Catalyzing Conflict: The Internal Dimension of The Security Dilemma

Journal of Global Security Studies, 1(2), 2016, 111126
doi: 10.1093/jogss/ogw002
Research Article
Catalyzing Conflict: The Internal Dimension of the

Security Dilemma
Andrej Krickovic
National Research University, Higher School of Economics, Moscow
Abstract
Keywords: security dilemma, developing states, Russia, China
The Wests attempts to isolate Russia during the recent

crisis in Ukraine failed to win the support of China and
the other leading states of the developing world. China, in
particular, passively aligned with Russia over the annexation of Crimea by implementing a series of economic deals
designed to offset the effects of US sanctions (Meyer and
Pissmenaya 2014). Chinas continued support of Russia in
the wake of Russias violations of Ukraines sovereignty is
puzzling. China itself faces active separatist movements
and therefore might be expected to staunchly defend
the principle of territorial sovereignty. From a realpolitik
stance, Chinas recent actions could be viewed as opportunistican attempt to balance power against the United
States and other Western countries. However, Chinas actions also reflect receptiveness to Russian claims that
events in Kiev constituted a Color Revolution orchestrated by the West (Global Times 2014). This narrative
speaks to feelings of vulnerability and insecurity shared

by China and other developing states. Leaders and intellectuals in China and Russia believe the Wests promotion
of human rights and democracy is detrimental to their
countries political and social stability (Rengger 2011).
Some even go so far as to claim that Western countries
are deliberately using democracy and human rights as
tools to destabilize their countries and thereby prevent
them from rising up as formidable challengers to US and
Western hegemony (China Daily 2014).
Building on a significant body of literature examining
the way internal insecurity affects the least developed
states foreign policies, I argue that the most advanced developing states, such as China and Russia, also face challenges to domestic legitimacy and sovereignty. Thus, in
many respects, they are prone to the same internal security
concerns associated with the least developed countries.
Krickovic, Andrej. (2016) Catalyzing Conflict: The Internal Dimension of the Security Dilemma. Journal of Global Security Studies, doi:10.1093/jogss/ogw002
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Realists are accustomed to thinking about security competition between states in terms of the security
dilemma: each states efforts to improve its security can be taken as a threat by others, sparking competition that destabilizes the system and increases the likelihood of conflict. By focusing almost exclusively on
external threat dynamics, however, common thinking about the security dilemma misses how domestic
vulnerabilities can also be a catalyst for security competition. This is particularly the case in weak states
that lack internal legitimacy. Weak developing states see intervention (whether perceived or real) targeted
at their domestic vulnerabilities as an existential threat to political survival. When the targeted state
responds to minimize or negate the threat, its response may be perceived as a threat, warranting a counter
response. Particularly, when a targeted state possesses significant national poweras in the cases of China
and Russiaa security competition is born. This article develops the logic behind this modified version of
the security dilemma focused on internal vulnerabilities. Managing these internal fears will be of critical
importance if we are to avoid the reemergence of security competition between great powers in the future.
112
Catalyzing Conflict: The Internal Dimension of the Security Dilemma
Internal Security Concerns and States

Foreign Policy
The field of security studies has traditionally taken the
state as the primary unit of analysis and defined the concept of security in external terms, focusing on the threats
that originate outside rather than inside the state. However, a significant body of literature has sought to trace
the ways in which internal security concerns have shaped
states foreign and security policies. The most immediate
internal threat for many state leaders is to their own political survival from coups detats, illegal and overt
attempts by the military or other elites within the state
apparatus to unseat the sitting executive (Powell and
Thyne 2011). Leaders can adopt a variety of measures to
coup proof their regimes. These include selecting top
military officers from the same ethnic, religious, or kinship groups; dividing the military and security apparatus
into separate branches with overlapping jurisdictions;
and buying the loyalty of military officers through budgetary outlays or the dispensation of special privileges
(Quinlivan 1999). Coup proofing can also affect foreign
security policy, as leaders may consent to stationing foreign troops in their countries or pursue military alliances
with those foreign powers that will stand by incumbents
and resist any potential coup (Powell 2012).
Incumbents imperative for political survival is also at
the center of Steven Davids concept of omnibalancing,
which he uses to explain the alignment choices of thirdworld states during the Cold War. For David (1991), conventional realist balance of power theory, which sees alliance behavior as a reaction of unitary states to external
threats, does not provide an adequate framework for the
third world, where states are weak and societies divided.
In this context, the primary unit of analysis is state elites,
whose most pressing security concerns come from internal
challenges to their rule. Contrary to the expectation of realist theories, leaders often align with outside powers, not
because they help them balance against external threats,
but because these alliances help them balance against
internal rivals that threaten the survival of their regimes
(David 1991, 235). Subsequent studies have extended and
modified Davids theory to explain the alignment choices
of more recent cases, such as the post-Soviet states (Miller
2006) and the Persian Gulf states (Gause 2003).
Of all the current theories dealing with internal security concerns and their effects on states foreign policy,
diversionary war theories have received the most attention. Diversionary war theories postulate that desperate
incumbents will provoke conflicts with other states to deflect attention from pressing domestic problems that may
However, unlike the least developed countries, China and

Russias material and economic power are substantially
large enough to threaten the security of great powers.
When internal and external security concerns co-exist,
they create unique challenges to our understanding of
international relationsand more specifically, security dilemmas. Internal vulnerabilities, particularly when exploited by outside interests, can generate security dilemmas
between advanced developing countries and great powers.
We often think of security dilemma dynamics between
states (and especially between great powers) as a product of
external relations. One states efforts to improve its security
can lead other states to respond with similar measures, producing increased tensions that create conflict even when no
one desires it (Jervis 1978). Internal insecurities can also catalyze security dilemmas between states by giving rise to
fears in one state that other states will exploit their internal
vulnerabilities and foment internal unrest. States that have
these concerns will employ conventional and non-conventional means to counter states that they believe are exploiting their internal vulnerabilities. These actions will set off
the cycle of reaction and counter-reaction that constitute
the security dilemma.
The fundamental cause of the security dilemma is states
uncertainty about the true intentions of other states
(Schweller 1996). States can never be truly sure whether
the policies of others are intended to guarantee their own
security, or whether they are motivated by more aggressive
intentions. Even if their perceptions about the intentions of
others are accurate today, they may change over time (Glaser 1997). Where security dilemmas are the product of
states external security policies, states can deescalate tensions through confidence-building measures that highlight
each states defensive security posture and nonaggressive
intentions. But the internal insecurities of states present a
special challenge to policymakers who are trying to avoid
the security dilemma. Fears of internal meddling are generated not so much by the policies of other states as by the
states internal vulnerabilities themselves. Thus, states with
internal vulnerabilities may not be easily assuaged by confidence-building measures. The policies of Western states to
promote democracy and defend human rights (often carried out through domestic agencies and non-governmental
actors), or even the demonstration effects of Western states
economic and political models, may be enough to generate
fears and suspicions on the part of leaders in internally vulnerable states. In a world where emerging powers and
potential rivals to US and Western hegemony are also developing states that face internal vulnerabilities, managing
these fears may be the key to avoiding conflict and major
power wars.
ANDREJ KRICKOVIC
Non-state actors include multinational corporations,

irredentist groups, and supranational movements.
Ayoobs work allows us to develop a better understanding of the domestic context under which leaders operate, as
well as the larger structural forces that shape internal vulnerabilities. Under the circumstances described above, concerns about internal security may encompass more than
just the imperative for political survival, but also reflect
concerns about domestic stability and continued political
and economic development. However, the increased complexity that is gained by considering these factors comes at
the price of analytical ambiguity. The fate of the regime is
equated with the interests of the state and nation, making it
difficult to determine whether leaders are motivated by personal concerns of political survival or by genuine commitments to state and nation building. This task is largely left
up to the analyst on a case-by-case basis, and Ayoob provides few clues about how to make this distinction.
Taken together, this body of literature allows us to better understand the critical role that domestic insecurity
plays in shaping foreign and security policies. For the most
part, these studies focus on developing or weak states that
have a limited ability to project their power externally.
Like the states that are the focus of these theories, China
and Russia exhibit profound internal vulnerabilities. But,
unlike many third-world states, China and Russia have
unique characteristics not captured in the existing literature. They are both significant powers in their own right,
and as such have a variety of political and economic interests that extend internationally and go well beyond the
mere survival of their domestic political regime. They
have the capability to exert their national power on the
world stage and can react to what they see as Western
meddling in their internal affairs in ways that threaten the
security of the developed states of the West.
Expanding the Security Dilemma to

Account for States Internal Vulnerabilities
The focus in most work on the security dilemma has
been on states external security concerns (Tang 2009).
States adopt foreign and defense policies to improve their
security vis-a-vis other states by improving their military
capabilities or expanding their sphere of influence. In
adopting these policies, they may not harbor aggressive
intentions. However, in an anarchical and self-help international system, states can never be certain about other
states true intentions, and must assume the worst (Jervis
1978). Thus, even if the motivations behind a states
polices are purely defensive, these policies may still be
seen as threatening by other states, and may prompt
threatening countermeasures. Thus, states can find themselves in a vicious cycle that leads to increased security
competition, arms race, and even war.
threatened the survival of their regimes (Levy 1989).

These theories are rooted in the literature on conflict cohesion and in-group/out-group dynamics developed in
the field of social psychology (Simmel 1955). According
to diversionary war theories, the essential purpose of belligerent foreign policy is to ensure domestic political survival, and is thus a response to internal threats to the
incumbents political power, rather than a response to external threats to state security or national interests (Fravel
2010). Developing states, whose political institutions are
weak, or states undergoing the process of democratization
may be particularly susceptible to using diversionary war,
as ruling elites resort to deception and violence to
strengthen their hold on power (Mansfield and Snyder
2005).
These studies focus on regime security and incumbent
leadership, and for the most part ignore the broader historical context under which leaders facing these kinds of internal threats operate. Nor do these studies examine the ways
in which broader social and economic forces shape leaders
choices. Mohammed Ayoob (1995; 2002) argues that
third world states security concerns are profoundly
shaped by the fact that they are late-comers to nation
buildinga violent process that developed countries underwent generations ago. These countries are economically underdeveloped, and are trying to catch up with the nations of
the developed world. Their domestic political institutions as
well as their national identities, state borders, and social
and economic orders often lack legitimacy, or are fiercely
contested by domestic political opponents. As a result of
these internal weaknesses, third-world states have an inadequate degree of stateness, making them acutely vulnerable to external pressurespolitical, military, economic, or
technologicalfrom other state and non-state actors
(Ayoob 1995, 8).1 These pressures further destabilize what
is already a fragile political and social order. Norms and
principles emanating from the developed countries, and in
particular ideas about human rights, democracy, and demonstration effects, contribute to internal discontent and
complicate a developing states efforts at nation and state
building. [These norms] undermine the political legitimacy
of these same states by prescribing standards of political
behavior that most third world states, struggling to maintain political order, will not be able to meet for many
decades (Ayoob 1995, 85). In the context of nation building, the Wests promotion of these norms is profoundly
destabilizing, constituting a threat to regime and even state
survival.
113
114
Where they have the power and capability to do so,

vulnerable states will push back to limit their exposure to
internal destabilization from outside. Internally, they will
use foreign intervention as a justification for further
repressing the political opposition and strengthening their
authoritarian rule. A vulnerable states suppression of
human rights and democracy, in turn, leads intervening
states to be concerned about democratic backsliding and
to see the regression of democracy as part of a broader
trend that could threaten global conditions that support
democracy (Burrows and Stephan 2015). Democratic regression in the target state may also activate commonly
held beliefs of proponents of democracy about the inherent belligerence of autocratic states (Rosato 2003).
According to proponents of democracy, states moving
away from democracy and toward authoritarian rule are
more likely to adopt aggressive and expansionistic foreign
policies in order to bolster their legitimacy and divert attention from their own domestic policy failures (Miller
1995).
States that believe they are the targets of internal destabilization, and that also have the capability to exercise their
power externally, can push back against intervening states
through their foreign policies. They will ramp up their criticisms of these foreign interventions (through diplomatic
communications as well as publicly in international fora)
in order to signal their displeasure to the intervening
state and to win the sympathy of other states that may face
similar threats. They may increase their influence in neighboring states that fall within their sphere of influencelest
these states fall under the influence of rival states. Targeted
states may also support other regimes in their efforts to
crack down on domestic opposition. In the extreme case,
an internally vulnerable state may even intervene militarily
by sending troops (overtly or covertly) to support incumbents that face revolutionary threats, or to reverse the outcomes of regime changes they deem to be unfavorable.
Internally vulnerable states may also engage in more
conventional forms of externally-oriented balancing behavior to counter the perceived threat. They can form alliances or partnerships with other states that may also have
an adversarial relationship with the intervening state,
and that are similarly threatened by internal destabilization. Internally vulnerable states can also engage in arms
buildups and other forms of provocative military behavior
to increase the costs of intervening, and to signal that they
are ready to respond to this threat. Table 1 summarizes
the actions that a target state may take in response to a
perceived policy of internal destabilization on the part of
an intervening state, and gives some examples from the
Russian case. These examples will be covered in greater
detail throughout the article. While the policies adopted
The internal insecurities of states can also play a pivotal

role in generating interstate conflict and security competition by serving as a catalyst for security dilemmas between
states. As such, internal insecurities deserve far more attention than they have received in conventional literature on
the security dilemma. A more comprehensive theory of the
security dilemma is needed that incorporates internal security concerns in its analysis. States that face internal security
concerns are sensitive about the prospects of other states
taking advantage of their internal weaknesses. Adversarial
states may indeed seize the opportunity to weaken their
rivals. But leaders in vulnerable countries often perceive
internal discord as being stoked, or even orchestrated, by
foreign powerseven if there is no deliberate policy by
other states to do so. When state agencies or non-state
actors seek to advance principles of democracy and human
rights, domestically insecure states may feel threatened.
The democracy and human rights promotion efforts
of non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty
International, the National Endowment for Democracy,
and the Soros Foundation are often quite separate from
government policy. International non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) coordinate with domestic actors
to create international advocacy networks, which
pressure governments to change their policies (Keck and
Sikkink 1998). Their activities are nonetheless seen as existential threats by many authoritarian regimes because
they challenge the legitimacy of fragile domestic political
institutions (Murdie 2012). Moreover, studies have
found that NGOs are highly selective when it comes to
which cases they direct their attention to. Their choices
are often shaped by their own material interests and the
political concerns and interests of their Western donors
(Cooley and Ron 2002; Grant and Keohane 2005;
Murdie 2012). Governments may see these groups efforts as serving the interest of hostile Western governments. Presenting NGOs activities as opportunistic also
serves the domestic political interests of authoritarian regimes by allowing them to deflect criticism and delegitimize domestic political opponents by labeling them as
agents of foreign powers (Carothers 2010).
When states embrace democracy and human rights promotion as a foreign policy goal, their true intentions may
not be to destabilize or weaken other states, but to promote
principles such as democracy, human rights, and good governance. If implemented correctly, reforms based on these
principles could ultimately strengthen the target state. Yet,
the target state will rarely perceive interventions in this
way. From the perspective of many authoritarian leaders,
the promotion of these ideals will only sow discord in societies that are still undergoing the process of political, social,
and economic development (Wilson 2009).
ANDREJ KRICKOVIC
115
Table 1. Foreign policies that target states may adopt to push back against perceived intervention
Response
Internal
Example from the Russian case
Restricting domestic political space;

cracking down on domestic opposition
by the targeted state are not necessarily offensive in nature, they may be perceived as such by the intervening
state. In response, the intervening state may adopt policies
designed to counter the perceived threats from the targeted state.
As a result, both states find themselves embroiled in a
classic security dilemma. However, the roots of this dilemma lie in the internal weaknesses of one state, rather
than either states efforts to address external security
concerns. Thus, the internal dimension of the security
dilemma can generate conflict even in circumstances
where states do not pose an immediate external military
threat to one another.
In many situationsas is the case with the United
States relationship with China and Russiaonly one
side exhibits significant internal vulnerabilities. This may
make it more difficult for the two sides to extricate themselves from the vicious cycle of the security dilemma. It
may be logical to assume that the intervening state will
forego its efforts to promote democracy and human
rights when confronted by the defensive reactions of the
target state. But, this may not necessarily be the case. An
intervening democratic state may not recognize the need
to adjust or modify these policies to make them less
threatening. As it does not have the same internal vulnerabilities, the intervening state will not fully appreciate a
target states sensitivities to internal security concerns.
Nor will an intervening state be able to recognize that a
target states reaction is defensive in nature. An intervening state may instead view the target states aggressive
behavior as a product of its increasingly authoritarian

and undemocratic political regime.2 This will only further motivate the intervening state to promote regime
change in the target state by taking advantage of the target states internal vulnerabilities.
Figure 1 presents the traditional security dilemma,
where one states actions to improve external security
generate a vicious cycle of balancing and counterbalancingleading to a dangerous security competition. Figure
2 represents a modified version of the security dilemma
that includes an internal dimension; internal vulnerabilities serve as the catalyst for states to adopt policies that
threaten each others security.
In Figure 2, neither state A nor B initially views the
other state as constituting a security threat that warrants
a response. However, state As internal vulnerabilities either invite predation on the part of state B or give rise to
fears on the part of state A (even if these are unfounded).
As a result, state A adopts internal and external policies
that threaten state B, leading B to adopt policies in response to the threat now emanating from state A. The
Liberal international relations theorists have argued that

states that commit domestic human rights violations are
also more prone to external aggression. If massive human
rights violations (even if they occur only at the domestic
level) go unpunished, these states may be emboldened to
one day mount a more serious challenge to international
peace and stability (Slaughter 2011).
Laws restricting activities of foreign NGOs;

moves to control and manipulate the electoral
process; restriction on freedom of speech and
expression; mobilizing domestic groups to come
to the aid of the regime in the event of Color Revolution
External Public and diplomatic rhetoric
Putins 2007 Munich speech; various public statements by
Russian leaders and diplomats; organizing alternative
media such as Russia Today to disseminate governments
point of view on Color Revolutions
Support for regimes facing internal threats; efforts to
Support for authoritarian regimes in Belarus and Uzbekistan;
reverse regime change in neighboring countries
support for pro-Russian grassroots movements
and political forces in Ukraine (Crimea)
Covert or overt military action to protect incumbent
Russias annexation of Crimea; support for separatism in
regimes or to destabilize post-revolutionary governments
East Ukraines (aka hybrid warfare)
Cooperating or allying with states that have adversarial
Shanghai Cooperation Organization; arms sales and security
relations with the intervening state
cooperation with Venezuela, Iran, Syria
Arms buildups and military deployments against the
Large-scale military exercises targeted at NATO states;
intervening state and its allies
renewed long-distance fights by nuclear bombers
116
Figure 1. The security dilemma
two states now find themselves in a traditional security

dilemma, a form familiar to most students of international relations.
States can avoid the traditional (externally generated)
security dilemma by adopting policies that are overtly defensive rather than offensive in nature,3 or by engaging
in confidence-building measures (disarmament, limitations of troop deployments, or exchange of sensitive information about each others capabilities). An actor with
aggressive intentions would not be willing to take these
kinds of actions, and thus these measures constitute
costly signals that allow states to reassure their potential
adversaries that their motives are defensive and benign
(Morrow 1999). Nevertheless, this kind of solution to
the security dilemma is fraught with difficulties. In taking
the kinds of actions needed to signal benign intentions,
states undermine their ability to defend themselves
against states whose intentions are truly aggressive.
Thus, even benign states are reluctant to make reassuring
moves that may jeopardize their security.
Theorists often make the distinction between offensive

and defensive weapons systems. A state that looks to
practice reassurance will be sensitive to this distinction
and look to deploy defensive systems when possible.
However, this distinction is not always clear, as many
ostensibly defensive systems can also be used for offensive purposes. Moreover, much depends on the overall state of military technology. When offense dominates
over defense, states will have little choice but to adopt
offensive systems. See Jervis (1978); Van Evera (1998).
Instituting a policy of reassurance that avoids the security dilemma is difficult enough in the real world of international politics. The internal dimension of the security dilemma not only complicates the relationship, but also
creates a unique problem even more difficult to solve. Fears
of internal meddling are generated, not only by the policies of other states, but also by the internal vulnerabilities
of a targeted state. In reviewing the model in Figure 2, it is
thus unclear as to exactly what kind of policies will reassure
state A that B will not take advantage of its internal vulnerabilities. State A will always harbor the fear of being taken
advantage of as long as internal vulnerabilities exist. Even
if state B stops its policy of promoting democracy and human rights, this may not be enough to assuage state As fears
of internal destabilization. In a world where the most prominent potential challengers to US hegemony (i.e., China and
Russia) are developing states that exhibit these internal
vulnerabilities, avoiding a security dilemma in the form
outlined above is a particularly challenging problem for
policymakers. I will return to this issue in the conclusion
with some policy prescriptions, but there are no easy solutions to this conundrum.
Internal Vulnerabilities in Contemporary

China and Russia
The current literature on how the foreign policies of
developing states are shaped by internal vulnerabilities is
described in detail above. However, as demonstrated,
there is a gap in the current literature with respect to the
more advanced developing countries such as China and
Russia. The central insights of Ayoob, David, and other
Figure 2. Modified security dilemma that accounts for internal dimensions
ANDREJ KRICKOVIC
Liberal democracy is not the only ideology that can confer legitimacy to a regime. The examples of communism,
fascism, and (in the present day) Islamic fundamentalism have all played a similar legitimizing role for
regimes. Nevertheless, neither Russia nor China have
thus far been able to develop a coherent ideological
alternative to liberal democracy that would command
peoples loyalty (Laqueur 2014; Shamabaugh 2013).
Russia or Tibetans and Uighurs in China). There is also a

danger that ethnic unrest can spread to other minorities,
who thus far have not actively sought to challenge the legitimacy of the state (Tatars in Russia or Mongols and
Manchu in China). In Russia, future calls for secession
may come from ethnic Russians themselves. The current
state structure professes to represent an all-Russian (rossiskii) identity that includes many non-ethnic Russian
groups, as opposed to an exclusively ethnic Russian identity (russkii) identity. Calls for separatism could arise
from nationalists that espouse a more exclusive ethnically-based definition of Russian identity. These groups
may strive to build a more ethnically pure Russian state
that excludes minority groups (Akt
urk 2012).
Internal ethnic and religious divisions can give rise to
separatist and secessionist movements that threaten the survival of these states. The defense of territorial integrity is a
central security concern for any state. But threats to territorial integrity can come from within as well as outside the
territorial boundaries of a state. Moreover, governments
that face these kinds of threats must also be concerned that
failure to defend against secessionist movements can lead to
popular protests, a threat to regime stability in its own
right. This is particularly true of the Chinese leadership,
which must deal with active ethnic separatist movements in
Tibet and Xinjiang, as well as the thorny issue of Taiwan.
These issues challenge the very foundations of the Peoples
Republic of China (PRC), as the communist regimes legitimacy is closely tied to its ability to defend the countrys territorial integrity and national unity. Many observers argue
that sustained popular protests by Taiwan for independence
or any manifestations of separatism on the part of Chinas
Tibetan and Uighur minorities could jeopardize the Chinese
Communist Partys ability to hold on to power (Chen Weiss
2014). Thus, ethnic separatism represents a direct threat to
the regime, despite the fact that the Han Chinese comprise
over 90 percent of the population, and are the predominant
ethnic group even in territories with the greatest ethnic tensions (Zang 2015).
These legitimacy problems are exacerbated by the
fact that, despite their robust record of development and
growth in recent years, China and Russia are still developing countries and face all the negative social, economic,
and political effects of backwardness and peripheral status
in the world economy. China still lags behind the West in
terms of its overall level of development and the welfare of
its population. Economic development and improved
communication with the outside world give rise to demonstrations effects, whereby expectations for the future
are defined in comparison to the good life in the developed countries of the West rather than by what is actually
economically feasible (Janos 1986). Even as China over-
scholars exploring the nexus between internal and external security concerns are still relevant (i.e., that the security concerns of nations undergoing nation and state
building differ profoundly from those of developed
Western states). However, as demonstrated earlier via
the theoretical models, advanced developing countries,
with both internal vulnerabilities and an ability to project national power, pose a unique problema problem
not yet fully analyzed by scholars. Despite the progress
Russia and China have made in recent decades, they still
lag behind developed Western states in terms of legitimacy and institutional state capacity. These deficiencies
are vulnerabilities that fundamentally shape how Russia
and China define their security.
Although Russia and China are not vulnerable to the
same type of uprisings and insurgencies described in Ayoobs
work on the least developed countries, they do remain vulnerable over concerns of leader and institutional legitimacy.
In authoritarian countries such as China and Russia, where
elections are absent or manipulated, leader legitimacy is fragile and tied directly to the ruling governments performance
in delivering collective goods valued by citizens, such as economic growth or international status.4 Openly contested
elections confer a certain degree of legitimacy to elected authorities that even domestic opponents must recognize (Baldwin 1989). Elected officials are often given the benefit of the
doubt by the electorate, and their right to rule (at least for
the period of their mandate) is unchallenged unless they
egregiously violate the law. When performance does not
meet citizens expectations, they are liable to take to the
streets or engage in other kinds of anti-systemic protests, including acts of violence. This creates problems of internal security for both the state and its leaders.
The constitution of the political community (which
groups belong and which do not) is also contested as ethnic and religious fissures continue to divide these states.
In most cases, the situation is not as dire as it is in many
third-world states, as the titular ethnic groups (be they
Han Chinese or ethnic Russians) are dominant in terms
of their numbers. Yet, these countries still have large ethnic and religious minorities, many of which do not accept
the legitimacy of existing state structures (Chechens in
117
118
Table 2. Different dimensions of the legitimacy deficit faced

by China and Russia
Regime
Community
Territoriality
takes the United States in terms of overall gross domestic

product (GDP) in the next few years, it will still lag behind
in GDP per capita for decades to come. This may breed resentment, as reality does not meet the expectations created
by economic growth (Chen Weiss 2014).
These kinds of expectations can be particularly problematic for authoritarian regimes, such as China, whose
legitimacy has come to rest on its ability to maintain high
levels of economic growth (Shirk 2007). High levels of
economic growth, coupled with unequal growth in income among the social classes, may spur class tension
and erode the governments legitimacy, giving rise to
calls for a redistribution of wealth based on social justice.
Unfulfilled economic expectations can also aggravate
ethnic tensions. Economic and social grievances, often
politicized along ethnic lines, give rise to ethnic violence
and potentially to calls for secession. The problem of
unfulfilled economic expectations leading to political instability is perhaps even more acute in Russia. Russians
are culturally much closer to the West than the Chinese,
and are thus more susceptible to economic and political
demonstration effects emanating from the Western world
(English 2000).
Thus far, Chinas economic system has been able to
keep pace with its populations expectations. This may
change over time, especially if economic growth slows
and demonstration effects increase. This potentially
volatile combination of slower economic growth and
greater awareness by the Chinese people as to their economic inequities vis-a-vis the developed world may
erode the legitimacy of the social and economic system,
and by extension the legitimacy of the ruling government. Russias economic system, which is the product
of wild and turbulent economic reforms throughout the
1990s, already faces such a crisis of legitimacy. The far-
Economic
and social
system
The authority of state leaders and state

institutions is highly contested. Legitimacy,
when it does exist, is tenuous and based
exclusively on the governments performance.
Ethnic, racial, and religious diversity is
highly politicized. Who is and who is not a
member of the political community is
contested.
The borders of the state are called into question
because of active separatist and irredentist
movements.
Lack of acceptance by large parts of the population
of social and economic hierarchies and the
distribution of wealth in society.
reaching redistribution of property and wealth in the

1990s has not yet been accepted by a broad segment of
the Russian elite and public. Calls for the complete reversal of the privatization process remain popular
nearly twenty-five years after these reforms began
(Hedlund 2013). Table 2 summarizes the different aspects of the domestic legitimacy deficits faced by Russia
and China.
Internal vulnerabilities also give rise to external ones.
While internally vulnerable powers have improved their
state capacity and internal legitimacy, the degree and nature
of external challenges have also changed for the worse. As
the world becomes increasingly interconnected, it is becoming increasingly difficult for governments to manage civil
unrest within their borders. Relatively small groups that
wish to challenge the state can take advantage of new communication technologies and more porous borders to have
a much greater impact than their small numbers would suggest. They may also be able to expand their movements to
the point where they can mount a significant challenge to
the state. Political instability and popular protests can
spread quickly, as was evident in the Arab Spring, which
both Moscow and Beijing saw as a threat (Fallows 2011).
There is a fear among leaders in China and Russia
that the United States and other developed states will
take advantage of these vulnerabilities and act to destabilize their internal political situations. According to
Jeanne Wilson, in this respect, both governments considered that a policy of subversion, which acts to undermine the structural underpinnings of the state, poses in
many respects a greater threat to the maintenance of
state sovereignty and regime legitimacy than the more
straightforward challenges of conventional military intimidation (2009, 27273).
Russian leaders have fully embraced this narrative
since the onset of the Color Revolutions, which swept
through the post-Soviet region in the early 2000s and
brought pro-Western governments to power in Georgia
and Ukraine. Russia, believing that the United States
directly supported these revolutions, viewed US involvement as both an attack on its geopolitical interests in the
region and as an existential threat to regime survival.
According to Vladislav Surkov (2006, 53742), a close
adviser to President Vladimir Putin, the greatest threat to
Russia is an oligarchic revanchea fringe alliance of
marginalized political forces encouraged by visiting
diplomats to engineer a soft takeover, according to
modern-day orange techniques. This will subject Russia to the dominance of foreigners eager to exploit the
countrys resource wealth.
The Kremlin was quick to identify NGOs as the main
protagonists in the Color Revolutions and took steps to
ANDREJ KRICKOVIC
istration shows to the world that in fact it is not the

American democracy that is lovable, but the American
arbitrariness that is hateful. In May 2005, President Hu
Jintao himself is believed to have issued an internal
report calling for vigilance against American attempts to
start a Color Revolution in China. Chinese intelligence
officials were dispatched to Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan to investigate the circumstances around the revolutions in those countries. Chinese academics were sent
to the United States to determine whether or not the US
was also planning on fomenting a Color Revolution in
China (Wilson 2009). Taking a cue from Russia, Chinese
leaders clamped down on civil society, NGOs, and news
media (Krickovic and Specter 2008). China and Russia
also issued a joint statement through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) calling on the United States
to make clear its timetable for withdrawing its forces
from Central Asia. The China Peoples Daily (2005b)
interpreted this as a dazzling signal to the world that
SCO countries would reject Western democracy promotion efforts, affirming that the the people of each country have their right to choose their own path of
development.
Chinas leaders accept the Russian narrative that the
Maidan Revolution and the overthrow of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych were orchestrated by the US government through its Ukrainian proxies. Chinas Global
Times, a paper with close ties to the communist party,
published a scathing commentary on the West s role in
Ukraine. The columnist opined: Once again, people see
another great country torn apart because of a clumsy and
selfish West that boasts too many lofty ideals but always
comes up short of practical solutions (Global Times
2014). They also see Western meddling as being behind
the recent street protests in Hong Kong. China Daily
(2014), another paper with ties to the government, argued
that like the Color Revolutions in the post-Soviet space,
Hong Kongs Umbrella Revolution (as the protest
movement had come to be called) was part of a larger US
and Western conspiracy to undermine Chinas political
system. Color Revolutions usually have fancy names
Rose Revolution in Georgia, Orange in Ukraine and
Tulip in Kyrgyzstan. More recently, there was the Jasmine Revolution in the Middle East and the Sunflower
Movement in Taiwan. But in reality, these movements
were poison laced with honey (China Daily 2014).
According to Yang Cheng (2014), a professor at East
China Normal University and an adviser to the Central
Committee of the Communist Party, The United States
and Great Britain are clearly trying to destabilize the situation in Hong Kong through their proxies in the so called
democratic movement. . . the goal as always is to put po-
bring them and other elements of civil society under

tighter control. Russia even went so far as to organize its
own loyalist youth movements, which mimicked the style
and tactics of the youth movements that were involved in
the Color Revolutions. These groups could take to the
streets to support the government in the event that massive
anti-regime protests broke out (Krickovic and Specter
2008). The Arab Spring heightened fears of Western meddling, as Russia and China observed Western support to
anti-government rebels in Libya and Syria. At an international conference devoted to the threat of Color Revolutions in Moscow in May of 2014, Russian military officers
described the phenomenon as a new approach to warfare
that focuses on creating internal political instability and
fomenting revolutions as a means of achieving geopolitical
interests at low cost and with minimal casualties. Color
Revolutions were presented as posing a potential threat to
Russia, China, and other developing states not aligned
with the United States (Cordesman 2014).
Most recently, Russian leaders claim that Western economic sanctions enacted in response to Russias policies in
Ukraine are designed to foment regime change in Moscow. According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, public figures in Western countries say there is a
need to impose sanctions that will destroy the economy
and cause public protests. . .the West is making it clear it
does not want to force Russia to change policy but wants
to secure regime change (Reuters 2014a). These comments echoed earlier warnings by President Putin, that
under the present situation, Russia must be on guard
against the threat of a Color Revolution (Reuters 2014b).
The Russian governments latest official military doctrine,
released in December 2014, designates regime change in
neighboring countries and the undermining of domestic
stability by foreign powers as two of the most dangerous
security threats that Russia now faces. It can be observed that military dangers and threats are moving into the
information sphere and the domestic sphere of the Russian Federation (Voennaya Doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii 2014).
The idea that Color Revolutions are organized from
Washington as a way to destabilize geopolitical rivals
has also gained currency in China. In the wake of the
2005 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, a flurry of internal
party memos and newspaper articles appeared, warning
of the dangers of a Color Revolution. A widely circulated
editorial in the official China Peoples Daily (2005a)
claimed that it was clear that the United States was behind the recent wave of revolutionssomething the US
government itself did not deny but rather showed selfsatisfaction. The editorial concluded by stating that
The democratic offensive pursued by the Bush admin-
119
120
side. These kinds of claims are often used to delegitimize

home-grown opposition that stems from genuine grievances on the part of the domestic population. Authoritarian leaders often equate the security of their regime with
the security of the nation, reflecting their narrow interests of staying in power and protecting their position of
wealth and privilege. Nevertheless, the record of failed
states from Libya to Afghanistan shows that, in many instances, these claims are not entirely unfounded. Where
state institutions collapse the alternative to authoritarian
rule is often more detrimental to the citizenry than even
the most repressive dictatorship. Larger security interests
are not always in conflict with the narrower interests of
elites. Just because repressive policies serve authoritarian
leaders personal interests does not preclude the possibility that some are also motivated by what they see to
be genuine national security concerns. Admittedly, this
is not always the case, and some authoritarian leaders
deliberately manipulate internal security concerns to
feed their own lust for wealth and power. Sorting out predatory regimes from those that do have larger national interests in mind (at least to some minimally accepted degree)
represents a significant challenge for scholars looking to
explore the internal dimensions of security in the developing world.
The discussion thus far has focused on China and
Russia, but other large developing states have exhibited
concerns about internal meddling. The view of Color
Revolutions held by China and Russia has not gained
official acceptance by governments in either Brazil or India. As democracies, neither of these countries see themselves as targets for a Color Revolution the same way
that Russia or China do. Yet, both countries continue to
be suspicious of the Wests meddling in the internal
affairs of other countries and accept the Russian narrative about events in Kiev (Malik 2014; Weissheimer
2014). This kind of thinking is informed by Indian and
Brazilian elites knowledge of their countries own acute
internal vulnerabilities.
To a certain degree, both Brazil and India are secure
and, as democracies, enjoy a reservoir of legitimacy that autocrats in Beijing or Moscow envy. Nevertheless, internal
security problems abound, whether in the form of separatism and religious fanaticism in India, or political protests
and violence by large, disenfranchised segments of society
in Brazil. These states share a keen appreciation of how
profoundly destabilizing external intervention, even in the
seemingly benign form of democracy or human rights promotion, can be for developing countries (Stuenkel and Jacob 2010). For now, their skepticism has not given rise to
widespread suspicions about internal meddling in their
own countries. In the future, internal vulnerabilities within
litical pressure and destabilize the internal situation in

China itself.
Party cadres are instructed to be vigilant against American efforts to overthrow the communist system through
peaceful evolutionthat is, the spread of Western ideas
and culture (Page 2013). Professor Wang Tiejun (2014),
an international relations expert at East China Normal
University, believes that Chinas elites feel particularly vulnerable to internal unrest because of the rapid social
changes the country is now experiencing. Chinas leaders
feel a revolutionary threat because this is a crucial time of
transition that is full of conflicts and contradictions
between the people and the government (Wang 2014). In
the past, US officials such as Robert Zoellick (2005) have
prodded China to adopt democratic reforms that would
lead to a peaceful political transition to make its government accountable and responsible to its people. Though
they are not as vocal as elites in Russia, Chinas elites also
see ulterior motives behind these calls for democratic
change. From their point of view the imperialists can
never give up their intention to transform China peacefully, offering the Chinese people liberty, individualism
and consumerism and leading to the decay of traditional
Chinese virtues and national pride (Wang 2014).
Moscow and Beijing see Washingtons direct hand in
the Color Revolutions, Arab Spring, and other instances
of domestic instability in developing countries. While
their beliefs in a conscious conspiracy may be largely
unfounded, their beliefs about the negative effects that
Western influence has on internal stability rest on a more
solid foundation. Western influence need not come in the
form of policies orchestrated at the top level of government. NGOs or smaller interest groups within Western
governments also have influence and promote their own
agendas, which often diverge from the Western governments foreign and defense policies. Moreover, influence
need not be coordinated on any level, either governmental or non-state. Demonstration effects and the promotion of democracy and human rights as an ideology and
standard of civilized behavior are a serious threat to
states that are dealing with legitimacy issues and still
struggling with the problems of economic development
and state building. These forces can be just as, if not more,
destabilizing as a potential coup or street protest directly
organized by Western intelligence services. In complaining
about pernicious Western influence and suggesting that it
comes directly from Washington or Brussels, Russian and
Chinese leaders are assuming conspiratorial forces at
work even though the melange of efforts directed at development are often beyond the control of any given state.
Authoritarian leaders find it in their interests to portray any form of opposition as being fomented from out-
ANDREJ KRICKOVIC
both these powers may very well become a source of conflict that catalyzes security dilemmas between them and
other great powers, including the United States.
The Internal Dimension of the Security

Dilemma at Work: Russias Reaction to the
Color Revolutions and the New Cold War
cracked down violently on the ensuing street protests to

prevent a Color Revolution (dubbed by protesters the
Blue Jeans Revolution) from happening in Minsk
(Ambrosio 2009).
In order to cement its influence in Central Asia and
prevent the spread of Color Revolutions in the region,
Moscow renewed its commitment to regional security institutions such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and (in partnership with China) the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization. Both organizations have improved their ability to address non-conventional regional
security threats such as terrorism and drug trafficking,
making authoritarian regimes in the region less dependent
on the United States for protectionand thus less susceptible to US pressure on democracy and human rights (Aris
2010). It is under the auspices of the SCO that China and
Russia called for the closure of US bases in Central Asia.
Russia also began defensive efforts on the broader
world stage. Russian officials stepped up their public
criticism of US foreign policy. Putin openly accused the
United States of being behind the Color Revolutions in
his (now infamous) Munich speech, shocking many
Western observers with his defiant language and his
open call for a turning away from US dominance and
toward a multipolar world order (Putin 2007). Outside
the immediate post-Soviet region, Russia stepped up military cooperation with countries that have had contentious relations with the United States. Moscow negotiated arms sales and held military exercises with
Venezuela, Syria, and Iran. It renewed regular patrols by
its strategic bombersincluding a surprise trip by a
squadron of Tu-160 bombers to Venezuela in 2008.
Moscow also intensified troop deployments and military
exercises on its borders. A large-scale military exercise in
2009 simulated both a nuclear strike on Poland and an
uprising by a Polish minority in Belarus (Day 2009).
Moscows reactive moves, in turn, raised fears in
Washington and other Western capitals about Russias
true intentions. Rather than seeing Russias moves as defensive, Western leaders have come to suspect that Russia harbors imperialist and revanchist ambitions in the
post-Soviet space and beyond, including Poland, the Baltics, and other member-states of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). Putins statement that the collapse
of the Soviet Union was the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century is commonly cited as evidence of
the Kremlins true goal of overturning the results of the
end of the Cold War and reestablishing its sphere of influence in the former Soviet states and Eastern Europe (Lucas
2009).
Moscows fears of the Color Revolutions thus set
Russias relations with the West on a downward trajec-
Russias reaction to the Color Revolutions in Georgia in

2003, Ukraine in 2004, and Kyrgyzstan in 2005, and the
fears and concerns that these have provoked in the West,
provide an example of how internal vulnerabilities can
work to generate a security dilemma. As has been noted
above, Russian leaders firmly believed that these revolutions were orchestrated by the United States, through the
international network of US-backed democracy-promoting NGOs. Moreover, Russian leaders also feared that
these revolutions in the post-Soviet republics were, in aggregate, a rehearsal for regime change in the Kremlin
(Tsygankov 2013, 177). For Putin and other Russian leaders, the United States ultimate goal was to undermine
Russian state power and make it subservient to the United
States (Wilson 2009). Anti-regime protesters in Tbilisi and
Kiev (though not in Bishkek, where the uprising was
much less organized) were well-integrated with the worldwide network of democracy promotion NGOs that has
arisen with US sponsorship. And American leaders undoubtedly would have welcomed changes in Moscow that
brought a more cooperative government to power (Mitchell 2012). But there is scant evidence that Washington had
a direct hand in these events or that it was planning on
bringing regime change to Russia. Nevertheless, this is
how these events were perceived in the Kremlin. Russias
internal weaknesses, manifest in the legitimacy deficits of
its political institutions, made the regime internally vulnerable. This gave rise to fears of US meddling that would
jeopardize Russias sovereignty and national security.
The Russian leadership adopted measures to guard
against internal dissent. These included organizing proregime youth groups, who could be mobilized against
anti-regime protesters, and clamping down on domestic
opposition and NGOs (Krickovic and Specter 2008). In
the immediate post-Soviet region, Russia tried to curtail
US influence by lending support to authoritarian regimes
throughout the region that faced their own Color Revolutionary threats. For example, Russia backed Uzbek
President Islam Karimov after the massacre of protesters
in the Uzbek city of Andijan in May 2005, encouraging
him to close the US airbase in Uzbekistan in response to
US criticism over human rights violations. Russia also
lent diplomatic and material support to Belarussian
strongman President Aleksander Lukashenko and then
121
122
Scholars have put forward two alternative explanations

for Russias response to the Color Revolutions and its action in Ukraine (Tsygankov 2015). The first explanation
shows Russias actions as motivated by the leaderships
nationalist and imperial ambitionsexpansionist and
aggressive foreign policy that seeks to reconstitute its former empire (Lucas 2009). Russias annexation of Crimea
and attempts to create a Novorossiya in Eastern Ukraine
are just the latest manifestations of Russias historical irredentism (Snyder 2015). The second explanation, which is
closer to the theory of diversionary war discussed above,
views Russias aggressive foreign policy as a means of
legitimizing what is essentially a corrupt and kleptocratic
regime (Dawisha 2011). According to proponents of this
argument, Putins actions in Ukraine are intended to coalesce Russias middle class around Russian nationalism
a diversionary tactic to suppress their growing frustrations
over economic stagnation and creeping authoritarianism.
Russian citizens growing discontent was clearly evident in
the winter of 2011, when massive demonstrations against
electoral fraud brought tens of thousands of people to the
street (Stoner and McFaul 2015).
Yet, none of these explanations really hold up to closer
scrutiny. Russias historical right to an empire in the
former Soviet states may indeed have a certain appeal for
many Russians. However, in its foreign policy, Moscow
has been reluctant to invest its blood and treasure toward
a renewed drive for a Eurasian empire or to bear the many
burdens of regional leadership (Trenin 2011). Even in
Ukraine, the goal of Russias policy is not outright military
conquest and territorial gain; rather it seeks to influence
the government in Kiev to adopt pro-Russian policies and
to refrain from allying with NATO and the European
Union (Suslov 2014).
The diversionary hypothesis also has trouble accounting for Russias actual behavior. In retrospect, the actual
probability of a Color Revolution coming to Red Square
in 20072008 appeared remote. One may argue that
this lends credence to a diversionary explanation for
their behavior. However, if we examine the context in
which these events occurred, we can understand how
Russian leaders had real fears. The Color Revolutions
coincided with a period of leadership transition in the
Kremlin (between the Putin and Medvedev presidencies),
which opened up fissures within the political elite. Moreover, Russia has a long history of sudden and unexpected
revolutionary change. Given this context and an analysis
of the formal and informal discourse among Russias
elites, Peter Duncan (2012) concluded that the fears of a
Color Revolution were genuine, and that Russias leaders
acted to prevent a revolution rather than divert the publics
attention from domestic problems. Furthermore, leading up
tory that has culminated in the current Ukraine crisis.

This crisis exhibits many of the elements of a security
dilemma. Russian leaders viewed US involvement in the
revolution in Kiev, which ousted the pro-Russian Yanukovich government, as a form of intervention that could
also be used against Russia (Karaganov 2014). Russia
reacted to what its leaders viewed as a US-backed
putsch in Kiev by annexing Crimea to shore up its strategic assets in the Black Sea and by fomenting an armed
insurrection in the countrys East to undermine the new
Ukrainian authorities. These moves have exacerbated
fears in the West about the Russian threat.
In response to perceived meddling by Western powers,
Russia increased its own capabilities to exploit the internal
vulnerabilities of the postSoviet satellite states. Russian
interventions in Crimea and Ukraine were highly effective.
Leading up to the current confrontation, the Kremlin supported the development of pro-Russian NGOs, which
played a pivotal role in the drive for Crimeas declaration of
independence and eventual annexation by Russia. Russia
has also developed the ability to engage in what NATO
leaders call hybrid warfare (Barnes 2015). In Eastern
Ukraine, Russia relied on local proxies and Russian irregulars to do most of the fighting, and developed a sophisticated system to coordinate their actions with the selective
use of Russian Special Forces and regular troops. These
activities are augmented with propaganda (via radio,
television, blogs, etc.) to disseminate Moscows narrative
and incite protests against the former Soviet satellite governments. NATO and Western leaders now worry that
Russia will use the same tactics in the Baltic States,
taking advantage of the grievances of these countries
Russian ethnic minorities to create local conflicts that
warrant Russian intervention.
It is unclear if Russia has developed the hybrid warfare
capabilities and operational plans to expand its influence into the Baltic States (Kofman and Rojansky 2015).
Nevertheless, Russias actions in Ukraine have incited
fears among countries in the West. Thus, the security dilemma created by Russias internal insecurities has come
full circle, as Russias own concern about foreign meddling has led it to adopt policies that give rise to the same
kind of fears in NATO countries. The alliance responded
to these fears by strengthening its troop presence and increasing its military exercises. These take place on Russias
borders, awakening Russias traditional fears about external threats. Russia has responded by increasing its own
military activities in the region, which further fuels anxieties on the part of NATO states. The two sides thus find
themselves in the vicious cycle emblematic of the security
dilemmawhere each sides efforts to improve their own
security threaten the security of the other side.
ANDREJ KRICKOVIC
Conclusion
Rather than focusing solely on the external security
threats that states face from one another, a more compre-
hensive theory of the security dilemma must account for

the internal security challenges emanating from within
states. Internal insecurities can catalyze security dilemmas
with other states. States that suffer from internal insecurity related to the weak legitimacy of their political regimes, state institutions, national identity, and borders
will fear that these vulnerabilities are being exploited by
outside powers. As a result, they will begin to adopt internal and external policies to push back against the
perceived intervention. These policies will threaten the intervening states, setting off the familiar cycle of response
and counter-response that characterizes the security dilemma.
A world where the most prominent potential challengers to US hegemony, China and Russia, are developing
states that exhibit internal vulnerabilities, presents a particularly difficult problem for policymakers that want to
avoid security dilemmas. States can try to address the fears
caused by the external dimension of the security dilemma
by adopting security policies that signal their defensive
intentions and thereby reassure other states. Trying to
institute these kinds of policies is difficult enough in the
real world. Policies of reassurance come with great risks,
as they leave states that adopt them vulnerable to attack
by aggressive powers (Montgomery 2006). The picture is
further complicated by the internal dimension of the security dilemma, as fears about the intentions of other states
are not necessarily generated by other states behavior but
by the internal vulnerabilities themselves.
Western states may be able to assuage some fears that
rise out of internal vulnerabilities. They could, for instance,
affirm their commitments to the territorial status quo and
be careful to avoid encouraging the separatist aspirations
of disgruntled minorities. However, when it comes to policies that threaten the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes,
the situation is much more complicated. Even policies that
may have the most benign motives behind them, such as
American and European efforts to promote democracy and
human rights, may be misinterpreted as efforts to destabilize and take advantage of internal weaknesses. Western
leaders must recognize that democracy and human rights
promotion can give rise to acute security concerns in the
target states that can exacerbate conflict and increase geopolitical conflict in cases where these states are great
powers, such as China and Russia. This does not necessarily mean that the West needs to abandon its commitment
to the advancement of these core principles and values.
Advocates of democracy and human rights can tailor their
efforts to make them less threatening. Rather than promoting policies that give rise to fears of regime change and
internal destabilization, they can promote more policies
that work toward gradual change by strengthening domes-
to the Ukraine crisis, it is not clear that Putin faced the kind
of domestic opposition that would make a diversionary foreign policy necessary. His popularity had recovered from
the 2011 street protests in Moscow (at least among Russias
conservative silent majority) to the point where he felt
comfortable making substantial concessions to the domestic
opposition, such as the liberalization of electoral laws and
the freeing of political prisoners (Tsygankov 2015).
A more convincing explanation is put forward by
Andrei Tysgankov (2015), who argues that Russias policies
visavis the Color Revolution are reactive and reflect Moscows fears of Western encroachment in its sphere of influence. Tysgankov argues that Russias motivations also
include a desire to protect its identity and traditional cultural values from the onslaught of Western postmodernism.
A complete understanding of Russias reactive policies,
however, must also acknowledge the critical role that Russias internal insecurities have played in the calculations of
its leaders. Because of Russias domestic vulnerabilities,
Color Revolutions in neighboring states, or the toppling of
a friendly regime in Ukraine, can have spillover effects that
directly threaten Russian domestic political stability and
regime survival. Russias meddling in former Soviet states is
thus a defensive reaction against what Russian leaders see
as a direct existential threat to the regime.
Nevertheless, the West has seen these actions as evidence of Russias imperial ambitions or the Kremlins
need to divert attention from domestic problems. Many
Western leaders now see Putins Russia as a revisionist
power, determined to reverse the outcome of the Cold
War and reestablish Russian hegemony in the post-Soviet
space (Pifer and Talbott 2015). Conversely, Russian leaders are convinced that economic sanctions and other policies instituted by the West to isolate and punish Russia are
ultimately aimed at regime change (Suslov 2014). In retaliating against what it perceives to be US meddling in its
internal affairs, Russia has aggravated security concerns in
the West. Of course, the Color Revolutions and the Russian reaction to them are not the only reasons behind the
deterioration of Russias relations with the West. NATO
enlargement, the expansion of the US missile defense program, and Russias growing authoritarianism have also
contributed to worsening relations. Yet, Russias internal
insecurities have been an important catalyst to the current
conflict and have given rise to security concerns on both
sides, which are in turn propelling US and Russia toward a
new Cold War (Trenin 2014).
123
124
relevant to the issue of legitimacy. Maintaining a coherent

sense of identity and purpose is essential to states legitimacy
in the eyes of domestic publics as well as other states.
Exploring the ontological dimensions of the security dilemma thus represents a promising area for future research
that may help us develop a better understanding of how
states establish and maintain legitimacy. Moreover, it may
also allow us to link security dilemma theorizing with theories of democratic peace, something that surveys of the security dilemma literature have found lacking (Tang 2009).
Some scholars believe that todays emerging powers
internal vulnerabilities will help keep the peace by hindering their ability to project power on the world stage (Nye
2011). But, ironically, this may not be the case if these
states believe that their internal weaknesses are being exploited by other states. These states may have internal
weaknesses, but they are still great powers. They have the
ability to project their state power externally beyond their
borders and to threaten the security of other states, including with their nuclear weapons. This can lead to the rise of
security dilemmas in their relations with other great
powers, exacerbating security competition and creating
more instability and conflict in world politics.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Steven Walt, Deborah Avant, Erica
Chenoweth, Felix Berenskoetter, and all of the participants
in the Journal of Global Security Studys Special Issue
Workshop, held April 2930, 2015, at the University of
Denver for their invaluable comments, criticisms, and editorial suggestions to earlier drafts of this article.
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Catalyzing Conflict: The Internal Dimension of The Security Dilemma

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Journal of Global Security Studies, 1(2), 2016, 111126

Catalyzing Conflict: The Internal Dimension of the

Keywords: security dilemma, developing states, Russia, China

The Wests attempts to isolate Russia during the recent

speaks to feelings of vulnerability and insecurity shared

All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com

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Catalyzing Conflict: The Internal Dimension of the Security Dilemma

Internal Security Concerns and States

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However, unlike the least developed countries, China and

Non-state actors include multinational corporations,

Expanding the Security Dilemma to

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threatened the survival of their regimes (Levy 1989).

Catalyzing Conflict: The Internal Dimension of the Security Dilemma

Where they have the power and capability to do so,

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The internal insecurities of states can also play a pivotal

Example from the Russian case

Restricting domestic political space;

behavior as a product of its increasingly authoritarian

Liberal international relations theorists have argued that

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Laws restricting activities of foreign NGOs;

Catalyzing Conflict: The Internal Dimension of the Security Dilemma

Figure 1. The security dilemma

two states now find themselves in a traditional security

Theorists often make the distinction between offensive

Internal Vulnerabilities in Contemporary

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Figure 2. Modified security dilemma that accounts for internal dimensions

Russia or Tibetans and Uighurs in China). There is also a

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Catalyzing Conflict: The Internal Dimension of the Security Dilemma

Table 2. Different dimensions of the legitimacy deficit faced

takes the United States in terms of overall gross domestic

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The authority of state leaders and state

reaching redistribution of property and wealth in the

istration shows to the world that in fact it is not the

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bring them and other elements of civil society under

Catalyzing Conflict: The Internal Dimension of the Security Dilemma

side. These kinds of claims are often used to delegitimize

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litical pressure and destabilize the internal situation in

The Internal Dimension of the Security

cracked down violently on the ensuing street protests to

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Russias reaction to the Color Revolutions in Georgia in

Catalyzing Conflict: The Internal Dimension of the Security Dilemma

Scholars have put forward two alternative explanations

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tory that has culminated in the current Ukraine crisis.

hensive theory of the security dilemma must account for

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Catalyzing Conflict: The Internal Dimension of the Security Dilemma

relevant to the issue of legitimacy. Maintaining a coherent

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tic political institutions, property rights, and the rule of

edited by Per-Arne Bodin, Stefan Hedlund, Elena Namli,

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