PRIL Overseas Employment Contract 95Suzara

vs Benipayo (19 9!"acts#

1.Suzara et al entered into employment contracts
with Magsaysay lines to work aboardvessels
owned/operated/manned by the latter for a period of 12 calendar
months andwith dierent rating/position salary overtime pay and
allowance. !he contracts wereapproved by the "ational Seamen
#oard.2.$pon arrival at the port of %ancouver &anada demands
for increase in wages weremade through the help of the 'nternational !
ransport (orker)s *ederation +'!*, amilitant worldwide especially in
&anada -ustralia Scandinavia and variousuropean countries
interdicting foreign vessels and demanding wage increases forthird
world seamen..(ages were increased but complaints were 0led
by Magsaysay before the "S#. "S#ordered the return of the additional
wages paid for being obtained thru violent meansand for lacking "S#
approval. "& a3rmed the order.4.Meanwhile Magsaysay 0led
estafa charges against the seamen.5.'n this petition
the seamen seeks for the reversal of the "& decision and
the6uashal of the complaints for estafa.
Issue#
(hether the increase in wages needed the approval of the "S# to be legal
($O!Ratio#
1.!here is nothing in the record supporting the 0nding that the
workers resorted toviolent means to obtain an increase in their
wages.2.'t is impractical for the "S# to re6uire the petitioners
caught in the middle of a laborstruggle between the '!* and owners of
ocean going vessels halfway around theworld in %ancouver #ritish
&olumbia to 0rst secure the approval of the "S# in Manilabefore signing
an agreement which the employer was willing to sign.-ccdg to the
case of %ir78en9 !he form contracts approved by the "ational
Seamen#oard are designed to protect *ilipino seamen not foreign
shipowners who can takecare of themselves. !he standard forms embody
the basic minimums which must beincorporated as parts of the

employment contract. +Section 15 ule % ules andegulations

'mplementing the abor &ode,.
lwph1.t
!hey are not collectivebargaining agreements or immutable contracts
which the parties cannot improveupon or modify in the course of the
agreed period of time4.!he "S# the :epartment of abor and
mployment and all its agencies e;ist primarily for the
workingman<s interest and the nation<s as a whole.

You are here: Home 2013 August Case Digest: SOUTHEAST

ASIA SHIPPING CORPORATION v. SEAGULL MARITIME CORP.
and COURT OF APPEALS
CASE DIGEST: SOUTHEAST ASIA SHIPPING CORPORATION
V. SEAGULL MARITIME CORP. AND COURT OF APPEALS
Published by geline on August 23, 2013 | Leave a response
SOUTHEAST ASIA SHIPPING CORPORATION v.
SEAGULL MARITIME CORP. and COURT OF APPEALS
14 SCRA 419 (2003)
When the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous, the
literal meaning shall stand.
Philimare Shipping and Equipment Supply (Philimare), manning
agent
in
the
Philippines
of NavalesShipmanagement
and Marine Consulting Pte, Ltd. of Singapore (Navales) which was
acting for and on behalf of Turtle Bay Shipping Pte, Ltd of
Singapore (Turtle), hired Nerry Balatogan to work aboard the
vessel
Turtle
Bay. Navales subsequently
appointed
Seagull Maritime Corporation(Seagull) as its manning agent in
the Philippines and assumed full responsibility for all seaman
deployed by Philimare. Balatogan met an accident in Egypt and

was found to be permanently disabled. He thereafter filed a claim

before the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) for the payment of his insurance from Philimare and
Seagull. The POEA rendered judgment in favor of Balatongan. On
appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the POES. The same
decision was upheld by the Supreme Court.
However, before the promulgation of the Supreme Court of
the earlier decision, Navales on behalf of Arawa Bay Shipping
Corporation Pte Ltd. Of Singapore and Southeast Asia Shipping
Corporation(Seascorp)
enterd
into
a
manning
agency agreement wherein Navales appointed
Seascorp
as
recruiting agent of Filipino seamen. It was stated in the affidavit
and special power of attorney that Seascorp will assume all
liabilities that may arise with respect to all seamen recruited and
deployed by Seagull for Navales. On the basis of the agreement,
Seagull filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court against
Seascorp for the recovery of the amount paid by them to
Balatogan. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Seagull. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Seascorp is liable to Seagulls claim solely on the
basis of the agreement executed by Seascorp and Navales prior to
the rendition of judgment by the Supreme Court
HELD:
As stated earlier, Seagull was the manning agent of Navales which
was acting for and behalf of Tutle Bay Shipping. Upon the other
hand, Seascorp was the manning agent of Navales which was
acting for and on behalf of Arawa Bay Shipping.
SEASCORP could only have referred to liabilities that may arise or
have arisen with respect to seamen it recruited and deployed

for NAVALES acting for and on behalf of ARAWA BAY

SHIPPING.
There is no doubt that the general rule is that when the terms of
a contract are clear and unambiguous about the intention of the
contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall
control. That is the mandate of Article 1370 of the Civil Code.
The Manning Agency Agreement clearly states that Navales,
acting for and in behalf of Arawa Bay Shipping, appointed
Seascrp as its recruitment agent for the hiring of Filipino seaman.
The same Manning Agency Agreement states that it shall
incorporate the Special Power of Attorney executed byNavales for
the purpose in favor of Seascorp. Reference then to the Special
Power of Attorney is likewise in order. The Special Power of
Attorney just as clearly stated that Navales, acting for and in
behalf of Arawa Bay Shipping, named, constituted and appointed
Seascorp as its attorney-in-fact. To disregard the Manning
Agency Agreement and the Special Power of Attorney in
construing the affidavit as the appellate court did, thus upholding
the literal interpretation of the affidavit against affiant Seascorp,
despite the circumstances under which it was accomplished,
which circumstances throw light upon, explain and restrict the
terms of the affidavit, would sacrifice the substantial rights of
Seascorp and thus work injustice, rather than promote justice.
Whether Seascorps employees merely copied the Affidavit from a
copy of the POEA, one fact is certain; Seascorp was mistaken
either through ignorance, lack of skill, or negligence. The affidavit
does not thus express the true intention of the parties.

RAMIREZ MARCAIDA VS. AGLUBAT

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

JOSEFINA JUANA DE DIOS RAMIREZ MARCAIDA vs.
LEONCIO V. AGLUBAT, in his capacity as Deputy Local Civil
Registrar of Manila, respondent-appellee.
G.R. No. L-24006, November 25, 1967
FACTS:
Prior to October 21, 1958, proceedings for adoption were
started before the CFI- Madrid, Spain by Maria Garnier
Garreau, then 84 years of age, adopting Josefina Juana de
Dios Ramirez Marcaida, 55 years, a citizen of the
Philippines. Both were residents of Madrid, Spain. The
court granted the application for adoption and gave the
necessary judicial authority, once the judgment becomes
final, to execute the corresponding adoption document.
On November 29, 1958, the notarial document of
adoption which embodies the court order of adoption
whereunder Maria Garnier Garreau formally adopted
petitioner, was executed before Notary Public Braulio
Velasco Carrasquedo of Madrid. In that document, Maria
Gernier Garreau instituted petitioner, amongst other
conditions as here unica y universal heredera de todos
sus bienes, derechos y acciones, presentes y futuros.
In conformity with our law, this escritura de adopcion
(deed of adoption) was, on December 10, 1953,
authenticated by Emilio S. Martinez, Philippine Vice
Consul, Philippine Embassy, Madrid, who issued the
corresponding certificate of authentication.
The document of adoption was filed in the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila. The Registrar refused to
register it on the ground that under Philippine law,

adoption can only be had through judicial proceeding.

And since the notarial document of adoption is not a
judicial proceeding, it is not entitled to registration.
Petitioner went to CFI- Manila on mandamus. The lower
court dismissed said petition and decided that what is
registrable is only adoption obtained through a judgment
rendered by a Philippine court.
Solicitor General argues that petitioners case does not
come within the purview of Article 409 of the Civil Code,
which states that:
In cases of legal separation, adoption, naturalization and
other judicial orders mentioned in the preceding article it
shall be the duty of the clerk of the court which issued
the decree to ascertain whether the same has been
registered, and if this has not been done, to send a copy
of said decree to the civil registry of the city or
municipality where the court is functioning, and Section
11 of Act 3753, which reads:
Duties of clerks of court to register certain decisions.
In cases of legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption,
naturalization, and change of given or family name, or
both, upon the decree of the court becoming final, it shall
be the duty of the clerk of the court which issued the
decree to ascertain whether the same has been
registered, and if this has not been done, to have said
decree recorded in the office of the civil registrar of the
municipality where the court is functioning.:
ISSUE:
WON the order of adoption issued by the CFI- Madrid can
be registered in the Philippines.

RULING:
Yes. The cited provisions refer to adoptions effected in the
Philippines.Article 409 of the Civil Code and Section 10 of
the Registry Law speak of adoption which shall be
registered in the municipality or city where the court
issuing the adoption decree is functioning.
We perceive that Article 409 and Section 10 aforesaid
were incorporated into the statute books merely to give
effect to our law which required judicial proceedings for
adoption. Limitation of registration of adoptions to those
granted by Philippine courts is a misconception which a
broader view allows us now to correct. For, if registration
is to be narrowed down to local adoptions, it is the
function of Congress, not of this Court, to spell out such
limitation. We cannot carve out a prohibition where the
law does not so state. Excessive rigidity serves no
purpose. And, by Articles 407 and 408 of our Civil Code,
the disputed document of adoption is registrable.
No suggestion there is in the record that prejudice to
State and adoptee, or any other person for that matter,
would ensue from the adoption here involved. The validity
thereof is not under attack. At any rate, whatever may be
the effect of adoption, the rights of the State and adoptee
and other persons interested are fully safeguarded by
Article 15 of our Civil Code which, in terms explicit,
provides that: Laws relating to family rights and duties,
or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though
living abroad.
Private international law offers no obstacle to recognition
of foreign adoption. This rests on the principle that the

status of adoption, created by the law of a State having

jurisdiction to create it, will be given the same effect in
another state as is given by the latter state to the status
of adoption when created by its own law. It is quite
obvious then that the status of adoption, once created
under the proper foreign law, will be recognized in this
country, except where public policy or the interests of its
inhabitants forbid its enforcement and demand the
substitution of the lex fori. Indeed, implicit in Article 15 of
our Civil Code just quoted, is that the exercise of
incidents to foreign adoption remains subject to local
law.
We hold that an adoption created under the law of a
foreign country is entitled to registration in the
corresponding civil register of the Philippines. It is to be
understood, however, that the effects of such adoption
shall be governed by the laws of this country.
The lower courts decision is hereby reversed; and the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila is hereby directed to
register the deed of adoption (Escritura de Adopcion) by
Maria Garnier Garreau in favor of petitioner Josefina de
Dios Ramirez Marcaida.
REPUBLIC vs.
ALARCON VERGARAGR. No. 95551 March 20, 1997Facts
:
On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye
filed a petitionbefore the RegionalTrialCourtofAngelesCity to adopt
Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and12 years old, respectively,
younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr, a member of the
UnitedStates Air Force, is an American citizen who resided at the Clark
Air Base in Pampanga. His wifeRosalina is a former Filipino who

became a naturalized American. They have two children. Mariceland

Alvin Due, as well as their natural parents, gave their consent to the
adoption. The Republic filed this petition for review on a pure question o
f law, contending that thespouses Dye are not qualified under the law to
adopt Maricel and Alvin Due. As a general rule,aliens cannot adopt
Filipino citizens.Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and,
therefore, an alien is disqualified fromadopting the minors Maricel and
Alvin Due because he does not fall under any of the three aforequoted
exceptions in the law. He is not a former Filipino citizen who seeks to
adopt a relative byconsanguinity. Nor does he seek to adopt his wife's
legitimate child. Although he seeks to adopt with his wife her relatives
by consanguinity, he is not married to a Filipino citizen,
for Rosalina wasalready a naturalized American at the time the petition
was filed, thus excluding him from thecoverage of the exception. The
law here does not provide for an alien who is married to a formerFilipino
citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity, as anexception to the general rule that aliens may not
adopt.On her own, Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister for
the law mandates jointadoption by husband and wife, subject to
exceptions. Article 29 of Presidential Decree No. 603(Child and Youth
Welfare Code) retained the Civil Code provision that husband and wife
mayjointly adopt. The Family Code amended this rule by scrapping the
optional character of jointadoption and making it now mandatory.
Issue:
Whether or not the adoption is valid.
Ruling:
Article 185 of the Family Code provides: Husband and wife must adopt,
except in the
Persons and Family Relation
440

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child;(2) When
one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other."None of the
above exceptions applies to Samuel and Rosalina Dye, for they did not
petitionto adopt the latter's child but her brother and sister. Accordingly,
the law should be construedliberally, in a manner that will sustain rather
than defeat said purpose. The law must also be
applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the
fact that it is intended to providehomes, love, care and education for less
fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in aposition to affirm the
trial court's decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is
clearand it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against
judicial legislation. Until suchtime however, that the law on the matter is
amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses'petition for adoption

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