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Ty vs CA
GR No. 127406, November 27, 2000
FACTS:
Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married with Anna
Villanueva in a civil ceremony in March 1977 in Manila and
subsequently had a church wedding in August 1977. Both
weddings were declared null and void ab initio for lack of
marriage license and consent of the parties. Even before the
decree nullifying the marriage was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty
herein petitioner on April 1979 and had their church wedding in
Makati on April 1982. The decree was only issued in August
1980. In January 1991, Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to have
his marriage with petitioner be declared null and void. AC ruled
that a judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage with
Anna must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could
be validly contracted. However, SC found that the provisions of
the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present
case for doing so would prejudice the vested rights of the
petitioner and of her children.
ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty.
HELD:
SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no damages should
be awarded to the wife who sought damages against the husband
for filing a baseless complaint causing her mental anguish,
anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation
from her parents. Aside from the fact, that petitioner wants her
marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is
likewise suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. To grant
her petition for damages would result to a situation where the
husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds.
To do so, would make the application of the law absurd.
Moreover, Philippine laws do not comprehend an action for
damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of
a marital obligation.
RATIO: The loan obtained by the husband from AIDC was for the
benefit of PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
of Ching.
4. Go vs CA
Family Code Article 73 Exercise of Profession of Either Spouse
In 1981, Hermogenes Ong and Jane Ong contracted with Nancy
Go for the latter to film their wedding. After the wedding, the
newlywed inquired about their wedding video but Nancy Go said
its not yet ready. She advised them to return for the wedding
video after their honeymoon. The newlywed did so but only to
find out that Nancy Go can no longer produce the said wedding
video because the copy has been erased.
The Ongs then sued Nancy Go for damages. Nancys husband,
Alex Go, was impleaded. The trial court ruled in favor of the
spouses Ong and awarded in their favor, among others, P75k in
moral damages. In her defense on appeal, Nancy Go said: that
they erased the video tape because as per the terms of their
agreement, the spouses are supposed to claim their wedding tape
Concepcion, C.J.
FACTS:
FACTS:
Gaviola and Protacio, Jr. entered into a contract ofsale of a parcel
of land. 23 years later, Protacio, Jr executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation and Waiver affirming under oath that it was his
father Protacio Go, Sr.(Married to Marta Go) who purchased the
said property. Subsequently, Protacio Go together with his son
Rito Go sold a portion of the property to herein respondent Ester
Servacio. On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return
of the property, but Servacio refused to heed their demand;
hence this case for the annulment of sale of the property. The
contention of the petitioner was that following Protacio, Jr.s
renunciation, the property became conjugal property; and that
the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation
of the community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was
null and void pursuant to Article 130 of the Family Code. Servacio
and Rito countered thatArticle 130 of the Family Code was
inapplicable; that the want of the liquidation prior to the sale did
not render the sale invalid, because the sale was valid to the
extent of the portion that was finally allotted to the vendors as his
share; and that the sale did not also prejudice any rights of the
petitioners as heirs, considering that what the sale disposed of
was within the aliquot portion of the property that the vendors
were entitled to as heirs.
The RTC declared that the property was the conjugal property of
Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr.
Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the
property. Aggrieved, the petitioners went all the way up to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether Article 130 of the Family Code was applicable.
HELD:
RULING:
No. SC held that the marriage between Yee and Cario falls under
the Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property
regime of bigamous or polygamous marriages, adulterous or
concubinage relationships.
FACTS: Lilius was driving with his wife and daughter for
ISSUE:
1.
2.
his attention thus occupied, he did not see the crossing but he
heard two short whistles. Immediately afterwards, he saw a huge
1. YES
drove his car, and prays that it be absolved from the complaint.
disfigures her face and that the fracture of her left leg has caused
damages, excessive.
her face and that the fractures of both her legs permanently
fact that all of this unfavorably and to a great extent affect her
matrimonial future.
c. Lilius also seeks to recover the sum of P2,500 for the loss of
what is called Anglo-Saxon common law consortium of his wife,
that is, her services, society and conjugal companionship, as a
result of personal injuries which she had received from the
accident now under consideration.
Under the law and the doctrine of this court, one of the husbands
rights is to count on his wifes assistance. This assistance
comprises the management of the home and the performance of
household duties. However, nowadays when women, in their
equal in all the activities of life, marriage has ceased to create the
enough that the latter has been guilty of negligence, but it is also
necessary that the said victim has not, through his own
husband and children, which the law imposes upon her, and he
It appears that Lilius took all precautions which his skill and the
presence of his wife and child, driving his car at a speed which
prudence demanded according to the circumstances and
conditions of the road, slackening his speed in the face of an
obstacle and blowing his horn upon seeing persons on the road. If
he failed to stop, look and listen before going over the crossing, in
spite of the fact that he was driving at 12 miles per hour after
having been free from obstacles, it was because, his attention
necessary for the party claiming indemnity for the loss of such
become inevitable.
doing
NOTES:
10. GO vs YAMANE
Petitioners: Spouses JOSEPHINE MENDOZA GO & HENRY GO
Respondent: LEONARDO YAMANE
FACTS:
HELD:
Property purchased by spouses during the existence of their
marriage is presumed to be conjugal in nature, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
(Article 160)
The nature of a property, whether conjugal or paraphernal, is
determined by law and not by the will of one of the spouses.
The mere registration of a property in the name of one spouse
does not destroy its conjugal nature. Conjugal property cannot be
held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse,
unless some advantage of benefit is shown to have accrued to
the conjugal partnership.
10
Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of
execution, claiming that the levied properties were conjugal
assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia.
ISSUE: WON the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia
can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecias
civil liability in the murder case.
HELD: Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as
they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon
them be charged to the partnership.
The payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon the spouses
may be enforced against the partnership assets if the spouse who
is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be
insufficient.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTCs finding that Melecia has no
exclusive property of her own, the above applies. The civil
indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on her
may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code
have been covered.
FACTS:
Honorio Carlos filed a petition against Manuel Abelardo, his sonin-law for recovery of the $25,000 loan used to purchase a house
and lot located at Paranaque. It was in October 1989 when the
petitioner issued a check worth as such to assist the spouses in
conducting their married life independently. The seller of the
property acknowledged receipt of the full payment. In July 1991,
the petitioner inquired from spouses status of the amount loaned
from him, the spouses pleaded that they were not yet in position
to make a definite settlement. Thereafter, respondent expressed
13. Guiang v. CA
Facts:
Over the objection of private respondent Gilda Corpuz and while
she was in Manila seeking employment, her husband sold to the
petitioners-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang one half of
their conjugal peoperty, consisting of their residence and the lot
on which it stood. Upon her return to Cotabato, respondent
11
FACTS:
Petitioner, Thelma A. Jader-Manalo made an offer to buy the
properties of the respondents from the husband of Norma
Fernandez C. Camaisa, respondent Edilberto Camaisa. After some
bargaining, petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase
price and terms of payment. The agreement handwritten by the
petitioner was signed by Edilberto, with assurance from him that
he would secure his wifes consent. Petitioner was later on
surprised when she was informed that respondent spouses were
backing out of the agreement. Hence, she filed a complaint for
specific performance and damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal
property without the wife's written consent.
HELD:
Under Art. 124 of the Family Code: In the event that one spouse
is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must
have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
The properties subject to the contract in this case were conjugal;
hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both
husband and wife must be obtained. Respondent Norma Camaisa
did not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that
respondent Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale
of the subject properties, which she denied, her written consent
to the sale is required by law for its validity. She may have been
aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties,
however that is not sufficient to demonstrate consent.
12
a Decision declaring the said documents null and void and further
ordered the defendant is ordered to reconvey the property
subject of this complaint to the plaintiff, to pay the plaintiff the
13
sum representing the value of the car which was burned, the
The appellate court affirmed the trial courts Decision, but deleted
the award for damages and attorneys fees for lack of basis.
that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null
and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining
to the husband who contracted the sale.
Respondent and the late Marcelino. were married on August 8,
1967. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed the property relations between respondent and her
late husband. With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family
rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or other
laws.
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property
relations of respondent and the late Marcelino even in a
suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of
gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband
14
the same manner that the rule on co-ownership under Article 493
of the Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts
should not distinguish. Thus, both the trial court and the appellate
consent.
the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have
been benefited; . . . .
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without
the knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino constituted a
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit
15
HELD: Yes. The subject lot which was once owned by PHHC and
covered by the Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred
during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. The title to the
property was only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully paid the
purchase price on June 22, 1970. This full payment was made
more than 2 years after his marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968.
In effect, the property was acquired during the existence of the
marriage. Hence, ownership to the property is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership.
FACTS: On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, then single, and the
Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into
16
17
18
Held:
NO, THE PROPERTIES ARE NOT THE PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY OF
JOSEFINA AND CAN BE HELD TO ANSWER FOR EDUARDOS
OBLIGATIONS.
Although it is true that the properties cannot be held as conjugal
for the cohabitation between Eduardo and Josefina are bigamous,
the latter failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that she
contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of the
subject property and hence, is not a co-owner of such. Also, the
Court doubted that when she acquired the property at 23 years of
age, she had enough funds to pay for it. Her claim that the funds
for the property were provided by her mother and sister, the
Court believed, was just an afterthought.
20. ABRENICA VS ABRENICA GR 180572 06.18.12
FACTS
P and R were law firm partners. R filed a case against P d to
return partnership funds representing profits from the sale of a
parcel of land and sought to recover from petitioner retainer fees
19
that he received from two clients of the firm and the balance of
the cash advance that he obtained.
P filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that the sheriff had
levied on properties belonging to his children and petitioner
Joena. Joena filed an Affidavit of Third Party alleging that she and
her stepchildren owned a number of the personal properties
sought to be levied and that it was under their ACP.
A Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was issued on 3 January 2008 in
favor of the law firm for the Ps properties.
*P has been previously married to another woman but their
marriage has already been dissolved.
ISSUE
RATIO
Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the
community property the property acquired before the marriage of
a spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage;
and the fruits and the income, if any, of that property. Thus,
neither these two vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the
second marriage.
HELD
Petition denied.
HELD: Yes. Brigido and Rita tied the knot on January 6, 1977.
Since at the time of exchange of martial vows, the operative law
was the NCC and since they did not agree on a marriage
settlement, the property relations between them is the system of
relative community or the conjugal partnership of gains. Under
20
and requirements to
complete
the
sale.
In
the
Php 60,000 down payment and Php 140,000 will be paid upon the
Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe, J
FACTS:
ISSUE:
was not attained and that Rosarios signature was a mere forgery.
Is the petitioner entitled to assail the decision of the RTC and CA?
The Fuentes spouses claim that the action has prescribed since
HELD:
The petition lacks merit. Firstly, foreigners may not own lands in
the Philippines. However, there are no restrictions to the
ownership of buildings or structures on lands of foreigners. As
such, the two houses on Lots 1 and 2142 are considered coowned by the parties.
discovery.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Fuentes spouses ruling that there
was no forgery, that the testimony of Atty. Plagata who witnessed
the signing of Rosario must be given weight, and that the action
has
already
prescribed.
21
1950 Civil Code which provided that the sale of Conjugal Property
action
the
Rosario is completely void under Art 124 of the family code. With
hence
must
it
be
was
brought
well
within 10
within
years.
the
Given
that
prescriptive
period.
should have assailed such contract due to the fraud but they
Fuentes
spouses
was
forged;
that
sale
to
the
spouses
already
prescribed;
prescribe
since
it
is
void
contract.
and
3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not
had,
Rosario, who can file such a case to assail the validity of the sale
could
bring
the
action
to
annul
that
sale.
but given that Rosario was already dead no one could bring the
RULING:
1. The SC ruled that there was forgery due to the difference in the
stated
Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the
lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the
why
disposal.
there
was
such
difference
in
the
handwriting.
above,
that
sale
was
void
from
the
beginning.
22
Mary Ann and Pedro Villa-Abrille were husband and wife. They
had four children (herein respondents). The properties involved
in this case are: (1982) Lot 7 acquired by the spouses during
their marriage; Lot 8 acquired by Pedro when he was still single;
House built on lot 7 and 8 built from their joint efforts and the
proceeds of a loan from DBP.
(1991) Pedro got a mistress. Pedro offered to sell the house and
two lots to petitioners Ravina. Mary Ann objected. Pedro still sold
the properties without her consent. Pedro, with the connivance
Ravina and some Civilian Armed Forces (CAFGU) transferred all
the belongings from the house to an apartment and prevented
Mary Ann and the kids from entering the house.
Thus, Mary Ann and the children filed a complaint for Annulment
of Sale, Specific Performance and Damages before RTC Davao.
During the trial, Pedro declared that the house was built with his
own money. Petitioner Ravina testified that they bought the house
and lot from Pedro upon examination of the title.
RTC The sale of: Lot 7 void as to representing share of Mary
Ann; Lot 8 void as to representing share of Mary Ann who did
not consent; house void as to ; pay Mary Ann the value of
belongings that were lost; pay moral and exemplary damages and
the cost of suit.
CA sale of Lot 8 valid; sale of Lot 7 null and void; ordered
Pedro to return the value of the consideration to Ravina; ordered
Ravina to reconvey the house and Lot to spouses Pedro and Mary
Ann; ordered Pedro and Ravina to pay Mary Ann moral and
exemplary damages.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether Lot 7 is an exclusive property of Pedro or conjugal
property.
(2) Whether sale of Lot 7 by Pedro was valid considering the
absence of Mary Anns consent.
HELD:
23
RULINGS:
24
Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family
Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the
25
Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired
during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the presumption
under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these are conjugal
properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.
26
27