SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996]

RODOLFO
NAVARRO, complainant,
vs. JUDGE
HERNANDO
DOMAGTOY, respondent.

G.
C.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

The
complainant
in
this
administrative case is the Municipal
Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte,
Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted
evidence in relation to two specific acts
committed by respondent Municipal
Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando
Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits
gross misconduct as well as inefficiency
in office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994,
respondent
judge
solemnized
the
wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan
and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the
knowledge that the groom is merely
separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he
performed
a
marriage
ceremony
between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his
court's jurisdiction on October 27,
1994. Respondent judge holds office
and has jurisdiction in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Sta. MonicaBurgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding
was solemnized at the respondent
judge's residence in the municipality of
Dapa, which does not fall within his
jurisdictional area of the municipalities
of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located
some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the Office
of the Court Administrator, respondent
judge avers that the office and name of
the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been
used by someone else, who, as the
mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned
with his actuations both as judge and as
a private person. The same person had
earlier filed Administrative Matter No.
94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for

lack of merit on September 15, 1994,

and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI95-16,
"Antonio
Adapon
v.
Judge
Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still
pending.
In relation to the charges against
him,
respondent
judge
seeks
exculpation from his act of having
solemnized
the
marriage
between
Gaspar
Tagadan,
a
married
man
separated from his wife, and Arlyn F.
Borga by stating that he merely relied
on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal
Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming
the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first
wife have not seen each other for
almost seven years.[1] With respect to
the second charge, he maintains that in
solemnizing the marriage between
Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not
violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the
Family
Code
which
states
that: "Marriage may be solemnized
by: (1) Any incumbent member of the
judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
and that Article 8 thereof applies to the
case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as
is usual, for investigation, since the
pleadings submitted were considered
sufficient for a resolution of the case.[2]
Since the countercharges of sinister
motives and fraud on the part of
complainant have not been sufficiently
proven,
they
will
not
be
dwelt
upon. The acts complained of and
respondent judge's answer thereto will
suffice and can be objectively assessed
by themselves to prove the latter's
malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the
marriage contract between Gaspar
Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that
Tagadan's civil status is "separated."
Despite this declaration, the wedding
ceremony
was
solemnized
by
respondent judge. He presented in
evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A.
Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer,
subscribed and sworn to before Judge
Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal
Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. [3] The
affidavit was not issued by the latter
judge, as claimed by respondent judge,

but merely acknowledged before him. In

their affidavit, the affiants stated that
they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have
been civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda
in September 1983; that after thirteen
years of cohabitation and having borne
five children, Ida Pearanda left the
conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon
and that she has not returned nor been
heard of for almost seven years,
thereby giving rise to the presumption
that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains
that the aforementioned joint affidavit
is sufficient proof of Ida Pearanda's
presumptive death, and ample reason
for him to proceed with the marriage
ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the
expressly provides:

Family

Code

"A marriage contracted by any person

during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions
of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the
subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse."
(Emphasis added.)

There is nothing ambiguous or

difficult
to
comprehend
in
this
provision. In fact, the law is clear and
simple. Even if the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead, a summary
proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is necessary in order
to contract a subsequent marriage, a

mandatory requirement which has been

precisely incorporated into the Family
Code
to
discourage
subsequent
marriages where it is not proven that
the
previous
marriage
has
been
dissolved or a missing spouse is
factually or presumptively dead, in
accordance with pertinent provisions of
law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan
did not institute a summary proceeding
for the declaration of his first wife's
presumptive death.Absent this judicial
declaration, he remains married to Ida
Pearanda. Whether
wittingly,
or
unwittingly, it was manifest error on the
part of respondent judge to have
accepted the joint affidavit submitted
by
the
groom. Such
neglect
or
ignorance of the law has resulted in a
bigamous,
and
therefore
void,
marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family
Code, "The following marriage shall be
void from the beginning: (4) Those
bigamous x x x marriages not falling
under Article 41."
The second issue involves the
solemnization of a marriage ceremony
outside the court's jurisdiction, covered
by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code,
thus:

"Art. 7. Marriage may be

solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the
judiciary within the court's
jurisdiction;
x x x x x x xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized

publicly in the chambers of the judge or
in open court, in the church, chapel or
temple, or in the office of the consulgeneral, consul or vice-consul, as the case
may be, and not elsewhere, except in
cases of marriages contracted on the
point of death or in remote places in
accordance with Article 29 of this Code,
or where both parties request the
solemnizing officer in writing in which
case the marriage may be solemnized at a

house or place designated by them in a

sworn statement to that effect."

Respondent judge points to Article 8

and its exceptions as the justifications
for his having solemnized the marriage
between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma
del Rosario outside of his court's
jurisdiction. As
the
aforequoted
provision states, a marriage can be held
outside of the judge's chambers or
courtroom
only
in
the
following
instances: (1) at the point of death, (2)
in remote places in accordance with
Article 29 or (3) upon request of both
parties in writing in a sworn statement
to this effect. There is no pretense that
either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at
the point of death or in a remote
place. Moreover, the written request
presented addressed to the respondent
judge was made by only one party,
Gemma del Rosario.[4]
More importantly, the elementary
principle underlying this provision is
the
authority
of
the
solemnizing
judge. Under Article 3, one of the
formal requisites of marriage is the
"authority of the solemnizing officer."
Under Article 7, marriage may be
solemnized by, among others, "any
incumbent
member
of
the
judiciary within the court's jurisdiction."
Article 8, which is a directory provision,
refers only to the venue of the marriage
ceremony and does not alter or qualify
the authority of the solemnizing officer
as
provided
in
the
preceding
provision. Non-compliance herewith will
not invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and
allowed by his local ordinary to marry
the faithful, is authorized to do so only
within the area of the diocese or place
allowed by his Bishop. An appellate
court Justice or a Justice of this Court
has
jurisdiction
over
the
entire
Philippines to solemnize marriages,
regardless of the venue, as long as the
requisites of the law are complied
with. However,
judges
who
are
appointed to specific jurisdictions, may
officiate in weddings only within said
areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his

court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant

irregularity in the formal requisite laid
down in Article 3, which while it may
not affect the validity of the marriage,
may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.[5]
Inasmuch as respondent judge's
jurisdiction covers the municipalities of
Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not
clothed with authority to solemnize a
marriage in the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8
and the exceptions therein as grounds
for the exercise of his misplaced
authority,
respondent
judge
again
demonstrated a lack of understanding
of the basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly,
the
Court
finds
respondent to have acted in gross
ignorance
of
the
law. The
legal
principles applicable in the cases
brought to our attention are elementary
and uncomplicated, prompting us to
conclude that respondent's failure to
apply them is due to a lack of
comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of
persons who, if not experts, are at
least, proficient in the law they are
sworn to apply, more than the ordinary
laymen. They should be skilled and
competent
in
understanding
and
applying the law. It is imperative that
they be conversant with basic legal
principles like the ones involved in
instant case.[6] It is not too much to
expect them to know and apply the law
intelligently.[7] Otherwise, the system of
justice rests on a shaky foundation
indeed, compounded by the errors
committed by those not learned in the
law. While magistrates may at times
make mistakes in judgment, for which
they are not penalized, the respondent
judge
exhibited
ignorance
of
elementary provisions of law, in an area
which has greatly prejudiced the status
of married persons.
The
marriage
between
Gaspar
Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered
bigamous and void, there being a
subsisting marriage between Gaspar
Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.

The
Office
of
the
Court
Administrator
recommends,
in
its
Memorandum to the Court, a six-month
suspension and a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts
will
be
dealt
with
more
severely. Considering that one of the
marriages in question resulted in a
bigamous union and therefore void, and
the
other
lacked
the
necessary
authority of respondent judge, the
Court
adopts
said
recommendation. Respondent
is
advised to be more circumspect in
applying the law and to cultivate a
deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW
OF THE FOREGOING,
respondent
Judge
Hernando
C.
Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a
period of six (6) months and given a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado
(Chairman),
Puno,
Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Rollo, pp. 7-8.
Uy v. Dizon-Capulong, A.M. No. RTJ-91-766, April 7, 1993;
Montemayor v. Collado, A.M. No. 2519-MTJ, September 10,
1981; Ubongon v. Mayo, A.M. No. 1255-CTJ, August 6, 1980, 99
SCRA 30.
[3]
Rollo, p. 12.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 10-11.
[5]
Article 4, Family Code.
[6]
Lim v. Domogas, A.M. No. RTJ-92-899, October 15, 1993, 227
SCRA 258, 263 citing Ubongan v. Mayo, 99 SCRA 30 and Ajeno
v. Inserto, 71 SCRA 166.
[7]
Galan Realty Co. v. Arranz, A.M. No. MTJ-93-978, October 27,
1994, 237 SCRA 771.
[1]
[2]

THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-94-999. September 23,
1996]

TERESITA DYSICO, complainant,

vs. JUDGE EUGENIO A.
DACUMOS, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

In this Decision, the Court finds

occasion to remind trial magistrates,
particularly municipal court judges, that
they must strictly abide by the Code of
Judicial Conduct, for as the frontline
officials of the judiciary, their actions
are scrutinized by our people who

expect them to be models of utmost

integrity, professional competence and
unassailable independence.
The Charge
In her sworn letter-complaint dated
January
26,
1994,[1] complainant
Teresita Dysico charged respondent
Judge
Eugenio
Dacumos
of
the
Municipal Trial Court of San Fernando,
La Union, Branch 1 with (1) delay in
hearing and resolving Criminal Case No.
20012 for grave coercion, where said
complainant was the offended party; (2)
grave misconduct; (3) partiality; and (4)
inefficiency in managing his court
personnel.
Complainant alleged in her said
letter-complaint
that
sometime
in
January 1989, she filed Criminal Case
No. 20012 for grave coercion against
her former employer, Benito Gapuz Te
and the latter's counsel, Atty. Roman
Villalon, Jr. for forcing her to sign a
resignation letter and an affidavit
containing an admission that she was a
dishonest employee of the Te-owned
Asian Lumber and Construction. She
said that the trial took more than four
(4) years and yet after the case was
submitted for decision, the judge kept
on delaying -- for no sufficient reason
and in spite of his alleged promises to
the contrary -- the promulgation of his
decision. She suspected that the judge
was delaying the case because he had
been bribed by the accused. In urging
the judge to speed up the resolution of
the case, she allegedly furnished him a
copy of a decision rendered by the
National Labor Relations Commission in
her case for illegal dismissal, ordering
her reinstatement.

Complainant also asked that

respondent judge, who she claimed
already owned a big, concrete
residential house, be made to
explain the source of his funds for
the construction of a new 3-storey
concrete building worth about P5
million.
The Other Pleadings

In his Comment,[2] respondent Judge

admitted that Criminal Case No. 20012
lasted for more than four (4) years but
that the delay could not be attributed
to him because (1) he had 481 pending
cases; (2) complainant contributed to
the delay; and (3) the evidence
presented was voluminous, consisting
of cartons of receipts. In any event, the
decision,
all
of
73
pages
was
promulgated on January 27, 1994, a day
after the herein complaint was filed.
The
judge
also
presented
documentary evidence to show that the
funds for his residential house and his
two- (not three-) storey building (which
according
to
him
was
worth
only P650,000
to P700,000)
were
sourced from loans from the Rural Bank
of
Bauang
(La
Union),
Home
Development and Mutual Fund, Pagibig, Philippine National Bank (La
Union) and other creditors.
Complainant in her reply[3] insisted
on her previous allegations and added
that respondent judge received money
from
wedding
sponsors
thru
his
employees who passed around a brown
envelope among said sponsors and
asked them to contribute "for the
judge", in spite of the legal fees having
already been fully paid. She also
contested the valuation of the building
as being worth at least P3 million which
could not have been totally funded by
the alleged borrowings. She further
accused respondent of partiality in the
conduct of the trial, and inefficiency and
laxity in the management of his court
personnel.
Filing
his
rejoinder,[4] respondent
judge averred that the irregularities
attributed to him in regard to Criminal
Case No. 20012 had already been
passed upon by the Regional Trial Court
and the Supreme Court, both of which
upheld his decision. He denied forcing
money from wedding sponsors -claiming that such payment, if any, was
purely voluntary on the part of the
parties and their sponsors.

In her answer[5] to the rejoinder,

complainant averred that

respondent judge during the

preliminary investigation of Criminal
Case No. 20012 partook of a
merienda hosted by the accused.
Investigation, Report and
Recommendation
By Resolution of the First Division of
this Court on November 9, 1994, this
case was referred to Executive Judge
Braulio
Yaranon
for
investigation,
report and recommendation. In his
extensive Report[6] dated June 7, 1995,
Executive Judge Yaranon submitted the
following findings.[7]
"I - Findings Re: Alleged Delay,
Partiality, and Gross Misconduct In
Hearing and Resolving Criminal Case
No. 20012.
A) - Alleged bias or partiality in resolving
the case. The Decision (Exhibit N) on its
face, shows that the respondent set forth
the evidence adduced for the prosecution
(Decision, pp. 3-16), as well as that for
the defense (Decision, pp. 20-58). He
then analyzed and evaluated the evidence
(Decision, pp. 58-73), and concluded,
citing reasons, that the weight of
evidence, leans in favor of the defense
version of the incident and consequently
held the two co-accused not guilty of
offense charged. The undersigned
respectfully makes the finding that the
said decision on its face, indicates that
the respondent exercised reasonably fair
and sound judgment, without bias or
partiality, in rendering his decision in
Criminal Case No. 20012, hence he should
be absolved of this particular charge.
B) - Alleged Delay in the Proceedings Due
to Partiality and Ignorance of the Law. It
is charged that the respondent was
partial and ignorant of the law because
he allowed the accused to file several
motions prohibited under the Rule on
Summary Procedure, and that he further
granted the accused extension to file
counter-affidavits. It is respectfully
pointed out that the two (2) Grave
Coercion Cases (Nos. 20012 and 20013)
which are both triable under the Rule on
Summary Procedure, were taken up
jointly with Criminal Case No. 20014, For

Serious Illegal Detention, until the later

case was remanded to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, hence a strict
application of the Rule on Summary
Procedure, may not be appropriate. Most
of the motions complained of, appear to
have been filed while all the three (3)
criminal cases aforementioned, were
jointly considered by the
respondent.Considering that the
respondent in fact denied the motion to
allow cross-examination of prosecution
witnesses, and to present rebuttal
evidence during the preliminary
examination xxx a finding is made that
this particular charge is not sufficiently
established.
The record shows that delay in the
hearing of the case is mainly attributable
to legal maneuvers employed by the
defense xxx as well as by the
prosecution.
C) - Alleged Delay in Resolving the
Case. The record shows that the last
hearing in Criminal Case No. 20012, was
held on February 11, 1993, for the
reception of rebuttal evidence for the
prosecution. There is no order of record
indicating when the case was deemed
submitted for
resolution. ConsideringMarch 23, 1993,
when the prosecution submitted a
position paper, as the date when the case
was deemed submitted for resolution,
and considering further that the Decision
dated December 29, 1993, was
promulgated on January 27, 1994, there is
no question that the respondent
exceeded the ninety (90) day
reglementary period by at least six (6)
months. That the draft of the decision
was misplaced sometime in October,
1993, cannot excuse the delay because
even at that time, the reglementary
period had already been exceeded by at
least four (4) months. A finding is
therefore made that the respondent
rendered his decision at least six (6)
months beyond the reglementary period.
Evident on the face of the Decision
(Decision, pp. 16-20) rendered in Criminal
Case No. 20012, is the resolution of a
motion for contempt submitted for
resolution on April 22, 1993 (per Order
dated April 22, 1993, Record of Criminal

Case No. 20012, p. 675). The motion for

contempt was therefore resolved at least
five (5) months beyond the reglementary
period.
D) - Alleged Bribery. The suspicion of the
complainant that the respondent must
have been bribed by the co-accused
Benito Gapuz Te, owner of Asian Lumber
and Construction, because he has been
able to build a residential house valued at
not less than Three Million
(P3,000,000.00) Pesos, and that the
materials must have come from the said
accused, is not supported by
evidence. The respondent presented
building plans indicating a cost estimate
ofP650,000.00. He also presented
documents evidencing loans obtained by
the respondent from various financing
institutions and from private individuals,
the totality of which sufficiently covers
the cost estimate of the construction. A
finding is therefore made that this
particular charge is not proven.
F) - Re Alleged 'Merienda' offered by the
co-accused Benito Gapuz Te. Respondent
admits that the said co-accused, on one
occasion after a court hearing, offered
'merienda' consisting of softdrinks and
biscuit to the court personnel, and that
respondent was offered and took a bottle
of softdrink and biscuit from the said coaccused. A finding is therefore made that
this charge is established by admission of
the respondent.
II) - Re Laxity in the Supervision of
Personnel.
This charge is established by the patent
dis-array in the records of Criminal Case
No. 20012. Records are not arranged
chronologically xxx and some pages of
documents attached to the records, are
missing.
III) - Re Alleged Collections from Wedding
Sponsors.
It is charge that an employee of the
respondent passed an envelope among
sponsors whispering that the amount was
for the judge. It is further charged that
the respondent and his personnel
attended wedding feasts after the

solemnization of marriage
ceremonies. Attendance at wedding
feasts is not denied, hence is deemed
admitted. Respondent denies making
collections from sponsors, but adds that
'Fee if any, is purely voluntary' thereby
implying that cash offers voluntarily
tendered, are accepted on said
occasions. A finding is therefore made
that the respondent admits this
specification."

The
Office
of
the
Court
Administrator to which this case was
also referred for evaluation concurred
with
the
above
findings
and
recommended that "the charges of bias
and partiality, ignorance of the law, and
bribery be dismissed for not being
substantiated."

Moreover, the OCA concurred with

the executive judge's
recommendation that administrative
sanctions be imposed "on the
respondent judge for: (1) the delay
in resolving the motion for contempt
and for the delay in deciding Crim.
Case No. 20012; (2) accepting fees
for solemnizing marriages; and (3)
for partaking of the snacks offered
by the co-accused in the
investigation done in Crim. Case No.
20012."
The Court's Ruling
We
agree
with
these
recommendations. The
defense
interposed by the judge as to the delay
in
the
criminal
case
are
not
meritorious. An independent and fair
judge should not allow the parties to
practically control the proceedings in
his court through obvious dilatory
tactics.The amended complaint was
filed on June 26, 1990 but the decision
was promulgated only on January 27,
1994. The
promulgation
itself
was
delayed
by
seven
months
(after
subtracting the 90-day period allowed
by law) as the case was deemed
submitted when the prosecution filed
its position paper on March 23,
1994. Respondent likewise delayed the
resolution of the second motion for
comtempt by at least five (5) months

counted from the expiration of the 90day reglementary period within which
to resolve motions.
The
acceptance
of
fees
for
solemnizing marriages, even if given
voluntarily, is reprehensible. By such
act respondent judge cheapened his
noble office, as well as the entire
judiciary, in the eyes of the public.
Delay
in
resolving
motions
is
inexcusable
and
should
not
be
condoned.[8] A judge is administratively
liable for unreasonable delay in the
disposition of the cases.[9]
Judges must not only be fully
cognizant of the state of their dockets,
likewise, they must keep a watchful eye
on the level of performance and
conduct of the court personnel under
their immediate supervision who are
primarily employed to aid in the
administration
of
justice
xxx.The
leniency of a judge in the administrative
supervision of his employees is an
undesirable
trait.[10] It
is
therefore
necessary that judges should exercise
close supervision over court personnel.
[11]

The respondent admitted partaking

of the "merienda" proferred by the
accused in Criminal Case No. 20012, as
well as accepting "fees" for solemnizing
marriages and attending weddings
feasts of marriages solemnized by
him. While these incidents may appear
petty or trivial, respondent should
nevertheless bear in mind that one who
occupies a position of such grave
responsibility in the administration of
justice must conduct himself in a
manner befitting the dignity of such
exalted office. A judge's private as well
as official conduct must at all times be
free
from
all
appearances
of
impropriety, and be beyond reproach.[12]
We have repeatedly held that a
municipal trial judge occupies the
forefront of the judicial arm that is
closest to the public we serve.Thus, he
must act at all times with great
constancy and utmost probity.[13] In this
respect, respondent gravely failed.

All in all, Judge Dacumos is found

wanting in his observance of the
following provisions of the Code of
Judicial Conduct:
Rule 1.01. A judge should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence.
Rule 1.02 A judge sould administer justice
impartially and without delay.
xxxxxxxxx

Rule 2.01. A judge should so behave at all

times as to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.
xxxxxxxxx

Rule 3.01. A judge shall be faithful to the

law and maintain professional
competence.
xxxxxxxxx

Rule 3.05. A judge shall dispose of court's

business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods.
x x x x xx x x x

Rule 3.08. A judge should diligently

discharge administrative responsibilities,
maintain professional competence in
court management, and facilitate the
performance of the administrative
functions of other judges and court
personnel.
Rule 3.09. A judge should organize and
supervise the court personnel to ensure
the prompt efficient dispatch of business,
and require at all times the observance of
high standards of public service and
fidelity.
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
respondent
Judge
is
found GUILTY as
recommended by the Office of the Court
Administrator
and
is
hereby IMPOSED the
penalty of SUSPENSION from office, without pay,
for one (1) month.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman),
Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Davide,

Jr.,

Rollo, p. 1.
Rollo, pp. 9 et seq.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 102 et seq.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 152 et seq.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 201-202.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 206 et seq.
[7]
Rollo, pp. 219-222.
[8]
Ubarra vs. Tecson, 134 SCRA 4, January 17,
1985.
[9]
Beduya vs. Alpuerto, 96 SCRA 673, March 31,
1980.
[10]
Shan, Jr., vs. Aguinaldo, 117 SCRA 32, 38,
September 30, 1982.
[11]
Bendesula vs. Laya, 58 SCRA 16, July 18,
1974.
[12]
Jugueta vs. Boncaros, 60 SCRA 27, September
30, 1974; Luzuriaga vs. Judge Bromo, 115 SCRA
830, August 19, 1982.
[13]
Mardoquio vs. Ilanga, 235 SCRA 198, August
10, 1994.
[1]
[2]

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001]

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J.

GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien

may be recognized in our jurisdiction,
provided such decree is valid according
to the national law of the
foreigner. However, the divorce decree
and the governing personal law of the
alien spouse who obtained the divorce
must be proven. Our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgments; hence, like any other facts,
both the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien must be
alleged and proven according to our law
on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999
Decision[1] and the March 24, 1999
Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil
Case No. 3026AF. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court declares

the marriage between Grace J.
Garcia and Rederick A. Recio
solemnized on January 12, 1994 at
Cabanatuan City as dissolved and
both parties can now remarry
under existing and applicable laws
to any and/or both parties.[3]
The assailed Order denied
reconsideration of the above-quoted
Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was
married
to
Editha
Samson,
an
Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on
March 1, 1987.[4] They lived together as
husband and wife in Australia. On May
18,
1989, [5] a
decree
of
divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage,

was issued
court.

by

an

Australian

family

On June 26, 1992, respondent

became an Australian citizen, as shown
by a Certificate of Australian Citizenship
issued by the Australian government.
[6]
Petitioner
-a
Filipina
-and
respondent were married on January 12,
1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help
Church
in
Cabanatuan
City.[7] In
theirapplication for a marriage license,
respondent was declared as single and
Filipino.[8]
Starting
October
22,
1995,
petitioner
and
respondent
lived
separately
without
prior
judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the
two were still in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided on May 16,
1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia.[9]
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage[10] in the court a quo, on the
ground
of
bigamy
-respondent
allegedly
had
a
prior
subsisting
marriage at the time he married her on
January 12, 1994. She claimed that she
learned of respondents marriage to
Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred
that, as far back as 1993, he had
revealed
to
petitioner
his
prior
marriage and its
subsequent
dissolution.[11] He contended that his
first marriage to an Australian citizen
had been validly dissolved by a divorce
decree obtained in Australia in 1989;
[12]
thus, he was legally capacitated to
marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years
after the couples wedding and while the
suit for the declaration of nullity was
pending -- respondent was able to
secure a divorce decree from a family
court in Sydney, Australia because the
marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken
down.[13]
Respondent prayed in his Answer
that the Complaint be dismissed on the
ground that it stated no cause of action.
[14]
The Office of the Solicitor General

agreed with respondent.[15] The court

marked and admitted the documentary
evidence of both parties. [16] After they
submitted their respective memoranda,
the case was submitted for resolution.

The trial court patently and grievously

erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35,
40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the
applicable provisions in this case.
5

[17]

Thereafter, the trial court rendered the

assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The
trial
court
declared
the
marriage dissolved on the ground that
the divorce issued in Australia was valid
and recognized in the Philippines. It
deemed the marriage ended, but not on
the basis of any defect in an essential
element
of
the
marriage;
that
is, respondents alleged lack of legal
capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its
Decision on the divorce decree obtained
by respondent. The Australian divorce
had ended the marriage; thus, there
was no more marital union to nullify or
annul.

The trial court gravely erred in

pronouncing that the divorce decree
obtained by the respondent in
Australia ipso facto capacitated the
parties to remarry, without first securing
a recognition of the judgment granting
the divorce decree before our courts.
[19]

The Petition raises five issues, but for

purposes of this Decision, we shall
concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1)
whether the divorce between
respondent and Editha Samson was
proven, and (2) whether respondent
was proven to be legally capacitated to
marry petitioner. Because of our ruling
on these two, there is no more
necessity to take up the rest.
The Courts Ruling

Hence, this Petition.[18]

The Petition is partly meritorious.

Issues
Petitioner submits the
issues for our consideration:

following

The trial court gravely erred in finding

that the divorce decree obtained in
Australia by the respondent ipso
facto terminated his first marriage to
Editha Samson thereby capacitating him
to contract a second marriage with the
petitioner.
2

The failure of the respondent, who is now

a naturalized Australian, to present a
certificate of legal capacity to marry
constitutes absence of a substantial
requisite voiding the petitioners marriage
to the respondent
3

The trial court seriously erred in the

application of Art. 26 of the Family Code
in this case.
4

First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between
Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial courts
recognition of the divorce between
respondent
and
Editha
Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng
Gee,[20] petitioner
argues
that
the
divorce decree, like any other foreign
judgment, may be given recognition in
this jurisdiction only upon proof of the
existence of (1) the foreign law allowing
absolute divorce and (2) the alleged
divorce decree itself. She adds that
respondent miserably failed to establish
these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the
first paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, marriages solemnized
abroad are governed by the law of the
place where they were celebrated
(the lex loci celebrationis). In effect, the
Code requires the presentation of the

foreign law to show the conformity of

the marriage in question to the legal
requirements of the place where the
marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following
basic legal principles as the take-off
points for our discussion. Philippine law
does not provide for absolute divorce;
hence, our courts cannot grant it. [21] A
marriage between two Filipinos cannot
be dissolved even by a divorce obtained
abroad, because of Articles 15 [22] and
17[23] of the Civil Code.[24] In mixed
marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, Article 26[25] of the Family
Code allows the former to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry.[26] A divorce obtained abroad
by a couple, who are both aliens, may
be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their
respective national laws.[27]
A comparison between marriage and
divorce, as far as pleading and proof
are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn
v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their
national law.[28] Therefore, before a
foreign
divorce
decree
can
be
recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to
the
foreign
law
allowing
it.
[29]
Presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a
divorce decree can be admitted in
evidence, it must first comply with the
registration
requirements
under
Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family
Code. These articles read as follows:
ART. 11. Where a marriage license is
required, each of the contracting parties
shall file separately a sworn application
for such license with the proper local civil
registrar which shall specify the
following:

xxxxxxxxx

(5) If previously married, how, when and

where the previous marriage was
dissolved or annulled;
xxxxxxxxx

ART. 13. In case either of the contracting

parties has been previously married, the
applicant shall be required to
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting
parties has been previously married, the
applicant shall be required to furnish,
instead of the birth or baptismal
certificate required in the last preceding
article, the death certificate of the
deceased spouse or the judicial decree of
the absolute divorce, or the judicial
decree of annulment or declaration of
nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x
x.
ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of
absolute nullity of the marriage, the
partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, and the
delivery of the childrens presumptive
legitimes shall be recorded in the
appropriate civil registry and registries of
property; otherwise, the same shall not
affect their persons.

Respondent, on the other hand,

argues that the Australian divorce
decree is a public document -- a written
official act of an Australian family
court.Therefore, it requires no further
proof of its authenticity and due
execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of
himself. Before a foreign judgment is
given presumptive evidentiary value,
the document must first be presented
and admitted in evidence.[30] A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the
divorce decree itself. Indeed the best
evidence of a judgment is the judgment
itself.[31] The decree purports to be a
written act or record of an act of an
official body or tribunal of a foreign
country.[32]
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132, on the other hand, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or

official record of a foreign country by

either (1) an official publication or (2) a
copy thereof attested[33] by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If
the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be (a) accompanied by
a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in
the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office. [34]
The
divorce
decree
between
respondent and Editha Samson appears
to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian
family
court.[35] However,
appearance is not sufficient; compliance
with the aforementioned rules on
evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause,
when the divorce decree of May 18,
1989 was submitted in evidence,
counsel for petitioner objected, not to
its admissibility, but only to the fact
that it had not been registered in the
Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.
[36]
The trial court ruled that it was
admissible,
subject
to
petitioners
qualification.[37] Hence, it was admitted
in evidence and accorded weight by the
judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to
object properly rendered the divorce
decree admissible as a written act of
the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.[38]
Compliance with the quoted articles
(11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is
not necessary; respondent was no
longer bound by Philippine personal
laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992.[39] Naturalization is
the legal act of adopting an alien and
clothing him with the political and civil
rights
belonging
to
a
citizen.
[40]
Naturalized citizens, freed from the
protective cloak of their former states,
don the attires of their adoptive
countries. By becoming an Australian,
respondent severed his allegiance to
the
Philippines
and
the vinculum
juris that had tied him to Philippine
personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent
contends
that
the
burden to prove Australian divorce law
falls upon petitioner, because she is the
party challenging the validity of a
foreign judgment. He contends that
petitioner was satisfied with the
original of the divorce decree and was
cognizant of the marital laws of
Australia, because she had lived and
worked in that country for quite a long
time. Besides, the Australian divorce
law is allegedly known by Philippine
courts; thus, judges may take judicial
notice of foreign laws in the exercise of
sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden
of proof lies with the party who alleges
the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense
of an action.[41] In civil cases, plaintiffs
have the burden of proving the material
allegations of the complaint when those
are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving
the material allegations in their answer
when they introduce new matters.
[42]
Since the divorce was a defense
raised by respondent, the burden of
proving the pertinent Australian law
validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction
that our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws.[43] Like any other
facts, they must be alleged and
proved. Australian marital laws are not
among those matters that judges are
supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function.[44] The power of judicial
notice must be exercised with caution,
and every reasonable doubt upon the
subject should be resolved in the
negative.
Second Issue: Respondents Legal
Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of
the insufficient proof of the divorce,
respondent was legally incapacitated to
marry
her
in
1994. Hence,
she
concludes that their marriage was
void ab initio.
Respondent
replies
that
the
Australian divorce decree, which was
validly
admitted
in
evidence,

adequately
established
his
legal
capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondents
contention
is
untenable. In
its
strict
legal
sense, divorce means
the
legal
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause
arising after marriage.But divorces are
of different types. The two basic ones
are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a
mensa
et
thoro. The
first
kind
terminates the marriage, while the
second suspends it and leaves the bond
in full force.[45] There is no showing in
the case at bar which type of divorce
was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi
or
an
interlocutory
decree
-a
conditional or provisional judgment of
divorce. It is in effect the same as a
separation
from
bed
and
board,
although an absolute divorce may
follow after the lapse of the prescribed
period during which no reconciliation is
effected.[46]
Even after the divorce becomes
absolute, the court may under some
foreign statutes and practices, still
restrict remarriage. Under some other
jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited
by statute; thus, the guilty party in a
divorce which was granted on the
ground of adultery may be prohibited
from marrying again. The court may
allow a remarriage only after proof of
good behavior.[47]
On its face, the herein Australian
divorce decree contains a restriction
that reads:
1. A party to a marriage who
marries again before this decree
becomes absolute (unless the
other party has died) commits the
offence of bigamy.[48]

This
quotation
bolsters
our
contention that the divorce obtained by
respondent may have been restricted. It
did not absolutely establish his legal
capacity to remarry according to his
national law. Hence, we find no basis for
the ruling of the trial court, which
erroneously
assumed
that
the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored

respondents
capacity
to
remarry
despite the paucity of evidence on this
matter.
We
also
reject
the
claim
of
respondent that the divorce decree
raises a disputable presumption or
presumptive evidence as to his civil
status based on Section 48, Rule 39 [49] of
the Rules of Court, for the simple
reason
that
no
proof
has
been
presented on the legal effects of the
divorce
decree
obtained
under
Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal
Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate
of legal capacity required by Article 21
of the Family Code was not submitted
together with the application for a
marriage license. According to her, its
absence is proof that respondent did
not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal
capacity
to
contract
marriage
is
determined by the national law of the
party
concerned. The
certificate
mentioned in Article 21 of the Family
Code would have been sufficient to
establish
the
legal
capacity
of
respondent, had he duly presented it in
court. A
duly
authenticated
and
admitted certificate is prima facie
evidence of legal capacity to marry on
the part of the alien applicant for a
marriage license.[50]
As it is, however, there is absolutely
no evidence that proves respondents
legal capacity to marry petitioner. A
review of the records before this Court
shows that only the following exhibits
were presented before the lower court:
(1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit A
Complaint;[51] (b) Exhibit B Certificate of
Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio
(Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia
(Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in
Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;[52] (c)
Exhibit
C
Certificate
of
Marriage
Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino)
and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on
March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro
Manila;[53] (d) Exhibit D Office of the City
Registrar
of
Cabanatuan
City

Certification that no information of

annulment between Rederick A. Recio
and Editha D. Samson was in its
records;[54] and (e) Exhibit E Certificate
of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A.
Recio;[55] (2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit
1 -- Amended Answer;[56] (b) Exhibit 2
Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of
Dissolution of Marriage in the Family
Court of Australia;[57] (c) Exhibit 3
Certificate of Australian Citizenship of
Rederick A. Recio;[58] (d) Exhibit 4
Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in
the Family Court of Australia Certificate;
[59]
and Exhibit 5 -- Statutory Declaration
of the Legal Separation Between
Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia
Recio since October 22, 1995.[60]
Based on the above records, we
cannot conclude that respondent, who
was then a naturalized Australian
citizen, was legally capacitated to
marry
petitioner
on
January
12,
1994. We
agree
with
petitioners
contention that the court a quo erred in
finding that the divorce decree ipso
facto clothed respondent with the legal
capacity to remarry without requiring
him to adduce sufficient evidence to
show the Australian personal law
governing his status; or at the very
least, to prove his legal capacity to
contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioners
prayer to declare her marriage to
respondent null and void on the ground
of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that
under Australian law, he was really
capacitated to marry petitioner as a
direct
result
of
the
divorce
decree. Hence, we believe that the most
judicious course is to remand this case
to the trial court to receive evidence, if
any, which show petitioners legal
capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in
that, then the court a quo may declare a
nullity of the parties marriage on the
ground of bigamy, there being already
in evidence two existing marriage
certificates, which were both obtained
in the Philippines, one in Malabon,
Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and
the other, in Cabanatuan City dated
January 12, 1994.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of

orderly
procedure
and
substantial
justice, we REMAND the case to the
court a quo for the purpose of receiving
evidence
which
conclusively
show
respondents legal capacity to marry
petitioner; and failing in that, of
declaring the parties marriage void on
the ground of bigamy, as above
discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo,
(Chairman),
Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez,
JJ., concur.
[1]

Penned by Judge Feliciano V.

Buenaventura; rollo, pp. 7-9.
[2]
Rollo, p. 10.
[3]
Ibid., p. 9.
[4]
Rollo, p. 37.
[5]
Ibid., p. 47.
[6]
Id., p. 44.
[7]
Id., p. 36.
[8]
Annex 1; temporary rollo, p. 9.
[9]
The couple secured an Australian
Statutory Declaration of their legal
separation and division of conjugal assets.
See Annexes 3 and 4 of Respondents
Comment; rollo, p. 48.
[10]
Id., pp. 33-35.
[11]
Id., p. 39.
[12]
Amended Answer, p. 2; rollo, p. 39.
[13]
Id., pp. 77-78.
[14]
Id., p. 43.
[15]
Rollo, pp. 48-51.
[16]
TSN, December 16, 1998, pp. 1-8;
records, pp. 172-179.
[17]
RTC Order of December 16, 1998; ibid.,
p. 203.
[18]
The case was deemed submitted for
decision on January 11, 2000, upon this
Courts receipt of the Memorandum for
petitioner, signed by Atty. Olivia VelascoJacoba. The Memorandum for respondent,
signed by Atty. Gloria V. Gomez of Gomez
and Associates, had been filed on December
10, 1999.
[19]
Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 8-9; rollo,
pp. 242-243.
[20]
43 Phil. 43, 49, March 3, 1922.
[21]
Ruben F. Balane, Family Courts and
Significant Jurisprudence in Family
Law, Journal of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, 1st & 2nd Quarters, 2001, Vol.
XXVII, No. 1, p. 25.
[22]
ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights
and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon

citizens of the Philippines, even though

living abroad.
[23]
ART. 17. The forms and solemnities of
contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws
of the country in which they are executed.
xxxxxxxxx
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their
acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.
[24]
Tenchaves v. Escano 15 SCRA 355, 362,
November 29, 1965; Barretto Gonzalez v.
Gonzalez, 58 Phil. 67, 71-72, March 7, 1933.
[25]
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside
the Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5), and
(6), 36, 37, and 38. (71a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (As amended by EO 227, prom. July 27,
1987)
[26]
Cf. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr., 139 SCRA 139,
143-144, October 8, 1985; and Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653, 663, June 30,
1989.
[27]
Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr., supra.
[28]
Ibid., p. 143.
[29]
For a detailed discussion of Van
Dorn, see Salonga, Private International
Law, 1995 ed. pp. 295-300. See also Jose C.
Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and
Jurisprudence, 1993 ed., p. 16;
[30]
SEC. 19. Classes of documents.For the
purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of
the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether in the Philippines, or of a
foreign country.
x x x x x x x x x.
[31]
Burr W. Jones, Commentaries on the Law
of Evidence in Civil Cases, Vol. IV, 1926 ed.,
p. 3511; 3, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence provides that when the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself.

[32]

SEC. 19. Classes of documents. For the

purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of
the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether in the Philippines, or of a
foreign country.
x x x x x x x x x.
[33]
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must
state. Whenever a copy of a document or
record is attested for the purpose of
evidence, the attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of
the original, or a specific part thereof, as
the case may be. The attestation must be
under the official seal of the attesting
officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk
of a court having a seal, under the seal of
such court.
[34]
Sec. 24. Proof of official record.The
record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof
or by a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is
not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is
kept is in a foreign country, the certificate
may be made by a secretary of the embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, viceconsul, or consular agent or by any officer
in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept, and authenticated by the
seal of his office.
See also Asiavest Ltd. v. Court of
Appeals, 296 SCRA 539, 550-551,
September 25, 1998; Pacific Asia Overseas
Shipping Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 161 SCRA 122, 133-134, May 6,
1988.
[35]
The transcript of stenographic notes
states that the original copies of the
divorce decrees were presented in court
(TSN, December 16, 1998, p. 5; records, p.
176), but only photocopies of the same
documents were attached to the records
(Records, Index of Exhibits, p. 1.).
[36]
TSN, December 15, 1998, p. 7; records,
p. 178.
[37]
TSN, December 16, 1998, p. 7; records,
p. 178.
[38]
People v. Yatco, 97 Phil. 941, 945,
November 28, 1955; Marella v. Reyes, 12
Phil. 1, 3, November 10, 1908; People v.
Diaz, 271 SCRA 504, 516, April 18, 1997; De

la Torre v. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 196,

203-204, August 14, 1998; Maunlad Savings
& Loan Asso., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, GR
No. 114942, November 27, 2000, pp. 8-9.
[39]
Art. 15, Civil Code.
[40]
Joaquin Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines: A
Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 566.
[41]
Ricardo J. Francisco, Evidence: Rules of
Court in the Philippines, second edition, p.
382.
[42]
Ibid., p. 384.
[43]
Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Court of
Appeals, GR No. 119602, October 6, 2000, p.
7.
[44]
Francisco, p. 29, citing De los Angeles v.
Cabahug, 106 Phil. 839, December 29, 1959.
[45]
27A CJS, 15-17, 1.
[46]
Ibid., p. 611-613, 161.
[47]
27A CJS, 625, 162.
[48]
Rollo, p. 36.
[49]
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or
final orders.The effect of a judgment or final
order of a tribunal of a foreign country,
having jurisdiction to render the judgment
or final order is as follows:
xxxxxxxxx
(b) In case of a judgment or final order
against a person, the judgment or final
order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order
may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.
[50]
In passing, we note that the absence of
the said certificate is merely an irregularity
in complying with the formal requirement
for procuring a marriage license. Under
Article 4 of the Family Code, an irregularity
will not affect the validity of a marriage
celebrated on the basis of a marriage
license issued without that
certificate. (Vitug, Compendium, pp. 120126; Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family
Code of the Philippines, 1997 reprint, p. 17;
Rufus Rodriguez, The Family Code of the
Philippines Annotated, 1990 ed., p. 42;
Melencio Sta. Maria Jr., Persons and Family
Relations Law, 1999 ed., p. 146.)
[51]
Records, pp. 1-3.
[52]
Ibid., p. 4.
[53]
Id., p. 5.
[54]
Id., p. 180.
[55]
Id., pp. 170-171.
[56]
Id., pp. 84-89.
[57]
Id., pp. 181-182.
[58]
Id., pp. 40-41.
[59]
Id., p. 183.

[60]

Id., pp. 184-187.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-32473

October 6, 1930

MELECIO MADRIDEJO, assisted by his

guardian ad litem, Pedro Madridejo, plaintiffappellee,
vs.
GONZALO DE LEON, ET AL., defendantsappellants.
L. D. Abaya and S. C. Pamatmat for
appellants.
Aurelio Palileo for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This is a rehearsing of the appeal taken by the
defendants, Gonzalo de Leon et al. from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna holding as follows:
Wherefore, the court finds that Melecio
Madridejo is Domingo de Leon's next of
kin, and hereby orders the defendants
in case No. 5258 to restore and deliver
the ownership and possession of the
property described in the complaints
filed in the aforesaid case, to Melecio
Madridejo, without cost. So ordered.
In support of their appeal the defendants
assign the following alleged errors as
committed by the trial court, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in holding that
the marriage between Pedro Madridejo
and Flaviana Perez is valid.
2. The lower court also erred in
declaring that solely because of the
subsequent marriage of his parents,
the appellee Melecio Madridejo, a
natural child, was legitimated.
3. The lower court lastly erred in not
rendering judgment in favor of the
defendants and appellants.

The relevant facts necessary for the decision

of all the questions of fact and of law raised
herein are as follows:
Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, man and
wife, had but one child, Domingo de Leon. The
wife and son survived Eulogio de Leon, who
died in the year 1915. During her widowhood,
Flaviana Perez lived with Pedro Madridejo, a
bachelor. The registry of births of the
municipality of Siniloan, Laguna, shows that
on June 1, 1917, a child was born to Pedro
Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, which was
named Melecio Madridejo, the necessary data
being furnished by Pedro Madridejo (Exhibit
B). On June 17, 1917, a 24-day old child of
Siniloan, Laguna, as a son of Flaviana Perez,
no mention being made of the father (Exhibit
2). On July 8, 1920, Flaviana Perez, being at
death's door, was married to Pedro Madridejo,
a bachelor, 30 years of age, by the parish
priest of Siniloan (Exhibit A). She died on the
following day, July 9, 1920, leaving Domingo
de Leon, her son by Eulogio de Leon, and the
plaintiff-appellee Melecio Madridejo, as well
as her alleged second husband, Pedro
Madridejo. Domingo de Leon died on the 2nd
of May, 1928.
With regard to the first assignment of error,
the mere fact that the parish priest of
Siniloan, Laguna, who married Pedro
Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, failed to send a
copy of the marriage certificate to the
municipal secretary does not invalidate the
marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing
that the essential requisites required by law
for its validity were lacking in the ceremony,
and the forwarding of a copy of the marriage
certificate is not one of said essential
requisites.
Touching the second assignment of error,
there has been no attempt to deny that
Melecio Madridejo, the plaintiff-appellee, is
the natural son of the Pedro Madridejo and
Flaviana Perez, The only question to be
decided is whether the subsequent marriage
of his parents legitimated him.
Article 121 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 121. Children shall be considered
as legitimated by a subsequent
marriage only when they have been

acknowledged by the parents before or

after the celebration thereof.
According to this legal provision, in order that
a subsequent marriage may be effective as a
legitimation, the natural children born out of
wedlock must have been acknowledged by the
parents either before or after its celebration.
The Civil Code has established two kinds of
acknowledgment: voluntary and compulsary.
Article 131 provides for the voluntary
acknowledgment by the father or mother as
follows:
Art. 131. The acknowledgment of a
natural child must be made in the
record of birth, in a will, or in some
other public document.
Article 135 provides for the compulsary
acknowledgment by the father, thus:
Art. 135. The father may be compelled
to acknowledge his natural child in the
following cases:
1. When an indisputable paper written
by him, expressly acknowledging his
paternity, is in existence.
2. When the child has been in the
uninterrupted possession of the status
of a natural child of the defendant
father, justified by the conduct of the
father himself of that of his family.
3. In cases of rape, seduction, or
abduction, the provisions of the Penal
Code with regard to the
acknowledgment of the issue, shall be
observed.
Article 136 providing for the compulsory
acknowledgment by the mother, reads:
Art. 136. The mother may be compelled
to acknowlegde her natural child:
1. When the child is, with respect to the
mother, included in any of the cases
mentioned in the next preceding
article.
2. When the fact of the birth and the
identity of the child are fully proven.

Let us see whether the plaintiff-appellee,

Melecio Madridejo, has been acknowledged by
his parents Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana
Perez, under any of the provisions above
quoted.
To begin with the father, no document has
been adduced to show that he has voluntarily
acknowledged Melecio Madridejo as his son,
except the registry certificate of birth, Exhibit
B. This, of course, is not the record of birth
mentioned in the law, for it lacks the
requisites of article 48 of the Law of Civil
Registry. It, no doubt, is a public instrument,
but it has neither been executed nor signed
by Pedro Madridejo, and contains no
statement by which he acknowledges Melecio
Madridejo to be his son. Although as Pedro
Madridejo testified, he furnished the
municipal secretary of Siniloan with necessary
data for recording the birth of Melecio
Madridejo, and although said official inscribed
the data thus given in the civil registry of
births, this is not sufficient to bring it under
the legal provision regarding acknowledgment
by a public document.
As to the mother, it does not appear that
Flaviana Perez supplied the data set forth in
the civil registry of births, Exhibit B, or in the
baptismal register, where of Exhibit 2 is a
certificate, and which constitutes final proof
only of the baptism, and not of the kinship or
parentage of the person baptized (Adriano vs.
De Jesus, 23 Phil., 350). Furthermore, church
registers of baptism are no longer considered
public documents (United States vs.
Evangelista, 29 Phil., 215).
Melecio Madridejo, then, was not voluntarily
acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo or Flaviana
Perez, either before or after their marriage.
1awph!

l.net

Did Pedro Madridejo acknowledge Melecio

Madridejo as his son, by compulsion?

In the instant action brought by Melecio

Madridejo not only has he not demanded to be
acknowledged as a natural child, which is the
condition precedent to establishing his
legitimation by the subsequent marriage and
his right to the estate of his uterine brother,
Domingo de Leon, but he has not even
impleaded either his father Pedro Madridejo,
or the heirs of his mother, Flaviana Perez, in
order that the court might have authority to
make a valid and effective pronouncement of
his being a natural child, and to compel them
to acknowledge him as such.
The plaintiff-appellee alleges that the second
paragraph of the defendants' answer amounts
to an admission that he is indeed Flaviana
Perez's son, and relieves him of the burden of
proving that his mother acknowledged him as
a son before her marriage. Such an admission
would have been affective if the present
action had been brought for the purpose of
compelling Flaviana Perez or her heirs to
acknowledge the appellee as her son.
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that
Melecio Madridejo has not been acknowledged
by Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, either
voluntarily or by compulsion, before or after
their marriage, and therefore said marriage
did not legitimate him.
Wherefore, the judgment is reversed, the
complaint dismissed, and the defendants
absolved with costs against the appellee
without prejudice to any right he may have to
establish or compel his acknowledgment as
the natural son of Pedro Madridejo and
Flaviana Perez. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Villamor,
Ostrand and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
JOHNS, J., dissenting:

The compulsory acknowledgment by the

father established in article 135 of the Civil
Code, and by the mother according to article
136, requires that the natural child take
judicial action against the father or mother, or
against the persons setting themselves up as
the heirs of both, for the purpose of
compelling them to acknowledge him as a
natural son through a judgment of the court.

I dissent and the judgment of the lower court

should be affirmed.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-9005

Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the

complaint.

June 20, 1958

ARSENIO DE LORIA and RICARDA DE

LORIA, petitioners,
vs.
FELIPE APELAN FELIX, respondent.
Guido Advincula and Nicanor Lapuz for
petitioners.
Nicodemus L. Dasig for respondent.
BENGZON, J.:
Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals,
involving the central issue of the validity of
the marriage in articulo mortis between Matea
de la Cruz and Felipe Apelan Felix.
It appears that long before, and during the
War of the Pacific, these two persons lived
together as wife and husband at Cabrera
Street, Pasay City. They acquired properties
but had no children. In the early part of the
liberation of Manila and surrounding territory,
Matea be came seriously ill. Knowing her
critical condition, two young ladies of legal
age dedicated to the service of God, named
Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra1 visited
and persuaded her to go to confession. They
fetched Father Gerardo Bautista, Catholic
parish priest of Pasay. The latter, upon
learning that the penitent had been living
with Felipe Apelan Felix without benefit of
marriage, asked both parties to ratify their
union according to the rites of his Church.
Both agreed. Whereupon the priest heard the
confession of the bed-ridden old woman, gave
her Holy Communion, administered the
Sacrament of Extreme Unction and then
solemnized her marriage with Felipe Apelan
Felix in articulo mortis,2 Carmen Ordiales and
Judith Vizcarra acting as sponsors or
witnesses. It was then January 29 or 30, 1945.
After a few months, Matea recovered from her
sickness; but death was not to be denied, and
in January 1946, she was interred in Pasay,
the same Fr. Bautista performing the burial
ceremonies.
On May 12, 1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda
de Loria filed this complaint to compel
defendant to an accounting and to deliver the
properties left by the deceased. They are
grandchildren of Adriana de la Cruz, sister of
Matea, and claim to be the only surviving
forced heirs of the latter. Felipe Apelan Felix
resisted the action, setting up his rights as
widower. They obtained favorable judgment in
the court of first instance, but on appeal the

Their request for review here was given due

course principally to consider the legal
question-which they amply discussed in their
petition and printed brief whether the
events which took place in January 1945
constituted, in the eyes of the law, a valid and
binding marriage.
According to the Court of Appeals:
There is no doubt at all in the mind of this
Court, that Fr. Gerardo Bautista, solemnized
the marriage in articulo mortis of Defendant
Apelan Felix and Matea de la Cruz, on January
29 and 30, 1945, under the circumstances set
forth in the reverend's testimony in court. Fr.
Bautista, a respectable old priest of Pasay City
then, had no reason to side one or the
other. . . . Notwithstanding this positive
evidence on the celebration or performance of
the marriage in question, Plaintiffs-Appellees
contend that the same was not in articulo
mortis, because Matea de la Cruz was not
then on the point of death. Fr. Bautista clearly
testified, however, that her condition at the
time was bad; she was bed-ridden; and
according to his observation, she might die at
any moment (Exhibit 1), so apprehensive was
he about her condition that he decided in
administering to her the sacrament of
extreme unction, after hearing her confession.
. . . .The greatest objection of the Appellees
and the trial court against the validity of the
marriage under consideration, is the admitted
fact that it was not registered.
The applicable legal provisions are contained
in the Marriage Law of 1929 (Act No. 3613) as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 114 (Nov.
1936) specially sections 1, 3, 20 and 21.
There is no question about the officiating
priest's authority to solemnize marriage.
There is also no question that the parties had
legal capacity to contract marriage, and that
both declared before Fr. Bautista and Carmen
Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra that "they took
each other as husband and wife."
The appellants' contention of invalidity rests
on these propositions:
(a) There was no "marriage contract" signed
by the wedded couple the witnesses and the
priest, as required by section 3 of the
Marriage Law; and
(b) The priest filed no affidavit, nor recorded
the marriage with the local civil registry.

The factual basis of the first proposition no

signing may seriously be doubted. The
Court of Appeals made no finding thereon.
Indeed if anything, its decision impliedly held
such marriage contract to have been
executed, since it said "the marriage in
articulo mortis was a fact", and the only
question at issue was whether "the failure of
Fr. Bautista to send copies of the certificate of
marriage in question to the Local Civil
Registrar and to register the said marriage in
the Record of Marriages of the Pasay Catholic
Church . . . renders the said marriage invalid."
And such was the only issue tendered in the
court of first instance. (See p. 14, 34, Record
on Appeal.)
However, we may as well face this second
issue: Does the failure to sign the "marriage
certificate or contract" constitute a cause for
nullity?
Marriage contract is the "instrument in
triplicate" mentioned in sec. 3 of the Marriage
Law which provides:
Sec. 3. Mutual Consent. No particular form
for the ceremony of marriage is required, but
the parties with legal capacity to contract
marriage must declare, in the presence of the
person solemnizing the marriage and of two
witnesses of legal age, that they take each
other as husband and wife. This declaration
shall be set forth in an instrument in
triplicate, signed by signature or mark by the
contracting parties and said two witnesses
and attested by the person solemnizing the
marriage. . . . (Emphasis ours).
In the first place, the Marriage Law itself, in
sections 28, 29 and 30 enumerates the causes
for annulment of marriage. Failure to sign the
marriage contract is not one of them.
In the second place, bearing in mind that the
"essential requisites for marriage are the
legal capacity of the contracting parties and
their consent" (section 1), the latter being
manifested by the declaration of "the parties"
"in the presence of the person solemnizing the
marriage and of two witnesses of legal age
that they take each other as husband and
wife" which in this case actually
occurred.3 We think the signing of the
marriage contract or certificate was required
by the statute simply for the purpose of
evidencing the act.4 No statutory provision or
court ruling has been cited making it
an essential requisite not
the formal requirement of evidentiary value,
which we believe it is. The fact of marriage is
one thing; the proof by which it may be
established is quite another.

Certificate and Record. Statutes relating to

the solemnization of marriage usually provide
for the issuance of a certificate of marriage
and for the registration or recording of
marriage . . . Generally speaking, the
registration or recording of a marriage is not
essential to its validity, the statute being
addressed to the officials issuing the license,
certifying the marriage, and making the
proper return and registration or recording.
(Sec. 27 American Jurisprudence "Marriage" p.
197-198.)
Formal Requisites. . . . The general rule,
however, is that statutes which direct that a
license must be issued and procured, that
only certain persons shall perform the
ceremony, that a certain number of witnesses
shall be present, that a certificate of the
marriage shall be signed, returned, and
recorded, and that persons violating the
conditions shall be guilty of a criminal offense,
are addressed to persons in authority to
secure publicity and to require a record to be
made of the marriage contract. Such statutes
do not void common-law marriages unless
they do so expressly, even where such
marriage are entered into without obtaining a
license and are not recorded. It is the purpose
of these statutes to discourage deception and
seduction, prevent illicit intercourse under the
guise of matrimony, and relieve from doubt
the status of parties who live together as man
and wife, by providing competent evidence of
the marriage. . . . (Section 15 American
Jurisprudence "Marriage" pp. 188-189.)
Emphasis Ours. (See also Corpus Juris
Secundum "Marriage" Sec. 33.)
And our law says, "no marriage shall be
declared invalid because of the absence of
one or several formal requirements of this Act
. . . ." (Section 27.)
In the third place, the law, imposing on the
priest the duty to furnish to the parties copies
of such marriage certificate (section 16) and
punishing him for its omission (section 41)
implies his obligation to see that such
"certificate" is executed accordingly. Hence, it
would not be fair to visit upon the wedded
couple in the form of annulment, Father
Bautista's omission, if any, which apparently
had been caused by the prevailing disorder
during the liberation of Manila and its
environs.
Identical remarks apply to the priest's failure
to make and file the affidavit required by
sections 20 and 21. It was the priest's
obligation; non-compliance with it, should
bring no serious consequences to the married
pair, specially where as in this case, it was
caused by the emergency.

The mere fact that the parish priest who

married the plaintiff's natural father and
mother, while the latter was in articulo mortis,
failed to send a copy of the marriage
certificate to the municipal secretary, does
not invalidate said marriage, since it does not
appear that in the celebration thereof all
requisites for its validity were not present,
the forwarding of a copy of the marriage
certificate not being one of the requisites.
(Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179.) See
also Madridejo vs. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1.
The law permits in articulo mortis marriages,
without marriage license; but it requires the
priest to make the affidavit and file it. Such
affidavit contains the data usually required for
the issuance of a marriage license. The
first practically substitutes the latter. Now
then, if a marriage celebrated without the
license is not voidable (under Act 3613),5 this
marriage should not also be voidable for lack
of such affidavit.
In line with the policy to encourage the
legalization of the union of men and women
who have lived publicly in a state of
concubinage6, (section 22), we must hold this
marriage to be valid.
The widower, needless to add, has better
rights to the estate of the deceased than the
plaintiffs who are the grandchildren of her
sister Adriana. "In the absence of brothers or
sisters and of nephews, children of the former,
. . . the surviving spouse . . . shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased. (Art 952,
Civil Code.)
Wherefore, the Court of Appeals' decision is
affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista
Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia,
and Felix, JJ.,concur.
Footnotes

Now a nun at Sta. Escolastica College.

In his presence, Matea and Felipe
expressed mutual consent to be
thenceforward husband and wife.
3
p. 49 Record on Appeal.
4
And to prevent fraud, as petitioners
contend, p. 30 brief. See Corpuz Juris
Secundum, Vol. 55 p. 899.
5
Because it is a formal requisite"
(Section 7 as amended. See American
Jurisprudence, supra. However, the New
Civil Code seemingly rules otherwise.
(Art. 80 (3) ).
1
2

Section 22 Act 3613; Article 76 New

Civil Code.
6

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16925

March 31, 1962

FABIAN PUGEDA, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RAPAEL TRIAS, MIGUEL TRIAS, SOLEDAD
TRIAS, assisted by her husband Angel
Sanchez,
CLARA TRIAS, assisted by her husband
Victoriano Salvanera,
GABRIEL TRIAS, minors ROMULO VINIEGRA,
GLORIA VINIEGRA
and FERNANDO VINIEGRA, JR., assisted by
guardian-ad-litem, Rafael Trias,
TEOFILO PUGEDA, and VIRGINIA PUGEDA,
assisted by her husband Ramon
Portugal, defendants-appellants.
Placido Ramos for plaintiff-appellee.
Cajulis, Trias and Viniegra for defendantsappellants Trias, et al.
Ramon C. Aquino for defendants-appellants
Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda.
LABRADOR, J.:
The subject of this action, which was appealed
from the Court of First Instance of Cavite, is
certain lands acquired from the Friar Lands
Estate Administration known as lots Nos. 225,
226, 269, 311, 1803, 1814, 1816, 1832, 2264,
2265, 2266, 2282, 2284, 2378, 2412, 2282,
2683, 2685, 2686, 2688, 2722, 3177 and 3178
of the San Francisco de Malabon estate
located in General Trias, Cavite, a house of
strong materials, a barn (camarin) also of
strong materials, and a store also of strong
materials in General Trias, Cavite and sets of
household furniture. The plaintiff claims
participation in the said properties on the
ground that the same were acquired by him
and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, with whom
plaintiff contracted marriage in January, 1916
and who died on February 11, 1934.
The defendants Rafael, Miguel, Soledad,
Clara, Constancia and Gabriel, all surnamed
Trias are the children of the deceased Maria C.
Ferrer with her first husband Mariano Trias,
while the defendants Teofilo Pugeda and
Virginia Pugeda are children of the plaintiff
with said deceased Maria C. Ferrer.

The plaintiff alleges that during the lifetime of

the marriage between himself and the
deceased Maria C. Ferrer, they acquired with
conjugal partnership funds lots Nos. 273,
2650, 2680, 2718 and 2764 of the San
Francisco de Malabon estate with the
following interest therein; 71% in lot No. 273,
82% in lot No. 2650, 77% in lot No. 2652, 77%
in lot No. 2080, 64% in lot No. 2718 and 76%
in lot No. 2764; that plaintiff is the owner of
one-half of the said interest in the lots abovementioned; that upon the death of Maria C.
Ferrer in 1934 plaintiff and defendants
became co-owners of said properties and
defendants managed the properties in trust as
co-owners thereof. Plaintiff prays that the
properties above described, acquired as
conjugal properties by the plaintiff and
deceased Maria C. Ferrer, be partitioned -and
one-half thereof be given as share therein of
plaintiff.
The defendants surnamed Trias and Viniegra
denied the claims of the plaintiff to the
properties described in the complaint, or that
said properties had been administered by the
defendants in trust as co-owners with the
plaintiff, and by way of special and affirmative
defense they alleged that the properties
subject of the complaint had been inherited
by the defendants from their deceased father
Mariano Trias and deceased mother Maria C.
Ferrer and had been in possession and full
enjoyment thereof for more than 10 years,
peacefully, uninterruptedly, quietly and
adversely under a claim of ownership to the
exclusion of all others, and that plaintiff is
estopped from claiming or asserting any
rights or participation in the said properties.
Defendants Trias also denied for lack of
knowledge and belief the claim of plaintiff in
his complaint that he was married to Maria C.
Ferrer and that the marriage continued up to
the death of the latter in 1934. They further
presented a counterclaim against the plaintiff
for the sum of P40,000, this amount being
what was contributed by them in support of
the candidacies of plaintiff when running for
the office of provincial governor of Cavite.
They also filed a counterclaim for 30 pieces of
Spanish gold coins and P5,000 in cash
amounting in value to the total sum of
P50,000 and a counterclaim for P100,000
which is the value of four big parcels of land
belonging to the defendants which the
plaintiff had appropriated for his own use.
The defendants Pugeda joined the plaintiff in
the latter's claim that the properties
mentioned in plaintiff's complaint were joint
properties of the plaintiff and the defendants.
They also allege that the properties had gone
to the management and control of the
defendants Trias who should be required to

answer for the fruits and profits thereof

during the administration by them of said
properties. As cross-claim against their codefendants, they allege that they are each
entitled to one-eighth of the properties left by
their mother as listed in the first ten
paragraphs of the complaint, as well as a
share of one-eighth each in lots Nos. 98, 2015
of the San Francisco de Malabon estate and in
a parcel of land in Lingad, Litiit in Silang,
Cavite and in 60 heads of cattle.
Plaintiff denied the counterclaim of the
defendants Trias and the defendants Trias,
answering the cross-claim of their codefendants Pugeda, denied all the allegations
contained in the answer of the defendants
Pugeda, and further alleged that the crossclaim is improper as the same should be the
subject of probate proceedings, and the
defendants Pugeda are estopped and barred
by prescription from claiming any further right
to the properties left by their deceased
mother.
There are two questions or issues raised in
the present case. The first is the alleged
existence of a marriage of Fabian Pugeda and
Maria C. Ferrer. The second is the claim of the
plaintiff to various lands acquired from the
Friar Lands Estate under certificates of sale
issued first in the name of Mariano Trias and
later assigned to Maria C. Ferrer, but paid for
in part during the marriage of plaintiff and
Maria C. Ferrer. A third but minor issue is the
claim for furniture alleged by plaintiff to have
been bought by him and Maria C. Ferrer
during the marriage, which plaintiff claims is
in the possession of the defendants.
On the first issue, the existence of marriage,
plaintiff and his witness Ricardo Ricafrente
testified that in the afternoon of January 5,
1916, on the eve of Epiphany or Three Kings,
plaintiff and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer
went to the office of the Justice of the Peace,
who was then witness Ricardo Ricafrente, to
ask the latter to marry them; that accordingly
Ricafrente celebrated the desired marriage in
the presence of two witnesses one of whom
was Santiago Salazar and another Amado
Prudente, deceased; that after the usual
ceremony Ricafrente asked the parties to sign
two copies of a marriage contract, and after
the witnesses had signed the same, he
delivered one copy to the contracting parties
and another to the President of the Sanitary
Division, which officer was at that time the
keeper of the records of the civil register.
Plaintiff and his witnesses explained that no
celebration of the marriage was held inspite
of the prominence of the contracting parties
because plaintiff was then busy campaigning
for the office of Member of the Provincial

Board and Maria C. Ferrer was already on the

family way.
The defendants denied the existence of the
marriage and introduced a photostatic copy of
the record of marriages in the municipality of
Rosario, Cavite, in the month of January, 1916,
which showed that no record of the alleged
marriage existed therein; but this absence
was explained by the Justice of the Peace that
perhaps the person who kept the register
forgot tomake an entry of the marriage in the
registry.
Other witnesses were introduced to the effect
that after the marriage plaintiff lived in the
house of Maria C. Ferrer, which was the house
of spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer.
Evidence was also submitted to the effect that
the first issue was baptized on August 26,
1917 and the one who acted as sponsor was a
sister-in-law of Maria C. Ferrer. The baptismal
certificate submitted states that the baptized
child was the issue of the spouses Fabian
Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer. The registry of
said birth was also submitted and it states
that the father is Fabian Pugeda and the
mother is Maria C. Ferrer.

The judge who heard the evidence, after a

review of he testimonial and documental
evidence, arrived at the conclusion that
plaintiff Fabian Pugeda was in fact married to
Maria C. Ferrer on January 5, 1916, this
conclusion being borne out not only by the
chain of circumstances but also by the
testimonies of the witnesses to the
celebration of the marriage, who appeared to
be truthful, as well as by the fact that plaintiff
and deceased Maria C. Ferrer lived together
as husband and wife for eighteen years (19161934) and there is a strong presumption that
they were actually married.
On the competency of the evidence submitted
by plaintiff to prove the marriage we cite the
following authority: .
Art. 53. As to marriages contracted
subsequently, no proof other than a certificate
of the record in the civil register shall be
admitted, unless such books have never been
kept, or have disappeared, or the question
arises in litigation, in which cases the
marriage may be proved by evidence of any
kind. (p. 27, Civil Code) .

It is also not denied that after the marriage,

plaintiff cohabited with the deceased wife, as
husband and wife, until the death of the
latter, publicly and openly as husband and
wife. Lastly, a document entitled "Project of
Partition" (Exhibit 5-Trias) was signed by the
parties defendants themselves. The document
contains the following significant statement or
admission: .

The mere fact that the parish priest who

married the plaintiff's natural father and
mother, while the latter was in articulo mortis,
failed to send a copy of the marriage
certificate to the municipal secretary, does
not invalidate said marriage, since it does not
appear that in the celebration thereof all
requisites for its validity were not present,
and the forwarding of a copy of the marriage
certificate not being one of said requisites.
(Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil., 1) .

WHEREAS the parties hereto are the only

children and forced heirs of the said
deceased: Rafael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara,
Constancia, and Gabriel, all surnamed Trias y
Ferrer, are the children of her first marriage
with Mariano Trias, now deceased; and Teofilo
and Virginia, both surnamed Pugeda y
Ferrer,are the children of her second marriage
with Fabian Pugeda..

Testimony by one of the parties to the

marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the
marriage, has been held to be admissible to
prove the fact of marriage. The person who
officiated at the solemnization is also
competent to testify as an eyewitness to the
fact of marriage. (55 C.J.S., p. 900).

.... That it is hereby agreed by and between

the parties hereto that lots Nos. 3177 and
3178 known as the Buenavista property will
be administered by one of the parties to be
agreed upon and for said purpose they
appoint MIGUEL F. TRIAS, and all earnings,
rentals and income or profits shall be
expended for the improvement and welfare of
the said property and for the payment of all
claims and accounts of our deceased mother
Maria C. Ferrer, and for the maintenance and
education of Teofilo and Virginia Pugeda y
Ferrer.

In our judgment the evidence submitted

shows conclusively that plaintiff Fabian
Pugeda was in fact married to Maria C. Ferrer,
said marriage subsisting from 1916 until
1934, upon the death of the latter, and we
affirm the finding of the trial court to that
effect.
On the second issue the evidence introduced
at the trial shows that the lands subject of the
action were formerly Friar Lands included in
the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, province
of Cavite, which were acquired under
certificates of sale in the name of Mariano
Trias in the year 1910 and later assigned to

his widow Maria C. Ferrer in the year 1916.

The different lots, the dates of their
acquisition and assignment to said Maria C.
Ferrer, widow are set forth in a table
appended to this decision as Annex "A".
On the basis of the facts about their
acquisition and assignment Judge Lucero
declared that the lots in question were
conjugal properties of Mariano Trias and Maria
C. Ferrer, and consequently decreed that 1/2
thereof, should be adjudicated to Mariano
Trias, as the latter's share in the conjugal
properties, to be divided among his 6 children
at the rate of 1/6 each, and the other half to
Maria C. Ferrer, as her share in the conjugal
properties, to be assigned to her children by
both marriages at the rate of 1/9 each and the
balance of 1/9 to widower Fabian Pugeda in
usufruct. From this judgment the case was
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
When the case was before the Court of
Appeals, the attorneys for the defendants
presented a motion for new trial on the
ground that they discovered copies of four
documents namely Annexes "A", "B" "C,"
"D" and "E" Record on Appeal, pp. 108-117,
(The last document is a copy of a court order
issued by Judge Manuel V. Moran approving
the project of partition in Case No. 860,
Intestate estate of Mariano Trias) which if
admitted might alter the decision. The Court
of Appeals granted the motion and remanded
the case to the Court of First Instance of
Cavite for the consideration of said evidence.
Upon the return of the case to the Court of
First Instance, Judge Primitivo Gonzales who
then presided the court, rendered a new
decision. Judge Gonzales found that the total
amount paid by Mariano Trias and Maria C.
Ferrer on the lots in question amounts to only
P8,911.84, while the installments paid during
the marriage of the spouses Fabian Pugeda
and Maria C. Ferrer totaled P35,146.46. He
also found that lots 3177 and 3178 were paid
for during the marriage of Pugeda and Ferrer
in the total sum of P16,557.32. Judge Gonzales
therefore ruled that the two marriages should
participate in the ownership of the lands,
according to the actual contributions made by
each marriage in the installments in payment
of the lands. The dispositive part of the
decision, now subject of the appeal, is as
follows: .
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION,
the Court hereby renders judgment: .
1. That lots 2378, 225, 226, 269, 311, 1808,
1804, 1816; 1832, 2264, 2265, 2282, 2284,
2412, 2682, 273, 2650, 2652, 2680, 2718,

2764 (21 lots) are conjugal assets of Pugeda

and Maria C. Ferrer in the proportion of
percentage and indicated in each individual
lot;
2. That lots 3177 and 3178, since all the
installments for the same were fully paid
during the marriage of Pugeda and Maria C.
Ferrer are hereby declared conjugal of the
couple Pugeda and Ferrer; and even some of
the installments for these two lots were paid
after the death of Maria C. Ferrer, they do not
loss the character of conjugal property for
payments were made from the crops thereof;
3. That since Mariano Trias during his
marriage to Maria C. Ferrer contributed in the
payment for the installments of these 21 lots
amounting to P8,911.84, half of which must be
reimbursed in favor of the children or heirs of
Mariano Trias to be paid from the mass of the
hereditary estate of Maria C. Ferrer; the other
half of P4,455.92 to be distributed among all
the children or heirs of Maria C. Ferrer in her
first and second marriage to be deducted from
the mass of her estate;
4. That lots 2266, 2683, 2685, 2686, 2688 and
2722 since all the installments for these six
(6) lots were fully paid during marriage of
Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, they are
hereby declared to be conjugal between them
one half of which must go to the children or
heirs of Mariano Trias, the other half must
equally go to the children or heirs of Maria C.
Ferrer in her first and second marriage;
5. That Miguel Trias as administrator of all the
properties which commenced after the death
of his mother who died on February 11, 1934,
must render an accounting of his
administration within three (3) months time
from the date this judgment has become final.
6. That defendants Trias to pay the costs of
this action. (Record on Appeal, pp. 154-156) .
Against this ruling the appeal has come to this
Court. Defendants-appellants claim that Judge
Gonzales had no power or authority to change
the decision of Judge Lucero, as it was not he
but Judge Lucero himself, who had heard the
evidence. They have also assigned before Us a
set of errors which may be boiled down to the
three main issues set forth above. As the
issue of marriage has already been considered
we will now pass to the second and more
important question as to whether the land
subject of the action may be considered
conjugal properties of the first marriage or of
the second or of both.

A consideration of the legal nature and

character of the acquisition of the various lots
is necessary that the issues in the action may
be justly determined.
A study of the provisions of the Friar Lands
Act (Act No. 1120) discloses that the friar
lands were purchased by the government for
sale to actual occupants (actual settler and
occupants at the time said land are acquired
by the Government). (Paragraph 3 of
Declaration of Purposes, Act 1120). The said
act expressly declares that the land are not
public land in the sense in which this word is
used in the Public Land Act, and their
acquisition is not governed by the provisions
of the Public Land Act (Par. IV, Declaration of
Purposes, Id.) .
The pertinent provisions of said Act No. 1120
are as follows: .
Sec. 12. .... When the costs thereof shall
have been thus ascertained, the Chief of the
Bureau of Public Lands shall give the said
settler and occupant a certificate which shall
set forth in detail that the Government has
agreed to sell to such settler and occupant the
amount of land so held by him, at the price so
fixed, payable as provided in this Act at the
office of the Chief of the Bureau of Public
Lands, in gold coin of the United States or its
equivalent in Philippine currency, and that
upon the payment of the final installment
together with all accrued interest the
Government will convey to such settler and
occupant the said land so held by him by
proper instrument of conveyance, which shall
be issued and become effective in the manner
provided in section one hundred and twentytwo of the Land Registration Act. ...
Sec. 13. The acceptance by the settler and
occupant of such certificate shall be
considered as an agreement by him to pay the
purchase price so fixed and in the installments
and at the interest specified in the certificate,
and he shall by such acceptance become a
debtor to the Government in that amount
together with all accrued interest. ....
Provided however, That every settler and
occupant who desires to purchase his holding
must enter into the agreement to purchase
such holding by accepting the said certificate
and executing the said receipt whenever
called on so to do by the Chief of the Bureau
of Public Lands, and a failure on the part of
the settler and occupant to comply with this
requirement shall be considered as a refusal
to purchase, and he shall be ousted as above
provided and thereafter his holding may be
leased or sold as in case of unoccupied
lands: ....

Sec. 15. The Government hereby reserves

the title to each and every parcel of land sold
under the provisions of this Act until the full
payment of all installments of purchase
money and interest by the purchaser has been
made, and any sale or incumbrance made by
him shall be invalid as against the
Government of the Philippine Islands and shall
be in all respects subordinate to its prior
claim.
Sec. 16. In the event of the death of a
holder of a certificate the issuance of which is
provided for in section twelve hereof, prior to
the execution of a deed by the Government to
any purchaser, his widow shall be entitled to
receive a deed of the land stated in the
certificate upon showing that she has
complied with the requirements of law for the
purchase of the same. In case a holder of a
certificate dies before the giving of the deed
and does not leave a widow, then the interest
of the holder of the certificate shall descend
and deed shall issue to the persons who under
the laws of the Philippine Islands would have
taken had the title been perfected before the
death of the holder of the certificate, upon
proof of the holders thus entitled of
compliance with all the requirements of the
certificate. In case the holder of the certificate
shall have sold his interest in the land before
having complied with all the conditions
thereof, the purchaser from the holder of the
certificate shall be entitled to all the rights of
the holder of the certificate upon presenting
his assignment to the Chief of the Bureau of
Public Lands for registration. (Vol. III, Public
Laws, pp. 315-316).
A study of the above quoted provisions clearly
indicates that the conveyance executed in
favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so-called
certificate of sale, is a conveyance of the
ownership of the property, subject only to the
resolutory condition that the sale may be
cancelled if the price agreed upon is not paid
for in full. In the case at bar the sale
certificates were made in favor of Mariano
Trias, and upon his death they were assigned
in accordance with Sec. 16, to his widow. But
the law provides that when the buyer does not
leave a widow, the rights and interests of the
holder of the certificate of sale are left to the
buyer's heirs in accordance with the laws of
succession. In the case of the Director of
Lands, et al. vs. Ricardo Rizal, et al., G.R. No.
2925 prom. December 29, 1950, this court
thru Mr. Justice Montemayor held: .
... All this clearly and inevitably leads to the
conclusion that the purchaser, even before the
payment of the full price and before the
execution of the final deed of conveyance, is
considered by the law as the actual owner of

the lot purchased, under obligation to pay in

full the purchase price, the role or position of
the Government being that of a mere lien
holder or mortgagee.
... In conclusion, we find and hold that in the
sale of a Friar Lands lot or parcel under Act
1120, pending payment in full of the purchase
price, altho the Government reserves title
thereto, merely for its protection, the
beneficial and equitable title is in the
purchaser, and that any accretion received by
the lot even before payment of the last
installment belongs to the purchaser thereof.
We also invite attention to the fact that a sale
of friar lands is entirely different from a sale
of public lands under the provisions of the
Public Land Act. In the case of public lands, a
person who desires to acquire must first apply
for the parcel of land desired. Thereafter, the
land is opened for bidding. If the land is
awarded to an applicant or to a qualified
bidder the successful bidder is given a right of
entry to occupy the land and cultivate and
improve it (Secs. 22-28, Commonwealth Act
141). It is only after satisfying the
requirements of cultivation and improvement
of 1/5 of the land that the applicant is given a
sales patent (Sec. 30).
In the case of friar lands the purchaser
becomes the owner upon issuance of the
certificate of sale in his favor, subject only to
cancellation thereof in case the price agreed
upon is not paid. In case of sale of public
lands if the applicant dies and his widow
remarries both she and the second husband
are entitled to the land; the new husband has
the same right as his wife. Such is not the
case with friar lands. As indicated in Section
16 of Act 1120, if a holder of a certificate dies
before the payment of the price in full, the
sale certificate is assigned to the widow, but if
the buyer does not leave a widow, the right to
the friar lands is transmitted to his heirs at
law.
It is true that the evidence shows that of the
various parcels of land now subject of the
action none was paid for in full during the
marriage of Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer,
and that payments in installments continued
to be made even after the marriage of Pugeda
and Maria C. Ferrer on January 5, 1916. But it
is also true that even after said marriage the
certificates of sale were assigned to Maria C.
Ferrer and installments for the lots after said
marriage continued in the name of Maria C.
Ferrer; also all the amounts paid as
installments for the lots were taken from the
fruits of the properties themselves, according
to the admission of plaintiff Fabian Pugeda
himself, thus: .

Mr. Viniegra:
Q De los productos de pesos terrenos,
durante la administracion por los
demandados, recibia Vd. su
participation?
A No, seor.
Q Nunca? .
A Because I know there are
obligations to be paid to the Bureau of
Lands, and I have been informed that
the obligations have been paid annually
from the products of the land.
Q Therefore, from the products of
these lands - the proceeds - the
obligations to the Bureau of Lands are
being discounted from the said
proceeds and after the remainder, as in
palay, are equally divided, is that what
you mean to say ? .
A Perhaps they were following the
practice that, from the products of the
lands the obligations to the Bureau of
Lands would be paid.
Court: .
Q Pero Vd. no ha recibido ninguna
cantidad, o sea les darian alguna
participation?
A No seor, porque estaba en Manila,
but they informed me that the
obligations to the Bureau of Lands were
being paid from the products of the
lands.
Mr. Viniegra: .
Q You do not claim any participation
in the remainder of the products after
paying the Bureau of Lands? .
A How would I ask for I knew they
were still paying the obligations to the
Bureau of Lands - that was until the
Japanese time, and I knew some
obligations were not paid, as a result of
which the sales certificates of some big
lots were cancelled.
Court:
Q Como se mantenia Vd.? .
A Mi madre tenia la casa en Manila y
ella recibia alguna renta. My mother
helped me. (Session of November 20,
1951, before Judge A. G. Lucero, pp.
259-261, Matro.) (Brief for DefendantsAppellants, pp. 49-51).
There is another reason why the above
conclusion must be upheld in the case at bar,
and that is the fact that in the proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased

Mariano Trias, which was instituted in August

1915, the inventory of the estate left by said
deceased included the lots purchased from
the Friar Lands Estates (Exh. 2, Trias) and the
project of partition in said special proceedings
submitted to the court as Exh. 3-Trias
adjudicated 1/2 of said lands as the share of
Mariano Trias in the conjugal properties, the
other 1/2 being awarded to Maria C. Ferrer.
The above considerations, factual and legal,
lead us to the inevitable conclusion that the
friar lands purchased as above described and
paid for, had the character of conjugal
properties of the spouses Mariano Trias and
Maria C. Ferrer. But another compelling legal
reason for this conclusion as against plaintiff,
is the judicial pronouncement on said nature
of the lands in question. In the year 1915,
even before the marriage of plaintiff and
Maria C. Ferrer took place, the latter was
appointed administratrix of the estate of her
deceased husband Mariano Trias in Civil Case
No. 860 of the Court of First Instance of Cavite
(Exh. "1" Trias). An inventory of the estate left
by the deceased Mariano Trias, dated January
15, 1929, was submitted by her and on April
10, 1929, the project of partition of the
properties was submitted. The project
includes the friar lands subject of the action,
and in accordance with it one-half of the
properties listed in the inventory was
adjudicated to the deceased Mariano Trias as
his share and the other half adjudicated to
Maria C. Ferrer also as her share. The share of
Mariano Trias was decreed in favor of his
children and heirs. This project of partition
was approved by Judge Manuel V. Moran in an
order dated February 11, 1929, submitted to
the Court of Appeals as Annex "E", pp. 114115 of the record on appeal.
The pendency of the above intestate
proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of Mariano Trias must have been known to
plaintiff Fabian Pugeda, who is a lawyer. It
does not appear, and neither does he claim or
allege, that he ever appeared in said
proceedings to claim participation in the
properties subject of the proceedings. His
failure to intervene in the proceedings to
claim that the friar lands or some of them
belonged to himself and his wife Maria C.
Ferrer, shows a conviction on his part that the
said friar lands actually belonged to the
spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, and
that he had no interest therein. The project of
partition was approved as late as 1929, by
which time plaintiff and defendant had
already been married for a period of 13 years.
Plaintiff's failure to assert any claim to the
properties in the said intestate proceedings
during its pendency now bars him absolutely

from asserting the claim that he now pretends

to have to said properties.
We will now proceed to consider plaintiff's
claim that the lands in question had, through
the joint effort of himself and his wife,
increased in productivity from 900 cavans to
2,400 cavans of rice because of the
introduction therein of improvements such as
a system of irrigation for the lands. If, as
admitted by plaintiff himself, the installments
remaining unpaid were taken from the
produce or the yield of the said lands and if it
be taken into account that one-half of said
lands already belonged to the children of the
first marriage, to whom the lands were
adjudicated in the settlement of the estate of
their father, the deceased Mariano C. Trias,
the only portion of the products or produce of
the lands in which plaintiff could claim any
participation is the one-half share therein
produced from the paraphernal properties of
Maria C. Ferrer. How much of said produce
belonging to Maria C. Ferrer was actually used
in the improvement of the lands is not shown,
but the fact that plaintiff was engaged in
continuous political campaigns, ever since his
marriage in 1916 (he had devoted most of his
time while married to Maria C. Ferrer to
politics), portions of the products of the
paraphernal properties of Maria C. Ferrer
must have been used in these political
campaigns as well as in meeting the expenses
of the conjugal partnership. The value of the
useful improvements introduced on the lands,
joint properties of Maria C. Ferrer and her
children, was not proved in court by plaintiff.
Hence the provisions of Article 1404 of the old
Civil Code, to the effect that useful
expenditures for the benefit of the separate
properties of one of the spouses are
partnership properties, cannot be applied. But
even if such useful improvements had been
proved, the statute of limitations bars
plaintiff' action to recover his share therein
because Maria C. Ferrer died in 1934, whereas
the present action was instituted by plaintiff
only in the year 1948. After the death of Maria
C. Ferrer, plaintiff came to Manila, took a
second wife, and was not heard from for 14
years, that is, until he instituted this action in
1948. His claim for the improvements, if any,
is therefore also barred.
1wph1.t

The above ruling, that the action to demand

his share in the value of the improvements in
the paraphernal properties of Maria C. Ferrer
is barred, is also applicable to the claim of the
plaintiff herein for the construction alleged to
have been made and the furniture supposedly
bought by him and his spouse Maria C. Ferrer,
and which had the character of conjugal
partnership property of said spouses. In the
year 1935, defendants herein presented a

project of partition to plaintiff for his

signature (the project of partition is dated
March, 1935 and is mark Exhibit "5"-Trias). In
this project of partition of the properties of
the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, mention is made
of the participation of the plaintiff's children
with the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, but no
mention is made therein of any participation
that plaintiff had or could have as usufruct or
otherwise, or in any building or improvement.
This deed of partition was shown to plaintif
but the latter did not sign it.

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS,

the plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed,
and the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Cavite, Hon. Antonio C. Lucero,
presiding, decreeing the division of the
properties of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer
among her eight children and plaintiff, is
hereby modified in the sense that all of her
properties be divided among her eight
children at the rate of one-eight per child. As
thus modified, the judgment of Judge Lucero
is hereby affirmed. Without costs.

The express omission of the name of plaintiff

here in the above deed of partition as one of
the heirs of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer was
enough notice to plaintiff that defendants had
intended to deprive him of any share or
participation in the properties left by the
deceased Maria C. Ferrer, even of the usufruct
that the law assigns to him. But in spite of his
knowledge of this fact no action was taken by
him until February, 1948 when plaintiff
demanded his share in the properties and
later brought this action.

Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera,

Paredes, Dizon and De Leon, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J. and Padilla, J., took no part.

The period of around 13 years therefore

elapsed before plaintiff instituted this action.
Consequently, whatever rights he may have
had to any portion of the estate left by the
deceased Maria C. Ferrer, as a usufructuary or
otherwise, must be deemed to have
prescribed. As a consequence, we find that
the order of Judge Lucero granting to the
plaintiff herein one-ninth share in the estate
of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer in usufruct
should be set aside and the objection to the
grant of such share to plaintiff on the ground
of prescription is sustained.
Having disposed of the claims of plaintiff
Fabian Pugeda, we will now proceed to
consider the cross-claim of his children,
namely, Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda.
Judge Lucero decreed that the properties left
by the deceased Maria C. Pugeda, be divided
among her children, including the two crossclaimants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda,
and decreed one-ninth of the properties of the
said deceased Maria C. Ferrer to each of these
two children of hers with the plaintiff and
assigning also to the plaintiff one-ninth share
in the said estate left by her in usufruct.
In view of our finding that the claim of the
plaintiff to any share in the estate of his wife
Maria C. Ferrer is already barred by the
statute of limitations, the decree entered by
Judge Lucero declaring that her properties be
divided into nine parts, one part belonging to
each heir and one to plaintiff in usufruct, is
hereby modified, by eliminating the share in
usufruct of the plaintiff therein and increasing
the share of each of her heirs to one-eighth.

ANNEX "A"
Lands included in action - Dates of acquisition and assignment.

Lot
Number

Date of Sale
to Mariano
Trias

Date of Assignment
to
Maria C. Ferrer

Certificate
of Title

225

April 30, 1960

May 17, 1915

226

April 5, 1910

May 17, 1915

269

April 5, 1910

May 17, 1915

311

April 13, 1910

May 17, 1915

1808(3)

April 13, 1910

May 15, 1915

1814

Not known

May 17, 1915

1816

April 13, 1910

May 17, 1915

1832

April 13, 1910

May 17, 1915

2284

Nov. 1, 1910

Not known

2265

Nov. 1, 1910

July 11, 1924

2266

Nov. 1, 1910

Not known

July 11, 1924

2282

April 30, 1910

Not known

July 11, 1924

2284

Nov. 1, 1910

Not known

July 11, 1924

2378

April 30, 1910

May 17, 1915

2412

April 30, 1910

May 17, 1915

2682

Nov. 1, 1910

Not known

July 11, 1924

2683

Nov. 1, 1910

Not known

July 11, 1924

2685

Nov. 1, 1910

Not known

July 11, 1924

2686

Nov. 1, 1910

Not known

2688

Nov. 1, 1910

Not known

2722

Jan. 1, 1913

Not known

3177

Jan. 25, 1913

May 17, 1915

3178

Jan. 25, 1913

May 17, 1915

July 11, 1924

July 11, 1924

Other lots included in the complaint on which evidence was

submitted are the following:
273

April 30, 1910

May 17, 1915

2650

April 27, 1910

April 17, 1915

2672

April 30, 1910

May 17, 1915

2718

April 30, 1910

May 17, 1915

2765

April 30, 1910

May 17, 1915

Two other additional lots are the following:.

2225

July 1, 1909

2226

July 1, 1909

May 17, 1915

Sept. 20,
1924.

Sold to Ignacio Ascano

later to M. Trias on
July 1, 1910.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-61873 October 3l, 1984
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,
vs.
ELIAS BORROMEO, defendant-appellant.
RELOVA, J.:

crying. Elias Borromeo was lying near Susana

still holding on to a bloody kitchen bolo.
Susana's father called for the Mabolo police
and, after a few minutes, police officer
Fernando C. Abella and three policemen
arrived. The peace officers shouted and
ordered Elias to open the door. Elias answered
calmly that he would smoke first before he
would open the door. When he did, the peace
officers found Susana already dead, her
intestine having spilled out of her abdomen. A
small kitchen bolo was at her side.
When questioned, the accused Elias Borromeo
could only mumble incoherent words.
Dr. Jesus Serna, police medico-legal officer,
submitted his necropsy report (Exhibits "A" &
"B") which states that the cause of death was
"stab wounds, multiple chest, abdomen, left
supraclavicular region and left shoulder."
There were five (5) incised wounds and six (6)
stab wounds on the deceased.

+.wph!1

Appeal from the decision of the then Circuit

Criminal Court, Fourteenth Judicial District,
Cebu-Bohol (now Regional Trial Court), finding
accused Elias Borromeo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory
penalties of the law; to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased Susana Taborada-Borromeo, in
the sum of P12,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to
pay the costs.
Records show that at high noon of July 3,
1981, the four-year old niece of Elias and
Susana Borromeo reported to Matilde
Taborada, mother of Susana, that Susana was
shouting frantically for help because Elias was
killing her. The 71-year old Matilde Taborada
told the child to go to Geronimo Taborada, her
son, who was then working in their mango
plantation. Upon hearing the report of the
child, Geronimo informed his father and
together they went to Susana's hut. The
windows and the door were closed and
Geronimo could only peep through the
bamboo slats at the wall where he saw Susana
lying down, motionless, apparently dead
beside her one-month old child who was

In his brief, accused-appellant contends that

the trial court erred (1) in holding as it did
that appellant and Susana Taborada (the
deceased) were legally and validly married in
a church wedding ceremony, when the
officiating priest testified otherwise and there
was no marriage contract executed on the
occasion or later on; hence, the accused could
only be liable for homicide; (2) in failing to
appreciate in favor of appellant the mitigating
circumstances of provocation or obfuscation
and voluntary surrender, without any
aggravating circumstance to offset the same;
and, (3) in convicting appellant of the crime of
parricide and in imposing upon him the
penultimate penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Appellant in his brief, page 9, concurs with
"the trial court's finding to the effect that he
killed Susana Taborada (the deceased)
without legal justification" The main issue
raised by him is that he and Susana were not
legally married and therefore the crime
committed is not parricide, but homicide.
Other than the stand of appellant's counsel
against the existence of marriage in order to
lessen or mitigate the penalty imposable upon
his client, accused Elias Borromeo himself
admitted that the deceased-victim was his

legitimate wife. Hereunder is his testimony on

this point:
t.hqw

Q Please state your name, age and other

personal circumstances?
A ELIAS BORROMEO, 40 years old, married,
farmer, resident of Putingbato, Babag Cebu
City.
The COURT:

t.hqw

Q You say you are married, who is your

wife?
A Susana Taborada.
Q When did you get married with Susana
Taborada?
A I forgot.
Q Where did you get married?
A Near the RCPI station in Babag.
Q There is a church there?
A There is a chapel.
Q Were you married by a priest or a
minister?
A By a priest.
Q Who is this priest?
A Father Binghay of Guadalupe.
Q Do you have any children with Susana
Taborada?
A We have one.
Q How old is the child?
A I already forgot, I have been here for
quite a long time already. (pp. 4-5, tsn.,
December 12, 1981 hearing)
There is no better proof of marriage than the
admission of the accused of the existence of
such marriage. (Tolentino vs. Paras, 122 SCRA
525).
Person living together in apparent matrimony
are presumed, in the absence of any counter
presumption or evidence special to the case,
to be in fact married. The reason is that such
is the common order of society, and if the
parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living
in constant violation of decency and law. (Son
Cui vs. Guepangco, 22 Phil. 216) The
presumption in favor of matrimony is one of
the strongest known in law. The law presumes
morality, and not immorality; marriage, and
not concubinage: legitimacy, and not
bastardy. There is the presumption that
persons living together as husband and wife
are married to each other. The reason for this
presumption of marriage is well stated
in Perido vs. Perido, 63 SCRA 97, thus:
t.hqw

The basis of human society throughout the

civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage is
not only a civil contract, but it is a new
relation, an institution in the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law
leans toward legal matrimony. ...
And, the mere fact that no record of the
marriage exists in the registry of marriage
does not invalidate said marriage, as long as
in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its
validity are present. The forwarding of a copy
of the marriage certificate to the registry is
not one of said requisites. (Pugeda vs. Trias, 4
SCRA 849).
Anent the second and third assigned errors,
suffice it to say that the penalty for parricide
is reclusion perpetua to death. (Article 246,
Revised Penal Code) Paragraph 3, Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code, provides that where
the law prescribed a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties and the commission of
the act is attended by some mitigating
circumstances, with no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be
applied. Thus, assuming the presence of the
mitigating circumstances of provocation or
obfuscation and voluntary surrender, without
any aggravating circumstance to offset the
same, the penalty is still reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED, with the modification that the
indemnity of P12,000.00 is increased to
P30,000.00. With costs.
SO ORDERED.

1wph1.t

Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera,

Plana, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992
MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET
AL., petitioners,
vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO

MARIATEGUI, JULIAN MARIATEGUI and PAULINA
MARIATEGUI,respondents.
Montesa, Albon & Associates for petitioners.
Parmenio B. Patacsil, Patacsil Twins Law Office
for the heirs of the late Maria del Rosario
Mariategui.
Tinga, Fuentes & Tagle Firm for private
respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of
the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated
December 24, 1980 in CA-G.R. No. 61841,
entitled "Jacinto Mariategui, et al. v. Maria del
Rosario Mariategui, et al.," reversing the
judgment of the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch VIII ** at Pasig, Metro Manila.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June
26, 1953 (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp.
116; 8). During his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui
contracted three (3) marriages. With his first
wife, Eusebia Montellano, who died on
November 8, 1904, he begot four (4) children,
namely: Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana
and Ireneo. Baldomera died and was survived
by her children named Antero, Rufina,
Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and
Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo also
died and left a son named Ruperto. With his
second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a
daughter named Cresenciana who was born on
May 8, 1910 (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 36).
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's
third wife) got married sometime in 1930.
They had three children, namely: Jacinto, born
on July 3, 1929, Julian, born on February 16,
1931 and Paulina, born on April 19, 1938.
Felipa Velasco Mariategui died in 1941
(Rollo, Ibid).
At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left
certain properties which he acquired when he
was still unmarried (Brief for
respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 4). These
properties are described in the complaint as

Lots Nos. 163, 66, 1346 and 156 of the

Muntinglupa Estate (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 39).
On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by
his first and second marriages, namely, Maria
del Rosario, Urbana, Ruperto, Cresencia, all
surnamed Mariategui and Antero, Rufina,
Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and
Federico, all surnamed Espina, executed a
deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they
adjudicated unto themselves Lot No. 163 of
the Muntinglupa Estate. Thereafter, Lot No.
163 was the subject of a voluntary
registration proceedings filed by the
adjudicatees under Act No. 496, and the land
registration court issued a decree ordering
the registration of the lot. Thus, on April 1,
1971, OCT No. 8828 was issued in the name of
the above-mentioned heirs. Subsequently, the
registered owners caused the subdivision of
the said lot into Lots Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for
which separate transfer certificates of title
were issued to the respective parties
(Rollo, ibid).
On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third
marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto, Julian
and Paulina) filed with the lower court an
amended complaint claiming that Lot No. 163
together with Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154
were owned by their common father, Lupo
Mariategui, and that, with the adjudication of
Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs, they (children of
the third marriage) were deprived of their
respective shares in the lots. Plaintiffs pray
for partition of the estate of their deceased
father and annulment of the deed of
extrajudicial partition dated December 2,
1967 (Petition, Rollo, p. 10). Cresencia
Mariategui Abas, Flaviana Mariategui Cabrera
and Isabel Santos were impleaded in the
complaint as unwilling defendants as they
would not like to join the suit as plaintiffs
although they acknowledged the status and
rights of the plaintiffs and agreed to the
partition of the parcels of land as well as the
accounting of their fruits (Ibid., Rollo, p. 8;
Record on Appeal, p. 4).
The defendants (now petitioners) filed an
answer with counterclaim (Amended Record
on Appeal, p. 13). Thereafter, they filed a
motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of
cause of action and prescription. They
specifically contended that the complaint was
one for recognition of natural children. On

August 14, 1974, the motion to dismiss was

denied by the trial court, in an order the
dispositive portion of which reads:
It is therefore the opinion of the Court that
Articles 278 and 285 of the Civil Code cited by
counsel for the defendants are of erroneous
application to this case. The motion to dismiss
is therefore denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. (Ibid, p. 37).
However, on February 16, 1977, the complaint
as well as petitioners' counterclaim were
dismissed by the trial court, in its decision
stating thus:
The plaintiffs' right to inherit depends upon
the acknowledgment or recognition of their
continuous enjoyment and possession of
status of children of their supposed father.
The evidence fails to sustain either premise,
and it is clear that this action cannot be
sustained. (Ibid, Rollo, pp. 67-68)
The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals on the ground that the trial court
committed an error ". . . in not finding that the
parents of the appellants, Lupo Mariategui
and Felipa Velasco (were) lawfully married,
and in holding (that) they (appellants) are not
legitimate children of their said parents,
thereby divesting them of their
inheritance . . . " (Rollo, pp. 14-15).
On December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision declaring all the children
and descendants of Lupo Mariategui,
including appellants Jacinto, Julian and
Paulina (children of the third marriage) as
entitled to equal shares in the estate of Lupo
Mariategui; directing the adjudicatees in the
extrajudicial partition of real properties who
eventually acquired transfer certificates of
title thereto, to execute deeds of
reconveyance in favor, and for the shares, of
Jacinto, Julian and Paulina provided rights of
innocent third persons are not prejudiced
otherwise the said adjudicatees shall
reimburse the said heirs the fair market value
of their shares; and directing all the parties to
submit to the lower court a project of partition
in the net estate of Lupo Mariategui after
payment of taxes, other government charges
and outstanding legal obligations.

The defendants-appellees filed a motion for

reconsideration of said decision but it was
denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition
which was given due course by the court on
December 7, 1981.
The petitioners submit to the Court the
following issues: (a) whether or not
prescription barred private respondents' right
to demand the partition of the estate of Lupo
Mariategui, and (b) whether or not the private
respondents, who belatedly filed the action
for recognition, were able to prove their
successional rights over said estate. The
resolution of these issues hinges, however, on
the resolution of the preliminary matter, i.e.,
the nature of the complaint filed by the
private respondents.
The complaint alleged, among other things,
that "plaintiffs are the children of the
deceased spouses Lupo Mariategui . . . and
Felipa Velasco"; that "during his lifetime, Lupo
Mariategui had repeatedly acknowledged and
confirmed plaintiffs as his children and the
latter, in turn, have continuously enjoyed such
status since their birth"; and "on the basis of
their relationship to the deceased Lupo
Mariategui and in accordance with the law on
intestate succession, plaintiffs are entitled to
inherit shares in the foregoing estate (Record
on Appeal, pp. 5 & 6). It prayed, among
others, that plaintiffs be declared as children
and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and adjudication
in favor of plaintiffs their lawful shares in the
estate of the decedent (Ibid, p. 10).
A perusal of the entire allegations of the
complaint, however, shows that the action is
principally one of partition. The allegation
with respect to the status of the private
respondents was raised only collaterally to
assert their rights in the estate of the
deceased. Hence, the Court of Appeals
correctly adopted the settled rule that the
nature of an action filed in court is determined
by the facts alleged in the complaint
constituting the cause of action (Republic vs.
Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]).
It has been held that, if the relief demanded is
not the proper one which may be granted
under the law, it does not characterize or
determine the nature of plaintiffs' action, and
the relief to which plaintiff is entitled based
on the facts alleged by him in his complaint,

although it is not the relief demanded, is what

determines the nature of the action (1 Moran,
p. 127, 1979 ed., citing Baguioro vs. Barrios,
et al., 77 Phil. 120).
With respect to the legal basis of private
respondents' demand for partition of the
estate of Lupo Mariategui, the Court of
Appeals aptly held that the private
respondents are legitimate children of the
deceased.
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were
alleged to have been lawfully married in or
about 1930. This fact is based on the
declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui
to Jacinto who testified that "when (his) father
was still living, he was able to mention to
(him) that he and (his) mother were able to
get married before a Justice of the Peace of
Taguig, Rizal." The spouses deported
themselves as husband and wife, and were
known in the community to be such. Although
no marriage certificate was introduced to this
effect, no evidence was likewise offered to
controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere
fact that no record of the marriage exists does
not invalidate the marriage, provided all
requisites for its validity are present (People
vs. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 [1984]).
Under these circumstances, a marriage may
be presumed to have taken place between
Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man
and a woman, deporting themselves as
husband and wife, have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage; that a child born in
lawful wedlock, there being no divorce,
absolute or from bed and board is legitimate;
and that things have happened according to
the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life (Section 5 (z), (bb), (cc), Rule
131, Rules of Court; Corpus v. Corpus, 85
SCRA 567 [1978]; Saurnaba v. Workmen's
Compensation, 85 SCRA 502 [1978]; Alavado
v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230
[1985]; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA
439 [1985]).
Courts look upon the presumption of marriage
with great favor as it is founded on the
following rationale:
The basis of human society throughout the
civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in
this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but

it is a new relation, an institution in the

maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of
the law leans toward legalizing matrimony.
Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of
any counterpresumption or evidence special
to that case, to be in fact married. The reason
is that such is the common order of society
and if the parties were not what they thus
hold themselves out as being, they would be
living in the constant violation of decency and
of
law . . . (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil.
43, 56 [1922] quoted in Alavado vs. City
Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230
[1985]).
So much so that once a man and a woman
have lived as husband and wife and such
relationship is not denied nor contradicted,
the presumption of their being married must
be admitted as a fact (Alavado v. City Gov't. of
Tacloban, supra).
The Civil Code provides for the manner under
which legitimate filiation may be proven.
However, considering the effectivity of the
Family Code of the Philippines, the case at bar
must be decided under a new if not entirely
dissimilar set of rules because the parties
have been overtaken by events, to use the
popular phrase (Uyguangco vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 76873, October 26, 1989).
Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code, there
are only two classes of children legitimate
and illegitimate. The fine distinctions among
various types of illegitimate children have
been eliminated (Castro vs. Court of Appeals,
173 SCRA 656 [1989]).
Article 172 of the said Code provides that the
filiation of legitimate children may be
established by the record of birth appearing in
the civil register or a final judgment or by the
open and continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child.
Evidence on record proves the legitimate
filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's
birth certificate is a record of birth referred to
in the said article. Again, no evidence which
tends to disprove facts contained therein was
adduced before the lower court. In the case of
the two other private respondents, Julian and
Paulina, they may not have presented in

evidence any of the documents required by

Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the
status of children of Lupo Mariategui in the
same manner as their brother Jacinto.
While the trial court found Jacinto's
testimonies to be inconsequential and lacking
in substance as to certain dates and names of
relatives with whom their family resided,
these are but minor details. The nagging fact
is that for a considerable length of time and
despite the death of Felipa in 1941, the
private respondents and Lupo lived together
until Lupo's death in 1953. It should be noted
that even the trial court mentioned in its
decision the admission made in the affidavit of
Cresenciana Mariategui Abas, one of the
petitioners herein, that " . . . Jacinto, Julian
and Paulina Mariategui ay pawang mga
kapatid ko sa ama . . ." (Exh. M, Record on
Appeal, pp. 65-66).
In view of the foregoing, there can be no other
conclusion than that private respondents are
legitimate children and heirs of Lupo
Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation
prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action
for recognition is inapplicable to this case.
Corollarily, prescription does not run against
private respondents with respect to the filing
of the action for partition so long as the heirs
for whose benefit prescription is invoked,
have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the
co-ownership. In other words, prescription of
an action for partition does not lie except
when the co-ownership is properly repudiated
by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing
Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire
by prescription the share of the other coowners absent a clear repudiation of coownership duly communicated to the other coowners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342
[1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand
partition is imprescriptible and cannot be
barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA
55 [1987]). On the other hand, an action for
partition may be seen to be at once an action
for declaration of co-ownership and for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate
portion of the property involved (Roque vs.
IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).

Petitioners contend that they have repudiated

the co-ownership when they executed the
extrajudicial partition excluding the private
respondents and registered the properties in
their own names (Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 20).
However, no valid repudiation was made by
petitioners to the prejudice of private
respondents. Assuming petitioners'
registration of the subject lot in 1971 was an
act of repudiation of the co-ownership,
prescription had not yet set in when private
respondents filed in 1973 the present action
for partition (Ceniza vs. C.A., 181 SCRA 552
[1990]).
In their complaint, private respondents
averred that in spite of their demands,
petitioners, except the unwilling defendants
in the lower court, failed and refused to
acknowledge and convey their lawful shares in
the estate of their father (Record on Appeal,
p. 6). This allegation, though denied by the
petitioners in their answer (Ibid, p. 14), was
never successfully refuted by them. Put
differently, in spite of petitioners' undisputed
knowledge of their relationship to private
respondents who are therefore their co-heirs,
petitioners fraudulently withheld private
respondent's share in the estate of Lupo
Mariategui. According to respondent Jacinto,
since 1962, he had been inquiring from
petitioner Maria del Rosario about their
(respondents) share in the property left by
their deceased father and had been assured
by the latter (Maria del Rosario) not to worry
because they will get some shares. As a
matter of fact, sometime in 1969, Jacinto
constructed a house where he now resides on
Lot No. 163 without any complaint from
petitioners.
Petitioners' registration of the properties in
their names in 1971 did not operate as a valid
repudiation of the co-ownership. In Adille
vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462
[1988]), the Court held:
Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation
of co-ownership, must have been preceded by
repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of
repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain
conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the coownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is
clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3)
the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive;
and (4) he has been in possession through open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
of the property for the period required by law.

xxx xxx xxx

CONCEPCION, J.:

It is true that registration under the Torrens

system is constructive notice of title, but it has
likewise been our holding that the Torrens title
does not furnish shield for fraud. It is therefore
no argument to say that the act of registration is
equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming
there was one, notwithstanding the longstanding rule that registration operates as a
universal notice of title.

Inasmuch as petitioners registered the

properties in their names in fraud of their coheirs prescription can only be deemed to have
commenced from the time private
respondents discovered the petitioners' act of
defraudation (Adille vs. Court of
Appeals, supra). Hence, prescription definitely
may not be invoked by petitioners because
private respondents commenced the instant
action barely two months after learning that
petitioners had registered in their names the
lots involved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated December 24, 1980 is Affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Davide, Jr. and
Romero, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* Penned by Associate Justice Elias B. Asuncion,
concurred by Sison, P.V. and Censon, JJ.
** Presided by Judge Serafin E. Camilon.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-43701

March 6, 1937

In re Instate of the deceased Marciana

Escao.
ANGELITA JONES., petitioner-appellantappellee,
vs.
FELIX HORTIGUELA, as administrator, widower
and heir, oppositor-appellant-appellee.
Salvador E. Imperial for petitioner-appellantappellee.
Vicente L. Faelnar , Hipolito Alo and Ciriaco S.
Salazar for oppositor-appellant-appellee.

This is an appeal taken from the order issued

by the Court of First Instance of Cebu on
March 14, 1935 , in the intestate proceedings
of the deceased Marciana Escao, denying
thereby: (1) the motion to appoint a new
administrator and (2) to set aside the order of
May 9, 1932, declaring the heirs of said
deceased; (3) holding it unwarranted to
declare that the properties of the intestate
estate are paraphernal properties of said
deceased, but reserving to the parties the
right to discuss which of said properties are
paraphernal and which are conjugal;
(4)setting aside the order of January 10, 1933.
granting to the administrator fees in the sum
of P10,000, and that of June 26, 1933,
approving the project of portion and the final
account; and (5) ordering the presentation of
another project of partition and final account.
As Marciana Escao had died intestate, her
widower Felix Hortiguela was appointed
judicial administrator of her entire estate, and
in an order issued on May 9, 1932, Angelita
Jones, her daughter by her first marriage, and
Felix Hortiguela, her widower by her second
marriage, were declared her only heirs. In a
motion filed with the conformity of the
guardian of the heiress Angelita Jones, Felix
Hortiguela, as administrator, prayed that his
fees, as such, be fixed at P10,000 which was
granted by the court in its order of January 10,
1933. The administrator later presented an
inventory of the properties left by said
deceased Marciana Escao, a final account of
his administration, and a project of partition
of the intestate estate wherein he adjudicated
to himself a part of the estate in payment of
his share of the conjugal properties and his
usufructuary right, and the remaining part to
Angelita Jones. The latter, who was a minor,
was represented in the proceedings by her
guardian Paz Escao de Corominas. The
project of partition and final account were
approved in an order of June 26, 1933, and the
properties were turned over to the respective
grantees by virtue thereof.
On May 3, 1934, the heiress Angelita Jones,
then married to Ernesto Lardizabal, filed a
motion alleging that she was the only heir of
her mother, the deceased Marciana Escao;
that there never was a valid marriage
between her mother and Felix Hortiguela or

that had such marriage been celebrated, it

was null and void; and even granting that it
were valid, Felix Hortiguela was not entitled
to a share in usufruct of one-third of the
inheritance; that the petitioner was a minor
and that during the hearing of the intestate
proceedings she had not been assisted by
counsel but was represent by the same
attorney of Felix Hortiguela; that during said
proceedings there had been committed many
errors and inaccuracies which impaired her
rights and that the fees of P10,000 charged by
the administrator were highly unreasonable
and unconscionable. She prayed: (a) for the
reopening of the proceedings; (b) that her
husband appointed special administrator
without bond; (c) that her mother's alleged
marriage to Felix Hortiguela be declared null
and void; (d) that the partition of the
properties made by administrator or
Hortiguela be declared null and void that
petitioner be declared the only universal heir
of her deceased mother; and (e) that in case
there was a valid marriage between Felix
Hortiguela and Marciana Escao, Hortiguela
be declared not entitled to the widower's
usufruct; the errors in the administrator's
account be corrected; the latter be granted a
remuneration of only P4 a day, and new
partition of the properties be made.
After Hortiguela's answer had been filed and
the evidence for both parties received, the
court issued the order of March 14, 1935, the
provisions of which are stated in the first
paragraph of this decision. Both parties
appealed therefrom.
The principal question upon the resolution of
which depends that of the others, is whether
or not Felix Hortiguela's alleged marriage to
Marciana Escao was celebrated.
It is a fact that in December, 1914, Marciana
Escao married Arthur W. Jones in the
suburban catholic church of San Nicolas,
Province of Cebu. On January 10, 1918, Jones
secured a passport to go abroad and
thereafter nothing was ever heard of him. In
October, 1919, proceedings were institute in
the Court of First Instance of Maasin, Leyte, at
the instance of Marciana Escao, to have her
husband judicially declared an absentee. On
the 25th of said month, the court issued an
order declaring Arthur W. Jones an absentee
from the Philippine Islands pursuant to the

provisions of article 186 of the Civil Code, with

the proviso that said judicial declaration of
absence would not take effect until six months
after its publication in the official newspapers.
Said order directed the publication thereof in
the Official Gazette and in the newspaper "El
Ideal". Pursuant thereto, said order was
published in the Official Gazette during the
month of December, 1919, and January,
February, March, April, May and June, 1920.
On April 23, 1921, the court issued another
order for the taking effect of the declaration
of absence, publication thereof having been
made in the Official Gazette and in "El Ideal."
On May 6, 1927, Felix Hortiguela and Marciana
Escao were married before the justice of the
peace of Malitbog, Leyte, and they signed the
certificate of marriage.
Now, Angelita Jones contends that the
declaration of absence must be understood to
have been made not in the order of October
25, 1919, but in that of April 23, 1921, and
that from the latter date to May 6, 1927, the
date of the celebration of the marriage, only 6
years and 14 days elapsed; and in accordance
with section III, paragraph 2, of General
Orders, No. 68, the marriage so contracted by
Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escao is null
and void. This court does not believe so. For
the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not
necessary to have the former spouse judicially
declared an absentee. The declaration of
absence made in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole
purpose to enable the taking of the necessary
precautions for the administration of the
estate of the absentee. For the celebration of
civil marriage, however, the law only requires
that the former spouse has been absent for
seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage, that the spouse present
does not know his or her former spouse to be
living, that such former spouse is generally
reputed to be dead and the spouse present so
believe at the time of the celebration of the
marriage (section III, paragraph 2, General
orders, No. 68).
In accordance with the foregoing legal
provision, the absence of Marciana Escao's
former husband should be counted from
January 10, 1918, the date on which the last
news concerning Arthur W. Jones was
received, and from said date to May 6, 1927,

more than nine years elapsed. Said marriage

is, therefore, valid and lawful.
For some unknown reason not attributable, of
course, to the fault or negligence of Felix
Hortiguela or Marciana Escao, the marriage
contracted does not appear recorded in the
marriage register of the municipality of
Malitbog. Angelita Jones assigns as one of the
errors of the court its having declared that
failure to record said marriage does not affect
the efficacy and validity thereof.
On this point, the court a quo very correctly
stated as follows:
Section VIII of General Orders, No. 68, as
amended, provides that the person
solemnizing the marriage must transmit the
marriage certificate to the municipal
secretary, and failure to transmit such
certificate shall be fined not less than twentyfive and not more than fifty dollars; but does
not provide that failure to transmit such
certificate to the municipal secretary annuls
the marriage. Interpreting this legal provision,
the Supreme Court, in its decision of
September 5, 1931 (Madridejo vs. De Leon, 55
Phil., 1 ) said:
"The mere fact that the parish priest who
married the plaintiff's natural father and
mother, while the latter was in articulo
mortis failed to send a copy of the marriage
certificate to the municipal secretary, does
not invalidate said marriage, since it does not
appear that in the celebration thereof all
requisites for its validity were not present,
the forwarding of a copy of the marriage
certificate not being one said requisites."
In another case (U. S. vs. De Vera, 28 Phil.,
105), the court said:
"Certificate issued pursuant the provisions of
section 20 of the Municipal Code by municipal
secretaries, marriages recorded in their
respective registers, are not the only ones
that can attest and prove such facts to such
an extent that other proofs established by law
may not be presented or admitted at trial,
when through the omission or fault either of
the municipal secretary himself or of the
person who solemnized the marriage, it was
not duly entered or recorded in the municipal
register."

Furthermore, Marciana Escao believed Arthur

W. Jones to be dead when she contracted her
second marriage. Her daughter Angelita Jones
herself was of the same belief, since she lived
with her mother after the latter had married
Hortiguela, treated Hortiguela as her true
stepfather, and lived and traveled with him
together with her mother. She certainly would
not have behaved so if she had not believed
her father to be dead. Still furthermore,
according to section 334, No. 24, of the Code
of Civil Procedure, a person not heard from in
seven years is presumed to be dead.
Inasmuch as Felix Hortiguela was lawfully
married to Marciana Escao and was divorced
from her at the time of her death there is no
doubt that he is entitled to inherit in usufruct,
not only in testate but also in intestate
succession, as in the present case (6 and 7
Manresa, pages 497-499 and 134-141,
respectively).
Therefor, there is no reason to annul the order
of May 9, 1932, declaring that the heirs of the
deceased were her widower and her daughter
Angelita Jones. Neither is there any reason to
annul the order of June 26, 1933, approving
the partition of the properties of the intestate
estate.
The inaccuracies and error attributed to the
administrator Felix Hortiguela in Angelita
Jones' motion and alleged therein as one of
the grounds for asking for the reopening of
any assignment of error. It should, therefore,
be considered that the petitioner has desisted
from her intention relative to this alleged
ground for the nullity of the proceedings.
As to the administrator's fees, the evidence
shows that of the P10,000 granted by the
court to Hortiguela as his own sum of P8,000
for the latter's professional services in this as
well as in other cases affecting the estate of
his deceased wife. Taking into consideration
the nature of and the amount involved in this
and in the other cases wherein Attorney
Faelnar has rendered his services this court is
of the opinion that the sum of P8,000 paid by
the administrator is a reasonable and
moderate compensation. Angelita Jones'
objection to the effect that she had no reason
to contribute to the payment of Faelnar's fees
is untenable, considering the fact that said
attorney's professional services were

rendered for the benefit of the administration

of the estate of the deceased Escao prior to
the controversy provoked by said heiress. As
to the remainder of P2,000, said administrator
is entitled to collect the sum of P4 for every
day employed by him as such, and considering
the importance of the inheritance in question
and the time elapsed since the inception of
the administration proceedings this court is of
the opinion that the sum of P2,000 is an
adequate compensation for said
administrator's services.
Lastly, had the court jurisdiction to set aside,
as it did, the order of January 10, 1933,
approving the administrator's fees and the
order of June 26, 1933, approving the
partition and the final account? Had the court
jurisdiction to order the presentation of
another project of partition and final account?
These are the questions raised by Felix
Hortiguela and this court is of the opinion that
said orders having therefrom, the court has
lost jurisdiction that no appeal was ever taken
therefrom, the court has lost jurisdiction over
the case and it could not resume it under
section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure or
under section 598 thereof because the abovecited section refer to grounds other than
those upon which Angelita Jones' motion of
May 3, 1934, is based.
For all the foregoing consideration this court
reverses the appealed order of March 14,
1935, in so far as it set aside the order of
January 10, 1933, relative to the
administrator's fees and the order of June 26,
1933, approving the final account and the
project of portion, and in so far as said order
of March 14, 1935, required the presentation
of a new project of partition; denied the
appointment of Angelita Jones husband as
administrator; affirms the order of May 9,
1932, relative to declaration of heirs; and
holds it unwarranted to make a finding as to
whether or not the properties of this intestate
estate are paraphernal properties of the
deceased Marciana Escao reserving to the
parties the right to discuss which are
paraphernal and which are conjugal
properties. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Diaz
and Laurel, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding
Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Region Pasay City and
RICHARD UPTON respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition,
petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set
aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983
and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P,
issued by respondent Judge, which denied her
Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion
for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order,
respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner
is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent is a citizen of the United States;
that they were married in Hongkong in 1972;
that, after the marriage, they established
their residence in the Philippines; that they
begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and
December 18, 1975, respectively; that the
parties were divorced in Nevada, United
States, in 1982; and that petitioner has remarried also in Nevada, this time to Theodore
Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed
suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in
Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business
in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for
short), is conjugal property of the parties, and
asking that petitioner be ordered to render an
accounting of that business, and that private
respondent be declared with right to manage
the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that the cause
of action is barred by previous judgment in
the divorce proceedings before the Nevada
Court wherein respondent had acknowledged
that he and petitioner had "no community
property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court
below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the

mentioned case on the ground that the

property involved is located in the Philippines
so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in
the case. The denial is now the subject of this
certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in
a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject
to appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are
neither the remedies to question the propriety
of an interlocutory order of the trial Court.
However, when a grave abuse of discretion
was patently committed, or the lower Court
acted capriciously and whimsically, then it
devolves upon this Court in a certiorari
proceeding to exercise its supervisory
authority and to correct the error committed
which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it
would be useless and a waste of time to go
ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the
petition filed in this case within the exception,
and we have given it due course.

For resolution is the effect of the foreign

divorce on the parties and their alleged
conjugal property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is
estopped from laying claim on the alleged
conjugal property because of the
representation he made in the divorce
proceedings before the American Court that
they had no community of property; that the
Galleon Shop was not established through
conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is
barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the
Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court
cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the
Philippines and its declared national policy;
that the acts and declaration of a foreign
Court cannot, especially if the same is
contrary to public policy, divest Philippine
Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters
within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not
necessary to determine whether the property
relations between petitioner and private
respondent, after their marriage, were upon
absolute or relative community property, upon
complete separation of property, or upon any
other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is
the Nevada divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the

divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over
petitioner who appeared in person before the
Court during the trial of the case. It also
obtained jurisdiction over private respondent
who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush
Street, San Francisco, California, authorized
his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp &
Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the
ground of incompatibility in the
understanding that there were neither
community property nor community
obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of
Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of
KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno,
Nevada, to represent him in the divorce
proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of

Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my
behalf and do an things necessary and proper
to represent me, without further contesting,
subject to the following:

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the

ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to
be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations
to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx

There can be no question as to the validity of

that Nevada divorce in any of the States of
the United States. The decree is binding on
private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
Union. What he is contending in this case is
that the divorce is not valid and binding in
this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to
local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by
the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of
public police and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law. 6 In this
case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce

dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal

Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton
vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova,

Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ.,
concur.

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce

from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the
existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from
the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed
as to one party, ceases to bind either. A
husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the
guilty party shall not marry again, that party,
as well as the other, is still absolutely freed
from the bond of the former marriage.

Footnotes
1 Sanchez vs. Zosa, 68 SCRA 171 (1975); Malit vs.
People, 114 SCRA 348 (1982).
2 U.S.T. vs. Hon. Villanueva, et al., 106 Phil. 439 (1959).
3 Annex "Y", Petition for Certiorari.
4 p. 98, Rollo.
5 "Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties or
to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.
6 cf. Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 [1956]; Paras, Civil
Code, 1971 ed., Vol. I, p. 52; Salonga, Private
International Law, 1979 ed., p. 231."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private

respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue
in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his
own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he
does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that,
under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent
and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot
be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to
live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to
be one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and
respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss
the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of
his Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity
as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR,
in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and
ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a
foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute
divorce, only to be followed by a criminal
infidelity suit of the latter against the former,
provides Us the opportunity to lay down a
decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be
an unresolved jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda
Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and
private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national, were married before the
Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at
Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of
Germany. The marriage started auspiciously
enough, and the couple lived together for
some time in Malate, Manila where their only
child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on
April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual
recriminations between the spouses, followed
by a separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of
marriage, such connubial disharmony
eventuated in private respondent initiating a
divorce proceeding against petitioner in
Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in
January, 1983. He claimed that there was
failure of their marriage and that they had
been living apart since April, 1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action
for legal separation, support and separation
of property before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983

where the same is still pending as Civil Case

No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the
Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of
Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on
the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses. The custody of the child was granted
to petitioner. The records show that under
German law said court was locally and
internationally competent for the divorce
proceeding and that the dissolution of said
marriage was legally founded on and
authorized by the applicable law of that
foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months
after the issuance of the divorce decree,
private respondent filed two complaints for
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
alleging that, while still married to said
respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a
certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with
yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime
in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los
Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding
investigation, recommended the dismissal of
the cases on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. 5 However, upon review, the
respondent city fiscal approved a resolution,
dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two
complaints for adultery against the
petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly
filed and were eventually raffled to two branches
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda
Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal
Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI
presided by the respondent judge; while the
other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda
Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal
Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge
Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7

On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition

with the Secretary of Justice asking that the
aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be
set aside and the cases against her be
dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James
Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 8752434. The Secretary of Justice, through the
Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both
petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal
to inform the Department of Justice "if the
accused have already been arraigned and if not
yet arraigned, to move to defer further

proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of

both cases to his office for review. 9

for the dismissal of the complaints against the

petitioner. 16

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both

criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to
suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As a

We find this petition meritorious. The writs

prayed for shall accordingly issue.

consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended

proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On
the other hand, respondent judge merely reset
the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No.
87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled
date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of
the arraignment and for the suspension of
proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435
until after the resolution of the petition for
review then pending before the Secretary of
Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the
same case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the
respondent judge in an order dated September
8, 1987. The same order also directed the
arraignment of both accused therein, that is,
petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a
plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to
be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner
being considered by respondent judge as direct
contempt, she and her counsel were fined and
the former was ordered detained until she
submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later,
private respondent entered a plea of not
guilty. 14

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal

Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four

On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this

special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order, seeking the annulment of
the order of the lower court denying her
motion to quash. The petition is anchored on
the main ground that the court is without
jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of
adultery, which is a private offense that
cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the
purported complainant, a foreigner, does not
qualify as an offended spouse having obtained
a final divorce decree under his national law
prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents from implementing the aforesaid
order of September 8, 1987 and from further
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435.
Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of
Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez acted on the
aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding
petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution
directing the respondent city fiscal to move

other crimes against chastity, cannot be

prosecuted except upon a sworn written
complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has
long since been established, with unwavering
consistency, that compliance with this rule is a
jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,
requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the
jurisdiction of the court over the offense is
vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the
requirement for a sworn written complaint is just
as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that
complaint which starts the prosecutory
proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot
exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.

Now, the law specifically provides that in

prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the
person who can legally file the complaint
should be the offended spouse, and nobody
else. Unlike the offenses of seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no
provision is made for the prosecution of the
crimes of adultery and concubinage by the
parents, grandparents or guardian of the
offended party. The so-called exclusive and
successive rule in the prosecution of the first
four offenses above mentioned do not apply to
adultery and concubinage. It is significant that
while the State, as parens patriae, was added
and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure with the power to initiate the
criminal action for a deceased or
incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses
of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, in default of her parents,
grandparents or guardian, such amendment
did not include the crimes of adultery and
concubinage. In other words, only the
offended spouse, and no other, is authorized
by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to
the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must
have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the
filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar
and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack
of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a

motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined

as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in
the prosecution of criminal cases does not
mean that the same requirement and
rationale would not apply. Understandably, it
may not have been found necessary since
criminal actions are generally and
fundamentally commenced by the State,
through the People of the Philippines, the
offended party being merely the complaining
witness therein. However, in the so-called
"private crimes" or those which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio, and the present
prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the
offended spouse assumes a more predominant
role since the right to commence the action,
or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively
within his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration
for the aggrieved party who might prefer to
suffer the outrage in silence rather than go
through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence,
as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of
the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that
the marital relationship is still subsisting at the
time of the institution of the criminal action for,
adultery. This is a logical consequence since
the raison d'etre of said provision of law would
be absent where the supposed offended party
had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged
offender at the time of the filing of the criminal
case. 21

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable

that the status and capacity of the
complainant to commence the action be
definitely established and, as already
demonstrated, such status or capacity must
indubitably exist as of the time he initiates
the action. It would be absurd if his capacity
to bring the action would be determined by
his status before or subsequent to the
commencement thereof, where such capacity
or status existed prior to but ceased before,
or was acquired subsequent to but did not
exist at the time of, the institution of the
case. We would thereby have the anomalous
spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very
time when he is without the legal capacity to
do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any
local precedential jurisprudence on the

specific issue as to when precisely the status

of a complainant as an offended spouse must
exist where a criminal prosecution can be
commenced only by one who in law can be
categorized as possessed of such status.
Stated differently and with reference to the
present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it
is necessary in the commencement of a
criminal action for adultery that the marital
bonds between the complainant and the
accused be unsevered and existing at the time
of the institution of the action by the former
against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving
statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari
materia with ours, yields the rule that after a
divorce has been decreed, the innocent
spouse no longer has the right to institute
proceedings against the offenders where the
statute provides that the innocent spouse
shall have the exclusive right to institute a
prosecution for adultery. Where, however,
proceedings have been properly commenced,
a divorce subsequently granted can have no
legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal
proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of
Iowa held that
'No prosecution for adultery can be
commenced except on the complaint of the
husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though
Loftus was husband of defendant when the
offense is said to have been committed, he
had ceased to be such when the prosecution
was begun; and appellant insists that his
status was not such as to entitle him to make
the complaint. We have repeatedly said that
the offense is against the unoffending spouse,
as well as the state, in explaining the reason
for this provision in the statute; and we are of
the opinion that the unoffending spouse must
be such when the prosecution is commenced.
(Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule
should not apply in this case and in our
jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and
jural policy on the matter. We are convinced
that in cases of such nature, the status of the
complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be
determined as of the time the complaint was
filed. Thus, the person who initiates the
adultery case must be an offended spouse,

and by this is meant that he is still married to

the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of
the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private
respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is
admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar
as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of
the nationality principle in our civil law on the
matter of status of persons.

Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs.

Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted
by a United States court between Alice Van
Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the
latter filed a civil case in a trial court here
alleging that her business concern was conjugal
property and praying that she be ordered to
render an accounting and that the plaintiff be
granted the right to manage the business.
Rejecting his pretensions, this Court
perspicuously demonstrated the error of such
stance, thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of

that Nevada divorce in any of the States of
the United States. The decree is binding on
private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by
the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private
respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue
in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale,
private respondent, being no longer the
husband of petitioner, had no legal standing
to commence the adultery case under the

imposture that he was the offended spouse at

the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he
could not have brought this case before the
decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even
if true, is of no legal significance or
consequence in this case. When said
respondent initiated the divorce proceeding,
he obviously knew that there would no longer
be a family nor marriage vows to protect once
a dissolution of the marriage is decreed.
Neither would there be a danger of
introducing spurious heirs into the family,
which is said to be one of the reasons for the
particular formulation of our law on
adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no
spousal relationship to speak of. The severance
of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating
the former spouses from each other, hence the
actuations of one would not affect or cast
obloquy on the other.

The aforecited case of United States vs.

Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by
private respondent. In applying Article 433 of
the old Penal Code, substantially the same as
Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which
punished adultery "although the marriage be
afterwards declared void", the Court merely
stated that "the lawmakers intended to
declare adulterous the infidelity of a married
woman to her marital vows, even though it
should be made to appear that she is entitled
to have her marriage contract declared null
and void, until and unless she actually secures
a formal judicial declaration to that effect".
Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred
therefrom that the complaint can still be filed
after the declaration of nullity because such
declaration that the marriage is void ab
initio is equivalent to stating that it never
existed. There being no marriage from the
beginning, any complaint for adultery filed
after said declaration of nullity would no
longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what
was consequently contemplated and within
the purview of the decision in said case is the
situation where the criminal action for
adultery was filed before the termination of
the marriage by a judicial declaration of its
nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite
would necessarily apply where the
termination of the marriage was effected, as
in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.

Private respondent's invocation of DonioTeves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore

cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of
inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case
reveals that the offended spouse therein had
duly and seasonably filed a complaint for
adultery, although an issue was raised as to its
sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the
complainant. Said case did not involve a factual
situation akin to the one at bar or any issue
determinative of the controversy herein.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying

petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and
another one enteredDISMISSING the complaint
in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of
jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order
issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is
hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of
whether We consider the German absolute
divorce as valid also in the Philippines, the
fact is that the husband in the instant case, by
the very act of his obtaining an absolute
divorce in Germany can no longer be
considered as the offended party in case his
former wife actually has carnal knowledge
with another, because in divorcing her, he
already implicitly authorized the woman to
have sexual relations with others. A contrary
ruling would be less than fair for a man, who
is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive
the woman of the same privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427
[1956]), the Supreme Court considered the
absolute divorce between the American
husband and his American wife as valid and
binding in the Philippines on the theory that
their status and capacity are governed by
their National law, namely, American law.
There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court
regarding the validity of such a divorce if one
of the parties, say an American, is married to
a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different
nationalities would be involved.

In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga

entitled Private International Law and
precisely because of theNational law doctrine,
he considers the absolute divorce as valid
insofar as the American husband is concerned
but void insofar as the Filipino wife is
involved. This results in what he calls a
"socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino
woman is still married to a man who is no
longer her husband. It is the opinion however,
of the undersigned that very likely the
opposite expresses the correct view. While
under the national law of the husband the
absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the
exceptions to the application of the proper
foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity)
is when the foreign law will work an injustice
or injury to the people or residents of the
forum. Consequently since to recognize the
absolute divorce as valid on the part of the
husband would be injurious or prejudicial to
the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still
valid under her national law, it would seem
that under our law existing before the new
Family Code (which took effect on August 3,
1988) the divorce should be considered void
both with respect to the American husband
and the Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139
SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact
that the husband was an American can with a
Filipino wife because in said case the validity
of the divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is
concerned was NEVER put in issue.

Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of
whether We consider the German absolute
divorce as valid also in the Philippines, the
fact is that the husband in the instant case, by
the very act of his obtaining an absolute
divorce in Germany can no longer be
considered as the offended party in case his
former wife actually has carnal knowledge
with another, because in divorcing her, he
already implicitly authorized the woman to
have sexual relations with others. A contrary
ruling would be less than fair for a man, who
is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive
the woman of the same privilege.

In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427

[1956]), the Supreme Court considered the
absolute divorce between the American
husband and his American wife as valid and
binding in the Philippines on the theory that
their status and capacity are governed by
their National law, namely, American law.
There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court
regarding the validity of such a divorce if one
of the parties, say an American, is married to
a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different
nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga
entitled Private International Law and
precisely because of theNational law doctrine,
he considers the absolute divorce as valid
insofar as the American husband is concerned
but void insofar as the Filipino wife is
involved. This results in what he calls a
"socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino
woman is still married to a man who is no
longer her husband. It is the opinion however,
of the undersigned that very likely the
opposite expresses the correct view. While
under the national law of the husband the
absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the
exceptions to the application of the proper
foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity)
is when the foreign law will work an injustice
or injury to the people or residents of the
forum. Consequently since to recognize the
absolute divorce as valid on the part of the
husband would be injurious or prejudicial to
the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still
valid under her national law, it would seem
that under our law existing before the new
Family Code (which took effect on August 3,
1988) the divorce should be considered void
both with respect to the American husband
and the Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139
SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact
that the husband was an American can with a
Filipino wife because in said case the validity
of the divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is
concerned was NEVER put in issue.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, 5, 29.
2 Ibid., 6, 29.
3 Ibid., 7.
4 Ibid., 7, 29-30; Annexes A and A-1, Petition.
5 Ibid., 7, 178.
6 Ibid., 8; Annexes B, B-1 and B-2, id.
7 Ibid., 8-9, 178.

8 Ibid., 9, 178; Annex C, id.

9 Ibid., 9-10, 178; Annex D, id.
10 Ibid., 9; Annexes E and E-1, id.
11 Ibid., 10; Annex F, id.
12 Ibid., 9, 179; Annex G, id.
13 Ibid., 10 Annex H, id.
14 Ibid, 105.
15 Ibid., 11.
16 Ibid., 311-313.
17 Cf. Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court.
18 People vs. Mandia, 60 Phil. 372, 375 (1934); People
vs. Zurbano, 37 SCRA 565, 569 (1971); People vs.
Lingayen, G.R. No. 64556, June 10, 1988.
19 Valdepeas vs. People, 16 SCRA 871 (1966); People
vs. Babasa, 97 SCRA 672 (1980).
20 Samilin vs. Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, 57
Phil. 298 (1932); Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, et al.,
133 SCRA 616 (1984).
21 Rollo, 289.
22 2 Am. Jur. 2d., 973 citing State vs. Loftus, 104 NW
906, 907; Re Smith, 2 Okla. 153, 37 p. 1099; State vs.
Russell, 90 Iowa 569, 58 NW 915.
23 Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 (1956).
24 139 SCRA 139,140 (1985).
25 The said pronouncements foreshadowed and are
adopted in the Family Code of the Philippines
(Executive Order No. 209, as amended by Executive
Order No. 227, effective on August 3, 1988), Article 26
whereof provides that "(w)here marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to re under
Philippine law.
26 U.S. vs. Mata, 18 Phil. 490 (1911).
27 Footnote 20, ante.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000]

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,

vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the
decision of the Court of Appeals modifying that
of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur,
Branch 35, Iriga City declaring respondent Alicia
F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as Alicia), as
co-owners of whatever property she and the
deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter
referred to as Lorenzo) may have acquired
during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived
together as husband and wife.
[1]

[2]

The Facts

The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an

enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy
from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.
[3]

On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and

petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to
as Paula) were married before a parish priest,
Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines
Sur.
[4]

On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia

F. Llorente in Manila. Apparently, Alicia had no
knowledge of the first marriage even if they
resided in the same town as Paula, who did not
oppose the marriage or cohabitation.
[13]

[14]

From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived

together as husband and wife. Their twentyfive (25) year union produced three children,
Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.
[15]

[16]

Before the outbreak of the Pacific War,

Lorenzo departed for the United States and
Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio
Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.
[5]

On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was

admitted to United States citizenship and
Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was
issued in his favor by the United States District
Court, Southern District of New York.
[6]

Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the

American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted
an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his
wife and he visited the Philippines. He
discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and
was living in and having an adulterous
relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.
[7]

[8]

On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a

boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of
Nabua as Crisologo Llorente, with the certificate
stating that the child was not legitimate and the
line for the fathers name was left blank.
[9]

Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live

with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple
drew a written agreement to the effect that (1)
all the family allowances allotted by the United
States Navy as part of Lorenzos salary and all
other obligations for Paulas daily maintenance
and support would be suspended; (2) they would
dissolve their marital union in accordance with
judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a
separate agreement regarding their conjugal
property acquired during their marital life; and
(4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her
adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her
fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo
peacefully. The agreement was signed by both
Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paulas
father and stepmother. The agreement was
notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.
[10]

Lorenzo returned to the United States and

on
November
16,
1951
filed
for
divorce with the Superior Court of the State of
California in and for the County of San
Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John
Riley,
and
actively
participated
in
the
proceedings. On
November
27,
1951,
the
Superior Court of the State of California, for the
County of San Diego found all factual allegations
to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment
of divorce.
[11]

On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree

became final.
[12]

In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the

Philippines.

On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last

Will and Testament. The will was notarized by
Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed
by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco
Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the
will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to
Alicia and their three children, to wit:

(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA

R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential
house and lot, located at San Francisco,
Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines,
including ALL the personal properties and
other movables or belongings that may be
found or existing therein;
(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my
wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children,
Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and
Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all
my real properties whatsoever and
wheresoever located, specifically my real
properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao,
Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon,
Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras,
Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and
Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong,
Nabua, Camarines Sur;
(3) I likewise give and bequeath
exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno
and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente,
Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in
equal shares, my real properties located
in Quezon City Philippines, and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal,
Philippines, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and
165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of
the province of Rizal, Philippines;
(4) That their respective shares in the
above-mentioned properties, whether
real or personal properties, shall not be
disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to
any other persons, but could only be sold,
ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and
among themselves;

On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court

issued a joint decision, thus:

(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R.

FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this
my Last Will and Testament, and in her
default or incapacity of the latter to act,
any of my children in the order of age, if
of age;
(6) I hereby direct that the executor
named herein or her lawful substitute
should served (sic) without bond;
(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other
wills, codicils, or testamentary
dispositions heretofore executed, signed,
or published, by me;
(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I
die, no relatives of mine in any degree in
the Llorentes Side should ever bother and
disturb in any manner whatsoever my
wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children
with respect to any real or personal
properties I gave and bequeathed
respectively to each one of them by virtue
of this Last Will and Testament.
[17]

On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with

the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a
petition for the probate and allowance of his last
will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that
Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his
estate.
[18]

On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied

the motion for the reason that the testator
Lorenzo was still alive.
[19]

On January 24, 1984, finding that the will

was duly executed, the trial court admitted the
will to probate.
[20]

On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings

could be terminated, Lorenzo died.
[21]

On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the

same
court
a
petition for
letters
of
administration over Lorenzos estate in her
favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzos
surviving spouse, (2) that the various property
were acquired during their marriage, (3) that
Lorenzos will disposed of all his property in favor
of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her
legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property.
[22]

[23]

On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the

testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a
petition for the issuance of letters testamentary.
[24]

On October 14, 1985, without terminating

the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due
course to Paulas petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.
[25]

On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order

was published in the newspaper Bicol Star.
[26]

Wherefore, considering that this court

has so found that the divorce decree
granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is
void and inapplicable in the Philippines,
therefore the marriage he contracted
with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958
at Manila is likewise void. This being so
the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the
issuance of letters testamentary is
denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to
receive any share from the estate even if
the will especially said so her relationship
with Lorenzo having gained the status of
paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
On the other hand, the court finds the
petition of Paula Titular Llorente,
meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic
disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente
dated March 13, 1981 as void and
declares her entitled as conjugal partner
and entitled to one-half of their conjugal
properties, and as primary compulsory
heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to
one-third of the estate and then one-third
should go to the illegitimate children,
Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic)
Llorente, for them to partition in equal
shares and also entitled to the remaining
free portion in equal shares.
Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed
legal administrator of the estate of the
deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let
the corresponding letters of
administration issue in her favor upon her
filing a bond in the amount (sic) of
P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make
a return to the court within three (3)
months a true and complete inventory of
all goods, chattels, rights, and credits,
and estate which shall at any time come
to her possession or to the possession of
any other person for her, and from the
proceeds to pay and discharge all debts,
legacies and charges on the same, or
such dividends thereon as shall be
decreed or required by this court; to
render a true and just account of her
administration to the court within one (1)
year, and at any other time when required
by the court and to perform all orders of
this court by her to be performed.

On the other matters prayed for in

respective petitions for want of evidence
could not be granted.
SO ORDERED.

[27]

In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a

motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted
decision.
[28]

On September 14, 1987, the trial court

denied Alicias motion for reconsideration but
modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul
and Luz Llorente are not children legitimate or
otherwise of Lorenzo since they were not legally
adopted by him. Amending its decision of May
18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly
Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo,
entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and
one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate.
[29]

[30]

On
September
28,
1987,
appealed to the Court of Appeals.

respondent

[31]

On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals

promulgated
its
decision,
affirming
with
modification the decision of the trial court in this
wise:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from

is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as
co-owner of whatever properties she and
the deceased may have acquired during
the twenty-five (25) years of
cohabitation.
SO ORDERED.

[32]

On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the

Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of
the decision.
[33]

[34]

On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,

denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.

[35]

The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese
and
sorting
through
the
various
arguments
raised, the
issue
is
simple. Who are entitled to inherit from
the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
[36]

We do not agree with the decision of

the Court of Appeals. We remand the
case to the trial court for ruling on the
intrinsic validity of the will of the
deceased.
The Applicable Law

The fact that the late Lorenzo N.

Llorente became an American citizen
long before and at the time of: (1) his
divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to
Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4)
death, is duly established, admitted and
undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from
these
incidents
are
necessarily
governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:

Art. 15. Laws relating to family

rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens
of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.
Art. 16. Real property as well as
personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and
testamentary succession, both
with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person
whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found.
(emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove
themselves in our jurisdiction and our
courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them. Like any other
fact, they must be alleged and proved.
[37]

While the substance of the foreign

law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals
did not admit the foreign law. The Court
of Appeals and the trial court called to
the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the
case was referred back to the law of the

decedents domicile,
Philippine law.

in

this

case,

We note that while the trial court

stated that the law of New York was not
sufficiently proven, in the same breath
it made the categorical, albeit equally
unproven statement that American law
follows the domiciliary theory hence,
Philippine
law
applies
when
determining the validity of Lorenzos
will.
[38]

First, there is no such thing as one

American
law. The
"national
law"
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code
cannot possibly apply to general
American law. There is no such law
governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the United States. Each
State of the union has its own law
applicable to its citizens and in force
only within the State. It can therefore
refer to no other than the law of the
State of which the decedent was a
resident. Second, there is no showing
that
the
application
of
the renvoi doctrine is called for or
required by New York State law.
[39]

The trial court held that the will was

intrinsically invalid since it contained
dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the
trial
courts
opinion
was
a
mere paramour. The trial court threw
the will out, leaving Alice, and her two
children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The
Court
of
Appeals
also
disregarded the will. It declared Alice
entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever
property she and Lorenzo acquired
during their cohabitation, applying
Article 144 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine
law and the complete disregard of the
will, already probated as duly executed
in accordance with the formalities of
Philippine law, is fatal, especially in
light
of
the
factual
and
legal
circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held
that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
[40]

only Philippine nationals are covered by

the policy against absolute divorces,
the same being considered contrary to
our concept of public policy and
morality. In the same case, the Court
ruled that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad,
provided
they
are
valid
according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court
held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that
once proven that respondent was no
longer a Filipino citizen when he
obtained the divorce from petitioner,
the ruling in Van Dorn would become
applicable and petitioner could very
well lose her right to inherit from him.
[41]

In Pilapil
v.
Ibay-Somera, we
recognized the divorce obtained by the
respondent in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany.There, we stated
that divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as
respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on
the status of persons.
[42]

For failing to apply these doctrines,

the decision of the Court of Appeals
must be reversed. We hold that the
divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente
from his first wife Paula was valid and
recognized in this jurisdiction as a
matter of comity. Now, the effects of
this divorce (as to the succession to the
estate of the decedent) are matters
best left to the determination of the
trial court.
[43]

Validity of the Will

The Civil Code provides:
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of
contracts, wills, and other public instruments
shall be governed by the laws of the country
in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before
the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in a foreign
country, the solemnities established by
Philippine laws shall be observed in their
execution. (underscoring ours)

The clear intent of Lorenzo to

bequeath his property to his second
wife and children by her is glaringly

shown in the will he executed.We do

not wish to frustrate his wishes, since
he was a foreigner, not covered by our
laws on family rights and duties, status,
condition and legal capacity.
[44]

Whether the will is intrinsically valid

and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are
issues best proved by foreign law which
must be pleaded and proved. Whether
the will was executed in accordance
with
the
formalities
required
is
answered by referring to Philippine
law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court
should note that whatever public policy
or good customs may be involved in our
system of legitimes, Congress did not
intend to extend the same to the
succession
of
foreign
nationals. Congress specifically left the
amount of successional rights to the
decedent's national law.
[45]

Having thus ruled, we find it

unnecessary to pass upon the other
issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is
GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446
promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET
ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES
the decision of the Regional Trial Court
and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of
divorce granted in favor of the
deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the
Superior Court of the State of California
in and for the County of San Diego,
made final on December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the
cases to the court of origin for
determination of the intrinsic validity of
Lorenzo
N.
Llorentes
will
and
determination
of
the
parties
successional rights allowing proof of
foreign law with instructions that the
trial court shall proceed with all
deliberate dispatch to settle the estate
of the deceased within the framework
of the Rules of Court.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno,
Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago,
JJ., concur.
In CA-G. R. SP. No. 17446, promulgated on July 31,
1995, Lipana-Reyes+, J., ponente, Torres, Jr. and
Hofilena, JJ., concurring.
[2]
In Spec. Proc. No. IR-755 (In the Matter of the
Probate and Allowance of the Last Will and Testament
of Lorenzo N. Llorente, Lorenzo N. Llorente, Petitioner)
and Spec. Proc. No. IR-888 (Petition for the Grant of
Letters of Administration for the Estate of Lorenzo N.
Llorente, Paula T. Llorente, Petitioner), dated May 18,
1987, Judge Esteban B. Abonal, presiding.
[3]
Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 51.
[4]
Exh. B, Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 61.
[5]
Ibid.
[6]
This was issued pursuant to Lorenzos petition,
Petition No. 4708849, filed with the U.S. Court. Exhs. H
and H-3 Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 157, 159.
[7]
Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 51; Exh. B, Trial
Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 61.
[8]
Ibid.
[9]
Exh. A, Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 60.
[10]
Exh. B-1 Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 62.
[11]
Exh. D, Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, pp. 63-64.
[12]
Exh. E, Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 69.
[13]
Exh. F, Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 148.
[14]
Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 52.
[15]
Comment, Rollo, p. 147.
[16]
Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 52.
[17]
Exh. A, Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, pp. 3-4;
Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 52.
[18]
Docketed as Spec. Proc. No. IR-755.
[19]
Decision, RTC, Rollo, p. 37.
[20]
Ibid.
[21]
Ibid.
[22]
Docketed as Spec. Proc. No. IR-888.
[23]
Decision, RTC, Rollo, p. 38.
[24]
Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 52.
[25]
Ibid., pp. 52-53.
[26]
Ibid., p. 53.
[27]
RTC Decision, Rollo, p. 37.
[28]
Order, Regional Trial Court in Spec. Proc. Nos. IR-755
and 888, Rollo, p. 46.
[29]
Citing Article 335 of the Civil Code, which states, The
following cannot adopt: xxx
(3) a married person, without the consent of the other
spouse; xxx, the trial court reasoned that since the
divorce obtained by Lorenzo did not dissolve his first
marriage with Paula, then the adoption of Raul and Luz
was void, as Paula did not give her consent to it.
[30]
Order, Regional Trial Court, Rollo, p. 47.
[31]
Docketed as CA-G. R. SP No. 17446.
[32]
Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 56.
[33]
On August 31, 1995, petitioner also filed with this
Court a verified complaint against the members of the
Special Thirteenth Division, Court of Appeals,
Associate Justices Justo P. Torres, Jr., Celia LipanaReyes + and Hector Hofilena for gross ignorance of the
law, manifest incompetence and extreme bias (Rollo, p.
15).
[34]
Again with Associate Justice Celia LipanaReyes+, ponente, concurred in by Associate Justices
Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Hector Hofilena (Former Special
Thirteenth Division).
[35]
Filed on May 10, 1996, Rollo, pp. 9-36.
[36]
Petitioner alleges (1) That the Court of Appeals lost
its jurisdiction over the case when it issued the
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration; (2)
That Art. 144 of the Civil Case has been repealed by
Arts. 253 and 147 of the Family Code and (3) That
[1]

Alicia and her children not are entitled to any share in

the estate of the deceased (Rollo, p. 19).
[37]
Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher, 110 Phil. 686
(1961).
[38]
Joint Record on Appeal, p. 255; Rollo, p. 40.
[39]
In Re: Estate of Edward Christensen, Aznar v. Helen
Garcia, 117 Phil. 96 (1963).
[40]
139 SCRA 139 (1985).
[41]
300 SCRA 406 (1998).
[42]
174 SCRA 653 (1989).
[43]
The ruling in the case of Tenchavez v. Escano (122
Phil. 752 [1965]) that provides that a foreign divorce
between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the
effectivity of the present civil code is not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction is NOT
applicable in the case at bar as Lorenzo was no longer
a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce.
[44]
Article 15, Civil Code provides Laws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad. (Underscoring
ours)
[45]
Bellis v. Bellis, 126 Phil. 726 (1967).

FIRST DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 154380

Present:
- versus -

Davide, Jr., C.J.,

(Chairman),
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.

CIPRIANO ORBECIDO
III,
Promulgated:
Respondent.
October 5, 2005
x-------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino
citizens, where one party is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains
a valid divorce decree capacitating him or
her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse
likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that
behooves the Court to make a definite
ruling on this apparently novel question,
presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor
General assails the Decision[1] dated May
15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and
its Resolution[2] dated July 4, 2002 denying
the motion for reconsideration. The courta
quo had declared that herein respondent
Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to
remarry.
The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the
second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code
and by reason of the divorce decree obtained
against him by his American wife, the petitioner
is given the capacity to remarry under the
Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]

The factual antecedents, as narrated by

the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III
married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at

the United Church of Christ in the

Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City.
Their marriage was blessed with a son
and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V.
Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V.
Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the
United States bringing along their son
Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned
from his son that his wife had obtained
a divorce decree and then married a
certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley
and her child by him currently live at
5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San
Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial
court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code. No opposition was
filed. Finding merit in the petition, the
court granted the same. The Republic,
herein petitioner, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure
question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY
UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE[4]

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of

Article 26 of the Family Code is not
applicable to the instant case because
it only applies to a valid mixed
marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and an alien.
The proper remedy, according to the
OSG, is to file a petition for annulment
or for legal separation.[5] Furthermore,
the OSG argues there is no law that
governs respondents situation. The OSG
posits that this is a matter of legislation
and not of judicial determination. [6]
For his part, respondent admits that
Article 26 is not directly applicable to
his case but insists that when his
naturalized alien wife obtained a
divorce decree which capacitated her to

remarry, he is likewise capacitated by

operation of law pursuant to Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution.[7]
At the outset, we note that the petition
for authority to remarry filed before the
trial court actually constituted a
petition for declaratory relief. In this
connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court provides:

Family Code apply to the case of

respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell
on how this provision had come about
in the first place, and what was the
intent of the legislators in its
enactment?

Brief Historical Background

RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person
interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected
by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an
action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his
rights or duties, thereunder.
...

The requisites of a petition for

declaratory relief are: (1) there must be
a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons
whose interests are adverse; (3) that
the party seeking the relief has a legal
interest in the controversy; and (4) that
the issue is ripe for judicial
determination.[8]
This case concerns the applicability of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage
between two Filipino citizens where one
later acquired alien citizenship,
obtained a divorce decree, and
remarried while in the U.S.A. The
interests of the parties are also
adverse, as petitioner representing the
State asserts its duty to protect the
institution of marriage while
respondent, a private citizen, insists on
a declaration of his capacity to remarry.
Respondent, praying for relief, has legal
interest in the controversy. The issue
raised is also ripe for judicial
determination inasmuch as when
respondent remarries, litigation ensues
and puts into question the validity of
his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue,
does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon

Aquino signed into law Executive Order
No. 209, otherwise known as the Family
Code, which took effect on August 3,
1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines
in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37,
and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the

signing of the original Family Code,
Executive Order No. 227 was likewise
signed into law, amending Articles 26,
36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26.
As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

On its face, the foregoing provision

does not appear to govern the situation
presented by the case at hand. It seems
to apply only to cases where at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties are a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The instant case is one where
at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two
Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife
was naturalized as an American citizen

and subsequently obtained a divorce

granting her capacity to remarry, and
indeed she remarried an American
citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public
Hearings[9] on the Family Code, the
Catholic Bishops Conference of the
Philippines (CBCP) registered the
following objections to Paragraph 2 of
Article 26:
1.
The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates
against those whose spouses are Filipinos who
divorce them abroad. These spouses who are
divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the
spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them
abroad can.
2.
This is the beginning of the recognition of
the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens.
For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce
them abroad will also be considered to be validly
divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that
this be deleted and made into law only after
more widespread consultation. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family
Code deliberations showed that the intent
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to
Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of
the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to
avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26
traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case
involved a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino
spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case
where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens,
but later on, one of them obtains a foreign
citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the
1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.
[11]
In Quita, the parties were, as in this
case, Filipino citizens when they got
married. The wife became a naturalized

American citizen in 1954 and obtained a

divorce in the same year. The Court therein
hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a
Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign
spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the
legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article
26 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains
a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the
other party were a foreigner at the time of
the solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity
and injustice. Where the interpretation of a
statute according to its exact and literal
import would lead to mischievous results or
contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter
of the law. A statute may therefore be
extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they come
within its spirit or intent.[12]
If we are to give meaning to the legislative
intent to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse,
then the instant case must be deemed as
coming within the contemplation of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the

twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1.
There is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2.
A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of

the parties at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, but their citizenship at the
time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was
naturalized as an American citizen, there
was still a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between her and Cipriano. As

fate would have it, the naturalized alien

wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the
twin requisites for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present
in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced
Filipino spouse, should be allowed to
remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs
theory that the proper remedy of the
Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for
annulment or a petition for legal
separation. Annulment would be a long and
tedious process, and in this particular case,
not even feasible, considering that the
marriage of the parties appears to have all
the badges of validity. On the other hand,
legal separation would not be a sufficient
remedy for it would not sever the marriage
tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino
spouse would still remain married to the
naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are
bereft of competent evidence duly
submitted by respondent concerning the
divorce decree and the naturalization of
respondents wife. It is settled rule that one
who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence.[13]
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper,
respondent herein must prove his allegation
that his wife was naturalized as an
American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our
own courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate
its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
[14]
Such foreign law must also be proved as
our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws
must be alleged and proved.
[15]
Furthermore, respondent must also show
that the divorce decree allows his former
wife to remarry as specifically required in
Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no
evidence sufficient to declare that he is
capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our
holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by
E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to
allow a Filipino citizen, who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired
foreign citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry. However, considering that in the
present petition there is no sufficient
evidence submitted and on record, we are

unable to declare, based on respondents

bare allegations that his wife, who was
naturalized as an American citizen, had
obtained a divorce decree and had
remarried an American, that respondent is
now capacitated to remarry. Such
declaration could only be made properly
upon respondents submission of the
aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic
of the Philippines is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and
Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga
del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
Chairman
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice

Rollo, pp. 20-22.

Id. at 27-29.
[3]
Id. at 21-22.
[4]
Id. at 105.
[5]
Id. at 106-110.
[6]
Id. at 110.
[7]
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family
life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally
protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from conception. The natural and primary right and
duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character
shall receive the support of the Government.
[8]
Office of the Ombudsman v. Ibay, G.R. No. 137538, 3
September 2001, 364 SCRA 281, 286, citing Galarosa v.
Valencia, G.R. No. 109455, 11 November 1993, 227
SCRA 729, 737.
[1]
[2]

Held on January 27 and 28, 1988 and February 3,

1988.
[10]
No. L-68470, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA 139.
[11]
G.R. No. 124862, 22 December 1998, 300 SCRA
406.
[12]
Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, No. L9274, 1 February 1957, 100 Phil. 850, 855.
[13]
Cortes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121772, 13
January 2003, 395 SCRA 33, 38.
[14]
Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2001,
366 SCRA 437, 447.
[15]
Id. at 451.
[9]

Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus

received a letter from her requesting that he
sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded
the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent
Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely
to their children, that Fely got married to an
American, with whom she eventually had a child.
In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with
her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel
in Cebu City.

Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely

because he was afraid he might not be able to
bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused
him. Fely returned to the Philippines several
SECOND DIVISION
times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their
eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 152577
operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in
Petitioner,
Present:
1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to
live with her American family in New Jersey,
PUNO,
U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname
Chairman,
of her American husband in the Philippines and
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely
CALLEJO, SR.,
- versusherself had invitations made in which she was
TINGA, and
named as Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus. At the time the
CHICO-NAZARIO,
Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since
Promulgated:
Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and
there was no more possibility of reconciliation
September 21, 2005
CRASUS L. IYOY,
between them. Respondent Crasus finally
R e s p o n d e n t.
alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts brought
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
demonstrated her psychological incapacity to
perform the essential obligations of marriage.
DECISION
Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing,
constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles
68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Philippines.
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic
of the Philippines, represented by the Office of
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim[4] with
the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of
the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein
that she was already an American citizen since
CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,[1] affirming
1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus.
the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
While she admitted being previously married to
Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB[2]
respondent Crasus and having five children with
20077, dated 30 October 1998,
declaring the
him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by
marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and
respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She
Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of
explained that she was no more hot-tempered
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
than any normal person, and she may had been
indignant at respondent Crasus on certain
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with
occasions but it was because of the latters
[3]
the filing of a Complaint
for declaration of
drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere
nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25
effort to find employment and to contribute to
March 1997.
the maintenance of their household. She could
not have been extravagant since the family
According to the said Complaint, respondent
hardly had enough money for basic needs.
Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at
Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons
Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu
as respondent Crasus had no job and what she
City. As a result of their union, they had five
was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the
children Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and
Philippines was insufficient to support their
Carlos who are now all of legal ages. After the
family. Although she left all of her children with
celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus
respondent Crasus, she continued to provide
discovered that Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger
financial support to them, as well as, to
and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the
respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able
Philippines for the United States of America
to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for
(U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the
one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical
youngest then being only six years old, to the
reasons. While she did file for divorce from
care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after
respondent Crasus, she denied having herself

sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting

him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After
securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely
married her American husband and acquired
American citizenship. She argued that her
marriage to her American husband was legal
because now being an American citizen, her
status shall be governed by the law of her
present nationality. Fely also pointed out that
respondent Crasus himself was presently living
with another woman who bore him a child. She
also accused respondent Crasus of misusing the
amount of P90,000.00 which she advanced to
him to finance the brain operation of their son,
Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also
prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to
respondent Crasus null and void; and that
respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely
the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with
interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their
respective Pre-Trial Briefs,[5] the RTC afforded
both parties the opportunity to present their
evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the
trial through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. [6]
Respondent Crasus submitted the following
pieces of evidence in support of his Complaint:
(1) his own testimony on 08 September 1997, in
which he essentially reiterated the allegations in
his Complaint;[7] (2) the Certification, dated 13
April 1989, by the Health Department of Cebu
City, on the recording of the Marriage Contract
between respondent Crasus and Fely in the
Register of Deeds, such marriage celebration
taking place on 16 December 1961;[8] and (3) the
invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their
eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her
American husbands surname, Micklus.[9]
Felys counsel filed a Notice,[10] and, later on, a
Motion,[11] to take the deposition of witnesses,
namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and
Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the
consular officers of the Philippines in New York
and California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses
reside. Despite the Orders[12] and
Commissions[13] issued by the RTC to the
Philippine Consuls of New York and California,
U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses
upon written interrogatories, not a single
deposition was ever submitted to the RTC.
Taking into account that it had been over a year
since respondent Crasus had presented his
evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to
have the case progress, the RTC issued an Order,
dated 05 October 1998,[14] considering Fely to
have waived her right to present her evidence.
The case was thus deemed submitted for
decision.
Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC
promulgated its Judgment declaring the

marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and

void ab initio, on the basis of the following
findings

The ground bearing defendants

psychological incapacity deserves a
reasonable consideration. As observed,
plaintiffs testimony is decidedly credible.
The Court finds that defendant had indeed
exhibited unmistakable signs of
psychological incapacity to comply with her
marital duties such as striving for family
unity, observing fidelity, mutual love,
respect, help and support. From the
evidence presented, plaintiff adequately
established that the defendant practically
abandoned him. She obtained a divorce
decree in the United States of America and
married another man and has establish [sic]
another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an
anomalous situation, wherein he is married
to a wife who is already married to another
man in another country.
Defendants intolerable traits may not have
been apparent or manifest before the
marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless
allows the annulment of the marriage
provided that these were eventually
manifested after the wedding. It appears to
be the case in this instance.
Certainly defendants posture being an
irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very
low regard for that sacred and inviolable
institution of marriage which is the
foundation of human society throughout the
civilized world. It is quite evident that the
defendant is bereft of the mind, will and
heart to comply with her marital
obligations, such incapacity was already
there at the time of the marriage in
question is shown by defendants own
attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff
which is defendants psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential
marital obligations which already existed at
the time of the marriage in question has
been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in
herein case establishes the irresponsibility
of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.
Going over plaintiffs testimony which is
decidedly credible, the Court finds that the
defendant had indeed exhibited
unmistakable signs of such psychological
incapacity to comply with her marital
obligations. These are her excessive
disposition to material things over and
above the marital stability. That such

incapacity was already there at the time of

the marriage in question is shown by
defendants own attitude towards her
marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons
there is a legal ground to declare the
marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and
defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and
void ab initio.[15]
Petitioner Republic, believing that the aforequoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law
and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its
Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the
appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no
reversible error therein. It even offered
additional ratiocination for declaring the
marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely
null and void, to wit

Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiffappellee abroad, has remarried, and is now
permanently residing in the United States.
Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this
as one of his reasons for seeking the
declaration of nullity of their marriage

It would be the height of unfairness if,

under these circumstances, plaintiff would
still be considered as married to defendant,
given her total incapacity to honor her
marital covenants to the former. To
condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a
marriage that in truth and in fact does not
exist and to remain married to a spouse
who is incapacitated to discharge essential
marital covenants, is verily to condemn him
to a perpetual disadvantage which this
Court finds abhorrent and will not
countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff
be given relief by affirming the trial courts
declaration of the nullity of the marriage of
the parties.[16]
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated
08 March 2002,[17] denied its Motion for
Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the
instant Petition before this Court, based on the
following arguments/grounds

Article 26 of the Family Code provides:

I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of

respondents wife do not per se constitute
psychological incapacity.

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside

the Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.

II. The Court of Appeals has decided

questions of substance not in accord with
law and jurisprudence considering that the
Court of Appeals committed serious errors
of law in ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2
of the Family Code is inapplicable to the
case at bar.[18]

WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO

CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY
CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS
THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY
THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR
HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE
SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO
REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.
The rationale behind the second paragraph
of the above-quoted provision is to avoid
the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino
citizen still being married to his or her alien
spouse, although the latter is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse because he
or she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the
case at bench, the defendant has
undoubtedly acquired her American
husbands citizenship and thus has become
an alien as well. This Court cannot see why
the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not
be extended to a Filipino citizen whose
spouse eventually embraces another
citizenship and thus becomes herself an
alien.

In his Comment[19] to the Petition, respondent

Crasus maintained that Felys psychological
incapacity was clearly established after a fullblown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code of the Philippines was indeed
applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus
and Fely, because the latter had already become
an American citizen. He further questioned the
personality of petitioner Republic, represented
by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute
the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the
Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the
trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene
on behalf of the State, in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages.
After having reviewed the records of this case
and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, this
Court finds the instant Petition to be
meritorious.
The totality of evidence presented during trial is
insufficient to support the finding of
psychological incapacity of Fely.

Article 36, concededly one of the more

controversial provisions of the Family Code of
the Philippines, reads

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party

who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Issues most commonly arise as to what
constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series
of cases, this Court laid down guidelines for
determining its existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the term
psychological incapacity was defined, thus

. . . [P]sychological incapacity should refer

to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly
cognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated[21]
The psychological incapacity must be
characterized by
(a)
Gravity It must be grave or serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b)
Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in
the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and
(c)
Incurability It must be incurable or, even if
it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.[22]
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Article 36 of the Family Code
of the Philippines were handed down by this
Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,
[23]
which, although quite lengthy, by its
significance, deserves to be reproduced below

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity

of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the

existence and continuation of the marriage

and against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it as the
foundation of the nation. It decrees
marriage as legally inviolable, thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional
edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36
of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must
be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at the time of the celebration of
the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of
the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute
or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore,
such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to

marriage, like the exercise of a profession

or employment in a job

totality of the evidence presented during the

trial.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to

bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person,
an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

Using the guidelines established by the aforementioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that
the totality of evidence presented by respondent
Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife Fely;
therefore, there is no basis for declaring their
marriage null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines.

(6) The essential marital obligations must

be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts
(8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor
vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.[24]
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[25] further
clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be
personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. Such psychological
incapacity, however, must be established by the

The only substantial evidence presented by

respondent Crasus before the RTC was his
testimony, which can be easily put into question
for being self-serving, in the absence of any
other corroborating evidence. He submitted only
two other pieces of evidence: (1) the
Certification on the recording with the Register
of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between
respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being
celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the
invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their
eldest son, in which Fely used her American
husbands surname. Even considering the
admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer
to respondent Crasuss Complaint filed with the
RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this
Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness
that prevented her from assuming the essential
obligations of marriage.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the
errant spouse.[26] Irreconcilable differences,
conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment, by themselves, also do not
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under the said Article.[27]
As has already been stressed by this Court in
previous cases, Article 36 is not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at
the time the causes therefore manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave
and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[28]
The evidence may have proven that Fely
committed acts that hurt and embarrassed
respondent Crasus and the rest of the family.
Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her
abandonment of respondent Crasus; her
marriage to an American; and even her flaunting
of her American family and her American
surname, may indeed be manifestations of her
alleged incapacity to comply with her marital
obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such

was not identified. If the root cause of the

incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be
satisfactorily established as a psychological or
mental defect that is serious or grave; neither
could it be proven to be in existence at the time
of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is
incurable. While the personal examination of
Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no
longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Courts
ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,[29] respondent Crasus
must still have complied with the requirement
laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina[30] that the root cause of the incapacity
be identified as a psychological illness and that
its incapacitating nature be fully explained.
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor
of the validity of the marriage.[31] No less than
the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic
social institution and marriage as the foundation
of the family.[32]
II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the
Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code of the Philippines

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen

and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to

a special situation wherein one of the couple
getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other
a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated. By its plain and literal
interpretation, the said provision cannot be
applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his
wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her
divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although
the exact date was not established, Fely herself
admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that
she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus
sometime after she left for the United States in
1984, after which she married her American
husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she
alleged that she had been an American
citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for
divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and
pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
she was still bound by Philippine laws on family
rights and duties, status, condition, and legal
capacity, even when she was already living
abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now,
do not allow and recognize divorce between
Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have

validly obtained a divorce from respondent

Crasus.
III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene,
on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages.
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to
the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in
proceedings for annulment or declaration of
nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of the
Solicitor General had no personality to file the
instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48
provides

ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or

declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,
the Court shall order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear
on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and
to take care that the evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.

That Article 48 does not expressly mention the

Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office
from intervening in proceedings for annulment
or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the
Solicitor General as the principal law officer and
legal defender of the Government.[33] His Office
is tasked to represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities
and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the
services of lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor
General shall constitute the law office of the
Government and, as such, shall discharge duties
requiring the services of lawyers.[34]
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the
Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the
State is represented and protected in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages by preventing collusion
between the parties, or the fabrication or
suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind
that the Solicitor General is the principal law
officer and legal defender of the land, then his
intervention in such proceedings could only
serve and contribute to the realization of such
intent, rather than thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the
Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend
actions on behalf of the People or the Republic
of the Philippines once the case is brought
before this Court or the Court of Appeals.
[35]
While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal

who actively participates, on behalf of the State,

in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of
nullity of marriage before the RTC, the Office of
the Solicitor General takes over when the case is
elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court.
Since it shall be eventually responsible for
taking the case to the appellate courts when
circumstances demand, then it is only
reasonable and practical that even while the
proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the
Office of the Solicitor General can already
exercise supervision and control over the
conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
therein to better guarantee the protection of the
interests of the State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and
affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in
several cases for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages that were appealed before
it, summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta
v. Ancheta[36]

In the case of Republic v. Court of

Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court
laid down the guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 48 of
the Family Code, one of which concerns the
role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
[Id., at 213]

to the authority of the Solicitor General to file

the instant Petition on behalf of the State. The
Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor
General to intervene and take part in the
proceedings for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages before the RTC and on
appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions
of the said Rule are reproduced below

Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.

(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The
petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition
on the Office of the Solicitor General and
the Office of the City or Provincial
Prosecutor, within five days from the date
of its filing and submit to the court proof of
such service within the same period.
Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court may require
the parties and the public prosecutor, in
consultation with the Office of the Solicitor
General, to file their respective memoranda
in support of their claims within fifteen days
from the date the trial is terminated. It may
require the Office of the Solicitor General to
file its own memorandum if the case is of
significant interest to the State. No other
pleadings or papers may be submitted
without leave of court. After the lapse of
the period herein provided, the case will be
considered submitted for decision, with or
without the memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision.
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor
General and the public prosecutor, shall be
served with copies of the decision
personally or by registered mail. If the
respondent summoned by publication failed
to appear in the action, the dispositive part
of the decision shall be published once in a
newspaper of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the
expiration of fifteen days from notice to the
parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if
no motion for reconsideration or new trial,
or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the
public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.

This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v.

Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its
pronouncement in Republic v. Court of
Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the State[37]

Sec. 20. Appeal.

(2) Notice of Appeal. An aggrieved party or
the Solicitor General may appeal from the
decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within
fifteen days from notice of denial of the
motion for reconsideration or new trial. The
appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of
appeal on the adverse parties.

Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on

Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[38] which
became effective on 15 March 2003, should
dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as

Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a

conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity and
existence of the marriage between respondent
Crasus and Fely. At most, Felys abandonment,

sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent

Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under
Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
but not for declaration of nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the same Code. While this
Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for
being continuously shackled to what is now a
hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of
those situations where neither law nor society
can provide the specific answer to every
individual problem.[39]

Records, pp. 1-3.

Id., pp. 8-13.
[5]
Id., pp. 25-29, 30-32.
[6]
Id., 23-24.
[7]
TSN, 08 September 1997.
[8]
Supra, note 6, p. 36.
[9]
Id., p. 37.
[10]
Id., pp. 40-45.
[11]
Id., pp. 48-49.
[12]
Penned by Judge Pampio A. Abarintos, dated 07 November
1997 (Id., p. 51) and 01 August 1998 (Id., p. 58).
[13]
Id., p. 52.
[14]
Id., p. 61.
[15]
Supra, note 2, pp. 65-66.
[16]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the
Supra, note 1, pp. 28-30.
[17]
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAPenned by Associate Justice Portia Alino-Hormachuelos with
Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia and Mercedes GozoG.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming
Dadole, concurring; Rollo, p. 32.
the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22,
[18]
Id., p. 13.
in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October
[19]
Id., pp. 36-41.
1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
[20]
G.R. No. 112019, 04 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and
[21]
Id., p. 34.
Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.
[22]
Id., pp. 33-34.
[23]
G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997, 268 SCRA 198.
[24]
SO ORDERED.
Id., pp. 209-213.
[25]
G.R. No. 136490, 19 October 2000, 343 SCRA 755.
[26]
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra, note 24, p.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
211.
Associate Justice
[27]
Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, 27 October
WE CONCUR:
2004, 441 SCRA 422; Dedel v. Court of Appeals and CorpuzDedel, G.R. No. 151867, 29 January 2004, 421 SCRA 461;
R E Y N AT O S . P U N O
Guillen-Pesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, 17 April 2001, 356
Associate Justice
SCRA 588; Marcos v. Marcos, supra, note 25; Hernandez v.
Chairman
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126010, 08 December 1999, 320
SCRA 76.
[28]
Marcos v. Marcos, supra, note 25, p. 765.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
[29]
Supra, note 25.
Associate Justice
[30]
Supra, note 23.
[31]
Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, supra, note 27; Republic v.
Dagdag, G.R. No. 109975, 09 February 20001, 351 SCRA 425;
Marcos v. Marcos, supra, note 25; Hernandez v. Court of
Appeals, supra, note 27; Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina, supra, note 23.
DANTE O. TINGA
[32]
Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Philippine Constitution of
Associate Justice
1987.
[33]
Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12, Section 34.
[34]
Id., Section 35.
[35]
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Tonda, G.R. No.
134436, 16 August 2000, 338 SCRA 254, 265.
[36]
I attest that the conclusions in the above
G.R. No. 145370, 04 March 2004, 424 SCRA 725.
[37]
Decision were reached in consultation before the
Id., pp. 738-739.
[38]
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
[39]
Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, supra, note 27, p. 439;
the Courts Division.
Dedel v. Court of Appeals and Corpuz-Dedel, supra, note 27, p.
467; Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 20, p. 36.
REYNATO S. PUNO
[3]
[4]

ATTESTATION

Associate Justice
Chairman, Second Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairmans
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
H I L A R I O G . D AV I D E , J R .
Chief Justice

Penned by Associate Justice Portia Alio-Hormachuelos with

Acting Presiding Justice Cancio C. Garcia and Associate Justice
Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, concurring; Rollo, pp. 23-31.
[2]
Penned by Judge Pampio A. Abarintos, Id., pp. 63-66.
[1]

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY
BAYOT,
Petitioner,
- versus THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL
BAYOT,
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY
BAYOT,
Petitioner,
- versus -

G.R. No. 155635

Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
G.R. No. 163979

VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT,

Respondent.

Promulgated:
November 7, 2008
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us are these two petitions
interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca
Makapugay Bayot impugning certain
issuances handed out by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.
In the first, a petition for certiorari[1] under
Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No.
155635, Rebecca assails and seeks to nullify
the April 30, 2002 Resolution[2] of the CA, as
reiterated in another Resolution of
September 2, 2002,[3] granting a writ of
preliminary injunction in favor of private
respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving
off the trial courts grant of
support pendente lite to Rebecca.
The second, a petition for review under Rule
45,[4] docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the
March 25, 2004 Decision[5] of the CA, (1)
dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit
for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage with application for support
commenced by Rebecca against Vicente
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside
certain orders and a resolution issued by
the RTC in the said case.

Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the

Court ordered the consolidation of both
cases.
The Facts
Vicente and Rebecca were married on April
20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose,
Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face,
the Marriage Certificate[6] identified
Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an
American citizen[7] born in
Agaa, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong
Makapugay, American, and Helen Corn
Makapugay, American.
On November 27, 1982 in San
Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to
Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From
then on, Vicente and Rebeccas marital
relationship seemed to have soured as the
latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce
proceedings in the Dominican Republic.
Before the Court of the First Instance of the
Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca
personally appeared, while Vicente was
duly represented by counsel. On February
22, 1996, the Dominican court issued Civil
Decree No. 362/96,[8] ordering the
dissolution of the couples marriage and
leaving them to remarry after completing
the legal requirements, but giving
them joint custody and guardianship over
Alix. Over a year later, the same court
would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,
[9]
settling the couples property relations
pursuant to an Agreement[10] they executed
on December 14, 1996. Said agreement
specifically stated that the conjugal
property which they acquired during their
marriage consist[s] only of the real property
and all the improvements and personal
properties therein contained at 502 Acacia
Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa.[11]
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than
a month from the issuance of Civil Decree
No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati
City RTC a petition[12] dated January 26,
1996, with attachments, for declaration of
nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil Case
No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later
moved[13] and secured approval[14] of the
motion to withdraw the petition.
On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an
Affidavit of Acknowledgment[15] stating
under oath that she is an American citizen;
that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been
living separately; and that she is carrying a
child not of Vicente.

On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another

petition, this time before the Muntinlupa
City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage[16] on the ground of Vicentes
alleged psychological incapacity. Docketed
as Civil Case No. 01-094 and entitled
as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v.
Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition was
eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the
court. In it, Rebecca also sought
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
of gains with application for
support pendente lite for her and Alix.
Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be
ordered to pay a permanent monthly
support for their daughter Alix in the
amount of PhP 220,000.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to
Dismiss[17] on, inter alia, the grounds of lack
of cause of action and that the petition is
barred by the prior judgment of
divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca
filed and moved for the allowance of her
application for support pendente lite.
To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca
interposed an opposition, insisting on her
Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and that,
therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak
of.
Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim
contracted another marriage, and Rebecca
commenced several criminal complaints
against each other. Specifically, Vicente
filed adultery and perjury complaints
against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other
hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and
concubinage.
Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss
and Motion for Support Pendente Lite
On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an
Order[18] denying Vicentes motion to dismiss
Civil Case No. 01-094 and granting
Rebeccas application for support pendente
lite, disposing as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to
Dismiss filed by the respondent is
DENIED. Petitioners Application in Support of the
Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby
GRANTED. Respondent is hereby ordered to
remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a
month to Petitioner as support for the duration
of the proceedings relative to the instant
Petition.

SO ORDERED.[19]

The RTC declared, among other things,

that the divorce judgment invoked by
Vicente as bar to the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage is a matter of defense best
taken up during actual trial. As to the
grant of support pendente lite, the trial
court held that a mere allegation of
adultery against Rebecca does not
operate to preclude her from receiving
legal support.
Following the denial[20] of his motion for
reconsideration of the above August 8,
2001 RTC order, Vicente went to the CA
on a petition for certiorari, with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction.[21] His petition
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.
Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction
by the CA
On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the
desired TRO.[22] On April 30, 2002, the
appellate court granted, via a
Resolution, the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, the decretal
portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending
final resolution of the petition at bar, let the
Writ of Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in
this case, enjoining the respondent court
from implementing the assailed Omnibus
Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order
dated November 20, 2001, and from
conducting further proceedings in Civil Case
No. 01-094, upon the posting of an
injunction bond in the amount of
P250,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[23]

Rebecca moved[24] but was denied

reconsideration of the
aforementioned April 30,
2002 resolution. In the meantime,
onMay 20, 2002, the preliminary
injunctive writ[25] was issued. Rebecca
also moved for reconsideration of this
issuance, but the CA, by Resolution

dated September 2, 2002, denied her

motion.
The adverted CA resolutions of April 30,
2002 and September 2, 2002 are
presently being assailed in Rebeccas
petition for certiorari, docketed
under G.R. No. 155635.
Ruling of the CA
Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635,
the CA, by a Decision dated March 25,
2004, effectively dismissed Civil Case
No. 01-094, and set aside incidental
orders the RTC issued in relation to the
case. The fallo of the presently assailed
CA Decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition
is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001
and the Order dated November 20, 2001
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure
to state a cause of action. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.[26]

To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted

Vicentes motion to dismiss on the basis of
the following premises:
(1) As held in China Road and Bridge
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the
hypothetical-admission rule applies in
determining whether a complaint or
petition states a cause of action.
[27]
Applying said rule in the light of the
essential elements of a cause of action,
[28]
Rebecca had no cause of action against
Vicente for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in
this jurisdiction to have her marriage with
Vicente declared void, the union having
previously been dissolved on February 22,
1996 by the foreign divorce decree she
personally secured as an American
citizen.Pursuant to the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce
restored Vicentes capacity to contract
another marriage.
(3) Rebeccas contention about the nullity of
a divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at the
time the foreign divorce decree was
rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to
her alleged Filipino citizenship was also
doubtful as it was not shown that her

father, at the time of her birth, was still a

Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of
Rebecca issued by the Government of Guam
also did not indicate the nationality of her
father.
(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her
American citizenship, having professed to
have that nationality status and having
made representations to that effect during
momentous events of her life, such as: (a)
during her marriage; (b) when she applied
for divorce; and (c) when she applied for
and eventually secured an American
passport on January 18, 1995, or a little
over a year before she initiated the first but
later withdrawn petition for nullity of her
marriage (Civil Case No. 96-378) on March
14, 1996.
(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship,
being born of a purportedly Filipino father
in Guam, USA which follows the jus
soli principle, Rebeccas representation and
assertion about being an American citizen
when she secured her foreign divorce
precluded her from denying her citizenship
and impugning the validity of the divorce.
Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration of the above Decision, but
this recourse was denied in the equally
assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution.[29] Hence,
Rebeccas Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45, docketed under G.R. No.
163979.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4)
assignments of errors as grounds for the
allowance of her petition, all of which
converged on the proposition that the CA
erred in enjoining the implementation of
the RTCs orders which would have entitled
her to support pending final resolution of
Civil Case No. 01-094.
In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the
reversal of the assailed CA decision
submitting as follows:
I

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

NOT MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING INTO
CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF
THE FACTS THE FACT OF PETITIONERS
FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY
STATED AND ALLEGED IN HER PETITION
BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES TO THE

PETITION IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS

BROUGHT BEFORE IT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT IS
ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS
MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER HAD ALREADY
BEEN DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS
SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT ACTS.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
RULING THAT THERE WAS ABUSE OF
DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL
COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE.[30]
We shall first address the petition in G.R.
No. 163979, its outcome being
determinative of the success or failure of
the petition in G.R. No. 155635.
Three legal premises need to be
underscored at the outset. First, a divorce
obtained abroad by an alien married to a
Philippine national may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided the decree of
divorce is valid according to the national
law of the foreigner.[31] Second, the
reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
divorcing parties at birth or at the time of
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a
valid divorce is obtained abroad. And third,
an absolute divorce secured by a Filipino
married to another Filipino is contrary to
our concept of public policy and morality
and shall not be recognized in this
jurisdiction.[32]
Given the foregoing perspective, the
determinative issue tendered in G.R. No.
155635, i.e., the propriety of the granting
of the motion to dismiss by the appellate
court, resolves itself into the questions
of: first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a
Filipino citizen at the time the divorce
judgment was rendered in the Dominican
Republic on February 22, 1996; and second,
whether the judgment of divorce is valid
and, if so, what are its consequent legal
effects?
The Courts Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview
of This Case
There can be no serious dispute that
Rebecca, at the time she applied for and

obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an

American citizen and remains to be one,
absent proof of an effective repudiation of
such citizenship. The following are
compelling circumstances indicative of her
American citizenship: (1) she was born in
Agaa, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus
soli is followed in this American territory
granting American citizenship to those who
are born there; and (3) she was, and may
still be, a holder of an American passport.[33]
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had
consistently professed, asserted, and
represented herself as an American citizen,
particularly: (1) during her marriage as
shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the
birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she
secured the divorce from the Dominican
Republic. Mention may be made of the
Affidavit of Acknowledgment[34] in which she
stated being an American citizen.
It is true that Rebecca had been issued by
the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of
Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC 9778
and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to show
that she has indeed been recognized as a
Filipino citizen. It cannot be overemphasized, however, that such recognition
was given only on June 8, 2000 upon the
affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of
Rebeccas recognition pursuant to the Order
of Recognition issued by Bureau Associate
Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.
For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents
of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:
To Whom It May Concern:
This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA
MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose photograph and
thumbprints are affixed hereto and partially
covered by the seal of this Office, and
whose other particulars are as follows:
Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of
Birth: March 5, 1953
Sex: female Civil Status: married Color of
Hair: brown
Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks
on face: none
was r e c o g n i z e d as a citizen of the
Philippines as per pursuant to Article IV,
Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the 1935
Constitution per order of Recognition JBL
95-213 signed by Associate Commissioner
Jose B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995, and

duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice

Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement
dated June 8, 2000.

by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for

Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is
required.

Issued for identification purposes only. NOT

VALID for travel purposes.

Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No.

RBR-99-002[35] on Recognition as a Filipino
Citizen clearly provides:

Given under my hand and seal this 11th day

of October, 1995
(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA
ASSO. COMMISSIONER
Official Receipt No. 5939988
issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000
From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778,
the following material facts and dates may
be deduced: (1) Bureau Associate
Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the
Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995;
(2) the 1st Indorsement of Secretary of
Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming
Rebeccas recognition as a Filipino citizen
was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five
years from the date of the order of
recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC
9778 was purportedly issued on October 11,
1995 after the payment of the PhP 2,000
fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No.
5939988.
What begs the question is, however, how
the above certificate could have been
issued by the Bureau on October 11,
1995when the Secretary of Justice issued
the required affirmation only on June 8,
2000. No explanation was given for this
patent aberration. There seems to be no
error with the date of the issuance of the
1st Indorsement by Secretary of Justice
Tuquero as this Court takes judicial notice
that he was the Secretary of Justice
from February 16, 2000 to January 22,
2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason
to conclude that the certificate in question
must be spurious.
Under extant immigration rules,
applications for recognition of Filipino
citizenship require the affirmation by the
DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by
the Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292,
also known as the 1987 Administrative
Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1,
Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to
provide immigration and naturalization
regulatory services and implement the laws
governing citizenship and the admission
and stay of aliens. Thus, the confirmation

The Bureau [of Immigration] through its

Records Section shall automatically furnish
the Department of Justice an official copy of
its Order of Recognition within 72 days from
its date of approval by the way of
indorsement for confirmation of the Order
by the Secretary of Justice pursuant to
Executive Order No. 292. No Identification
Certificate shall be issued before the date
of confirmation by the Secretary of
Justice and any Identification Certificate
issued by the Bureau pursuant to an Order
of Recognition shall prominently indicate
thereon the date of confirmation by the
Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis ours.)
Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by
Rebecca of her Philippine passport only
on June 13, 2000, or five days after then
Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the
1st Indorsement confirming the order of
recognition. It may be too much to attribute
to coincidence this unusual sequence of
close events which, to us, clearly suggests
that prior to said affirmation or
confirmation, Rebecca was not yet
recognized as a Filipino citizen. The same
sequence would also imply that ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been
issued in 1995, as Bureau Law Instruction
No. RBR-99-002 mandates that no
identification certificate shall be issued
before the date of confirmation by the
Secretary of Justice. Logically, therefore,
the affirmation or confirmation of
Rebeccasrecognition as a Filipino citizen
through the 1st Indorsement issued only on
June 8, 2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero
corresponds to the eventual issuance of
Rebeccas passport a few days later, or on
June 13, 2000 to be exact.

When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She

Was not a
Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized
as One
The Court can assume hypothetically that
Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from
the foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable
that Rebecca did not have that status of, or

at least was not yet recognized as, a

Filipino citizen when she secured
theFebruary 22, 1996 judgment of divorce
from the Dominican Republic.
The Court notes and at this juncture wishes
to point out that Rebecca voluntarily
withdrew her original petition for
declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378
of the Makati City RTC) obviously because
she could not show proof of her alleged
Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal
of that petition shows that, while bearing
the date January 26, 1996, it was only filed
with the RTC on March 14, 1996 or less than
a month after Rebecca secured, on February
22, 1996, the foreign divorce decree in
question.Consequently, there was no
mention about said divorce in the
petition. Significantly, the only documents
appended as annexes to said original
petition were: the Vicente-Rebecca
Marriage Contract (Annex A) and Birth
Certificate of Alix (Annex B). If indeed ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau
was truly issued on October 11, 1995, is it
not but logical to expect that this piece of
document be appended to form part of the
petition, the question of her citizenship
being crucial to her case?
As may be noted, the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
under Civil Case No. 01-094, like the
withdrawn first petition, also did not have
the ID Certificate from the Bureau as
attachment. What were attached consisted
of the following material
documents: Marriage Contract (Annex A)
and Divorce Decree. It was only through her
Opposition (To Respondents Motion to
Dismiss dated 31 May 2001)[36] did Rebecca
attach as Annex C ID Certificate No. RC
9778.
At any rate, the CA was correct in holding
that the RTC had sufficient basis to dismiss
the petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage as said petition, taken
together with Vicentes motion to dismiss
and Rebeccas opposition to motion, with
their respective attachments, clearly made
out a case of lack of cause of action, which
we will expound later.
Validity of Divorce Decree
Going to the second core issue, we find Civil
Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.

First, at the time of the divorce, as above

elucidated, Rebecca was still to be
recognized, assuming for argument that she
was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino
citizen, but represented herself in public
documents as an American citizen. At the
very least, she chose, before, during, and
shortly after her divorce, her American
citizenship to govern her marital
relationship. Second, she secured
personally said divorce as an American
citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil
Decrees, which pertinently declared:
IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the
parties expressly submit to the jurisdiction
of this court, by reason of the existing
incompatibility of temperaments x x x. The
parties MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United
States nationality, 42 years of age, married,
domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave.,
Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x
x, who personally appeared before this
court, accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN
OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and VICENTE
MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine nationality,
of 43 years of age, married and domiciled
and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala
Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared
before this court represented by DR.
ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x x,
revalidated by special power of attorney
given the 19th of February of 1996, signed
before the Notary Public Enrico L. Espanol
of the City of Manila, duly legalized and
authorizing him to subscribe all the acts
concerning this case.[37] (Emphasis ours.)
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca
was bound by the national laws of
the United States of America, a country
which allows divorce. Fourth, the property
relations of Vicente and Rebecca were
properly adjudicated through their
Agreement[38]executed on December 14,
1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was
rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly
affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued
on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign
divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the
holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign
divorce can be recognized here, provided
the divorce decree is proven as a fact and
as valid under the national law of the alien
spouse.[39] Be this as it may, the fact that
Rebecca was clearly an American citizen
when she secured the divorce and that
divorce is recognized and allowed in any of

the States of the Union,[40] the presentation

of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly
authenticated by the foreign court issuing
said decree is, as here, sufficient.
It bears to stress that the existence of the
divorce decree has not been denied, but in
fact admitted by both parties. And neither
did they impeach the jurisdiction of the
divorce court nor challenge the validity of
its proceedings on the ground of collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit
both appeared to have the opportunity to
do so. The same holds true with respect to
the decree of partition of their conjugal
property. As this Court explained in Roehr v.
Rodriguez:
Before our courts can give the effect of res
judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x
x x, it must be shown that the parties
opposed to the judgment had been given
ample opportunity to do so on grounds
allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the
Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.The
effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific
thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the
title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person,
the judgment is presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title;
but the judgment may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
It is essential that there should be an
opportunity to challenge the foreign
judgment, in order for the court in this
jurisdiction to properly determine its
efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of
Court clearly provide that with respect to
actions in personam, as distinguished from
actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of the
justness of the claim of a party and, as
such, is subject to proof to the contrary. [41]
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by
counsel, personally secured the foreign
divorce while Vicente was duly represented
by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro

Torrens, in said proceedings. As things

stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered
and issued by the Dominican Republic court
are valid and, consequently, bind both
Rebecca and Vicente.
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have
been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by
force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by
Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October
6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will
not, standing alone, work to nullify or
invalidate the foreign divorce secured by
Rebecca as an American citizen on February
22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset,
in determining whether or not a divorce
secured abroad would come within the pale
of the countrys policy against absolute
divorce, the reckoning point is the
citizenship of the parties at the time a valid
divorce is obtained.[42]
Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce
secured by Rebecca, the same shall be
given a res judicata effect in this
jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the
divorce decree obtained, the
marital vinculum between Rebecca and
Vicente is considered severed; they are
both freed from the bond of matrimony. In
plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no
longer husband and wife to each other. As
the divorce court formally pronounced:
[T]hat the marriage between MARIA
REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL
BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving
them free to remarry after completing the
legal requirements.[43]
Consequent to the dissolution of the
marriage, Vicente could no longer be
subject to a husbands obligation under the
Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be
obliged to live with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.[44]
The divorce decree in question also brings
into play the second paragraph of Art. 26 of
the Family Code, providing as follows:
Art. 26. x x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (As amended by E.O. 227)

In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled

out the twin elements for the
applicability of the second paragraph of
Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as
follows:
1.
There is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2.
A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a
valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.[45]

Both elements obtain in the instant

case. We need not belabor further the
fact of marriage of Vicente and
Rebecca, their citizenship when they
wed, and their professed citizenship
during the valid divorce proceedings.
Not to be overlooked of course is the
fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and
the Agreement executed on December
14, 1996bind both Rebecca and Vicente
as regards their property relations. The
Agreement provided that the excouples conjugal property consisted
only their family home, thus:
9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property
which they acquired during their marriage
consists only of the real property and all the
improvements and personal properties therein
contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No. 168301 dated Feb. 7,
1990 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro
Manila registered in the name of Vicente M. Bayot,
married to Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x.[46] (Emphasis ours.)

This property settlement embodied in

the Agreement was affirmed by the
divorce court which, per its second
divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97
dated March 4, 1997, ordered that,
THIRD: That the agreement entered into
between the parties dated 14thday of
December 1996 in Makati City,
Philippines shall survive in this
Judgment of divorce by reference but
not merged and that the parties are
hereby ordered and directed to comply
with each and every provision of said
agreement.[47]

Rebecca has not repudiated the

property settlement contained in the
Agreement. She is thus estopped by her
representation before the divorce court
from asserting that her and Vicentes
conjugal property was not limited to
their family home in Ayala Alabang.[48]
No Cause of Action in the Petition for
Nullity of Marriage
Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is
abundantly clear to the Court that
Rebecca lacks, under the premises,
cause of action.Philippine Bank of
Communications v. Trazo explains the
concept and elements of a cause of
action, thus:
A cause of action is an act or omission of one
party in violation of the legal right of the
other. A motion to dismiss based on lack
ofcause of action hypothetically admits the truth
of the allegations in the complaint. The
allegations in a complaint are sufficient to
constitute a cause of action against the
defendants if, hypothetically admitting the facts
alleged, the court can render a valid judgment
upon the same in accordance with the prayer
therein. A cause of action exists if the
following elements are present, namely: (1) a
right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means
and under whatever law it arises or is created;
(2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right;
and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter
may maintain an action for recovery of damages.
[49]

One thing is clear from a perusal of

Rebeccas underlying petition before the
RTC, Vicentes motion to dismiss and
Rebeccas opposition thereof, with the
documentary evidence attached
therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of
action for declaration of nullity of
marriage, a suit which presupposes the
existence of a marriage.
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack
of cause of action, the movant must
show that the claim for relief does not
exist rather than that a claim has been
defectively stated or is ambiguous,
indefinite, or uncertain.[50] With the
valid foreign divorce secured by
Rebecca, there is no more marital tie

binding her to Vicente. There is in fine

no more marriage to be dissolved or
nullified.
The Court to be sure does not lose sight
of the legal obligation of Vicente and
Rebecca to support the needs of their
daughter, Alix. The records do not
clearly show how he had discharged his
duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the
support given had been insufficient. At
any rate, we do note that Alix, having
been born on November 27, 1982,
reached the majority age on November
27, 2000, or four months before her
mother initiated her petition for
declaration of nullity. She would now be
26 years old. Hence, the issue of back
support, which allegedly had been
partly shouldered by Rebecca, is best
litigated in a separate civil action for
reimbursement. In this way, the actual
figure for the support of Alix can be
proved as well as the earning capacity
of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial
court can thus determine what Vicente
owes, if any, considering that support
includes provisions until the child
concerned shall have finished her
education.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the
Court no longer need to delve into the
issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, that
is, Rebeccas right to support pendente
lite. As it were, her entitlement to that
kind of support hinges on the tenability
of her petition under Civil Case No. 01094 for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case
No. 01-094 by the CA veritably removed
any legal anchorage for, and effectively
mooted, the claim for support pendente
lite.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari
in G.R. No. 155635 is
hereby DISMISSED on the ground of
mootness, while the petition for review
in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. Accordingly, the March
25, 2004 Decision and June 4,
2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP
No. 68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 3-34.
Id. at 36-38. Penned by Associate, now Presiding, Justice Conrado M.
Vasquez, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr.
and Mario L. Guaria III.
[3]
Id. at 40-41.
[4]
Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 10-43.
[5]
Id. at 575-583.
[6]
Id. at 145.
[7]
See Certification of Birth from the Government of Guam issued
on June 1, 2000; rollo (G.R. No. 155635), p. 213.
[8]
Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 146-150.
[9]
Id. at 214-217.
[10]
Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 151-158.
[11]
Id. at 154.
[12]
Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 206-212.
[13]
Id. at 305-306. Per a motion to withdraw dated November 8, 1996.
[14]
Id. at 213. Per Order of Judge Josefina Guevara Salonga
dated November 14, 1996.
[15]
Id. at 236-237.
[16]
Id. at 126-144.
[17]
Id. at 156-204.
[18]
Id. at 123-124. Penned by Presiding Judge Alberto L. Lerma.
[19]
Id. at 338.
[20]
Id. at 125. Per Order dated November 20, 2001.
[21]
Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 512-590.
[22]
Id. at 592-593.
[23]
Id. at 38.
[24]
Id. at 852-869.
[25]
Id. at 850-851.
[26]
Supra note 5, at 583.
[27]
G.R. No. 137898, December 15, 2000, 348 SCRA 401, 409.
[28]
Enumerated in San Lorenzo Village Association, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 116825 March 26, 1998, 288 SCRA 115, 125: (1) the
legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the
[1]
[2]

defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of

said legal right.
[29]
Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), p. 597.
[30]
Id. at 22-23.
[31]
Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437,
447.
[32]
Llorente v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000,
345 SCRA 592, 600.
[33]
Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 388-389, issued on January 18,
1995 with expiration date on January 17, 2005.
[34]
Supra note 15.
[35]
Adopted on April 15, 1999.
[36]
Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 268-292.
[37]
Id. at 147, 214-215.
[38]
Supra note 10.
[39]
Supra note 31.
[40]
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA
139, 143.
[41]
G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003, 404 SCRA 495, 502-503.
[42]
Id. at 501-502.
[43]
Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 148, 216.
[44]
Van Dorn, supra note 40, at 144.
[45]
G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114, 122.
[46]
Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), p. 154.
[47]
Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), p. 215.
[48]
Van Dorn, supra note 44.
[49]
G.R. No. 165500, August 30, 2006, 500 SCRA 242, 251-252;
citations omitted.
[50]
Azur v. Provincial Board, No. L-22333, February 27, 1969, 27 SCRA
50, 57-58.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
GERBERT R.
CORPUZ,
Petitioner,

versus -

G.R. No. 186571

Present:
CARPIO
MORALES, J.,
Chairperson,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
*
ABAD, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

DAISYLYN TIROL S
Promulgated:
TO. TOMAS and
August 11, 2010
The SOLICITOR
GENERAL,
Respondents. -- x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the

decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevatedvia a
petition for review on certiorari[2] under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present
petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former
Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization
onNovember 29, 2000.[3] On January 18,
2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn
T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.
[4]
Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon
after the wedding. He returned to
the Philippinessometime in April 2005 to
surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to
discover that his wife was having an affair
with another man. Hurt and disappointed,
Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a
petition for divorce. The Superior Court of
Justice, Windsor, Ontario,Canada granted
Gerberts petition for divorce on December
8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a
month later, on January 8, 2006.[5]
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has
moved on and has found another Filipina to
love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina
fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to
the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and
registered the Canadian divorce decree on
his and Daisylyns marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the
divorce decree, an official of the National
Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert
that the marriage between him and
Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law;
to be enforceable, the foreign divorce
decree must first be judicially recognized by
a competent Philippine court, pursuant to
NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.[6]
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and/or declaration of marriage as
dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although
summoned, Daisylyn did not file any
responsive pleading but submitted instead
a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial
court. She offered no opposition to Gerberts
petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to
file a similar case herself but was prevented

by financial and personal

circumstances. She, thus, requested that
she be considered as a party-in-interest
with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC
denied Gerberts petition. The RTC
concluded that Gerbert was not the proper
party to institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as
he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled
thatonly the Filipino spouse can avail of the
remedy, under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code,[8] in order for
him or her to be able to remarry under
Philippine law.[9] Article 26 of the Family
Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside
the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is

consistent with the legislative intent behind
the enactment of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined
by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;
[10]
the provision was enacted to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.[11]
THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the
present petition.[13]
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the
RTC is essentially for declaratory relief,
similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus,
similarly asks for a determination of his
rights under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into
account the rationale behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
he contends that the provision applies as
well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He
claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched
the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the

standing to file the petition only to the

Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims
to be contrary to the essence of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code. He considers himself as a proper
party, vested with sufficient legal interest,
to institute the case, as there is a
possibility that he might be prosecuted for
bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in
the Philippines since two marriage
certificates, involving him, would be on file
with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of
the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their
respective Comments,[14] both support
Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue
of whether the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the
right to petition a court of this jurisdiction
for the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code as the substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a
review of the legislative history and intent
behind the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types
of defective marriages void[15] and
voidable[16] marriages. In both cases, the
basis for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity or annulment of the marriage
exists before or at the time of the
marriage. Divorce, on the other hand,
contemplates the dissolution of the lawful
union for cause arising after the marriage.
[17]
Our family laws do not recognize
absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.
[18]

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a

possibility in marriages between a Filipino
and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino,
in the exercise of her legislative powers
under the Freedom Constitution,[19] enacted
Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending
Article 26 of the Family Code to its present
wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside
the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also

be valid in this country, except those prohibited

under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26

of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively
incorporated into the law this Courts
holding inVan Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
[20]
and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[21] In both
cases, the Court refused to acknowledge
the alien spouses assertion of marital rights
after a foreign courts divorce decree
between the alien and the Filipino. The
Court, thus, recognized that the foreign
divorce had already severed the marital
bond between the spouses. The Court
reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the
Filipino spouse] has to be considered still
married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to
a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The
Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should
not be discriminated against in her own country
if the ends of justice are to be served.[22]

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision

was included in the law to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse.[23] The legislative intent
is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by
clarifying his or her marital status, settling
the doubts created by the divorce
decree. Essentially, the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code provided
the Filipino spouse a substantive right to
have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or
her to remarry.[24] Without the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
the judicial recognition of the foreign
decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding
instituted precisely for that purpose or as a
related issue in another proceeding, would
be of no significance to the Filipino spouse
since our laws do not recognize divorce as a
mode of severing the marital bond;
[25]
Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that
the policy against absolute divorces cannot
be subverted by judgments promulgated in

a foreign country. The inclusion of the

second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family
Code provides the direct exception to this
rule and serves as basis for recognizing the
dissolution of the marriage between the
Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
is not limited to the recognition of the
foreign divorce decree. If the court finds
that the decree capacitated the alien
spouse to remarry, the courts can declare
that the Filipino spouse is likewise
capacitated to contract another
marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
however, can make a similar declaration for
the alien spouse (other than that already
established by the decree), whose status
and legal capacity are generally governed
by his national law.[26]
Given the rationale and intent behind the
enactment, and the purpose of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
the RTC was correct in limiting the
applicability of the provision for the benefit
of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only
the Filipino spouse can invoke the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code;
the alien spouse can claim no right under
this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive
evidence of a right that clothes the party
with legal interest to petition for its
recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code bestows no rights in favor of
aliens with the complementary statement
that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to
dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In
other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code to aliens does not necessarily strip
Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC
for the recognition of his foreign divorce
decree. The foreign divorce decree itself,
after its authenticity and conformity with
the aliens national law have been duly
proven according to our rules of evidence,
serves as a presumptive evidence of right in
favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides
for the effect of foreign judgments. This
Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final

orders.The effect of a judgment or final order of
a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order
is as follows:
(a)
In case of a judgment or final order upon
a specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b)
In case of a judgment or final order
against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may
be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being

the subject of the foreign judgment is
sufficient to clothe a party with the
requisite interest to institute an action
before our courts for the recognition of the
foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we
have declared, no less, that the divorce
obtained by an alien abroad may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided the
divorce is valid according to his or her
national law.[27]
The starting point in any recognition of a
foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not
take judicial notice of foreign judgments
and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as
a rule, no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered
by a tribunal of another country.[28] This
means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under
our rules on evidence, together with the
aliens applicable national law to show the
effect of the judgment on the alien himself
or herself.[29] The recognition may be made
in an action instituted specifically for the
purpose or in another action where a party
invokes the foreign decree as an integral
aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign
divorce decree and the national law of the
alien, recognizing his or her capacity to
obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts
of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court comes into
play. This Section requires proof, either by
(1) official publications or (2) copies
attested by the officer having legal custody
of the documents.If the copies of official

records are not kept in the Philippines,

these must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to
his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as
well as the required certificates proving its
authenticity,[30] but failed to include a copy
of the Canadian law on divorce.[31] Under
this situation, we can, at this point, simply
dismiss the petition for insufficiency of
supporting evidence, unless we deem it
more appropriate to remand the case to the
RTC to determine whether the divorce
decree is consistent with the Canadian
divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this
latter course of action, given the Article 26
interests that will be served and the Filipina
wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with
the petition. A remand, at the same time,
will allow other interested parties to oppose
the foreign judgment and overcome a
petitioners presumptive evidence of a right
by proving want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. Needless to state,
every precaution must be taken to ensure
conformity with our laws before a
recognition is made, as the foreign
judgment, once recognized, shall have the
effect of res judicata[32] between the
parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court.[33]
In fact, more than the principle of comity
that is served by the practice of reciprocal
recognition of foreign judgments between
nations, the res judicata effect of the
foreign judgments of divorce serves as the
deeper basis for extending judicial
recognition and for considering the alien
spouse bound by its terms. This same
effect, as discussed above, will not obtain
for the Filipino spouse were it not for the
substantive rule that the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of
the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of housekeeping concern, we
note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
has already recorded the divorce decree on
Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate

based on the mere presentation of the

decree.[34] We consider the recording to be
legally improper; hence, the need to draw
attention of the bench and the bar to what
had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that
[a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall
be recorded in the civil register. The law
requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences touching upon a persons
legal capacity and status, i.e., those
affecting all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature,
not ordinarily terminable at his own will,
such as his being legitimate or illegitimate,
or his being married or not.[35]
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree,
although a foreign one, affecting a persons
legal capacity and status that must be
recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law
on Registry of Civil Status specifically
requires the registration of divorce decrees
in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is
established for recording the civil status of
persons, in which shall be entered:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)

births;
deaths;
marriages;
annulments of marriages;
divorces;
legitimations;
adoptions;
acknowledgment of natural children;
naturalization; and
changes of name.

xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars
shall keep and preserve in their offices the
following books, in which they shall, respectively
make the proper entries concerning the civil
status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be
entered not only the marriages solemnized but
also divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption,
change of name and naturalization register.

But while the law requires the entry of the

divorce decree in the civil registry, the law
and the submission of the decree by

themselves do not ipso facto authorize the

decrees registration. The law should be
read in relation with the requirement of a
judicial recognition of the foreign judgment
before it can be given res judicata effect. In
the context of the present case, no judicial
order as yet exists recognizing the foreign
divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office acted totally out of turn and
without authority of law when it annotated
the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the
strength alone of the foreign decree
presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
was aware of the requirement of a court
recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4,
series of 1982,[36] and Department of
Justice Opinion No. 181, series of
1982[37] both of which required a final order
from a competent Philippine court before a
foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage,
can be registered in the civil registry, but it,
nonetheless, allowed the registration of the
decree. For being contrary to law, the
registration of the foreign divorce decree
without the requisite judicial recognition is
patently void and cannot produce any legal
effect.
Another point we wish to draw attention to
is that the recognition that the RTC may
extend to the Canadian divorce decree does
not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of
the entry in the civil registry. A petition for
recognition of a foreign judgment is not the
proper proceeding, contemplated under the
Rules of Court, for the cancellation of
entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that
no entry in a civil register shall be changed
or corrected, without judicial order.The
Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of
the Civil Code by specifically providing for a
special remedial proceeding by which
entries in the civil registry may be judicially
cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court sets in detail the
jurisdictional and procedural requirements
that must be complied with before a
judgment, authorizing the cancellation or
correction, may be annotated in the civil
registry. It also requires, among others,
that the verified petition must be filed with
the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located;
[38]
that the civil registrar and all persons

who have or claim any interest must be

made parties to the proceedings;[39] and
that the time and place for hearing must be
published in a newspaper of general
circulation.[40] As these basic jurisdictional
requirements have not been met in the
present case, we cannot consider the
petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one
filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling
should not be construed as requiring two
separate proceedings for the registration of a
foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one
for recognition of the foreign decree and another
specifically for cancellation of the entry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition
of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a
Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular
fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding[41] by which the applicability of the
foreign judgment can be measured and tested in
terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review
on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30,
2008 decision of
theRegional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11,
as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order
the REMAND of the case to the trial court for
further proceedings in accordance with our
ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.

before the case was assigned to the writer of the

opinion of the Courts Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Designated additional Member of the Third

Division, in view of the retirement of Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno, per Special Order No. 843
dated May 17, 2010.
[1]
Dated October 30, 2008, penned by Judge Perla
B. Querubin; rollo, pp. 24-31.
[2]
Id. at 3-20.
[3]
Id. at 27.
[4]
Marriage Certificate, id. at 37.
[5]
Certificate of Divorce, id. at 38.
[6]
Id. at 47-50; the pertinent portion of NSO
Circular No. 4, series of 1982, states:

It would therefore be premature to register the

decree of annulment in the Register of Annulment
of Marriages in Manila, unless and until final order
of execution of such foreign judgment is issued
by competent Philippine court.
[7]
Supra note 1.
[8]
Executive Order No. 209, enacted on July 6,
1987.
[9]
SO ORDERED.
Rollo, p. 31.
[10]
G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA
ARTURO D. BRION
114.
[11]
Associate Justice
Id. at 121.
[12]
Gerberts motion for reconsideration of the RTCs
WE CONCUR:
October 30, 2008 decision was denied in an order
dated February 17, 2009; rollo, p. 32.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
[13]
Supra note 2.
Associate Justice
[14]
Rollo, pp. 79-87 and 125-142, respectively.
[15]
The void marriages are those enumerated
ROBERTO A. ABAD
under Articles 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44, and 53
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code.
[16]
The voidable marriages are those enumerated
under Article 45 of the Family Code.
[17]
Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2,
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
2001, 366 SCRA 437, 452.
Associate Justice
[18]
Ibid. See A. Tolentino, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines,
Volume One, with the Family Code of
ATTESTATION
the Philippines (2004 ed.), p. 262.
[19]
Proclamation No. 3, issued on March 25, 1996.
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation

G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA

139.
[21]
G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.
[22]
Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20 at 144.
[23]
Republic v. Orbecido, supra note 10 at 121.
[24]
The capacity of the Filipino spouse to remarry,
however, depends on whether the foreign divorce
decree capacitated the alien spouse to do so.
[25]
See Article 17 in relation to Article 15 of the
Civil Code:
[20]

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties,

or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad.
xxxx
Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons,
their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
or judgments promulgated, or by determinations
or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
[26]
Parenthetically, we add that an aliens legal
capacity to contract is evidenced by a certificate
issued by his or her respective diplomatic and
consular officials, which he or she must present
to secure a marriage license (Article 21, Family
Code). The Filipino spouse who seeks to remarry,
however, must still resort to a judicial action for a
declaration of authority to remarry.
[27]
Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 447;
citing Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20.
[28]
Remedial Law, Volume II, Rules 23-56 (2007
ed.), p. 529.
[29]
Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 10 at 123
and Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 448; see
also Bayot v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155635,
November 7, 2008, 570 SCRA 472.
[30]
Rollo, pp. 38-41.
[31]
The foreign divorce decree only stated that the
marriage between Gerbert and Daisylyn was
dissolved by the Canadian court. The full text of
the courts judgment was not included.
[32]
Literally means a thing adjudged, Blacks Law
Dictionary (5th ed.), p. 1178; it establishes a rule
that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a
court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of
the rights of the parties or their privies in all later
suits, on points and matters determined in the
former. Supra note 28 at 462.
[33]
See Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 103493, June 19, 1997, 274
SCRA 102, 110, where the Court said:
While this Court has given the effect of res
judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, it
was after the parties opposed to the judgment
had been given ample opportunity to repel them
on grounds allowed under the law. It is not
necessary for this purpose to initiate a separate
action or proceeding for enforcement of the

foreign judgment. What is essential is that there

is opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment,
in order for the court to properly determine its
efficacy. This is because in this jurisdiction, with
respect to actions in personam, as distinguished
from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of
the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to
proof to the contrary.
[34]
On the face of the marriage certificate, the
word DIVORCED was written in big, bold
letters; rollo, p. 37.
[35]
Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October
22, 2007, 537 SCRA 373, 390, citing Beduya v.
Republic, 120 Phil. 114 (1964).
[36]
Rollo, pp. 47-50.
[37]
Id. at 51.
[38]
Section 1, Rule 108, Rules of Court.
[39]
Section 3, Rule 108, Rules of Court.
[40]
Section 4, Rule 108, Rules of Court.
[41]
When the entry sought to be corrected is
substantial (i.e., the civil status of a person), a
Rule 108 proceeding is deemed adversarial in
nature. See Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No.
138496, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 420, 430.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]

ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as

Guardian ad Litem of the minors
BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE
NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent. Ncmmis
DECISION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition
for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on
September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were
born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by
Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985.
One year and 8 months thereafter or on
December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent
Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and
Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11,
1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and
were thus exempt from securing a marriage
license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a
car accident. After their fathers death,
petitioners filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack
of a marriage license. The case was filed under

the assumption that the validity or invalidity of

the second marriage would affect petitioners
successional rights. Norma filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no
cause of action since they are not among the
persons who could file an action for "annulment
of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial
Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed
the petition after finding that the Family Code is
"rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve
the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of
action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their
deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of this
instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already
dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of
plaintiffs deceased father with defendant is null
and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from
assailing the validity of the second marriage
after it was dissolved due to their fathers death.
[1]

general public is interested. This interest

proceeds from the constitutional mandate that
the State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and of affording protection to the family as a
basic "autonomous social
institution." Specifically, the Constitution
considers marriage as an "inviolable social
institution," and is the foundation of family life
which shall be protected by the State. This is
why the Family Code considers marriage as "a
special contract of permanent union" and case
law considers it "not just an adventure but a
lifetime commitment."
[9]

[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]

However, there are several instances recognized

by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is
dispensed with, one of which is that provided in
Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man
and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife
for a continuous and unbroken period of at least
five years before the marriage. The rationale
why no license is required in such case is to
avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame
and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a
valid marriage due to the publication of every
applicants name for a marriage license. The
publicity attending the marriage license may
discourage such persons from legitimizing their
status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid
the peeping and suspicious eye of public
exposure and contain the source of gossip
arising from the publication of their names, the
law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and
exempt them from that requirement. Sdaa miso
[14]

[15]

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners

should have filed the action to declare null and
void their fathers marriage to respondent before
his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the
Family Code which enumerates the time and the
persons who could initiate an action for
annulment of marriage. Hence, this petition for
review with this Court grounded on a pure
question of law. Scnc m
[2]

This petition was originally dismissed for noncompliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the
verification failed to state the basis of
petitioners averment that the allegations in the
petition are true and correct." It was thus
treated as an unsigned pleading which produces
no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the
1997 Rules. However, upon motion of
petitioners, this Court reconsidered the
dismissal and reinstated the petition for review.
[3]

[4]

The two marriages involved herein having been

solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their
validity is the Civil Code which was the law in
effect at the time of their celebration. A valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage under
Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab
initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to
Article 58. The requirement and issuance of
marriage license is the States demonstration of
its involvement and participation in every
marriage, in the maintenance of which the
[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

There is no dispute that the marriage of

petitioners father to respondent Norma was
celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu
thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that
"they have attained the age of majority, and,
being unmarried, have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years, and that we now
desire to marry each other." The only issue that
needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of
cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of
the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five
year period in order to exempt the future
spouses from securing a marriage license.
Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties
are capacitated to marry each other during the
entire five-year continuous period or should it be
a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived
together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife during the entire five-year
continuous period regardless of whether there is
a legal impediment to their being lawfully
married, which impediment may have either
disappeared or intervened sometime during the
cohabitation period?
[16]

Working on the assumption that Pepito and

Norma have lived together as husband and wife
for five years without the benefit of marriage,
that five-year period should be computed on the
basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife"

where the only missing factor is the special

contract of marriage to validate the union. In
other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from
the date of celebration of marriage, should be a
period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period
should be the years immediately before the day
of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity
meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the 5 years and continuity that is
unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction
as to whether the parties were capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five years,
then the law would be sanctioning immorality
and encouraging parties to have common law
relationships and placing them on the same
footing with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse. Marriage being a special relationship
must be respected as such and its requirements
must be strictly observed. The presumption that
a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife is based on the approximation
of the requirements of the law. The parties
should not be afforded any excuse to not comply
with every single requirement and later use the
same missing element as a pre-conceived escape
ground to nullify their marriage. There should be
no exemption from securing a marriage license
unless the circumstances clearly fall within the
ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a
license is required in order to notify the public
that two persons are about to be united in
matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has
knowledge of any impediment to the union of the
two shall make it known to the local civil
registrar. The Civil Code provides:

person during the same period. Thus, any

marriage subsequently contracted during the
lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and
void, subject only to the exception in cases of
absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code
complements the civil law in that the contracting
of two or more marriages and the having of
extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e.,
bigamy and concubinage and adultery. The law
sanctions monogamy.
[18]

[19]

In this case, at the time of Pepito and

respondents marriage, it cannot be said that
they have lived with each other as husband and
wife for at least five years prior to their wedding
day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, only about twenty months had
elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both
Pepito and respondent had started living with
each other that has already lasted for five years,
the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature
of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting
marriage at the time when he started cohabiting
with respondent. It is immaterial that when they
lived with each other, Pepito had already been
separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there
was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third
party as being one as "husband and wife". Scs daad

[17]

Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all

persons having knowledge of any impediment to
the marriage to advice the local civil registrar
thereof. x x x."

Having determined that the second marriage

involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage
license, it is void ab initio because of the
absence of such element.

Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged

impediment to the marriage, the local civil
registrar shall forthwith make an investigation,
examining persons under oath. x x x" Sdaad

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners

have the personality to file a petition to declare
their fathers marriage void after his death?

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:

Article 17 provides in part: "x xx. This notice
shall request all persons having knowledge of
any impediment to the marriage to advise the
local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any
impediment known to the local civil registrar or
brought to his attention, he shall note down the
particulars thereof and his findings thereon in
the application for a marriage license. x x x."
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past
or present, absolutely prohibited the
concurrence of multiple marriages by the same

Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47

of the Family Code cannot be applied even by
analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The second ground for annulment of
marriage relied upon by the trial court, which
allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment
suit "at any time before the death of either
party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the
grounds, periods and persons who can file an
annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of
nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who
can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not
identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid
until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a
marriage that is void ab initio is considered as
having never to have taken place and cannot be
the source of rights. The first can be generally
[20]

[21]

ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or

prescription while the other can never be
ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed
collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a
void marriage can be attacked collaterally.
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned
even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the
lifetime of the parties and not after death of
either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid. That is why the action or
defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike
voidable marriages where the action prescribes.
Only the parties to a voidable marriage can
assail it but any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no
legal effects except those declared by law
concerning the properties of the alleged
spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership
through actual joint contribution, and its effect
on the children born to such void marriages as
provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43
and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the
Family Code. On the contrary, the property
regime governing voidable marriages is
generally conjugal partnership and the children
conceived before its annulment are legitimate. Sup
[22]

[23]

rema

Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of

petitioners father extinguished the alleged
marital bond between him and respondent. The
conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a
wrong premise that there was a marriage bond
that was dissolved between the two. It should be
noted that their marriage was void hence it is
deemed as if it never existed at all and the death
of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no
judicial decree is necessary in order to establish
the nullity of a marriage. "A void marriage does
not require a judicial decree to restore the
parties to their original rights or to make the
marriage void but though no sentence of
avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well
for the sake of good order of society as for the
peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient
that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a
court of competent jurisdiction." "Under
ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of
legal rights upon the parties, is as though no
marriage had ever taken place. And therefore,
being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity
can be maintained in any proceeding in which
the fact of marriage may be material, either
direct or collateral, in any civil court between
any parties at any time, whether before or after
the death of either or both the husband and the
wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering
such marriage void, it will be disregarded or
treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not
like a voidable marriage which cannot be
collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding
instituted during the lifetime of the parties so
[24]

that on the death of either, the marriage cannot

be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But
Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides
that there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage, though void,
before a party can enter into a second
marriage and such absolute nullity can be
based only on a final judgment to that effect.
For the same reason, the law makes either the
action or defense for the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily,
if the death of either party would extinguish the
cause of action or the ground for defense, then
the same cannot be considered
imprescriptible. Juris
[26]

[27]

[28]

[29]

However, other than for purposes of remarriage,

no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes,
such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on
the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the
Family Code connotes that such final judgment
need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo
City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No.
T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case
is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Puno, and Kapunan,
JJ., concur. Sc juris
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.

[25]

The dispositive portion of the Order dated March 27,

1998 issued by Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of Regional
Trial Court (RTC) - Branch 59, Toledo City, reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants motion
to dismiss is hereby granted and this instant case is
hereby ordered dismissed without costs." (p.
6; Rollo, p. 21).
[2]
Order, p. 4; Rollo, p. 19.
[3]
Minute Resolution dated July 13, 1998; Rollo, p. 39.
[4]
Minute Resolution dated October 7, 1998; Rollo, p.
50.
[5]
Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 (1998).
[6]
Now Article 3, Family Code. Art. 53. No marriage shall
be solemnized unless all the requisites are complied
with:
[1]

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; their

consent, freely given;
(2) Authority of the person performing the marriage;
and
(3) A marriage license, except in a marriage of
exceptional character.
[7]
Now Article 4, Family Code. Art. 80. The following
marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxxxxxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save
marriages of exceptional character.
xxxxxxxxx
[8]
Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character
authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those
under article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized
without a license first being issued by the local civil
registrar of the municipality where either contracting
party habitually resides.
[9]
Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97 (1975).
[10]
Section 12, Article II, 1987 Constitution; Hernandez
v. CA, G. R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999; See also
Tuason v. CA, 256 SCRA 158 (1996).
[11]
Section 2, Article XV (The Family), 1987 Constitution.
[12]
Article 1, Family Code provides: "Marriage is a
special contract of permanent union between a man
and a woman entered into in accordance with law for
the establishment of conjugal or family life. x x x.
[13]
Santos v. CA, 58 SCAD 17 (1995); 310 Phil. 21, 41
(1995).
[14]
Now Article 34, Family Code. Art. 76. No marriage
license shall be necessary when a man and a woman
who have attained the age of majority and who, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years, desire to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit
that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he
found no legal impediment to the marriage.
[15]
Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.
[16]
Rollo, p. 29.
[17]
Articles 63 and 64, Civil Code; Article 17 and 18,
Family Code.
[18]
Article 83, Civil Code provides "Any marriage
subsequently contracted by any person during the
lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and
void from its performance, unless:
(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven
consecutive years."
Article 41 of the Family Code reads: "A marriage
contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before
the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years"
[19]
Arts. 333 and 334, Revised Penal Code.
[20]
Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must
be filed by the following persons and within the periods
indicated herein:
(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by
the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or
her consent, within five years after attaining the age of
twenty-one; or by the parent or guardian or person
having legal charge of the minor, at any time before
such party has reached the age of twenty-one;

(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by

the sane spouse, who had no knowledge of the others
insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person
having legal charge of the insane, at any time before
the death of either party, or by the insane spouse
during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;
(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by
the injured party, within five years after the discovery
of the fraud;
(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by
the injured party, within five years from the time the
force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or
ceased;
For causes mentioned in numbers 5 and 6 of Article 45,
by the injured party, within five years after the
marriage.
[21]
Suntay v. Cojuanco-Suntay, 300 SCRA 760 (1998);
People v. Retirement Board, 272 Ill. App. 59 cited in I
Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed. p. 271.
[22]
In re Conzas Estate, 176 Ill. 192; Miller v. Miller, 175
Cal. 797, 167 Pac. 394 cited in I Tolentino, Civil Code,
1990 ed., p. 271.
[23]
Article 148-149, Family Code; Article 144, Civil Code.
[24]
Odayat v. Amante, 77 SCRA 338 (1977); Weigel v.
Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA 499 (1986); People v. Mendoza,
95 Phil. 845 (1954); 50 O.G. (10) 4767 cited in
People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957); 53 O.G. 3749.
[25]
35 Am. Jur. 219-220.
[26]
18 RCL 446-7; 35 Am Jur. 221.
[27]
Apiag v. Cantero, 335 Phil. 511 (1997); 268 SCRA 47
(1997); Atienza v. Judge Brillantes, Jr., 60 SCAD 119;
312 Phil. 939 (1995).
[28]
Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572 (1993).
[29]
Article 39, Family Code as amended by E.O. 209 and
227 s. 1987 and further amended by R.A. No. 8533
dated February 23, 1998.

THIRD DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,

G.R. No.November
175581 1986, attesting that both of
them had attained the age of maturity,
and that being unmarried, they had
lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years.

- versus JOSE A. DAYOT,

Respondent.
x------------------x
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT,
Petitioner,

- versus JOSE A. DAYOT,

Respondent.

On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a

Complaint[4] for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with
G.R. No.the
179474
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bian,
Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that
Present:his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as
no marriage ceremony was celebrated
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
between the parties; that he did not
Acting Chairperson,
execute the sworn affidavit stating that
TINGA, he and Felisa had lived as husband and
CHICO-NAZARIO,
wife for at least five years; and that his
VELASCO,
consent to the marriage was secured
REYES, through fraud.

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version

Promulgated:
of the events which led to his filing of
the same. According to Jose, he was
March 28,
introduced
2008
to Felisa in
1986. Immediately thereafter, he came
to live as a boarder in Felisas house,
the latter being his landlady. Some
three weeks later, Felisa requested him
to accompany her to the Pasay City
Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a
package sent to her by her brother
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from
Felisa, a man bearing three folded
DECISION
pieces of paper approached them. They
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
were told that Jose needed to sign the
papers so that the package could be
Before us are two consolidated
released to Felisa. He initially refused
petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No.
to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him,
179474 are Petitions for Review under
and told him that his refusal could get
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
both of them killed by her brother who
the Republic of the Philippines and
had learned about their
Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa),
relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the
respectively, both challenging the
pieces of paper, and gave them to the
Amended Decision[1] of the Court of
man who immediately left. It was in
Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CAFebruary 1987 when he discovered that
G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the
he had contracted marriage with
marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and
Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of
Felisa void ab initio.
paper lying on top of the table at the
The records disclose that on 24
sala of Felisas house. When he perused
November 1986, Jose and Felisa were
the same, he discovered that it was a
married at the Pasay City Hall. The
copy of his marriage contract with
marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas
Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the
V. Atienza.[2] In lieu of a marriage
latter feigned ignorance.
license, Jose and Felisa executed a
sworn affidavit,[3] also dated 24

In opposing the Complaint, Felisa

denied Joses allegations and defended
the validity of their marriage. She
declared that they had maintained their
relationship as man and wife absent the
legality of marriage in the early part of
1980, but that she had deferred
contracting marriage with him on
account of their age difference.[5] In her
pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that
while her marriage to Jose was
subsisting, the latter contracted
marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual
(Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June
1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy
against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an
administrative complaint against Jose
with the Office of the Ombudsman,
since Jose and Rufina were both
employees of the National Statistics
and Coordinating Board.[6] The
Ombudsman found Jose
administratively liable for disgraceful
and immoral conduct, and meted out to
him the penalty of suspension from
service for one year without
emolument.[7]
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a
Decision[8] dismissing the Complaint. It
disposed:
WHEREFORE,
after
a
careful
evaluation and analysis of the
evidence presented by both parties,
this Court finds and so holds that the
[C]omplaint does not deserve a
favorable consideration. Accordingly,
the above-entitled case is hereby
ordered
DISMISSED
with
costs
[9]
against [Jose].

The RTC ruled that from the testimonies

and evidence presented, the marriage
celebrated between Jose and Felisa
on 24 November 1986 was valid. It
dismissed Joses version of the story as
implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind
would easily suspect any attempt to make
him or her sign a blank sheet of
paper. [Jose] could have already detected
that something was amiss, unusual, as
they were at Pasay City Hall to get a
package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who
was made to sign the pieces of paper for
the release of the said package. Another

indirect suggestion that could have put

him on guard was the fact that, by his own
admission, [Felisa] told him that her
brother would kill them if he will not sign
the papers. And yet it took him, more or
less, three months to discover that the
pieces of paper that he signed was [sic]
purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose]
does not seem to be that ignorant, as
perceived by this Court, to be taken in for a
ride by [Felisa.]
[Joses] claim that he did not consent to the
marriage was belied by the fact that he
acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife
when he wrote [Felisas] name in the duly
notarized statement of assets and liabilities
he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after
he discovered the marriage contract he is
now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose],
again, in his company I.D., wrote the name
of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in
case of emergency. This Court does not
believe that the only reason why her name
was written in his company I.D. was
because he was residing there then. This is
just but a lame excuse because if he really
considers her not his lawfully wedded wife,
he would have written instead the name of
his sister.
When [Joses] sister was put into the witness
stand, under oath, she testified that she
signed her name voluntarily as a witness to
the marriage in the marriage certificate
(T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and
she further testified that the signature
appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was
the signature of his [sic] brother that he
voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract
(page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29,
1996), and when she was asked by the
Honorable Court if indeed she believed that
Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her
brother she answered yes. The testimony of
his sister all the more belied his claim that
his consent was procured through fraud.[10]

Moreover, on the matter of fraud,

the RTC ruled that Joses action had
prescribed. It cited Article 87[11] of the
New Civil Code which requires that the

action for annulment of marriage must

Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud

be commenced by the injured party

or intimidation was employed on Jose in

within four years after the discovery of

giving his consent to the marriage, the

the fraud. Thus:

action

That granting even for the sake of

argument that his consent was obtained by
[Felisa]
through
fraud,
trickery
and
machinations, he could have filed an
annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage
at
the
earliest
possible
opportunity, the time when he discovered
the alleged sham and false marriage
contract. [Jose] did not take any action to
void the marriage at the earliest instance. x
x x.[12]

already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of

Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal

fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in

for

the

annulment

thereof

had

the Civil Code provides that the action for

annulment of marriage on the ground that
the consent of a party was obtained by
fraud,

force

or

intimidation

must

be

commenced by said party within four (4)

years after the discovery of the fraud and
within four (4) years from the time the force
or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the

from the foregoing RTC Decision to the

February, 1987

then he

had

only until

Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11

February, 1991 within which to file an action

August

of

Appeals

for annulment of marriage.However, it was

be

without

only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the

merit. The dispositive portion of the

complaint for annulment of his marriage to

appellate courts Decision reads:

Felisa.[15]

found

2005,
the

the

Court

appeal

to

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is

AFFIRMED.[13]

to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a

The Court of Appeals applied the

Civil Code to the marriage between Jose
and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code. The
appellate

court

observed

that

the

circumstances constituting fraud as a

ground

for

annulment

of

marriage

under Article 86[14] of the Civil Code did

not exist in the marriage between the
parties. Further, it ruled that the action
for

Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not

accept Joses assertion that his marriage

annulment

of

marriage

on

the

ground of fraud was filed beyond the

prescriptive period provided by law. The
Court of Appeals struck down Joses
appeal in the following manner:

marriage license. It ruled that the

marriage was solemnized under Article
76[16] of the Civil Code as one of
exceptional character, with the parties
executing an affidavit of marriage
between man and woman who have
lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years. The Court of Appeals
concluded that the falsity in the
affidavit to the effect that Jose and
Felisa had lived together as husband
and wife for the period required by
Article 76 did not affect the validity of
the
marriage,
seeing
that
the
solemnizing officer was misled by the
statements contained therein. In this
manner, the Court of Appeals gave
credence to the good-faith reliance of
the solemnizing officer over the falsity

of the affidavit. The appellate court

further noted that on the dorsal side of
said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V.
Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated
that he took steps to ascertain the ages
and
other
qualifications
of
the
contracting parties and found no legal
impediment to their marriage. Finally,
the Court of Appeals dismissed Joses
argument that neither he nor Felisa was
a member of the sect to which Rev.
Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According
[17]

to the Court of Appeals, Article 56

of
the Civil Code did not require that
either one of the contracting parties to
the marriage must belong to the
solemnizing officers church or religious
sect. The prescription was established
only in Article 7[18] of the Family Code
which does not govern the parties
marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of
Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for
Reconsideration thereof. His central
opposition was that the requisites for
the proper application of the exemption
from a marriage license under Article 76
of the Civil Code were not fully
attendant in the case at bar. In
particular, Jose cited the legal condition
that the man and the woman must have
been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years before the
marriage. Essentially, he maintained
that the affidavit of marital cohabitation
executed by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Joses
Motion for Reconsideration and
reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered
an Amended Decision, dated 7
November 2006, the fallo of which
reads:
WHEREFORE,
the
Decision
dated August
11,
2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and
another one entered declaring the

marriage between Jose A. Dayot and

Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended
Decision to the Local Civil
Registrar of Pasay City.[19]

In

its Amended Decision, the

Court of Appeals relied on
the ruling of this Court
in Nial v. Bayadog,[20] and
reasoned that:

In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting

parties to a marriage solemnized without a
marriage license on the basis of their
affidavit that they had attained the age of
majority, that being unmarried, they had
lived together for at least five (5) years and
that they desired to marry each other, the
Supreme Court ruled as follows:
x x x In other words, the five-year commonlaw cohabitation period, which is counted
back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union
had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the
years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity
meaning no third party was involved at any
time within the 5 years and continuity that is
unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5year cohabitation is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the
entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging
parties to have common law relationships
and placing them on the same footing with
those who lived faithfully with their
spouse. Marriage
being
a
special
relationship must be respected as such and
its
requirements
must
be
strictly
observed. The presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife is based on the approximation of
the requirements of the law. The parties
should not be afforded any excuse to not
comply with every single requirement and
later use the same missing element as a preconceived escape ground to nullify their
marriage. There should be no exemption

from securing a marriage license unless the

circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of
the exception. It should be noted that a
license is required in order to notify the
public that two persons are about to be
united in matrimony and that anyone who is
aware or has knowledge of any impediment
to the union of the two shall make it known
to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that
a marriage solemnized without a marriage
license, save marriages of exceptional
character,
shall
be
void
from
the
beginning. Inasmuch
as
the
marriage
between Jose and Felisa is not covered by
the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab
initio because of the absence of a marriage
license.[21]
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended
Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court
rendered a Resolution[22] dated10 May 2007,
denying Felisas motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a Petition for Review before this Court in
G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of
Appeals Amended Decision dated 7 November
2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit,
and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa
be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a
separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R.
No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate
courts Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007,
this Court resolved to consolidate the two
Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the
Court rulings in similar cases brought before it
for resolution.[23]
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the
following arguments for the allowance of its
Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE
PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT
WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE
ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN
FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE
LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF
MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.[24]

Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the

Court of Appeals misapplied Nial.[25] She
differentiates the case at bar fromNial by
reasoning that one of the parties therein had an
existing prior marriage, a circumstance which
does not obtain in her cohabitation with
Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only
sought the annulment of their marriage after a
criminal case for bigamy and an administrative
case had been filed against him in order to avoid
liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of
nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose
from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage
between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered
ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the
related arguments vented
by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and
Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that
several circumstances give rise to the
presumption that a valid marriage exists
between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa
echoes the claim that any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage
by citing this Courts ruling in Hernandez v. Court
of Appeals.[26] To buttress its assertion, the
Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose
and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting
that they have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years, which they used in
lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republics
position that the falsity of the statements in the
affidavit does not affect the validity of the
marriage, as the essential and formal requisites
were complied with; and the solemnizing officer
was not required to investigate as to whether
the said affidavit was legally obtained. The
Republic opines that as a marriage under a
license is not invalidated by the fact that the
license was wrongfully obtained, so must a
marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the
parties incorporated a fabricated statement in
their affidavit that they cohabited as husband
and wife for at least five years. In addition, the
Republic posits that the parties marriage
contract states that their marriage was
solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It
also bears the signature of the parties and their
witnesses, and must be considered a primary
evidence of marriage. To further fortify its
Petition, the Republic adduces the following
documents: (1) Joses notarized Statement of
Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988
wherein he wrote Felisas name as his wife; (2)
Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the
Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of
Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had
lived together as husband and wife in said
barangay; and (3) Joses company ID card, dated
2 May 1988, indicating Felisas name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court
to rule on the issue of the effect of a false
affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A
survey of the prevailing rules is in order.

It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose

and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986,
prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their
union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the
essential requisites of marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless
all these requisites are complied with:
(1)
parties;

Legal capacity of the contracting

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the
marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of
exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)

Article 58[27] makes explicit that no marriage

shall be solemnized without a license first
being issued by the local civil registrar of
the municipality where either contracting
party habitually resides, save marriages of
an exceptional character authorized by the
Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.
[28]
Article 80(3)[29] of the Civil Code makes it
clear that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this
being nothing more than the legitimate
consequence flowing from the fact that the
license is the essence of the marriage
contract.[30] This is in stark contrast to the
old Marriage Law,[31] whereby the absence
of a marriage license did not make the
marriage void. The rationale for the
compulsory character of a marriage license
under the Civil Code is that it is the
authority granted by the State to the
contracting parties, after the proper
government official has inquired into their
capacity to contract marriage.[32]
Under the Civil Code, marriages of
exceptional character are covered by
Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to
79. To wit, these marriages are: (1)
marriages in articulo mortis or at the point
of death during peace or war, (2) marriages
in remote places, (2) consular marriages,
[33]
(3) ratification of marital cohabitation,
(4) religious ratification of a civil marriage,
(5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and
(6) mixed marriages.[34]
The instant case pertains to a ratification of
marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the
Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be
necessary when a man and a woman who

have attained the age of majority and

who,
being
unmarried,
have
lived
together as husband and wife for at least
five
years,
desire
to
marry
each
other. The contracting parties shall state
the foregoing facts in an affidavit before
any
person
authorized
by
law to
administer oaths. The official, priest or
minister who solemnized the marriage
shall also state in an affidavit that he took
steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties
and that he found no legal impediment to
the marriage.
The reason for the law,[35] as espoused by the
Code Commission, is that the publicity attending
a marriage license may discourage such persons
who have lived in a state of cohabitation from
legalizing their status.[36]
It is not contested herein that the marriage of
Jose and Felisa was performed without a
marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed
an affidavit declaring that they have attained the
age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have
lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years; and that because of this union, they
desire to marry each other.[37] One of the central
issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the
falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation,
where the parties have in truth fallen short of
the minimum five-year requirement, effectively
renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a
marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are,
doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a
marriage license. Under the rules of statutory
construction, exceptions, as a general rule,
should be strictly[38] but reasonably construed.
[39]
They extend only so far as their language
fairly warrants, and all doubts should be
resolved in favor of the general provisions rather
than the exception.[40] Where a general rule is
established by statute with exceptions, the court
will not curtail the former or add to the latter by
implication.[41] For the exception in Article 76 to
apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man
and the woman must have attained the age of
majority, and that, being unmarried, they have
lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76
leaves us with no other expediency but to read
the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a
marriage license under Article 76 applies only to
those who have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and desire to marry
each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous
terms, places a minimum period requirement of
five years of cohabitation. No other reading of

the law can be had, since the language of Article

76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five
years of cohabitation is an indispensability
carved in the language of the law. For a marriage
celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this
material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is
embodied in the law not as a directory
requirement, but as one that partakes of a
mandatory character. It is worthy to mention
that Article 76 also prescribes that the
contracting parties shall state the requisite
facts[42] in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths; and that
the official, priest or minister who solemnized
the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that
he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that
he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa
have not lived together for five years at the time
they executed their sworn affidavit and
contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that
Jose and Felisa started living together only in
June 1986, or barely five months before the
celebration of their marriage.[43] The Court of
Appeals also noted Felisas testimony that Jose
was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita
Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986
after the EDSA Revolution.[44] The appellate court
also cited Felisas own testimony that it was only
in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her
house.[45]
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as
to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year
requisite is factual in nature.A question of fact
arises when there is a need to decide on the
truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.[46] Under
Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not
subject to this Courts review.[47] It is already
well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of
facts of the Court of Appeals are binding
on this Court. A recognized exception to
this rule is when the Court of Appeals and
the trial court, or in this case the
administrative body, make contradictory
findings. However, the exception does not
apply in every instance that the Court of
Appeals
and
the
trial
court
or
administrative body disagree. The factual
findings of the Court of Appeals remain
conclusive on this Court if such findings
are supported by the record or based on
substantial evidence.[48]
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24
November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to
exempt them from the requirement of a
marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic
that the falsity of the statements in the parties
affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage,

since all the essential and formal requisites were

complied with. The argument deserves scant
merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the
marriage between Jose and Felisa was
celebrated without the formal requisite of a
marriage license.Neither did Jose and Felisa
meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76,
that they should have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years, so as to be
excepted from the requirement of a marriage
license.
Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of
marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no
applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when
we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with
reference to the prima facie presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.[49] Restated more explicitly,
persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter-presumption or evidence special to the
case, to be in fact married.[50] The present case
does not involve an apparent marriage to which
the presumption still needs to be applied. There
is no question that Jose and Felisa actually
entered into a contract of marriage on 24
November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to
institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which
spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil
Code[51] that every intendment of law or fact
leans towards the validity of marriage will not
salvage the parties marriage, and extricate them
from the effect of a violation of the law. The
marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into
without the requisite marriage license or
compliance with the stringent requirements of a
marriage under exceptional circumstance. The
solemnization of a marriage without prior license
is a clear violation of the law and would lead or
could be used, at least, for the perpetration of
fraud against innocent and unwary parties,
which was one of the evils that the law sought to
prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite
for a valid marriage.[52] The protection of
marriage as a sacred institution requires not just
the defense of a true and genuine union but the
exposure of an invalid one as well.[53] To permit a
false affidavit to take the place of a marriage
license is to allow an abject circumvention of the
law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the
institution of marriage, we must be wary of
deceptive schemes that violate the legal
measures set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the
ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage
under a license is not invalidated by the fact that
the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a
marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated
statement that the parties have cohabited for at
least five years as required by law. The contrast
is flagrant. The former is with reference to an
irregularity of the marriage license, and not to

the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage

license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the
allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the
period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which
would have qualified their marriage as an
exception to the requirement for a marriage
license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it
refers to a quintessential fact that the law
precisely required to be deposed and attested to
by the parties under oath. If the essential matter
in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a
mere scrap of paper, without force and
effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at
all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic
puts forth the argument that based on equity,
Jose should be denied relief because he
perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby
profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced
invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no
room for application where there is a law.
[54]
There is a law on the ratification of marital
cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under
Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the
authorities are consistent that the declaration of
nullity of the parties marriage is without
prejudice to their criminal liability. [55]
The Republic further avers in its third
assignment of error that Jose is deemed
estopped from assailing the legality of his
marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is
claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together
from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses
subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31
August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years
before he sought the declaration of nullity;
hence, estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of
marriage is imprescriptible.[56] Jose and Felisas
marriage was celebrated sans a marriage
license. No other conclusion can be reached
except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the
right to impugn a void marriage does not
prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has
laid down the rule that the five-year common-law
cohabitation period under Article 76 means a
five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of
legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage.[57] It covers the years immediately
preceding the day of the marriage, characterized
by exclusivity - meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the five years - and
continuity that is unbroken.[58]
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The
Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759,
declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa
Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED,
without prejudice to their criminal liability, if
any. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
DANTE O. TINGA PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Acting
Chairpersons attestation, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Per Special Order No. 497, dated 14 March 2008,

signed by Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno designating
Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga to replace Associate
Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, who is on official
leave under the Courts Wellness Program and
assigning Associate Justice Alicia Austria-Martinez as
Acting Chairperson.
**
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. was designated to sit
as additional member replacing Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated 12 September
2007.
*

Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon with

Associate Justices Mario L. Guaria III and Santiago
Javier Ranada, concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 175581), pp.
65-70; rollo, (G.R. No. 179474), pp. 156-161.
[2]
Records, p. 170.
[3]
Id.
[4]
Id. at 1-8.
[5]
The marriage contract shows that at the time of the
celebration of the parties marriage, Jose was 27 years
old, while Felisa was 37.
[6]
The Administrative complaint before the
Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the
Ombudsman was docketed as OMB-ADM-0-93-0466;
Records, pp. 252-258.
[7]
Id. at 257.
[8]
Id. at 313-323.
[9]
Id. at 323.
[10]
Id. at 321-322.
[1]

ART. 87. - The action for annulment of marriage must

be commenced by the parties and within the periods as
follows:
(1) For causes mentioned in Number 1 of Article 85, by
the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or
her consent, within four years after attaining the age of
twenty or eighteen years, as the case may be; or by
the parent or guardian or person having legal charge,
at any time before such party has arrived at the age of
twenty or eighteen years;
(2) For causes mentioned in Number 2 of Article 85, by
the spouse who has been absent, during his or her
lifetime; or by either spouse of the subsequent
marriage during the lifetime of the other;
(3) For causes mentioned in Number 3 of Article 85, by
the sane spouse, who had no knowledge of the other's
insanity; or by any relative or guardian of the party of
unsound mind, at any time before the death of either
party;
(4) For causes mentioned in Number 4, by the injured
party, within four years after the discovery of the
fraud;
(5) For causes mentioned in Number 5, by the injured
party, within four years from the time the force or
intimidation ceased;
(6) For causes mentioned in Number 6, by the injured
party, within eight years after the marriage.
[12]
Records, p. 322.
[13]
Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 125.
[14]
ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall
constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of the
preceding article:
(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the
contracting parties;
(2) Nondisclosure of the previous conviction of the
other party of a crime involving moral turpitude, and
the penalty imposed was imprisonment for two years
or more;
(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time
of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than
her husband;
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character,
rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as
will give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage.
[15]
Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 122.
[16]
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary
when a man and a woman who have attained the age
of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years,
desire to marry each other. The contracting parties
shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage
shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
[17]
ART. 56. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court;
(2) The Presiding Justice and the Justices of the Court of
Appeals;
(3) Judges of the Courts of First Instance;
(4) Mayors of cities and municipalities;
(5) Municipal judges and justices of the peace;
[11]

(6) Priests, rabbis, ministers of the gospel of any

denomination, church, religion or sect, duly registered,
as provided in Article 92; and
(7) Ship captains, airplane chiefs, military
commanders, and consuls and vice-consuls in special
cases provided in Articles 74 and 75.
[18]
ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the
courts jurisdiction;
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church
or religious sect duly authorized by his church or
religious sect and registered with the civil registrar
general, acting within the limits of the written authority
granted him by his church or religious sect and
provided that at least one of the contracting parties
belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or religious
sect;
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the cases
mentioned in Article 31;
(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a
chaplain is assigned, in the absence of the latter,
during a military operation, likewise only in the cases
mentioned in Article 32; or
(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the
case provided in Article 10.
[19]
CA rollo, p. 279.
[20]
384 Phil. 661 (2000).
[21]
CA rollo, pp. 278-279.
[22]
Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), pp. 173-174.
[23]
Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 180.
[24]
Rollo (G.R. No. 175581), pp. 44-45.
[25]
Erroneously cited as Nio v. Bayadog; rollo (G.R. No.
179474), p. 18.
[26]
377 Phil. 919 (1999).
[27]
ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character
authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those
under Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized
without a license first being issued by the local civil
registrar of the municipality where either contracting
party habitually resides.
[28]
ART. 75. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad
may be solemnized by consuls and vice-consuls of the
Republic of the Philippines. The duties of the local civil
registrar and of a judge or justice of the peace or
mayor with regard to the celebration of marriage shall
be performed by such consuls and vice-consuls.
[29]
ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from
the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save
marriages of exceptional character.
[30]
People v. De Lara, No. 12583-R, 14 February 1955,
51 O.G. 4079, 4082.
[31]
The Marriage Law, otherwise known as Act No. 3613,
requires the following essential requisites: (1) legal
capacity of the contracting parties; and (2) their
mutual consent.
[32]
Report of the Code Commission, pp. 79-80; see also
Ambrosio Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, 1956 Edition,
Vol. I, p. 195.
[33]
Must be read with Article 58 of the Civil Code which
provides:
ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character
authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those
under Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized
without a license first being issued by the local civil
registrar of the municipality where either contracting
party habitually resides.

Edgardo L. Paras, Civil Code of

the Philippines Annotated (1984 Eleventh Ed.), pp. 302310.
[35]
In Nial v. Bayadog (supra note 20 at 668-669), this
Court articulated the spirit behind Article 76 of the Civil
Code, thus:
However, there are several instances recognized by the
Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed
with, one of which is that provided in Article 76,
referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who
have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken
period of at least five years before the marriage. The
rationale why no license is required in such case is to
avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to
the publication of every applicants name for a
marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage
license may discourage such persons from legitimizing
their status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid the
peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and
contain the source of gossip arising from the
publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to
preserve their privacy and exempt them from that
requirement.
[36]
The Report of the Code Commission states that No
marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a
woman who have attained the age of majority and
who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years desire to marry each
other. In such case, the publicity attending a marriage
license may discourage such persons from legalizing
their status, Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.
[37]
Records, p. 49. The affidavit was denominated by
the parties as an Affidavit on (sic) Marriage Between
Man and Woman Who Haved (sic) Lived Together as
Husband and Wife for at Least Five Years.
[38]
Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 722, 744
(2001).
[39]
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of
Appeals, 363 Phil. 130, 137 (1999).
[40]
Id.
[41]
Id. citing Samson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L43182, 25 November 1986, 145 SCRA 654, 659.
[42]
The first part of Article 76 states, No marriage
license shall be necessary when a man and a woman
who have attained the age of majority and who, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years, desire to marry each other x x x.
[34]

Rollo (G.R. No. 175581), p. 38.

Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 158, citing TSN (Civil
Case No. B-4143), 15 April 1999.
[45]
Id. at 159.
[46]
First Dominion Resources Corporation v.
Pearanda, G.R. No. 166616, 27 January 2006, 480 SCRA
504, 508.
[47]
Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No.
154521, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 589, 605.
[48]
Id.
[49]
Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 708
(1999).
[50]
Id.
[51]
ART. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor
the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of
law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of
children, the community of property during marriage,
the authority of parents over their children, and the
validity of defense for any member of the family in
case of unlawful aggression.
[52]
People v. De Lara, supra note 30 at 4083.
[53]
Malcampo-Sin v. Sin, 407 Phil. 583, 588 (2001).
[54]
Salavarria v. Letran College, 357 Phil. 189, 196
(1998); Aparente, Sr. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 387 Phil. 96, 108 (2000).
[55]
Supra note 33 at 306. Alicia V. Sempio-Diy in A
Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines (1995
Ed., p. 38) wrote that If the parties falsify their affidavit
in order to have an instant marriage, although the truth
is that they have not been cohabiting for five years,
their marriage will be void for lack of a marriage
license, and they will also be criminally liable. Article
76 of the Civil Code is now Article 34 of the Family
Code, which reads:
ART. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage
of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without
any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also
state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications
of the contracting parties and found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
[56]
Nial v. Bayadog, supra note 20 at 134.
[57]
Id. at 130-131.
[58]
Id.
[43]
[44]