Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc.

vs Secretary
of Agrarian Reform
175 SCRA 343 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal
Protection Valid Classification
Eminent Domain Just Compensation
These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e.,
Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human
Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform
program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless,
to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was
enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the
compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers
and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President
Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of
the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued
lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987,
P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP)
was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131s)
implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No.
6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while
considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives
them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.

G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)

Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27,
EO 228, and 229) on the ground that these laws already valuated their lands
for the agrarian reform program and that the specific amount must be
determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred
that this violated the principle in eminent domain which provides that only
courts can determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due
process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use
without just compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be
paid for their land in bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that
just compensation has always been in the form of money and not in bonds.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program,
must be in terms of cash.
HELD:

[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]

1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a
different class exempt from the agrarian reform program. Under the law,
classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to
each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same
particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:

G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)

(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;

The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought

exception from the land distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The
Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose
landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their
landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute
their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown
willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from
agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a different class.

(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated
must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities
imposed. The Association have not shown that they belong to a different
class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only
landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the
burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial

distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except
to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any
event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts
of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the
Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in classifying
small landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged
in the courts. However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies
like the DAR from determining just compensation. In fact, just compensation
can be that amount agreed upon by the landowner and the government
even without judicial intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR can
determine just compensation through appraisers and if the landowner
agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law
however is that, the just compensation determined by an administrative body
is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just
compensation by an administrative body, then it can go to court and the
determination of the latter shall be the final determination. This is even so
provided by RA 6657:

process. On March 18, 1992, the respondent spouses, relyingon their claim
that subject lots are agricultural land within the coverage of the CARP,
brought before the respondent Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages
with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin the petitioner from
bulldozing further and making constructionson the lots under controversy.
Petitioner contended that the said lots which were previouslyreserved by
Proclamation No. 843 for housing and resettlement purposes are not covered
by theCARP as they are not agricultural lands within the definition and
contemplation of Section 3 (c)of R. A. No. 6657. The RTC issued the
writ.Issue:Whether or not the disputed land is covered by CARPHeld:Lands
reserved for, or converted to, non-agricultural uses by government agencies
other than the Department of Agrarian Reform, prior to the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 6657 arenot considered and treated as agricultural lands
and therefore, outside the ambit of said law.Thus, since as early as April 26,
1971, the Tala Estate was reserved, inter alia under PresidentialProclamation
No. 843, for the housing program of the National Housing Authority, the same
has been categorized as not being devoted to the agricultural activity
contemplated by Section 3 (c)of R.A. No. 6657, and is, therefore, outside the
coverage of the CARL.
DAR vs. Sutton

Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the
matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just
compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in
traditional exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a
revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The program will require billions of
pesos in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash if everything is
in cash, then the government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds,
and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just
compensation.
National Housing Authority v Allarde
Facts:Private respondent Rufino Mateo had lived in the disputed lots since
his birth in 1928. In1959, he started farming and working on a six-hectare
portion of said lots, after the death of hisfather who had cultivated a thirteenhectare portion of the same lots. On September 1, 1983, the National
Housing Authority notified the respondent spouses of the scheduled
development of theTala Estate including the lots in question, warning them
that it would not be responsible for anydamage which may be caused to the
crops planted on the said lots. In 1989, private respondentRufino Mateo filed
with the Department of Agrarian Reform a petition for the award to them of
subject disputed lots under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP). In January1992, petitioner caused the bulldozing of the ricefields of
private respondents, damaging thedikes and irrigations thereon, in the

FACTS:
The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents
which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October
26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the
government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their
landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.
On June 10, 1988, CARL took effect.
In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a
formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted
exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the
CARL.
MARO inspected respondents land and found that it was devoted solely to
cattle-raising and breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it
be exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
DAR ignored their request
DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only portions of
private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine
as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In
determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the following
retention limits, viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio.
DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order partially granting the application of
respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Respondents moved
for reconsideration. They contend that their entire landholding should be

exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising. Their motion was

denied.
Office of the President affirmed the order of DAR
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. It
declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void for being contrary to the intent of the
1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the land
reform program of the government.

ISSUE: Whether or not DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes a
maximum retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising is
constitutional.
HELD:
Assailed AO is unconstitutional.
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it
contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by
including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a
maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of
the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia,
all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising.
Natalia Realty Inc and Estate Developers & Investors Corp vs DAR
FACTS:
Petitioner Natalia is the owner of three contiguous parcels of land located in
Banaba, Antipolo, Rizal.
On 18 April 1979, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312
hectares of land located in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo and
Montalban as townsite areas to absorb the population overspill in the
metropolis which were designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite. The
Natalia properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as townsite
reservation.
EDIC, developer of Natalia, applied for and was granted preliminary approval
and locational clearances by the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission. Petitioners were likewise issued development permits after
complying with the requirements. Thus the Natalia properties later became
the Antipolo Hills Subdivision.
On 15 June 1988, CARL was enacted.
DAR, through MARO, issued a Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped
portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision which consisted of roughly 90.3307
hectares.
Natalia and EDIC protested to this.
Members of the Samahan ng Magsasaka sa Bundok Antipolo, Inc. (SAMBA),
filed a complaint against Natalia and EDIC before the DAR Regional

Adjudicator to restrain petitioners from developing areas under cultivation by

SAMBA members.
DAR Regional ruled by temporarily restraining petitioners from further
developing the subdivision.
Petitioners elevated their cause to DARAB but the latter merely remanded
the case to the Regional Adjudicator for further proceedings
Natalia wrote respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform reiterating its request
to set aside the Notice of Coverage. Neither respondent Secretary nor
respondent Director took action on the protest-letters.
Hence, this petition.
Natalias contention: Subject properties already ceased to be agricultural
lands when they were included in the areas reserved by presidential fiat for
townsite reservation.
OSGs contention: The permits granted petitioners were not valid and binding
because they did not comply with the implementing Standards, Rules and
Regulations of P.D. 957, otherwise known as "The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree," in that no application for
conversion of the NATALIA lands from agricultural to residential was ever
filed with the DAR. In other words, there was no valid conversion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties shall be included in the
coverage of CARP
HELD:
NO.
Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover, regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands." As to what constitutes "agricultural land," it is referred to
as "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. The
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation.
"Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are "arable and suitable
agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential
lands."
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the
Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be considered as
"agricultural lands." These lots were intended for residential use. They
ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the
Lungsod Silangan Reservation.
Isidro v CA
Facts: Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of the subject
parcel of land. In 1985, Aniceta Garcia, sister of private respondent and also
the overseer of the latter, allowed petitioner Remigio Isidro to occupy the
swampy portion of the land. The occupancy of a portion of said land was

subject to the condition that petitioner would vacate the land upon demand.
Petitioner occupied the land without paying any rental and converted the
same into a fishpond. In 1990, private respondent through the overseer
demanded from petitioner the return of the land, but the latter refused to
vacate and return possession of said land, claiming that he had spent effort
and invested capital in converting the same into a fishpond. A complaint for
unlawful detainer was filed by private respondent against petitioner before
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija. The trial court
dismissed the case because it ruled that it is an agrarian dispute, hence not
cognizable by civil courts. Private respondent appealed to the RTC which
affirmed in toto the decision of MTC. On appeal to the CA, the decision of the
trial court was reversed. Issue: Whether or not the case is an agrarian
dispute and hence not cognizable by civil courts Held: No. A case involving
an agricultural land does not automatically make such case an agrarian
dispute upon which the DARAB has jurisdiction. The mere fact that the land
is agricultural does not ipso facto make the possessor an agricultural lessee
of tenant. The law provides for conditions or requisites before he can qualify
as one and the land being agricultural is only one of them. The law states
that an agrarian dispute must be a controversy relating to a tenurial
arrangement over lands devoted to agriculture. And as previously mentioned,
such arrangement may be leasehold, tenancy or stewardship. Tenancy is not
a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon
the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the
understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements,
provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more
important.
Suplico v CA
Facts: Isabel Tupas leased her landholding for the amount of P10, 000.00 to
petitioner Enrique P. Suplico, her brother-in-law, under a contract that was
set to expire on 31 May 1982. Some time in 1979, respondent Armada
started tilling an area of 32,945 square meter of the farmland under an
agreement with Enrique Suplico. Petitioner was to receive from the
respondent 62 cavans from the palay harvest per crop yield by way of rental
for the use not only of the land but also of the work animals and a hand
tractor. Private respondent resided with his family in a farmhouse on the land.
When, years later, petitioner threatened to eject respondent from the
property, the respondent initiated an action for damages and injunction
against petitioner in the Court of Agrarian Relations.The complaint averred
that respondent was the tenant-farmer of around 2.5 hectares of the property
of Isabel Tupas having been instituted as such tenant in 1979 by her
administrator, herein petitioner Enrique Suplico, to whom he religiously paid
the fixed rental of 62 cavans of palay per crop yield. On 18 January 1990, the
trial court rendered its decision declaring private respondent a bona fide
agricultural lessee. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed by
the CA. Issue: Whether or not respondent is a tenant of the subject land

Held: Tenancy did exist between the parties. Firstly, private respondent was
in actual possession of the land, and he there resided, with his family, in a
farmhouse just like what a farm tenant normally would. Secondly, private
respondent and his wife were personally doing the farm work of plowing,
planting, weeding and harvesting the area. The occasional and temporary
hiring of persons outside of the immediate household, so long as the tenant
himself had control in the farmwork, was not essentially opposed to the
status of tenancy. Thirdly, the management of the farm was left entirely to
private respondent who defrayed the cultivation expenses. Fourthly, private
respondent shared the harvest of the land, depositing or delivering to
petitioner Enrique Suplico the agreed 62 cavans of palay per crop yield.
Bejasa v CA
Facts: On September 21, 1984, Candelaria constituted respondent Jaime
Dinglasan as her attorney-in-fact, having powers of administration over the
disputed land. On October 26, 1984, Candelaria entered into a new lease
contract over the land with Victoria Dinglasa
n, Jaimes wife
with a term of one year. On December 30, 1984, the Bejasas agreed to pay
Victoria rent of P15, 000.00 in consideration of an "aryenduhan" or "pakyaw
na bunga" agreement, with a term of one year. After the aryenduhan expired,
despite Victori
as demand to vacate the land, the Bejasas
continued to stay on the land and did not give any consideration for its use,
be it in the form of rent or a shared harvest. On February 15, 1988, the
Bejasas filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro a
complaint for confirmation of leasehold and home lot with recovery of
damages against Isabel Candelaria and Jaime Dinglasan, amd the trial court
ruled in favour of the Bejasas. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of
the trial court. Issue: Whether or not there is tenancy relationship between
the owner and the Bejasas Held: The elements of a tenancy relationship are:
(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural
land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there
is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests. Candelaria and
the Bejasas, between them, there is no tenancy relationship. Candelaria as
landowner never gave her consent. Even assuming that the Dinglasans had
the authority as civil law lessees of the land to bind it in a tenancy
agreement, there is no proof that they did.
Almuete v Andres
Facts: The subject property was awarded by the then National Resettlement
and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) to petitioner Rodrigo Almuete. He
and his family farmed the subject property peacefully and exclusively for
some twenty-two years. On August 17, 1979, an Agrarian Reform
Technologist filed a field investigation and inspection report stating that the
whereabouts of Rodrigo Almuete, was unknown and that he had waived all

his rights as a NARRA settler due to his poor health beyond his control and
financial hardship. The technologist also stated therein that the actual
occupant of the land is Marcelo Andres since April 1967 to date. Thereafter, a
homestead patent was issued in favour of Andres. Marcelo Andres gained
control, and took possession, of approximately half of the subject property.
Consequently, Rodrigo Almuete and his daughter, Ana Almuete, filed an
action for reconveyance and recovery of possession against Marcelo Andres
with the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela which rendered a decision
in favour of Almuete. On appeal, the Court of Appeals declared the decision
of the trial court NULL and VOID because the case is an agrarian dispute,
hence it falls within the jurisdiction of DARAB. Issue: Whether or not the
DARAB has jurisdiction over the case Held: The jurisdiction of the DARAB is
limited to cases involving a tenancy relationship between the parties. The
following elements are indispensable to establish a tenancy relationship: (1)
The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) The
subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) There is consent
between the parties to the relationship; (4) The purpose of the relationship is
to bring about agricultural production; (5) There is personal cultivation on the
part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) The harvest is shared
between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. The Court of
Appeals gravely erred when it granted the petition for certiorari and held that
the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
between petitioners and respondent since there is no tenancy relationship
between them. The action filed by petitioners was cognizable by the regular
courts.
Monsanto v Zerna
Facts: Spouses Jesus and Teresita Zerna were charged with qualified theft
for stealing the coconut harvests from the plantation of petitioner Monzanto.
The spouses were the overseer of the land owned by the petitioner. After trial
on the merits, the RTC acquitted them of the charge. The total proceeds of
the copra sale alleged in the Information were P6, 262.50. However, the
awarded amount was only P5, 162.50 which was deposited by private
respondents with the barangay secretary on March 2, 1995, after deducting
P340 for harvesting cost and P760 for labor cost. Thus, petitioner filed a
timely Motion for Reconsideration praying that the remaining sum of P1, 100
be returned to her. In its September 4, 1996 Order, the trial court granted the
Motion and ordered private respondents to return the amount of P1, 100.10.
On appeal, CA ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction to order private
respondents to pay petitioner the amount of P1, 100 because the dispute
involved an agricultural tenancy relationship; the matter fell within the
jurisdiction of DARAB. Issue: Whether or not the award of the civil liability in
this case is agrarian in nature Held: An agrarian dispute existed between the
parties. First, the subject of the dispute between them was the taking of
coconuts from the property owned by petitioner. Second, private respondents
were the overseers of the property at the time of the taking of the coconuts. A

tenurial arrangement exists among herein parties as regards the harvesting

of the agricultural products, as shown by the several remittances made by
private respondents to petitioner. These are substantiated by receipts. In any
event, their being overseers does not foreclose their being also tenants.
Alita v. CA
-petition seeking the reversal Court of Appeals decision: 1)Declaring
Presidential Decree No.27 inapplicable to lands obtained thru the homestead
law; 2) Declaring that the 4 registeredco-owners will cultivate and operate the
farmholding themselves as owners; & 3) Ejectingtenants, namely; Gabino
Alita, Jesus Julian, Sr., Jesus Julian, Jr., Pedro Ricalde, VicenteRicalde and
Rolando Salamar, as the owners would want to cultivate the
farmholdingthemselves.-2 parcels of land at Guilinan, Tungawan,
Zamboanga del Sur acquired by respondentsReyes through homestead
patent under Commonwealth Act No. 141- Reyes wants to personally
cultivate these lands, but Alita refuse to vacate, relying on theprovisions of
P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and regulations of MAR/DAR-June 18, 1981:
Respondents Reyes (Plaintiff) instituted a complaint against Minister of
Agrarian Reform Estrella, Regional Director of MAR Region IX P.D.
Macarambon, and Alitaet.al for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other
Decrees, Letters of Instructions and GeneralOrders inapplicable to
homestead lands. Defendants Alita filed their answer with special
andaffirmative defenses.-July 19, 1982: Reyes filed urgent motion to enjoin
the defendants from declaring the landsin litigation under Operation Land
Transfer and from being issued land transfer certificates-November 5, 1982:
Court of Agrarian Relations 16th Regional District, Branch IV, PagadianCity
(Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial Region, Branch XVIII) rendered its decision
dismissingcomplaint and the motion to enjoinOn January 4, 1983, plaintiffs
moved to reconsider the Order of dismissal, to whichdefendants filed their
opposition on January 10, 1983.RTC: issued decision prompting defendants
Alita et al to move for reconsideration but wasdeniedCA: the same was
sustained
ISSUE:
whether or not lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by
theAgrarian Reform under P.D. 27.
--NO
We agree with the petitioners Alita et.al in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the
emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring to them
ownership of the land they tillis a sweeping social legislation, a remedial
measure promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the
Constitution. However, such contention cannot be invoked to defeatthe
purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No.
141 toprotect ones right to life itself by give a needy citizen a land wherein
they could build ahouse and plant for necessary subsistence.
Art XIII, Sec 6 of the Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the
homesteaders' rights over therights of the tenants guaranteed by the
Agrarian Reform statute.Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of

agrarian reform or stewardshipin thedisposition or utilization of other

natural resources, including lands of public domain underlease or concession
suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of
smallsettlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral
lands.
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657
likewise supports theinapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by homestead
patents like those of the property inquestion,
Section 6. Retention Limits. ...
Daez v CA
Facts: Eudosia Daez was the owner of a 4.1685-hectare riceland in
Barangay Lawa, Meycauayan, Bulacan which was being cultivated by
respondents Macario Soriente, Rogelio Macatulad, Apolonio Mediana and
Manuel Umali under a system of share-tenancy. The said land was subjected
to the Operation Land Transfer Program under Presidential Decree No. 27 as
amended by Letter of Instruction Armed with an affidavit, allegedly signed
under duress by the respondents, stating that they are not share tenants but
hired laborers, Eudosia Daez applied for the exemption of said riceland from
coverage of P.D. No. 27 due to non-tenancy as well as for the cancellation of
the CLTs issued to private respondents. The application of the petitioner was
denied. Exemption of the 4.1685 riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27
having been finally denied her, Eudosia Daez next filed an application for
retention of the same riceland, this time under R.A. No. 6657. The DAR
Regional Director allowed Daez to retain the subject land but the DAR
Secretary reversed that decision. She appealed to the Office of the President
which ruled in her favour. Respondents appealed to the CA which reversed
the decision of the Office of the President. Issue: Whether or not the denial of
application for exemption under PD 27 would bar an application for retention
under RA 6657 Held: The requisites for the grant of an application for
exemption from coverage of OLT and
those for the grant of an application for the exercise of a landowners right of
retention are
different. Hence, it is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and
an application for retention are one and the same thing. Being distinct
remedies, finality of judgment in one does not preclude the subsequent
institution of the other. There was, thus, no procedural impediment to the
application filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention of the subject 4.1865hectare riceland, even after her appeal for exemption of the same land was
denied in a decision that became final and executory.
Paris v Alfeche
Facts: Petitioner is the registered owner of two parcels of land situated at
Paitan, Quezon, Bukidnon. The said parcels are fully tenanted by private
respondents herein who are recipients of Emancipation Patents in their
names pursuant to Operation Land Transfer under P.D. 27. Petitioner alleged

that she owns one of the subject property as original homestead grantee who
still owned the same when Republic Act No. 6657 was approved, thus she is
entitled to retain the area to the exclusion of her tenants. The Adjudicator a
quo rendered a decision in favour of the petitioner but that decision was
reversed by DARAB. On appeal to the CA, the appellate court rejected the
claim of the petitioner. Issue: Whether or not the original homesteads issued
under the public land act are automatically exempted from the operation of
land reform Held: Homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can
own and retain the original homesteads, only for "as long as they continue to
cultivate" them. That parcels of land are covered by homestead patents will
not automatically exempt them from the operation of land reform. It is the fact
of continued cultivation by the original grantees or their direct compulsory
heirs that shall exempt their lands from land reform coverage.
Atlas Fertilizer Corporation v Secretary of DAR
Facts: Petitioners Atlas Fertilizer Corporation, Philippine Federation of
Fishfarm Producers, Inc. and petitioner-inintervention Archies Fishpond, Inc. and Arsenio Al. Acuna are engaged in the
aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and prawn farms. They assail
Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of R.A. 6657, as well as the
implementing guidelines and procedures contained in Administrative Order
Nos. 8 and 10 Series of 1988 issued by public respondent Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform as unconstitutional. they contend that R.A.
6657, by including in its coverage, the raising of fish and aquaculture
operations including fishponds and prawn ponds, treating them as in the
same class or classification as agriculture or farming violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution and is, therefore void. During the
debates of the Constitutional Commission, it shows that the intent of the
constitutional framers is to exclude industrial lands, to which category lands
devoted to aquaculture, fishponds, and fish farms belong. Issue: Whether or
not fishponds and prawn ponds are included in the coverage of CARL Held:
On February 20, 1995, Republic Act No. 7881 was approved by Congress
amending some provisions of RA 6657. The provisions of R.A. No. 7881
expressly state that fishponds and prawn farms are excluded from the
coverage of CARL. In view of the foregoing, the question concerning the
constitutionality of the assailed provisions has become moot and academic
with the passage of R.A. No. 7881.
Republic v CA
Facts: Private respondent is the owner of the five parcels of land in issue
which have a combined area of approximately 112.0577 hectares situated at
Barangay Punta, Municipality of Jala-Jala, Rizal. The tax declarations
classified the properties as agricultural. On June 16, 1994, petitioner DAR
issued a Notice of Coverage of the subject parcels of land under compulsory
acquisition pursuant to Section 7, Chapter II of R.A. 6657. On July 21, 1994,
private respondent filed with the DAR Regional Office an application for

exemption of the land from agrarian reform. Private respondent alleged that
the property should be exempted since it is within the residential and forest
conservation zones of the town zoning ordinance of Jala-Jala. On October
19, 1995, the DAR Secretary issued an Order denying the application for
exemption of private respondent. On appeal to the CA, the decision of DAR
was reversed. Petitioner DAR maintains that the subject properties have
already been classified as agricultural based on the tax declarations. Issue:
Whether or not the land classification on tax declarations are conclusive
Held: There is no law or jurisprudence that holds that the land classification
embodied in a tax declaration is conclusive and final, nor would proscribe
any further inquiry. Furthermore, the tax declarations are clearly not the sole
basis of the classification of a land. In fact, DAR Administrative Order No. 6
lists other documents, aside from tax declarations, that must be submitted
when applying for exemption from CARP.
Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v CA
Facts: Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation was the
registered owner of two parcels of land with a total area of 254.6 hectares.
According to petitioner, the parcels of land are watersheds, which provide
clean potable water to the Canlubang community. Petitioner alleged that
respondents usurped its rights over the property, thereby destroying the
ecosystem. Sometime in December 1985, respondents filed a civil case with

the Regional Trial Court seeking an easement of a right of way to and from
Barangay Casile. By way of counterclaim, however, petitioner sought the
ejectment of private respondents. After the filing of the ejectment cases,
respondents petitioned the Department of Agrarian Reform for the
compulsory acquisition of the SRRDC property under the CARP. The
landholding of SRRDC was placed under compulsory acquisition. Petitioner
objected to the compulsory acquisition of the property contending that the
area was not appropriate for agricultural purposes. The area was rugged in
terrain with slopes of 18% and above and that the occupants of the land were
squatters, who were not entitled to any land as beneficiaries. The DARAB
ruled against the petitioner. On appeal the CA affirmed the decision of
DARAB. Issue: Whether or not the property in question is covered by CARP
despite the fact that the entire property formed part of a watershed area prior
to the enactment of R. A. No. 6657 Held: Watershed is one of those
enumerated by CARP to be exempt from its coverage. We cannot ignore the
fact that the disputed parcels of land form a vital part of an area that need to
be protected for watershed purposes. The protection of watersheds ensures
an adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of
flashfloods that not only damage property but cause loss of lives. Protection
of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be
answered now.