6. AIR FRANCE v.

CA and the GANAS

passenger completes his trip (parag. 3.5.1.) ... To complete the trip, the passenger must
purchase a new ticket for the remaining portion of the journey" (ibid.) 3

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Sometime in 1970, the late Jose Gana and his family purchased from Air France 9 opendated tickets for Manil-Osaka-Tokyo-Manila tickets. These were purchased through Imperial
Travels, Incorporated, a duly authorized travel agent. Ganas paid USD 2,528.85.

Ganas set their flight on May 8, 1970, with a return date on May22, 1970 BUT
they did not go Such tickets were said to be valid until May 8, 1971.

Sometime January, 1971 Ganas sought the help of Teresita Manucdic, Secretary of
Sta Clara Lumber. Teresita went to travel agent Ella to arrange
revalidation/extension of ticket validity.
o Ella gave tickets to Rillo of AF, but said that such extension was not
possible, unless fare differentials and additional travel tax fees were paid.
o Neverhtelss, Ganas set their flight on May 7.
o Ella said, Ganas can use tickets on May 7, but they could not use it
anymore to return back home to Manila, because expired na siya ng May
8.
o Teresita replied that it will be up to the GANAS to make the arrangements.
With that assurance, Ella on his own, attached to the tickets validating
stickers for the Osaka/Tokyo flight, one a JAL. sticker and the other an
SAS (Scandinavian Airways System) sticker. The SAS sticker indicates
thereon that it was "Reevaluated by: the Philippine Travel Bureau, Branch
No. 2" (as shown by a circular rubber stamp) and signed "Ador", and the
date is handwritten in the center of the circle. Then appear under printed
headings the notations: JL. 108 (Flight), 16 May (Date), 1040 (Time), OK
(status). Apparently, Ella made no more attempt to contact AIR FRANCE
as there was no more tim

Despite everything, Ganas went to Japan. #JaFun. AS FORSEEN, Ganas tickets

from Osaka to Tokyo and Tokyo to Manila were dishonoured. Therefore, they had to
buy new ones.
Ganas filed before the CFI a case for damages arising from breach of contract for carriage
against AF. And AF answered that Ganas brought upon themselves their own misfortune.

travel agent Ella's affixing of validating stickers on the tickets without the
knowledge and consent of AIR FRANCE, violated airline tariff rules and regulations
and was beyond the scope of his authority as a travel agent; and that AIR FRANCE
was not guilty of any fraudulent conduct or bad faith.
TC dismissed the complaint.
CA reversed the Trial Courts judgment damges were P90,000.
ISSUE: W/N there was a breach of contract of carriage. (NO)
HELD:
Pursuant to tariff rules and regulations of the International Air Transportation Association
(IATA), included in paragraphs 9, 10, and 11 of the Stipulations of Fact between the parties in
the Trial Court, dated 31 March 1973, an airplane ticket is valid for one year. "The
passenger must undertake the final portion of his journey by departing from the last
point at which he has made a voluntary stop before the expiry of this limit (parag.
3.1.2. ) ... That is the time allowed a passenger to begin and to complete his trip (parags. 3.2
and 3.3.). ... A ticket can no longer be used for travel if its validity has expired before the

From the foregoing rules, it is clear that AIR FRANCE cannot be faulted for breach of
contract when it dishonored the tickets of the GANAS after 8 May 1971 since those
tickets expired on said date; nor when it required the GANAS to buy new tickets or have
their tickets re-issued for the Tokyo/Manila segment of their trip. Neither can it be said
that, when upon sale of the new tickets, it imposed additional charges representing fare
differentials, it was motivated by self-interest or unjust enrichment considering that an
increase of fares took effect, as authorized by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in April,
1971.
The GANAS cannot defend by contending lack of knowledge of those rules since the
evidence bears out that Teresita, who handled travel arrangements for the GANAS, was
duly informed by travel agent Ella of the advice of Reno, the Office Manager of Air France,
that the tickets in question could not be extended beyond the period of their validity without
paying the fare differentials and additional travel taxes brought about by the increased fare rate
and travel taxes.
The ruling relied on by respondent Appellate Court, therefore, in KLM. vs. Court of Appeals,
65 SCRA 237 (1975), holding that it would be unfair to charge respondents therein with
automatic knowledge or notice of conditions in contracts of adhesion, is inapplicable. To all
legal intents and purposes, Teresita was the agent of the GANAS and notice to her of the
rejection of the request for extension of the validity of the tickets was notice to the
GANAS, her principals.
The SAS validating sticker for the Osaka/Tokyo flight affixed by Ella showing
reservations for JAL. Flight 108 for 16 May 1971, without clearing the same with AIR
FRANCE allegedly because of the imminent departure of the GANAS on the same day so
that he could not get in touch with Air France 6 was certainly in contravention of IATA
rules although as he had explained, he did so upon Teresita's assurance that for the
onward flight from Osaka and return, the GANAS would make other arrangements.
The circumstances that AIR FRANCE personnel at the ticket counter in the airport
allowed the GANAS to leave is not tantamount to an implied ratification of travel agent
Ella's irregular actuations. It should be recalled that the GANAS left in Manila the day
before the expiry date of their tickets and that "other arrangements" were to be made with
respect to the remaining segments. Besides, the validating stickers that Ella affixed on his own
merely reflect the status of reservations on the specified flight and could not legally serve to
extend the validity of a ticket or revive an expired one.
The conclusion is inevitable that the GANAS brought upon themselves the predicament they
were in for having insisted on using tickets that were due to expire in an effort, perhaps, to
beat the deadline and in the thought that by commencing the trip the day before the expiry
date, they could complete the trip even thereafter. It should be recalled that AIR FRANCE was
even unaware of the validating SAS and JAL. stickers that Ella had affixed spuriously.
Consequently, Japan Air Lines and AIR FRANCE merely acted within their contractual rights
when they dishonored the tickets on the remaining segments of the trip and when AIR
FRANCE demanded payment of the adjusted fare rates and travel taxes for the Tokyo/Manila
flight. WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby reversed and set aside

7. Caram v Laureta
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:

Laureta bought a land in Tagum, Davao from Marcos Mata for P650. And it would
be later on alleged by Mata that such sale was under duress, for Laureta was a
commanding officer of USFIP and he feared that Laureta would place him under
trouble.

Laureta used the land and went undisturbed. He alleged that he has been paying Tax
declarations and other obligations as Mata have already given him all papers from
Ownership title to Tax receipts.

It is also important to take note that such land was not notarized, for the reason that
the local government of Tagum was not yet organized and no one was authorized to
notarize.

2 years later, on 1947, Mata sold the same piece of land to Caram. And Mata
together with attys Aportadera and Arcilla, requested with CFI Davao for issuance of
duplicate of title for the reason that the original was LOST. And on the same year,
the sale to Caram was perfected.

1959, Laureta filed a case against Mata and Caram for action for nullity, recovery of
ownership and/or reconveyance with damages and attorney's fees.
o In Matas answer, here he alleged that such previous sale was under duress
and was only forced to sign w/o understanding.
o And that such was not notarized and registered.
o FURTHER, Matas acknowledge records in ROD in favor of Caram, but
denies that he signed it since he knew that Laureta was in possession.

Caram invokes good faith, saying he had no knowledge of such encumbrances. And
only came to know about it upon complaint.

Trial Court ruled in favor of Laureta and declared void sale to Caram. CA affirmed
this.
ISSUE: W/N Caram was in bad faith. (YES his agents bad faith attaches to principal)
HELD:
On Agency:

It was said by Caram that he only acted through his representatives Irespe as broker
and Aportadera as atty who notarized.

It was also acknowledged by Mata that he never met Caram.

Moreover, it could not be said that he acted in bad faith nor did his agents.

Even if Irespe and Aportadera did not have actual knowledge of the first sale, still
their actions have not satisfied the requirement of good faith. Bad faith is not based
solely on the fact that a vendee had knowledge of the defect or lack of title of his
vendor.

In the instant case, Irespe and Aportadera had knowledge of circumstances which
ought to have put them an inquiry. Both of them knew that Mata's certificate of title
together with other papers pertaining to the land was taken by soldiers under the
command of Col. Claro L. Laureta. 16 Added to this is the fact that at the time of the
second sale Laureta was already in possession of the land. Irespe and Aportadera
should have investigated the nature of Laureta's possession. If they failed to exercise

the ordinary care expected of a buyer of real estate they must suffer the
consequences. The rule of caveat emptor requires the purchaser to be aware of the
supposed title of the vendor and one who buys without checking the vendor's title
takes all the risks and losses consequent to such failure.
There is no doubt then that Irespe and Aportadera, acting as agents of Caram,
purchased the property of Mata in bad faith. Applying the principle of agency,
Caram as principal, should also be deemed to have acted in bad faith.
Article 1544 of the New Civil Code provides that:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees,
the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken
possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recordered it in the Registry of
Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shag pertain to the person
who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof,
to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
(1473)

Since Caram was a registrant in bad faith, the situation is as if there was no
registration at all.

Substantive:

It was ruled by SC that Laureta had better title over Caram. Though it was alleged
such land was taken under duress such was not raised or contested within the 4
year regulamentory period thus, sale was ratified.

Moreover, Caram now contends that a sale in bad faith is not void so now they
battle on who has better title.

Court ruled in favor of Laureta, because accd to:

Article 1544 specifically provides who shall be the owner in case of a double sale of
an immovable property. To give full effect to this provision, the status of the two
contracts must be declared valid so that one vendee may contract must be declared
void to cut off all rights which may arise from said contract. Otherwise, Article 1544
win be meaningless.
The first sale in favor of Laureta prevails over the sale in favor of Caram.

8. Safic Alcan Cie v. Imperial Vegtable Oil Co

FACTS:

Safic, a French corporation, purchased with IVO in 2 separate occasions, crude

coconut oil. On first account, 2000 tons of oil, but IVO failed to deliver and instead
tried to settle and pay Safic back amounting to USD 293, 500. IVO failed to pay
despite demands.

This urged Safic to cancel second line of order with IVO for a total of 4,750 tons of
crude coconut oil this amounted to USD 391,593.

Safic demanded payment under NIOP and FOSFA where it prayed that IVO pay
them above amounts plus damages and attorneys fees.

Trial court issued writ of pleminary attachment against IVO and placed it under
receivership to ensure the preservation of the assets.

IVO contested that Safic had no legal capacity since it was doing business in the PH
w/o license of authority. It was also alleged by IVO that their contracts were
speculative contracts entered by their former president Dominador Monteverde in
contravention of the prohibition by the BOD.

IVO set up counterclaims anchored on harassment, paralyzation of business,

financial losses, rumor-mongering and oppressive action. Later, IVO filed a
supplemental counterclaim alleging that it was unable to operate its business
normally because of the arrest of most of its physical assets; that its suppliers were
driven away; and that its major creditors have inundated it with claims for
immediate payment of its debts, and China Banking Corporation had foreclosed its
chattel and real estate mortgages.

Trial Court found that parties have been transacting in business for numerous times,
though risky.
o Also, the TC held that the contracts were ultra vires and were entered into
by Monteverde w/o authority of the BOD.
o Moreover, Safic cannot invoke/enforce the 1985 contracts for they were
entered with Monteverde, who acted on his own gain.
o TC dissolved IVO

CA affirmed TC decision in toto.

o unauthorized acts of Dominador Monteverde which do not bind IVO in
whose name they were entered into.
ISSUES:
W/N Monteverde validly entered into contracts. (NO, because they were ultra vires)
HELD:
It was proven by IVO, when they presented a copy of their by-laws, that Monteverde acted
beyond his authority when he entered into speculative contracts with SAC in 1986. The 1986
contracts are speculative because at the time of the contracts, the coconuts are not even
growing at that time and are yet to be harvested. Hence, the 1986 contracts are sales of mere
expectations and this is something prohibited by the by-laws and the Board of Directors of
IVO.
There can be no implied agency too simply because there has been a previous transaction
between SAC and IVO where IVO was represented by Monteverde. This is because the 1985

contract and the 1986 contracts are very different. The 1985 contract is not speculative while
the 1986 contracts are speculative hence, SAC should have secured the confirmation by IVOs
Board that Monteverde is indeed authorized to enter into such agreements. Further,
Monteverde did not even present the said 1986 agreements before the Board of Directors so
there was, in fact, no occasion at all for ratification. The contracts were not even reported in
IVOs export sales book and turn-out book. Neither were they reflected in other books and
records of the corporation. It must be pointed out that the Board of Directors, not Monteverde,
exercises corporate power. Clearly, Monteverdes speculative contracts with Safic never bound
IVO and Safic cannot therefore enforce those contracts against IVO.

its principal, the property committed to his custrody as such agent, to execute the necessary
docment thereof, to pay damages.
PROOF OF AGENCY:
9. Fabiola Severino v. Guillermo Severino
FACTS:
Melecio Severino owned 428 hectares od land in Silay, Occidental Negros. During Melecios
lifetime, his brother, Guillermo, worked to administer the land for Melecios behalf. When
Melecio died in 1915, Guillermo continued to occupy the land. In 1916, a parcel survey was
made of the lands in the municipality of Silay, including the land here on question, and
cadastral proceedings were instituted for the registration of the land titles w/in the surveyed
area. In the cadastral proceedings, Roque Hofilena, as lawyer for Guillermo, filed answers in
his behalf, claiming the lots mentioned as property of Guillermo. No oppositions presented,
therefore court awarded it to Guillermo.
During such cadastral proceedings, Fabiolo was just a minor and that Guillermo never
appeared personally in the proceedings. The only testimony made in the proceeding was of
atty. Hofilena, saying that Guillermo indeed owned the land and that he was in possession of it
for 30 years.
Thus, this action by Fabiola, the alleged natural daughter and sole heir of Melecio, to compel
Guillermo to convey to her four parcels of land as described in complaint, or in default
thereof, pay her P800,000 (take note this was the 1920s) as damages for wrongfully causing
said land to be registered in his own name. Felicitas Villanueva, in her capacity as
administratrix of the estate of Melecio Severino, has filed a complaint in intervention claiming
the same relief as Fabiola, except in so far as she prays that the conveyance be made, or paid
to estate.
Lower Court recognized Fabiola as the natural child and ordered Guillermo to covey the land
to the administratrix of the estate. The court did not allow Guillermo to present evidence to the
effect that the land was owned in common by all heris of Ramon Severino and not by Melcio
alone. The court also said that Guillermo was already estopped from denying Melencios title
because he admitted in previous case (montelibano v severino) that he was just mere agent of
Melencio.
ISSUE: W/N Guillermo employed fraud in procuring title to the land. (YES)
HELD:
He has to give to administratrix the land, because he was just mere agent of Melecio.
In Guillermos DEFENSE - Since the present action is with regard the alleged fraud on his
part in registering the land in his name, he should have been allowed to present evidence Also
more than a year having elapsed since the entry of the final decree adjudicating the land to the
defendant, therefore, said decree cannot now be re-opened. Under section 38 of the Land Reg
Act, he has an indefeasible title to the land and that the question of ownership of the land
being thus judicially settled, the question as to the previous relations between the parties
cannot now be inquired into.
SC this is NOT AN ACTION under sec 38 of the LRA to reopen or set aside a decree, it is an
action in personam against an agent to compel him to return or transfer to the heirs or estate of

In his testimony in the case of Montelibano vs. Severino (civil case No. 902 of the Court of
First Instance of Occidental Negros and which forms a part of the evidence in the present case)
is, in fact, conclusive in this respect. He there stated under oath that from the year 1902 up to
the time the testimony was given, in the year 1913, he had been continuously in charge and
occupation of the land as the encargado or administrator of Melecio Severino; that he had
always known the land as the property of Melecio Severino; and that the possession of the
latter had been peaceful, continuous, and exclusive. In his answer filed in the same case, the
same defendant, through his attorney, disclaimed all personal interest in the land and averred
that it was wholly the property of his brother Melecio.
Neither is it disputed that the possession enjoyed by the defendant at the time of obtaining his
decree was of the same character as that held during the lifetime of his brother, except in so far
as shortly before the trial of the cadastral case the defendant had secured from his brothers and
sisters a relinguishment in his favor of such rights as they might have in the land.
AGENT-PRINCIPAL RELATIONSHIP IS FIDUCIARY
it is an elementary and very old rule that in regard to property forming the subject-matter of
the agency, he is estopped from acquiring or asserting a title adverse to that of the principal.
His position is analogous to that of a trustee and he cannot consistently, with the principles of
good faith, be allowed to create in himself an interest in opposition to that of his principal or
cestui que trust. The case cited numerous US cases.
An Agent is not only estopped from denying his principals title to the property, but he is also
disabled from acquiring interests therein adverse to those of his principal during the term of
the agency.
THE DECREE OF REGISTRAION DID NOT EXTINGUISH THE PRINCIPALS
PERSONAL RIGHT OF ACTION
The decree of reg determined the legal title to the lnd as of the date of the decree. As to that
there is no question. That, under section 38 of the LRA, this decree became conclusive after
one year from the date of the entry is not disputed and no one attempts to disturb the decree of
the proceedings upon which is based. The plaintiff in intervention merely contends that in
equality the legal title so acquired injured to the benefit of the estate of Melecio Severino,
Guillermos principal and cestui que trust and asks that this superior equitable right be made
effective by compelling Guillermo as the holder of the legal title, to transfer it to the estate,
Before the issuance of the decree of registration it was the undoubted duty of the defendant to
restore the property committed to his custody to his principal, or to the latter's estate, and that
the principal had a right of action in personam to enforce the performance of this duty and to
compel the defendant to execute the necessary conveyance to that effect. The only question
remaining for consideration is, therefore, whether the decree of registration extinguishing this
personal right of action.
Turning to our own Land Registration Act, we find no indication there of an intention to cut
off, through the issuance of a decree of registration, equitable rights or remedies such as those
here in question. On the contrary, section 70 of the Act provides:

Registered lands and ownership therein, shall in all respects be subject to the same burdens
and incidents attached by law to unregistered land. Nothing contained in this Act shall in any
way be construed to relieve registered land or the owners thereof from any rights incident to
the relation of husband and wife, or from liability to attachment on mesne process or levy on
execution, or from liability to any lien of any description established by law on land and the
buildings thereon, or the interest of the owner in such land or buildings, or to change the laws
of descent, or the rights of partition between coparceners, joint tenants and other cotenants, or
the right to take the same by eminent domain, or to relieve such land from liability to be
appropriated in any lawful manner for the payment of debts, or to change or affect in any other
way any other rights or liabilities created by law and applicable to unregistered land, except as
otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in the amendments hereof.
Section 102 of the Act, after providing for actions for damages in which the Insular Treasurer,
as the Custodian of the Assurance Fund is a party, contains the following proviso:
Provided, however, That nothing in this Act shall be construed to deprive the plaintiff of any
action which he may have against any person for such loss or damage or deprivation of land or
of any estate or interest therein without joining the Treasurer of the Philippine Archipelago as
a defendant therein.
That an action such as the present one is covered by this proviso can hardly admit of doubt. In
Cabanos vs. Register of Deeds of Laguna and Obiana (40 Phil., 620), it was held that, while
a purchaser of land under a pacto de retro cannot institute a real action for the recovery thereof
where the vendor under said sale has caused such lands to be registered in his name without
said vendee's consent, yet he may have his personal action based on the contract of sale to
compel the execution of an unconditional deed for the said lands when the period for
repurchase has passed.
But once the relation and the breach of trust on the part of the fiduciary in thus established,
there is no reason, neither practical nor legal, why he should not be compelled to make such
reparation as may lie within his power for the injury caused by his wrong, and as long as the
land stands registered in the name of the party who is guilty of the breach of trust and no rights
of innocent third parties are adversely affected, there can be no reason why such reparation
should not, in the proper case, take the form of a conveyance or transfer of the title to the
cestui que trust. No reasons of public policy demand that a person guilty of fraud or breach of
trust be permitted to use his certificate of title as a shield against the consequences of his own
wrong.

We agree with private respondent.

Art. 1868 of the Civil Code provides that by the contract of agency, an agent binds himself to
render some service or do something in representation or on behalf of another, known as the
principal, with the consent or authority of the latter.[13]

10. Republic v. Evangelista

FACTS:

Petitioner Gen. Calimlim, representing the Republic, entered a MoA with Ciriaco
Reyes for they will be treasure hunting. They started digging, blasting, and tunneling
with 80 military personnel.

All these were alleged by Legaspi, the said owner of the land, also he furthered that
such soldiers harassed him and his men and other occupants of the area.

Legaspi then executed SPA appointing his nephew, Gutierrez, as his attorney-in-fact
to deal with the treasure hunting activities with a promised commission of 40%.

Gutierrez filed case for damages and injunction against Calimlim & friends for
trespassing in their land. He hired atty Adaza whom he promised 30% of Legaspis
share. Upon filing, Judge Tirona issued 72-hour TRO against Calimlim & friends.

Case was raffled to QC RTC Branch 223 presided by Judge Evangelista, who
again issued a 72-hour TRO against Calimlim and friends.

Calimlim and friends filed a Motion to Dismiss [6] contending: first, there is no real
party-in-interest as the SPA of Gutierrez to bring the suit was already revoked by
Legaspi on March 7, 2000, as evidenced by a Deed of Revocation, [7] and, second,
Gutierrez failed to establish that the alleged armed men guarding the area were
acting on orders of petitioners. On March 17, 2000, petitioners also filed a Motion
for Inhibition[8] of the respondent judge on the ground of alleged partiality in favor
of private respondent.

RTC ruled in favor of Legaspi and granted writ of preliminary injuction based on:
o Diggings were made in Legaspis land, hence there was a need to maintain
status quo to preserve it
o SPA granted to Gutierrez was valid.
o Also denied Calimlim and friends motion to dismiss and required them to
answer the complaint.

CA affirmed decision.
ISSUE:
1. whether the contract of agence between Gutierrrez and Legaspi revoked. (yes)
2. Whether Complaint against petitioner should be dismissed (no)
3. Whether Evangelista should have inhibited himself. (no)
FACTS:
We find no merit in the petition.
On the first issue, petitioners claim that the special power of attorney of Gutierrez to represent
Legaspi has already been revoked by the latter. Private respondent Gutierrez, however,
contends that the unilateral revocation is invalid as his agency is coupled with interest.

A contract of agency is generally revocable as it is a personal contract of representation based

on trust and confidence reposed by the principal on his agent. As the power of the agent to act
depends on the will and license of the principal he represents, the power of the agent ceases
when the will or permission is withdrawn by the principal. Thus, generally, the agency may be
revoked by the principal at will.[14]
However, an exception to the revocability of a contract of agency is when it is coupled with
interest, i.e., if a bilateral contract depends upon the agency. [15] The reason for its irrevocability
is because the agency becomes part of another obligation or agreement. It is not solely the
rights of the principal but also that of the agent and third persons which are affected. Hence,
the law provides that in such cases, the agency cannot be revoked at the sole will of the
principal.
In the case at bar, we agree with the finding of the trial and appellate courts that the agency
granted by Legaspi to Gutierrez is coupled with interest as a bilateral contract depends on it. It
is clear from the records that Gutierrez was given by Legaspi, inter alia, the power to
manage the treasure hunting activities in the subject land; to file any case against anyone
who enters the land without authority from Legaspi; to engage the services of lawyers to
carry out the agency; and, to dig for any treasure within the land and enter into
agreements relative thereto. It was likewise agreed upon that Gutierrez shall be entitled to
40% of whatever treasure may be found in the land. Pursuant to this authority and to
protect Legaspi's land from the alleged illegal entry of petitioners, agent Gutierrez hired the
services of Atty. Adaza to prosecute the case for damages and injunction against petitioners.
As payment for legal services, Gutierrez agreed to assign to Atty. Adaza 30% of Legaspi's
share in whatever treasure may be recovered in the subject land. It is clear that the
treasure that may be found in the land is the subject matter of the agency; that under the SPA,
Gutierrez can enter into contract for the legal services of Atty. Adaza; and, thus Gutierrez and
Atty. Adaza have an interest in the subject matter of the agency, i.e., in the treasures that may
be found in the land. This bilateral contract depends on the agency and thus renders it as one
coupled with interest, irrevocable at the sole will of the principal Legaspi. [16] When an agency
is constituted as a clause in a bilateral contract, that is, when the agency is inserted in another
agreement, the agency ceases to be revocable at the pleasure of the principal as the agency
shall now follow the condition of the bilateral agreement. [17] Consequently, the Deed of
Revocation executed by Legaspi has no effect. The authority of Gutierrez to file and continue
with the prosecution of the case at bar is unaffected.
On the second issue, we hold that the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is justified.
A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancilliary or preventive remedy that is resorted to by a
litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests and for no other purpose during the
pendency of the principal action. [18] It is issued by the court to prevent threatened or
continuous irremediable injury to the applicant before his claim can be thoroughly studied and
adjudicated.[19] Its aim is to preserve the status quo ante until the merits of the case can be
heard fully, upon the applicant's showing of two important conditions, viz.: (1) the right to be
protected prima facie exists; and, (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right.
[20]

Section 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a writ of preliminary
injunction may be issued when it is established:
1. that the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained
of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually;
2. that the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained
of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
3. that a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or
is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the
rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending
to render the judgment ineffectual.
It is crystal clear that at the hearing for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, mere
prima facie evidence is needed to establish the applicant's rights or interests in the subject
matter of the main action. [21] It is not required that the applicant should conclusively show that
there was a violation of his rights as this issue will still be fully litigated in the main case. [22]
Thus, an applicant for a writ is required only to show that he has an ostensible right to
the final relief prayed for in his complaint.[23]
In the case at bar, we find that respondent judge had sufficient basis to issue the writ of
preliminary injunction. It was established, prima facie, that Legaspi has a right to peaceful
possession of his land, pendente lite. Legaspi had title to the subject land. It was likewise
established that the diggings were conducted by petitioners in the enclosed area of Legaspi's
land. Whether the land fenced by Gutierrez and claimed to be included in the land of
Legaspi covered an area beyond that which is included in the title of Legaspi is a factual
issue still subject to litigation and proof by the parties in the main case for damages. It
was necessary for the trial court to issue the writ of preliminary injunction during the
pendency of the main case in order to preserve the rights and interests of private respondents
Legaspi and Gutierrez.

impartial judge. They fault the respondent judge for not giving credence to the testimony of
their surveyor that the diggings were conducted outside the land of Legaspi. They also claim
that respondent judge's rulings on objections raised by the parties were biased against them.
We have carefully examined the records and we find no sufficient basis to hold that respondent
judge should have recused himself from hearing the case. There is no discernible pattern of
bias on the rulings of the respondent judge. Bias and partiality can never be presumed. Bare
allegations of partiality will not suffice in an absence of a clear showing that will overcome the
presumption that the judge dispensed justice without fear or favor. [24] It bears to stress again
that a judge's appreciation or misappreciation of the sufficiency of evidence adduced by the
parties, or the correctness of a judge's orders or rulings on the objections of counsels during
the hearing, without proof of malice on the part of respondent judge, is not sufficient to show
bias or partiality. As we held in the case of Webb vs. People,[25] the adverse and erroneous
rulings of a judge on the various motions of a party do not sufficiently prove bias and
prejudice to disqualify him. To be disqualifying, it must be shown that the bias and prejudice
stemmed from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis
other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case. Opinions formed in the
course of judicial proceedings, although erroneous, as long as based on the evidence adduced,
do not prove bias or prejudice. We also emphasized that repeated rulings against a litigant, no
matter how erroneously, vigorously and consistently expressed, do not amount to bias and
prejudice which can be a bases for the disqualification of a judge.
Finally, the inhibition of respondent judge in hearing the case for damages has become moot
and academic in view of the latter's death during the pendency of the case. The main case for
damages shall now be heard and tried before another judge.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the impugned Orders of the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-00-40115,
dated March 23 and April 4, 2000, are AFFIRMED. The presiding judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City to whom Civil Case No. Q-00-40115 was assigned is directed to
proceed with dispatch in hearing the main case for damages. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

On the third issue, petitioners charge that the respondent judge lacked the neutrality of an