Armed Forces

ARTICLE
10.1177/0095327X05282118
Anderson,
Seitz&/ Society
EU Nation-Building and Identity

European Security and

Defense Policy Demystified
Nation-Building and Identity in
the European Union

Armed Forces & Society

Volume 33 Number 1
October 2006 24-42
2006, Inter-University
Seminar on Armed Forces
and Society. All rights reserved.
10.1177/0095327X05282118
http://afs.sagepub.com
hosted at
http://online.sagepub.com

Stephanie Anderson
Thomas R. Seitz
University of Wyoming

From a military standpoint, the European Unions Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)
defies logic. Why would the European allies seek to create a competing military force
outside NATO when worried about American isolationism and when unable and unwilling to dedicate the necessary resources? This article suggests an alternative motive
behind the European Unions establishment of a defense programthe development and
enhancement of a European identity. In short, the ESDP is designed in no small part to
further the project of nation-building in a broadening European Union. This article proposes a social-constructivist framework for analyzing this development.
Keywords: European Union; NATO; nation-building; constructivism; European security

ince the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the United States in its National Security Strategy
(NSS) has placed special emphasis on its relations with its closest allies: There is
little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada and Europe.1 As part
of this strategy, the U.S. government seeks to strengthen the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO): NATO must build a capability to field, at short notice, highly
mobile, specially trained forces whenever they are needed to respond to a threat
against any member of the alliance.2
Nevertheless, the future of NATO seems uncertain. As much as the United States
wishes to increase cooperation within the alliance, the European Union is seeking to
create its own distinct and separable, if not separate, European Security and Defense
Policy (ESDP).3 Although the NSS states that the United States welcomes these
changes, the NSS also notes, We cannot afford to lose this opportunity to better prepare the family of transatlantic democracies for the challenges to come. As Stephen
Larabee explains, Many of the forces and assets that will be required for ESDI [European Security and Defense Identity] already have NATO commitments. If these forces
are restructured for ESDI-related tasks, and especially if EU planning for these mis-

24

Anderson, Seitz / EU Nation-Building and Identity 25

sions is not done in close cooperation with NATOs defense planning process, ESDI
could weaken rather than strengthen NATO.4
Why is the European Union pursuing the ESDP? One key objective consistently
overlooked in analyses of ESDP is its importance to the European Unions nation- or
identity-building project, which is essential to further integration. This article demonstrates that rather than seeking to duplicate or supplant NATO, the European Union is
seeking a security and defense identity, not for deterrence or defense, but to promote a
European political identity. For Europe to be European,5 the European Union needs
a foreign and security policy to differentiate itself from U.S. foreign and security policy with which it is so entertwined. The formation of such a policy and its execution
are vital to the success of the union.

Europes Pursuit of a Common Security and Defense Policy

After the end of the cold war, many academics ignored the European Communitys
(EC) incursion into security affairs altogether, while others found the ECs experimentation with a security policy dangerous and the newborn military structures seemingly
6
pointless. Very simply, the EC could not defend itself without NATO. In a 640-page
National Defense University book titled European Security Policy after the Revolu7
tions of 1989, no chapter or section even addressed the EC. Those that did address the
possibility of an EC with a military dimension were pessimistic:
NATO has from the start been built up around the forces of its members, including the
USA. To remove the forces of any one country would court disaster. If that country were
to be the USA, NATO would quite simply collapse. Europe can probably build a new and
different defence structure in the long term, but this would demand much more expenditure, the mobilisation of more manpower and a high degree of integration of national
armed forces. To attempt this with the WTO [Warsaw Treaty Organization] countries in a
state of turmoil and instability would be folly of the highest order.8

Charles Glaser conceded that a European defense identity through the Western European Union (WEU) could provide flexibility for Western Europe to act militarily on
its own but concluded, nevertheless, that a Western European alliance would be an
ineffective substitute for NATO.9
More recently from the European perspective, Eilstrup-Sangiovanni has argued
that the ESDP is bad for Europe as it wastes resources and is divisive.10 LindleyFrench likens the 1990s to the 1920s and argues that seeing the formation of security
institutions as security ends in and of themselves is both dangerous and nave and
could undermine NATO, the serious defense organization.11
Certainly, the need for a separate military organization is dubious. Although support among the public is high for an ESDP, 71 percent of EU citizens favor it, the same
public does not perceive significant military threats.12 Rather, the top three threats are
organized crime, an accident in a nuclear power station, and terrorism.13 Moreover, in
Solanas European Security Strategy,14 the military is only one arrow in the quiver. His

26 Armed Forces & Society

definition of security threat is wide and encompassing including terrorism, nuclear

proliferation, and failed states. His prescription is multilateralism, international organizations, economic aid and humanitarian assistance, increased intelligence, police
and judicial cooperation, and military cooperation. As Van Oudenaren explains, The
emphasis in the report is on crisis preventiontaking political and economic steps to
ensure that the need for military action will not arise.15
Nevertheless, the European Union has been actively pursuing a military capability
of its own since the early nineties. Its member states have discussed increasing their
cooperation in the security field with talk of the WEUs16 becoming Europes
antiballistic missile system coordinator,17 creating a Standing Baltic Sea Force to
monitor the Baltic,18 and perhaps even controlling a European nuclear force.19 At the
1994 Brussels NATO Ministerial Meeting, the WEU arranged to have not separate,
but separable forces that it could borrow from NATO if need be.20 The NATO summit
in Washington in April 1999 reiterated NATOs commitment to this idea and outlined several possible proposals to assure European access to NATO capability when
Americans are not involved.21 This would allow the Europeans to make use of NATOs
C4I (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence) resources.
CRISEX 2000, NATOs war games, tested this scenario.
NATOs 1999 declaration was partly in response to the joint declaration by the
French and the British at Saint-Mlo in December 1998 to put security and defense
policy at the top of the European agenda:
The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international
stage. This means making a reality of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which will provide the
essential basis for action by the Union. It will be important to achieve full and rapid
implementation of the Amsterdam provisions on CFSP [Common Foreign and Security
Policy]. . . . This includes the responsibility of the European Council to decide on the progressive framing of a common defence policy in the framework of CFSP. To this end, the
Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military
forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to
international crises.22

In the Cologne presidency conclusions in June 1999, the member states echoed
Saint-Mlo declaring they were resolved that the European Union shall play its full
23
role on the international stage. Member states pledged not to reduce military spending and to try to bring together national and multi-national European forces, for
24
example, the Eurocorps. They stated categorically, The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide
to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without
prejudice to actions by NATO.25 At the December 1999 Helsinki summit, the EU
member states declared unequivocally that they would form their own rapid reaction
force of 60,000 independent from NATO. Although supposed to be operational by
2003, the European Rapid Reaction Force has not yet come to fruition. However, in
February 2004, France, Germany, and Britain initiated a joint military force to create
several battle groups of 1,500 soldiers to be deployed at short notice.

Anderson, Seitz / EU Nation-Building and Identity 27

Could the ESDP Replace NATO?

Much of the literature on ESDP focuses on traditional security analysis. Using a
traditional security perspective, many authors question the wisdom of the ESDP for
several reasons: (1) it compromises a cheap, effective, and proven defense alliance,
NATO; (2) it may well push the United States out of Europe, thus promoting American
isolationism, and altering the balance of power in Europe just when Germany has
regained power; (3) the division, created by the ESDP, weakens the perception of unity
both among the Europeans (integrationists vs. Atlanticists vs. neutrals) and between
the United States and Europe, a division that the Russians have sought to exploit;26 (4)
considering Europes aging population and extensive pension programs, the EU member states can ill afford the requisite increases in defense spending. As a result, of the
few books that exist on the ESDP, most focus on the question of its wisdom and its
compatibility with NATO. Robert E. Hunters The European Security and Defense
Policy: NATOs Companion or Competitor? concentrates on the issues of duplication
and decoupling.27 Stanley Sloans book NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic
Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered argues that one should not
underestimate NATOs utility.28
Certainly, the ESDP has made great progress over the past seven years. From 1998
until today, the ESDP has undergone tremendous institutionalization. The European
Union has created a High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, a Political and Security Committee, a European Union Military Committee, a
European Union Military Staff, a Policy Unit, a Situation Centre, a European Defence
Agency, and an EU Institute for Security Studies. Nevertheless, Javier Solana, the
high representative, in an address to the External Action Working Group of the European Constitutional Convention argued that the political will was lacking: Efficient
structures, access to suitable resources, institutional clarity count for little in the
absence of real political will on the part of our Member States.29
Considering the difficulty that the European Union has had even creating a 60,000strong European Rapid Reaction Force, despite public pronouncements to the contrary, one can conclude that EU rhetoric far exceeds the reality. Without doubt, the
European Union has aimed high expressing its ambitions even to entertain the possibility of a joint nuclear force, but after fourteen years at the negotiating table, the member states have yet to decide on whether to have a common defense or on how to vote to
make foreign and security policy decisions.30 The political will simply is not there.
Practically speaking, an ESDP would be difficult and expensive. The EU member
states have generous social-welfare nets and national pension schemes facing everincreasing demands from aging populations. With health care costs and the number of
elderly rising, governments will come under financial pressure to provide for their
people.31 Furthermore, most European armies are shrinking as states abandon universal conscriptionthat is, a cheap form of military laborfor more expensive volunteer forces. As a result, the general degree of militarization in Western European populations has thus sunk and is still sinking.32 Moreover, almost all the member states
reduced their defense spending after the end of the cold war. A major issue in the Euro-

28 Armed Forces & Society

pean Union has been getting member states to put increased amounts of resources
toward security and defense. To make matters worse, the sluggishness of the European
economies over the past five years, as well as European enlargement, will make finding the money to pay for such a force politically difficult. Much of EU funding is now
directed toward the ten new eastern member states, especially in the form of Common
Agricultural Policy subsidies.
Moreover, these new member states, especially Poland and the Baltics, are much
more favorable toward the United States and NATO than to an ESDP. During the
recent Iraq War, the eastern members vocal support for the United States caused
Jacques Chirac to suggest publicly that they shut up.33 They may well favor the
European Unions spending its money on structural funds for themselves rather than
on the ESDP. To sum up, since 1992, the lack of political will and money has stymied
the development of the ESDP. In the future, there is no sign this trend will change.
If not to supplant NATO, and if it is impossible to fulfill the rhetoric, then why create the rhetoric in the first place? Why would the European allies seek to create a competing military force outside NATO when worried about American isolationism and
when unable and unwilling to dedicate the necessary resources? Moreover, why have
some of the European allies, including key countries such as France, Belgium, and
Germany, refused to support American foreign policy to the point of rejecting an
American request in NATO for defensive equipment for Turkey in anticipation of a
possible war against Iraq?

Is America from Mars and Europe from Venus?

A common view in Washington is that fifty years of living in security beneath the
NATO umbrella has turned Europe into a continent of lotus eaters, or as Congressman Henry Hyde (R-IL) put it, peace, prosperity, and NATO have created a
beneficent, but artificial, environment so secure that its beneficiaries believe it to be
self-sustaining. Hyde goes so far as to argue that the Europeanslack of support is due
to their living in a cocoon.34
Undoubtedly, Hyde is influenced by Robert Kagans famous article Power and
Weakness in which he argues that American and European interests are diverging
because one side approaches world events from a position of power and the other from
a position of weakness. As a result, U.S.-European cooperation is doomed:
It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the
world, or even that they occupy the same world. On the all-important question of power
the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of powerAmerican and
European perspectives are diverging. Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules
and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of
peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Kants Perpetual Peace. The United
States, meanwhile, remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian
world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the

Anderson, Seitz / EU Nation-Building and Identity 29

defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military
might. That is why on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are
from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: They agree on little and understand one
another less and less. And this state of affairs is not transitorythe product of one American election or one catastrophic event. The reasons for the transatlantic divide are deep,
long in development, and likely to endure. When it comes to setting national priorities,
determining threats, defining challenges, and fashioning and implementing foreign and
defense policies, the United States and Europe have parted ways.35

In fact, Europeans live neither in a bubble nor in a Kantian perpetual peace

machine. Almost every country in Europe has been facing issues of terrorism far longer than America has. Certainly, war on the European Unions doorstep in the former
Yugoslavia would not fit the definition of cocoon. Moreover, Europeans are not loath
to use force. They sent troops to both Gulf Wars as well as to Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra
Leone, and other former colonies in Africa. If the Europeans were living in a bubble of
peace and eschewed violence as a policy tool, indeed, the European Union would not
be using the rhetoric of the ESDP at all. The European Union is already well established as a civilian power.36 As such, an ESDP would be very costly, and the member
states disagree as to how it should be shaped. Were Hydes and Kagans analyses correct, surely, the member states would not attempt to create a military dimension to the
European Union.
Part of the problem with the traditional security analysis is the presumption that the
development of a military force is purely for defensive purposes. The European Union
does not seek to replace NATO because of the expense, duplication, and danger. In The
Troubled Partnership37 and in Beyond American Hegemony,38 both Henry Kissinger
and David Calleo analyzed European integration as it related to the integrity of NATO.
They concluded that integration might strengthen Western Europes resolve to resist
American domination within NATO and, therefore, called for NATO reform to allow
for a more equal partnership. Calleos and Kissingers observations are instructive.
Integration has strengthened the Europeans resolve to resist American domination of
their security policy. Both the CFSP and the ESDP are serious attempts on the side of
the Europeans to make their collective voice on international events heard.

The Goal of the ESDP: A Tool for Nation-Building in Europe

Is the European Union, a nonstate actor, pursuing a common security policy for
defense reasons or to separate itself from American security policy to enhance and
solidify its artificial, European identity? Rather than being in a cocoon, the European Union has pursued its own security and defense policy as a way to increase its
stature on the world stage and among its people at home; in other words, the ESDP is
for nation-building purposes, and not for defense per se.39 The European Union needs
to broaden its appeal among the peoples of Europe. Too often now, referenda in EU
member states are unsuccessful and kill the momentum necessary to integrate. The
ESDP is used to distinguish what is European and to broaden the European Unions

30 Armed Forces & Society

base of support. U.S. policy is an easy target: one way to make the once fifteen, now
twenty-five, different nations feel European is to show and reinforce that they are
collectively different from Americans.
Europeans seem to have little to bind them together. To become a member of the
European Union, the country must have a functioning free-market economy, be a
functioning democracy, and be on the European continent. Otherwise, all they have in
common is a Christian cultural heritage and a shared bloody history where, twice in
the past hundred years, the Americans have come to their rescue. The European
Unions ESDP provides another way to rally its citizens behind European integration.
Significantly, of all the institutions, the European populace places the most trust in
their countries militaries; the police came in second.40 The ESDP not only provides
the European Union with another attribute of a state but also serves as a way to create a
foreign and security policy distinct from Americas that increases the prestige of the
union both among its peoples and abroad.

Nation-Building? In Europe?
Nation-building must be separated from the concept of state-building, with which
it is often confused. Taken in isolation, these two projects differ significantly. Statebuilding represents efforts to establish a centralized government organization and to
extend its authority across the width and breadth of the territory it holds sovereign
within the state system. Nation-building is more concerned with fostering legitimacy
and the formation of a national idea, a national identity among the people living within
a defined territorya national, collective self-awareness.
Nothing in this definition limits nation-building to failed states or postconflict
reconstruction contexts, despite the emphasis placed on these contexts by recent
works on the subject.41 Similarly, nothing in this definition limits nation-building to
less developed countries. Admittedly, as a body of literature, nation-building expanded tremendously during the political upheaval characterizing new states emerging
from colonial empires, especially during the 1950s and 1960s.42 However, this definition is broadly applicable to any society dealing with a fragmented population exhibiting any number of cleavages. The violence associated with Basque separatism
in Spain and the upheaval of Northern Ireland remind one that even ancient, wellestablished states face considerable nation-building tasks.
Finally, as suggested by its emphasis on fostering legitimacy and forming identity,
this definition of nation-building does not describe a short-term exercise or an event,
but a long process. Accordingly, despite the apparent success of the international communitys state-building efforts in East Timor, nation-building there will take some
time. In neighboring Indonesia, for example, nation-building remains that states
greatest challenge after nearly sixty years of independence. In the United States, a
nation of immigrant communities, nation-building is also an ongoing process.
While it is one thing to engage in nation-building in individual states, can the concept be applied to such a broad entity as the European Union? In examining the litera-

Anderson, Seitz / EU Nation-Building and Identity 31

ture of nationalism and national identity, there is little to suggest that we cannot use
these terms in discussing the European Union. While Gellner sensibly cautions
against trying to fix rigid definitions to the terms nation and culture, he does indicate
that a nation can be made and held together by a mixture of culture and will. That is,
groups that demonstrate an enduring will to live together and are not too culturally
diverse can be defined as a nation. However, he asserts that this definition holds only
when these elements of will and cultural affinity are shared broadly among the entire
population not merely among elites.43 Smith sets forth a clear set of requirements for
national identity, defining nation as a named human population, sharing an historic
territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common
economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.44 The European population has a defined, or at least delimited, territory (from the Atlantic to the Urals),
decades of economic cooperation and integration have moved Europe toward a common economy, and the integration process has made great strides in establishing legal
rights and duties for Europeans. In terms of culture, Europeans seem relatively
homogenous in terms of race, religion, dress, and so on, when compared to populations of other regions, although Europeans might not agree. Still, the integration process provides shared symbols of a common culture, ranging from flags and anthems to
a common currency.
Binding Europeans together with common myths and historical memories presents
more of a challenge. From a distance, it may not seem so. European societies share
classical philosophical roots and a Christian heritage as well as other values rooted in
their history, and many share histories common to the vast empires that have dominated the continent over the centuries. However, European integrationists are faced
with the task of effectively undoing the work of previous generations of nationalists
and nation builders in individual European states. As Benedict Anderson observes, in
manipulating symbols in the cause of nationalism, nationalists are less inclined to
describe the potential glories and accomplishments of a shared future than to evoke
memories of a glorious common history when their antecedents made their mark upon
the world.45 One way for European integrationists to solidify a foundation of common
historical memory is to make history in the name of Europe. One way that Europe can
make its mark as a player in world events is through a truly European security and
defense establishment.

Why Nation-Building in Europe?

The European Union faces a daunting nation-building challenge because the integration process may be losing steam. Simply put, the European Union falls short of
Gellners requirement for building a nation out of a sense of shared culture and common will: the European integration process has been and remains an elite-driven project. Most decisions regarding the European Union are taken by national parliaments.
When treaty ratification has been put to a popular vote, the results have been rather
underwhelming. The Danes voted no in the first referendum on Maastricht. The
French voted yes only by the narrowest of margins. Ireland rejected the Treaty of Nice.

32 Armed Forces & Society

Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Denmark have refused to join the common currency, the Euro. With regard to the new EU constitution, Spain voted yes but with a
very small turnout. The French and Dutch rejected it entirely. Although Luxembourg
decided to continue the ratification process with a subsequent referendum and yes
vote, most other countries have decided to postpone the ratification process indefinitely. Altogether, this apparent public skepticism represents at the least a significant
speed bump on the road to European integration.
Popular enthusiasm for the integration project is further strained by the rapid, eastward expansion of the European Union itself. At the first anniversary of EU enlargement, the EU Observer headline read, Mixed Feelings One Year after Enlargement.
Despite official assurances to the happiness of the day from European Commission
President Jos Manuel Barroso, the Observer wrote it was a milestone that is being
greeted with something less than enthusiasm in some older members of the club.
Countries such as the United Kingdom, Sweden, France, Germany, and Ireland are
concerned that eastern expansion means an influx of cheap labor and the unraveling of
their social services.46
If one thinks of the idea of Europe as an elastic band binding the peoples of Europe
to the integration process, that band is being stretched ever thinner by Europes expansion.47 Cedermans work demonstrates that while European identity remained relatively thick with an EU membership of fifteen, this sense of common identity
grows thin as the union takes on more member states, especially states of the former
Eastern Bloc, which many Western Europeans have long thought of as a social and
cultural out-group. Leaving aside the Nazi-era view of eastern, Slavic peoples as
Untermenschen, the fact remains that as recently as the interwar period, Western
Europe viewed Eastern Europe as what some have called the first third world, having economies and even cultures sharply different from those in the West. As the European Union expands to include peoples whose cultures may be considered other than
European, popular will toward integration may erode. To use Cedermans words, EU
expansion may not be a matter of just widening versus deepening but of exclusion versus dilution as well.48

How to Strengthen European Identity through ESDP

Through a relatively modest investment in the ESDP, the European Union can take
steps to overcome this perception of new Europe as an out-group while building and
reinforcing a sense of shared history and establishing Europe as a major force in world
affairs. Constructivism provides a useful framework within which to explore this
process.
Simply put, there is perhaps nothing so handy in creating and defining a sense of
identity than the presence of a competing other. Drawing on work by cognitive psychologists, Kowert shows that identity formation in groups can be defined by the minimal group paradigm (MGP), which asserts that group identities inevitably emerge and
become distinct through social interactions. Simply dividing individuals into groups is
enough to give rise to such group-identity formationsin-groups (their own) and out-

Anderson, Seitz / EU Nation-Building and Identity 33

groups (others). However, any competition or conflict between groups accelerates

such identity formation and encourages exaggeration of group attributes. Competition
or conflict also causes exaggeration of differences between in-groups and out-groups
while minimizing perceived differences within groups. In addition, in such situations,
people tend to attribute the behavior of out-groups to the intentions and desires of
those out-groups, while attributing their own in-group behavior to their situational
context and environmental constraints. This tendency to assume intent increases with
the perceived power of the out-group.49
Accordingly, in certain situations, the United States provides a useful other or outgroup for purposes of defining and strengthening European identity. On one hand, for
better or worse, all Europeans know the United States. In general, Europeans are much
more likely to be familiar with American film and television icons than those of their
EU neighbors. American politics and news lead European news coverage almost
every night. Considering the European media attention devoted to the United States
and its behavior, it should come as no surprise that Europeans know more about the
United States than they do about some other EU member states. In addition, the United
States is currently the sole superpower or, as the French have dubbed it, the
hyperpower. According to Kowerts model, this position of power alone would be
enough to exacerbate a sense of otherness in Europeans interactions with the United
States and to ascribe a willfulness or intent to every aspect of U.S. policy.
Yet, as others have pointed out, social groups can and do hold multiple identities
and invoke different identities in different situations. In addition, political elites can
and do manipulate group identities through appeals and ideas that resonate with preexisting identity constructions within a given political culture.50 While relations between
the United States and Europe are normally quite good, specific contexts can cause
Europeans to invoke different identity elements. One can observe that during and after
the cold war, policy rows between Europe and the United States gave rise to bursts of
political cooperation among European states. Currently, the foreign policy of the Bush
administration provides an excellent illustration of this point. European unease over
unbridled U.S. power in the world was exacerbated by the unilateralist tack taken by
the Bush administration upon assuming office. The post-9/11 enunciation of a preemptive approach to security heightened European unease and strained relations even
more. When the United States and Europe came into conflict over the decision to use
force in Iraq, the result was a groundswell of popular opposition to the policies and
perceived intent of the hyperpower, even in countries where the United States had the
support of political elites. In this light, the United States may play more of a role in
promoting and shaping the ESDP than Washington might bargain for.

The EU Swaggers: The United States and

the Rhetoric of European Security Policy
According to Robert Art, military force can be used in four ways: for defense,
deterrence, compelling, and swaggering. He explained, Not all four functions are
necessarily well or equally served by a given military posture. In fact, usually only the

34 Armed Forces & Society

great powers have the wherewithal to develop military forces that can serve more than
two functions at once.51 The rhetoric of the opening of the Maastricht negotiations
the European Unions rendezvous with history52shows that the goal of the security policy of the European Union is not for defense or deterrence, but rather for swaggering in order to define the identity of the European Union and to nation build.
By swaggering, a state would, Art explains, create a military force to enhance the
national pride of a people.53 With an artificial entity such as the European Union, such
pride is a necessary tool to encourage cohesiveness. French President Jacques Chirac
went so far as to say, The European Union will not fully exist until it possesses an
autonomous capacity for action.54 Ole Waever wrote,
In an article with the telling title of Does Europe Exist? Reflections on Defense, Identity
and Civic Virtue in a New Europe, Marlene Wind has pointed to a typically French way
of thinking politically, where the E.U. is seen as a project, not as something that must be
done because of ethno-national determinism, but as a political body deliberately constructed and equipped with the ability to act. Here, defense becomes symbolic of unit55
ness; defense and identity become mutually constitutive.

Furthermore, swaggering would allow the European Union to be taken more seriously in the eyes of the world. Art explains,
A state or statesman swaggers in order to look and feel more powerful and important, to
be taken seriously by others in the councils of international decision making, to enhance
the nations image in the eyes of others. . . . Swaggering is pursued because it offers to
bring prestige on the cheap. If swaggering causes other states to take ones interests
more seriously into account, the general interests of the state will benefit.56

Throughout the cold war, the Europeans, former imperial powers, lived in the
shadow of the United States. America was their protector and main trading partner. To
compete with the United States, the Europeans had no choice but to integrate both economically and politically. To get the Europeans out from under Americas thumb, they
pursued the formation of a uniquely European security identity, clearly separate and
distinct from that of the United States. Although the United States and most of the
European governments shared common security interests, they often had different
security policy objectives and perceptions. Negatively or positively, European foreign,
security, and defense policy redefined itself in reaction to changes in American foreign, security, and defense policy.57 This next section demonstrates how much influ58
ence the United States has had over the formation of EU policy.
After the failure of the European Defense Community in 1954, the member states
put their main focus on writing the Treaty of Rome, establishing the European Economic Community, and getting it up and running. It was not long thereafter, in the
1960s and 1970s, in response to the U.S. adoption of flexible response, the war in
Vietnam, and the failure of Kissingers Year of Europe in 1973, that the Western European countries collectively started to disassociate themselves from American foreign
and defense policy.59 Although maintaining the alliance was necessary as long as the

Anderson, Seitz / EU Nation-Building and Identity 35

Soviet threat existed, over the years, each crisis within NATO led to a corresponding
strengthening of foreign, security, and defense policy cooperation within the EC especially after France and the United Kingdom acquired their own nuclear weapons. If the
Europeans were to be taken seriously as a foreign policy actor independent of the
United States, they would need their own security identity or at least the rhetoric of
onein other words, to swagger. Historically, U.S.-EC relations have followed a pattern: European disapproval of U.S. policy leads to an increased desire among the
member states for a separate security identity. However, the result is more rhetoric
than reality because the member states lack consensus on how to proceed.
One of the earliest examples of swaggering came with Kissingers attempt to revive
the U.S.-European relationship, battered by differences on issues ranging from Vietnam to dtente, by proclaiming 1973 the Year of Europe and calling for a New
Atlantic Charter.60 In his speech to the Associated Press, Kissinger recognized the
European nationssuccess in economic integration and in their revival after World War
II. However, the Americans did not view Europe as an emerging power: according to
Kissinger, the United States has global interest and responsibilities. Our European
allies have regional interests.61 His remarks had immediate repercussions in Europe:
By the end of the year, a combination of established trends and unexpected events had
created an atmosphere of recrimination and suspicions which made the idea of a New
Atlantic Charter seem fairly ridiculous, and in which the idea of a specifically European
identity based on political coordination between members of the European Communities
(EC) had apparently gained fresh impetus from the Kissinger challenge.62

By December 1973, in Copenhagen, the EC member states chose to define their

own relations and place in world affairs: The time has come to draw up a document on
the European Identity. This will enable them to achieve a better definition of their relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy
in world affairs. They have decided to define the European Identity with the dynamic
nature of the Community in mind.63 Time and again, the way to define Europe was
not American. Rejection of American ways was to embrace European ways. As a
result, the member states created European Political Cooperation (EPC) as an intergovernmental forum within which they could discuss foreign policy issues.
The 1980s continued to see a divergence of European and American security positions. Bitter disagreements over the neutron bomb, sanctions on the USSR for
Afghanistan, winnable limited nuclear wars under Reagan, Pershing missiles, the
new cold war, and the Strategic Defense Initiative, all convinced Europeans across
the political spectrum that there were indeed separate continental interests.64 Partly
because of relations with the United States, Greek accession to the EC, and the fact
that it had taken the member states nineteen days to react to the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan within the context of EPC, pressure was growing for EPC reform: The
inability of Europe to influence significantly the course of events and the nakedness of
its exposure to external aggression was nowhere more keenly felt than in the German
Foreign Ministry.65 German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher said that pos-

36 Armed Forces & Society

sibly, the time had come for a Treaty on European Union to strengthen the Communitys political influence on the world stage: Perhaps Europes voice would be better
heard in Washington if this Europe of ours spoke more with one voice and acted
together more decisively.66 Italian Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo supported
Genschers views and together proposed closer cooperation in security and defense.
Their draft treaty stated that the member states aimed at the co-ordination of security
policy and the adoption of common European positions in this sphere in order to safeguard Europes independence, protect its vital interests and strengthen its security, by
enlarging the scope of EPC to include all major dimensions of collective security.67
At the same time, anti-American sentiment was rising; many Europeans opposed
the nuclear arms race and U.S. bases in Europe. In October 1983, two million people
participated in demonstrations throughout Europe to protest nuclear armaments.68
Such an outcry probably influenced politicians to take a step away from the Americans
and to revive a forum for the EC countries interested in discussing security issues.
However, the resuscitation of the WEU was purely political not institutional: The significance of the reactivation of the WEU in 1984 lies more in the political will and
the wide publicity given to it by its seven members than in its somewhat limited
relaunching.69
The end of the cold war seemed the perfect opportunity to change the focus from
the Americans to the Europeans, and the rhetoric or swaggering hit an all-time high.
With peace on the European continent, the EC would be able to take its rightful place
as leader of the whole of Europe. At the opening of the Intergovernmental Conference
(IGC) in Rome in December 1990, Jacques Delors declared that the Europeans had a
rendezvous with history.70 There, the EC formally announced its pursuit of a closer
union containing a common foreign and security policy. Alan Clark, the British minister for defense procurement, explained that Europe needed something slimmer, less
set than NATO, something capable of faster response.71 After all, Clark asked, what
exactly were the 4,000 military and civilian employees doing at NATO headquarters
these days? The secretary-general of the WEU, Wim van Eekelen, a former Dutch
defense minister, said he would not need such a vast bureaucratic structure to maintain
the type of European defense force he proposed, consisting of a brigade of four to five
thousand soldiers from each country with their own staffs, artillery, and logistical support. A single European general would have command. Such a force, Van Eekelen
reminded, could have been used in the Gulf.72
After the Gulf War, many of the member states as well as the community institutions tried to understand why the EC had so little impact internationally. Many blamed
the absence of a military dimension for the uncoordinated effort. The ECs impotence
during the Gulf War prompted Belgiums foreign minister to complain that Europe
was an economic giant, political dwarf and military worm for several reasons: the
member states could not agree or did not try to form a joint response, military efforts
among the Twelve were limited, and member states followed their own independent
73
policies. Jacques Delors, president of the European Commission, immediately after
the Gulf War, appealed to the member states for EC reform if the Community were to
correct the functional imbalances within its foreign and security policy cooperation:

Anderson, Seitz / EU Nation-Building and Identity 37

It is true that the very first day2 August 1990the Community took the firm line
expected of it. It confirmed the commitment of its member states to enforce sanctions, the
first line of dissuasion against aggressors. However, once it became obvious that the situation would have to be resolved by armed combat, the Community had neither the institutional machinery nor the military force which would have allowed it to act as a community. Are the Twelve prepared to learn from this experience?74

The answer was yes. During the 1991 IGC, the Twelve agreed to create a CFSP to
increase European presence on the world stage. When the Yugoslav crisis erupted, so
confident was Jacques Poos, Luxembourgs foreign minister, of the ECs future prowess, he declared, It is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the Americans. The days of
political deadlock were prehistory. The EC was now the leader of Europe, and as
Poos explained, If the Yugoslavs want to enter the Europe of the 20th century, they
have to follow our advice.75
What the Europeans learned was that their advice and power to influence the situation in the Balkans was minimal. In what must have been a humiliating move for
Europe, after pushing the United States out, the French asked the Americans to get
involved. And, in doing so, the cycle continued: with renewed force, the member
states attempted to negotiate a revitalized CFSP that would have teeth giving the European Union the status of a world player and the people something to unite around.

Conclusions
Europe should not be viewed as a Kantian paradise. The Europeans are not afraid
to use military force. France and Britain especially, but with the support of the other
EU members, have intervened in their former colonies in Africa. They are the ones
who asked the United States to get involved in Yugoslavia and in Liberia when they
needed help. The Europeans have been actively involved in international affairs for
fifty years supporting U.S. policy in Korea, Vietnam, and other places around the
globe. The Europeans and Americans do not dwell on different planets.
The ESDP could never supplant NATO. The Europeans cannot afford to equip it
with the necessary capabilities. Aging populations and generous social welfare and
pension programs mean that the ESDP could never be a competitor to the Atlantic
Alliance. European governments have consistently reduced their defense budgets
since the end of the cold war. Moreover, they have no leader (save the United States).
Nevertheless, the Europeans will continue to pursue an ESDP because it is central
to the European project. As Patrick Mileham put it, Armed forces are among a handful of institutions that traditionally define the nation.76 One of the most important
trappings of a state is the military. The United States has recognized that when dealing
with developing countries. They sell military hardware to developing countries so the
governments can have military parades to look strong and gain legitimacy with the
people. France had just such a military parade when the Germans marched side by side
with the French down the Champs-Elyses to show off the new Eurocorps as a symbol
of progress toward European integration. With a single market and a single currency

38 Armed Forces & Society

already established, aside from security and defense, there are not many more tools the
Europeans have on offer to keep the European Union unified. It cannot abandon its
pursuit of an ESDP.
Especially in the security realm, American actions can easily create an opposite
and equal reaction in the European Union if such actions are interpreted as efforts to
undermine Europes cohesion or its importance in world affairs. For example, White
House National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rices policy to punish France,
ignore Germany and forgive Russia to break up the prewar non-nein-nyet alliance
against America over Iraq will and has pushed the Europeans closer together on issues
of ESDP. Despite Washingtons objections, in December 2003, the British gave in to
their European allies demands for an independent EU military planning cell.
As this article has shown, fears for the future of the Atlantic security alliance are
somewhat misplaced. The ESDP does not indicate that Europe has become oblivious
to its need for a unified and capable defense alliance. Nor does the ESDP indicate any
European agenda to displace the United States from its key role in the defense of the
continent. It does indicate Europes will to be recognized as a major force in world
affairs as well as the European Unions need to broaden public support for European
integration and to promote a sense of pride in a European identity across all member
states.

Notes
1. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 28, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/
nss.pdf.
2. Ibid.
3. In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty on European Union introduced the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP). The CFSP provided the basis for the discussion of security affairs within the European
Union. Subsequently, in 1994, under the auspices of the NATO Council, the member states recognized the
need to define a European identity vis--vis security and defense. This agreement led to the development of
the European Security and Defense Identity to allow the European Union to borrow NATO capabilities to
carry out narrowly defined military operations such as peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks, also called the
Petersberg tasks. Unhappy with their ability to influence affairs during the Kosovo crisis and following a
meeting of the minds between Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac at Saint-Mlo, the EU member states agreed to
a full-fledged European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in Cologne in 1999. The ESDP was an important advance as it led to the formation of committees and other institutional structures such as the Political
and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee, and the EU Military Staff, which pave the way for an
autonomous EU defense. The ESDP is also referred to as the Common European Security and Defense Policy and, during the constitutional convention, as the Common Security and Defense Policy. Most academics
and even Solanas Web site refer to the ESDP.
4. F. Stephen Larrabee, RAND, The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and American
Interests (Prepared statement for a hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on
European Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC, March 9, 2000), 4.
5. Jacques Delors, European Integration and Security, Survival 33, no. 2 (March-April 1991): 100.
Jacques Delors argues, European must want to be European if it wants its political ambitions to come to
fruition.
6. The European Union came into existence in 1993 with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty on
European Union. When discussing Europe before this date, I use the term European Community (EC).

Anderson, Seitz / EU Nation-Building and Identity 39

7. Jeffrey Simon, ed., European Security Policy after the Revolutions of 1989 (Washington, DC:
National Defense University Press, 1991).
8. Martin Farnsdale, former commander North Atlantic Group (NATO Central Europe), Europe after
an American Withdrawal, ed. Jane O. Sharp (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1990), 454.
9. Charles L. Glaser, Why NATO Is Still Best, International Security 18 (Summer 1993): 48.
10. Mette Eilstrup Sandiovanni, Why a Common Security and Defense Policy Is Bad for Europe, Survival 45 (Winter 2003-2004): 193-206.
11. Julian Lindley-French, In the Shade of Locarno? Why European Defence Is Failing, International
Affairs 78 (2002): 789-811.
12. Eurobarometer 57 (May 2002). See also Eurobarometer 59 (June 2003) for similar statistics.
13. See Eurobarometer 54.1 as cited in Eurobarometer special survey by Philippe Manigart, Public
Opinion and European Defence, July 2001, http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs
_146_en.pdf.
14. A Secure Europe in a Better World: The European Security Strategy (Adopted at the European
Council in Brussels on December 12, 2003), http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.ASP?id=266&lang=EN&
mode=g.
15. John Van Oudenaren, The Solana Security Paper (American Institute for Contemporary German
Studies, Johns Hopkins University), http://www.aicgs.org/c/solana.shtml.
16. The Western European Union (WEU) is a partially dormant, separate military organization with very
close ties to the European Union. In the early nineties, the European Union looked on the WEU as a possible
defense arm. Although it was supposed to have been merged with the European Union, and some of its subsidiary bodies have been turned over to the union, it is separate and may well remain so. Instead, the WEU
was joined with the CFSP by having Javier Solana, high representative of the CFSP, made head of the WEU
as well. For more detail, see L. M. de Puig, The Myth of Europa: A Paradigm for European Defence (Paris:
WEU Assembly, 2000).
17. Craig Covault, WEU Seeks European Missile Defense Plan, Aviation Week and Space Technology,
January 18, 1993, 25.
18. Reuters, WEU Urges New Baltic Sea Force, December 5, 1995.
19. William J. Kole, Western Europes Defense Chiefs Eye French Nuclear Arsenal, Associated Press,
December 4, 1995.
20. North Atlantic Council, Final communiqu issued at the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic
Council at NATO headquarters (Brussels, Belgium, December 1, 1994), http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/
49-95/c941201a.htm. See also North Atlantic Council, Final communiqu issued at the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council (Berlin, Germany, June 3, 1996), http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/
p96-063e.htm.
21. Washington Summit communiqu issued by the heads of state and government participating in the
meeting of the North Atlantic Council (Washington, DC, April 24, 1999), http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/
1999/p99-064e.htm.
22. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Joint Declaration on European Defence, December 4, 1998
(British-French Summit, Saint-Mlo, France, December 3-4, 1998), http://www.fco.gov.uk/textonly/news/
newstext.asp?1795&printVersion=yes.
23. The Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, Annex III: European Council Declaration
on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, June 3-4, 1999, http://europa.eu
.int/council/off/conclu/june99/annexe_en.htm#a3.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Jackie Gower, Russia and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, in Russia and
Europe: Conflict or Cooperation? ed. Mark Webber (London: Macmillan, 2000), 88.
27. Robert E. Hunter, The European Security and Defense Policy: NATOs Companion or Competitor?
(Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2002).
28. Stanley Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain
Reconsidered (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002).

40 Armed Forces & Society

29. Javier Solana, Address by the EU High Representative for the CFSP to the External Action Working
Group (Brussels, Belgium, October 15, 2002).
30. These same issues have been discussed under the Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice treaties as well
as during the constitutional convention but without progress. Stephanie Anderson, Testing the Liberal
Aspect of Liberal Intergovernmentalism: Explaining the Development of an EU Common Security Policy
from 1990-2000 (Unpublished article).
31. See The Economist, A Tale of Two Bellies; Demography in America and Europe, August 24, 2002.
32. For a more detailed investigation, see Karl Haltiner, The Definite End of the Mass Army in Western
Europe? Armed Forces & Society 25, no. 1 (Fall 1998): 13.
33. Oana Lungescu, Chirac Blasts EU Candidates BBC News, February 18, 2003, http://news.bbc.co
.uk/2/hi/europe/2774139.stm.
34. Henry Hyde (R-IL), Pathology of Success (Opening remarks during a House International Relations Committee hearing featuring testimony from U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, February 11, 2003),
http://wwwa.house.gov/international relations/108/newsO212.htm.
35. Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness, Policy Review 113 (June/July 2002): 1, http://www
.policyreview.org/JUN02/kagan_print.html.
36. Many academics over the past fifty years have referred to the EC as a civilian power. Francois
Duchne is one of the first to use the term, writing, Europe would be the first major area of the Old World
where the age-old process of war and indirect violence could be translated into something more in tune with
the twentieth-century citizens notion of civilized politics. In such a context, Western Europe could in a sense
be the first of the worlds civilian centres of power; Francois Duchne, Europes Role in World Peace, in
Europe Tomorrow, ed. Richard Mayne (London: Fontana, 1972), 43. The term is used by many subsequent
authors including Hedley Bull, Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? Journal of Common
Market Studies 21 (September-December 1982); Christopher Hill, European Foreign Policy: Power Bloc,
Civilian Poweror Flop? in The Evolution of an International Actor: Western Europes New Assertiveness, ed. Reinhardt Rummel (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990); and Roy Ginsberg, The EUs CFSP: The Politics of Procedure, in Common Foreign and Security Policy, ed. Martin Holland (London: Pinter, 1997), 14.
37. Henry Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1966).
38. David P. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony (New York: Basic Books, 1987).
39. The definitions of nation-building versus state-building are discussed in more detail in the next section. In either case, both definitions are problematic considering that the European Union is a sui generis
entity, that is, an intergovernmental organization with supranational characteristics. Indeed, the European
Union is involved in both nation-building and state-building (at the supranational or suprastate level). For our
purposes, rather than come up with a new label appropriate specifically for the European Union, this article
will refer to nation-building as the effort to create a pan-European identity in keeping with the relevant
literature.
40. Eurobarometer 54.1 as cited in Manigart, Public Opinion, 9.
41. See, for example, Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper, Lessons from the Past: The American Record of
Nation-Building (Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief No. 24, April 2003); and Marina Ottaway, NationBuilding, Foreign Policy 132 (September/October 2002): 16-24.
42. See, for example, Lucien W. Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation-Building: Burmas Search for
Identity (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1962); Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, NationBuilding (New York: Atherton, 1966); and Jefferson Marquis, The Other Warriors: American Social Science and Nation-Building in Vietnam, Diplomatic History 24 (2000): 79-105.
43. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 5-7, 53-56.
44. Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 14.
45. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism
(London: Verso, 1991), 192-96.
46. Honor Mahoney, Mixed Feelings One Year after Enlargement, EU Observer, May 1, 2005.
47. Lars-Erik Cederman, Political Boundaries and Identity Tradeoffs, in Constructing Europes Identity: The External Dimension (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), chap. 1.
48. Ibid., 3.

Anderson, Seitz / EU Nation-Building and Identity 41

49. Paul Kowert, The Construction of National Identity, in International Relations in a Constructed
World, ed. in Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, and Paul Kowert (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 105-9.
50. Martin Marcussen, Thomas Risse, Daniela Engelmann-Martin, Hans Joachim Knopf, and Klaus
Roscher, Constructing Europe? The Evolution of Nation-State Identities, in The Social Construction of
Europe, ed. Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jrgensen, and Antje Wiener (London: Sage, 2001), 102-3.
51. Robert Art, To What Ends Military Power, International Security 4 (Spring 1980): 5.
52. New York Times, December 16, 1990, I6.
53. Art, To What Ends, 10.
54. President Jacques Chirac in Toulouse in June 1999, as cited in Janes Defence Weekly, Building a
European Force: New Key Figure on the European Union Stage, June 23, 1999.
55. Ole Waever, Identity, Integration and Security: Solving the Sovereignty Puzzle in E.U. Studies,
Journal of International Affairs 48 (Winter 1995): 407.
56. Art, To What Ends, 10-11.
57. Nuttall called the U.S.-European relationship one of the keys to understanding European political
cooperation: The United Statesview has fluctuated between support for a development which is in its longterm interest and suspicion of an emerging power which has not always followed the American lead. The
Europeans for their part have been divided over the response to make to American policy, and have changed
their views as US policy itself has changed. . . . Whether for or against, no member state of the Community
could remain indifferent to the position of Washington; Simon Nuttall, European Political Co-operation
(Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1992), 3.
58. For a more detailed account of transatlantic relations during this period, see Douglas Stuart, NATO
in the 1980s: Between European Pillar and European Home, Armed Forces & Society 16, no. 3 (Spring
1990): 421-36.
59. Michael Smith, From the Year of Europe to a Year of Carter: Continuing Patterns and Problems in
Euro-American Relations, Journal of Common Market Studies 17 (1978): 27.
60. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony, 44-64.
61. Henry A. Kissinger, The Year of Europe (Address to the Associated Press Annual Luncheon, New
York, April 23, 1973), in American Foreign Policy, 3rd ed. (New York: Norton, 1977), 104-5.
62. M. Smith, From the Year of Europe, 27.
63. Document on the European Identity Published by the Nine Foreign Ministers (Copenhagen, 14
December 1973), in European Political Co-operation, 5th ed. (Bonn, Germany: Press and Information
Office of the Federal Government, 1988), 48.
64. Ian Gambles, European Security Integration in the 1990s (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 1991),
5-6.
65. See Pauline Neville-Jones, The Genscher/Colombo Proposals on European Union, Common Market Law Review 20 (1983): 657-99.
66. Nuttall, European Political Co-operation, 184.
67. The Draft European Act submitted by the German and Italian governments, published by EP Bulletin
50/81.
68. New York Times, October 31, 1983. These were some of the largest demonstrations in Europe. Mary
Kaldor has argued that these grassroots movements were key in the getting the governments of the superpowers and of Eastern and Western Europe to end the arms race. See Mary Kaldor, Avoiding a New Division of
Europe, World Policy Journal 8 (Winter 1990-1991): 181-93; and Mary Kaldor, ed., Europe from Below
(London: Verso, 1991).
69. Jean-Marc Hoscheit and Panos Tsakaloyannis, Relaunching the Western European Union: An
Overview, in The Reactivation of the Western European Union: The Effects on the EC and Its Institutions, ed.
Panos Tsakaloyannis (Maastricht, the Netherlands: European Institute of Public Administration, 1985), 16.
70. New York Times, December 16, 1990, I6.
71. New York Times, December 26, 1990, A10.
72. Ibid.
73. Scott Anderson, Western Europe and the Gulf War, in The Evolution of an International Actor:
Western Europes New Assertiveness, ed. Reinhardt Rummel (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990), 147.
74. Delors, European Integration, 102 (emphasis added).

42 Armed Forces & Society

75. Financial Times, July 1, 1991.
76. Patrick Mileham, But Will They Fight and Will They Die? International Affairs 77, no. 3 (2001): 621.

Stephanie Anderson (PhD, University of Cambridge, UK) is an assistant professor in the Department of
Political Science at the University of Wyoming. She is the Fulbright Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin where she is writing her book on the development of the European Unions security and defense policy. Address for correspondence: Stephanie Anderson, University of
Wyoming, Political Science, Dept. 3197, Laramie, WY 82071; e-mail: redhead@uwyo.edu.
Thomas R. Seitz (PhD, University of Cambridge, UK) is a visiting assistant professor of political science at
the University of Wyoming. He is currently working on his book on nation-building in U.S. foreign policy.
E-mail: tseitz@uwyo.edu.