Persons and Family Relations

Art. 2 EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS (Bar Q-1990)

-When a law does not provide for its effectivity, it shall take effect
after the expiration of the 15-day period following the completion of its
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation
(as amended by EO No. 200-June 18, 1987).
-The phrase unless it is otherwise provided solely refers to the
15-day period and not to the requirement of publication.
-If the law provides for a different period, shorter or longer than
the 15-day period, then such shorter or longer period, as the case may be,
shall prevail.
Taada vs. Tuvera
146 SCRA 448
Must all laws be published and what must be published?
-Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature
may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall
be shortened or extended. Non-publication means violation of the
due process clause guaranteed by the Constitution.
-All statutes, including those of local application and private laws
or laws that name a public place in favor of a favored individual or
laws that exempt an individual from certain prohibitions or
requirement, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity.
EO 200 allows the publication of laws in a newspaper of general
circulation due to erratic releases of the Official Gazette and of its
limited readership.
Must decisions of the SC be published to be binding?
-The SC held in the case of De Roy vs. CA (157 SCRA 757) that
there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court
decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as
a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of
counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of
decisions of the Supreme Court. (As laid down in the case of
Habaluyas, Inc. vs. Japzon, 138 SCRA 46, the 15-day period for
appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be
extended. In the case at bar, the parties filed a motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration. At the time
of the filing of the motion however, the Habaluyas decision has yet
to be published.)
-Ordinances are governed by the Local Government Code.

Art. 3 - IGNORANCE OF THE LAW (85,96)

-Covers all domestic laws but only applies to mandatory or
prohibitive laws not on permissive or suppletory laws.
-Foreign laws are likewise excluded because we do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws as well as judgments/decisions rendered by
their courts. These are factual matters that must be pleaded and proved
before our courts in the absence of which it is presumed that their laws are
the same as our laws (principle of processual presumption).
-Not applied with equal force to minors, they occupy a privilege
position before our laws. Neither would this apply to laws susceptible of 2
or more interpretations.
MANZANO vs. SANCHEZ
354 SCRA 1
-It is significant to note that in their respective affidavits
executed on March 22, 1993 and sworn to before respondent
Judge Sanchez himself, Manzano and Payao expressly stated the
fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage
contract, it was indicated that both were separated. The fact
that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their
respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Legal
separation does not dissolve the marriage tie much less authorize
the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the
separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
-Neither can respondent judge take refuge on their joint
affidavit that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for 7
years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with
another person for at least five years does not sever the tie of a
subsisting previous marriage. Such cohabitation is merely a
ground for exemption from marriage license it could not serve as
a justification for respondent judge to solemnize a subsequent
marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
-Respondent
Judge
Sanchez
demonstrated
gross
ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous
marriage. The maxim ignorance of the law excuses no one has
special application to judges, who should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence. And when the law
transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

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Art. 4- PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF LAWS as a general
rule.
Exceptions: 1. If the laws are remedial in nature.
Atienza vs Brillantes, Jr.
243 SCRA 32
Brillantes prior marriage was celebrated in 1965 without the
requisite license so when he married de Castro in Los Angeles, California in
1991, he believed in good faith that he was capacitated to marry.
Accordingly, Art. 40 does not apply as his prior marriage was governed by
the New Civil Code which does not require any court decree of nullity if
void ab initio.
SC held: Article 40 of the Family Code applies to remarriages
entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code regardless of the date
of the first marriage. Besides Article 256 of the same Code is given
retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice vested rights. Article 40 is
a rule of procedure and Brillantes has not shown any vested right that was
impaired by the application of Art. 40.
Casupanan and Capitulo vs Laroya
August 26, 2002- Lawyers Review/September 30, 2002
The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given
retroactive effect considering the well-settled rule that
x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will
be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of the passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to
that extent.
CANCIO vs. ISIP
November 12, 2002
-The modes of enforcement of the civil liabilities are provided for
in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Though the assailed order of
the trial court was issued on March 20, 1998, the said Rules, which took
effect on December 1, 2000, must be given retroactive effect in the instant
case considering that statutes regulating the procedure of the court are
construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage.
CARLOS vs. SANDOVAL (expressly provides for prospectivity despite
being a rule of procedure) December 16, 2008
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages does
not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the
marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as
the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective in
application.

CHENG vs. SY 592 SCRA 155 (July 7, 2009)

-The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the
litigants rights does not preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws
does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural
laws.
Other exceptions:
2. Penal laws favorable to the accused provided he is not a
habitual delinquent.
3.Curative laws. 4. Emergency laws. 5. Laws creating new rights.
and 6. Tax laws.
Article 6. Waiver (04)
Requirements of a valid waiver: 1. the waiving party must actually
have the right he is renouncing or it must be in existence at the time of the
waiver;
2. he must have the full capacity to make the waiver;
3. the waiver must be clear and unequivocal;
4. the waiver must not be contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals or good customs or prejudicial to a 3 rd person with a right
recognized by law; and
5. when formalities are required for its validity such as an express
condonation of a debt the formalities must be complied with.
GUY vs. CA
502 SCRA 151 (September 15, 2006)
- To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to
give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not
be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince
intent to abandon a right. In this case, there was no waiver of hereditary
rights. The Release and Waiver does not state with clarity the purpose of
its execution. It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an
educational plan for her minor daughters by way of financial assistance
and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x
x x against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim. The document did
not specifically mention minors hereditary share in the estate of Sima
Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.

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- Moreover, assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary
rights of the children, such waiver will not bar the latters claim. Any
inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be
accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may
repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial
authorization.
-Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the
inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. This is because
repudiation amounts to an alienation of property that must pass the
courts scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward.
- Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the
intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of
a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a
material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a
consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.
Article 9- In case of silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of laws no judge
shall decline to render judgment. Applies only civil cases not to criminal
proceedings because of the principle that there is no crime when there is
no law punishing it (nullum crimen, nulla sine poena lege).
SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC
537 SCRA 373 (October 19, 2007)
Silverio successfully underwent sex reassignment surgery and
petitioned the court that his name be changed from Rommel Jacinto to
Mely and that his sex shall also be changed from male to female to reflect
the result of said surgery.
The Republic opposed the same alleging that there is no law
allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex
alteration.
Issue: May the trial court apply Article 9 of the Civil Code on the
ground of equity?
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that no judge
or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the law. However, it is not a license for courts
to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or
interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it
choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the
recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative

guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims

asserted are statute-based.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol
on when a person may be recognized as having successfully changed his
sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter,
or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It
can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of
government, Congress.
Art.
15
ADHERENCE
TO
NATIONALITY
THEORY
(75,78,81,83,87,95,97,98,99,02,03,04, 05)
RENVOI DOCTRINE where the conflict rules of the forum (ex.
Philippines) refer to a foreign law (ex.USA), and the latter refers it back to
the internal law, the law of the forum (Philippine law) shall apply (Aznar vs.
Garcia, 7 SCRA 95).
TRANSMISSION THEORY if the foreign law refers to a 3 rd
country, the laws of said country should govern; this situation is a variety
of the renvoi doctrine (ex. If B, a nationality of Canada who is a resident of
the Philippines and has properties in Switzerland dies, his estate shall be
governed by the laws of Canada based on Article 15 but if the laws of
Canada states that it is the law of the place where the property is situated
that will be applied then the laws of the 3 rd country will govern in the
distribution of his estate.)
Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr.
39 SCRA 139
Is Article 15 applicable to aliens who are married to Filipino
citizens?
-Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art. 15 of the Civil
Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces, the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the
Philippines provided they are valid according to their national law
(Cf. Art. 26 (2) Family Code).
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera
174 SCRA 653

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-Reiterated the Van Dorn decision.
-In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a
valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is
admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view
of the nationality principle in our civil law in the matter of status
of persons.
Garcia a.k.a. Grace Garcia- Recio vs. Recio
October 2, 2001
-A marriage between 2 Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a
divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil
Code.
-But a divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens,
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with
their respective national laws. Therefore, before our courts can
recognize a foreign divorce decree, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient. Under Rule 132 Sections 24 and 25, a writing or
document may be proven as public record of a foreign country by
either (1) official publication of the writing or document or (2) a
copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document.

QUITA vs. CA 300 SCRA 406

Fe and Arturo were married in 1941. After the relationship turned
sour Fe went to the US and in 1954 obtained a decree of absolute divorce.
Fe got married thrice. In 1972, Arturo died intestate. Fe is now claiming
her right over the estate of the deceased spouse.
The SC remanded the case to the lower court to determine
whether the second marriage of the spouse during the subsistence of the
first marriage was contracted before or after her changed of citizenship.
Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her 1 st
divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and Fe could very well lose her
right to inherit from Arturo.
ELMAR O. PEREZ vs. CA, CATINDIG
January 27, 2006

Filipino spouses Tristan and Lily decided to separate from each

other and upon advice of a friend obtained a divorce from the Dominican
Republic. On July 14, 1984, Tristan married Elmar in the State of Virginia,
USA. Elmar later on learned that the divorce decree issued by the court in
the Dominican Republic dissolving the marriage of Tristan and Lily was not
recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was void
under Philippine law. When confronted, Tristan assured her that he would
obtain an annulment of his marriage with Lily. In 2001, he filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily.
Elmar then filed a motion for leave to file intervention claiming
that she has an interest in the matter in litigation that was granted by the
lower court.
Issue: Does Elmar have a legal interest in the annulment case
between Tristan and Lily?
SC: Legal interest, which entitles a person to intervene, must be
in the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that
the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of
judgment. Such interest must be actual, direct and material, and not
simply contingent and expectant.
The claim of petitioner, that her status as the wife and companion
of Tristan for 17 years vests her the requisite legal interest, lacks merit.
Under the law, she was never the legal wife of Tristan hence her claim of
legal interest has no basis. When they got married in 1984, Tristan was still
lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree obtained by Tristan and Lily
from the Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage bond between
them. It is basic that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of
whether he/she was married here or abroad, initiates a petition abroad to
obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful
in getting an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize
such absolute divorce.
When Tristan and Lily got married in 1968, their marriage was
governed by the provisions of the Civil Code which took effect on August
30, 1950. In Tenchavez vs. Escano we held:
(1)
That a foreign divorce between Filipino
citizens, sought and decreed after the
effectivity of the present Civil Code (RA No.
386), is not entitled to recognition as valid
in this jurisdiction; and neither is the
marriage contracted with another party by

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the divorced consort, subsequently to the
foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity
in the country.
SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS
February 6, 2007
Felicisimo T. San Luis contracted 3 marriages during his lifetime.
His 1st marriage was terminated when his wife died leaving behind 6
children. Five years later Felicisimo married Mary Lee, an American citizen
with whom he had 1 child. The marriage ended when Mary Lee divorced
Felicisimo. The decree of absolute divorce was granted in December 1973.
He then contracted his 3rd marriage in June 1974 with Felicidad. When he
died, Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets
and the settlement of Felicisimos estate and prayed that letters of
administration be issued to her. Two of the children of the 1 st marriage filed
a motion to dismiss citing as ground, among others, that Felicidad has no
legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death was still legally married
to Mary Lee. Petitioners (Felicisimos heirs) cited Articles 15 and 17 (3) of
the NCC in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as
Filipinos are concerned.
SC: In resolving the issue, there is no need to retroactively apply
the provisions of the FC, particularly Article 26 (2) as there is sufficient
jurisprudential basis to rule in the affirmative.
In the light of the ruling in Van Dorn, the Filipino spouse should
not be discriminated in his own country if the ends of justice are to be
served. The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with
the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving
spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to
prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the
marriage of Felicidad and Felicisimo under the laws of the USA. In Garcia
vs. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and
proving foreign law and divorce judgments. The presentation solely of the
divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due
execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record
is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular official of the

Philippines who is stationed in the foreign country where the document is

kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo allegedly
solemnized in California, USA, she submitted photocopies of the Marriage
Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which
purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with said law.
As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN vs. CA and ORLANDO CATALAN and
MEROPE BRAGANZA 514 SCRA 607 (February 6, 2007)
Felicitas and Orlando were married in June 1950 in Pangasinan but
migrated to the United States after the marriage. Allegedly, they became
naturalized citizens thereof and after 38 years of marriage or in 1988, they
divorced. Two months after the divorce, Orlando married Merope in
Pangasinan. Felicitas then filed a petition for declaration of nullity with
damages against Orlando and Merope alleging that Merope had a prior
subsisting marriage with one Eusebio Bristol. Orlando and Merope moved
for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of cause of action as
Felicitas was not a real party-in-interest.
SC: A divorce obtained abroad may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of
the foreigner. However, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it before it
can be recognized by our courts. It must be proved considering that our
courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions,
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest
and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Ninal vs. Badayog (328
SCRA 122), the Court held that the children have the personality to file the
petition to declare the nullity of the marriage of their deceased father to
their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.
Significantly, Section 2 (a) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, specifically
provides: A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of a void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.

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If it is proved that a divorce decree was obtained and the same
did not allow Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court should declare
respondents marriage as bigamous and void ab initio. On the contrary, if
it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando
to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the petition on the ground
that Felicitas lacks legal personality to file the same.
Art. 16 -law governing real and personal property is the law of the place
where the property is situated exception in cases of succession it is the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration par. (2)
(76,77,84,85,86,89,91,95,98,01,02,04).
Art. 17 par. (1) Doctrine of Lex Loci Celebrationis
(75,77,78,81,85,91,93,95,96,98,02,03)
(2) - Rule respecting Prohibitive Laws
Tenchavez vs. Escao
15 SCRA 355
May our courts recognize a decree of divorce validly obtained
abroad by spouses who are Filipino citizens?
-The SC applied par. 3 of Article 17.
-For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or
effect to a foreign
decree of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens would be a
patent violation
of the declared public policy of the State, specially in view of the
third paragraph
of Article 17 of the Civil Code.
-The court also applied Article 15 of the same Code.
Article 19 Golden Rule of the Civil Code (81)
Globe Mackay Cable Radio Corp. vs. CA
176 SCRA 778
-This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as
the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must
be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in
the performance of ones duties. The imputation of guilt without
basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of
Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the

right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be

confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the
effects flowing therefrom.
FAR EAST BANK (FEBTC), NOW BANK OF THE PHIL. ISLANDS,
vs. PACILAN, JR.
465 SCRA 372
Facts: Pacilans current account was closed by FEBTC on
the ground that his account was improperly mishandled. This was due to
Pacilans issuance of 4 checks to different persons with an aggregate of
amount of P7,410.00 but the balance of his current deposit was only
P6,981.43 resulting to the dishonor of Check No. 2434886. Pacilan then
complained in writing to the bank about the closure of his account and
when he did not receive any reply from FEBTC he sued the bank for
damages. He alleged that the closure of his account was unjustified
inasmuch as he immediately deposited the following day an amount
sufficient to fund the check. Moreover, the closure exposed him to criminal
prosecution for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The indecent haste
that attended the closure of his account was patently malicious and
intended to embarrass him. He alleged that he is a prominent and
respected leader in the civic and banking communities (as cashier of
Prudential Bank). The alleged malicious acts of the bank besmirched his
reputation and caused him social humiliation, wounded feelings,
insurmountable worries and sleepless nights.
Held: The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the
existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and
(c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Malice or bad faith
is at the core of the said provision. The law always presumes good faith
and any person who seeks to be awarded damages due to acts of another
has the burden of proving that the latter acted in bad faith or with ill
motive.
- Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple
negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and
conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some
motives or interest or ill will that partakes the nature of fraud.
Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty.
It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice
is bad faith or bad motive.
In the case at bench, the facts as found by the court a quo
and the appellate court, do not establish that, in the exercise
of this right, FEBTC committed an abuse thereof. Specifically,

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the 2nd and 3rd elements for abuse of rights are not attendant
in the present case. The evidence presented by the bank
negates the existence of bad faith or malice on its part in
closing Pacilans account on April 4, 1988 because on said
date the same was already overdrawn. Further, it was shown
that in 1986, the current account of Pacilan was overdrawn
156 times due to his issuance of checks against insufficient
funds. In 1987, the said account was overdrawn 117 times for
the same reason. Again, in 1988, 26 times. There were also
several instances when Pacilan issued checks deliberately
using a signature different from his specimen signature on file
with bank. All these circumstances taken together justified
the banks closure of Pacilans account on April 4, 1988 for
improper handling.
UYPITCHING et al vs. QUIAMCO (December 6, 2006)
Davalan, Gabutero and Generoso surrendered to Quiamco a red
Honda XL- 100 motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of registration
as settlement of their civil liability. Quiamco asked for the original
certificate of registration but the 3 never came back to see him again. He
parked the motorcycle in an open space in his business establishment
visible and accessible to the public. It turned out however that Gabutero
bought the motorcycle on installments secured by a chattel mortgage from
Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc. that was managed by Atty. Ernesto Ramas
Uypitching. The mortgage indebtedness was assumed by Davalan but
stopped the payments in 1982 and told the corporations collector that the
motorcycle had been taken by Quiamcos men. Nine years later,
Uypitching accompanied by policemen went to Avesco (the business
establishment of Quiamco) to recover the motorcycle. While the leader of
the police team P/Lt. Vendiola asked for Quiamco, Uypitching paced back
and forth uttering Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle. Unable to find
Quiamco, and upon Uypitchings instructions and over the objection of
Quiamcos clerk, they took the motorcycle. Uypitching then filed a criminal
complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law but
was dismissed by the Office of the City Prosecutor. Later, Quiamco filed an
action for damages against Uypitching.
SC: Petitioners claim that they should not be held liable for
petitioner corporations exercise of its right as seller-mortgagee to recover
the mortgaged vehicle preliminary to the enforcement of its right to
foreclose on the mortgage in case of default. They are clearly mistaken.
True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to

enable to enforce or protect its foreclosure right thereon. There is,

however, a well-defined procedure for the recovery of possession of
mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a
mortgaged property for its sale on foreclosure, he must bring a civil action
either to recover such possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to
obtain judicial foreclosure.
Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action
necessary to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle. Instead Uypitching
descended on Quiamcos establishment with his policemen and ordered
the seizure of the motorcycle without a search warrant or court order.
Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure, Uypitching even mouthed a
slanderous statement. No doubt, the corporation, acting thru Uypitching
blatantly disregarded the lawful procedure for the enforcement of its right,
to the prejudice of Quiamco. Their acts violated the law as well as public
morals, and transgressed the proper norms of human relations. This basic
principle of human relations is embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code.
Also known as the principle of abuse of rights, it prescribes that a
person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good
faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability. It seeks to preclude the use
of, or the tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust
ends.
There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice
or injure another. In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was
taken was not only attended by bad faith but also contrary to the
procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory
statement, petitioners exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged
vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to Quiamco. The precipitate act
of filing an unfounded complaint could not in any way be considered to be
in accordance with the purpose for which the right to prosecute a crime
was established. Thus, the totality of petitioners actions showed a
calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule Quiamco.
Triple costs against petitioners, considering that Ramas Uypitching is a
lawyer and an officer of the court, for his improper behavior.
CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC. (CCCI), DAPAT, et. al. vs. ELIZAGAQUE
January 18, 2008
Elizagaque was designated as a special non-proprietary member
of CCCI by San Miguel Corporation. In 1996, Elizagaque filed with CCCI an
application for proprietary membership. The price of a proprietary share
was around P5 million, Unchuan however, offered to sell a share for only
P3.5 million but Elizagaque bought the share of a certain Butalid for only

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P3 million. Elizagaques application for proprietary membership was
deferred twice by the board and eventually, disapproved his application.
Elizagaque wrote the Board thrice for reconsideration but no reply was ever
made by CCCI. In 1998, Elizagaque filed a complaint for damages against
CCCI.
SC: As shown by the records, the Board adopted a secret balloting
known as the black ball system of voting wherein each member will
drop a ball in the ballot box. A white ball represents conformity to the
admission of an applicant, while a black ball means disapproval. A
unanimous vote of the directors is required pursuant to the amendment
made in Section 3 of its articles. Obviously, the board has the right to
approve or disapprove an application for proprietary membership. But such
right should not be exercised arbitrarily. Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code on the Chapter on Human Relations provide restrictions.
In rejecting respondents application for membership, the
petitioners violated the rules governing human relations, the basic
principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human
beings and for the stability of social order. Petitioners committed fraud
and evident bad faith in disapproving respondents application.
The amendment to Section 3 of CCCIs amended by-laws
requiring the unanimous vote of the directors present at a special or
regular meeting was not printed on the application form respondent filled
and submitted to CCCI. What was printed thereon was the original
provision of Section 3 which was silent on the required number of votes
needed for admission of an applicant as a proprietary member. The
explanation that the amendment was not printed on the application form
due to economic reasons, is flimsy and unconvincing. Such amendment,
aside from being extremely significant, was introduced way back in 1978 or
almost 20 years before Elizagaque filed his application. It cannot be
fathomed why such a prestigious and exclusive golf country club whose
members are affluent, did not have enough money to cause the printing of
an updated application form.
It is thus clear that respondent was left groping in the dark
wondering why his application was disapproved. He was not even informed
that a unanimous vote of the Board members was required. When he sent
a letter for reconsideration and an inquiry whether there was an objection
to his application, petitioners apparently ignored him. At the very least,
they should have informed him why his application was disapproved.
The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless be
in accordance with the proper norm. When the right is exercised arbitrarily,
unjustly or excessively and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is

committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Petitioners

disapproval of respondents application is characterized by bad faith as
found by both the trial and appellate courts.
As to petitioners reliance on damnum absque injuria or damage
without injury, suffice it to state that the same is misplaced. In Amonoy vs.
Gutierrez (351SCRA731), we held that this principle does not apply when
there is an abuse of a persons right, as in this case.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES DOYON
582 SCRA 403 (March 25, 2010)
The spouses Doyon obtained a 10-million peso loan from DBP
secured by real and chattel mortgages. The obligation remained unpaid
despite having the loan restructured. DBP the initiated extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings but was forestalled when the spouses filed a civil
action for its nullification claiming payment. Three years later, DBP
withdrew the application for foreclosure while Doyon withdrew the civil
case. Weeks later, DBP demanded the payment of the loan that has now
ballooned to 20 million. Doyon still ignored the demand so DBP applied for
extrajudicial foreclosure of Doyons real and chattel mortgages and took
constructive possession of the properties, then its sheriff issued notices of
sale at public auction.
Meanwhile, Doyon filed a complaint for damages against DBP
claiming that by withdrawing the earlier application for extrajudicial
foreclosure and the dismissal of the earlier civil case DBP led them to
believe that it would no longer seek satisfaction of its claims and that their
loans had been extinguished. DBP therefore, acted contrary to Article 19 of
the Civil Code when it foreclosed on the real and chattel mortgages anew.
SC: for an action for damages under Article 19 to prosper, the
complainant must prove that: (a) defendant has a legal right or duty; (b)
he exercised his right or performed his duty with bad faith and (c)
complainant was prejudiced or injured as a result of the said exercise or
performance by defendant.
On the 1st requisite, the petitioner had the legal right to foreclose
on the real and chattel mortgages. When the principal obligation becomes
due and the debtor fails to perform his obligation, the creditor may
foreclose on the mortgage for the purpose of alienating the property to
satisfy his credit.
2nd requisite, bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity or conscious doing of a wrong that partakes the nature of fraud.
Nothing in the RTC order, re on withdrawal of the application
foreclosure, that stated or even hinted, that Doyons obligation to DBP had

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in fact been extinguished. Thus, there was nothing on the part of DBP even
remotely showing that it led Doyon to believe that it had waived its claims.
Lastly, the fact that a demand for payment was made negated
bad faith on the part of DBP. Despite giving Doyon the opportunity to pay
their long overdue obligations and avoid foreclosure, Doyon still refused to
pay.
CALATAGAN GOLF CLUB, INC. vs. CLEMENTE, JR. 585 SCRA 300 (April
16, 2009)
Clemente became a delinquent member of the club due to his
failure to pay his monthly dues for more than 60 days. The demand letters
that were sent to his mailing address were returned with the postal note
that the address had been closed. A 3rd and final demand was again sent to
Clemente in the same postal address were the 1 st 2 demand letters were
sent. Clementes share was later sold through auction.
SC: Bad faith on Calatagans part is palpable. As found by the
CA, Calatagan very well knew that Clementes postal box to which it sent
its previous letters had been closed, yet it persisted in sending that final
letter to the same postal box.
It is noteworthy that Clemente in his membership application had
provided his residential address along with residence and office telephone
numbers.
The utter bad faith exhibited by Calatagan brings into operation
Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code under the Chapter on Human
Relations. These provisions enunciate a general obligation under the law for
every person to act fairly and in good faith towards one another. A nonstock corporation like Calatagan is not exempt from that obligation in its
treatment of its members. The obligation of a corporation to treat every
person honestly and in good faith extends even to its shareholders or
members, even if the latter find themselves contractually bound to perform
certain obligations to the corporation. A certificate of stock cannot be the
charter of dehumanization.
Art. 20 Acts Contrary to Law (78,03)
Art. 21 Acts Contrary to Morals (75,81,82,96)
1) Bunag, Jr. vs. CA
211 SCRA 440
-In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time honored rule that an
action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil
law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced

by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise.

Under the
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in
forcibly abducting private respondent and having carnal
knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter promising to
marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter
renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for 21 days,
irremissibly constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs.
These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions that
indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral
and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21.
2) Wassmer vs. Velez
12 SCRA 648
-Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But
to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and
publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably
contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21.
3) Tanjanco vs. CA and Santos
18 SCRA 994
-No case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The plaintiff,
a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with
appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here
voluntariness and mutual passion, for had she been deceived, had
she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful
persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again
yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting
early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage.

BUENAVENTURA vs. CA & ISABEL LUCIA

SINGH BUENAVENTURA,
March 31, 2005
Is the aggrieved spouse in a marriage declared void by
reason of psychological incapacity of the other spouse entitled to
moral and exemplary damages under article 21 of the New Civil
Code?
SC: It must be noted that Article 21 states that the
individual must willfully cause loss or injury to another. There is a
need that the act is willful and hence done in complete freedom. It

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is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological
incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of
an innate inability, while at the same time considering the same
set of acts as willful. By declaring Noel as psychologically
incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the
same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages
should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the
marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately
and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his/her disability
and yet willfully concealed the same.
ACI PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. COQUIA
559 SCRA 300 (July 14, 2008)
The appellate courts citation of Article 21 is misplaced not only
because of the pre-existing contractual relation between the parties which
bars the application of this provision, but more importantly because we
cannot deem ACI to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Art. 22 Unjust Enrichment
REPUBLIC vs. LACAP
517 SCRA 255 (March 2, 2007)
In 1992, Lacap, who was doing business under the name Carwin
Construction, was awarded the contract for the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay
Pare by the District Engineer of Pampanga. On October 29, 1992, the Office
of the District Engineer of San Fernando, Pampanga found the project
100% completed in accordance with the approved plans and specification
and was then issued Certificates of Final Inspection and Acceptance. When
Lacap sought to collect payment, the DPWH withheld the payment because
COA disapproved the final release of funds on the ground that the
contractors license of Lacap had expired at the time of the execution of
the contract. The District Engineer then sought the opinion of the DPWH
Legal Department twice whether the contracts of Carwin for various
rehabilitation projects were valid although its contractors license had
already expired when the projects were contracted. Its Legal Department
opined that since RA 4566 known as the Contractors License Law does
not provide that a contract entered into after the license has expired is void
and there is no law which expressly prohibits or declares void such
contract, the contract is enforceable and may be paid, without prejudice to
administrative liabilities that may be imposed on the contractor and the
government employees or officials concerned. Yet, despite such

recommendation, no payment was made. Thus, in July 1995, Lacap filed a

complaint for damages and specific performance against the Republic.
SC: The wordings of RA 4566 are clear. It does not declare,
expressly or impliedly, as void contracts entered into by a contractor whose
license had already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for
payment of the fine prescribed therein (Section 35 of said law states: x x
x x. or use an expired or revoked certificate or license, shall be guilty
of misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of
not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand
pesos.). Besides, Article 22 of the Civil Code embodies the maxim Nemo
ex alterius incommode debet lecupletari (no man ought to be made rich
out of anothers injury).
This article is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human
Relations, the provisions of which were formulated as basic principles to
be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order, x x x designed to indicate certain norms that
spring from the fountain of good conscience, x x x guides human conduct
that should run as golden threads through society to the end that law may
approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of justice.
The rules thereon apply equally well to the Government. Since Lacap had
rendered services to the full satisfaction and acceptance of petitioner, then
the former should be compensated for them. To allow petitioner to acquire
the finished project at no cost would undoubtedly constitute unjust
enrichment for the petitioner to the prejudice of the respondent.
Art. 26 Acts though not constituting a criminal offense but may
produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief.
Art. 37-(96) definition of terms re: Juridical Capacity and Capacity to Act;
Juridical capacity which is the fitness to be the subject of legal
relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through
death.
Capacity to act is the power to do acts with legal effect, is
acquired and may be lost.
Art.38-(85) restrictions on capacity to act; Art. 39-(85) circumstances
modifying or limiting capacity to act.
Art. 40 41 Civil Personality (81,86,91,99,03)
What determines personality (Art. 40) and its exception and the
requisites in order that the exception may apply (Art. 41).
QUIMIGUING v. ICAO GR No. 26795 July 13, 1970

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-

A conceived child although as yet unborn, is given by law

provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to
it, as explicitly provided in article 40 of the Civil Code. The
unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its
progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose
paternity is deemed admitted), even if the child is only en
ventre de sa mere, even as yet unborn may receive
donations prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its
being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in
preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of a
testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the
death of the testator (Article 854, Civil Code).
It is thus clear that the lower courts theory that Article 291
of the Civil Code (now Article 195 of the Family Code)
declaring support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate
children does not contemplate support to children as yet
unborn, violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a
condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is
true that Article 40 prescribing that the conceived child shall
be considered born for all purposes favorable to it adds
further provided it be born later with the conditions specified
in the in the following article (i.e. that the foetus be alive at
the time it is completely delivered from the mothers womb).
This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the
right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of
Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective.

CONTINENTAL STEEL v. MONTANO, et. al. GR No. 182836

10/13/2009
- The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child
dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have
acquired civil personality, as Continental avers. Without such
qualification then child shall be understood in its more general
sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mothers womb.
Art. 43 If there is a doubt as to who died first involving persons who are
called to succeed each other; the person alleging the death of one prior to
the other has the burden of proof and in the absence of proof it is
presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no
transmission of rights from one to the other. Applies only in cases of
succession between two or more persons who are called to succeed each

other, all other cases apply presumption of survivorship under the Rules of
Court. Ex. Between a parent and a child. (98,99,00)
Ex. (2000 Bar) Cristy and her late husband Luis had 2
children, Rose aged 10 and Patrick, 12 years old. One summer, her motherin-law, aged 70, took the 2 children with her on a boat trip to Cebu.
Unfortunately, the vessel sank en route, and the bodies of the 3 were never
found. None of the survivors ever saw them on the water. On the
settlement of her mother-in-laws estate, Cristy filed a claim for a share of
her estate on the ground that the same was inherited by her children from
their grandmother in representation of their father, and she inherited the
same from them. Will her action prosper? Ans. No, her action will not
prosper. Since there was no proof as to who died first, all the 3 are deemed
to have died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights
from one to another, applying Article 43 of the NCC. The survivorship
provision of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the problem.
It applies only to those cases where the issue involved is not succession.
(1998 Bar) Jaime, aged 65, and his son Willy, 25 years old and
married to Wilma, died in a plane crash. There is no proof as to who died
1st. Jaime had a life insurance policy with his wife Julia, and his son, Willy,
as the beneficiaries. Can Wilma successfully claim that of the proceeds
should belong to Willys estate? Ans. Yes, Wilma can invoke the
presumption of survivorship and claim that of the proceeds should
belong to Willys estate, as the dispute does not involve succession. Under
this presumption, the person between the ages of 15 and 60 years is
deemed to have survived one whose age was over 60 at the time of their
deaths. The estate of Willy endowed with juridical personality stands in
place and stead of Willy, as beneficiary.

Art. 21 Requirement when either or both parties are foreigners

Garcia a.k.a. Grace Garcia-Recio vs. Recio
October 2, 2001
-Is failure to present a certificate of legal capacity to marry
constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the
marriage? The Supreme Court held that legal capacity to contract
marriage is determined by the national law of the party
concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family
Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of
the respondent, had he duly presented it in court.
-SC also ruled that compliance with Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the
Family Code is not necessary; Philippine personal laws no longer

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bound respondent Recio after he acquired Australian citizenship in
1992.
Art. 22- Marriage Certificate marriage is still presumed despite absence
of marriage contract. Not an essential or formal requisite.
Art. 26- Validity of marriages celebrated abroad subject to certain
exceptions (89, 92, 96, 99,05,06)
GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE GARCIA-RECIO vs. RECIO
October 2, 2001
- In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26
of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in
case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
MANZANO vs. SANCHEZ
354 SCRA 1
-The Supreme Court enumerated the requisites that must concur
in order that the provision on legal ratification shall apply:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry
each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the
parties must be present at the time of the marriage
(underscoring supplied);
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they
have lived together for at least five years [and are
without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn
statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of
the parties and that he had found no legal impediment
to their marriage.
-In the case at bench, the SC held that the absence of the legal
impediment is only required at the time of the celebration of the
marriage no longer during the entire 5-year period of
cohabitation.

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