MiG Alley Korea War, the first jet vs.

jet aerial warfare

February 20, 2012
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The B-29 Superfortress and MiG Alley

The B-29 is a significant part of the MiG Alley story. The B-29
inflicted incalculable damage on North Korea and its forces during
the war. At the same time, the MiG-15 was a terror against B-29s.
It was the F-86s job, and the job of other USAF and USN fighters,
to protect those B-29s and much of that was done in MiG Alley.
There was and remains much controversy surrounding the
application of the B-29 in Korea.
It was meant to be a strategic bomber. If General Curt LeMay had
had his way, it would have been conserved for the Soviet Union
(even though jet replacement was coming into use), but if used in
the Korean War, he wanted to use it as a strategic even atomic
bomber in China as well as in North Korea. Of course China was
off limits for the B-29, as was the atomic bomb, much to the
dismay of General Lemay.
The introduction of the MiG-15 most certainly ruined the day for
all those who flew and believed in the B-29. It now had to be
protected, escorted.
Furthermore, there were so few strategic targets in the DPRK that
the B-29, during the early days when the US had air superiority,
exhausted its list of strategic targets in three months, destroying
them all, though some such targets such as hydroelectric plants
were initially kept off the roster. They were later added.
The bottom line was that the B-29 ended up being used for
interdiction and on occasion close air support, for which it was not
designed and the crews were not trained. Its deficiencies in the
close air support arena angered the Army and Marines, who
needed that kind of support the most.

Here you see a USAF B-29 bomber in the line sight of a Soviet
MiG-15. Flying at about 300 mph, with the MiG able to go nearly
Mach speeds, the B-29 caught alone was a sitting duck. The B-29s
gunners fortunately were good, many very good, and they could
give the MiG a good fight.
The B-29s contribution during the Korean War is not widely
known and in some cases controversial. The B-29s role deserves to
be studied separately. But the MiG Alley story must include at
least a summary about the B-29 in Korea. After all, this is the
aircraft the MiG-15 was designed to stop, and the F-86 was used to
protect.

The B-29 was the brain child of General Hap Arnold, who would
eventually lead the Army Air Corps in WWII and then become the
Chief of Staff, USAF thereafter. He was very much a forward
thinker and had to fight hard for the aircrafts development and
production. He felt existing bombers were good enough for Europe,
because of the short distances involved. He saw the B-29 as
mission essential for the Pacific, where distances were much
greater. He also understood that Allied ground forces were going to
have to fight their way up the Pacific island chains to get airfields
that would put the B-29 within striking range of Japans home
islands. The Marianas were close enough, so when the Marines
took Guam, Saipan and Tinian, his foresight came into productive
application. The B-29s could now fly round-robin from the
Marianas to Japan. Once the Marines took Iwo Jima, they could do
so with fighter escort from Iwo Jima all the way to target and back
to Iwo Jia. Iwo Jima also gave battle damaged B-29s a place to
recover should the crew feel it could not make it to the Marianas.
With the end of WWII came the Cold War and the Atomic Age. The
B-29 was now the aircraft to conduct atom bomb drops against the
Soviet Union until follow-on jet bombers could be developed and
fielded. It had now fully matured as a strategic bomber. Truman
was reluctant to employ too many in Korea because they were
needed for the Soviet mission. And as I said in an earlier section,
Truman to this point was not enamored with the USAF, an
organization he agreed to make a separate service in order to keep
its overall strength down. Yet, despite this, he committed the B-29
Superfortress to battle right away.
It must also be said that following WWII, and the formation of the

USAF, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) was formed as a Major

Air Command (MAJCOM) to conduct nuclear attacks against the
Soviet Union. SACs prominence rose in stature rapidly, in terms of
priority and funding. SACs focus was on the Soviet Union. It
therefore saw the Korean War as a distraction. It was, therefore,
always reluctant to commit B-29s and crews to the Korean War. It
did so, but grudgingly.

At first, the B-29s worked to protect retreating US forces. Then

quite quickly, they began bombing strategic targets throughout
North Korea. For all practical purposes, given North Koreas sad
economic shape, the B-29s ran out of strategic targets within three
months, and concentrated on interdiction of enemy lines of
communication (LOC). This is a post-strike photo of the Wonsan
petroleum refinery after B-29 bomber strikes in August 1950,
ninety-five percent destroyed.

Three days after the invasion, on June 28, 1950, the 19th
Bombardment Group (BG) transferred four of its twenty-two B-29s
from Guam to Okinawa. They began right away attacking enemy
forces north of Seoul. This is a photo of a 19th BG B-29 in flight.
Among its first missions was to provide ground support by
attacking enemy troops on the north side of the Han River north of
Seoul. It did not do this well. Nonetheless, it was among the first
USAF aircraft in the battle.
The 19th was the only medium bomb group not under the control
of SAC. The 19th BG was B-29 BG assigned to 20th AF, once the
proud owner of all B-29s in WWII, and the numbered AF
responsible for bombing the Japanese home islands and for
dropping the atomic bombs on Japan. Other B-29 units would
come to fight in Korea. For the Korean War, B-29s fell under the
operational control of two commands, the 20th AF, which was
subordinate to FEAF, and SAC, which was responsible to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Its worth pointing out as well that following
WWII the B-29s label was changed from heavy bomber to medium
bomber group, a label change only.

The 19th BG bombers were the only B-29s permanently stationed

overseas, in their case in Guam. They were the only bombers
capable of hitting the Korean peninsula, but had to be moved to
Japan to get in close for a maximum punch. It promptly began
bombing bridges, roads, railroads and troop concentrations when
they could be found. The initial job was to provide defensive
protection for US forces retreating to the south. It was the first
B-29 group to arrive and the last to leave the war.

In the first two months, it flew more than six hundred sorties,
supporting UN ground forces by bombing enemy troops, vehicles,
and such communications points as the Han River bridges. In the
north, its targets included an oil refinery and port facilities at
Wonsan, a railroad bridge at Pyonyang, and an airfield at Yonpo.
After UN ground forces pushed the communists out of South Korea,
the 19th BG turned to strategic objectives in North Korea,
including industrial and hydroelectric facilities. It also continued
to attack bridges, marshalling yards, supply centers, artillery and
troop positions, barracks, port facilities, and airfields. This photo
shows B-29 bombs blanket the runway at Saamcham, about 50
miles north of Pyongyang.
The 92nd BG deployed to Japan in early 1950 and began bombing
the Wonson Marshalling Yards straight away. It fell under the
20th AF but returned to the US in late October and November
1950.

The 98th BG followed in August 1950. It immediately started

bombing marshaling yards at Pyongyang, North Koreas capital
and quickly became an important part of the interdiction effort.

Unlike the 19th, it fell under SACs command. This photo shows
the 98th bombing a target in North Korea in January 1951, hitting
a supply center. The aircraft in the foreground would, in February
1952, crash on take-off from Japan, all 13 souls aboard lost.
The 307th BG also arrived in August. It is my understanding that
it was detached from SAC to fall under the 20th AF as well. From
August through September 1950, the 307th bombed strategic
targets in North Korea and in November 1950 bombed bridges over
the Yalu River and played an interdiction role.
In the early days, the B-29s employed general purpose (GP) bombs
instead of employing incendiary bombs which worked so well
against the Japanese home islands in WWII. Use of the GP bombs
demanded more sorties to knock out targets, though they were
outfitted with delayed-action fuses to slow enemy damage repairs.
The bombers could bomb during poor weather using radars that
located offset aiming points. The reality was that there were not
many worthy strategic or military targets in North Korea. The
B-29s had just about destroyed all 18 strategic targets by
September 15, 1950. Oil storage facilities at Rashin were the only
one left untouched because it was so close to the USSR. Pyongyang
fell on October 19, and UN forces advanced toward the Yalu. Not
only had most North Korean strategic targets already been
destroyed, but now UN forces held most of North Korea. The 22nd
and 92nd Bomb Wings were returned to their SAC roles in the US
on October 27. Remaining B-29s focused on tactical targets
supporting forces on the ground.
Th Soviets acted to improve defenses on the ground, but the major
action taken to thwart the B-29 was the introduction of the
MiG-15. Between June and November, the B-29 bombed where it
pleased virtually at will. Some called the flights milk runs. The
B-29s did not encounter significant enemy fighter opposition until
the MiG-15 came along in November 1950. The Chinese invasions
and introduction of the MiG-15 changed the whole calculus for the
B-29. Prior to that, they would bomb from altitudes as low as
10,000 ft. without any danger.
Just back up a month, to October 1950. Robert F. Dorr, in his book
B-29 Superfortress Units of the Korean War, wrote that on
October 18, 1950 an RB-29 reconnaissance crew of the 31st
Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron (SRS) peered across the Yalu
River and counted more than 75 fighters parked in neat rows at
Antung airfield. We know today that these were MiG-15s belonging
to a Soviet fighter regiment. The fighters were gone the following
day, and General Stratmeyer concluded that the enemy had merely
displayed the aircraft as window dressing. Stratemeyer could not
have been more wrong.
A note on the RB-29s. They were modified, some to take
photographic intelligence (PHOTINT) and some to conduct
Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) signals collection. Four of these
arrived in Johnson AB, Japan in late summer 1950, two of each
speciality.
Dorr reported on Gene Fisher, a 30th BS gunner from the 19th BG
who had previously been shot up by a Yak-9. Fishers comments
went like this:
The first time I spotted a MiG-15 was on the 23 October 1950
mission, a seven and one-half hour marathon, to the bridges along
the Yalu River. We could see the Manchurian air bases on the
other side of the border (Yalu River). We could see the MiGs
taking off. When they made passes as us I could see their noses
lighting up.
Other crews also saw the MiG-15s, and one airman reported
watching a MiG-15 limping across the Yalu with trailing smoke.
Still the leadership seemed unconvinced about the MiGs and the
threat they posed.
On November 1, 1950, reality turned its ugly head. Eight MiG-15s
intercepted about 15 USAF P-51s. A Soviet piloted MiG shot down
one. Then on that same day came the first fighter-to-fighter kill,
when another Soviet piloted MiG-15 shot down an F-80C.

Then, in early November, a RB-29 was jumped by MiG-15s while

photographing Yalu River bridges. This is when Sgt. Harry Lavene,
a tail-gunner, shot one down. During that flight, however, two
B-29 engines both on the port side were shot out. But the crew
made it back to Japan. Regrettably, on final approach, the left
wing stalled and went in, killing everyone in the forward
compartment except Lavene.
Given that crews had spotted MiG-15s parked at Antung, an RB-29
was sent up there is take photos. It was escorted by three P-51s.
They had some trouble seeing through their own contrails, but
managed to get good photography. Shortly thereafter, they too
were jumped by MiG-15s. The P-51s attacked them and kept them
busy while the Rb-29 cut away and escaped out to the Yellow Sea.
Incredibly, Lt. Ambrose, the Rb-29s skipper, did a high speed dive
as an evasive action and got away with it. He would be kidded for
being a frustrated fighter pilot, but he got them out of there.

F9-2F from VF-21 Mach Busters aboard the USS Midway, 1952

Americas first MiG kill occurred on November 9, when Lt.

Commander William T. Amen (shown here after the kill) shot one
down. He flew a VF-111 Sundowner F9F-2B from the USS
Philippine Sea. He chased his prey from 4,000 ft up to 15,000 and
down again before making his hit. I might remark that some
report that the first jet against jet fight took place on November 8,
1950, when a F-80C pilot, 1st Lt. Russell Brown, from the 16th
FIS, 51st FIW, shot down a MiG based at Antung. It is my
understanding Russian records indicate no MiG-15 lost on that
date, but Brown retains credit nonetheless Ill stay out of this
debate --- the USAF and Navy can fight this out on the football
field!
Despite the knowledge that the MiG-15 was in the fight,
MacArthur ordered a maximum effort to end the war by bombing
the men and material coming across the Yalu for two weeks
starting November 5, 1950. Truman did not like the operation,
fearing upsetting the Chinese too much, but the JCS agreed to the
attacks so long as no US aircraft crossed into China. Attacking the
bridges across the Yalu with a lumbering massive B-29 without
crossing into China was virtually impossible. The two week

campaign would last only one day.

To my knowledge, the first B-29 to be engaged by a MiG-15 was a
RB-29 reconnaissance aircraft from the 31st SRS on November 9, a
day after a massive B-29 bombing raid against Yalu bridges. He
made it back to Johnson AB in Japan, but crash landed killing five
crew. But during the action, Cpl. Harry J. LaVene, the RB-29s tail
gunner, was credited with shooting down one MiG-15. This was the
first loss of a B-29 in combat and to a MiG-15 and the first MiG
kill by a B-29 gunner.

As an aside, gunners would later report that the MiGs were like
blurs in the sky to them because of their high speed attacks. They
had only a few seconds to fire, and if lucky, might score one or two
hits, often nowhere near enough to bring down the tough MiG.
Here you see three MiG-15s rolling in toward a B-29 preparing to
attack.
In February 1951, the B-29s ran a series of interdiction raids
against the Chiese designed to slow them down. On February 25,
four B-29s attacking Sunchon were attacked by eight MiG-15s.
Following this, the B-29s demanded escorts and flew at 20,000 ft
in defensive formations. F-80C and F-84s provided the escort, both
of which were largely ineffective against the MiG-15. On March 1, a
force of 48 B-29s attacked the rail bridge connecting North Korea
with Antung and those were hit by dozens of MiG-15s. Three B-29s
were lost, seven damaged. General Stratemeyer now restricted the
B-29 to attacking Chinese forces and supply lines farther to the
south, around the 38th parallel.
In August and September 1951, the B-29s hit at rail lines and
bridges. US intelligence found the enemy quickly repaired the
damages.
In October 1951, the Chinese were known to be building air bases
throughout North Korea, and the B-29s were tasked to destroy
those.

As history tells the story, the worst day for the B-29 in North
Korea was October 23, 1951, known as Black Tuesday. B-29s from
the 307th BW were to attack Namsi airfield, which was in the
heart of MiG alley. Earl J. McGills book, Black Tuesday of Namsi,
chronicles the calamitous B-29 daylight bombing missions
against Namsi Airfield. What many experts consider the epic air
battle of the Korean War and perhaps the greatest jet engagement
in the history of aerial warfare has largely become another
forgotten battle in a forgotten war.

John Wagenhalls participated in the flight. He has written this:

I was flying as Bombardier in the #2 position in C Flight and
Peter Dempsey was the Aircraft Commander. . . From the battle
damage we sustained it would be the most likely position in the
formation. The bomb doors on the right side of the aircraft were
shattered from cannon fire, while those on the opposite side
suffered only minor damage. I was able to wire the pieces of the
bomb bay doors in the up position sufficiently to allowed us to fly
the aircraft back to Kadena (Okinawa, Japan).
"Fortunately no one aboard the aircraft was injured in the melee.
During and after the attack it seemed that the B29s were scattered,
as not one of the flights remained intact. It was almost as if each
airplane was on its own since at least one aircraft from each flight
was destroyed almost immediately in the first attack. The (B-29)
firepower effectiveness was severely reduced as, basically, no
formation still existed. I believe we were the first crew to reach
Kadena from Korea that fateful day. If the MiGs would have to
continued their attack they could have shot us all down."
Stars & Stripes reported that an estimated 150 MiG-15s attacked
the B-29 flight of nine. F-86s and F-84 Thunderjets defended the

nine. Three B-29s were lost along with one F-84. However, the
newspaper said the USAF crews shot down 18 MiG-15s, five of
which were shot down by B-29 gunners. My gut instinct is that
this number is way too high. I have seen as low as one MiG shot
down, and several reports saying four were shot down.
I must comment here that I have seen a wide variety of loss
numbers for both sides.
Newsweek said 100 MiGs attacked, thirty-four F-86s operated as a
screening force while 55 F-84s escorted the B-29s. Newsweek went
on to say that 50 MiGs got through, shot down two B-29s and
severely damaged six others, leaving only one in reasonable shape.
There seems to be a consensus that three B-29s were shot down
along with one F-84. I have seen no consensus on how many MiGs
were lost.

Aircrews reported three B-29s had to land at Kimpo in the ROK

with heavy battle damage. Aircraft 44-61816 flown by Fogler had
over 500 holes in it. It is shown here at Kimpo. A common practice
for Air Force men and women is to go out to a damaged aircraft
and just stare at it, like many of these people are doing, oft times
in complete awe. The second aircraft flown by Reeter had cannon
damage that killed the navigator and wounded others. Major
William Griner crash landed but all crew members survived.
Paul Dickerson was a gunner aboard Griners aircraft and said,
We took the shell in no. 3 main (fuel tank) and fuel started
pouring out over the wing and down the right side over my blister.
When the fuel went over the blister it made the blister milky I
could not see out of it anymore I then went off interphone and
took care of Lt. Thorton who had shrapnel in his arm. On landing
we went off the side of the runway. Major Griner gave the crew the
option to bail out. None did. Our CFC (central fire controller),
SSgt. Slagowski got a MiG, confirmed by 4th FIW photos at
debriefing.
Dewell Turner was a gunner. He said, Paul Dickerson's account
matches my recollection. I saw the tires blow out upon our landing
when Major Griner locked the brakes to stop us. I also recall that a
bomb hung up and had to be manually jettisoned before we
landed. I think the bombadier and CFC did that chore. I saw the
MIG go down after the CFC hit it. I remember the debriefers at
Kimpo really pressed me about what I saw. Major Griner gave us
the option of bailing out, but all the regular crew wanted to stay
with the plane, probably because the radar operator was wounded
and could not jump and they did want to leave him. I wasn't about
to jump alone. Everyone had great confidence in Major Griner and
he did a fantastic job getting us down safely. The first thing the
gunners did after landing was to clear the guns. When we looked
for the lower forward turret cover to remount it after clearing the
guns, we could never find it. No telling what happened to it.
Someone probably thought it would never be needed again. They
were right.
Whatever numbers are right, the B-29 took a beating this day.
Making matters worse, the B-29 was completely ineffective this day
against the Namsi airfield. Some reports say they did not get to
drop any bombs, others say the ones they dropped missed the
target.
By October 27, it appears five B-29s had been lost total and 20
more heavily damaged. Between November 1950 and November

1951, the USAF lost 16 B-29s (I have seen as high as 28) to enemy
action and, on October 28, they were restricted to nighttime
bombing in an interdiction role for the rest of the war. Daylight
raids were suspended in favor of night raids which would employ
SHORAN radar.
By December 1950 MiGs were all over the skies engaging the B-29s
in the Sinuiju and Sananju areas of northwest North Korea.

In April 1952, the B-29s and USAF and USN fighters were given
permission to attack hydroelectric facilities, the bombers by night,
the fighters by day, and by Junes end estimates were 90 percent
of North Koreas power supplies had been destroyed. Starting in
July, heavy-duty raids were conducted against Pyongyang,
Sungho-Ri- Chosin, Sindok and Sinuiju. Some 45 B-29s destroyed
a chemical plant at Namsan-Ri. This photo shows the damage
done to the Chosin power plant after a raid on July 11, 1952.
But between November 1952 and January 1953, five B-29s were
lost to enemy night fighters and Marine F3D-2 Skyknight night
fighters were brought in. By late spring 1953, the emphasis for the
B-29 returned to the bridges in the north and Chinese airfields.
Joe Baugher has studied aviation and the numbers game carefully.
He has written this:
When the Korean War ended on July 27, 1953, the B-29s had
flown over 21,000 sorties, nearly 167,000 tons of bombs had been
dropped, and 34 B-29s had been lost in combat (16 to fighters,
four to flak, and fourteen to other causes). B-29 gunners had
accounted for 34 Communist fighters (16 of these being MiG-15s)
probably destroyed another 17 (all MiG-15s) and damaged 11 (all
MiG-15s). Losses were less than one per 1000 sorties.
I leave those numbers to you and not dispute them.
I will try to summarize what I perceive to be the accomplishments
of the B-29 in Korea.
It was among the first USAF aircraft to inflict major damage
against North Korean marshaling yards, rail bridges, and supply
depots right off the bat, starting just days after the invasion. They
wiped out virtually all North Korean strategic targets in less than
two months, and left the country in a complete state of
destruction. I do not know if the North Koreans really expected
this level of destruction so quickly. Since the MiG-15 did not show
up until November 1950, one could argue their arrival was too late.

Even with the arrival of the MiG-15, the B-29s would continue to
conduct those kinds of missions, though they did incur losses.
They had a tough time hitting the bridges across the Yalu, in part
because bridges were hard to take out, and the North Koreans were
able to work around the losses. Complicating the B-29s Yalu
bridge mission was that they were not supposed to overfly China,
which constrained their approach profiles.

The B-29 was very effective against supply depots, forcing the
enemy to disperse supply centers, which slowed resupply of forces
heading south. This especially hurt the enemy the farther south it
went. This photo shows what happened to a supply depot in the
environs of Pyongyang, as an example.
Ground-based radars were effective in helping the B-29 conduct
night attacks against enemy positions and troop concentrations.
But such night bombing did negatively impact accuracy.
Employment of the SHORAN helped improve that.
But the B-29 was without question vulnerable to the MiG-15. The
F-86 Sabres started showing up, as you recall, in November 1950.
Along with other fighters such as the F-80C and F-84, they gave
the MiG-15 a helluva fight and inflicted major damage, so much so
that at one point the MiGs were told to stay out of MiG Alley. So
the B-29s just kept on trucking in and out hitting their targets.
Perhaps the most significant point to be made is that the American
air war in Korea employed a variety of aircraft and demanding
command, control, and coordination of all these aircraft to produce
cohesive attacks against the enemy. No single aircraft did the job.
All together raids slowed the enemy advance, in some cases
enough to allow UN forces to regroup. While enemy forces, North
Koreans alone, and with the Chinese, made significant advances,
they were always pushed back. Between the B-29s, the supporting
fighters, shelling from the sea, artillery, transport supply flights,
and the troops fighting on the ground, the enemy advance was
stopped and pushed back twice across the 38th parallel, where it
remains today.
Lt. General Georgi A. Lobov, commander of the Soviet 64th Air
Defense Corps, conceded this point:
"We could not overcome the Americans in the air. We had only
fighters and AAA."
If there was a bottom line for the USAF, is was that following this
war, it needed to quickly get a new jet powered bomber force to
replace the B-29 and a new suite of jet fighters. Always in
competition with the Army and Navy for air assets, the newly
formed USAF would have to work hard to build.