G.R. No.

195432

August 27, 2014

EDELINA T. ANDO, Petitioner,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
nullification of the Orders dated 14 January and 8 February 2011 issued by the
Regional Trial Court (R TC), Third Judicial Region, Branch 45,1 City of San
Fernando, Pampanga, in Civil Case No. 137, which dismissed the Petition for
Declaratory Relief filed therein.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND OF THE CASE
The pertinent facts of the case, as alleged by petitioner, are as follows:
3. On 16 September 2001, petitioner married Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese
National, in a civil wedding solemnized at Candaba, Pampanga. A copy of their
Certificate of Marriage is hereto attached as Annex 'A' and made an integral part
hereof.
4. On 16 September 2004, Yuichiro Kobayashi sought in Japan, and was validly
granted under Japanese laws, a divorce in respect of his marriage with petitioner.
A copy of the Divorce Certificate duly issued by the Consulate-General of Japan
and duly authenticated by the Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila, is here to as
Annex B and made an integral part hereof.
5. Said Divorce Certificate was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registry
of Manila. A copy of the Certification dated 28 October 2005 is hereto attached as
Annex C and made an integral part hereof.
6. Believing in good faith that said divorce capacitated her to remarry and that by
such she reverted to her single status, petitioner married Masatomi Y. Ando on 13
September 2005 in a civil wedding celebrated in Sta. Ana, Pampanga. A copy of
their Certificate of Marriage is hereto attached as Annex D and made an integral
part hereof.
7. In the meantime, Yuichiro Kobayashi married Ryo Miken on 27 December 2005.
A copy of the Japanese Family Registry Record of Kobayashi showing the divorce
he obtained and his remarriage with Ryo Miken, duly authenticated by the
Consulate-General of Japan and the Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila, is
hereto attached as Annex E and made an integral part hereof.
8. Recently, petitioner applied for the renewal of her Philippine passport to
indicate her surname with her husband Masatomi Y. Ando but she was told at the
Department of Foreign Affairs that the same cannot be issued to her until she can
prove by competent court decision that her marriage with her said husband
Masatomi Y. Ando is valid until otherwise declared.
xxxx
12. Prescinding from the foregoing, petitioners marriage with her said husband
Masatomi Y. Ando mustt herefore be honored, considered and declared valid, until
otherwise declared by a competent court. Consequently, and until then, petitioner

therefore is and must be declared entitled to the issuance of a Philippine passport

under the name Edelina Ando y Tungol. Hence, this petitioner pursuant to Rule
63 of the Rules of Court.2
On 29 October 2010, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Declaratory Relief,
which was later raffled off to Branch 46. She impleaded the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) as respondent and prayed for the following reliefs before the lower
court:
WHEREFORE, petitioner most respectfully prays of this Honorable Court that after
proper proceedings, judgment be rendered, as follows:
(a) declaring as valid and subsisting the marriage between petitioner Edelina T.
Ando and her husband Masatomi Y. Ando until otherwise declared by a competent
court;
(b) declaring petitioner entitled to the issuance of a Philippine Passport under the
name "Edelina Ando y Tungol"; and
(c) directing the Department of Foreign Affairs to honor petitioners marriage to
her husband Masatomi Y. Ando and to issue a Philippine Passport to petitioner
under the name "Edelina Ando y Tungol".
Petitioner prays for such other just and equitable reliefs.
On 15 November 2010, in an Order dismissing the Petition for want of cause and
action, as well as jurisdiction, the RTC held thus:
Records of the case would reveal that prior to petitioners marriage to Masatomi Y.
Ando, herein petitioner was married to Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese National, in
Candaba, Pampanga, on September 16, 2001, and that though a divorce was
obtained and granted in Japan, with respect to the their (sic) marriage, there is no
showing that petitioner herein complied with the requirements set forth in Art. 13
of the Family Code that is obtaining a judicial recognition of the foreign decree of
absolute divorce in our country.
It is therefore evident, under the foregoing circumstances, that herein petitioner
does not have any cause of action and/or is entitled to the reliefs prayed for under
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. In the same vein, though there is other adequate
remedy available to the petitioner, such remedy is however beyond the authority
and jurisdiction of this court to act upon and grant, as it is only the family court
which is vested with such authority and jurisdiction.4
On 3 December 2010, petitioner filed an Ex ParteMotion for Reconsideration of the
Order dated 15 November 2010. In an Order dated 14 December 2010, the RTC
granted the motion in this wise:
WHEREFORE, considering that the allegations and reliefs prayed for by the
petitioner in her petition and the instant Motion for Reconsideration falls within
the jurisdiction of the Special Family Court of this jurisdiction and for the interest
ofsubstantial justice, the Order of the Court dated November 15, 2010 is hereby
reconsidered.
Let the record of this case be therefore referred back to the Office of the Clerk of
Court for proper endorsement to the Family Court of this jurisdiction for
appropriate action and/or disposition.5 Thereafter, the case was raffled to Branch
45 of the RTC. On 14 January 2011, the trial court dismissed the Petition anew on
the ground that petitioner had no cause of action. The Order reads thus:

The petition specifically admits that the marriage she seeks to be declared as
valid is already her second marriage, a bigamous marriage under Article 35(4) of
the Family Codeconsidering that the first one, though allegedly terminated by
virtue of the divorce obtained by Kobayashi, was never recognized by a Philippine
court, hence, petitioner is considered as still married to Kobayashi. Accordingly,
the second marriage with Ando cannot be honored and considered asvalid at this
time.
Petitioners allegation of Sec. 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is misplaced. The fact
that no judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage with Ando was rendered does
not make the same valid because such declaration under Article 40 ofthe Family
Code is applicable only in case of re-marriage. More importantly, the absence of a
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is not even a requisite to make a
marriage valid.
In view of the foregoing, the dismissal of this case is imperative.6
On 1 February 2011,petitioner filed an Ex Parte Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order dated 14 January 2011. The motion was denied by the RTC in open court on
8 February2011, considering that neither the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
nor respondent was furnished with copies of the motion.
On 24 March 2011, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review, raising the sole
issue of whether or not the RTC erred in ruling that she had no cause of action.
Petitioner argues that under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on the Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, it is
solely the wife or the husband who can file a petition for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of a void marriage. Thus, as the state is not even allowed to file a
direct petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a void marriage,with
even more reason can it not collaterally attack the validity of a marriage, as in a
petition for declaratory relief. Further, petitioner alleges that under the law, a
marriage even one that is void or voidable shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
Petitioner also argues that assuming a court judgment recognizing a judicial
decree of divorce is required under Article 13 of the Family Code, noncompliance
therewith is a mere irregularity in the issuance of a marriage license. Any
irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage, such as with respect to the
marriage license, shall notaffect the legality of the marriage. Petitioner further
claims that all the requisites for a petition for declaratory relief have been
complied with.
With respect to the failure to furnish a copy of the Ex ParteMotion for
Reconsideration to the OSG and the DFA, petitioner avers that at the time of the
filing, the RTC had yet to issue a summons to respondent; thus, it had yet to
acquire jurisdiction over them.
Thereafter, the DFA, through the OSG, filed a Comment on the Petition. The latter
raised the following arguments: (1) the Petition was improperly verified, as the
juratin the Verification thereof only stated that the affiant had exhibited "her
current and valid proof of identity," which proof was not properly indicated,
however; (2) prior judicial recognition by a Philippine court of a divorce decree
obtained by the alien spouse is required before a Filipino spouse can remarry and
be entitled to the legal effects of remarriage; (3) petitioner failed to show that she
had first exhausted all available administrative remedies, such as appealing to the
Secretary of the DFA under Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8239, or the Philippine Passport
Act of 1996, before resorting to the special civil action of declaratory relief; and
(4) petitioners Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC was a mere scrap of

paper and did not toll the running of the period to appeal. Hence, the RTC Order
dated 14 January 2011 is now final.
On 29 November 2011, petitioner filed her Reply to the Comment, addressing the
issues raised therein.
THE COURTS RULING
The Court finds the Petition to be without merit.
First, with respect to her prayer to compel the DFA to issue her passport,
petitioner incorrectly filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC. She
should have first appealed before the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, since her
ultimate entreaty was to question the DFAs refusal to issue a passport to her
under her second husbands name.
Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 8239, which was
adopted on 25 February 1997, the following are the additional documentary
requirements before a married woman may obtain a passport under the name of
her spouse:
SECTION 2. The issuance of passports to married, divorced or widowed women
shall be made in accordance with the following provisions:
a) In case of a woman who is married and who decides to adopt the surname of
her husband pursuant to Art. 370 of Republic Act No. 386, she must present the
original or certified true copy of her marriage contract, and one photocopy
thereof.
In addition thereto, a Filipino who contracts marriage in the Philippines to a
foreigner, shall be required to present a Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance
and Counselling Seminar conducted by the CFO when applying for a passport for
the first time.
b) In case of annulment of marriage, the applicant must present a certified true
copy of her annotated Marriage Contract or Certificate of Registration and the
Court Order effecting the annulment.
c) In case of a woman who was divorced by her alien husband, she must present a
certified true copy of the Divorce Decree duly authenticated by the Philippine
Embassy or consular post which has jurisdiction over the place where the divorce
is obtained or by the concerned foreign diplomatic or consular mission in the
Philippines.
When the divorcee is a Filipino Muslim, she must present a certified true copy of
the Divorce Decree or a certified true copy of the Certificate of Divorce from the
Shariah Court or the OCRG. d) In the event that marriage is dissolved by the
death of the husband, the applicant must present the original or certified true
copy of the Death Certificate of the husband or the Declaration of Presumptive
Death by a Civil or Shariah Court, in which case the applicant may choose to
continue to use her husbands surname or resume the use of her maiden
surname.
From the above provisions, it is clear that for petitioner to obtain a copy of her
passport under her married name, all she needed to present were the following:
(1) the original or certified true copy of her marriage contract and one photocopy
thereof;
(2) a Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance and Counseling Seminar, if
applicable; and

(3) a certified true copy of the Divorce Decree duly authenticated by the
Philippine Embassy or consular post that has jurisdiction over the place where the
divorce is obtained or by the concerned foreign diplomatic or consular mission in
the Philippines.
In this case, petitioner was allegedly told that she would not be issued a Philippine
passport under her second husbands name. Should her application for a passport
be denied, the remedies available to her are provided in Section 9 of R.A. 8239,
which reads thus:
Sec. 9. Appeal. Any person who feels aggrieved as a result of the application of
this Act of the implementing rules and regulations issued by the Secretary shall
have the right to appeal to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs from whose decision
judicial review may be had to the Courts in due course.
The IRR further provides in detail:
ARTICLE 10
Appeal
In the event that an application for a passport is denied, or an existing one
cancelled or restricted, the applicant or holder thereof shall have the right to
appeal in writing to the Secretary within fifteen (15) days from notice of denial,
cancellation or restriction.
Clearly, she should have filed an appeal with the Secretary of the DFA in the event
of the denial of her application for a passport, after having complied with the
provisions of R.A. 8239. Petitioners argument that her application "cannot be said
to have been either denied, cancelled or restricted by [the DFA ], so as to make
her an aggrieved party entitled to appeal",7 as instead she "was merely told"8
that her passport cannot be issued, does not persuade. The law provides a direct
recourse for petitioner in the event of the denial of her application.
Second, with respect to her prayer for the recognition of her second marriage as
valid, petitioner should have filed, instead, a petition for the judicial recognition of
her foreign divorce from her first husband.
In Garcia v. Recio,9 we ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be
recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. The presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient; both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien
spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Because our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that
both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and
proven and like any other fact.10
While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry filed before a
trial court actually constitutes a petition for declaratory relief,11 we are still
unable to grant the prayer of petitioner. As held by the RTC, there appears to be
insufficient proof or evidence presented on record of both the national law of her
first husband, Kobayashi, and of the validity of the divorce decree under that
national law.12 Hence, any declaration as to the validity of the divorce can only be
made upon her complete submission of evidence proving the divorce decree and
the national law of her alien spouse, in an action instituted in the proper forum.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED without prejudice to petitioner's
recourse to the proper remedies available.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 198587, January 14, 2015

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES (SAUDIA) AND BRENDA J. BETIA, Petitioners, v.
MA. JOPETTE M. REBESENCIO, MONTASSAH B. SACAR-ADIONG, ROUEN RUTH A.
CRISTOBAL AND LORAINE S. SCHNEIDER-CRUZ, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
All Filipinos are entitled to the protection of the rights guaranteed in the
Constitution.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari with application for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure praying that judgment be rendered reversing
and setting aside the June 16, 2011 Decision and September 13, 2011 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113006.
Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) is a foreign corporation established and
existing under the laws of Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It has a Philippine
office located at 4/F, Metro House Building, Sen. Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati City.3
In its Petition filed with this court, Saudia identified itself as follows:
1. Petitioner SAUDIA is a foreign corporation established and existing under the
Royal Decree No. M/24 of 18.07.1385H (10.02.1962G) in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia ("KSA"). Its Philippine Office is located at 4/F Metro House Building, Sen, Gil
J. Puyat Avenue, Makati City (Philippine Office). It may be served with orders of

this Honorable Court through undersigned counsel at 4th and 6th Floors, Citibank
Center Bldg., 8741 Paseo de Roxas, Makati City.4 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents (complainants before the Labor Arbiter) were recruited and hired by
Saudia as Temporary Flight Attendants with the accreditation and approval of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.5 After undergoing seminars
required by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration for deployment
overseas, as well as training modules offered by Saudia (e.g., initial flight
attendant/training course and transition training), and after working as Temporary
Flight Attendants, respondents became Permanent Flight Attendants. They then
entered into Cabin Attendant contracts with Saudia: Ma. Jopette M. Rebesencio
(Ma. Jopette) on May 16, 1990;6 Montassah B. Sacar-Adiong (Montassah) and
Rouen Ruth A. Cristobal (Rouen Ruth) on May 22, 1993;7 and Loraine SchneiderCruz (Loraine) on August 27, 1995.8
Respondents continued their employment with Saudia until they were separated
from service on various dates in 2006.
Respondents contended that the termination of their employment was illegal.
They alleged that the termination was made solely because they were
pregnant.10
As respondents alleged, they had informed Saudia of their respective pregnancies
and had gone through the necessary procedures to process their maternity
leaves. Initially, Saudia had given its approval but later on informed respondents
that its management in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia had disapproved their maternity
leaves. In addition, it required respondents to file their resignation letters.11
Respondents were told that if they did not resign, Saudia would terminate them all
the same. The threat of termination entailed the loss of benefits, such as
separation pay and ticket discount entitlements.12
Specifically, Ma. Jopette received a call on October 16, 2006 from Saudia's Base
Manager, Abdulmalik Saddik (Abdulmalik).13 Montassah was informed personally
by Abdulmalik and a certain Faisal Hussein on October 20, 2006 after being
required to report to the office one (1) month into her maternity leave.14 Rouen
Ruth was also personally informed by Abdulmalik on October 17, 2006 after being
required to report to the office by her Group Supervisor.15 Loraine received a call
on October 12, 2006 from her Group Supervisor, Dakila Salvador.16
Saudia anchored its disapproval of respondents' maternity leaves and demand for
their resignation on its "Unified Employment Contract for Female Cabin
Attendants" (Unified Contract).17 Under the Unified Contract, the employment of
a
Flight
Attendant
who
becomes
pregnant
is rendered
void.
It
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(H) Due to the essential nature of the Air Hostess functions to be physically fit on
board to provide various services required in normal or emergency cases on both
domestic/international flights beside her role in maintaining continuous safety and
security of passengers, and since she will not be able to maintain the required
medical fitness while at work in case of pregnancy, accordingly, if the Air Hostess
becomes pregnant at any time during the term of this contract, this shall render
her employment contract as void and she will be terminated due to lack of
medical fitness.18 (Emphasis supplied)
In their Comment on the present Petition,19 respondents emphasized that the
Unified Contract took effect on September 23, 2006 (the first day of Ramadan),20
well after they had filed and had their maternity leaves approved. Ma. Jopette filed
her maternity leave application on September 5, 2006.21 Montassah filed her
maternity leave application on August 29, 2006, and its approval was already
indicated in Saudia's computer system by August 30, 2006.22 Rouen Ruth filed

her maternity leave application on September 13, 2006,23 and Loraine filed her
maternity leave application on August 22, 2006.24
Rather than comply and tender resignation letters, respondents filed separate
appeal letters that were all rejected.25
Despite these initial rejections, respondents each received calls on the morning of
November 6, 2006 from Saudia's office secretary informing them that their
maternity leaves had been approved. Saudia, however, was quick to renege on its
approval. On the evening of November 6, 2006, respondents again received calls
informing them that it had received notification from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia that
their maternity leaves had been disapproved.26
Faced with the dilemma of resigning or totally losing their benefits, respondents
executed handwritten resignation letters. In Montassah's and Rouen Ruth's cases,
their resignations were executed on Saudia's blank letterheads that Saudia had
provided. These letterheads already had the word "RESIGNATION" typed on the
subject portions of their headings when these were handed to respondents.27
On November 8, 2007, respondents filed a Complaint against Saudia and its
officers for illegal dismissal and for underpayment of salary, overtime pay,
premium pay for holiday, rest day, premium, service incentive leave pay, 13th
month pay, separation pay, night shift differentials, medical expense
reimbursements, retirement benefits, illegal deduction, lay-over expense and
allowances, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.28 The case was
initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Hermino V. Suelo and docketed as NLRC NCR
Case No. 00-11-12342-07.
Saudia assailed the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.29 It claimed that all the
determining points of contact referred to foreign law and insisted that the
Complaint ought to be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens.30 It
added that respondents had no cause of action as they resigned voluntarily.31
On December 12, 2008, Executive Labor Arbiter Fatima Jambaro-Franco rendered
the Decision32 dismissing respondents' Complaint. The dispositive portion of this
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises' considered, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the
instant complaint for lack of jurisdiction/merit
On respondents' appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission's Sixth Division
reversed the ruling of Executive Labor Arbiter Jambaro-Franco. It explained that
"[considering that complainants-appellants are OFWs, the Labor Arbiters and the
NLRC has [sic] jurisdiction to hear and decide their complaint for illegal
termination."34 On the matter of forum non conveniens, it noted that there were
no special circumstances that warranted its abstention from exercising
jurisdiction.35 On the issue of whether respondents were validly dismissed, it held
that there was nothing on record to support Saudia's claim that respondents
resigned voluntarily.
The dispositive portion of the November 19, 2009 National Labor Relations
Commission Decision36 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
appeal impressed with merit. The respondents-appellees are hereby directed to
pay complainants-appellants the aggregate amount of SR614,001.24
corresponding to their backwages and separation pay plus ten (10%) percent
thereof as attorney's fees. The decision of the Labor Arbiter dated December 12,
2008 is hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE. Attached is the computation prepared by
this Commission and made an integral part of this Decision.37cralawlawlibrary
In the Resolution dated February 11, 2010,38 the National Labor Relations
Commission denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

In the June 16, 2011 Decision,39 the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' Rule 65
Petition and modified the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
with respect to the award of separation pay and backwages.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated November
19, 2009 issued by public respondent, Sixth Division of the National Labor
Relations Commission - National Capital Region is MODIFIED only insofar as the
computation of the award of separation pay and backwages. For greater clarity,
petitioners are ordered to pay private respondents separation pay which shall be
computed from private respondents' first day of employment up to the finality of
this decision, at the rate of one month per year of service and backwages which
shall be computed from the date the private respondents were illegally
terminated until finality of this decision. Consequently, the ten percent (10%)
attorney's fees shall be based on the total amount of the award. The assailed
Decision is affirmed in all other respects.
The labor arbiter is hereby DIRECTED to make a recomputation based on the
foregoing.40cralawlawlibrary
In the Resolution dated September 13, 2011,41 the Court of Appeals denied
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this Appeal was filed.
The issues for resolution are the following:
First, whether the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission may
exercise jurisdiction over Saudi Arabian Airlines and apply Philippine law in
adjudicating the present dispute;
Second, whether respondents' voluntarily resigned or were illegally terminated;
and
Lastly, whether Brenda J. Betia may be held personally liable along with Saudi
Arabian Airlines.
I
Summons were validly served on Saudia and jurisdiction over it validly acquired.
There is no doubt that the pleadings and summons were served on Saudia
through its counsel.42 Saudia, however, claims that the Labor Arbiter and the
National Labor Relations Commission had no jurisdiction over it because summons
were never served on it but on "Saudia Manila."43 Referring to itself as "Saudia
Jeddah," it claims that "Saudia Jeddah" and not "Saudia Manila" was the employer
of respondents because:
First, "Saudia Manila" was never a party to the Cabin Attendant contracts entered
into by respondents;
Second, it was "Saudia Jeddah" that provided the funds to pay for respondents'
salaries and benefits; and
Lastly, it was with "Saudia Jeddah" that respondents filed their resignations.44
Saudia posits that respondents' Complaint was brought against the wrong party
because "Saudia Manila," upon which summons was served, was never the
employer of respondents.45

Saudia is vainly splitting hairs in its effort to absolve itself of liability. Other than
its bare allegation, there is no basis for concluding that "Saudia Jeddah" is distinct
from "Saudia Manila."
What is clear is Saudia's statement in its own Petition that what it has is a
"Philippine Office . . . located at 4/F Metro House Building, Sen. Gil J. Puyat
Avenue, Makati City."46 Even in the position paper that Saudia submitted to the
Labor Arbiter,47 what Saudia now refers to as "Saudia Jeddah" was then only
referred to as "Saudia Head Office at Jeddah, KSA,"48 while what Saudia now
refers to as "Saudia Manila" was then only referred to as "Saudia's office in
Manila."49
By its own admission, Saudia, while a foreign corporation, has a Philippine office.
Section 3(d) of Republic Act No.. 7042, otherwise known as the Foreign
Investments Act of 1991, provides the following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The phrase "doing business" shall include . . . opening offices, whether called
"liaison" offices or branches; . . . and any other act or acts that imply a continuity
of commercial dealings or arrangements and contemplate to that extent the
performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally
incident to, and in progressive prosecution of commercial gain or of the purpose
and object of the business organization. (Emphasis supplied)
A plain application of Section 3(d) of the Foreign Investments Act leads to no other
conclusion than that Saudia is a foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines. As such, Saudia may be sued in the Philippines and is subject to the
jurisdiction of Philippine tribunals.
Moreover, since there is no real distinction between "Saudia Jeddah" and "Saudia
Manila" the latter being nothing more than Saudia's local office service of
summons to Saudia's office in Manila sufficed to vest jurisdiction over Saudia's
person in Philippine tribunals. II
Saudia asserts that Philippine courts and/or tribunals are not in a position to make
an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts. This is because respondents'
Cabin Attendant contracts require the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia,
rather than those of the Philippines.50 It claims that the difficulty of ascertaining
foreign law calls into operation the principle of forum non conveniens, thereby
rendering improper the exercise of jurisdiction by Philippine tribunals.51
A choice of law governing the validity of contracts or the interpretation of its
provisions dees not necessarily imply forum non conveniens. Choice of law and
forum non conveniens are entirely different matters.
Choice of law provisions are an offshoot of the fundamental principle of autonomy
of contracts. Article 1306 of the Civil Code firmly ensconces this:
Article 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
In contrast, forum non conveniens is a device akin to the rule against forum
shopping. It is designed to frustrate illicit means for securing advantages and
vexing litigants that would otherwise be possible if the venue of litigation (or
dispute resolution) were left entirely to the whim of either party.
Contractual choice of law provisions factor into transnational litigation and dispute
resolution in one of or in a combination of four ways: (1) procedures for settling
disputes, e.g., arbitration; (2) forum, i.e., venue; (3) governing law; and (4) basis
for interpretation. Forum non conveniens relates to, but is not subsumed by, the
second of these.

Likewise, contractual choice of law is not determinative of jurisdiction. Stipulating

on the laws of a given jurisdiction as the governing law of a contract does not
preclude the exercise of jurisdiction by tribunals elsewhere. The reverse is equally
true: The assumption of jurisdiction by tribunals does not ipso facto mean that it
cannot apply and rule on the basis of the parties' stipulation. In Hasegawa v.
Kitamura:
Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction
considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of
law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law which
will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise
jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply
forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori will often, coincide, the
"minimum contacts" for one do not always provide the necessary "significant
contacts" for the other. The question of whether the law of a state can be applied
to a transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state
have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.
As various dealings, commercial or otherwise, are facilitated by the progressive
ease of communication and travel, persons from various jurisdictions find
themselves transacting with each other. Contracts involving foreign elements are,
however, nothing new. Conflict of laws situations precipitated by disputes and
litigation anchored on these contracts are not totally novel.
Transnational transactions entail differing laws on the requirements Q for the
validity of the formalities and substantive provisions of contracts and their
interpretation. These transactions inevitably lend themselves to the possibility of
various fora for litigation and dispute resolution. As observed by an eminent
expert on transnational law:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The more jurisdictions having an interest in, or merely even a point of contact
with, a transaction or relationship, the greater the number of potential fora for the
resolution of disputes arising out of or related to that transaction or relationship.
In a world of increased mobility, where business and personal transactions
transcend national boundaries, the jurisdiction of a number of different fora may
easily be invoked in a single or a set of related disputes.54cralawlawlibrary
Philippine law is definite as to what governs the formal or extrinsic validity of
contracts. The first paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he
forms and solemnities of contracts . . . shall be governed by the laws of the
country in which they are executed"55 (i.e., lex loci celebrationis).
In contrast, there is no statutorily established mode of settling conflict of laws
situations on matters pertaining to substantive content of contracts. It has been
noted that three (3) modes have emerged: (1) lex loci contractus or the law of the
place of the making; (2) lex loci solutionis or the law of the place of performance;
and (3) lex loci intentionis or the law intended by the parties.56
Given Saudia's assertions, of particular relevance to resolving the present dispute
is lex loci intentionis.
An author observed that Spanish jurists and commentators "favor lex loci
intentionis."57 These jurists and commentators proceed from the Civil Code of
Spain, which, like our Civil Code, is silent on what governs the intrinsic validity of
contracts, and the same civil law traditions from which we draw ours.
In this jurisdiction, this court, in Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee v.
V.P. Eusebio Construction, Inc.,58 manifested preference for allowing the parties to
select the law applicable to their contract":chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
No conflicts rule on essential validity of contracts is expressly provided for in our
laws. The rule followed by most legal systems, however, is that the intrinsic
validity of a contract must be governed by the lex contractus or "proper law of the
contract." This is the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties (the lex loci

voluntatis) or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly (the lex loci
intentionis). The law selected may be implied from such factors as substantial
connection with the transaction, or the nationality or domicile of the parties.
Philippine courts would do well to adopt the first and most basic rule in most legal
systems, namely, to allow the parties to select the law applicable to their
contract, subject to the limitation that it is not against the law, morals, or public
policy of the forum and that the chosen law must bear a substantive relationship
to the transaction.59 (Emphasis in the original)
Saudia asserts that stipulations set in the Cabin Attendant contracts require the
application of the laws of Saudi Arabia. It insists that the need to comply with
these stipulations calls into operation the doctrine of forum non conveniens and,
in turn, makes it necessary for Philippine tribunals to refrain from exercising
jurisdiction.
As mentioned, contractual choice of laws factors into transnational litigation in
any or a combination of four (4) ways. Moreover, forum non conveniens relates to
one of these: choosing between multiple possible fora.
Nevertheless, the possibility of parallel litigation in multiple fora along with the
host of difficulties it poses is not unique to transnational litigation. It is a
difficulty that similarly arises in disputes well within the bounds of a singe
jurisdiction.
When parallel litigation arises strictly within the context of a single jurisdiction,
such rules as those on forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res judicata come into
operation. Thus, in the Philippines, the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure provide for
willful and deliberate forum shopping as a ground not only for summary dismissal
with prejudice but also for citing parties and counsels in direct contempt, as well
as for the imposition of administrative sanctions.60 Likewise, the same rules
expressly provide that a party may seek the dismissal of a Complaint or another
pleading asserting a claim on the ground "[t]hat there is another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause," i.e., litis pendentia, or "[t]hat the
cause of action is barred by a prior judgment,"61 i.e., res judicata.
Forum non conveniens, like the rules of forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res
judicata, is a means of addressing the problem of parallel litigation. While the
rules of forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res judicata are designed to address
the problem of parallel litigation within a single jurisdiction, forum non conveniens
is a means devised to address parallel litigation arising in multiple jurisdictions.
Forum non conveniens literally translates to "the forum is inconvenient."62 It is a
concept in private international law and was devised to combat the "less than
honorable" reasons and excuses that litigants use to secure procedural
advantages, annoy and harass defendants, avoid overcrowded dockets, and select
a "friendlier" venue.63 Thus, the doctrine of forum non conveniens addresses the
same rationale that the rule against forum shopping does, albeit on a
multijurisdictional scale.
Forum non conveniens, like res judicata,64 is a concept originating in common
law.65 However, unlike the rule on res judicata, as well as those on litis pendentia
and forum shopping, forum non conveniens finds no textual anchor, whether in
statute or in procedural rules, in our civil law system. Nevertheless, jurisprudence
has applied forum non conveniens as basis for a court to decline its exercise of
jurisdiction.66
Forum non conveniens is soundly applied not only to address parallel litigation
and undermine a litigant's capacity to vex and secure undue advantages by
engaging in forum shopping on an international scale. It is also grounded on
principles of comity and judicial efficiency.

Consistent with the principle of comity, a tribunal's desistance in exercising

jurisdiction on account of forum non conveniens is a deferential gesture to the
tribunals of another sovereign. It is a measure that prevents the former's having
to interfere in affairs which are better and more competently addressed by the
latter. Further, forum non conveniens entails a recognition not only that tribunals
elsewhere are better suited to rule on and resolve a controversy, but also, that
these tribunals are better positioned to enforce judgments and, ultimately, to
dispense justice. Forum non conveniens prevents the embarrassment of an
awkward situation where a tribunal is rendered incompetent in the face of the
greater capability both analytical and practical of a tribunal in another
jurisdiction.
The wisdom of avoiding conflicting and unenforceable judgments is as much a
matter of efficiency and economy as it is a matter of international courtesy. A
court would effectively be neutering itself if it insists on adjudicating a controversy
when it knows full well that it is in no position to enforce its judgment. Doing so is
not only an exercise in futility; it is an act of frivolity. It clogs the dockets of
a.tribunal and leaves it to waste its efforts on affairs, which, given transnational
exigencies, will be reduced to mere academic, if not trivial, exercises.
Accordingly, under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, "a court, in conflicts of
law cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most
'convenient' or available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking
remedies elsewhere."67 In Puyat v. Zabarte,68 this court recognized the following
situations as among those that may warrant a court's desistance from exercising
jurisdiction:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1)
The belief that the matter can be better tried and decided elsewhere, either
because the main aspects of the case transpired in a foreign jurisdiction or the
material witnesses have their residence there;
2)
The belief that the non-resident plaintiff sought the forum[,] a practice known as
forum shopping[,] merely to secure procedural advantages or to convey or harass
the defendant;
3)
The unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to non residents or aliens when
the docket may already be overcrowded;
4)
The inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for effectuating the right sought to
be maintained; and
5)
The difficulty of ascertaining foreign law.69
In Bank of America, NT&SA, Bank of America International, Ltd. v. Court of
Appeals,70 this court underscored that a Philippine court may properly assume
jurisdiction over a case if it chooses to do so to the extent: "(1) that the Philippine
Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the
Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and
the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to
enforce its decision."71
The use of the word "may" (i.e., "may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction"72) in
the decisions shows that the matter of jurisdiction rests on the sound discretion of
a court. Neither the mere invocation of forum non conveniens nor the averment of
foreign elements operates to automatically divest a court of jurisdiction. Rather, a
court should renounce jurisdiction only "after 'vital facts are established, to
determine whether special circumstances' require the court's desistance."73 As
the propriety of applying forum non conveniens is contingent on a factual
determination, it is, therefore, a matter of defense.74

The second sentence of Rule 9, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is
exclusive in its recital of the grounds for dismissal that are exempt from the
omnibus motion rule: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) litis
pendentia; (3) res judicata; and (4) prescription. Moreover, dismissal on account
offorum non conveniens is a fundamentally discretionary matter. It is, therefore,
not a matter for a defendant to foist upon the court at his or her own
convenience; rather, it must be pleaded at the earliest possible opportunity.
On the matter of pleading forum non conveniens, we state the rule, thus: Forum
non conveniens must not only be clearly pleaded as a ground for dismissal; it
must be pleaded as such at the earliest possible opportunity. Otherwise, it shall be
deemed waived.
This court notes that in Hasegawa,76 this court stated that forum non conveniens
is not a ground for a motion to dismiss. The factual ambience of this case however
does not squarely raise the viability of this doctrine. Until the opportunity comes
to review the use of motions to dismiss for parallel litigation, Hasegawa remains
existing doctrine.
Consistent with forum non conveniens as fundamentally a factual matter, it is
imperative that it proceed from & factually established basis. It would be improper
to dismiss an action pursuant to forum non conveniens based merely on a
perceived, likely, or hypothetical multiplicity of fora. Thus, a defendant must also
plead and show that a prior suit has, in fact, been brought in another jurisdiction.
The existence of a prior suit makes real the vexation engendered by duplicitous
litigation, the embarrassment of intruding into the affairs of another sovereign,
and the squandering of judicial efforts in resolving a dispute already lodged and
better resolved elsewhere. As has been noted:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A case will not be stayed o dismissed on [forum] non conveniens grounds unless
the plaintiff is shown to have an available alternative forum elsewhere. On this,
the moving party bears the burden of proof.
A number of factors affect the assessment of an alternative forum's adequacy.
The statute of limitations abroad may have run, of the foreign court may lack
either subject matter or personal jurisdiction over the defendant. . . . Occasionally,
doubts will be raised as to the integrity or impartiality of the foreign court (based,
for example, on suspicions of corruption or bias in favor of local nationals), as to
the fairness of its judicial procedures, or as to is operational efficiency (due, for
example, to lack of resources, congestion and delay, or interfering circumstances
such as a civil unrest). In one noted case, [it was found] that delays of 'up to a
quarter of a century' rendered the foreign forum... inadequate for these
purposes.77cralawlawlibrary
We deem it more appropriate and in the greater interest of prudence that a
defendant not only allege supposed dangerous tendencies in litigating in this
jurisdiction; the defendant must also show that such danger is real and present in
that litigation or dispute resolution has commenced in another jurisdiction and
that a foreign tribunal has chosen to exercise jurisdiction.
III
Forum non conveniens finds no application and does not operate to divest
Philippine tribunals of jurisdiction and to require the application of foreign law.
Saudia invokes forum non conveniens to supposedly effectuate the stipulations of
the Cabin Attendant contracts that require the application of the laws of Saudi
Arabia.

Forum non conveniens relates to forum, not to the choice of governing law. Thai
forum non conveniens may ultimately result in the application of foreign law is
merely an incident of its application. In this strict sense, forum non conveniens is
not applicable. It is not the primarily pivotal consideration in this case.
In any case, even a further consideration of the applicability of forum non
conveniens on the incidental matter of the law governing respondents' relation
with Saudia leads to the conclusion that it is improper for Philippine tribunals to
divest themselves of jurisdiction.
Any evaluation of the propriety of contracting parties' choice of a forum and its
incidents must grapple with two (2) considerations: first, the availability and
adequacy of recourse to a foreign tribunal; and second, the question of where, as
between the forum court and a foreign court, the balance of interests inhering in a
dispute weighs more heavily.
The first is a pragmatic matter. It relates to the viability of ceding jurisdiction to a
foreign tribunal and can be resolved by juxtaposing the competencies and
practical circumstances of the tribunals in alternative fora. Exigencies, like the
statute of limitations, capacity to enforce orders and judgments, access to
records, requirements for the acquisition of jurisdiction, and even questions
relating to the integrity of foreign courts, may render undesirable or even totally
unfeasible recourse to a foreign court. As mentioned, we consider it in the greater
interest of prudence that a defendant show, in pleading forum non conveniens,
that litigation has commenced in another jurisdiction and that a foieign tribunal
has, in fact, chosen to exercise jurisdiction.
Two (2) factors weigh into a court's appraisal of the balance of interests inhering
in a dispute: first, the vinculum which the parties and their relation have to a
given jurisdiction; and second, the public interest that must animate a tribunal, in
its capacity as an agent of the sovereign, in choosing to assume or decline
jurisdiction. The first is more concerned with the parties, their personal
circumstances, and private interests; the second concerns itself with the state and
the greater social order.
In considering the vinculum, a court must look into the preponderance of linkages
which the parties and their transaction may have to either jurisdiction. In this
respect, factors, such as the parties' respective nationalities and places of
negotiation, execution, performance, engagement or deployment, come into play.
In considering public interest, a court proceeds with a consciousness that it is an
organ of the state. It must, thus, determine if the interests of the sovereign (which
acts through it) are outweighed by those of the alternative jurisdiction. In this
respect, the court delves into a consideration of public policy. Should it find that
public interest weighs more heavily in favor of its assumption of jurisdiction, it
should proceed in adjudicating the dispute, any doubt or .contrary view arising
from the preponderance of linkages notwithstanding.
Our law on contracts recognizes the validity of contractual choice of law
provisions. Where such provisions exist, Philippine tribunals, acting as the forum
court, generally defer to the parties' articulated choice.
This is consistent with the fundamental principle of autonomy of contracts. Article
1306 of the Civ:l Code expressly provides that "[t]he contracting parties may
establish 'such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient."78 Nevertheless, while a Philippine tribunal (acting as the forum
court) is called upon to respect the parties' choice of governing law, such respect
must not be so permissive as to lose sight of considerations of law, morals, good

customs, public order, or public policy that underlie the contract central to the
controversy.
Specifically with respect to public policy, in Pakistan International Airlines
Corporation v. Ople,79 this court explained that:
counter-balancing the principle of autonomy of contracting parties is the equally
general rule that provisions of applicable law, especially provisions relating to
matters affected with public policy, are deemed written inta the contract. Put a
little differently, the governing principle is that parties may not contract away
applicable provisions of law especially peremptory provisions dealing with matters
heavily impressed with public interest.80 (Emphasis supplied)
Article II, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[t]he State ... shall
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men." Contrasted
with Article II, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution's statement that "[n]o person
shall ... be denied the equal protection of the laws," Article II, Section 14 exhorts
the State to "ensure." This does not only mean that the Philippines shall not
countenance nor lend legal recognition and approbation to measures that
discriminate on the basis of one's being male or female. It imposes an obligation
to actively engage in securing the fundamental equality of men and women.
The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW), signed and ratified by the Philippines on July 15, 1980, and on August 5,
1981, respectively,81 is part of the law of the land. In view of the widespread
signing and ratification of, as well as adherence (in practice) to it by states, it may
even be said that many provisions of the CEDAW may have become customary
international law. The CEDAW gives effect to the Constitution's policy statement in
Article II, Section 14. Article I of the CEDAW defines "discrimination against
women" as:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise
by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and
women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic,
social, cultural, civil or any other field.82cralawlawlibrary
The constitutional exhortation to ensure fundamental equality, as illumined by its
enabling law, the CEDAW, must inform and animate all the actions of all
personalities acting on behalf of the State. It is, therefore, the bounden duty of
this court, in rendering judgment on the disputes brought before it, to ensure that
no discrimination is heaped upon women on the mere basis of their being women.
This is a point so basic and central that all our discussions and pronouncements
regardless of whatever averments there may be of foreign law must proceed
from this premise.
So informed and animated, we emphasize the glaringly discriminatory nature of
Saudia's policy. As argued by respondents, Saudia's policy entails the termination
of employment of flight attendants who become pregnant. At the risk of stating
the obvious, pregnancy is an occurrence that pertains specifically to women.
Saudia's policy excludes from and restricts employment on the basis of no other
consideration but sex.
We do not lose sight of the reality that pregnancy does present physical
limitations that may render difficult the performance of functions associated with
being a flight attendant. Nevertheless, it would be the height of iniquity to view
pregnancy as a disability so permanent and immutable that, it must entail the
termination of one's employment. It is clear to us that any individual, regardless of
gender, may be subject to exigencies that limit the performance of functions.
However, we fail to appreciate how pregnancy could be such an impairing
occurrence that it leaves no other recourse but the complete termination of the
means through which a woman earns a living.

Apart from the constitutional policy on the fundamental equality before the law of
men and women, it is settled that contracts relating to labor and employment are
impressed with public interest. Article 1700 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he
relation between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so
impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common
good."
Consistent with this, this court's pronouncements in Pakistan International Airlines
Corporation83 are clear and unmistakable:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement
which specifies, firstly, the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement,
and, secondly, lays the venue for settlement of any dispute arising out of or in
connection with the agreement "only [in] courts of Karachi, Pakistan". The first
clause of paragraph 10 cannot be invoked to prevent the application of Philippine
labor laws and'regulations to the subject matter of this case, i.e., the employeremployee relationship between petitioner PIA and private respondents. We have
already pointed out that the relationship is much affected with public interest and
that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered
illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern their relationship. .
. . Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement
cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the
jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law.84 (Emphasis supplied)
As the present dispute relates to (what the respondents allege to be) the illegal
termination of respondents' employment, this case is immutably a matter of
public interest and public policy. Consistent with clear pronouncements in law and
jurisprudence, Philippine laws properly find application in and govern this case.
'Moreover, as this premise for Saudia's insistence on the application forum non
conveniens has been shattered, it follows that Philippine tribunals may properly
assume jurisdiction over the present controversy. Philippine jurisprudence
provides ample illustrations of when a court's renunciation of jurisdiction on
account of forum non conveniens is proper or improper.'
In Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals,85 this court noted that the
trial court failed to consider that one of the plaintiffs was a domestic corporation,
that one of the defendants was a Filipino, and that it was the extinguishment of
the latter's debt that was the object of the transaction subject of the litigation.
Thus, this court held, among others, that the trial court's refusal to assume
jurisdiction was not justified by forum non conveniens and remanded the case to
the trial court.
In Raytheon International, Inc. v. Rouzie, Jr.,86 this court sustained the trial court's
assumption of jurisdiction considering that the trial court could properly enforce
judgment on the petitioner which was a foreign corporation licensed to do
business in the Philippines.
In Pioneer International, Ltd. v. Guadiz, Jr.,87 this court found no reason to disturb
the trial court's assumption of jurisdiction over a case in which, as noted by the
trial court, "it is more convenient to hear and decide the case in the Philippines
because Todaro [the plaintiff] resides in the Philippines and the contract allegedly
breached involve[d] employment in the Philippines."88
In Pacific Consultants International Asia, Inc. v. Schonfeld,89 this court held that
the fact that the complainant in an illegal dismissal case was a Canadian citizen
and a repatriate did not warrant the application of forum non conveniens
considering that: (1) the Labor Code does not include forum non conveniens as a
ground for the dismissal of a complaint for illegal dismissal; (2) the propriety of
dismissing a case based on forum non conveniens requires a factual
determination; and (3) the requisites for assumption of jurisdiction as laid out in
Bank of America, NT&SA90 were all satisfied.

In contrast, this court ruled in The Manila Hotel Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Commission91 that the National Labor Relations Q Commission was a seriously
inconvenient forum. In that case, private respondent Marcelo G. Santos was
working in the Sultanate of Oman when he received a letter from Palace Hotel
recruiting him for employment in Beijing, China. Santos accepted the offer.
Subsequently, however, he was released from employment supposedly due to
business reverses arising from political upheavals in China (i.e., the Tiananmen
Square incidents of 1989). Santos later filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal
impleading Palace Hotel's General Manager, Mr. Gerhard Schmidt, the Manila
Hotel International Company Ltd. (which was, responsible for training Palace
Hotel's personnel and staff), and the Manila Hotel Corporation (which owned 50%
of Manila Hotel International Company Ltd.'s capital stock).
In ruling against the National Labor Relations Commission's exercise of
jurisdiction, this court noted that the main aspects of the case transpired in two
(2) foreign jurisdictions, Oman and China, and that the case involved purely
foreign elements. Specifically, Santos was directly hired by a foreign employer
through correspondence sent to Oman. Also, the proper defendants were neither
Philippine nationals nor engaged in business in the Philippines, while the main
witnesses were not residents of the Philippines. Likewise, this court noted that the
National Labor Relations Commission was in no position to conduct the following:
first, determine the law governing the employment contract, as it was entered
into in foreign soil; second, determine the facts, as Santos' employment was
terminated in Beijing; and third, enforce its judgment, since Santos' employer,
Palace Hotel, was incorporated under the laws of China and was not even served
with summons.
Contrary to Manila Hotel, the case now before us does not entail a preponderance
of linkages that favor a foreign jurisdiction.
Here, the circumstances of the parties and their relation do not approximate the
circumstances enumerated in Puyat,92 which this court recognized as possibly
justifying the desistance of Philippine tribunals from exercising jurisdiction.
First, there is no basis for concluding that the case can be more conveniently tried
elsewhere. As established earlier, Saudia is doing business in the Philippines. For
their part, all four (4) respondents are Filipino citizens maintaining residence in
the Philippines and, apart from their previous employment with Saudia, have no
other connection to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It would even be to respondents'
inconvenience if this case were to be tried elsewhere.
Second, the records are bereft of any indication that respondents filed their
Complaint in an effort to engage in forum shopping or to vex and inconvenience
Saudia.
Third, there is no indication of "unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to
non-residents or aliens."93 That Saudia has managed to bring the present
controversy all the way to this court proves this.
Fourth, it cannot be said that the local judicial machinery is inadequate for
effectuating the right sought to be maintained. Summons was properly served on
Saudia and jurisdiction over its person was validly acquired.
Lastly, there is not even room for considering foreign law. Philippine law properly
governs the present dispute.
As the question of applicable law has been settled, the supposed difficulty of
ascertaining foreign law (which requires the application of forum non conveniens)

provides no insurmountable inconvenience or special circumstance that will justify

depriving Philippine tribunals of jurisdiction.
Even if we were to assume, for the sake of discussion, that it is the laws of Saudi
Arabia which should apply, it does not follow that Philippine tribunals should
refrain from exercising jurisdiction. To. recall our pronouncements in Puyat,94 as
well as in Bank of America, NT&SA,95 it is not so much the mere applicability of
foreign law which calls into operation forum non conveniens. Rather, what justifies
a court's desistance from exercising jurisdiction is "[t]he difficulty of ascertaining
foreign law"96 or the inability of a "Philippine Court to make an intelligent decision
as to the law[.]"97
Consistent with lex loci intentionis, to the extent that it is proper and practicable
(i.e., "to make an intelligent decision"98), Philippine tribunals may apply the
foreign law selected by the parties. In fact, (albeit without meaning to make a
pronouncement on the accuracy and reliability of respondents' citation) in this
case, respondents themselves have made averments as to the laws of Saudi
Arabia. In their Comment, respondents write:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Under the Labor Laws of Saudi Arabia and the Philippines[,] it is illegal and
unlawful to terminate the employment of any woman by virtue of pregnancy. The
law in Saudi Arabia is even more harsh and strict [sic] in that no employer can
terminate the employment of a female worker or give her a warning of the same
while on Maternity Leave, the specific provision of Saudi Labor Laws on the matter
is hereto quoted as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"An employer may not terminate the employment of a female worker or give her a
warning of the same while on maternity leave." (Article 155, Labor Law of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Royal Decree No. M/51.)99cralawlawlibrary
All told, the considerations for assumption of jurisdiction by Philippine tribunals as
outlined in Bank of America, NT&SA100 have been satisfied. First, all the parties
are based in the Philippines and all the material incidents transpired in this
jurisdiction. Thus, the parties may conveniently seek relief from Philippine
tribunals. Second, Philippine tribunals are in a position to make an intelligent
decision as to the law and the facts. Third, Philippine tribunals are in a position to
enforce their decisions. There is no compelling basis for ceding jurisdiction to a
foreign tribunal. Quite the contrary, the immense public policy considerations
attendant to this case behoove Philippine tribunals to not shy away from their
duty to rule on the case.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
IV
Respondents were illegally terminated.
In Bilbao v. Saudi Arabian Airlines,101 this court defined voluntary resignation as
"the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where one believes that
personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and
one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from employment. It is a formal
pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the intention of relinquishing
the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment."102 Thus, essential to the
act of resignation is voluntariness. It must be the result of an employee's exercise
of his or her own will.
In the same case of Bilbao, this court advanced a means for determining whether
an employee resigned voluntarily:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As the intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the
acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered
in determining whether he or she, in fact, intended, to sever his or her
employment.103 (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, constructive dismissal has been defined as "cessation of work
because 'continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely,

as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay' and other

benefits."104
In Penaflor v. Outdoor Clothing Manufacturing Corporation,105 constructive
dismissal has been described as tantamount to "involuntarily [sic] resignation due
to the harsh, hostile, and unfavorable conditions set by the employer."106 In the
same case, it was noted that "[t]he gauge for constructive dismissal is whether a
reasonable person in the employee's position would feel compelled to give up his
employment under the prevailing circumstances."107
Applying the cited standards on resignation and constructive dismissal, it is clear
that respondents were constructively dismissed. Hence, their termination was
illegal.
The termination of respondents' employment happened when they were pregnant
and expecting to incur costs on account of child delivery and infant rearing. As
noted by the Court of Appeals, pregnancy is a time when they need employment
to sustain their families.108 Indeed, it goes against normal and reasonable human
behavior to abandon one's livelihood in a time of great financial need.
It is clear that respondents intended to remain employed with Saudia. All they did
was avail of their maternity leaves. Evidently, the very nature of a maternity leave
means that a pregnant employee will not report for work only temporarily and
that she will resume the performance of her duties as soon as the leave allowance
expires.
It is also clear that respondents exerted all efforts to' remain employed with
Saudia. Each of them repeatedly filed appeal letters (as much as five [5] letters in
the case of Rebesencio109) asking Saudia to reconsider the ultimatum that they
resign or be terminated along with the forfeiture of their benefits. Some of them
even went to Saudia's office to personally seek reconsideration.110
Respondents also adduced a copy of the "Unified Employment Contract for Female
Cabin Attendants."111 This contract deemed void the employment of a flight
attendant who becomes pregnant and threatened termination due to lack of
medical fitness.112 The threat of termination (and the forfeiture of benefits that it
entailed) is enough to compel a reasonable person in respondents' position to give
up his or her employment.
Saudia draws attention to how respondents' resignation letters were supposedly
made in their own handwriting. This minutia fails to surmount all the other
indications negating any voluntariness on respondents' part. If at all, these same
resignation letters are proof of how any supposed resignation did not arise from
respondents' own initiative. As earlier pointed out, respondents' resignations were
executed on Saudia's blank letterheads that Saudia had provided. These
letterheads already had the word "RESIGNATION" typed on the subject portion of
their respective headings when these were handed to respondents.
"In termination cases, the burden of proving just or valid cause for dismissing an
employee rests on the employer."114 In this case, Saudia makes much of how
respondents supposedly completed their exit interviews, executed quitclaims,
received their separation pay, and took more than a year to file their
Complaint.115 If at all, however, these circumstances prove only the fact of their
occurrence, nothing more. The voluntariness of respondents' departure from
Saudia is non sequitur.
Mere compliance with standard procedures or processes, such as the completion
of their exit interviews, neither negates compulsion nor indicates voluntariness.

As with respondent's resignation letters, their exit interview forms even support
their claim of illegal dismissal and militates against Saudia's arguments. These
exit interview forms, as reproduced by Saudia in its own Petition, confirms the
unfavorable conditions as regards respondents' maternity leaves. Ma. Jopette's
and
Loraine's
exit
interview
forms
are
particularly
telling:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
a. From Ma. Jopette's exit interview form:
3. In what respects has the job met or failed to meet your expectations?
THE SUDDEN TWIST OF DECISION REGARDING THE MATERNITY LEAVE.116
b. From Loraine's exit interview form:
1. What are your main reasons for leaving Saudia? What company are you
joining?
xxx xxx xxx
Others
CHANGING POLICIES REGARDING MATERNITY LEAVE (PREGNANCY)117
As to respondents' quitclaims, in Phil. Employ Services and Resources, Inc. v.
Paramio,118 this court noted that "[i]f (a) there is clear proof that the waiver was
wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person; or (b) the terms of the
settlement are unconscionable, and on their face invalid, such quitclaims must be
struck down as invalid or illegal."119 Respondents executed their quitclaims after
having been unfairly given an ultimatum to resign or be terminated (and forfeit
their benefits).chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
V
Having been illegally and unjustly dismissed, respondents are entitled to full
backwages and benefits from the time of their termination until the finality of this
Decision. They are likewise entitled to separation pay in the amount of one (1)
month's salary for every year of service until the fmality of this Decision, with a
fraction of a year of at least six (6) months being counted as one (1) whole year.
Moreover, "[m]oral damages are awarded in termination cases where the
employee's dismissal was attended by bad faith, malice or fraud, or where it
constitutes an act oppressive to labor, or where it was done in a manner contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy."120 In this case, Saudia terminated
respondents' employment in a manner that is patently discriminatory and running
afoul of the public interest that underlies employer-employee relationships. As
such, respondents are entitled to moral damages.
To provide an "example or correction for the public good"121 as against such
discriminatory and callous schemes, respondents are likewise entitled to
exemplary damages.
In a long line of cases, this court awarded exemplary damages to illegally
dismissed employees whose "dismissal[s were] effected in a wanton, oppressive
or malevolent manner."122 This court has awarded exemplary damages to
employees who were terminated on such frivolous, arbitrary, and unjust grounds
as membership in or involvement with labor unions,123 injuries sustained in the
course of employment,124 development of a medical condition due to the
employer's own violation of the employment contract,125 and lodging of a
Complaint against the employer.126 Exemplary damages were also awarded to
employees who were deemed illegally dismissed by an employer in an attempt to

evade compliance with statutorily established employee benefits.127 Likewise,

employees dismissed for supposedly just causes, but in violation of due process
requirements, were awarded exemplary damages.128
These examples pale in comparison to the present controversy. Stripped of all
unnecessary complexities, respondents were dismissed for no other reason than
simply that they were pregnant. This is as wanton, oppressive, and tainted with
bad faith as any reason for termination of employment can be. This is no ordinary
case of illegal dismissal. This is a case of manifest gender discrimination. It is an
affront not only to our statutes and policies on employees' security of tenure, but
more so, to the Constitution's dictum of fundamental equality between men and
women.129
The award of exemplary damages is, therefore, warranted, not only to remind
employers of the need to adhere to the requirements of procedural and
substantive due process in termination of employment, but more importantly, to
demonstrate that gender discrimination should in no case be countenanced.
Having been compelled to litigate to seek reliefs for their illegal and unjust
dismissal, respondents are likewise entitled to attorney's fees in the amount of
10% of the total monetary award.130
VI
Petitioner Brenda J. Betia may not be held liable.
A corporation has a personality separate and distinct from those of the persons
composing it. Thus, as a rule, corporate directors and officers are not liable for the
illegal termination of a corporation's employees. It is only when they acted in bad
faith or with malice that they become solidarity liable with the corporation.131
In Ever Electrical Manufacturing, Inc. (EEMI) v. Samahang Manggagawa ng Ever
Electrical,132 this court clarified that "[b]ad faith does not connote bad judgment
or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of a known duty through some motive
or interest or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud."133
Respondents have not produced proof to show that Brenda J. Betia acted in bad
faith or with malice as regards their termination. Thus, she may not be held
solidarity liable with Saudia.cralawred
WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS that first, petitioner Brenda J. Betia is not
solidarity liable with petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines, and second, that petitioner
Saudi Arabian Airlines is liable for moral and exemplary damages. The June 16,
2011 Decision and the September 13, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP. No. 113006 are hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects. Accordingly,
petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is ordered to pay respondents:
(1)
Full backwages and all other benefits computed from the respective dates in
which each of the respondents were illegally terminated until the finality of this
Decision;
(2)
Separation pay computed from the respective dates in which each of the
respondents commenced employment until the finality of this Decision at the rate
of one (1) month's salary for every year of service, with a fraction of a year of at
least six (6) months being counted as one (1) whole year;
(3)
Moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 per respondent;

(4)
Exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00 per respondent; and
(5)
Attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total award.
Interest of 6% per annum shall likewise be imposed on the total judgment award
from the finality of this Decision until full satisfaction thereof.
This case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter to make a detailed computation of
the amounts due to respondents which petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines should
pay without delay.
SO ORDERED.

VALERIO E. KALAW,
G.R. No. 166357
Petitioner
- versus MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ,
Respondent.
RESOLUTION
In our decision promulgated on September 19, 2011,[1] the Court dismissed the
complaint for declaration of nullity of the marriage of the parties upon the
following ratiocination, to wit:
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside
the trial courts Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.
xxxx
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from
psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert
witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but
the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior
of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioners experts heavily
relied on petitioners allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits
to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their
children. Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged habits, when
performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to
her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of
NPD.
But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of
the conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent
presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and
neglected their children as a result. Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it
was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her
duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioners allegations that
she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to three
times a week and always with the permission of her husband and without
abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that they

were with their mother when she played mahjong in their relatives home.
Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the
mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While
he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to
link this episode to respondents mahjong-playing. The least that could have been
done was to prove the frequency of respondents mahjong-playing during the
years when these two children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus,
while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating
frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioners claim about respondents alleged constant visits to
the beauty parlor, going out with friends, and obsessive need for attention from
other men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty
salons or her frequent partying with friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an
alleged companion of respondent during these nights-out) in order to prove that
respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario only testified that respondent
appeared to be dating other men. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was
able to prove that respondent had an extramarital affair with another man, that
one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive need
for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal
separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the
behaviors described as constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that
she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence
points to the opposite conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show that
respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing
her marital and parental duties. Not once did the children state that they were
neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of
them, was around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears
that respondent made real efforts to see and take care of her children despite her
estrangement from their father. There was no testimony whatsoever that shows
abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his
two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level despite having
tutors, there is nothing to link their academic shortcomings to Malyns actions.
After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the
conclusion of psychological incapacity. There is no error in the CAs reversal of the
trial courts ruling that there was psychological incapacity. The trial courts
Decision merely summarized the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the
respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of these allegations,
the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The trial court did
not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusion of
psychological incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which
may have constrained them from dedicating the best of themselves to each other
and to their children. There may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not
psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals
May 27, 2004 Decision and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No.
64240 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[2]
In his Motion for Reconsideration,[3] the petitioner implores the Court to take a
thorough second look into what constitutes psychological incapacity; to uphold
the findings of the trial court as supported by the testimonies of three expert

witnesses; and consequently to find that the respondent, if not both parties, were
psychologically incapacitated to perform their respective essential marital
obligation.
Upon an assiduous review of the records, we resolve to grant the petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration.
I
Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
prior to the celebration of the marriage that is permanent as to deprive the party
of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or
she was about to assume. Although the Family Code has not defined the term
psychological incapacity, the Court has usually looked up its meaning by
reviewing the deliberations of the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee
that had drafted the Family Code in order to gain an insight on the provision. It
appeared that the members of the Family Code Revision Committee were not
unanimous on the meaning, and in the end they decided to adopt the provision
with less specificity than expected in order to have the law allow some
resiliency in its application.[4] Illustrative of the less specificity than expected
has been the omission by the Family Code Revision Committee to give any
examples of psychological incapacity that would have limited the applicability of
the provision conformably with the principle of ejusdem generis, because the
Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-tocase basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and the decisions of church tribunals that had
persuasive effect by virtue of the provision itself having been taken from the
Canon Law.[5]
On the other hand, as the Court has observed in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[6] the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee and the relevant materials
on psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage have rendered
it obvious that the term psychological incapacity as used in Article 36 of the
Family Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely
low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances, and could not be taken and
construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts
in our law on marriage. Thus correlated:x x x psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not
evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family
Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity
of the void marriage to be legitimate.[7]
In time, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[8] the Court set some guidelines for the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, as follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing
it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable,
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family
and marriage are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
(a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and
(d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological
not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally
or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration
of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not
a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their childre n. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the

Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,
which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize
our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to
achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions
of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the
Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given
persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other shall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as
the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.[9]
The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to
every instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the
fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly
and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to
adopt its enacted version of less specificity obviously to enable some resiliency
in its application. Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity not
on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but
according to its own facts in recognition of the verity that no case would be on
all fours with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground
for the nullity of marriage; hence, every trial judge must take pains in examining
the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.[10]
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground
for the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with
expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of
experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves
to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the
malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis
by experts.[11]
II
The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-existence of
a partys psychological incapacity should be final and binding for as long as such

findings and evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses and other evidence are
not shown to be clearly and manifestly erroneous.[12] In every situation where
the findings of the trial court are sufficiently supported by the facts and evidence
presented during trial, the appellate court should restrain itself from substituting
its own judgment.[13] It is not enough reason to ignore the findings and
evaluation by the trial court and substitute our own as an appellate tribunal only
because the Constitution and the Family Code regard marriage as an inviolable
social institution. We have to stress that the fulfilment of the constitutional
mandate for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution[14]
only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to a marriage that
is null and void ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.[15]
In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, therefore, the Courts really
assiduously defend and promote the sanctity of marriage as an inviolable social
institution. The foundation of our society is thereby made all the more strong and
solid.
Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence
because it was in the better position to view and examine the demeanor of the
witnesses while they were testifying.[16] The position and role of the trial judge in
the appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological incapacity were not to
be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and respect.
Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court brushed aside the opinions
tendered by Dr. Cristina Gates, a psychologist, and Fr. Gerard Healy on the ground
that their conclusions were solely based on the petitioners version of the events.
After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and unwarranted to
give to such expert opinions a merely generalized consideration and treatment,
least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the declaration of the
nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and
competently described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the
standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by
the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records
and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had
accepted the veracity of the petitioners factual premises.[17]
Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the transcript of the petitioners
testimony, as well as on her interviews of the petitioner, his sister Trinidad, and
his son Miguel. Although her findings would seem to be unilateral under such
circumstances, it was not right to disregard the findings on that basis alone. After
all, her expert opinion took into consideration other factors extant in the records,
including the own opinions of another expert who had analyzed the issue from the
side of the respondent herself. Moreover, it is already settled that the courts must
accord weight to expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the
parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of marriages, for by the very
nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, despite having the primary
task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.[18]
The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately necessary herein to enable the trial
court to properly determine the issue of psychological incapacity of the
respondent (if not also of the petitioner). Consequently, the lack of personal
examination and interview of the person diagnosed with personality disorder, like
the respondent, did not per se invalidate the findings of the experts. The Court
has stressed in Marcos v. Marcos[19] that there is no requirement for one to be
declared psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician,
because what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately

establishes the partys psychological incapacity. Hence, if the totality of evidence

presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.[20]
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between
the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder
itself. If other evidence showing that a certain condition could possibly result from
an assumed state of facts existed in the record, the expert opinion should be
admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other
evidence on the causation.[21] Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological
incapacity should be considered as conjectural or speculative and without any
probative value only in the absence of other evidence to establish causation. The
experts findings under such circumstances would not constitute hearsay that
would justify their exclusion as evidence.[22] This is so, considering that any
ruling that brands the scientific and technical procedure adopted by Dr. Gates as
weakened by bias should be eschewed if it was clear that her psychiatric
evaluation had been based on the parties upbringing and psychodynamics.[23]
In that context, Dr. Gates expert opinion should be considered not in isolation but
along with the other evidence presented here.
Moreover, in its determination of the issue of psychological incapacity, the trial
court was expected to compare the expert findings and opinion of Dr. Natividad
Dayan, the respondents own witness, and those of Dr. Gates.
In her Psychological Evaluation Report,[24] Dr. Dayan impressed that the
respondent had compulsive and dependent tendencies to the extent of being
relationship dependent. Based from the respondents psychological data, Dr.
Dayan indicated that:
In her relationship with people, Malyne is likely to be reserved and seemingly
detached in her ways. Although she likes to be around people, she may keep her
emotional distance. She, too, values her relationship but she may not be that
demonstrative of her affections. Intimacy may be quite difficult for her since she
tries to maintain a certain distance to minimize opportunities for rejection. To
others, Malyne may appear, critical and demanding in her ways. She can be
assertive when opinions contrary to those of her own are expressed. And yet, she
is apt to be a dependent person. At a less conscious level, Malyne fears that
others will abandon her. Malyne, who always felt a bit lonely, placed an enormous
value on having significant others would depend on most times.
xxxx
But the minute she started to care, she became a different person clingy and
immature, doubting his love, constantly demanding reassurance that she was the
most important person in his life. She became relationship-dependent.[25]
Dr. Dayan was able to clearly interpret the results of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial
Inventory test[26] conducted on the respondent, observing that the respondent
obtained high scores on dependency, narcissism and compulsiveness, to wit:
Atty. Bretania
Q: How about this Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory?
A: Sir, the cut of the score which is supposed to be normal is 73 percental round
and there are several scores wherein Mrs. Kalaw obtained very high score and
these are on the score of dependency, narcissism and compulsion.

Q: Would you please tell us again, Madam Witness, what is the acceptable score?
A: When your score is 73 and above, that means that it is very significant. So, if
72 and below, it will be considered as acceptable.
Q: In what area did Mrs. Kalaw obtain high score?
A: Under dependency, her score is 78; under narcissism, is 79; under
compulsiveness, it is 84.[27]
It is notable that Dr. Dayans findings did not contradict but corroborated the
findings of Dr. Gates to the effect that the respondent had been afflicted with
Narcissistic Personality Disorder as well as with Anti- Social Disorder. Dr. Gates
relevantly testified:
ATTY. GONONG
Q: Could you please repeat for clarity. I myself is [sic] not quite familiar with
psychology terms. So, more or less, could you please tell me in more laymans
terms how you arrived at your findings that the respondent is self-centered or
narcissistic?
A: I moved into this particular conclusion. Basically, if you ask about her childhood
background, her father died in a vehicular accident when she was in her teens
and thereafter she was prompted to look for a job to partly assume the
breadwinners role in her family. I gathered that paternal grandmother partly took
care of her and her siblings against the fact that her own mother was unable to
carry out her respective duties and responsibilities towards Elena Fernandez and
her siblings considering that the husband died prematurely. And there was an
indication that Elena Fernandez on several occasions ever told petitioner that he
cannot blame her for being negligent as a mother because she herself never
experienced the care and affection of her own mother herself. So, there is a
precedent in her background, in her childhood, and indeed this seems to indicate
a particular script, we call it in psychology a script, the tendency to repeat some
kind of experience or the lack of care, lets say some kind of deprivation, there is
a tendency to sustain it even on to your own life when you have your own family. I
did interview the son because I was not satisfied with what I gathered from both
Trinidad and Valerio and even though as a young son at the age of fourteen
already expressed the he could not see, according to the child, the sincerity of
maternal care on the part of Elena and that he preferred to live with the father
actually.
Q: Taking these all out, you came to the conclusion that respondent is selfcentered and narcissistic?
A: Actually respondent has some needs which tempts [sic] from a deprived
childhood and she is still in search of this. In her several boyfriends, it seems that
she would jump from one boyfriend to another. There is this need for attention,
this need for love on other people.
Q: And that led you to conclude?
A: And therefore I concluded that she is self-centered to the point of neglecting
her duty as a wife and as a mother.[28]
The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement
of her theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that she can render to the
courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for her criterion and the reasons
upon which the logic of her conclusion is founded.[29] Hence, we should weigh

and consider the probative value of the findings of the expert witnesses vis--vis
the other evidence available.
The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy, a canon law expert, an advocate
before the Manila Archdiocese and Matrimonial Tribunal, and a consultant of the
Family Code Revision Committee. Regarding Father Healys expert testimony, we
have once declared that judicial understanding of psychological incapacity could
be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each
case, by current trends in psychological and even by canonical thought, and by
experience.[30] It is prudent for us to do so because the concept of psychological
incapacity adopted under Article 36 of the Family Code was derived from Canon
Law.
Father Healy tendered his opinion on whether or not the respondents level of
immaturity and irresponsibility with regard to her own children and to her
husband constituted psychological incapacity, testifying thusly:
ATTY. MADRID: Now, respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez claims that she is not
psychologically incapacitated. On the facts as you read it based on the records of
this case before this Honorable Court, what can you say to that claim of
respondent?
A: I would say it is a clear case of psychological incapacity because of her
immaturity and traumatic irresponsibility with regards to her own children.
Q: So what you are saying is that, the claim of respondent that she is not
psychologically incapacitated is not true?
A: Yes. It should be rejected.
Q: Why do you say so?
A: Because of what she has manifested in her whole lifestyle, inconsistent pattern
has been manifested running through their life made a doubt that this is
immaturity and irresponsibility because her family was dysfunctional and then her
being a model in her early life and being the breadwinner of the family put her in
an unusual position of prominence and then begun to inflate her own ego and she
begun to concentrate her own beauty and that became an obsession and that led
to her few responsibility of subordinating to her children to this lifestyle that she
had embraced.
Q: You only mentioned her relationship with the children, the impact. How about
the impact on the relationship of the respondent with her husband?
A: Also the same thing. It just did not fit in to her lifestyle to fulfill her obligation to
her husband and to her children. She had her own priorities, her beauty and her
going out and her mahjong and associating with friends. They were the priorities
of her life.
Q: And what you are saying is that, her family was merely secondary? Secondary.
And how does that relate to psychological incapacity?
A: That she could not appreciate or absorb or fulfill the obligations of marriage
which everybody takes for granted. The concentration on the husband and the
children before everything else would be subordinated to the marriage with her.
Its the other way around. Her beauty, her going out, her beauty parlor and her
mahjong, they were their priorities in her life.
Q: And in medical or clinical parlance, what specifically do you call this?

A: That is narcissism where the person falls in love with himself is from a
myt[h]ical case in Roman history.
Q: Could you please define to us what narcissism is?
A: Its a self-love, falling in love with oneself to make up for the loss of a dear
friend as in the case of Narcissus, the myth, and then that became known in
clinical terminology as narcissism. When a person is so concern[ed] with her own
beauty and prolonging and protecting it, then it becomes the top priority in her
life.
xxxx
Q: And you stated that circumstances that prove this narcissism. How do you
consider this narcissism afflicting respondent, it is grave, slight or .?
A: I would say its grave from the actual cases of neglect of her family and that
causes serious obligations which she has ignored and not properly esteemed
because she is so concern[ed] with herself in her own lifestyle. Very serious.
Q: And do you have an opinion whether or not this narcissism afflicting
respondent was already existing at the time or marriage or even thereafter?
xxxx
A: When you get married you dont develop narcissism or psychological
incapacity. You bring with you into the marriage and then it becomes manifested
because in marriage you accept these responsibilities. And now you show that you
dont accept them and you are not capable of fulfilling them and you dont care
about them.
Q: Is this narcissism, Fr. Healy, acquired by accident or congenital or what?
A: No. The lifestyle generates it. Once you become a model and still the family
was depended [sic] upon her and she was a model at Hyatt and then Rustans, it
began to inflate her ego so much that this became the top priority in her life. Its
her lifestyle.
Q: What you are saying is that, the narcissism of respondent even expanded after
the marriage?
A: That could have expanded because it became very obvious after the marriage
because she was neglecting such fundamental obligations.
Q: And how about the matter of curability, is this medically or clinically curable,
this narcissism that you mentioned?
A: Lets say, it was manifested for so many years in her life. It was found in her
family background situation. Say, almost for sure would be incurable now.
Q: What specific background are you referring to?
A: Well, the fact when the father died and she was the breadwinner and her
beauty was so important to give in her job and money and influence and so on.
But this is a very unusual situation for a young girl and her position in the family
was exalted in a very very unusual manner and therefore she had that pressure
on her and in her accepting the pressure, in going along with it and putting it in
top priority.[31]

Given his credentials and conceded expertise in Canon Law, Father Healys
opinions and findings commanded respect. The contribution that his opinions and
findings could add to the judicial determination of the parties psychological
incapacity was substantive and instructive. He could thereby inform the trial court
on the degrees of the malady that would warrant the nullity of marriage, and he
could as well thereby provide to the trial court an analytical insight upon a subject
as esoteric to the courts as psychological incapacity has been. We could not justly
disregard his opinions and findings. Appreciating them together with those of Dr.
Gates and Dr. Dayan would advance more the cause of justice. The Court
observed in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te:[32]
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological
expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the persons
entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts
and they were asked to give professional opinions about a partys mental capacity
at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to
be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not
amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an
accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the
past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important
connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a
legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer
be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand
the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability
to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment
are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological
incapacity, not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders
that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the
essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or
the right of the spouses to each others body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its
totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a
developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the
meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the
development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to
give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that
the spouses must be other oriented since the obligations of marriage are rooted
in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for
interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality
but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations
of marriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of this
interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and
support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered
in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature
marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment:
(1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness
to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial
responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of
marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might
lead to the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion
even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly
giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1)
antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of
moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of
sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses
consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether
he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does
not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the
psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in
their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties inability to exercise
proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases
seem to be concentrating on the parties incapacity to assume or carry out their
responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An
advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that at the time the
marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is
proof of someones failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promised at the
time the marriage was entered into.
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert
testimony to establish the precise cause of a partys psychological incapacity, and
to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos
asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the
presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of
the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.[33]
Ngo Te also emphasized that in light of the unintended consequences of strictly
applying the standards set in Molina,[34] the courts should consider the totality of
evidence in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, viz:
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case
basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers,

had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict

standards in Molina, thus:
xxxx
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts membership
concurred in the ponencia of then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V.
Panganiban, three justices concurred in the result and another threeincluding,
as aforesaid, Justice Romerotook pains to compose their individual separate
opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that each case must
be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is
on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the Court has applied the
aforesaid standards, without too much regard for the laws clear intention that
each case is to be treated differently, as courts should interpret the provision on
a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of
rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity.
Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the
dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGs exaggeration of
Article 36 as the most liberal divorce procedure in the world. The unintended
consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live
with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which,
like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our
basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has
become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or
unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed
sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to
continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman
Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said
individuals.
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by
Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which
is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against
collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence. The Court should
rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child
abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity,
the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting
the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a
psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital
obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the
infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a
sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no
marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very
beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will
simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
xxxx

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in

this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in
Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which
should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article
36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each
case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions
of church tribunals.[35]
III
In the decision of September 19, 2011, the Court declared as follows:
Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged
in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife.
Respondent refuted petitioners allegations that she played four to five times a
week. She maintained it was only two to three times a week and always with the
permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at home. The
children corroborated this, saying that they were with their mother when she
played mahjong in their relatives home. Petitioner did not present any proof, other
than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that
respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated
the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondents mahjongplaying. The least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of
respondents mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in
second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent
played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the
children were not proven.[36] (Emphasis supplied)
The frequency of the respondents mahjong playing should not have delimited our
determination of the presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the
determinant should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and
responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she
fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have known that
bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would
expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their
moral fiber.
Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondents obsessive mahjong playing
surely impacted on her family life, particularly on her very young children. We do
find to be revealing the disclosures made by Valerio Teodoro Kalaw[37] the
parties eldest son in his deposition, whereby the son confirmed the claim of his
father that his mother had been hooked on playing mahjong, viz:
ATTY. PISON: From the timebefore your parents separation, do you remember
any habit or activity or practice which your mother engaged in, before the
separation?
WITNESS: Yeah, habit? She was a heavy smoker and she likes to play mahjong a
lot, and I cant remember.
xxxx
ATTY. PISON: You said that your mother played mahjong frequently. How frequent,
do you remember?

WITNESS: Not really, but it was a lot. Not actually, I cant, I cant
ATTY. PISON: How long would she stay playing mahjong say one session?
WITNESS: Really long cuz we would go to my aunts house in White Plains and I
think we would get there by lunch then leave, we fall asleep. I think it was like one
in the morning.
ATTY. PISON: You, you went there? She brought you?
WITNESS: Yeah, to play with my cousins, yeah and my brothers & sisters.
ATTY. PISON: Were you brought all the time?
WITNESS: Yeah, almost all the time but sometimes, I guess shed go out by
herself.[38]
The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong
sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested
her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her
children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions
was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the
gratification of her own personal and escapist desires. This was the observation of
Father Healy himself. In that regard, Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan both explained that
the current psychological state of the respondent had been rooted on her own
childhood experience.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her childrens moral and
mental development. This disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard
and protect her children, as expressly defined under Article 209 and Article 220 of
the Family Code, to wit:
Article 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and
property of their unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility
shall include the caring for and rearing of such children for civic consciousness
and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character
and well-being.
Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with
respect to their unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right
precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with
their means;
(2) x x x x
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty,
integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in
civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at
all times;
(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise
their activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad
company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health,
studies and morals;

(6) x x x x
(7) x x x x
(8) x x x x
(9) x x x x (emphasis supplied)
The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly take into consideration the
findings of the RTC to the effect that both the petitioner and the respondent had
been psychologically incapacitated, and thus could not assume the essential
obligations of marriage. The RTC would not have found so without the allegation
to that effect by the respondent in her answer,[39] whereby she averred that it
was not she but the petitioner who had suffered from psychological incapacity.
The allegation of the petitioners psychological incapacity was substantiated by
Dr. Dayan, as follows:
ATTY. BRETAA:
Q: You stated earlier that both parties were behaviorally immature? Yes,sir.
Q: And that the marriage was a mistake?
A: Yes,sir.
Q: What is your basis for your statement that respondent was behaviorally
immature?
A: Sir, for the reason that even before the marriage Malyn had noticed already
some of those short temper of the petitioner but she was very much in love and
so she lived-in with him and even the time that they were together, that they
were living in, she also had noticed some of his psychological deficits if we may
say so. But as I said, because she is also dependent and she was one who
determined to make the relationship work, she was denying even those kinds of
problems that she had seen.
Q: To make it clear, Madam witness, Im talking here of the petitioner, Mr. Kalaw.
What led you to conclude that Mr. Kalaw was behaviorally immature?
A: I think he also mentioned that his concept of marriage was not duly stable
then. He was not really thinking of marriage except that his wife got pregnant and
so he thought that he had to marry her. And even that time he was not also a
monogamous person.
Q: Are you saying, Madam Witness, that ultimately the decision to marry lied on
the petitioner?
A: I think so, Sir.
Q: Now, in your report, Madam Witness, you mentioned here that the petitioner
admitted to you that in his younger years he was often out seeking other women.
Im referring specifically to page 18. He also admitted to you that the thought of
commitment scared him, the petitioner. Now, given these admissions by petitioner
to you, my questions is, is it possible for such a person to enter into marriage
despite
3. She specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of
the Petition alleging that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to

comply with the essential obligations to the marriage and that such incapacity
manifested itself only after the marriage, the truth of the matter being that it is
the petitioner who is psychologically incapacitated.
Q: this fear of commitment and given his admission that he was a womanizer? Is
it possible for this person to stop his womanizing ways during the marriage?
A: Sir, its difficult.
Q: It would be difficult for that person?
A: Yes,Sir.
Q: What is the probability of this person giving up his womanizing after marriage?
A: Sir, I would say the probability of his giving up is almost only 20%.
Q: So, it is entirely possible that the respondent womanized during his marriage
with the respondent?
A: Yes,Sir.
Q: What is the bearing of this fear of commitment on the part of the petitioner
insofar as his psychological capacity to perform his duties as a husband is
concerned?
A: Sir, it would impair his ability to have sexual integrity and also to be fully
committed to the role of husband to Malyn.
Q: Madam Witness, you never directly answered my question on whether the
petitioner was psychologically incapacitated to perform his duty as a husband. You
only said that the petitioner was behaviorally immature and that the marriage was
a mistake. Now, may I asked [sic] you that question again and request you to
answer that directly?
A: Sir, he is psychologically incapacitated.[40]
Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the burden to prove the nullity of
the marriage, the respondent, as the defendant spouse, could establish the
psychological incapacity of her husband because she raised the matter in her
answer. The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null and void under Article
36 of the Family Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the respondent
who imputes the psychological incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is
fully substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist in one
party alone or in both of them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is
established, the marriage has to be deemed null and void.
More than twenty (20) years had passed since the parties parted ways. By now,
they must have already accepted and come to terms with the awful truth that
their marriage, assuming it existed in the eyes of the law, was already beyond
repair. Both parties had inflicted so much damage not only to themselves, but also
to the lives and psyche of their own children. It would be a greater injustice should
we insist on still recognizing their void marriage, and then force them and their
children to endure some more damage. This was the very same injustice that
Justice Romero decried in her erudite dissenting opinion in Santos v. Court of
Appeals:[41]
It would be great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too
restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be

married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all
practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court
makes today. It is not, in effect, directly or indirectly, facilitating the
transformation of petitioner into a habitual tryster or one forced to maintain
illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging problems of
illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private respondent, his wife,
the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which
he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for
absolute divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of
its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a
new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wifes
psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation.
In this case, the marriage never existed from the beginning because the
respondent was afflicted with psychological incapacity at and prior to the time of
the marriage. Hence, the Court should not hesitate to declare the nullity of the
marriage between the parties.
To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of marriage as the basic
foundation of our society does not preclude striking down a marital union that is
ill-equipped to promote family life, thus:
Now is also the opportune time to comment on another common legal guide
utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity in the adjudication
of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court
and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1
and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that [t]he State
recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development[t], and that
[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State. These provisions highlight the importance of the
family and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to
marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the
province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the
strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political
influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such
legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This
being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the
constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been
accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines
marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the
limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the
judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the
constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a
statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what
marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need
not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving
a petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a
psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an
implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State

interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn

serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the
State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab
initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State
concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who,
for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply
with the essential obligations of marriage.[42] (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and
SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES
the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between
the petitioner and the respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO due to the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.