no self-determination movements since 1985 are blank in this column.
The icons in this column are used to highlight countries with the very real threat of
major armed conflicts being fought in early-2005, as summarized in Appendix figure
11.1 and described in Appendix table 11.1; these icons are not used in calculating
the indicators of peace-building capacity red icon highlights countries with an ongo-
against minority identity groups are strongly associated with divided societies, con-
569
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 569
1/17/2007 7:11:13 PM
C A M B ODI A
M OL DOVA
B A NG L A DES H
POLA ND
B H U TA N
UNITED STATES
ROMA NI A
C H I NA
AUSTRIA
SL O VA K R EPU B L I C
EA S T TI M OR
BELG IUM
SL O V ENI A
FIJI
CANAD A
UKR A I NE
NORTH K OR EA
DENMARK
FINLAND
N E IGH B O R H O O D
S O C IE TA L C A PA C IT Y
D U R A B IL IT Y
R E GIME T YPE
D IS C R IMIN AT IO N
S E L F -D E T E R MIN AT IO N
HU MA N S E C U R IT Y
A R MED C O NF L I C T
P EA CE- B UI L DI NG CA PA C I T Y
N E IGH B O R H O O D
S O C IE TA L C A PA C IT Y
D U R A B IL IT Y
R E GIME T YPE
D IS C R IMIN AT IO N
S E L F -D E T E R MIN AT IO N
HU MA N S E C U R IT Y
A R MED C O NF L I C T
P EA CE- B UI L DI NG CA PA C I T Y
N E IGH B O R H O O D
S O C IE TA L C A PA C IT Y
D U R A B IL IT Y
R E GIME T YPE
D IS C R IMIN AT IO N
S E L F -D E T E R MIN AT IO N
HU MA N S E C U R IT Y
P EA CE- B UI L DI NG CA PA C I T Y
A R MED C O NF L I C T
M A C EDONI A
NORTH
O T ATLANTIC
L A OS
LATIN
A
AMERICA + THE
H CARRIBBEAN
A R
FRAN CE
TH A I L A ND
V I ETNA M
G ERMANY
COLOM B I A
A U S TR A L I A
G REECE
HAITI
J A PA N
IRELAN D
ECU A DOR
S OU TH K OR EA
ITALY
GUATEM A L A
M A L AY S I A
NETH ERLAN D S
PER U
M ONG OL I A
NO R WAY
ARG ENTI NA
NEW ZEA L A ND
P O RTUG AL
BOLI V I A
PA PU A NEW G U I NEA
SPAIN
BRA ZI L
S I NG A POR E
SW EDEN
CHI L E
TA I WA N
SW ITZERLAND
COS TA R I C A
UNITED KIN G D O M
CUB A
NORTH
O T AFRICA + THE M
MIDDLE
D L EAST
A
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
FORMER
O M
SOCIALIST BLOC
L C
EL S A LVA DOR
A L G ER I A
GUYA NA
IRAQ
R USSIA
HON DU R A S
I S R A EL
ARMEN IA
JAMA I C A
IRAN
AZERBAIJ AN
M EXI C O
L EB A NON
TAJ IKISTAN
NI C A R A G U A
EG Y PT
BOSN IA
PANA M A
J OR DA N
G EO RG IA
PAR A G U AY
L I B YA
KYRG YZSTAN
T RI NI DA D & TOB A G O
M OR OC C O
SERBIA +
UR U G U AY
S A U DI A R A B I A
MON TEN EG RO
V E NEZU EL A
TURKMENISTAN
UZBEKISTAN
SYRIA
TU NI S I A
ASIA
S A + THE PACIFIC
ALBANIA
TU R K EY
Y EM EN
BELARUS
NE PA L
BAHRAIN
BULG ARIA
I ND I A
C Y PR U S
CROATIA
I ND ONES I A
K U WA I T
AF G H A NI S TA N
OM A N
ESTON IA
M YA NM A R (B U R M A )
QATA R
H UNG ARY
PAK I S TA N
U NI TED A R A B
KAZAKH STAN
SOL OM ON I S L A NDS
EM I R ATES
LATVIA
SRI L A NK A
LITH UAN IA
AFRICA
F
SOUTH OF TTHEE SAHARA
H R
570
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 570
1/17/2007 7:11:13 PM
GUI NEA B I S S A U
D. R. CO N G O
GUI NEA
S ENEG A L
NIG ERIA
CAMER OON
TA NZA NI A
SUDAN
CHA D
TOG O
UG AND A
COMOR OS
ZA M B I A
AN G O LA
DJIB OU TI
B ENI N
B OTS WA NA
REP UBLIC
ERI TR EA
M A L AW I
REP UBLIC O F CO N G O
GAB ON
MALI
ETH IO P IA
GAMB I A
M A U R I TI U S
COTE D IVOIRE
GHA NA
NA M I B I A
LIBERIA
KE NYA
S OU TH A F R I C A
R WAN D A
L ES OTH O
S WA ZI L A ND
SIERRA LEO N E
M A DA G A S C A R
ZI M B A B W E
SOMALIA
M A U R I TA NI A
BURKIN A FASO
M OZA M B I QU E
N E IGHB O R H O O D
S O C IE TA L C A PA C IT Y
D U R A B IL IT Y
R E GIME T YPE
D IS C R IMIN AT IO N
S E L F -D E T E R MIN AT IO N
HU MA N S E C U R IT Y
A R MED C O NF L I C T
P EA CE- B UI L DI NG CA PA C I T Y
N E IGHB O R H O O D
S O C IE TA L C A PA C IT Y
D U R A B IL IT Y
R E GIME T YPE
D IS C R IMIN AT IO N
S E L F -D E T E R MIN AT IO N
HU MA N S E C U R IT Y
A R MED C O NF L I C T
P EA CE- B UI L DI NG CA PA C I T Y
N E IGHB O R H O O D
S O C IE TA L C A PA C IT Y
D U R A B IL IT Y
R E GIME T YPE
D IS C R IMIN AT IO N
S E L F -D E T E R MIN AT IO N
HU MA N S E C U R IT Y
P EA CE- B UI L DI NG CA PA C I T Y
A R MED C O NF L I C T
BUR UND I
NI G ER
The governments of rich societies are better able to maintain peace and security than
tentious politics, and self-determination grievances. They are also indicative of strategies
of exclusion by dominant groups. This indicator looks at general levels of both political
on both GDP per capita (income) and societal energy consumption per capita
and economic discrimination against minorities at the end of 2003. Red icons denote
(capitalization) over the past five-year period to rate countries on this indicator.
Red icons signify countries in the lowest quintile (the bottom 20%) of societal capacity.
against minorities comprising at least ten percent of the population in 2003. Yellow
Yellow icons flag countries in the second quintile. Countries in the third quintile are
icons identify countries where there are active social practices of discrimination by
left blank. Green icons identify countries in the top two quintiles (the upper 40%) in
dominant groups against minority groups that comprise at least ten percent of the
societal capacity.
population but no official sanctions. Green icons are assigned to countries with little
or no active discrimination and government policies designed to help remedy or alleviate
C O LU MN 9: NEIG H B O R H O O D
the effects of past discriminatory policies and practices for groups constituting at
We define ten politically relevant neighborhoods: West Africa, North Africa, East
least five percent of the population. Countries with little or no active discrimination
Africa, South Africa, Middle East, South Asia, East Asia, South America, Central America,
and Europe/North America. For each region we gauge the extent of armed conflicts in
early 2005 and the prevailing types of regimes, either democratic, anocratic, or auto-
CO L UM N 6: RE GIME TY P E
cratic. Countries with green icons are in regions with relatively low armed conflict
The icons in this column show the nature of a countrys political institutions in early
and mostly democratic governments. Countries with red icons are in neighborhoods
2005. Red icons are anocracies (see section 4, following), that is, countries with gov-
with high armed conflict and many anocratic, or transitional, regimes. Countries with
ernments in the mixed or transitional zone between autocracy and democracy. Yellow
yellow icons are in regions with middling levels of armed conflict and mostly auto-
icons represent full autocratic regimes. Green icons are full democracies.
cratic regimes. For countries that straddle regions, or are situated in regions with
mixed traits, a final determination was made by reference to armed conflicts in
CO L UM N 7: D U RABILITY
bordering countries. For example, countries with two or more bordering countries
The icons in this column take into account the maturity of a countrys system of
engaged in armed conflicts are coded red on this indicator. Island states without
government and, as such, its conflict management capabilities. New political systems
have not yet consolidated central authority nor established effective institutions and,
so, are vulnerable to challenges and further change, especially during their first five
a countrys general quality of human security (column 3). The only current situations
countries whose political institutions in early 2005 were less than five years old, that
of major interstate war are the armed conflicts between the United States and insurgents
is, they were established between 2000 and 2004. Yellow icons register countries
and al Qaeda operatives in Iraq and Afghanistan. Countries that have contributed
whose polities were less than ten years old; established between 1995 and 1999.
peacekeeping troops to various locations of past and continuing violence are not
Green icons are used for countries whose polities were established before 1995.
considered to be at war.
CO L UM N 8: SOC IE TAL CA PA C I T Y
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 571
Interstate wars are included with this indicator but are not used in evaluating
571
1/17/2007 7:11:21 PM
GLOBAL TR ENDS IN
POL I TICA L DI S C RI M I NATI ON 1950 2003
2.
10
7.5
% O F C O U N T R IE S
12.5
% OF GL OBA L PO PU L AT IO N
75
60
45
30
2005
2000
1995
1990
1985
1980
1975
1970
1965
1960
0
1955
0
1950
15
1945
2.5
GLOBAL TR ENDS IN
ECONO MI C DI S C RI M I NATI ON 1950 2003
3.
10
7.5
% O F C O UN TR I ES
12.5
% O F G L O B AL PO P U L ATI O N
75
60
45
30
2 0 05
2 0 00
1 9 95
1 9 90
1 9 85
1 9 80
1 9 75
1 9 70
1 9 65
1 9 60
0
1 9 55
0
1 9 50
15
1 9 45
2.5
572
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 572
1/17/2007 7:11:25 PM
GOVERN MEN TAL D ISCRI M I NAT I ON S OC I ETAL DI S C RI M I NAT I ON HI S T ORI CAL DI S C RI M I NAT I ON REM EDI AL DI S C RI MI N AT I O N
80
70
60
50
40
30
10
2005
2000
1995
1990
1985
1980
1975
1970
1965
1960
1955
0
1950
# OF M I NOR I TI ES
20
200
WARFARE TOTAL S
(I NC L U DI NG C OL ONI A L WA R S )
S OC I ETAL WARFARE
180
160
140
120
80
60
40
20
2000
1995
1990
1985
1980
1975
1970
1965
1960
1955
0
1950
T OTA L M AG N IT UD E O F AR ME D CO N F L I CT
100
573
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 573
1/17/2007 7:11:27 PM
6.
76
481
1289
585
3%
20 %
53%
24%
3 . IN T E RN AL ARME D C ON FLIC T
4 . IN T E RN AT ION ALIZE D
IN T E RN AL ARME D C ON FLIC T
OC C U R S B ETW EEN TH E G OV ER N ME N T
O WN TERRITORY.
G R OU PS W I TH OU T I NTER V ENTI ON F R OM
OF A S TATE A ND I NTER NA L OP P O S IT IO N
OTH ER S TATES .
G R OU PS W I TH I NTER V ENTI ON F R O M
OTH ER S TATES .
7.
F R OM 1 9 46 TO 2 0 0 4
106
101
14
132
56
16
165
22
37
126
62
32
119
61
27
90
69
25
5
68
49
60
8
67
41
67
15
41
26
20
18
30
6
11
21
26
2
81
26
6
22
15
100 0
X
X
100
X
X
XX
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
2 0 00 2 00 4
X
X
X
1 9 95 1 99 9
10
X
X
X
X
1 9 90 1 99 4
1 9 85 1 98 9
1 9 80 1 98 4
1 9 75 1 97 9
1 9 70 1 97 4
1 9 65 1 96 9
1 9 60 1 96 4
1 9 55 1 95 9
1 9 50 1 95 4
1 9 46 1 94 9
574
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 574
1/17/2007 7:11:28 PM
LEV ELS O F
IN TER NATIO NAL I ZED I NTERNAL ARM ED C ONFLI C T
1946 2004
55
42
16
0 20
56
39
2 20
4 41
45
12 12
60
42
32
2
15
35
6
0
20
0
6
0
0
6
2
0
0
4
0
2
8.
50
45
X
X
40
X
35
X
X
30
25
20
15
X
X
X
X
10
X
X
1 9 55 1 95 9
1 9 60 1 96 4
1 9 65 1 96 9
1 9 75 1 97 9
1 9 70 1 97 4
X
Z 0 00 2 00 4
1 9 95 1 99 9
1 9 9 0 - 1 99 4
X
X
1 9 85 1 98 9
X
X
X
1 9 50 1 95 4
1 9 46 1 94 9
1 9 80 1 98 4
575
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 575
1/17/2007 7:11:30 PM
# OF DEATHS F R OM
C U R R ENT ONG OING C ONFLI C T S
TH R OU G H 2005
9.
SOLOM ON ISLANDS
500
C O NGO -B R A Z Z AVILLE
500
SAU DI A R A B IA
700
C EN T RA L A FRICA N R E U BLIC
1,000
LIBE RIA
1,000
T U RK E Y
1,000
YE M E N
1,000
T HA ILAND
1,200
PAK ISTA N
1,500
INDIA
1,500
NIGE RIA
1,500
H A ITI
2,000
PAK ISTA N
2,000
T HA ILAND
2,500
C OT E DIVO IR E
3,000
INDONE SIA
3,000
ANGO LA
3,500
NE PAL
8,000
U G A NDA
12,000
A FGH A NISTAN
15,000
ISR A E L
20,000
INDIA
25,000
R U SSIA
30,000
INDIA
35,000
IR A Q
40,000
PH ILIPPINE S
50,000
C O LOM BIA
50,000
NIGE RIA
55,000
ALGE RIA
60,000
SU DAN
60,000
5 0 0 DEATH S
+ 200
+ 200
B U R U NDI 100,000
M YA NM A R 100,000
D. R . C ( ZAIRE) 1,500,000
576
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 576
1/17/2007 7:11:30 PM
TO P 15 C ONF L IC TS :
AVE RAGE # OF CAS U ALTI ES
PER YEAR
10.
T H R OU G H 2 0 0 5
PHILIPPIN ES
001 , 5 1 5
MYAN MAR
001 , 7 5 4
HAITI
002 , 0 0 0
IN D IA
002 , 3 3 3
COL OMBIA
002 , 3 8 0
THAILAN D
002 , 5 0 0
AF GHAN ISTAN
003 , 7 5 0
AL GERIA
004 , 6 1 5
R USSIA
005 , 0 0 0
SOMAL IA
005 , 8 8 2
BUR UN D I
008 , 3 3 3
N IGERIA
018 , 3 3 3
IRAQ
020 , 0 0 0
SUDAN
030 , 0 0 0
D.R.C (Z AI RE )
166 , 6 6 6
577
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 577
1/17/2007 7:11:33 PM
H U MAN RIG HT S
region - average physical integrity rights index - average empowerments rights index - average scores of
disappearance, extrajudicial killings + torture - average scores of freedom-related rights - average scores of
political imprisonment + participation - types of womens rights by region and average - # of civil society
C ENT RAL AS I A
EUROP E
AS I A + T HE PAC I FI C
HUMAN RIG H TS IS S U ES
AM ERI CAS
AFRI CA
1.
ABUSES BY OF F I CI AL S AND I M PU NI TY
ARM E D CONF L I CT
CONF L I CT, CRI M E, AND I NSTA B I L I TY
DE ATH PE NALT Y
ECONOM I C, SOCI AL , AND CU LTU R A L R I G H TS
I NT ERNAT I ONAL JUST I CE
NAT I ONAL SE CURI TY
REGI ONAL I NI T I ATI V ES
RACI SM AND DI SCRI M I NAT I ON
REPRESSI ON OF DI SSENT
WAR ON TERROR
HUMAN RIGHTS
HUM AN RI GHT S DE F ENDERS
ACT I ON F OR HUM AN RI GHTS
I M PUNI T Y F OR HUM AN RI GH TS V I OL ATOR S
THE ARAB CHARTER ON HUM A N R I G H TS
POL ITICS
POL I T I CAL REPRESSI ON
EL ECTI ONS AND DENI AL OF C I V I L A ND POL I TI C A L R I G H TS
POL I T I CAL V I OL E NCE
REF UGEES
REF UGEES, I NT ERNAL LY DI S PL A C ED PEOPL E A ND M I G R A NTS
REF UGEES AND ASY L UM -SE EK ER S
REF UGEES AND M I GRANTS
WOMEN
V I OL E NCE AGAI NST WOM E N
WOM ENS RI GHTS
578
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 578
1/17/2007 7:11:34 PM
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 579
OC E A N I A
0 .9 3
1 .9
1 .7 9
1 .7
1.5
1. 33
2.5
0 .9 7
0 .9 1
OC EANI A
NORT H AM ERI CA
LAT I N AM ERI CA
EUROP E
C ENT RAL AS I A
4.84
4.8
10
9 .5
8 .7 5
8 .4 3
8 .3 3
7 .6 9
7 .8 5
7 .7 5
10
N ORT H A ME R ICA
0.5
1. 2
L AT I N A ME R I CA
1
5.
0 .8
0. 6
BY REG IO N 2 0 0 4
0 .4
4.
0 .8 4
0 .4 8
0 .4 3
0 .3 4
7 .2 9
C E N T R AL A SI A
0. 08
E U R OP E
2
1.5
1.73
M I DDLE EAS T
MI D D L E E A ST
6
5.37
10
3.87
3.62
AS I A
4.58
5.06
4.81
4.35
3.7
AFRI CA
OC EANI A
NORT H AM ERI CA
LAT I N AM ERI CA
EUROP E
6 .2 5
6 .2 6
12
1 .0 4
2
1.93
1.79
C ENT RAL AS I A
4.4
4.2
0 .7 3
0. 62
0 .8 1
0. 53
0 .4 7
0 .4 8
0 .9 2
0. 33
0. 33
1.36
1.5
1.5
1. 4
1.49
M I DDLE EAS T
0 .3 7
1 .1 2
1. 07
1.91
3.13
3.53
3.95
4.62
AV ERAGE PH YSICA L
IN TEGRI TY R I GH TS IN DE X
A SI A
AF R ICA
OC E A N I A
0 .5 2
0. 5
N O RT H A ME R ICA
0 .2
0. 6
1. 3 6
AS I A
AFRI CA
L AT I N A ME R ICA
C E N T R AL A SI A
EU R OP E
1
0 .8 2
1. 5
MI D D L E E AS T
1 .3 3
2. 5
1.75
1 .1 2
0 .5 2
0 .6 3
12
A SI A
AF R ICA
2.
3.
AV ER A G E EM P OWERM E N T
RI GHTS INDEX
B Y R EG I ON A ND Y EA R
2 0 0 0 AV ERAGE I NDEX S CALE 0 -1 0
AV ER A G E S C OR ES OF
FREEDO M RELATED RI GH T S
B Y R EG IO N 2 0 0 4
579
1/17/2007 7:11:35 PM
7.
6.
1 .5 7
1.4 3
1 .6 7
1 .8 7
1 .8
1 .4 8
1 .6
1.4
0.98
1.14
1.33
1
0.67
0.33
0.4
0.6
0.67
0.67
1.2
0.73
0.64
0.78
1.12
1.04
0. 5
1.23
1.5
1 .6 8
1 .8 1
1.19
1. 5
1 .9 6
0.5
OC EANI A
NORT H AM ERI CA
LAT I N AM ERI CA
C ENT RAL AS I A
EUROP E
M I DDLE EAS T
AS I A
OC EANI A
NORT H AM ERI CA
C ENT RAL AS I A
EUROP E
M I DDLE EAS T
AFRI CA
LAT I N AM ERI CA
0
AS I A
AFRI CA
EC ONOM I C RI GHT S
3
2.5
2
1 .8 6
BY REG IO N 2 0 0 4
2
2
2. 5
1 .6 4
1 .8 5
B Y R EG I ON + AV ER A G E 2 0 0 4
2 .5
2 .5
2 .5
AV ERAGE SCORE S OF
POLIT ICA L I MPRISO NMENT
+ PARTICIPATI ON
TY PES OF
# OF C I V I L S OC I ETY
ORGANI ZATI ONS
8 b.
B Y S EL EC T H U M A N R I G H TS I S U ES + R EG I ON 2 0 0 6
60
DISAB ILIT Y
S EX UALI
L TY
S OC I AL EX C LUS
S I ON
G E NDE R
50
45
37
30
30
12
14
8
2
0
2
1
1
0
2
O C E A N IA
L AT I N A ME RI CA
E U RO P E
MI D D L E E A ST
A SI A
0
A F RI CA
4
1
2
3
OC E A N I A
N ORT H A ME R ICA
15
18
11
6
31
10
12
27
14
14
56
53
75
L AT I N A ME R I CA
E U R OP E
A SI A
AF R ICA
MI D D L E E A ST
4
2
5
3
20
53
57
48
51
55
48
15
19
16
50
20
81
10 0
21
22
15 0
148
149
16 1
40
22
20 0
25 0
62
RELI GI ON
C IVIL R IG H T S
N ORTH AM E RI CA
RAC E P OLI T I C S
59
58
70
57
# OF CI VI L SO CI ETY
ORGANI ZATI ONS
8 a.
580
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 580
1/17/2007 7:11:35 PM
I NTERNATION AL
T E RRORIS M
IN JURIES
2 a.
10000
X
XX
X
X
X
X
1000
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
10
XXX
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
1970 1975
1975 1980
1980 1985
1985 1990
1990 1995
1995 2000
2000 2005
275
205
314
348
5714
5269
818
17
20
53
107
31
79
100
66
23
25
30
ARMED ATTACK
ARSON
ASSASSIN ATION
BARRICAD E/HOSTAGE
123
714
30
667
BOMBIN G
721
2024
4164
5557
5004
9914
6919
HIJACKIN G
1b .
42
53
48
188
26
51
KID N APPIN G
13
18
15
16
2350
MIDDLE EAS T/
W ES T ERN
PERS I AN GULF
EUROP E
LATIN AMERICA
+ CARIBBEAN
E AST +
EASTERN
C E NT RA L ASIA
EUROPE
0050
0086
0135
0145
0256
0154
0054
0015
0007
0016
0040
0027
0025
0016
0002
0007
0012
0014
0069
0085
0043
0351
0287
0360
0582
0421
0139
0099
0221
0330
0424
0546
0384
0194
0947
0144
0188
0118
0031
0014
0014
0005
0025
0029
0049
0148
0081
0067
0186
0037
0036
0025
0110
0095
0054
0053
0327
0523
0819
0584
0482
0332
0171
1970 -75
1975 -80
1980 -85
1985 -90
1990 -95
1995 -00
2000 -05
1970 -75
1975 -80
1980 -85
1985 -90
1990 -95
1995 -00
2000 -05
1970 -75
1975 -80
1980 -85
1985 -90
1990 -95
1995 -00
2000 -05
1970 -75
1975 -80
1980 -85
1985 -90
1990 -95
1995 -00
2000 -05
1970 -75
1975 -80
1980 -85
1985 -90
1990 -95
1995 -00
2000 -05
1970 -75
1975 -80
1980 -85
1985 -90
1990 -95
1995 -00
2000 -05
1970 -75
1975 -80
1980 -85
1985 -90
1990 -95
1995 -00
2000 -05
1970 -75
1975 -80
1980 -85
1985 -90
1990 -95
1995 -00
2000 -05
1970 -75
1975 -80
1980 -85
1985 -90
1990 -95
1995 -00
2000 -05
NORT H
A FR ICA
AM ERI CA
S OUT H AS I A
S OUT H EAS T
AS I A + OC EANI A
582
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 582
1/17/2007 7:12:21 PM
0079
0353
0143
0245
0482
55 3 7
0374
0038
0002
0013
0050
50 1 0
50 9 5
0004
0000
0003
0008
0005
0120
0062
0698
0068
0097
0141
0405
0739
0037
0121
0644
19 6 6
24 0 8
13 1 9
14 4 7
20 3 2
51 4 3
0106
0147
0072
0028
10 4 9
0004
23 4 0
0016
0011
0108
24 5 4
14 7 9
19 5 2
0699
0021
0070
0049
0110
0111
0147
0804
0229
0444
17 4 0
16 3 8
0441
0525
0635
1970 -75
1975 -80
1980 -85
1985 -90
1990 -95
1995 -00
2000 -05
1970 -75
1975 -80
1980 -85
1985 -90
1990 -95
1995 -00
2000 -05
1970 -75
1975 -80
1980 -85
1985 -90
1990 -95
1995 -00
2000 -05
1970 -75
1975 -80
1980 -85
1985 -90
1990 -95
1995 -00
2000 -05
1970 -75
1975 -80
1980 -85
1985 -90
1990 -95
1995 -00
2000 -05
1970 -75
1975 -80
1980 -85
1985 -90
1990 -95
1995 -00
2000 -05
1970 -75
1975 -80
1980 -85
1985 -90
1990 -95
1995 -00
2000 -05
1970 -75
1975 -80
1980 -85
1985 -90
1990 -95
1995 -00
2000 -05
1970 -75
1975 -80
1980 -85
1985 -90
1990 -95
1995 -00
2000 -05
2b.
I NTERNAT I O N AL T ER R O RI S M I NJU RI E S
A FRICA
E AST +
MIDDLE EAS T /
CE NT R A L ASIA
PERSI AN GULF
S OUT H AS I A
W ES T ERN
EUROP E
N ORT H
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 583
EASTERN
LATIN AMERICA
A M ERICA
EUROPE
+ CARIBBEAN
S OUT H EAS T
AS I A + OC EANI A
583
1/17/2007 7:12:26 PM
I NTERNATION AL
TERRORIS M
FATALIT IES
3a .
10000
X
X
X
1000
X
IN TERNATION AL IN CIDENT S ARE T HOSE
IN W H ICH TERRO RISTS G O ABROAD
X
X
X
X
XX
10
X
XX
XX
X
X
XX
X
X
X
X
XX
X
X
X
X
XX
X
X
1
1970 1975
1975 1980
1980 1985
1985 1990
1990 1995
1995 2000
2000 2005
115
188
132
290
518
382
590
34
36
16
44
53
157
191
167
129
71
82
ARMED ATTACK
ARSON
ASSASSIN ATION
BARRICAD E/HOSTAGE
38
234
55
11
17
171
338
406
1648
1936
881
941
1866
HIJ ACKIN G
13
142
67
159
11
129
23
KID N APPIN G
19
31
42
38
61
82
127
2982
BOMBIN G
I NTERNAT IO NAL
TERRORIS M FATA LITI ES
MIDDLE EAS T/
PERS I AN GULF
3b .
0181
0152
0291
0508
0079
0053
0196
0038
0204
0126
0138
0257
0052
0035
1970 -75
1975 -80
1980 -85
1985 -90
1990 -95
1995 -00
2000 -05
EUROP E
1970 -75
1975 -80
1980 -85
1985 -90
1990 -95
1995 -00
2000 -05
0000
0000
0006
0003
0026
0029
0180
1970 -75
1975 -80
1980 -85
1985 -90
1990 -95
1995 -00
2000 -05
W ES T ERN
0008
0118
0038
0072
0058
0049
0276
0028
0002
0004
0007
0026
0052
0028
S OUT H EAS T
AS I A + OC EANI A
1970 -75
1975 -80
1980 -85
1985 -90
1990 -95
1995 -00
2000 -05
EUROPE
1970 -75 0 0 1 9
1975 -80 0 0 3 5
1980 -85 0 3 5 4
1985 -90 0 3 3 5
1990 -95 0 0 1 7
1995 -00 0 0 0 2
2 000-0 5 2,98 5
EASTERN
C E NT RA L ASIA
1970 -75 0 2 6 3
1975 -80 0 4 8 5
1 980-8 5 1,15 1
1985 -90 0 5 7 8
1990 -95 0 3 9 2
1995 -00 0 3 3 1
2 000-0 5 1,66 9
E AST +
1970 -75
1975 -80
1980 -85
1985 -90
1990 -95
1995 -00
2000 -05
AM ERI CA
0056
0148
0130
0329
0325
0813
0206
+ CARIBBEAN
1970 -75
1975 -80
1980 -85
1985 -90
1990 -95
1995 -00
2000 -05
NORT H
0095
0014
0070
0668
0479
0287
0304
S OUT H AS I A
LATIN AMERICA
1970 -75
1975 -80
1980 -85
1985 -90
1990 -95
1995 -00
2000 -05
A FR ICA
584
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 584
1/17/2007 7:12:26 PM
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 585
197 0-75
197 5-80
198 0-85
198 5-90
199 0-95
199 5-00
200 0-05
197 0-75
197 5-80
198 0-85
198 5-90
199 0-95
199 5-00
200 0-05
197 0-75
197 5-80
198 0-85
198 5-90
199 0-95
199 5-00
200 0-05
197 0-75
197 5-80
198 0-85
198 5-90
199 0-95
199 5-00
200 0-05
197 0-75
197 5-80
198 0-85
198 5-90
199 0-95
199 5-00
200 0-05
197 0-75
197 5-80
198 0-85
198 5-90
199 0-95
199 5-00
200 0-05
7
12
45
30
46
21
17
147
170
427
554
395
157
72
52
58
62
77
93
24
20
229
275
517
534
323
168
272
5
6
4
2
3
2
1
25
40
107
134
184
118
277
1d.
AN ARCHIST
GLOBALI ZAT I ON
ANT I -
C OM M UNI S T /
S OC I ALI S T
LEFT I S T
NAT I ONALI S T/
RELI GI OUS
C I T I ZENS +
FI GURES /
P ROP ERT Y
I NS T I T UT I ONS
RAC I S T
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90
1990-95
1995-00
2000-05
P RI VAT E
985
33
45
67
47
44
61
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90
1990-95
1995-00
2000-05
P OLI C E
862
33
58
139
135
50
28
JOURNALI S T S
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90
1990-95
1995-00
2000-05
4 ,4 2 0
57
59
87
51
74
292
NGO
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90
1990-95
1995-00
2000-05
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90
1990-95
1995-00
2000-05
307
3
12
43
67
67
72
+ M EDI A
2 ,1 7 1
4
2
12
11
17
74
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90
1990-95
1995-00
2000-05
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90
1990-95
1995-00
2000-05
GOVERN MEN T
538
19
40
55
33
32
55
4 ,0 0 0
28
36
33
26
36
99
D IPLOMATIC
197 0-75
197 5-80
198 0-85
198 5-90
199 0-95
199 5-00
200 0-05
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90
1990-95
1995-00
2000-05
2 ,5 5 8
512
572
530
386
195
242
B U SIN ESS
15
3
6
6
0
29
18
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90
1990-95
1995-00
2000-05
3 ,3 4 7
291
353
494
432
233
268
1 c.
S EPARAT I S T
RELI G I O U S
585
1/17/2007 7:12:27 PM
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 586
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90
1990-95
1995-00
2000-05
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90
1990-95
1995-00
2000-05
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90
1990-95
1995-00
2000-05
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90
1990-95
1995-00
2000-05
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90
1990-95
1995-00
2000-05
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90
1990-95
1995-00
2000-05
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90
1990-95
1995-00
2000-05
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90
1990-95
1995-00
2000-05
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90
1990-95
1995-00
2000-05
1 2 ,6 6 2
399
591
741
2 ,5 0 4
1 ,8 3 4
3 ,2 2 9
8 ,3 2 5
238
819
345
470
5 ,2 3 5
1 ,2 3 8
8 ,7 1 2
12
116
124
10
14
627
366
3
76
6
13
7
106
278
0
1
50
46
88
31
7 ,7 7 9
5
5
67
40
32
386
1 6 ,5 7 4
547
694
537
253
949
2 ,4 1 8
5 ,6 6 9
575
398
76
480
154
171
1 2 ,1 5 6
323
164
536
5 ,6 2 5
5 ,7 5 0
1 ,3 2 7
2 c.
B U SIN ESS
D IPL OMATIC
GOVERN MEN T
+ M EDI A
NGO
P OLI C E
P RI VAT E
RELI GI OUS
C I T I ZENS +
FI GURES /
P ROP ERT Y
I NS T I T UT I ONS
T RAN S P O RTAT I O N
586
1/17/2007 7:12:27 PM
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 587
197 0-75
197 5-80
198 0-85
198 5-90
199 0-95
199 5-00
200 0-05
197 0-75
197 5-80
198 0-85
198 5-90
199 0-95
199 5-00
200 0-05
197 0-75
197 5-80
198 0-85
198 5-90
199 0-95
199 5-00
200 0-05
197 0-75
197 5-80
198 0-85
198 5-90
199 0-95
199 5-00
200 0-05
197 0-75
197 5-80
198 0-85
198 5-90
199 0-95
199 5-00
200 0-05
197 0-75
197 5-80
198 0-85
198 5-90
199 0-95
199 5-00
200 0-05
197 0-75
197 5-80
198 0-85
198 5-90
199 0-95
199 5-00
200 0-05
197 0-75
197 5-80
198 0-85
198 5-90
199 0-95
199 5-00
200 0-05
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
3
3
1
4
5
2
150
130
163
157
181
120
32
15
28
26
5
30
13
4
430
271
1 , 0 33
795
366
403
1 , 1 40
4
0
1
1
0
0
0
11
13
446
354
536
818
4762
101
13
67
65
32
50
1
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90
1990-95
1995-00
2000-05
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90
1990-95
1995-00
2000-05
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90
1990-95
1995-00
2000-05
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90
1990-95
1995-00
2000-05
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90
1990-95
1995-00
2000-05
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90
1990-95
1995-00
2000-05
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90
1990-95
1995-00
2000-05
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90
1990-95
1995-00
2000-05
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90
1990-95
1995-00
2000-05
5 ,1 4 3
91
104
142
433
180
3 ,0 2 6
1 ,2 5 9
139
354
99
108
393
210
4 ,1 3 1
16
30
23
35
21
437
233
9
23
25
18
5
53
281
3
1
34
41
97
65
4 ,5 1 8
4
1
8
10
3
133
7 ,1 9 7
64
195
144
89
170
644
199
199
41
78
123
39
88
2 ,0 6 9
66
20
125
187
196
397
3 c.
B U SIN ESS
D IPLOMATIC
AN ARCHIST
GOVERN MEN T
GLOBAL IZATION
AN TI-
+ M EDI A
COMMUN IST /
NGO
SOCIAL IS T
LEFT I S T
P OLI C E
NAT I ONALI S T/
P RI VAT E
RELI GI OUS
C I T I ZENS +
FI GURES /
P ROP ERT Y
I NS T I T UT I ONS
RAC I S T
RELI GI OUS
T RAN S P O RTAT I O N
3 d.
IN TE RNATION AL
TER RO RISM FATA LI TI ES
S EPARAT I S T
OTH ER
587
1/17/2007 7:12:27 PM
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 588
197 0-75
197 5-80
198 0-85
198 5-90
199 0-95
199 5-00
200 0-05
197 0-75
197 5-80
198 0-85
198 5-90
199 0-95
199 5-00
200 0-05
197 0-75
197 5-80
198 0-85
198 5-90
199 0-95
199 5-00
200 0-05
197 0-75
197 5-80
198 0-85
198 5-90
199 0-95
199 5-00
200 0-05
197 0-75
197 5-80
198 0-85
198 5-90
199 0-95
199 5-00
200 0-05
197 0-75
197 5-80
198 0-85
198 5-90
199 0-95
199 5-00
200 0-05
197 0-75
197 5-80
198 0-85
198 5-90
199 0-95
199 5-00
200 0-05
197 0-75
197 5-80
198 0-85
198 5-90
199 0-95
199 5-00
200 0-05
7
1
2
1
0
0
0
4
19
3
51
9
1
5
479
382
1 , 0 05
779
311
166
206
27
30
82
47
80
3
29
697
1 , 1 52
2 , 7 00
1 , 9 44
1 , 4 77
3 , 4 08
4 , 1 69
20
0
26
16
1
3
0
33
35
530
569
6909
1 ,2 4 6 6
8104
77
104
114
310
1
29
10
2d .
AN ARCHIST
GL OBAL IZATION
AN TI-
C OM M UNI S T /
S OC I ALI S T
LEFT I S T
S EPARAT I S T
NAT I ONALI S T/
RAC I S T
RELI GI OUS
OTH ER
588
1/17/2007 7:12:27 PM
4.
B Y TAR G E T 2 0 0 5
B U SIN ESS
FATALITIES IN CID EN TS
DOM ES TI C I NC I DENTS A R E TH OS E
13
323
A G A I NS T A PU R ELY DOM ES TI C TA R G ET
242
D IP LOMATIC
24
60
E DUCATIO N AL INSTITUTIONS
62
184
F O O D OR WATER SUP P LY
0
1
G OVERN MEN T
1,221
1,161
73
86
M A RITIME
0
1
NGO
24
32
POLICE
2,713
1,166
1,873
898
9
20
T ERRO RISTS
40
34
T OURISTS
75
10
T R AN SP ORTATION
155
140
U T ILITIES
65
221
U NKN O W N
80
88
O TH ERS
726
351
589
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 589
1/17/2007 7:12:27 PM
5.
A L-M A N SORAIN
16
SUP P O RT + JIHAD
20
AL-QAEDA
21
A L-FATAH
21
33
HAMAS
21
183
23
BANGL ADESH
12
H IZ BU L M U JAHID EEN
31
C O M M U NIST PARTY
36
93
41
54
LIBE RAT IO N TIGERS
47
62
ISLA M I C ARMY
48
I N I RA Q
11
SO LDIERS OF
53
T H E PR O PH E T S C OM PAN ION S
SE C RE T OR G A NIZ ATION OF
56
A L Q A E DA IN E UROPE
A BU HAFS
56
A L-M A SR I BRIGAD E
LO R DS R E SISTANCE ARMY
65
(L RA)
13
R E VO LU T IO NARY A R M E D FORCES
90
O F COL OM BI A
61
C O M M U NIST PARTY
119
OF I NDI A
90
TALIBAN
202
100
318
42
190
590
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 590
1/17/2007 7:12:27 PM
6.
311
DOM ES TI C I NC I DENTS A R E TH OS E
F RONT ( MILF)
104
A NSAR ALLA H
236
A G A I NS T A PU R ELY DOM ES TI C TA R G ET
117
A L-GA M AA AL-ISLA M IYYA
242
( G AI)
138
L ASHK A R -E -TAIB A
276
( L E T)
152
M OVSA R BA RYAYE V GA NG
657
162
1000
( PI J )
193
A B U SAYYA F G R O U P
515
(ASG)
197
TAWH ID AN D JIHA D
200
219
453
248
A BU H A FS A L-M A SR I BR IGAD E
826
249
J E M AA H ISLA M IYA
699
( J I)
261
TALIB A N
320
402
908
494
A RM E D ISLA M IC G R O U P
259
506
1136
B RIGA DE
514
L OR DS R E SISTANC E AR MY
297
( L RA)
529
H AM A S
2892
H EZ BO LLA H
1538
A L-Q A E DA OR G A NIZ AT IO N
3071
IN TH E LAN D OF TW O RIVERS
1644
A L-Q A E DA
8863
595
838
3537
591
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 591
1/17/2007 7:12:28 PM
1.
94
122
EL S A LVA DOR
F I NL A ND
F R A NC E
TH E G A M B I A
G ER M A NY
G R EEC E
89
H U NG A RY
I NDONES I A
I S R A EL
97
I TA LY
JAMAICA
J A PA N
83
M A DA G A S C A R
M EXI C O
C OU NT R IE S H AVING SIGN ED 0
TH E NETH ER L A NDS
A NT I HU M AN-T R A FFIC K IN G
NI G ER I A
C ONVE NT IO NS
NOR WAY
M YAN MAR
AF GHANI STAN
A R G ENTI NA
PA NA M A
E A ST TIMOR
AL GE RI A
A U S TR I A
PER U
H ON G KON G
ANGOL A
A ZER B A I J A N
PH I L I PPI NES
N O RTH KO REA
BAHRAI N
B EL G I U M
POL A ND
S OMALIA
I RAN
B ENI N
PORTU G A L
TA IWAN
I RA Q
B R A ZI L
R OM A NI A
TA J IKISTAN
KUWAI T
BULGARIA
S ENEG A L
L AOS
C A M ER OON
S PA I N
M AL AY SI A
C A NA DA
S R I L A NK A
QATA R
CHILE
S W EDEN
C OL OM B I A
S W I TZER L A ND
UZBEKI STAN
C OS TA R I C A
U K R A I NE
Y EM EN
DENM A R K
U NI TED K I NG DOM
ZI M BABWE
EC U A DOR
592
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 592
1/17/2007 7:12:28 PM
I N TO TAL # O F CO UN TRIES
I N TOTA L # OF C OU NTR I ES
88 SOU R C E
86 T R A NSIT
90 DE ST INAT IO N
2 b.
2a .
3.
TH E T IERS + PLACEMEN TS
PL A C EM ENTS T I ER 1:
PL A C EM ENTS T I ER 2:
A U S TR A L I A
A F G H A NI S TA N
G U YA NA
A U S TR I A
A L B A NI A
H ONDU R A S
B EL G I U M
A L G ER I A
H U NG A RY
A C T S M INIM U M STA NDARD S, BUT ARE MAKIN G SIGN IF ICAN T EF FORT S T O BRI NG
C A NA DA
A NG OL A
I NDONES I A
C OL OM B I A
A R G ENTI NA
IRAN
C ZEC H R EPU B L I C
B A NG L A DES H
I S R A EL
DENM A R K
B EL A R U S
J A PA N
WIT H T H E A C T S M INIM UN STAN DARD S, BUT ARE MAKIN G SIGN IF ICANT EFFORT S
F R A NC E
B OS NI A /H ER ZEG OV I NA
K A ZA K H S TA N
G ER M A NY
B R A ZI L
K ENYA
H ONG K ONG
BULGARIA
K Y R G Y Z R EPU B LIC
I TA LY
B U R K I NA FA S O
S ENEG A L
L I TH U A NI A
B U R U NDI
S ER B I A -M ONTEN E G R O
S EVERE FORMS O F TRAFFI CKI NG I N PE RSONS F ROM THE PRE V I OUS Y EAR ; OR
L U XEM B OU R G
CHAD
S I NG A POR E
M OR OC C O
CHILE
S L OV ENI A
NEPA L
C ONG O (DR C )
S R I L A NK A
TH E NETH ER L A NDS
C OS TA R I C A
S W I TZER L A ND
N EX T YEAR
NEW ZEA L A ND
C OTE D I V OI R E
SYRIA
NOR WAY
C R OATI A
TAI WAN
POL A ND
C Y PR U S
TA J I K I S TA N
PORTU G A L
EA S T TI M OR
TA NZA NI A
S OU TH K OR EA
EG Y PT
TH A I L A ND
S PA I N
EL S A LVA DOR
TU R K EY
S W EDEN
U G A NDA
U NI TED K I NG DOM
ES TONI A
U R U G U AY
ETH I OPI A
V I ETNA M
F I NL A ND
Y EM EN
G A B ON
ZA M B I A
G EOR G I A
G H A NA
G U ATEM A L A
593
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 593
1/17/2007 7:12:28 PM
IL L IC IT DR U G PR ODU C TION :
OP I U M + C OCAI NE
P RODU C TI ON LEV ELS
I N HEC TARES
4a.
500
450
300,000
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
ECUAD OR
B E N IN
J AMAICA
C A MEROO N
KUWAIT
C HINA ( P RC)
N ORTH KOREA
QATAR
T HE G AMBIA
SAUD I ARABIA
G R EECE
SUDAN
G U IN EA
TOGO
H A ITI
I N DIA
VEN EZUEL A
M A URITIUS
158,000
195,940
153,800
170,300
180.172
210,900
142,094
221,300
221,952
220,600
216,204
190,800
237,819
194,000
168,600
2004
B E LIZE
500
2003
CUBA
2002
CAMBOD IA
B A H RAIN
2001
MYAN MAR
A ZERBAIJ AN
2000
BOL IVIA
A RMENIA
1999
WAT C HLIST :
1998
PLACEMENTS T IE R 2
1997
251,819
0.0
500
IL L IC IT DR U G PR ODU C TION :
M ETHAM P HETAM I NE +
# OF LABS
4 b.
450
12000
450
10000
20
8000
16
6000
12
4000
2000
M EX ICO
N ICARAG UA
N IG ER
1
11
10
MYA N MA R 2 0 0 3
P H IL I PP IN ES 20 0 3
TA IWA N 2 0 03
G E RM AN Y 20 0 2
13
CH I N A 2 0 0 2
7
C A MB O DI A 20 0 3
S LO VA K I A 2 0 0 3
17
M EX IC O 2 0 0 3
L IT H UA N I A 2 0 0 3
14
CA N A D A 2 0 0 3
U K RAIN E
S URIN AME
A F R IC A 2 0 0 2
S OUTH AFRICA
188
C Z E C H R E P U BL I C 2 0 0 3
S IERRA LEO N E
201
R WAND A
0.0
N E W Z E A L AN D 2 0 0 3
R USSIA
PH ILIP P INES
U Z BEKISTAN
Z I M BABW E
594
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 594
1/17/2007 7:12:28 PM
500
450
AVE RAGE
CO RR UPTION P ERC EP TI ON
5.
IND EX CPI
10
2005
1.9
155 . H A IT I
1.8
156 . M YANM A R
1.8
157 . T U RK M E NISTAN
1.8
159 . BA NGLADE SH
1.7
160 . C HA D
1.7
9.6
0 3 . NEW ZEALAND
9.6
0 4 . DENM ARK
9.5
0 5 . S I NGAP ORE
9.4
0 6 . S W EDEN
9.2
0 7 . S W I T ZERLAND
9.1
0 8 . NOR WAY
8.9
0 9 . AUS T RALI A
8.8
1 0 . AUS T RI A
8.7
2.5
2.8
2.8
3.2
8.0
8.5
4.2
4.8
3.5
3.9
5.3
5.4
9.7
0 2 . FI NLAND
S OUT H AS I A
1.9
S UB -S AHARAN
2.0
152 . C OT E DIVOIR E
NORT H AM ERI CA
2.1
151 . ANGO LA
15 0 . TAJIK ISTAN
S CO R E ( 0 - 1 0 ) 2 0 0 5
C OR R U PT ION PE RC E PT IO N IN D EX
EAS T AS I A + PAC I FI C
4.6
0 1 . I C ELAND
WORLD s
10 MO ST C ORR U P T LEADERS
6.
N AME
P OS I T I ON
FUNDS EM BEZZLED 2
MOHAMED SUHARTO
PR ES I DENT OF I NDONES I A (1 9 6 7 1 9 9 8 )
$ 1 5 3 5 B I L L I ON
F ERD IN AN D MARCOS
$ $5 1 0 B I L L I ON
PR ES I DENT OF ZA I R E (1 9 6 5 1 9 9 7 )
SAN I ABACHA
PR ES I DENT OF NI G ER I A (1 9 9 3 1 9 9 8 )
$ 05 $
5 B I L L I ON
$ $2 5 B I L L I ON
PR ES I DENT OF S ER B I A /Y U G OS L AV I A (1 9 8 9 2 0 0 0 ) $ 1 5 31 B I L L I ON
PR ES I DENT OF H A I TI (1 9 7 1 1 9 8 6 )
PR ES I DENT OF PER U (1 9 9 0 2 0 0 0 )
3 0 0 6 0 0 M I L L I ON
PAVL O LAZAREN KO
PR I M E M I NI S TER OF U K R A I NE (1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 )
1 1 4 2 0 0 M I L L I ON
PR ES I DENT OF NI C A R A G U A (1 9 9 7 2 0 0 2 )
3 0 0 1 0 0 M I L L I ON
JOSEPH ESTRADA
3 0 0 8 0 0 M I L L I ON
7 8 8 0 M I L L I ON
595
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 595
1/17/2007 7:12:29 PM
P I RAC Y
levels around the world 2001 - kazaa media desktop application usage (more music piracy) - pirated product
containment rates for dvd and home-video markets in select countries
1.
A C T IONS TA K E N
G U ILTY P LEAS/CO N VICTIO NS
1,250
S IG H T SEIZURES
5,388
A RRESTS/IN D ICTMEN TS
3,904
1,367
1000 0
B O OT LE G SE IZ U RE S
V I DEOS
3,164
C D- Rs
29,707
C Ds
1,259
C A SSETTES
4,607
10000
1,024,108
C D- Rs
5,109,926
C Ds
785,314
C A SSETTES
118,313
10000
2.
AFRICA
ASIA/PACIF IC
EAST +
LAT I N AM ERI CA
M I DDLE EAS T
M I DDLE EAS T/
NORT H AM ERI CA
EUROP E
0 .7 7
0 .7 4
0 .7 0
0 .6 0
0 .5 8
0 .5 6
0 .5 2
0 .5 4
0 .4 8
0 .6 8
0 .6 4
0 .5 5
0 .5 2
0 .4 9
0 .4 7
0 .5 1
0 .5 4
0 .5 5
0 .6 8
0 .6 4
0 .5 5
0 .5 2
0 .4 9
0 .4 7
0 .5 1
0 .5 4
0 .5 5
0 .7 8
0 .7 6
0 .6 9
0 .6 4
0 .6 2
0 .5 9
0 .5 8
0 .5 7
0 .5 5
0 .8 4
0 .8 3
0 .7 9
0 .7 2
0 .6 9
0 .6 3
0 .5 7
0 .5 0
0 .5 0
0 .8 0
0 .7 8
0 .7 4
0 .6 5
0 .6 3
0 .6 0
0 .5 5
0 .5 2
0 .4 9
0 .3 2
0 .2 7
0 .2 8
0 .2 8
0 .2 6
0 .2 6
0 .2 5
0 .2 6
0 .2 4
0 .5 2
0 .4 9
0 .4 3
0 .3 9
0 .3 6
0 .3 4
0 .3 4
0 .3 7
0 .3 5
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2001
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2001
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2001
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2001
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2001
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2001
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2001
AFRI CA
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2001
596
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 596
1/17/2007 7:12:29 PM
3.
2001 I N U NI TS
OVER 5 0%
2 5 5 0%
1 0 2 5%
N ORTH AMERICA
LES S T HEN 1 0 %
C A NA DA
U NI TED S TATES
EUROPE
BUL G A R I A
C Y PR U S
C R OATI A
A U S TR I A
CI S (OTH ER )
C ZEC H R EPU B L I C
F I NL A ND
B EL G I U M
EST ONI A
I TA LY
H U NG A RY
DENM A R K
GREEC E
POL A ND
NETH ER L A NDS
F R A NC E
L ATV I A
S L OVA K I A
S L OV ENI A
G ER M A NY
L I THU A NI A
S PA I N
TU R K EY
I C EL A ND
ROMA NI A
I R EL A ND
R USS I A
NOR WAY
UKRA I NE
PORTU G A L
S W EDEN
S W I TZER L A ND
U NI TED K I NG DOM
ASIA
L ATIN AMERICA
CHI NA
I NDI A
H ONG K ONG
I NDONES I A
PH I L I PPI NES
S I NG A POR E
M AL AY S I A
TA I WA N
S OU TH K OR EA
PAKIS TA N
TH A I L A ND
BOL IV I A
A R G ENTI NA
BRAZ I L
CHILE
CENT R A L A M ER I C A
U R U G U AY
J A PA N
COL O M B I A
ECUA DOR
M EXI C O
PARA G U AY
PER U
V ENE ZU EL A
AUSTRAL IA
A U S TR A L I A
NEW ZEA L A ND
MID D L E EAST
EGY PT
I S R A EL
BAHRAIN
K U WA I T
OM A N
L EB A NON
QATAR
U NI TED A R A B EM I R ATES
S A U DI A R A B I A
W OR LD
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2001
0 .4 9
0 .4 6
0 .4 3
0 .4 0
0 .3 8
0 .3 6
0 .3 7
0 .4 0
0 .3 9
AFRICA
KE NYA
G H A NA
NI GE R I A
S OU TH A F R I C A
ZI M B A B W E
597
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 597
1/17/2007 7:12:29 PM
500
2 0 ,0 0 0
2 1 ,3 3 3
2 4 ,8 3 3
2 5 ,6 6 7
2 6 ,0 0 0
3 0 ,3 3 3
3 1 ,0 0 0
3 3 ,3 3 3
3 5 ,0 0 0
3 4 ,5 0 0
3 3 ,8 3 3
3 3 ,2 9 0
3 2 ,0 0 0
3 2 ,5 0 0
3 1 ,8 3 3
I N # OF U NI QU E U S ER S
450
36000
34000
9 /8 /0 3 -R I A A
32000
F I L ES L AW S U I TS
30000
6 /2 5 /0 3 -R I A A
28000
A NNOU NC ES I T I S
26000
PR EPA R I NG TO S U E
24000
P2 P U S ER S
A G A I NS T P2 P U S ER S
22000
20000
FEB-0 3
JAN-0 3
DEC -0 3
NOV-0 3
OC T-0 3
S EP -0 3
AUG-0 3
JUL-0 3
JUN-0 3
M AY-0 3
AP R-0 3
M AR-0 3
FEB-0 3
DEC -0 2
PIR ATED
PRO DUCT
C ON TAINMENT
RATES FO R
D VD + HOME- VI DEO
MA RKETS
5.
JAN-0 3
18000
AS I A
PA K I S TA N
9 5%
+ 5%
C H I NA
9 1%
+ 1%
I NDONES I A
9 0%
PH I L I PPI NES
8 0%
M A L AY S I A
7 5%
+ 5%
L AT I N AM ERI CA
C OL OM B I A
9 0%
PA R A G U AY
8 0%
V ENEZU EL A
6 5%
DOM I N I C A N R EPU B L I C
6 0%
G U ATEM A L A
6 0%
+ 5%
EUROP E
B OS NI A
9 5%
U K R A I NE
9 0%
+ 5%
RUSSIA
8 0%
TU R K EY
4 5%
A U S TR I A
2 5%
+ 5%
+ 5%
C Y PR U S
2 5%
F I NL A ND
2 0%
G ER M A NY
2 0%
+ 5%
M I DDLE EAS T
K U WA I T
9 5%
J OR DA N
8 0%
L EB A NON
7 0%
+ 5%
598
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 598
1/17/2007 7:12:29 PM
in the developing world (80%) were either undemocratic regimes or governments with
refer to small portable weapons, such as rifles, carbines, pistols, etc., or larger equipment
such as tanks, helicopters, and ships. Today, the arms trade permeates national borders, linking distant economies in tight association, all the while functioning as a major
Levels of military expenditures vary by region depending on ability to spend and the politi-
worldwide business currently estimated at more than $25 billion each year (Acton, 2006).
The proliferation of arms does not necessarily cause conflict, but it makes conflict
USD) almost doubled those of Europe, and almost tripled those of Asia and Oceana (SI-
PRI, 2005). Military expenditures in the Middle East and Africa were the lowest: $56.1
billion and $12.6 billion respectively (SIPRI, 2005). However, if military expenditures
W HAT D O W E K N OW AB O UT A R M S A N D W H AT A R E T H E I S S UE S ?
are measured in relation to gross domestic product (GDP), Middle Eastern countries,
The sales of arms are dominated by a handful of large companies. In 2003, Lockheed
such as Jordan and Oman, and Eritrea in North Africa, spend the most proportionately
Martin, Boeing, and Northrop Grumman were the top three arms-producing compa-
on their militaries. In fact, all of the top 15 countries that spend the highest percentage
of their GDP on the military are located in the Middle East or Africa (CIA, 2004). The
$72,000 million. Halliburton was the 12 th largest arms-producing company and had
the largest US Department of Defense contract in Iraq from 2002 through 2004 of over
bate tensions and suspicions between countries in the West, the Middle East and Asia.
Similarly, the expansion of military presence by the US in regions such as the Middle
Germany and China decreased their agreements drastically from the periods between
East and Latin America under the auspices of spreading hope, freedom, democracy, and
1997-2000 and 2001-2004. China, India, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel are the nations
that receive the most agreements in terms of value (Grimmett, 2005). As a region, Asia
alone received 41% of worldwide arms transfers between 2001 and 2004, and Europe
received about 26.6% (Grimmett, 2005). Between 1997 and 2000, the United Arab
Emirates received the most arms transfer agreements and from 2001 and 2004, China
was the main recipient. Despite the fact that the United States military expenditure
was over two and a half times that of China in 2004, the size of Chinese armed forces
was over one and a half times larger than that of the US (IISS, 2003).
The arms trade is lucrative and associated with the persistence of regional and global
power relations on the one hand, and patterns of poverty and underdevelopment on the
other. Approximately 7 to 8 million pieces of arms are produced each year worldwide,
most of which are made in the US, Russia, and China (UNDP, 2005). A majority of small
arms enter the market legally, and most foreign arms sales are targeted to developing
nations. The developing world spends approximately $20 billion USD a year on arms
(Acton, 2006). In 2004, the value of arms deliveries to developing nations was close to
$22.5 billion (Grimmett, 2005). The US and Russia accounted for over 58% of all arms
transfer agreements with developing nations from 1997 to 2004 (Grimmett, 2005). The
US primarily has its arms agreements with the Near East and Asia; Russia has most
number of agreements (82%) with Asia (Grimmett, 2005). From 1997 to 2004, the US,
Russia and France were the three countries with the most arms transfer agreements
with developing nations; and India, China and the United Arab Emirates were the leading developing nation recipients of arms transfer agreements (Grimmett, 2005).
For areas in persistent conflict, small wars have become income generators, ways to
provide employment for individuals (many of whom are children) who have few options for making money. In these conflicts today, small arms, such as machine guns,
handguns, and assault rifles are increasingly used and it is estimated that they kill half
a million people a year on average (one person per minute) (UNDP, 2005). Small arms
are the weapons of choice for new conflicts and are responsible for the ballooning
death rates, especially amongst civilian non-combatants, commonly associated with
current conflicts. It is estimated that light weapons were the only arms used in 46 out
of 49 major conflicts globally during the 1990s, and that civilian deaths accounted for
80 to 90% of parties killed in conflicts (compared with the 5% rate of civilian death
during World War I) (Klare, 1999).
Some governments have recently begun monitoring the small arms trade. For instance,
in 1998, many arms importing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa signed the Moratorium
on the Import, Export and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa,
which was the worlds first regional moratorium on small arms. Other regions have also
initiated monitoring and control programs, but these established agreements are often
not legally binding and inconsistent across regions.
While arms sales are monitored by exporting countries, arms often end up in the hands
of brutal and oppressive regimes. For example, in 2003, 20 of the top 25 U.S. arms clients
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operations respectively in each. Other operations occurred at that time in nations such
as Haiti, Ivory Coast, Kosovo, Burundi and East Timor, among others. In 2004, UN troop
that emphasizes collective responsibility for a world of peace and prosperity. This link
strength reached an all time high of 64,720 people. In 2005, most UN peacekeeping
is expressed clearly in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and more recently in
the 2005 United Nations Human Development Report, which focused on the role of the
international community in times of conflict and war: The rights violated by conflict
WH AT A R E TH E IS S UES ?
are universal human rights that the entire international community has a moral and
gagement and adequate resources for building and strengthening state and civil society
institutions. When peace settlements are reached, there are traditionally short-term
This statement, however, overlooks the longstanding tension between upholding uni-
surges of humanitarian aid, which then disappear and are rarely replenished. Conflict
fact, governments and other stakeholders disagree on how to balance both principles,
countries can exacerbate conflicts if they favor one party or are insensitive to cultural
and on just how much and in what capacity intervention is warranted and appropriate.
intricacies and histories (see the relevant chapters by Viejo Rose; Nelson, Carver and
Some argue that too much intervention represents imposition of outside culture, values,
Kaboolian; and Thompson). Furthermore, the work of outside and local civil society
and norms on specific countries or regions that are typically poor and often struggling.
organizations are hindered by limited capacity and resources. While there has been a
By contrast, too little engagement could amount to willful neglect in the face of more
growth of INGOs and NGOs that organize peacekeeping activities, very few actually go
conflict and violence than could be the case otherwise, with Rwanda in the 1990s and
divide of conservatives and reformists amongst member states who believe the institu-
flicts are resolved. A successful and lasting resolution satisfies each partys and
tion itself is a liability for peacekeeping around the world (Falk, 2006). The legitimacy
stakeholders interests, and addresses their needs as well as underlying concerns and
of the UN is further questioned when it fails to penalize members states that violate its
conventions or fail to pay their dues (i.e., as is the case with the United States). The
arbitration, or litigation. All methods require third party intervention, but each arrives
public generally sees the UNs successes and failures mainly in relation to peace and
security issues (Falk, 2002); thus, the ability of the UN to adequately provide peace
a third party, mediation signifies an attempt by the parties to reach some common
monitoring and promotion can be further crippled when public opinion views UN efforts
agreement with the guidance, but not the decision-making, by a third party. Negotiation is
as failures, as seen throughout the 1990s with Bosnia and Rwanda, and more recently
in Darfur.
as a social and organizational tool, which can be managed for more beneficial and
progressive outcomes.
Although the number of conflicts worldwide has decreased, the intensity has increased,
as demonstrated in the Current Conflicts suite. Newer weaponry, greater availability
The UN was established in 1945 to promote international peace and security. The orga-
of small arms, and the use of communication technology in financing armed conflict
endanger the livelihoods and rights of civilians caught by violence. Such situations are
cause for reform to bring the international system of conflict prevention, management
and humanitarian problems and in promoting respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms; and to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in attaining these
ends. (http://www.un.org/aboutun/basicfacts/unorg.htm). Since the initiation of the
UN collective security system, established after the Second World War, the intensity,
T h e C a r t e r C e n t e r, t h e C e n t e r f o r C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , a n d S a f e r Wo r l d a r e t h r e e
magnitude, and scope of interstate wars has declined. What is more, after the Cold
War, the role of the UN as a peacekeeper increased, albeit frequently without adequate
material and human resources commensurate to the typically complex tasks involved.
WHAT D O W E K N OW AB O UT C O N F L I C T R E S O L UT I O N A N D P E A C E K EEP ING ?
There has been a slow growth in peacekeeping efforts and numbers of peacekeeping
organizations since 2000. As noted in the Current Conflicts, Issues, and Tensions suite,
conventional wars have decreased over the past years, whereas other types of conflicts
have increased in prevalence. The numbers of different types of peacekeeping and
building organizations have been steadily increasing and have fluctuated since 1990
based on this global need. Between 1996 and 1998, for example, there was a spike
in organizations that focused on disarmament. During this time, the numbers of UN
troops dropped from about 25,000 to about 14,300 (United Nations Peace Operations).
Between 2001 and 2002, all peacekeeping and building organizations saw an increase
in numberswhereas there were 37 peacekeeping organizations in 1990, there were
close to 300 in 2004.
Since the middle of the 1990s, when the UN carried out the majority of peace missions
globally, the number of UN missions has been decreasing, and regional organizations
and alliances now account for most of the peace missions executed worldwide (29
missions compared to the UNs 21) (SIPRI, 2005).
In 2004, UN peacekeeping operations were focused in the Congo and Liberia, as African
countries typically have very low peace-building capacity, with over 18,500 and 17,500
600
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mination (Marshall and Gurr, 2005). These developments have encouraged minorities
positive trends in global conflict have been counter-balanced by negative trends that
to seek political, human, and social rights from their countries and have perhaps con-
pose obstacles for peace. While major armed conflicts have decreased in prevalence,
tributed to the decline in instances of conflict over recent years. In 2005, almost half
other types of violence are rising, in particular the so-called New Wars (Kaldor, 1999)
as many states had official policies of political discrimination against specific ethnic
that include complex civil wars and conflicts associated with the trauma and legacy
of weak states.
declined from over 31% of states to 13.7% (Marshall and Gurr, 2005). Remedial policies
to confront entrenched discrimination have also increased substantially around the
Armed conflict remains one of the largest obstacles to human development; it violates
world since 1955 (Marshall and Gurr, 2005). In places like North Africa and the Middle
the right of people to both life and security (UNDP, 2005). Border disputes, competition,
East, however, there has been little movement towards remedial policies or actions for
ethnic and religious tensions, economic inequalities, intervention, natural resources, de-
marginalized groups.
mographic changes and migrations, historically entrenched values, identity conflicts, and
economic and political shiftsall contribute to the prevalence of violent and prolonged
As the world becomes increasingly violent conflicts, once local, are becoming transnational.
conflict within nations. The lack of stable institutions, corruption, and other structural
Increased movements of assets and people, the flow of communication, global diasporas,
and cultural factors exacerbate tensions and pose challenges to poor countries strug-
and other forms of interconnectedness have created situations in which conflicts are played
out on a global stage. Migration, in particular, can potentially create conflict that can be
exploited by political entrepreneurs and instrumentalizedwhich poses both opportunities
Almost three times as many conflict-related deaths occurred in the 20 th century than
for resolution and barriers that further fragment communities and cultures (see chapters
in the previous four centuries combined (UNDP, 2005). Since the end of the Cold War,
on migration).
however, there has been an overall decline in armed conflict, including ethno-national
wars for independence, interstate wars, and repression of ethnic minorities (Peace and
Whereas globalization is seen by some as a powerful tool for unity, progress and devel-
Conflict, 2005). By 2004, the general magnitude of global welfare decreased by over 60
opment, others see it as a hegemonic process that promotes a single cultural and eco-
percent since it reached a high in the mid-1980s (Marshall and Gurr, 2005).
nomic model (see chapter by Achugar). In this view, tensions based on unequal distribution of economic and cultural production fuel conflicts (between the North and the
Although the number of conflicts has declined, recent conflicts have yielded larger
South, or the Arab and Western worlds for instance). Economic and political inequities
numbers of fatalities and more prolonged fighting; for instance, in the Western Sudan
resulting from globalization can cause cultural conflict. As Crawford explains in her
region of Darfur and Rwanda (UNDP, 2005). Moreover, internal conflicts have become
chapter, liberal democracies can lessen cultural conflict through certain institutions
more prevalent than interstate conflicts. In fact, there were over four times as many in-
and electoral systems, whereas illiberal democracies make cultural conflict worse.
ternal conflicts in 2004 than there were in 1946, whereas, interstate conflict decreased
by almost half during this time (PRIO, 2005).
Ideological and perceptual schisms exist on global levels, based on identities, histories,
values, and emotions. Global media sources and academia highlight these divisions,
Globally, since 1990, more than 3 million people have died in armed conflicts, and most
perhaps exacerbating and entrenching them in different regions cultural psyches. Govern-
of these deaths have occurred in the worlds poorest countries in Africa and Asia (UNDP,
ments can actively oppose the influx of outside culture and influence. Mega identities
2005). Between 1990 and 2003, almost 40% of the worlds conflicts were in Africa
(see chapter by Corm) link politics with religion and cultural values, and promote mis-
(UNDP, 2005). In Zaire/Congo alone, 1.5 million deaths were tallied in ongoing conflicts
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HUMAN RIGHTS At the most fundamental level, human rights are inalienable
issue today is the abuse of powers and human rights injustices by governments in the
rights closely intertwined with the rule of law. More concretely, human rights are linked
name of national security. The 2006 Annual Report by Amnesty International sees the
justice; and thus, inextricably tied to instances of political, economic and socio-cultural
a leading cause of human rights abuses today. Similarly, in its 2006 report, Human
conflict. The juxtaposition of these issues highlights the delicate balance necessary in
Rights Watch critically points to the hypocrisy factor (Human Rights Watch, 2006) of
a globalizing world to maintain and protect rights in the name of human dignity, equality
the US government and some of its allies in de facto undermining efforts to improve the
and preservation.
What are currently known as human rights have undergone years of elaboration to
due process, other governments may well feel encouraged to engage in actions that
themselves violate the Convention on Human Rights and the Geneva Convention.
around the world. Today, there are seven core UN treaties and six supplementals that
signatory countries must abide by. Together, these treaties define human rights as
The competing priorities of governments underscore the reality that human rights often
are secondary to political and economic interests. Yet no one country or government,
especially those in positions of great power and influence, can afford to bend the rules
All humans are born free and equal in dignity and rights
Human rights bare no "distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth
or other status".
and still maintain a peaceful and respectful presence in the world or in the processes
that foster democracy and justice. In this light, the diminishing credibility of leading
nations could become a growing hindrance to the promotion of human rights in the
world today.
The right to life, liberty and security of person is a right essential to the enjoyment
What is more, the capacity of international governing bodies to enforce human rights
conventions has come into question over the last few years. Many CSOs are calling
for a reform of the UN system to increase international oversight of human rights, and
Ever since the struggle for human rights began, there has been widespread growth
enhance the legal capacity for implementing and enforcing human rights legislation.
of related rights movements that prominently include the workers and womens
movement, and also movements protecting the rights of children, migrants and refugees,
this process. CSOs are also demanding that, in a globalizing world, attention should
indigenous peoples, religions, cultural heritage and traditions, the elderly and disabled,
shift from an exclusive focus on state actors to private actors as violators of human
and more recently, the rights for those living with HIV/AIDS. These movements have
gained momentum and significance through the identification of human rights (i.e.,
womens rights as human rights) thus leading to further action by international
governing bodies like the UN or the EU to enact conventions that address these
individual issues.
WHAT D O W E K N OW AB O UT H UM A N R I G H T S ?
A recent study as part of the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset, which compared
levels and types of rights among regions, found that Oceania leads the world in
providing physical integrity rights to their populations, based on rights surrounding
torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearances (CIRI, 2004).
Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America offer the least physical integrity rights,
but have scored higher ranks in recent years, compared to the past (CIRI, 2004).
Between 2000 and 2004, rights in North America decreased (CIRI, 2004). The Middle
East was the only region that saw an increase in empowerment rights of movement,
speech, workers rights, religion, and political participation, between 2000 and 2004; all
other regions registered declines in such freedoms (CIRI, 2004). According to the study,
the US had the highest score (10 or a possible 10) on the empowerment rights index in
2000, but fell to 9.5 in 2004 (CIRI, 2004).
In terms of womens economic, social, and political rights, North America and Latin
America were some of the freest regions, while the Middle East, followed by Africa and
then Europe registered lower degrees of womens rights (CIRI, 2004). Importantly, 183
nations have signed the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
against Women (Division for the Advancement of Women http://www.un.org/
womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm).
A variety of civil society organizations (CSOs) worldwide address human rights issues,
with Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch among the most prominent and
vocal; many other CSOs focus on gender issues and civil rights in local and regional
contexts, e.g., the situation of Sinti and Roma in Central and Eastern Europe. Overall,
Europe has the highest numbers of human rights CSOs, and the Middle East and
Oceania have the lowest (One World Partners, 2004).
WHAT ARE THE ISSU E S ?
In light of current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and ongoing conflicts in many
developing nations (i.e., Sudan, Nepal, the Congo and Zimbabwe), the most salient
602
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st
century, although
its targets and their allies, and making individuals unsure about their personal safety.
in terms of a global average, the probability of being killed in a terrorist attack is very
In public opinion polls from developed countries, it is evident that most people feel
low. Much of the power of terrorism lies in its ability to evoke fear, causing not only
that the world is less safe than during the Cold War, due primarily to threat of terrorist
economic and political problems, but also cultural, social and psychological ones. In-
attacks (UNDP, 2005). While some of these fears are founded, a distinct culture of fear
deed, while terrorism may not cause numerous deaths at one time (unless perpetrated
has evolved around safety and terrorism that perpetuates cultural misconceptions and
by larger state actors), it is associated with significant psychological trauma that im-
misunderstanding.
that emphasizes a focus on the organization of terrorist groups rather than attacking
that recent terrorism attacks signify the existence of a great global divide, or clash of
the causes of terror itself. The war so far includes: the Afghan war of 2001; the Iraq
civilizations to use Huntingtons term, others see the acts as representative of ingrained
war of 2003; a search for weapons of mass destruction; a massive shift in spending
WHAT IS TE RRORISM?
According to Marshall and Gurr (2005), terrorism is a type of political violence that
targets civilian, non-combatant populations, which includes both repressive and expressive forms. Repressive terrorism is employed by authorities to enforce order from
above, whereas expressive terrorism is used by constituents against authority or symbols
of authority. Terrorism is a personalized, one-sided application of violent force, which
is unique because of its huge perceptual impact.
WHAT D O W E K N OW AB O UT T E R R O R I S M ?
From 2003 to 2005, terrorism accounted for approximately 20,000 deaths (mostly civilian)
worldwide (UNDP, 2005). According to the Terrorism Knowledge Base (2006), on which
the data in the balance of this section are based, terrorism is concentrated in the
Middle East, South Asia, Europe, and parts of Latin America. Developed countries are
more likely to be targets of terrorism, but are less likely to experience great numbers
of deaths from each incident. North America saw a decline in terrorism between the
1970s and 2000, and spikes in the mid 1990s, and in 2001, as evident by the events of
September 11, 2001, and other recent attacks. Rates of terrorism and related injuries
and deaths have increased in Eastern Europe and the Middle East since the 1970s. In
2005, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia were the
terrorist groups that caused the most fatalities.
International terrorism, a highly visible form of terrorism, has increased since the
1970s with the Bader-Meinhof Gang in Germany (attack on the West German embassy
in Stockholm), the IRA (attacks in London), and Middle Eastern groups (e.g., hijacking of
airplanes) as early prime examples of terrorists crossing national boundaries to further
their cause. Terrorism by religious, nationalist, separatist and anti-globalization groups
has increased significantly since 1970, whereas violence by groups based around issues of race, communism or socialist ideals has decreased significantly.
Bombings, armed attacks and kidnappings are the leading forms of international terrorism; and account for the most injuries and fatalities caused by terrorism worldwide.
By contrast, local assassinations, barricading, hostage taking, and hijackings have
declined in recent years. Most international terrorism is directed towards businesses,
diplomatic targets, or private citizens and property.
WHAT ARE THE ISSU E S ?
International terrorism has traditionally represented only a small portion of global terrorism. In fact, over 90 percent of terror incidents before September 11, 2001 were
carried out nationally (Marshall and Gurr, 2005). Despite the relatively low frequency of
international terrorist acts, their visibility and salience on the world stage suggest that
they represent focal events crystallizing larger underlying issues, divisions, and trends.
Both international and other acts of terrorism are often used as statements about perceived injustice in terms of poverty, underdevelopment, unequal resource distribution,
cultural and political oppression, or weak and absent governance institutions (Marshall
and Gurr, 2005). International terrorism can also be understood as a specific reaction
against globalization that may be perceived as an imposition of a dominant Western
system on local cultures.
Thanks to the recent penetration and expansion of communication technologies, terrorism is broadcast around the world, making its power exponential by instilling fear in
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WH AT A R E TH E IS S UES ?
The main challenge in combating transnational crime is developing effective legal sys-
among law enforcement agencies, better surveillance tools, and the emergence of civil
tems that can help build democratic societies based on the rule of law-and to do so in a
way that promotes collaboration. Standards and norms, however, vary widely. The crime
of piracy, for example, reveals the challenges to existing legal systems. Litigation sur-
Broadly defined, corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain
rounding online music share pages has curbed usage. In the first nine months after the
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) announced its 2003 lawsuit against
the peer-to-peer file sharing application KaZaa, the numbers of unique users of the
giving/receiving bribes.
site dropped by 43 percent (Pew Internet Project & comScore, 2004). Nevertheless, while
recording associations, software companies, and individuals have sued some illegal
which are protected by intellectual property rights such as software, music, books,
and videos, even information. We mainly refer to it here in its software and
campaign in all countries around the world is next to impossible. What is more, coun-
music incarnations.
tries have different conceptions of intellectual property and property rights. Therefore,
Human Trafficking refers to the smuggling of migrants and the trafficking of human
controlling piracy is not simply a matter of deciding whether to use incentives or repri-
mands or how to adapt to new technologies. Rather, it involves the fundamental debate
surrounding intellectual property, property rights, and freedom of the individual.
WHAT W E K N OW ABOU T T R A N S N AT I O N A L C R I M E
Transnational crime reflects complex social, political economic phenomena and the
Human trafficking is a global issue, but a lack of reliable data that would allow com-
growth of these activities threaten the safety of individuals and hamper countries in
parative analyses and the design of policies and countermeasures is scarce (Trafficking
their social, economic and cultural development (Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice,
in Persons: Global Patterns, 2006). There is a need to strengthen the criminal justice re-
2006). Corruption in particular places power in the hands of a few, thereby harming
the most poor and vulnerable. Not surprisingly, we see on the trafficking & corruption
suite that corruption is more prevalent in countries with less effective legal institutions,
depend heavily on victim testimony. This is especially problematic since traffickers play
civil service codes, and accountability mechanisms, and without free media or vital civil
society. Data from the Failed States Index, compiled by Foreign Policy, the Fund for
Peace, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace indicate a strong correlation
A large part of the approach to addressing corruption is a push by civil society, the pub-
between corruption and instability: eight out of the ten most stable countries are the
lic, and other stakeholders, for greater transparency and accountability from governments
and business. Transparency includes more open reporting and auditing mechanisms,
Report. In 2005, Scandinavian countries in general, New Zealand and Singapore ranked
South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Caribbean had the lowest scores (Transparency
International, 2005).
International, 2006). Governments can indicate that they are practicing legitimate processes by signing agreements and initiatives. The Extractive Industries Transparency
Almost every country in the world is affected by human trafficking, according to the
Initiative (EITI), for example, was recently established as a system whereby govern-
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The UN reports that victims of human
ments that have extractive industries can report that they are not corrupt; The 20 coun-
trafficking came from 127 countries, passed through some 98 others on their way
tries below-most of them still rated in the bottom third of Transparency Internationals
2005 Corruption Perceptions Index-have committed to the EITI since a Lancaster House
to confront human trafficking are hindered by a lack of accurate empirical data, and
some countries unwillingness to acknowledge the prevalence of the problem. Out of the
approximately 192 nations worldwide, only 89 nations have signed the Optional Protocol
Africa
Azerbaijan
to the Convention of the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution
Angola
Kazakhstan
and Child Pornography. Only 94 nations have signed the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
Cameroon
Kyrgyz Republic
and Punish Trafficking in Persons (US Department of State, 2004). It is estimated that
Chad
worldwide, there are 250,000 child soldiers (UNDP, 2005) but just 97 nations have
signed the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child in Armed
Congo, Republic of
Mongolia
Conflict.
Equatorial Guinea
East Timor
Gabon
The piracy suite reveals that global technology has facilitated easy access to information
Ghana
and goods and has sparked a heated debate regarding the circulation and use of texts,
Guinea
Bolivia
music, movies, and software. Piracy of music via the internet has been linked by some
Mauritania
Peru
with the decline in music sales over the last years, and thus with great losses for the
Niger
recording industry. Data show that most music downloads and uploads are to and from
Nigeria
the United States (Oberholzer, F. & Strumpf, K. 2004). While overall worldwide software
piracy rates have been declining, rates in Central and Eastern Europe rose sharply from
Sierra Leone
(EITI, 2005)
2000-2002 and in the Middle East, to a lesser extent, from 2001-2002 (IPR, 2003).
North America, Western Europe and Latin America have the lowest rates of piracy, while
countries in East and Central Europe, such as Bulgaria, Latvia, Russia, and Greece, have
the highest rates. Accordingly, North America and Latin America have ratified the most
treaties protecting property rights, while Eastern and Central European countries have
passed a much lower number of treaties.
604
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CULTURES + GLOBALIZATION
IN D I CAT OR SU I T E S & D I G E S T S
1. - 4.
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D IS S EM INATI ON
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IN NOVATION A ND P ROTE C T I O N
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http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi.
(accessed 5/6/06).
digest: terrorism
6.
Foreign Policy in Focus and the Center for Defense Information. (2004)
(accessed 5/6/06).
Task Force on a Unified Budget for the United States, Washington, DC.
Marshall, Monty G., and Gurr, Ted R. (2005) Peace and Conflict. Center for
1.
2.
Business Software Alliance. (BSA) Eight Annual BSA Global Software Piracy
4.
an article for the Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research.
Available at http://www.transnational.org/forum/meet/2002/Falk_UNRenewal.html.
(accessed 5/5/06).
(accessed 6/23/06).
ComScore Media Metrix, as it appears on the Pew Internet Project & Comscore
Falk, Richard. (2006) Reforming the United Nations: Global Civil Society
624
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International Institute for Strategic Studies. (IISS) (2003) The Military Balance
Klare, Michael. (1999) The Kalashnikov Age, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
January/February, p. 19.
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Published for the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), New York.
International Planning and Research Corporation (IPR) (2003) Eighth Annual BSA
Available at http://download.microsoft.com/download//f/5/c/f5cabee0-4ed8-
Available at http://www.unc.edu/~cigar/papers/FileSharing_March2004.pdf
Acton, James. (2006) Arms Trade, role of the United Nations and US interests,
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United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (UNODC) (2006) Crime Prevention
625
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 625
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626
5c.conflict_DEF.indd 626
1/17/2007 7:12:35 PM
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Page 628
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INDEX
629
creativity, 901
crisis, 565
Croatia, 37, 106, 111
cross-community arts projects, 301
cross-community organizations, see concord
organizations
cross-cultural dialogue, 182, 297
Crusaders, 98, 213, 225
cultural authenticity, 135, 136
cultural capital, 8, 437
cultural change, 1889, 18990
cultural conservatism, 1778, 179, 185, 192
cultural consumption, 206, 444, 453
cultural diplomacy organizations, 5567, 558
cultural diversity, 56, 488, 5534
cultural economy, 453; statistics. 44052
cultural entrepreneurs, 32, 37, 38, 46; Islamic
radicals as, 45; support for diasporic
communities, 40; in Yugoslavia, 39, 40
cultural exclusion, 122, 1234
cultural fragmentation, 7, 110, 222, 223
cultural goods and services: global brands, 452;
trade in, 44952, 4534
cultural heritage, 30, 102; destruction of, 59,
93, 10214; illicit trade in, 10910; protection
of, 107, 108; tension with contemporary
creativity, 901
cultural identities, 24, 38, 54, 147, 148
cultural imperialism, 13, 80, 1245
cultural indicators, 335, 337; indicator suites, 3446
cultural industries, 91, 122, 203, 447; cultural
institutions and, 92; employment in, 447; in Latin
America, 1667; major transnational
corporations, 448
cultural insecurity, globalization and, 121, 123,
1256, 129
cultural institutions, and conflict, 912
cultural observatories, 558
cultural participation, 437; statistics, 42731
cultural performance, 57, 623; and
conflict resolution, 298304; national
identity and, 298
cultural policy, 6, 558
cultural practice, 52, 55, 623; economic and
social development through, 578;
protection of, 303
cultural production: conflict in, 902, 946;
local, 206
cultural professions, 4568, 460
cultural symbols, destruction of, as attack
on enemy, 106, 107
culture, 9, 10; definitions, 7, 341; role for in postconflict reconstruction, 934
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631
Gabon, 128
Gacaca, 306, 307, 30910
Galeano, E., 163
Gan Yang, 178
Gandhi, M.K., 63
Garca Canclini, N., 8, 164, 165, 202, 207
Garca Marquez, G., 168
Garret, G., 394
gender equality, Islam and, 138, 215
gender values, 3847
General Agreement on Trade in Services, 453
General Electric, 466
Genesis (Ann Arbor), 288, 290
Germany, 38; anti-immigrant rhetoric, 36; immigrant
unemployment, 34, 37; violence against
immigrants, 456
Giddens, A., 8, 125, 235
Gilroy, P., 4
Girardin, L., 72
The Girls of Aboke, 94
Giuliani, R., 96
global arts market, 4403
global brands, 452
global cities, 52, 47683, 487
global civil society, 10, 341, 35860, 368,
474, 602
global consumerism, 123, 124, 533, 542;
threat to local culture, 84, 88
global governance, 22, 365
Global Green Federation, 535
Global Strategy for a Balanced Representative and
Credible World Heritage List, 435
global warming, 436
globalization, 34, 9, 1011, 20, 368;
attitudes to, 394, 533, 542; predecessors
to, 2012
Goebbels, J., 110
Goethe, J.W. 202
Goethe Institut, 558
Golden Age, 152; in US, 185
Google, 95, 502, 513, 515
Gramsci, A., 8
Gray, J., 149
Gray, P., 185
Great Awakenings, 18990, 191, 192
Greece: plundering of heritage of, 109; visit of Pope
John Paul II, 98
greenhouse effect, 436
Greenpeace, membership of, 535, 542
Guernica, bombing of, 106
guerrilla organizations, 6970; in Colombia, 314,
321, 323
Gunaratna, R., 304
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Gunasinghe, N., 37
Gurr, T., 72, 603
Habermas, J., 8, 151, 237
habitus, 56
Hague Convention, 1954, 104, 107
Haider, J., 38
Hakimiyyat Allah (Gods rule), 224, 226
Hall, S., 8
Halloran, J.D., 125, 130
Hannerz, U., 8
He Qing, 179
hegemony, 187, 189, 192; challenges to, 188, 189,
190, 192; cultural, 824, 134; symbolic, 203,
204; Western, 136, 176
Heidegger, M., 236
Held, D., 11, 12, 119
Hemerijk, A., 153
Henry, C., 135
heritage, destruction of, 4224, 435
heritage preservation (see also cultural heritage),
4224, 435
heterogeneity, 205, 299
hierarchies, 126, 127, 1867, 189
Hinduism, 338, 390, 392, 396
historical traumas: Arab, 21112, 225, 228;
European, 21011
history, 284; Islam and, 224; rewriting, 107; as
source of propaganda, 225
Hoeffler, A., 712
Hollande, F., 157
home town associations, 261
homogenization, 7, 34, 123, 125, 138
Hong Kong, 182, 476
Hopenhayn, M., 207
Horkheimer, M., 453
housing exhibition, 63
Huidobro, V., 206
Human Development Report 2004, 6
Human Poverty Index, 601
human rights, 250, 57880, 601, 602;
Asian notion of, 180; Islam and, 215,
2245; US and, 241
human rights treaties, signatories, 362
Human Rights Watch, 602
human security, 569
human trafficking, 5923, 604
humanitarian aid, 600; trade and, 350
humanitarian treaties, 3624
Huntington, S., 24, 72, 78, 1378, 1456,
199, 223, 369, 541
hybrid culture, 59, 2356, 299
hyperglobizers, 12
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633
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Page 634
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Page 635
INDEX
Mugabe, R., 71
multiculturalism, 13, 53, 148, 236, 238
Mumbai, 477
Munkler, H., 69
museum collections, 41011
music, 514, 552; festivals, 57, 484, 488; piracy, 597;
recorded music sales, 496, 497
Muslim Brotherhood, 223, 224
Muslim-Western cultural relations,
225, 2267, 228
Muslim diaspora, 223, 226, 229, 236
Muslims. 137, 388, 390, 392, 396; in
Bulgaria, 42, 43; in Europe, 45, 236
(marginalization of, 223, 229); protest over
Danish cartoons, 96, 97, 127, 172,
182, 542; in US, 2601
Mussolini, B., 107
Myrdal, G., 235
Nagorno-Karabkh, 68
nation-state/s, 29, 74; creation of, 74, 75
(war and, 767); culture and, 74;
diversity of, as predictor of civil
war, 72, 76; global diffusion of, 734;
history of, 74
National Conference for Community
and Justice, 2901
national identity, 74, 80, 298, 369, 372;
pride and, 373
national libraries, 406
nationalism, 23; and anti-Americanism, in China,
1756; and creation of nation-states 74, 75;
popular, 1767
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 233
neighborhood, 571
neo-colonialism, 139
neo-liberalism, 134, 248; in Argentina, 264, 265,
2667; and xenophobia, 2667
Nepal, 601
Netherlands, 34; anti-immigrant feelings, 261; use of
Dutch language by immigrants, 945
networks, 11, 13
New York, 4789; Brooklyn Museum, 96; ethnic
groups in, 478
New Zealand, media ownership, 473
News Corporation, 464
newspapers, 202, 4923, 512
NGOs (non-governmental organizations), 469; in arts
and culture, 46970, 474
Nigeria: ethnic minorities, 126; identity in, 369;
religious conflict, 1267, 129
Nike, Chamber of Fear advert, 172, 182
Ninasam Theatre Institute, 54
635
Nizam, 224
North-South tensions, 201, 2048
Northern Ireland: communal conflict, 284; concord
organizations, 285, 287, 290, 2912; Good
Friday Agreement, 291
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development), 74
Olympic Games, 438; revenue from, 433, 434
Organization of the Islamic Conference, 215
Orientalism, 147, 222, 250
Ortiz, R., 1656, 202
Osama bin Laden, 24
Ostrom, E., 287
Other, 205, 223, 284; acceptance/
understanding of, 290
Palestine, 135, 212, 213
Pamuk, Orhan, 97
parallel summits, 534, 542
Paris, 487
patents, 41216; companies filing, 41213,
414, 420
path dependency, 21; in European welfare
systems, 153
Patten, C., 232, 237
peace, 66, 227, 228; food for peace recipients, 567
peace and conflict ledger, 56971
Peace and Development Program for MiddleMagdalena (Colombia), 316
peace-building capacity, 569
peacekeeping missions, 566, 5678, 600
Pron, J.D., 266
Persson, G., 235
piracy, 513, 514, 5968, 604
pluralism, 6, 53; religious belief and, 2545
political parties, as cultural entrepreneurs, 38
political power, and conflict, 314
political values, 3789
Pongue Thamil, 302
popular culture, 174, 175, 203
population growth, 487; migration and, 259
post-colonial societies, resistance to cultural
globalization, 845
Pottier, J., 306
poverty, 612, 601; in Arab world, 135; in Latin
America, 164, 165
Powell, E., 38
power, 21, 34, 1912; conflicts about,
284, 314; of cultural entrepreneurs,
38, 39; hard/soft, 233
prejudice, 377
Preston, P., 111
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Page 637
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637
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Page 638
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Page 639
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639