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PE R SP EC TI V ES O N P SY CH O L O G I CA L S CI E N CE
Self-Enhancement
Food for Thought
Constantine Sedikides and Aiden P. Gregg
University of Southampton, Southampton, England, United Kingdom
ABSTRACTSelf-enhancement
102
A GASTRONOMIC ANALOGY
Roughly speaking, self-enhancement involves taking a tendentiously favorable view of oneself. In what follows, we will try
to further clarify the concept by drawing an extended (and
perhaps far-fetched) analogy between it and a more familiar
concept: eating. We do this because the term self-enhancement
can refer to several phenomena that stand in need of careful
distinction. Eating is a motivated activity in humans; one rooted
in biology but regulated by culture. Precisely because
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MANIFESTATIONS OF SELF-ENHANCEMENT
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Subtler Signs
Self-enhancement manifests itself in less obvious ways too. In
such cases, unconscious psychological processes are automatically recruited as a means of protecting and advancing selfregard. In other words, self-enhancement occurs more as an
ongoing process than as an observed effectin gastronomic
terms, more like the act of eating itself than the (variously explainable) presence of an empty plate.
For example, several studies nd evidence of egotistical
distortions not only in the forecasting of future events, but also in
the remembrance of things past. People preferentially forget
negative feedback about themselves (Sanitioso & Wlodarski,
2004), specically in domains that matter to them (Sedikides &
Volume 3Number 2
Behavioral Self-Handicapping
Although performing well matters to people, they sometimes act
in ways that paradoxically hinder performance (Jones & Berglas,
1978). They do this either to protect themselves against the
shame of performing poorly (by manufacturing a convenient
excuse: discounting) or to enhance themselves by succeeding
105
106
consequence when they occur. Second, when a domain is relevant, comparison (or contrast) occurs, a better performance
from another individual prompts self-derogation (e.g., humiliation), whereas a worse performance from another individual
prompts self-enhancement (e.g., triumph). Third, when a domain
is irrelevant, reection (or assimilation) occurs, a worse performance from another individual prompts self-enhancement
(e.g., vicarious pride), whereas a better performance from another individual prompts self-derogation (e.g., guilty shame).
Indeed, people have less favorable perceptions of targets
performance in ego-relevant domains when those targets are
close rather than distant (Tesser & Campbell, 1982). The aversive nature of these perceptions is attested to by the higher levels
of accompanying physiological arousal (Achee, Tesser, & Pilkington, 1994). To escape or forestall such negative feelings,
people resort to several strategies including adjusting their
perceptions of task relevance (Tesser & Paulhus, 1983);
choosing friends who, despite being roughly matched in level
and type of ability, are somewhat less able in ego-relevant domains and are somewhat more able in ego-irrelevant domains
(Tesser, Campbell, & Smith, 1984); and acting so as to hinder
close others performance in ego-relevant domains (Pemberton
& Sedikides, 2001). Comparable effects are observed in married
couples, with partners striving to complement rather than mimic
each others strengths (Beach, Whitaker, Jones, & Tesser, 2001).
However, matters are further complicated by the fact that partners empathize with and wish to accommodate each others reection and comparison processes (Pilkington, Tesser, &
Stephens, 1991)a greater responsiveness to a partners SEM
needs than to ones own predicts positive social interactions
(Mendolia, Beach, & Tesser, 1996).
SEM theory focuses on the consequences of involuntary social
comparisons, but people also have some latitude in terms of
which target they compare with and in how they construe that
target. In particular, although people generally compare themselves with similar or slightly superior others (Gruder, 1971),
there are occasions on which they are disposed to compare
themselves with inferior others (Wills, 1981)for example, to
boost their sense of optimism and control by contrast with lessfortunate individuals (Wood, Taylor, & Lictman, 1985). However, assimilation as well as contrast effects can occur (Mussweiler, 2003), meaning that downward comparisons can be
dispiriting (Wheeler & Miyake, 1992) and that upward comparisons inspiring (Collins, 2000). Indeed, if a targets skill or
success are regarded as attainable (Lockwood & Kunda, 1997),
upward comparisons facilitate self-enhancement via expectations for self-improvement. However, attempting to defend
against an ego threat can bring out prejudices that would otherwise remain dormant. For example, a threat to intelligence or
personal insult induce more stereotypical and less favorable
attitudes towards gays, Blacks, and women (Fein & Spencer,
1997; Sinclair & Kunda, 1999, 2000) and lead to the automatic
activation of such stereotypes and attitudes (Spencer, Fein,
Volume 3Number 2
Wolfe, Fong, & Dunn, 1998). However, such ungenerous construals of social targets can be undone by the manipulations
discussed in the following section (Fein & Spencer, 1997).
Afrmations of Self
Although the dynamics of self-enhancement discussed so far in
principle encompass both self-protection and self-advancement, the emphasis has squarely been on dealing with ego
threat. In contrast, self-afrmation (SA) theory focuses on ways
of preemptively propping up the ego, with a view to lessening
subsequent defensiveness (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). (In terms
of our gastronomic analogyinstead of depriving people of food
to explore the perturbing impact of hunger, one instead lls
peoples bellies, to explore the protective impact of satiety.) The
canonical manipulation involves having participants rst report
and then elaborate on a value or domain that they personally
regard as important. Such a manipulation then reduces or
eliminates a range of typical self-protective responses, which
are itemized below. This effect suggests that a common psychic
currency underlies various self-enhancement dynamics (Tesser,
2000). SA theory labels this underlying currency as self-integrity and denes it as moral and adaptive adequacy. Still, given
that it is claimed to involve at least two positive illusions (selfpositivity and perceived control), it can be equated, for our
purposes, with something like positive self-regard.
SA effects were rst empirically demonstrated in relation to
cognitive dissonance phenomena (Harmon-Jones & Mills,
1999). SA undermined their emergence (Steele & Liu, 1983)
and thereby indirectly implicating the ego in their genesis
(Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992). For example, science students
who wore an identity-reinforcing lab coat no longer rationalized
a difcult choice between two closely matched alternatives by
augmenting their relative preference for the alternative they
chose (Steele, Hopp, & Gonzales, 1986; cited in Steele, 1988).
SA lessens bias. For example, it decreases the tendency for
students to exaggerate their current academic performance
(Gramzow & Willard, 2006). It also alleviates the partisan processing of ambiguous messages in the direction of preexisting
opinions and eliminates preferences for those who share ones
views (Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000). Moreover, by reducing
ideological entrenchment, it facilitates the making of concession crucial to the success of politically charged negotiations
(Cohen et al., 2007). Such effects are mediated by increased
attention to the central merits of arguments that opponents might
advocate (Correll, Spencer, & Zanna, 2004). In addition, although close relationships are sometimes characterized by
competitive dynamics described by SEM theory, they also
generally serve as a potent SA resourceone that opens people
up to receiving critical information (Kumashiro & Sedikides,
2005) and restores positive illusions (Martz et al., 1998).
Furthermore, SA makes people less reluctant to take on board
potentially disquieting data about their health (Sherman, Nel-
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son, & Steele, 2000), undoing standard biases (Reed & Aspinwall, 1998). Moreover, SA seemingly provides not only a
sustained impetus to health-promoting attitudes and actions
(Harris & Napper, 2005) but also concrete health benets, in
terms of both coping with stress and reducing symptoms (Creswell, Lam, et al., 2007; Creswell, Welch, et al., 2005). Finally,
SA has positive implications for social comparisons and behavior. It wards off SEM concerns, making people less likely to
sabotage the performance of close others in ego-relevant domains; people spontaneously use SA to cope with SEM threats
(Tesser, Crepaz, Collins, Cornell, & Beach, 2000). SA also acts
as a prophylactic against derogatory social comparison. For
example, participants led to believe that their intelligence was
below average were normally prompted to bolster their egos by
choosing to listen to an incompetent interviewee as opposed to
competent one; however, an intervening SA manipulation symmetrically reverses this effect (Spencer, Fein, & Lomore, 2001).
The above might be taken to imply that SA invariably yields
edifying outcomes, which is not true. First, if the afrmation is in
the same domain as the outcome rather than another, SA
backres (Stone & Cooper, 2003). Second, if people afrm their
rectitude or objectivity, then they become subsequently more
likely to take ethical liberties (B.R. Brown, 2000) or engage in
gender discrimination (Uhlmann, 2007). Third, if an ostensible
self-enhancement effect is driven by an amotivated process
(e.g., a cognitive bias in memory), SA has little impact on the
magnitude of the bias (Gramzow & Willard, 2006).
PRIMACY OF SELF-ENHANCEMENT
107
Constraints on Self-Enhancement
According to Demosthenes (384322 BCE), the Greek orator of
antiquity, Nothing is so easy as to deceive oneself; for what we
wish, we readily believe. But this is plain wrongblatant selfdeception is very difcult. That is, people cannot self-enhance
willy-nilly; they must have sufcient grounds in their own eyes
for doing so. Unfortunately, such grounds are not automatically
forthcoming. To be reasonable, as opposed to delusional, is to
acknowledge that there are limits to what one can believe about
oneself and that reality informs us as to what these limits are.
Consequently, reason is not, as Hume (1738/1951) famously
put, only the slave of the passions (p. 415), but it is also
sometimes their masteralbeit only partially and perhaps reluctantly.
Several lines of evidence bear out the view that self-enhancement occurs within the constraints imposed by rationality
and reality. For example, when extraverts and introverts are led
to believe that either extraversion or introversion predicts success, they duly rate themselves higher than they otherwise would
on adjectives associated with the successful trait; but still, their
ratings remain more shaped by their preexisting personalities
than by the manipulated desirability of the traits (Sanitioso
et al., 1990). In addition, the BTAE occurs on ambiguously
dened traits (e.g., idealistic) rather than well-dened traits
(e.g., punctual)even when the ambiguity involved is created or
eliminated experimentally (Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg,
1989). Furthermore, ambiguous (rather than well-dened)
comparison targets facilitate self-enhancing social comparisons
(Stapel & Schwinghammer, 2004). In sum, positive self-evaluations reect not only what people want to believe, but also what
they can believe. (Gastronomically speaking, one can only indulge ones appetite to the extent one can afford to.)
Other ndings illustrate indirectly how self-enhancement is
bounded by cognitive constraints. People evaluate their own
work less positively if they know that they will subsequently
have to defend and justify their evaluation before an audience.
Being held accountable in this way (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999)
leads people to anticipate being assessed as identiable individuals (Sedikides, Herbst, Hardin, & Dardis, 2002), which in
turn prompts them to consider areas of possible weakness
(Sedikides & Herbst, 2002). Similar manipulations attenuate
the above-average effect in domains such as driving ability
(McKenna & Myers, 1997). Accountability may also explain
self-effacement among (relatively knowledgeable) friends than
among (more ignorant) strangers (Tice, Butler, Muraven, &
Stillwell, 1995). Self-evaluations also become less positive, and
self-concepts become less certain, when people generate and
concretize possible reasons for why they might or might not
possess particular personality traits, an activity we dub explanatory introspection (Sedikides, Horton, & Gregg, 2007). In
both cases, the mechanism curtailing self-enhancement involves drawing peoples attention to demerits they are usually
content to overlook.
108
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in particular. Second, mood does not mediate SA effects (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Nonetheless, positive mood certainly does
have an energizing and restorative effect (Tice, Baumeister,
Shmueli, & Muraven, 2007) and may account for many of the
functional benets of self-enhancement (Roese & Olson, 2007).
Another factor moderating whether people self-assess or selfenhance is the perceived modiability of the ability under
consideration. In particular, when a trait is seen as modiable,
people are less affectively disturbed by critical feedback and are
more interested in receiving it as well (Dauenheimer, Stahlberg,
Spreeman, & Sedikides, 2002; Green, Pinter, & Sedikides,
2005). They are also more likely to make internal attributions of
failure (Duval & Silvia, 2002). In general, when something can
still be changed, self-assessing realism tends to predominate,
whereas when something is a fait accompli, self-enhancing rationalizations take over (Roese & Olson, 2007).
Finally, alongside self-enhancement and self-assessment
(and its close cousin, self-improvement), a further self-motive
has been postulated: self-verication (Swann, Rentrow, & Guinn, 2003) The key claim here is that identity matters in itself
whether or not it is positive or realistic, because having a coherent self-view affords a satisfying sense of prediction and
control in the interpersonal sphere. Moreover, some behavioral
evidence provocatively suggests that people are keener to selfverify rather than self-enhance. For example, when given the
choice, people with negative self-views (e.g., depressives) opt to
interact with people who view them negatively as opposed to
positively and opt to read feedback that portrays them negatively
as opposed to positively (Giesler, Josephs, & Swann, 1996).
Such dynamics are counterintuitive and are worthy of empirical
attention as they are liable to stabilize often needlessly negative
self-views. However, it remains a moot point whether such
choices reect the operation of a corresponding motive. An alternative interpretation is that people with negative self-views
seek negative feedback, not because they want it to reinforce
their strangely cherished negative identity, but because they do
not regard themselves as rationally entitled to believe positive
feedback, even though they would dearly like to (Gregg, in
press).
Universality of Self-Enhancement
Culture is another apparently potent moderator of self-enhancement. It has been claimed that Easterners (e.g., Chinese,
Japanese) self-enhance less overall than Westerners (e.g.,
Americans, Europeans) and thatin some senses and ways
they do not self-enhance at all (Heine & Hamamura, 2007;
Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999). This alleged
difference in mental make-up is one of many attributed to the
divergent cultural traditions characterizing the West and East
(Heine et al., 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). The issue has
evoked considerable controversy (J.D. Brown & Kobayashi,
2002; Heine, 2003, 2005; Sedikides et al., 2003). Philosophi-
Volume 3Number 2
109
La Rochefoucauld (1678/1827) noted that Whatever discoveries have been made in the land of self-love, many territories
remain to be discovered. Thanks to the recent growth of empirical psychology, the terra incognita of the ego is beginning to
be mapped by an array of specialized cartographers. Nonetheless, La Rochefoucaulds remark remains as apt today as it was
in the 17th century. We hope (at the risk of mixing metaphors!)
that our review of the phenomenon of self-enhancement will
have both satised our readers appetite for current scientic
wisdom and given them food for further thought.
110
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