Portugal and the American Revolution:

the portuguese-american diplomatic relations throughout the 18th century

I.

Foreword

Unlike almost all states, the United States of America were essentially established based on an
ideology. Since the arrival of the first settlers coming from the European great powers to its
independence, the United States saw themselves, not only through the biblical writings, but also as a
revolutionary society. Ergo, the New World1 would allow the experimentation of ideals turning them into
concrete realities. The successive waves of migrants, leaving everything behind that departed over the
years to the North of the American continent in order to start a new life, were substantially conquered by
the seductive power of its utopia2. In short, life in the United States can never be imitated due to its
mythical and apocalyptic origins, its ideals of freedom and strength of its religiosity.
For a better understanding of the reason that led the American rebels to engage in an armed conflict
with the Great Britain on behalf of its independence, it shall be considered the factors that boosted the
revolt. It should be noted, that the Puritans and Pilgrims escapade from the religious repression in the
colonial era, dissidents from the English Reformation and Counter-Reformation, was intended to create a
society that would be the nation of saints and should serve as an example to the old continent. As such, it
was wanted to be implemented rules and ideals of coexistence in society, which would be innovative and
never repressive. One of the adopted political theories was the one by John Locke, so it held that freedom
would not be a primordial human condition, but rather the result of generations of institutional
construction; this freedom could no longer be guaranteed in Europe: despite being originally a construct
of these, the monarchical and aristocratic system prevailing in the old continent was disgusted by the
settlers and their Declaration of Independence.
Portugal was placed involuntarily in a political and military game of interests, which could harm its
trade and economy, or simply put an end to its secular independence.
However, the peripheral nation placed in the Iberian west was able to overcome these events and
embodied itself as one of the first countries to recognize the American rebels as independents, without
thereby harm the old relations with the its most precious ally, the Great Britain.
The objective of this paper is to prove and examine the diplomatic relations between Portugal and the
United States of America, during the rise of the former British colony to a recognized nation across
borders. Moreover, it is a sample of a wider research writing project, presented as the final essay for the
seminar, History and Problems of Portuguese Foreign Policy.

II.

Anglo-Portuguese Alliance
Since the mid-seventeenth century, the Portuguese foreign policy was focused
on the following habitats in the Atlantic, in addition to their importance as a
communication line that united the various possessions overseas and the
Continental territory:
1. Brazil, which had acquired the main colony of the kingdom;
2. Europe, destination and source of the Portuguese economy;
3. The Strait of Gibraltar;
4. The slave routes between Africa and the Americas, in particular.

Concept widely developed in the considered ideological and cultural "bible" of the United States of American, A Model of
Christian Charity, John Winthrop, 1630.
2
There is no denying the Americanization of a myth, the celebrated "American Dream"; the dream of building higher society and of
course better than the old continent, which indulged all wishes and desires. It is a concept set out in, Of Plymouth Plantation, by
William Bradford, one of the Americans Founding Fathers. This Bradfords work, written after the Puritan colonists arrival to the
American soil, presents the story of a minority separatist group from the early conflicts in England against the Church of England,
through the Netherlands, crossing the ocean and culminating in a "new society" implementation in the New World.

It is in this geographic space that Portugal, since the fifteenth century,

imposed its presence.3

The old Anglo-Portuguese Alliance appeared as vital to the small Portuguese metropolis in the far
west of the European continent, by cause of its vast colonial empire ownership, needed the British help to
preserve its independence by several centuries threatened.
Vis--vis the Anglo-American plot, the intended secession of the English colony in the North
America and all the surrounding issues, Spain took the opportunity to attack the Portuguese position in
Brazil, conquering Santa Catarinas island and Sacramentos colony: in 1750 it was signed the Treaty of
Madrid4 by Kings John V of Portugal and Ferdinand VI of Spain, in order to define the South American
colonies borders of the mentioned nations. Therefore, this treaty would replace the Tordesillas that have
been violated, on account of both Portugal and Spain not honouring its conditions in Asia and America.
Legitimately, John V granted the Sacramentos colony in exchange for the Spanish area of the Seven
Peoples of the Missions.
It is recalled that in June 1499, as soon as Vasco da Gama arrived in Lisbon with the long-awaited
news that India could be reached by sea, the once King Manoel immediately organized a new expedition
to the location. In his outward journey, this expedition could also explore the western shore of the
Atlantic, whose tenure Portugal assured since the Treaty of Tordesillas, signed in 1494 5. Withal, the
map of Juan de la Cosa would become the main proof that Pinzn was the first European navigator to
officially land in current Brazilian territory6. In this sense, the historical uncertainty and constant
violation of agreements explains the tiny hostility fostered for centuries between the Iberian neighbours.
Nevertheless, it should be noted the English inability to assist Portugal throughout the American War of
Independence, as this nation and its marine resources were focused on the North Atlantic.

III.

Portuguese Foreign Policy: impartiality

Placed in a political and military disadvantageous scene and wrapped in a game hostile to neutral
interests, throughout the 18th century Portugal was portrayed by a pawn in the great powers hands:
without jeopardizing the English Alliance, Portugal could not so little harass the already poor relations
with Spain and France, which were held together by the spirit of the Pacte de Famille 7. In this sense,
Portuguese diplomats sought support in all courts on the grounds of politics, military forces and trade, if
not only for the sake of affinity or neighbourhood.
The new royalty maintained good relations with Spain, a result of the double
Iberian consortium of 1785. When the bargaining of the southern border of
South America was regulated, the Sacramento colonys loss had to be offset
by our rights to the Rio Grande and the island of Santa Catarina recognition.
But, in 1777 it had to be consolidated peace in Iberia, to avoid friction as the
situation that occurred during the Seven Years' War.8

En route the English lethargy and the Spanish threat, Portugal tried to establish peaceful relations
with its Iberian neighbour and with France: two great European powers, hostile to the British Empire and
holding political and economic interests that could harm not only the Portuguese economy but also its
independence. These attempts to repair relations with the two mentioned powers, allowed Portugal to
diversify trade and exports: i.e. the Port wine, targeting the product to the eastern market. Thereby,
Portugal also dodged any animosity by both its ally, the Great Britain and its possible antagonists.
3

In O Poder Naval portugus no Atlntico Sculos XVI a XVIII, Augusto A. Alves Salgado, p. 4 [my translation]
Treaty written to terminate the controversy between Portugal and Spain, regarding their South American colonies.
5
In Nufragos, Traficantes e Degredados: As primeiras expedies ao Brasil, Eduardo Bueno, p. 29 [my translation]
6
Id., Ibid., p. 26 [my translation]
7
The policy of the Bourbons, consolidated by the Franco-Spanish alliance was intended to shoot down the Maritimes England
power, which, due to its overseas trade, aspired to be the greatest power in Europe, In Histria de Portugal: o Despotismo
Iluminado (1750-1807), Joaquim Verssimo Serro, p. 54
8
In Histria de Portugal: o Despotismo Iluminado (1750-1807), Joaquim Verssimo Serro, p. 304 (my translation]
4

The need to preserve the alliance with the Great Britain, without antagonizing
France and the problems in Brazil with Spain, led to a decision-making in
constant evolution. The apparent initial intransigence of the Marquess of
Pombal against the American rebels became untenable after the
internationalization of the war with the entry of France (1778), Spain (1779)
and the United Provinces (1780) (). The Portuguese military defeats in
South America against the Spaniards and the subsequent treaties of St.
Ildefonso (1777) and Brown (1778), with Carlos III and the formation of the
League of Armed Neutrality (1780) under the leadership of Russia, led to the
reversal of Portuguese foreign policy. The reopening of the Portuguese ports
to American ships and finally the normalization of diplomatic relations after
the war ended in 1783 (Peace of Versailles), came to crown the silent and
subtle change in the course of national diplomacy.9

It will be particularly relevant to note that the potential Iberian armed battle was considered by
the British diplomacy as a time bomb, capable of endangering peace in Europe and to destroy the English
strategy for America10.

IV.

The American Rebels

Along with the European conspiracy, ensued a war in the North of the American continent, that on
4th of July 1776 led the United States of America to free themselves from England. The space that
defines the American nation borders was thought, since the colonial period, as a dreams reason by the
Europeans: a heavenly place, conducive to the creation of a democracy at all different from the reigning
protocol prevailing in Europe; a refuge that would serve as an adoptive mother for those persecuted by
their own religious beliefs; a land that provided the triumph of a desired and expected dynamic
capitalism; a promise of a society that would decipher itself by its abundance, whether material or
spiritual.
Yet, hence the Seven Years War, the English Parliament decided to pay the costs of this conflict
through the colonies, afterwards the main beneficiaries (...). London, however, did not give up taxing the
colonies and the Parliament asserted its superiority over the colonial legislatures 11. It is certain that
whilom the English pilgrims did not set off for the Americas to remain abject subjects of the British
Empire12, but to build a new society, free and self-sustainable. Therefore, the secession and consequent
independence was inevitable.
Along these lines, the American Revolution spelt out itself as an independence movement on behalf
of the rights of people, who found themselves governed according to a sovereign and oppressive
legislation - the British Crown. This event was a turning point in the eighteenth centurys World History,
since for the first time outside Europe, there was a gradual development of a nation-state, according to
cultural and political parameters distinct from the ones prevailing in the old continent.

V.

Post American Emancipation

The American Revolution shook Europe: on one hand, the former colony was forced to aim for new
diplomatic relations with regard to sustain the market share lost by British pressure. On the other hand,
the Great Britain needed new customers and suppliers, in pursuance of draining its production and swing
the domestic economy. It shall be noted that, with the Industrial Revolution, the production of that nation
increased exponentially.

In A Guerra da Independncia dos E.U.A e os Diplomatas Portuguesas. Lus Pinto de Sousa Coutinho e os Primrdios do conflito
(1774-1776), Jlio Joaquim da Costa Rodrigues da Silva, p. 2 [my translation]
10
In Comrcio e Diplomacia nas Relaes luso-americanas (1776-1822), Jorge Manuel Martins Ribeiro, p. 286 [my translation]
11
In Comrcio e Diplomacia nas Relaes luso-americanas (1776-1822), Jorge Manuel Martins Ribeiro, p. 287 [my translation]
12
In Great Britain and the USA: Past and Present, p.67

"(...) More interesting is its [Marquess of Pombal] view that this war will
hardly be won by the English, if the settlers pursue a attritions strategy
similar to that used by the Portuguese-Brazilian in the War of Restoration
against the Dutch. (...) In fact, considers that the rebels have better
preparation and resources than the Portuguese from Brazil of the seventeenth
century to fight the British. In addition, the simple maintenance of the English
army to control Americans would be excessively burdensome to perpetuate
power. Supporter of an Anglo-American reconcile, the Portuguese statesman
was concerned about any weakening of the Great Britain in the maritime and
colonial plan with regard to France and Spain.13

Even with this position, this did not prevent him from closing the Portuguese ports to American
ships in July 1776, when he perceived the impossibility of reconciliation and inevitability of an armed
conflict between an European nation and its yet property.

VI.

Diplomatic Solutions

Erstwhile, the Portuguese diplomacy (accordant to Joseph I [1750-1777] and Mary I [1777-1816]
reigns) was forced to deal with these successive emancipation's events of a colony of its longstanding
ally, the Great Britain: it was necessary to preserve the Alliance, but not antagonize the relations with
France and its greatest potential enemy, Spain.
Portugal had to adopt a coherent policy according to its colonial power status
and to preserve their traditional and important relations with the Great
Britain (...)14

Devoted to the various European powers, the Portuguese diplomatic posture outlined instability,
which altered depending on the danger and imminent threat of war. In order to not hurt its precious ally,
Portugal refused the American rebellion and considered crucial to cease its maritime ports to any ships
coming from the United States. Thus, the American Revolution was a major embarrassment for the
Portuguese diplomacy, by jeopardizing principles and old alliances. Notice that, in the late eighteenth
century, the commercial trade between the Portuguese and American ports provided mutual and very
significant benefits.
The Marquess himself, in a 1775 dispatch, that was self directed, opposed to
the English confrontation strategy against the settlers following clearly the
positions of the English Whig opposition, particularly from Edmund Burke.
Also considers totally absurd not to grant a parliament to the American
colonies, (). The affair was not obviously their independence, but only a
separate representation, keeping obedience to George III, in line with the
abovementioned British opponents.15

However, the British pressure for the same trade assignment and the Spanish invasion threat, led
the Portuguese leaders to operate, firstly in accordance with their security needs. Therefore, the decision
to close the ports to American, ships out of respect to the British, entailed economic losses. But, this
decision dared offending French and Spanish interests and could mortgage the future relations with the
new country as well as with the aforementioned powers.

13

In A Guerra da Independncia dos E.U.A e os Diplomatas Portugueses (1774-1776), Jlio Joaquim da Costa Rodrigues da Silva,
p. 5 (my translation]
14
In Relaes entre Portugal e os Estados Unidos da Amrica na poca das Luzes, p. 17 [my translation]
15
In A Guerra da Independncia dos E.U.A e os Diplomatas Portuguesas (1774-1776), Jlio Joaquim da Costa Rodrigues da Silva,
p. 4 [my translation]

VII.

The Portuguese-American diplomatic relations: observations

In the years prior to the American Revolution, Portugal held a profitable and mutual business
relationship with the yet American colony, with special attention to Madeira and Azores.
The reaction from the United States regarding the relations terminus with Portugal, was felt through
Benjamin Franklin, who mourned for the lack of Portuguese support to their cause.
With Marquess of Pombal's fall and the war that emerged in 1778 between France and England,
allowed Mary I to restore and maintain a non-interference foreign policy. On 15 February 1783, Portugal
recognized the independence of the United States of America, being one of the first Western nations to
accept the American rebels as a nation-state. On 3 September, was signed the peace of Versailles, and the
Great Britain was forced to admit the independence of its now former colony.
Undoubtedly, the American Revolutionary War (1775-1783) was a major conflict in the decades
preceding the outbreak of the French Revolution by 1789, since it served as a model and example for
Latin American anti-colonial movements of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century 16. Thus, it
was conceivable and approved an American presentation of a political and ideological uniqueness in the
global spectrum, which impressed and influenced the old Western society.

VIII.

References

_________________. Relaes entre Portugal e os Estados Unidos da Amrica na poca das Luzes. Lisboa:
Torre do Tombo, 1997
BUENO, Eduardo. Nufragos, Traficantes e Degredados: As primeiras expedies ao Brasil. Rio de Janeiro:
Objectiva, 2006
DUVERGER, Maurice. Os Grandes Sistemas Polticos: Instituies Polticas e Direito Constitucional.
Coimbra: Almedina, 1985. Vol. 1
JEFFERSON, Thomas. Declaration of Independence: The Unanimous Declaration of the Thirteen United States
of America. 1776 (available online in PDF file http://www.gutenberg.org/files/16780/16780-pdf.pdf)
LOCKE, John. Trad. Miguel Morgado. Dois tratados do Governo Civil. Lisboa: Edies 70
MAILER, Norman. The armies of the night: History as a novel, the novel as History. United States: Plume
Publisher, 1995
RIBEIRO, Jorge Manuel Martins. Comrcio e Diplomacia nas Relaes luso-americanas (1776-1822). 1997.
1005 f. Thesis (Doctorade thesis in Contemporary and Modern History) Faculty of Arts. Universidade do
Porto, Porto
SERRO, Joaquim Verssimo. Histria de Portugal: o Despotismo Iluminado (1750-1807). Cacm: Verbo,
1982. Vol. 6
SILVA, Jlio Joaquim da Costa Rodrigues da. A Guerra da Independncia dos E.U.A e os Diplomatas
portugueses: Lus Pinto de Sousa Coutinho e os primrdios do conflito (1774-1776) (available online in PDF
file http://www.fcsh.unl.pt/chc/pdfs/guerraindependencia.pdf)
WINTHROP, John. A Model of Christian Charity. Paperback, 1630

16

In A Guerra da Independncia dos E.U.A e os Diplomatas Portuguesas (1774-1776), Jlio Joaquim da Costa Rodrigues da Silva,
p. 1 [my translation]