Am.erican Journal of Educational Studies, Vo /.4, No.

1, 2011

THE NONSEGMENTAL CONTEXT OF SEGMENTAL UNDERSTANDING:

A BIOFUNCTIONAL SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE

Asghar lran-Nejad
College of Education
The University of Alabama
Tuscaloosa, Al35487-231
airannej@bamaed.ua.edu
Madeleine Gregg
College of Education
The University of Alabama
Tuscaloosa, Al35487-231
mgregg@bamaed.ua.edu
ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to present a new biofunctional systems perspective on

understanding and knowing. Understanding is commonly assumed to result, like knowledge,
from interaction among discrete mental objects such as ideas, concepts, and schemas that are
independent segments. However, such interaction does not tell the whole, or even the essential
part, of the story of understanding. Through a discussion of past research in the light of recent
biofunctional theory, indications of a comprehensive way of thinking about understanding
emerge. To illustrate, if understanding were an iceberg, interactions of segments, whether
simple or complex, would be confined to just the tip of the iceberg seen above the water. This
paper explains how the hidden, larger part of the iceberg of understanding is inherently
nonsegmental, biofunctional in origin, and the source of the dynamic self-awareness that is the
defining material of human knowledge. Understanding is the nervous system's special function,
the means of eliminating complexity in thinking, and the nonsegmental<>segmental process by
which knowledge is produced in the form of insights. Without understanding, segmental
knowledge acquisition results in ill-structured mental complexity or isolated mental fragments
easily rendered inert or forgotten. The biofunctional systems perspective offers educators
insight that can lead to better curriculum, better teaching, and better learning.

Keywords: Nonsegmental understanding, segmental knowledge, taxonomic understanding,

biofunctional science, complexity, problem solving
Introduction

A widespread assumption is that human understanding is a more deeply interconnected or

better organized form of knowledge. In this article, we assume that knowing and understanding
are fundamentally different, though complementary human capacities. We consider knowing to
be a cognitive categorization (taxonomic) capacity, inherently segmental, and capable of

41

lran-Nejad and Gregg

American Journal of Educational Studies, Vo/.4, No. 1, 2011

supporting only taxonomic understanding. By contrast, understanding is a biofunctional

integration capacity, inherently nonsegmental (intuitive), and the source of both thematic and
taxonomic knowledge production. The central theme of this article is that knowing involves
linear (segment-to-segment) causality and is a source of complexity. Understanding, by contrast,
removes complexity by means of nonlinear (nonsegmental) problem solving that culminates in
insight.
Deeply Interconnected Segmental Knowledge

How does knowing as an inherently segmental categorization process work? The classic
experiments by Bransford and Johnson (1972) and a theoretical example from an article by
Schurz and Lambert (1994) illustrate the widespread assumption that understanding requires
deeply interconnected knowledge schemas stored in the form a taxonomic corpus in long-te rm
memory (lran-Nejad 1978, 2000). By definition, each taxonomy uses explicitly defined segments
of information to categorize phenomena and processes within a specific domain. Though
holistic, a domain-specific schema is no more than an abstract tool for formalizing (e.g .,
classifying and standardizing) concrete segmental knowledge.
Ordinarily, considerate discourse or text comprises both part-to-part and part-to-whole
connections. The latter serve as clues for locating and accessing the relevant domain-specific
schema (taxonomy) that provides the abstract connections necessary for deeper understanding .
In the Bransford and Johnson study, the researchers used carefully-crafted passages with wellformed part-to-part connections, but free of part-to-whole clues. In other words, the words and
sentences in the passages were well-formed and meaningful by themselves but were difficult to
understand as an ensemble. As predicted by the authors, the group provided with prior
knowledge (schema) outperformed the other group in measures of memory and understanding.
Bransford and Johnson came to the conclusion that deeply connected knowledge schemas are a
necessary and sufficient condition for understanding.
Like Bransford and Johnson, Schurz and Lambert assumed deeply connected knowledge
structures stored in long-term memory to be a prerequisite to understanding and did not see
any reason to qualify their assumption as being applicable only to taxonomic understanding .
According Schurz and Lambert, to 'understand a phenomenon Pis to know how P fits into one's
background knowledge" (1994, p. 66).
The Challenge of Going beyond Taxonomic Understanding

In discourse comprehension research, idea units, a segmental source of understanding, have

been a popular dependent measure for investigating the role of prior knowledge schemas
(Anderson & Pichert, 1978; Pichert & Anderson, 1977). An idea unit is commonly "defined as a
single sentence, clause, or phrase containing a single complete idea" (Schwartz, Ellsworth ,
Graham, & Knight, 1998, p. 75). To assess comprehension, subjects are exposed to a text

42

lran-Nejad and Gregg

American Journal of Educational Studies, Vo /.4, No. 1, 2011

segmented into idea units and then asked to recall as much as they can (e.g., Johnson, 1970;
Meyer, 1975). Their recall is compared with the number of idea units in the original text to
produce a measure of comprehension. In other words, comprehension is measured by the
amount of information in the segmental responses (Sharp, 2004) .
It is widely accepted that segmental sources of understanding do not fully account for discourse
comprehension, let alone comprehensive understanding in general. An invitational "Sit down!"
uses the same segments as a reproving "Sit down! " , and yet, people have no difficulty
comprehending the meaning in both contexts . Something more is at work in people's
comprehension of language. Yet, when researchers have sought additional sources that
contribute to understanding, they have not looked beyond segment-to-segment interaction. For
example, Sharp (2004) used the notion of idea-unit segments to capture between-the-lines
comprehension (i .e., the communication between text and reader). Sharp defined idea units as
complete thought units, " segmented according to Johnson (1970), with 'pausal boundaries '
being designated to allow quantitative assessment of recall" (p. 335).
Sharp noted that some of the sources that contribute to text comprehension originate (within
the lines) in the text and some are added (between the lines) by the reader. Some are
quantitative and others are qualitative . However, he assumed all of the sources to be either
segmental or capable of being segmental and , therefore, formalized them all in the manner of
text segmentals . An example of a non-segmental source that Sharp treats as if it were segmental
is the " pausal unit." If a pausal unit has its origin in nonsegmental sources of understanding such
as rhyme, rhythm, intonation, thematic understanding, and reader intuition, then treating it as a
segmental does not realize the benefits of formalizing its contribution .
Biofunctional Activity in the Absence of the Knowledge of a Situation

In addition to taxonomic or segmental comprehension, people are capable of another kind of

understanding, nonsegmental understanding, which is at work even in the absence of
knowledge of a situation . As already suggested, this kind of understanding has its origin in the
biology of the human being. Such understanding manifests itself in two different kinds of
biofunctional activity that produce two correspondingly different kinds of self-awareness that
work in causal synergy. Ongoing biofunctional activity of the neurons in the nervous system
produces

nontaxonomic

constellation

firing

of the

self-awareness
neurons

(intuitive

thematic

knowledge).

produces taxonomic self-awareness

(or

Momentary
segmental

knowledge).
Again, we illustrate these ideas with examples . The first is from Auble, Franks, and Soraci
(1979), which is more like a simulation than a real example. Consider the statement The
haystack was important because the cloth ripped. Reading this sentence simulates a state of
uncertainty (i.e., the absence of situational knowledge) that marks the start of a sustainable
process of ongoing biofunctional activity punctuated by momentary constellation firing of

43

lran-Nejad and Gregg

American Journal of Educational Studies, Vo /.4, No .1, 2011

neurons with the potential to culminate in an aha-triggering insight. The insight, in this case,
comes when people hear the clue parachute soon after exposure to the statement. Such
understanding is essentially a nonlinear process of nonsegmental-to-segmental understanding.
A second example is found in a story of a firefighter named Wag Dodge who, in 1949, survived a
fire in which 13 of his colleagues died (Lehrer, 2008) . Wag and his crew found themselves caught
between a fast approaching wall of fire and a mountain hill impossible to climb . Like everyone
else, Wag began running away. At that moment, he was using prior knowledge of an escape
strategy (run from danger) without understanding the specific context of his lived experience .
But, then, he hesitated in the midst of the desperate uncertainty of his position and looked over
his shoulder to see what the wall of fire was doing. This pause gave his ongoing biofunctional
activity time for a momentary constellation firing that led to a different idea (i .e., an insight) that
saved his life: fighting one raging fire by starting another. So he quickly set fire to the bushes in
front of him . Then, as the new fire cleared the foliage in front of him, he dropped face down on
the still burning embers. There, he waited as the big fire arrived and, finding no foliage to
consume, passed over his body, leaving him relatively unharmed . Later, Wag could not explain
what gave him the idea that saved his life except to say that it was the obvious thing to do!
Defining Complexity and a Solution

Why did so many firefighters die when faced with a problem for which there was, as Wag Dodge
characterized it, so obvious an escape route of a solution to survival? The answer can be
explained by the inordinate stability of taxonomic understanding, on the one hand, and the
unrestrained flexibility of nontaxonomic understanding, on the other. Taxonomic understanding
is segmental-knowledge driven and an inert source of ill-structured complexity (Bereiter &
Scardamalia, 1985; Renkl, Mandl, & Gruber, 1996), Nonsegmental understanding is a fertile
source of solutions to complexity (lran-Nejad, 2000). In other words, segmental knowledge
breeds complexity; because it is a taxonomic maze of certainties filled with blind alleys (like the
escape route Wag's friends took to their death) . Nonsegmental understanding fosters timely
solutions to complexity, because it results from nontaxonomic, ongoing biofunctional activity
ready to deliver self-evident taxonomic solutions .
In the absence of nontaxonomic understanding, human knowledge is complex, ill -structured,
and difficult to describe in coherent ways (Loftus, Oberg, & Dillon, 2004; Lyons & Page, 1981;
Spiro, Feltovich, Jacobson, & Coulson, 1992). The phenomena and processes involved in the
resolution of this complexity have eluded systematic study, though they are governed by
hitherto unsuspected systemic dependencies .
The origin of human nontaxonomic understanding is not in prior knowledge or the certainty of
it but conversely in the uncertainty of its absence. Moreover, nontaxonomic understanding
cannot be set out in straight lines, discrete objects, and linear interactions. To focus on any part
of a complex idea, situation, or system is to oversimplify it, to the point of no longer actually

44

lran-Nejad and Gregg

American Journal of Educational Studies, Vo/.4, No. 1, 2011

matching the reality of its entire context. The death of Wag Dodge's colleagues resulted from
such oversimplification.
Productive and Inert Cause-Effect Dependencies

In many ways, comprehensive states of understanding are like ecosystems such as forests,
seashores, or deserts (Gibson, 1966) . Though perspectives vary on their nature (Muller, 1997),
there is general agreement that ecosystems differ from industrial production-lines . What is the
difference? Are cause-effect dependencies in ecosystems different from those in factories? Do
ecosystems function analogously to nontaxonomic understanding and factories by means of
taxonomic knowing? We attempt to answer this question by distinguishing taxonomic
segment<>segment interaction from nontaxonomic segmental<>nonsegmental integration.
In ecosystems, as in production lines, various forms of linear segment<>segment interaction
may be observed: part< >part, part<>whole, and whole<>whole. In a forest, for example, there
are part<> part relations between branches and leaves; whole<>part relations plants have with
their branches, flowers, fruits, and leaves; and whole<>whole relations between trees . In favor
of their individual identities, parts differ in color and texture. Taxonomic classification uses and
standardization removes these differences . The obvious advantage of using or removing
differences in factories

is that segment<>segment connections

can

be

assembled

or

disassembled and parts can be replaced without affecting the structural integrity of the system.
Thus, a part may be replaced without the system showing any sign of acceptance or rejection of
those parts . Reliance on local cause-effect dependencies is convenient but carries a cost. It
makes factories mechanical rather than organic, artificial rather than natural, and static rather
than dynamic. Over-re liance, or reliance of a different kind, on segmental proclivities comes at
the expense of nonsegmental dependencies .
Taxonomic classification and standardization can also be applied to such human capacities as
knowing and understanding with analogous results. To be sure, for the purpose of deliberate
stan dardization or classification, it is easy to focus on segment-wide features of knowing (e.g .,
abstract vers us concrete) and difficult to deal with comprehensive or system-wide qualities of
understanding (e.g., rejection of the part by the whole) . Linear interdependence, for example,
enables the manipulation of the mean-ends events of local problem solving as well as domain specific mental objects of remembering, learning, and thinking. However, these conveniences of
simplification by isolation in the context of taxonomic knowing have too long delayed learning
about peo ple's other capacities for simplifying life, which might be even more effective or
powerful. For exam ple, by assuming that knowing and understanding are fundamentally the
same, we have built an infrastructure in education that over-relies on the segment<>segment
events of taxonomic knowing. That is, curriculum focuses on specific part<>part, part<>whole,
or whole<>whole interaction among isolated but interdependent objects of the mind . What is
needed is a new infrastructure in education that is more balanced with

respect to

segmental<>no nsegmental cause-effect integration.

45

lran-Nejad and Gregg

American Journal of Educational Studies, Vol.4, No.1, 2011

Segment<>segment interaction among natural objects is necessary to ensure immediate spatial,

causal, or temporal continuity, but it does not explain how an ecosystem is different from a
factory {Ghilarov, 2000) or how understanding is different from knowing.

Both factories and

human knowledge are governed by taxonomic patterns of segment<>segment interaction .

These patterns are fundamentally different from how nonsegmental<>segmental integration
works in ecosystems and understandings . What complicates matters is the assumption that
segment<>segment interactivity determines all cause-effect dependencies including those for
ecosystems and understanding, albeit at shallow or deeper levels of interconnectivity. Deep or
shallow, it is possible that human-made rules of taxonomic interaction are not the same as the
natural laws of nontaxonomic integration .
In an ecosystem, not all causation is predetermined, has a single or adjacent cause, or aims at a
simple purpose, or is even pragmatically purposeful. As insects go from plant to plant in search
of food, they also pollinate, get infected with diseases, contribute to their spread, become food
themselves, and cause an indeterminate variety of other effects. Ecosystems are indeterminate
zones of practice and it is the same with human understanding {Schon, 1983) . Both ecosystems
and understandings give the impression of being ill-structured and complex. But this is because
they both obey the hietherto unsuspected laws of nonsegmental<>segmental integration which
are different from the taxonomic segment<>segment rule of interaction.
Problem Solving by Interaction and Integration

Human beings are capable of at least two major kinds of problem solving. The first is taxonomic
problem solving enabled by people's capacity of knowing, or the capacity for classifying objects
using varying patterns of segment<>segment interactivity. Knowing is a vital capacity, but it has
at least one major negative effect when used improperly. Bartlett {1932) and others have
described it as problem solving by isolating objects or simplification by isolation {lran-Nejad,
McKeachie, & Berliner, 1990; Salomon, 2006) . In other words, since categorizing objects
demands individualizing them, problem solving by means of knowing is done by manufacturing
differences or isolating objects to simplify their use {Shulman, 2002). Taxonomies become more
and more complex. This kind of problem solving is the driving force behind educational
taxonomies (Bloom, Englehart, Furst, Hill, & Krathwohl, 1956). The implication of simplification
by isolation is that educators must be cautious in how they use knowledge . Because knowing is a
taxonomic capacity, using taxonomies {Shulman, 2002) is the mandate for proliferating
complexity.
There are segmental ways to go beyond immediate segmen<>segment causality that are less
likely to run into the problem of complexity. In particular, segments may be redefined by adding
part<>whole features to them. According to Koestler {1967), when one part of a natural system
images the complexity of the system, the part is a "halon," a word Koestler coined to help in the
discussion of complexity. Similarly, Sperry {1988) explained the downward control exerted by

46

lran-Nejad and Gregg

American Journal of Educational Studies, Vo/.4, No .1, 2011

mental objects over the information processing system using the analogy of how features such
as the shape cause a wheel to roll down a hill.
The second major type of problem solving, about which past research has given us no direct
theory

or evidence,

is

by segmental<>nonsegmental

integration

enabled

by

people's

biofunctional capacity for understanding. We have argued in this article and elsewhere (lranNejad & Gregg, 2001; lran-Nejad & Stewart, 2010) that biofunctional segmental<>nonsegmental
problem solving is a special case of the same kind of problem solving that occurs in
comprehensive

ecosystems.

Complex

ecosystems

are

governed

by

multiple-source,

nonsegmental<>segmental, cause-effect dependencies, one example of which extends even

beyond the planet Earth, namely, gravity. In a forest, the leaves, fruit, or branches that separate
from trees, no matter how far apart those trees might be, all travel in the same downward
direction . This is not because of any interdependent system of element<>element interactivity
(Paas, Renkl, & Sweller, 2003; Sweller, Van Merrienboer, & Paas, 1998), but because all of these
events are dependent on gravity, which operates comprehensively, that is to say, systemically.
The leaves or branches or the fruit do not travel downward in order to reach the ground or
fertilize the soil below, or feed the animals, even though they do all of these and much more .
Similarly, the molecules in an avalanche or in different drops of the same or different rain
showers do not need to be interconnected in a segment<>segment fashion to move downward.
Nor do they head downward to block or wet the freeway, irrigate the forest, raise the demand
for umbrellas, or clear the smog in the metropolis . They all head in the same downward
direction because they are governed by gravity enforcing its nonsegmental<>segmental
causality.
In much the same way, the sources involved in remembering, learning, and imagination act
together psychologically not because they are necessarily interconnected constructs, or means
to specific ends, but because they are all systemically dependent on the more comprehensive
process of nonsegmental understanding. This, by analogy, is the kind of comprehensive causeeffect

dependency

on

which

nonsegmental>segmental,

segmental<nonsegmental,

and

nonsegmental<>nonsegmental varieties of causal integration rely in human understanding .

Examples of such processes are incidental impression formation (segmental<nonsegmental
understanding) and intonation (nonsegmental>segmental understanding) . Themes, intuitions,
moods, and attitudes may all be considered understandings that are fertile grounds for
nonsegmental<>segmental production (e.g., event<>theme integration).
The nonsegmental theory implies that the direction of causality is seldom linear or segmental.
To survive in the ocean, fish must have an organ to turn the nonsegmental oxygen in the water
into bodily energy. Survival of fish would be impossible if the oxygen were only present
segmentally here and there and not everywhere continuously, that is, nonsegmentally. The fish
or its gills are not interacting with oxygen. The nonsegmental context is an inescapable part of

47

lran-Nejad and Gregg

American Journal of Educational Studies, Vol.4, N o.1 , 2011

the ecosystem, which is why the fish cannot live out of the water where oxygen is still present
but not integrated with water.
The nonsegmental<>segmental cause-effect relations in an ecosystem, such as oxygen-toorganism or water-to-organism, have coevolved in dynamic balance. Any particular segment-a
drink or a deep breath that an organism takes-may seem isolated, inefficient, or even illstructured when viewed through the lens of immediate, adjacent, or local action or linear
interaction, much more so than any corresponding part in a tightly-woven factory . A healthy
ecosystem

governs

its

cause -effect

dependencies

comprehensively

and

synergistically,

producing astonishing biodiversity, biomass, biogeography, and bioenergy (Hubbell & Borda-deAgua, 2004; Tilman, 1999).
From the perspective of the nonsegmental theory, it is untenable to formalize remembered
experiences, incidental impressions, moods, skills, dispositions, insights, and imagination
segmentally. All these work simultaneously in the ecosystem of nonsegmental<>segmental
biofunctional activity, rather than like in a segment<>segment factory assembly. They are
synergistically integrated to produce comprehensive states of understanding. Whenever a
person learns something new, or demonstrates genuine conceptual change, the person's
integrated understanding is reworked more comprehensively than is captured by any form of
linear interaction that may describe a person's changing representation from one specific
domain to another (Carey, 2000; Clancey, 1997).
In the world of understanding, as in an ecosystem, domain-specific knowledge structures (or
ideas) do not exist as separate entities with permanently fixed internal structures (Clancey,
1997). They are not independent parts that can be manipulated or simplified by isolating them
from the context in which they arise (Bartlett, 1932). They are more likely to be momentary
outcomes of comprehensive understanding from which they cannot be excised (lran-Nejad,
1980) . They do not rely solely on part-to-part interaction (the sum of the parts) or on part-whole
relations (more than the sum of the parts). A tree's or a fish's survival is not dependent simply
on a whole that is more than the sum of its parts. Rather, biological survival depends on sources
as far apart as the ocean and the sun. Causal dependencies of human understanding rely on
nonsegmental integration, something fundamentally different from "sum of their parts"
thinking .

Darwin's understanding of the nature of survival, for example, marked him as a

revolutionary thinker to set him apart from the more knowledgeable contemporary biologists
(Wiggins & McTighe, 2005).
Nonsegmental<>segmental integration is different from all forms of segment<>segment
interaction. Dynamic ecosystems rely comprehensively on the integration of multiple sources,
unlike segments that interconnect by means of interdependent interaction. In an ecosystem,
and analogously in the biological person, system-wide integration and localized interaction
among the parts are fundamentally different processes. In other words, ecosystems illustrate
the principle of simplifying complexity by integration (Bartlett, 1932; lran-Nejad et al., 1990;

48

lran-Nejad and Gregg

American Journal of Educational Studies, Vol.4, No. 1, 2011

Salomon, 1991, 1995, 2006}. Factories, by contrast, simplify complexity by means of immediate
interdependent interaction. This is simplifying complexity by isolating segments to have them
ready to reconnect by interaction. Simplification by isolation breaks down nature into separate
parts each with its own seemingly immutable structure . The human -made process of simplifying
complexity by dividing nature into its segments robs nature of its inherent systemic conditions.
Yet, understanding depends on the dynamic integration of nonsegmental dependencies.
Existing Evidence for Nonsegmental Understanding

Nonsegmental-to-segmental integration is a widespread phenomenon in nature. People live in a

nonsegmental environment and their sensory and other biological systems are fully integrated
with it . The manner in which we pull and push air with our lungs is a segmental<>nonsegmental
process. Our auditory, visual, olfactory, and other senses have been evolution-tested to use the
nonsegmental affordances that engulf us. We hear, see, and smell everything in our
environment. Moreover, the way our lungs or even our auditory or visual systems integrate with
the segmental<>nonsegmental world around us is not dramatically different from the manner in
which the gills of the ocean fish integrate with nonsegmental air in the real ocean to extract
oxygen

from

the

water.

It

seems

that

evolution

makes

maximal

use

of

nonsegmental<>segmental processes everywhere.

Similarly, although less apparent to observation, the motor and skeletal systems of the head and
the face integrate with the nonsegmental ongoing biofunctional activity of our nervous and
bodily systems to produce the segmental momentary constellation firing that result in speech
utterances in the form of sound waves for the benefit of other ears that might happen to be
around. Like those in the ocean, as soon as these waves have performed their task, they reintegrate with the surrounding nonsegmental world and disappear in thin air. We assume that
all

this

natural

evidence

nonsegmental<>segmental

points
(e.g.,

reasonable

validity

and

uncertainty-to-insight)

with

process

by

reliability
which

the

to

the

ongoing

biofunctional activity and the momentary constellation firing of the cells in the nervous system
understands the world (lran-Nejad & Ortony, 1984}?
Why, then, in so much of science and education, have we overlooked the ubiquitous presence of
the nonsegmental<>segmental integration process in the world and its counterpart in our
nervous

and

bodily

systems?

Some

lines

of

research

have

investigated

the

nonsegmental<>segmental sources of variation that occur in speech utterances. Stress, pitch,

tone, rhythm, intonation, or more generally language supersegmentals produce changes in
meaning (Fiege, 1981} . To illustrate, the meaning-changing pronunciation of the segmental
utterance for the noun "construct" with the stress on the first sy ll able is supersegmentally
different from the pronunciation of the same utterance for the verb "construct" with the stress
on the last syllable. Similarly, intonation can make an utterance a question, a statement, a
directive, or an interjection . Rhyme and rhythm help us appreciate the differences between

49

lran-Nejad and Gregg

American Journal of Educational Stud;es, Vo/.4, No.1, 2011

poetry and prose . And, like rhythm and rhyme, accent makes the language spoken in one region
to sound different from another region .
Thus, at any given moment, nonsegmental<>segmental cause-effect integration is working
always behind what appears to be segment<>segment cause-effect interaction . Educators in
both behavioral and cognitive science have been too occupied with the segment<>segment
causality to observe the nonsegmental<>segmental dependencies that nature so plentifully
illustrates. Such dependencies are perceived when people share among themselves their
dynamic lived experiences (Merleau-Ponty, 1962) of both the linguistic and the nonlinguistic
kinds (Dowhower, 1994; Erteschik-Shir, 2006; Kuhn & Stahl, 2003).
In terms of available evidence, some past research on nonsegmentals has been reported using
words like supersegmental and prosody, even though the term nonsegmental has also been
occationally used (Crystal, 1973; Ruch, 1936), especially in the realm of phonology and its
development in young infants, but in other areas as well (Beddor, Krakow, & Lindemann, 2001;
Blackburn, 1983; D'Odorico, 1984; Krakow, 1993; Munro, 1995; Perfetti & Zhang, 1991).
Research suggests that the gestural stream that accompanies talk provides interpretation cues
unavailable from segmental language alone (Quek et al., 2002). Similarly, supersegmentals-in dynamic-motion, like pitch and tone, seem to shape understanding, as when sounds with a
rising pitch contour suggest disagreement or request, or sounds with a short frequency range
and long duration imply hesitation (Nagasaki & Komatsu, 2004). The interjection " aha " that
signals a moment of understanding comes with a nonsegmental-to-segmental burst of affect
(lran -Nejad, 1987).
Many linguists distinguish between nonsegmental and segmental phonology (Fiege, 1981) . Long
ago, Irwin and Weiss (1930), talking about newborns during their first 10 days of life,
distinguished their segmental (discretely identifiable behavior) from their nonsegmental-indynamic-motion behavior (that involved the entire body). Such early activity may be the
precursor to the gestural stream that adults display during conversation . Later, D'Odorico and
colleagues reported that nonsegmental features affect the duration of infant vocalizations
(D'Odorico, 1984; D'Odorico, Franco, & Vidotto, 1985). Similarly, nonsegmental sources such as
speaking rate and style affect nasal co-articulation (Krakow, 1993). Finally,

prelingual

vocalizations of infants indicate a nonsegmental communicative competence. The sounds that

infants make consistently influence their mothers' responses (Goldstein & West, 1999). A
mothers' language, motherese, is richly nonsegmental (Hsu & Fogel, 2003) and infants
demonstrate a consistent preference for it (Fernald, 1985, 1992).
Hawkins and Nguyen (2004) claim that nonsegmental speech is processed directly into meaning.
As the notion of nonsegmental<>nonsegmental causality suggests, this claim implies that
segmental representations may not be necessary for the understanding of an utterance.
Prelingual children use a nonsegmental capacity for immediate impression formation about
both the material and social worlds, a capacity that is distinct from the segmental tool language

50

lran-Nejad and Gregg

American Journal of Educational Studies, Vol.4, No .1, 2011

later becomes (Gibson, 1973; Lyons & Page, 1981). Whole journal issues have debated the claim
that children are capable of bypassing phonemic (or meaning bearing) segmentals in
understanding speech (Ogden & Local, 1994) .
The evidence just reported suggests that nonsegmental sources work in dynamic motion
between the lines of the observable behavior. However, the underlying assumption in much of
the research reviewed here is that nonsegmentals are processed in the same way as segmentals.
Erteschik-Shir (2006), for example, noted that viewing (between-the-lines) topic and focus as
supersegmental, poses the dilemma of when and when not to treat them in the manner of
(within-the-lines) lexical items. Questioning the wisdom behind formalizing (e.g., classifying or
standardizing) supersegmentals in terms of segmentals, Frick (1985) pointed out that "it seems
unlikely that peoples' abilities to discriminate emotions prosodically is based on the profiles of
those emotions using simple summary descriptors such as average pitch or average loudness"
(p. 417) . In fact, several studies have suggested the possibility that language supersegmentals
may serve as the immediate context for nonsegmental understanding (Coombes, Cauraugh, &
Janelle, 2007; Perfetti & Zhang, 1991) . Nonetheless, these supersegmentals have tended more
often to be formalized as segmental features percolating upward from text segmentals
(Erteschik-Shir, 2006).
The research on language supersegmentals targets their role in expressing thoughts, emotions,
and personality traits (Erteschik-Shir, 2006; Frick, 1985; Nagasaki & Komatsu, 2004) . A general
strategy for formalizing interdependent activity is implemented in terms of symbolic or subsymbolic connections, units, and activation levels or weights (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1986;
Rumelhart

&

McClelland,

1986).

But

in

all

of

this

research,

the

presence

of

nonsegmental<>segmental causation seems to have been missed by scientists. For example,

variations in supersegmental sources (e.g., affective, phonological, visual, and auditory), similar
to those of natural speech, have been deemed essential for the improvement of the quality of
synthetic speech . Henton (2002) has noted, because research on "nonsegmental aspects of
speech has lagged in linguistics and phonetics, our knowledge of how to model successful and
natural prosody [in synthetic speech] is still in its infancy." As a result, "the intonation contours
in both parametric and concatenative systems [of speech synthesis are] too invariable, with a
tendency to be either overly dynamic (too enthusiastic or emotional), or to drone in a
predictable, soporific, bored and boring monotone" (pp . 125-126) .
Discussion and Implications

From an educational standpoint, the taxonomic practice of simplifying complex thoughts for the
purpose of understanding by isolating segments from their embodied contexts in biology and
beyond is likely to have undesirable side effects for learners. The assumption seems to be that
not only knowledge acquisition but also understanding can be achieved by breaking down ideas
into simple, more or less long-lasting pieces, detached from the comprehensive ecosystem that
keeps people's lived experiences in perpetual motion. A corresponding assumption is that the

51

lran-Nej'ad and Gregg

American Journal of Educational Studies, Vol.4, No .1, 2011

broken down pieces of lived experiences can then be re-assembled by means of segment-tosegment causal interaction to produce similarly complex future experiences . We have known for
some time now that when people use the simplification by isolation strategy for learning (e.g .,
Salomon, 2006), a proliferation of detached pieces of knowledge can resist reassembly, and
result in ill-structured complexity (Spiro et al., 1992) and inert knowledge (Bereiter &
Scardamalia, 1985; Renkl et al., 1996). One implication of the arguments in this article is that
educators can now recognize these negative side effects on learner understanding of seeking
and working with knowledge taxonomies.
For interdependent interaction among segmental mental objects to work best, educators must
find ways to utilize the multiple near and far sources of nonsegmental human understanding.
The focus on segmental interaction at the expense of nonsegmental integration has had many
nontrivial consequences: the traditional emphasis on the specialization, if not fragmentation ,
that comes with content knowledge at the expense of nonsegmental sources of human wisdom
(Mayer, 1995; Prawat, 2000; Wiggins & McTighe, 2005). Among these are the emphasis on
content at the expense of passion (Neumann, 1999, 2006a); the separation of learning from
application (Bransford & Schwartz, 1999); the problem of symbol grounding (Harnad, 1990,
1993, 2001); or the problem of the separation of the mind from the physical body (Bruer, 1997).
Like the analytic practice of simplification by isolation, the taxonomic strategy of limiting
learners to part<>part, part<>whole, and whole<>whole varieties of segment<>segment
patterns of interactivity has unintended consequences. Nonsegmental integration at the
expense of segmental interaction would also have unintended effects. In the multiple-source
ecosystem of the biological person, both aspects of understanding are needed . Segmental
interaction in the form of knowledge and nonsegmental sources of understanding integrate to
produce powerful learning.
The central theme of this article suggests that interdependent interaction among mental objects
is not enough for understanding the complexities of human understanding. It may be, of course,
that the theory of interdependent interaction is not the culprit, either. Rather, the problem may
be the propensity of any theory to foster simplification by isolation. Moreover, In addition to
language-related supersegmentals, human understanding may rely fundamentally on between the-lines themes, moods, intuitions, and attitudes . Such subjective mental phenomena have
been traditionally set aside as epiphenomenal, biased, animalistic, irrational, self-centered, and
undesirable (Barrett et al., 2007; Neumann, 2006; Panksepp, 1998). The extent to which these
contributing sources of understanding continue to be overlooked in theories prone to
simplification by isolation is likely to determine the prevalence of inert knowledge (Bereiter &
Scardamalia, 1985; Renkl et al., 1996), the pathologies of learning (Shulman, 1999) and the gap
between research and practice or learning and application ., Yet, it is with systemic,
nonsegmental integration that human understanding, learning, and communication come to
life.

52

lran-Nejad and Gregg

American Journal of Educational Studies, Vo l.4, No. 1, 2011

How could the infrastructure of today's education change, as so many assert it should? On the
on e hand, an

appreciation

of the

entire

iceberg

of

human

understanding-i.e .,

its

segme nta l<>nonsegmental integration cycle-may be needed to steer the field toward a new
infrastructu re in tune with the evolution -tested ways of natural ecosystems . On the hand, if
ove ra nalyzed in consc ious content, the seductive attention-grabbing tip of the iceberg (i .e., the
network of its segment<>segment interaction pattern) might turn into an impediment to
progress. Recall that segmental contents of understanding are noisy mental objects in plain sight
of t he co nsciousness : letters, sounds, words, concepts, and schemas. These are the material for
interdepend ent, within-the-lines interaction . The less familiar nonsegmental sources of
un derstand ing include invisible processes such as incidental impression formation , intonation,
rh yme, rhythm, them e, attitude, and intuition. They constitute the sources for between-theli nes integrat ion . Educational research and practice must integrate both kinds of sources . The
goa l of th e nonsegmental theory presented in this paper is to move in this unexplored direction.
A re late d way to thin k about the distinction between segmentals and nonsegmentals is in terms
of how rea dily a mental object - a word, phrase, sentence, concept, schema, and propositioncan beco me the focus of attention. Well -learned segmentals are always selective attention
rea dy. Nonsegmentals (e .g., gravity) are selective attention invisible/unprepared, or perhaps
even inherently resistant to direct selective attention (i.e ., perpetually invisible) . The challenge
in ed ucat ional science and practice is to make the ir integration the object of experimental
inve stigat ion without having one work at the expense of the othe r. As Bartlett (1932) pointed
out and demonstrated , such an undertaking is well within the realm of experimental research .
The adva ntage today is that we have more sophisticated perspectives available on the nature of
human und erstand ing than did Bartlett (lran-Nejad & Stewart, 2010; Mayer, 1989, 1995; D.
Perkin s & Blythe, 1994; D. N. Perkins, 1988; Wiggins & McTighe, 2005).
Com plex lea rn ing of the

kind

investigated

by Bartlett (1932)

required

nonsegmental

un derst and ing m ade possible by the biological system's capacity for multiple-source integration.
As a syste m for solving the complex problems of survival, the nervous system almost certainly
evolved the cap acity for multiple-source integration first without the kind of noisy segmentation
that re quires analyti c selective attention to mental objects . This (silent) aspect of the evolution
of the nervou s system mirrors that of other (silent) ecosystems in which multiple -source
integra t ion is at least as common an occurrence as are (noisy) higher mental functions such as
rememberi ng, le arning, and thinking in the authentic real world. For example, both plant and
animal life is multipl e-source dependent, relying for survival on the organisms capacity to
integrate air, w at er, min erals, and the like without anything like mindful segmentation of these
sources. Mind f ul se lective attention would have come later with the evolution of the segm ental
capacity t o fo cus deliberately on mental objects . This is probably how segmentals acquired their
selective-a ttention -readiness that is realized with learning. What is needed in education and
research , t hen, is a perspective on segmental interdependent interaction that takes into account
both in t egrat ive and analytic aspects of human understanding. It is perhaps because of the ir
nonsegme ntal nature that human intuition or passion, on the one hand, and human insight, on

53

lran-Nejad and Gregg

American Jou rnal of Educational Studies, Vo l.4, No. 1, 201 1

the other, have been seen as mysterious and irrational phenomena when viewed through the
one-way lens of analytic science (Dewey, 1938; Neumann, 1999, 2006) .

References

Anderson, R. C., & Pichert, J. W. (1978). Recall of previously unrecallable information following a
shift in perspective. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 17, 1-12.
doi:10.1016/S0022-5371(1078)90485-90481.
Auble, P. M., Franks, J. J., & Soraci, S. A. (1979). Effort toward comprehension: Elaboration or
'ahap'? Memory & Cognition, 7, 426-434 .
Barrett, L. F., Lindquist, K. A., Bliss-Moreau, E., Duncan, S., Gendron, M., Mize, J., et al. (2007). Of
mice and men: Natural kinds of emotions in the mammalian brain? A response to
Panksepp

and

Izard.

Perspectives

on

Psychological

Science,

2,

297-312 .

doi :210.1111/j .17 45-6916.2007 .00046.x.

Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology. Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press.
Beddor, P., Krakow, R., & Lindemann, S. (2001). Patterns of perceptual compensation and their
phonological consequences. In E. Hume & K. Johnson (Eds.), The role of speech

perception in phonology (pp. 55-78). San Diego: Academic Press.

Bereiter, C., & Scardamalia, M. (1985). Cognitive coping strategies and the problem of "inert
knowledge". InS. F. Chipman, J. W. Segal & R. Glaser (Eds .), Thinking and learning skills:

Current research and open questions (Vol. 2, pp. 65-80). Hillsdale, NJ : Erlbaum.
Blackburn, W. K. (1983). The perception of non-segmental patterns in early infancy. Dissertation

Abstracts International, 44(5-B), 1615.

Bloom, B. S., Englehart, M . D., Furst, E. J., Hill, W . H., & Krathwohl, D. R. (1956). Taxonomy of

educational objectives, Handbook 1: The cognitive domain . New York: Longman .

Bransford, J. D., & Johnson, M . K. (1972) . Contextual prerequisites for understanding : Some
investigations of comprehension and recall. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal

Behavior, 11, 717-726. doi:710.1016/S0022-5371(1072)80006-80009.

Bransford, J. D., & Schwartz, D. L. (1999). Rethinking transfer: A simple proposal with multiple
implications. In A. lran-Nejad & P. D. Pearson (Eds .), Review of research in education
(Vol. 24, pp. 1-19). Washington, DC: American Educational Research Association .

54

lran-Nejad and Gregg

American Journal of Educational Studies, Vo/.4, No. 1, 2011

Bruer, J. T. (1997). Education and the brain: A bridge too far. Educational Researcher, 26(8), 416.
Carey, S. (2000). Science education as conceptual change . Journal of Applied Developmental
Psychology, 21, 13-19. doi :10.1016/S0193-3973(1099)00046-00045.

Clancey, W . J. (1997) . Conceptual coordination: Abstraction without description . International

Journal of Educational Research, 27, 5-19. doi:10.1016/S0883-0355(1097)88440-88446 .

Coombes, S. A., Cauraugh, J. H., & Janelle, C. M. (2007) . Emotional state and initiating cue alter
central and peripheral motor processes. Emotion, 7, 275-284 . doi :210 .1037 /15283542 .1037.1032.1275.
Crystal, D. (1973). Non-segmental phonology in language acquisition : A review of the issues .
Lingua, 32, 31-45 .

D'Odorico, L. (1984) . Non-segmental features in prelinguistic communications: An analysis of

some types of infant cry and non-cry vocalizations. Journal of Child Language, 11 , 17-27.
D'Odorico, L., Franco, F., & Vidotto, G. (1985) . Temporal characteristics in infant cry and non -cry
vocalizations. Language and Speech, 28, 29-46.
Dewey, J. (1938). Logic, the theory of inquiry . New York: H. Holt and Company.
Dowhower, S. L. (1994) . Repeated reading revisited: Research into practice . Reading and Writing
Quarterly: Overcoming Learning Difficulties, 10, 343-358.

Erteschik-Shir, N. (2006). The architecture of topic and focus. In V. Molnar & S. Winkler (Eds .),
The architecture offocus (pp. 33-58). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Fernald, A. (1985). Four-month-old infants prefer to listen to motherese . Infant Behavior and
Development, 8, 181-195. doi:110.1016/S0163-6383(1085)80005-80009.

Fernald , A. (1992) . Human maternal vocalizations to infants as biologically relevant signals: An

evolutionary perspective. In J. H. Barkow, I. Cosmides & J. Tooby (Eds.), The adapted
mind: Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture (pp . 391-428) . New York :

Oxford University Press.

Flege, J. E. (1981) . The phonological basis of foreign accent : A hypothesis . TESOL Quarterly, 15,
443-455.

55

lran-Nejad and Gregg

American Journal of Educational Studies, Vo 1.4, No. 1, 2011

Frick, R. W . {1985). Communicating emotion : The role of pro?odic features . Psychological

Bulletin, 97, 412 -429 . doi :410.1037 /0033 -2909.1097.1033 .1412.

Ghilarov, A. M . {2000). Ecosystem functioning and intrinsic value of biodiversity. Oikos, 90{2),
408-412.
Gibson, J. J. {1966). The senses considered as perceptual systems. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Gibson, J. J. {1973). On the concept of 'formless invariants' in visual perception. Leonardo, 6{1),
43-45.
Goldstein, M . H., & West, M . J. {1999) . Consistent responses of human mothers to prelinguistic
infants : The effect of prelinguistic repertoire size . Journal of Comparative Psychology,

113, 52-58 . doi :10.1037/0735-7036.1113.1031.1052 .

Harnad, S. {1990) . The symbol-grounding problem. Physico, 42, 335-346.
Harnad, S. {1993). Grounding symbols in the analog world with neural nets-A hybrid model.
Think, 2, 12-78.

Harnad, S. {2001). Grounding symbols in the analog world with neural nets-A hybrid model.
Psycoloquy, 12(34), No Pagination Specified.

Hawkins, S., & Nguyen, N. {2004). Influence of syllable-coda voicing on the acoustic properties of
syllable-onset /1/ in English . Journal of Phonetics, 32, 199-231. doi :110.1016/S009544 70{1003 }00031-00037.
Henton, C. {2002) . Challenges and rewards in using parametric or concatenative speech
synthesis .

International

Journal

of

Speech

Technology,

5,

117-131.

doi:110.1023/ A:1015416013198 .
Hsu, H. C., & Fogel , A. {2003) . Social regulatory effects of infant nondistress vocalization on
maternal

behavior . Developmental Psychology,

39,

976-991.

doi :910.1037 /0012-

1649.1039.1036.1976.
Hubbell, S. P., & Borda-de-Agua, L. {2004). The unified neutral theory of biodiversity and
biogeography: Reply . Ecology, 85, 3175-3178 .
lran-Nejad, A. {1980) . The schema: A structural or a functional pattern . (Tech . Rep . No . 159).
Washington, D. C.: National Institute of Education . {ERIC Document Reproduction
Service No . ED182735) .

56

lran-Nejad and Gregg

American Journal of Educational Studies, Vo l.4, No. 1, 2011

lran -Nejad, A. {1987). Cognitive and affective causes of interest and liking . Journal of Educational
Psychology, 79, 120-130.

lran-Nejad, A. (Ed.) . (2000). Brain, Knowledge, and Self-Regulation . (Vol. 21, Special Edition of
the Journal of Mind and Behavior). New York: Institute of Mind and Behavior.
lran-Nejad, A., McKeachie, W. J., & Berliner, D. C. (1990) . The multisource nature of learning: An
introduction . Review of Educational Research, 60, 509-515.
lran-Nejad, A., & Ortony, A. {1984). A biofunctional model of distributed mental content, mental
structures, awareness, and attention. The Journal of Mind and Behavior, 5, 171-210.
lran-Nejad, A., & Stewart, W. {2010). First-person education and the biofunctional nature of
knowing, understanding, and affect. In D. lfenthaler, D. Kinshuk, P. Isaias, D. G. Sampson
& J. M . Spector (Eds.), Multiple perspectives on problem solving and learning in the
digital age (pp. 89-109) . New York: Springer.

Irwin, 0. C., & Weiss, A. P. (1930) . A note on mass activity in newborn infants . The Pedagogical
Seminary and Journal of Genetic Psychology, 38, 20-30 .

Johnson, R. E. {1970) . Recall of prose as a function of the structural importance of the linguistic
units. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 9, 12-20. doi:10 .1016/S00225371{1070)80003-80002 .
Koestler, A. (1967) . The ghost in the machine . New York : Macmillan .
Krakow, R. A. (1993) . Nonsegmental influences on velum movement patterns: Syllables,
sentences, stress, and speaking rate . In M . K. Huffman & R. A. Krakow (Eds.), Nasals,
nasalization, and the velum (pp . 87-113). San Diego : Academic Press .

Kuhn , M . R., & Stahl, S. A. {2003). Fluency: A review of developmental and remedial practices.
Journal of Educational Psychology, 95(1), 3-21 . doi:10 .1037 /0022-0663 .1095 .1031.1033.

Lehrer, J. {2008, July 28) . The eureka hunt. The New Yorker, 40-45 .
Loftus, G. R., Oberg, M . A., & Dillon, A. M. {2004) . Linear theory, dimensional theory, and the
face-inversion

effect.

Psychological

Review,

111 ,

835 -863 .

doi :810 .1037 /0033-

1295X.1111.1034.1835.
Lyon s, J., & Page, R. B. L. (1981). Language and speech [and discu ssion] . Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society of London . Series B, Biological Sciences, 295(1077),

215-222.

57

lran-Nejad and Gregg

American Journal of Educational Studies, Vo /.4, No. 1, 2011

Mayer, R. E. {1989} . Models for understanding. Review of Educational Research, 59{1}, 43-64.
Mayer, R. E. {1995} . The search for insight: Grappling with Gestalt psychology's unanswered
questions . In R. J. Sternberg & J. E. Davidson (Eds.}, The nature of insight {pp . 3-32}.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
McClelland , J. L. , & Rumelhart, D. E. {Eds.). {1986} . Parallel distributed processing: Explorations in

the microstructure of cognition {Vol. 2: Psychological and Biological Models) . Cambridge,

MA: MIT Press .
Merleau- Ponty, M . {1962}. Phenomenology of perception (C. Smith, Trans.). London : Routl edge.
Meyer, B. J. F. {1975} . The organization of prose and its effect on memory. Amsterdam : North
Holland Publishing Company.
Muller, F. {1997) . State-of-the-art in ecosystem theory. Ecological Modeling, 100{1-3}, 135-161.
Munro, M . J. {1995} . Nonsegmental factors in foreign accent : Ratings of filtered speech . Studies

in Second Language Acquisition, 17{1}, 17-34.

Nagasaki, Y., & Komatsu , T. {2004, March). Can people perceive different emotions from a non-

emotional voice by modifying its FO and duration? Paper presented at the Spe ech
Prosody International Conference, Nara, Japan.
Neumann, A. {1999}. Professing passion: Views of passionate thought in scholarship. Pap er
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association ,
Montreal.
Neumann, A. {2006} . Professing passion : Emotion in the scholarship of professors at research
universities .

American

Educational

Research

Journal,

43 ,

38 1-424 .

doi :3 10.3102/00028312043003381.
Ogden, R., & Loc al, J. K. {1994} . Disentangling autosegments from prosodies : A note on th e
mi srepresentation of a research tradition in phonology. Journal of Linguistics, 30{ 2},
477-498 .
Paas, F., Renkl, A., & Sw eller, J. {2003}. Cognitive load theory and instructional design : Recent
developm ents.

Educational

Psychologist,

38,

1-4.

doi:10 .1207 /S15326985EP15323801_15326981.

Panksepp, J. {1998} . Affective neuroscience: The foundations of human and animal emotions.
New York : Oxfo rd University Press .

58

lran -Nejad and Gregg

American Journal of Educational Studies, Vo 1.4, No .1, 2011

Perfetti, C. A., & Zhang, S. {1991). Phonological processes in reading Chinese characters. Journal
of

Experimental

Psychology:

Learning,

Memory,

and

Cognition,

17,

633-643.

doi :610.1037 /0278-7393 .1017.1034.1633.

Perkins, D., & Blythe, T. {1994) . Putting understanding up front. Educational Leadership, 51{5), 47.
Perkins, D. N. {1988). Art as understanding. Journal of Aesthetic Education, 22{1), 111-131.
Pichert, J. W., & Anderson, R. C. {1977). Taking different perspectives on a story. Journal of
Educational Psychology, 69, 309 -315 .

Prawat, R. S. {2000). Keep the solution, broaden the problem: Commentary on "Knowledge, selfregulation, and the brain-mind cycle of reflection ". The Journal of Mind and Behavior,

21, 89-96.
Quek, F., McNeill, D., Bryll, R. , Duncan, S., Ma , X. F., Kirbas, C., et al. {2002). Multimodal human
discourse: Gesture and speech . ACM Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction
(TOCHI}, 9, 171-193. doi :1 10.1145/568513.568515 .

Renkl, A., Mandl, H., & Gruber, H. {1996) . Inert knowledge : Analyses and remedies . Educational
Psychologist, 31, 115-121.

Ruch, T. C. {1936) . Evidence of the non-segmental character of spinal reflexes from an analysis of
the cephalad effects of spinal transection American Journal of Physiology, 114, 457-467 .
Rumelhart, D. E., & McClelland, J. L. {Eds .). {1986) . Parallel distributed processing : Explorations in
the microstructure of cognition {Vol. 1: Foundations) . Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Salomon, G. {1991). Transcending the qualitative-quantitative debate: The analytic and systemic
approaches to educational research . Educational Researcher, 20{6), 10-18.
Salomon, G. {1995). Reflections on the field of educational psychology by the outgoing journal
editor. Educational Psychologist, 30, 105-108.
Salomon, G. {2006). The systemic vs. analytic study of complex learning environments . In J. Elen,
R. E. Clark & J. Lowyck {Eds .), Handling complexity in learning environments: Theory and
research {pp . 255-264). Boston: Elsevier.

Schon , D. A. {1983) . The reflective practitioner: How professionals think in action: Basic Books.

59

lran-Nejad and Gregg

American Journal of Educational Studies, Vo /.4, No.1 , 2011

Schurz, G., & Lambert, K. (1994} . Outline of a Theory of Scientifi"c Understanding. Synthese,
101(1}, 65-120 .
Schwartz, N. H., Ellsworth, L. S., Graham, L., & Knight, B. (1998}. Accessing prior knowl edge to
remember text : A comparison of advance organizers and maps. Contemporary
Educational Psychology, 23, 65-89 . doi:10 .1006/ceps.1997.0958.

Sharp, A. (2004} . Strategies and predilections in reading expository text : The importance of t ext
patterns. RELC Journal, 35, 329-349 . doi :310.1177 /0033688205052145.
Shulman, L. S. (1999} . Taking learning seriously. Change, 31(4}, 10-17.
Shulman, L. S. (2002} . Making differences: A table of learning . Change, 34(6}, 36-44.
Sperry, R. W. (1988} . Psychology's mentalist paradigm and the religion/science tension .
American Psychologist, 43(8}, 607-613.

Spiro, R. J., Feltovich, P. J., Jacobson, M . J., & Coulson, R. L. (1992}. Cognitive flexibility,
constructivism, and hypertext: Random access instruction for advanced knowledge
acquisition in ill-structured domains . In T. M . Duffy &

D. H. Jonassen (Eds .},

Constructivism and the technology of instruction : A conversation . Hill sdale, NJ : Erlbaum .

Sweller, J., Van Merrienboer, J. J. G., & Paas, F. (1998} . Cognitive architecture and instructional
design. Educational Psychology Review, 10, 251-296. doi:210 .1023/A:1022 1937 28205.
Tilman, D. (1999} . The ecological consequences of changes in biodiversity: A search for general
principles. Ecology, 80, 1455-1474.
Wiggins, G. P., & McTighe, J. (2005}. Understanding by design (2nd ed .). Ale xandria, VA :
Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development.

60

lran-N ej ad and Gregg