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-Crisostomo v CA

-Viola v Alunan
-Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy Regulatory Board v Commissioner Fe Barin
-Commission on Human Rights Employees Association v CHR
-Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v The Executive Sec
-Bagaoisan v National Tobacco Administration
-Sinon v CSC
-Domingo v DBP
-Eugenio v CSC
-Larin v Executive Sec
-Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs Zamora
-Makati Stock Exchange v SEC
-Kilusang Bayan v Dominguez
-Sen. Jaworski v PAGCOR
-Cooperative Development Authority v Dolefil Agrarian Reform Benefeciares Cooperative, Inc
-Maceda v Macaraig
-Rabor v CSC
-Edu v Ericta
-ABAKADA Guro Party List v Purisima


The respondents admittedly operate "colorum" or "kabit" taxicab units. On or about the second week of
February, 1977, private respondents filed their petitions with the respondent Board for the legalization
of their unauthorized "excess" taxicab units citing Presidential Decree No. 101, promulgated on January
17, 1973, "to eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators, by replacing or allowing
them to become legitimate and responsible operators." Within a matter of days, the respondent Board
promulgated its orders setting the applications for hearing and granting applicants provisional authority
to operate their "excess taxicab units" for which legalization was sought. Thus, the present petition.
Opposing the applications and seeking to restrain the grant of provisional permits or authority, as well
as the annulment of permits already granted under PD 101, the petitioners allege that the BOT acted
without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the petitions for legalization and awarding special permits to
the private respondents.
Citing, however, Section 4 of the Decree which provides:
SEC. 4. Transitory Provision. Six months after the promulgation of this Decree, the Board of
Transportation, the Bureau of Transportation, The Philippine Constabulary, the city and
municipal forces, and the provincial and city fiscals shall wage a concerted and relentless drive
towards the total elimination and punishment of all clandestine and unlawful operators of
public utility motor vehicles."
the petitioners argue that neither the Board of Transportation chairman nor any member thereof had
the power, at the time the petitions were filed (i.e. in 1977), to legitimize clandestine operations under
PD 101 as such power had been limited to a period of six (6) months from and after the promulgation of
the Decree on January 17, 1973.
Under PD 101, it is the fixed policy of the State "to eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of
clandestine operators by replacing or allowing them to become legitimate and responsible ones"
(Whereas clause, PD 101). In view thereof, it is maintained that respondent Board may continue to grant
to "colorum" operators the benefits of legalization under PD 101, despite the lapse of its power, after six
(6) months, to do so, without taking punitive measures against the said operators.
It provides for the withdrawal of the State's waiver of its right to punish said colorum operators for their
illegal acts. In other words, the cited section declares when the period of moratorium suspending the
relentless drive to eliminate illegal operators shall end.

It is a settled principle of law that in determining whether a board or commission has a certain power,
the authority given should be liberally construed in the light of the purposes for which it was created,
and that which is incidentally necessary to a full implementation of the legislative intent should be
upheld as being germane to the law.
"As the need of the public changes and oscillates with the trends of modern life, so must the Memo
Orders issued by respondent jibe with the dynamic and flexible standards of public needs. ...
Respondent Board is not supposed to 'tie its hands' on its issued Memo Orders should public interest
demand otherwise"


On June 30, 1987, former President Corazon C. Aquino, issued Executive Order No. 127 establishing the
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) as part of the structural organization of the
Ministry of Finance. That the EIIB "shall be the agency of primary responsibility for anti-smuggling
operations in all land areas and inland waters and waterways outside the areas of sole jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Customs."
Eleven years after, or on January 7, 2000, President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order No. 191
entitled "Deactivation of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau."7 Motivated by the fact
that "the designated functions of the EIIB are also being performed by the other existing agencies of the
government" and that "there is a need to constantly monitor the overlapping of functions" among these
agencies, former President Estrada ordered the deactivation of EIIB and the transfer of its functions to
the Bureau of Customs and the National Bureau of Investigation.
Meanwhile, President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 196 creating the Presidential Anti-Smuggling
Task Force "Aduana."9
Then the day feared by the EIIB employees came. On March 29, 2000, President Estrada issued
Executive Order No. 223 providing that all EIIB personnel occupying positions specified therein shall be
deemed separated from the service effective April 30, 2000, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization
resulting to abolition, redundancy, merger, division, or consolidation of positions.
Petitioners contend that the issuance of the afore-mentioned executive orders is: (a) a violation of their
right to security of tenure; (b) tainted with bad faith as they were not actually intended to make the
bureaucracy more efficient but to give way to Task Force "Aduana," the functions of which are
essentially and substantially the same as that of EIIB; and (c) a usurpation of the power of Congress to
decide whether or not to abolish the EIIB.
Arguing in behalf of respondents, the Solicitor General maintains that: (a) the President enjoys the
totality of the executive power provided under Sections 1 and 7, Article VII of the Constitution, thus, he
has the authority to issue Executive Order Nos. 191 and 223; (b) the said executive orders were issued in
the interest of national economy, to avoid duplicity of work and to streamline the functions of the
bureaucracy; and (c) the EIIB was not "abolished," it was only "deactivated."
I. Does the President have the authority to reorganize the executive department?
II. Whether or not reorganization is valid?


Surely, there exists a distinction between the words "deactivate" and "abolish." To "deactivate" means
to render inactive or ineffective or to break up by discharging or reassigning personnel, while to
"abolish" means to do away with, to annul, abrogate or destroy completely. In essence, abolition
denotes an intention to do away with the office wholly and permanently. Thus, while in abolition, the
office ceases to exist, the same is not true in deactivation where the office continues to exist, albeit
remaining dormant or inoperative. Be that as it may, deactivation and abolition are both reorganization
The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature.
This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to destroy. A public
office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the
office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it
into existence.
The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are
concerned, the President's power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular
office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures. In this
case, it was argued that there is no law which empowers the President to reorganize the BIR. In
decreeing otherwise, this Court sustained the following legal basis, thus:
Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:
'Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of Agencies Within the Executive Branch. The
heads of departments, bureaus and offices and agencies are hereby directed to identify their
respective activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may
be scaled down, phased out or abolished, subject to civil service rules and regulations. X x x. Actual
scaling down, phasing out or abolition of the activities shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or
Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the President.'
Said provision clearly mentions the acts of "scaling down, phasing out and abolition" of offices only
and does not cover the creation of offices or transfer of functions. Nevertheless, the act of creating
and decentralizing is included in the subsequent provision of Section 62 which provides that:
'Sec. 62. Unauthorized organizational charges. - Unless otherwise created by law or directed by the
President of the Philippines, no organizational unit or changes in key positions in any department or
agency shall be authorized in their respective organization structures and be funded from
appropriations by this Act.' (italics ours)
The foregoing provision evidently shows that the President is authorized to effect organizational
changes including the creation of offices in the department or agency concerned.
This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the law. What law then
gives him the power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential
Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing
authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate
bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions,
services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials. The validity of these two decrees
are unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that "all laws, decrees, executive orders,

proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this
Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked. So far, there is yet no law
amending or repealing said decrees."
Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure
of the Office of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or
Agencies to the Office of the President. Reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It
takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein,
including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached
to the Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the
President's continuing authority to reorganize.
In this jurisdiction, reorganizations have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith.
Reorganization is carried out in 'good faith' if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy
more efficient.2Pertinently, Republic Act No. 6656 provides for the circumstances which may be
considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil service employees made as a result of
reorganization, to wit: (a) where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new
staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) where an office is abolished and another
performing substantially the same functions is created; (c)where incumbents are replaced by those less
qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; (d)where there is a classification of
offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the
same functions as the original offices, and (e) where the removal violates the order of separation.

G.R. No. 111812 May 31, 1995

DIONISIO M. RABOR, petitioner,
1. Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in the Office of the Mayor, Davao City.
2. Pagatpatan, an official in the Office of the Mayor of Davao City, advised Rabor to apply
for retirement, considering that he had already reached the age of 68 years with 13 years
government service. Rabor responded to this advice the GSIS in a certificate of membership
extended Rabors service to comply 15 years service requirements.
3. Ms. Pagatpatan, wrote to the Civil Service Commission, informing the latter of the
foregoing and requesting advice "as to what action should be taken on this matter."
4. CSC advised Davao City Mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte that the extension of services of Mr.
Rabor is contrary to M.C. No. 65 of the Office of the President, as quoted: Officials
and employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years shall not
be retained the service, except for extremely meritorious reasons in which case the
retention shall not exceed six (6) months. Thus the services of Rabor are already nonextendible.
5. Rabor next wrote to the Office of the President seeking reconsideration. The Office of the
President referred Mr. Rabor's letter to the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission. The
Civil Service Commission dismissed the appeal of Mr. Rabor and affirmed the action of
Director Cawa stated CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27 Any request for extension of
service of compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen years service requirement for
retirement shall be allowed only to permanent appointees in the career service who
are regular members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and shall
be granted for a period of not exceeding one (1) year.
6. Mr. Rabor sought reconsideration this time invoking the Decision of this Court in Cena v.
Civil Service Commission. Rabor's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Commission!
7. Petitioner Rabor sent another letter to the Office of the Mayor, Davao City requesting that
he be allowed to continue rendering service.This request was once more denied by Mayor
Duterte. Mayor Duterte pointed out that, under Cena grant of the extension of service was
discretionary on the part of the City Mayor, but that he could not grant the extension
requested. You are already nearing your 70th birthday may no longer be able to perform the duties
attached to your position.
8. At this point, Mr. Rabor decided to come to this Court. In this proceeding, petitioner Rabor
contends that his claim falls squarely within the ruling of this Court in Cena v. Civil Service

Issue: Whether or not Mr. Rabors years of service should be extend on the basis of the exception
as granted in the Cena case.
We start by recalling the factual setting of Cena.
1. Gaudencio Cena was appointed Registrar of the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metropolitan
Manila. He reached the compulsory retirement age (65) and requested an extension of 3
years to enable him to retire with the full benefit of an Old-Age Pension under of P.D. No.
1146. The Commission allowed Cena a one (1) year extension of his service under its
Memorandum Circular No. 27. Dissatisfied, Cena moved for reconsideration, without
success. He then came to this Court, claiming that he was entitled to an extension of (3)
years, to complete the fifteen-year service requirement for retirement with full benefits.
2. This Court granted Cena's petition! The basis is under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 with
the exception which partly says: unless the service is extended by appropriate
authorities, retirement shall be compulsory for an employee at sixty-five-(65) years of
age with at least fifteen (15) years of service; Provided, that if he has less than fifteen
(15) years of service, he shall he allowed to continue in the service to completed the
fifteen (15) years.
3. The Court also held that the authority to grant the extension was a discretionary one vested
in the head of the agency concerned.
While Section 11 (b) appeared cast in verbally unqualified terms, there were two (2) administrative
issuances which prescribe limitations on the extension of service that may be granted to an
employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age:
1. The first administrative issuance is Civil Service Commission Circular No. 27, Series of

2. The second administrative issuance Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of

the President, dated 14 June 1988.

In Cena it was resolved that the challenges posed by the above two (2) administrative regulations by,
firstly, considering as invalid Civil Service Memorandum No. 27 and, secondly, by interpreting the
Office of the President's Memorandum Circular No. 65 as inapplicable.

It will be seen that Cena, in striking down Civil Service Commission Memorandum No. 27, took a
very narrow view on the question of what subordinate rule-making by an administrative agency is

permissible and valid. That restrictive view must be contrasted with this Court's earlier ruling
in People v. Exconde,
It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable
activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally
delegate authority and promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to standards that the law
Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a considerably higher degree of detail in the statute to be
implemented went against prevailing doctrine. It seems clear that if the governing or enabling
statute is quite detailed and specific to begin with, there would be very little need (or
occasion) for implementing administrative regulations. It is, however, precisely the inability
of legislative bodies to anticipate all (or many) possible detailed situations in respect of any
relatively complex subject matter, that makes subordinate, delegated rule-making by
administrative agencies so important and unavoidable. All that may be reasonably; demanded is
a showing that the delegated legislation consisting of administrative regulations are germane to the
general purposes projected by the governing or enabling statute. This is the test that is appropriately
applied in respect of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, and to this test we
now turn.
We consider that the enabling statute that should appropriately be examined is the present Civil
Service law found in Book V, Title I, of the Administrative Code of 1987 and not alone P.D.
No. 1146, otherwise known as the "Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977." For the
matter of extension of service of retirees who have reached sixty-five (65) years of age is an area that
is covered by both statutes and not alone by Section 11 (b) of P.D. 1146. This is crystal clear from
examination of many provisions of the present civil service law.

Section 12 of the present Civil Service law set out in the 1987 Administrative Code. It was on the
bases of the above quoted provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code that the Civil Service
Commission promulgated its Memorandum Circular No. 27 the Commission was acting as "the
central personnel agency of the government empowered to promulgate policies, standards and
guidelines for efficient, responsive and effective personnel administration in the government." It was
also discharging its function of "administering the retirement program for government officials and
employees" and of "evaluating qualifications for retirement".
In addition, the Civil Service Commission is charged by the 1987 Administrative Code with
providing leadership and assistance "in the development and retention of qualified and efficient work force in
the Civil Service" (Section 16 [10]) and with the "enforcement of the constitutional and statutory

provisions, relative to retirement and the regulation for the effective implementation of the retirement of government
officials and employees".
The policy considerations which guided the Civil Service Commission in limiting the maximum
extension of service allowable for compulsory retirees were summarized by Grio-Aquino, J. in her
dissenting opinion in Cena:
Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service Commission that extending
the service of compulsory retirees for longer than one (1) year would: (1) give a premium to
late-comers in the government service and in effect discriminate against those who enter the service at a
younger age; (2) delay the promotion of the latter and of next-in-rank employees; and (3) prejudice the
chances for employment of qualified young civil service applicants who have already passed the various
government examination but must wait for jobs to be vacated by "extendees" who have long
passed the mandatory retirement age but are enjoying extension of their government service
to complete 15 years so they may qualify for old-age pension.
Cena laid heavy stress on the interest of retirees or would be retirees, something that is, in itself, quite
appropriate. At the same time, however, we are bound to note that there should be countervailing
stress on the interests of the employer agency and of other government employees as a whole. The
results flowing from the striking down of the limitation established in Civil Service Memorandum
Circular No. 27 may well be "absurd and inequitable," as suggested by Mme. Justice Grio-Aquino
in her dissenting opinion. An employee who has rendered only three (3) years of government service
at age sixty-five (65) can have his service extended for twelve (12) years and finally retire at the age
of seventy-seven (77). This reduces the significance of the general principle of compulsory
retirement at age sixty-five (65) very close to the vanishing point.
The very real difficulties posed by the Cena doctrine for rational personnel administration and
management in the Civil Service, are aggravated when Cena is considered together with the case
of Toledo v. Civil Service Commission: When one combines the doctrine of Toledo with the ruling in Cena,
very strange results follow. Under these combined doctrines, a person sixty-four (64) years of age
may be appointed to the government service and one (1) year later may demand extension of his
service for the next fourteen (14) years; he would retire at age seventy-nine (79).
Our conclusion is that the doctrine of Cena should be and is hereby modified to this extent: that
Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, more specifically paragraph (1) thereof,
is hereby declared valid and effective. Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 must, accordingly, be read
together with Memorandum Circular No. 27. We reiterate, however, the holding in Cena that the
head of the government agency concerned is vested with discretionary authority to allow or disallow
extension of the service of an official or employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age
without completing fifteen (15) years of government service; this discretion is, nevertheless, to be
exercised conformably with the provisions of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of

We do not believe it necessary to deal specifically with Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office
of the President dated 14 June 1988. It will be noted from the text quoted supra (pp. 11-12) that the
text itself of Memorandum Circular No. 65 (and for that matter, that of Memorandum Circular No.
163, also of the Office of the President, dated 5 March 1968) 27 does not purport to apply only to
officers or employees who have reached the age of sixty-five (65) years and who have at least fifteen
(l5) years of government service. We noted earlier that Cena interpreted Memorandum Circular No.
65 as referring only to officers and employees who have both reached the compulsory retirement
age of sixty-five (65) and completed the fifteen (15) years of government service. Cena so interpreted
this Memorandum Circular precisely because Cena had reached the conclusion that employees who
have reached sixty-five (65) years of age, but who have less than fifteen (15) years of government
service, may be allowed such extension of service as may be needed to complete fifteen (15) years of
service. In other words, Cena read Memorandum Circular No. 65 in such a way as to comfort
with Cena's own conclusion reached without regard to that Memorandum Circular. In view of the
conclusion that we today reached in the instant case, this last ruling of Cena is properly regarded as
Applying now the results of our reexamination of Cena to the instant case, we believe and so hold
that Civil Service Resolution No. 92-594 dated 28 April 1992 dismissing the appeal of petitioner
Rabor and affirming the action of CSRO-XI Director Cawad dated 26 July 1991, must be upheld
and affirmed.

-Defendant Aniceto Barrias is the captain of the lighter Maude.
-He had moved the said lighter, when heavily laden, in the Pasig River, by bamboo poles in the hands of
the crew, and without steam, sail or any other external power.
-As such, he was charged with violation of Paragraphs 70 and 83 of the Circular No. 397 of the Insular
Collector of Customs.
-Par. 70 of said circular states:
No heavily loaded casco, lighter or other similar craft shall be permitted to move in the Pasig
River without being towed by steam or moved by other adequate power.
-Par. 80 of the same also reads:
For violation of any of the foregoing regulations, the person offending shall be liable to a fine of
not less than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of the court.
-The counsel of the defendant attacked the validity of Paragraph 70 on 2 grounds:
It is unauthorized by Sec. 19 of Act No. 355
If the acts of the Philippine Commission are to be interpreted as authorizing the Collector to
promulgate such a law, they are void, as constituting an illegal delegation of legislative power.
-Attorney-general joins the opposing counsel on discharging the defendant based on the first ground.
Issue: WON the authority of the Collector of Customs to issue Circular No. 397 constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power
(1) NO, insofar is the authority to issue such regulations is concerned;
(2) YES, insofar as the authority to fix penalties for violation thereof is concerned
Act No. 1136 provide:
Sec. 1, 2 ,3:
The Collector of Customs is authorized to license craft engaged in the lighterage or other
exclusively harbor business of the ports of the Islands, and, with certain exceptions, all vessels engaged
in lightering are required to be so licensed.
Sec. 5:
The Collector is authorized, empowered, and directed to promptly make and publish suitable
rules and regulations to carry this law into effect and to regulate the business herein licensed.
Sec. 8:
Any person who shall violate the provisions of this Act, or any rule or regulation made and
issued by the Collector shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment of not > 6
months, or by a fine of not > $100, or both, at the discretion of the court.

(1) Clearly under this statute, the regulation issued by the Collector, Circular No. 397, comes within the
terms of Section 5. Lighterage, as mentioned in Act No. 1136, is the very business in which this vessel
was engaged, and when heavily laden with hem she was navigating the Pasig River.
Purpose of delegation of issuance of rules and regulations relating to harbor to collector of customs:
The necessity of confiding to some local authority the framing, changing and enforcing of harbor
regulations is recognized throughout the world, as each region and each harbor requires peculiar rules
more minute than could be enacted by the central lawmaking power, and which, when kept within their
proper scope, are in their nature police regulations and not involving an undue grant of legislative

(2) The complaint was framed with reference to Act No. 355, of the Philippine Customs Administrative
Act, which empowers the Collector to make suitable regulations and to fix penalties for violation
thereof not exceeding a fine of P500.
One of the settled maxims in the constitutional laws is that the power conferred upon the legislature to
make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority. This doctrine is
based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty,
pursuant to a sovereign trust, to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own
judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of
In US vs Breen, the law empowering the Secretary of War to impose penalties for violations of the rules
he issued was held invalid, as vesting in him a power exclusively lodged in the Congress.
In another case, it was ruled that harbor commissioners cannot impose a penalty under statutes
authorizing them to do so, saying that although the legislation could delegate to plaintiff the authority
to make rules and regulations with reference to the navigation of Humboldt Bay, the penalty for the
violation of such rules and regulations is a matter purely in the hands of the legislature.
Hence, the power to fix penalties, the penalties fixed was also in conflict of the Sec. 8 of Act No. 1136, is
an invalid delegation of legislative power.
280 SCRA 713 Law on Public Officers Creation and Abolition of a Public Office is Essentially Legislative
In 1993, Aida Eugenio passed the Career Executive Service Eligibility (CES). She was then recommended to be
appointed as a Civil Service Officer Rank IV. But her appointment to said rank was impeded when in the same year,
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) abolished the Career Executive Service Board (CESB). CESB is the office
tasked with promulgating rules, standards, and procedures on the selection, classification and compensation of the
members of the Career Executive Service.
Eugenio then assailed the resolution which abolished CESB. She averred that the CSC does not have the power to
abolish CESB because the same was created by law (P.D. 1). CSC on the other hand argued that it has the power to
do so pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 which granted the CSC the right to reorganize the CSC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission may validly abolish the Career Executive Service Board.
HELD: No. The CESB is created by law. It can only be abolished by the legislature. The creation and abolition of
public offices is primarily a legislative function, except for Constitutional offices. The power to restructure granted to
the CSC is limited to offices under it. The law that created the CESB intended said office to be an autonomous entity
although it is administratively attached to the CSC.


Petitioner was employed by DBP as Senior Training and Career Development Officer on permanent status
from 1979 to December 1986. E.O. No. 81 was passed authorizing the reorganization of DBP. In order to fully
implement the reorganization, Board Resolution No. 304-87 was issued by DBP to allow the issuance of temporary
appointments. Further more, such temporary appointments were issued for only a maximum period of 12 months
during which their performance shall be assessed and such assessment be the basis of the renewal of their

Petitioner Domingo was issued a temporary appointment on January 2, 1987 for a period of one (1) year, which was
renewed for another period up to November 30, 1988. Thereafter, in a memorandum dated November 23, 1988
issued by the Final Review Committee, petitioner got a performance rating of "below average," by reason of which his
appointment was "made to lapse."

Consequently, petitioner filed with the CSC a verified complaint against DBP for illegal dismissal. He alleged that his
dismissal constituted a violation of the Civil Service Law against the issuance of temporary appointments to
permanent employees, as well as of his right to security of tenure and due process.

On November 27, 1989, CSC issued a resolution directing the reappointment of Mr. Domingo as Senior Training and
Career Development Officer or any such equivalent rank under the staffing pattern of DBP. The order for
reappointment was premised on the findings of the CSC that the action of the DBP to issue temporary appointments
to all DBP personnel in order to allow for the maximum flexibility in evaluating the performance of incumbents is not in
accord with civil service law rules. Accordingly, to issue a temporary appointment to one who has been on permanent
status before will deprive the employee of benefits accorded to permanent employees and will adversely affect his
security of tenure."

DBP filed a motion for reconsideration on December 27, 1989 alleging that the issuance of temporary appointments
to all the DBP employees was purely an interim arrangement; that in spite of the temporary appointment, they
continued to enjoy the salary, allowances and other benefits corresponding to permanent employees; that there can
be no impairment of herein petitioner's security of tenure since the new DBP charter expressly provides that "qualified
personnel of the bank may be appointed to appropriate positions in the new staffing pattern and those not so
appointed are deemed separated from the service;" that petitioner was evaluated and comparatively assessed under
a rating system approved by the respondent commission; and that petitioner cannot claim that he was denied due
process of law considering that, although several appeals were received by the Final Review Committee from other
employees similarly situated, herein petitioner never appealed his rating or the extension of his temporary
appointment although he was advised to do so by his direct supervisor.

On April 10, 1990, CSC rendered the questioned resolution setting aside its previous decision and affirming the
separation of herein petitioner. Hence this petition.

Petitioner contends, among others, that reorganization cannot be a valid ground to terminate the services of
government employees.
Whether reorganization is a valid ground for the separation of civil service employees. (Admin Issue)

Yes. Petitioner's statement is incomplete and inaccurate, if not outright erroneous. Either petitioner misunderstood or
he totally overlooked what was stated in the aforecited decision which held that "reorganizations in this jurisdiction
have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith." As we said in Dario:
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good
faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of dismissal)
or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security
of tenure would not be a Chinese wall.
Clearly, from our pronouncements in Dario, reorganization is a recognized valid ground for separation of civil service
employees, subject only to the condition that it be done in good faith. No less than the Constitution itself in Section 16
of the Transitory Provisions, together with Sections 33 and 34 of Executive Order No. 81 and Section 9 of Republic
Act No. 6656, support this conclusion with the declaration that all those not so appointed in the implementation of
said reorganization shall be deemed separated from the service with the concomitant recognition of their entitlement
to appropriate separation benefits and/or retirement plans of the reorganized government agency.
The facts of this case, particularly the evaluation process adopted by DBP, bear out the existence of good faith in the
course of reorganization.

Crisostomo was the President of the Philippine College of Commerce (PCC). As
president of PCC he was charged with both administrative and criminal cases.
Administratively, two cases were filed, one for illegal use of govt vehicle,
misappropriation of materials belonging to the college, oppression and the other for
harassment, grave misconduct, nepotism and dishonesty. The criminal charges
involved violations of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. As consequence he was
preventively suspended from office. Dr. Mateo was then designated as an OIC under
Subsequently in the middle of the pending complaints against Crisostomo, PD
No. 1341 was issued by Pres. Marcos converting PCC to Polytechnic University of the
Philippines (PUP) and in addition Dr. Mateo, who after suspension of Crisostomo was
appointed OIC and Acting President, was now the appointed as PUPs President in a 6
year term.
However, Crisostomo was acquitted of the charges against him. The Circuit
Criminal Court of Manila orders that Crisostomo be reinstated to the position of
President of PCC, now PUP, and to be entitled to recieved his salaries and other
benefits from the time of suspension leading to the present time when PCC was now
Subsequently, Crisostomo filed with RTC a motion for execution of the judgment.
The RTC granted the motion. However as the sheriff was tasked to serve the writ of
execution , Dr. Gellor the current president of PUP appointed by Pres. Aquino refused
to vacate. In turn a contempt citation was issued against Dr. Gellor and the DECS
secretary. A hearing was set, and Crisostomo was able to assume to his former office.
Thereafter, People of the Philippines filed petition for certiorari and prohibition to
the Court of Appeals assailing the 2 orders and writs of execution issued by RTC, and
asked for TRO, before CA.
The court of Appeals issued the TRO and set aside the order of writ of execution ruling
that Crisostomo can only be given of the benefits accruing from the time of suspension
up to the time when PCC was converted into PUP and furthermore that Crisostomo
cannot be reinstated as the law, PD 1341 abolished PCC when it was made into PUP.
The CA then remanded the case to the trial court for the determination of the amount of
back wages of crisostomo.

Hence the instant petition of Crisostomo to the Supreme Court.

Crisostomo Argues that PD 1341 did not abolish the PCC on the fact that if the law
intended to abolish PCC it would have expressly placed there in its provisions abolition
rather than convertion.


1. WON PD No. 1341 abolished PCC

2. WON Crisostomo may be reinstated to his office and reviece his benefits
and salaries from the time of suspension up to the present PUP.


1. NO. PD No. 1341 did not abolish, but only changed, the former PCC into PUP. What
took place was a change in academic status of educational institution, not of its
corporate life. Hence the change in its name, the expansion of its curricular offerings,
and the changes in its structure and organization.
When the purpose is to abolish a department or an office or an organization and to
replace it with another one, the lawmaking authority says so.
Neither the addition of new course offerings nor changes in its existing structure and
organization bring about the abolition of an educational institution and the creation of a
new oneonly an express declaration to that effect by the lawmaking authority will.
2. NO. reinstatement of Crisostomo to the position of president of PUP could not be
ordered by the RTC because PD 1437 fixes the term of office of presidents of state
universities and colleges at 6 yrs, renewable for another 6 yrs, and authorizing the
President of the Philippines to terminate the terms of incumbents who were not
Dr. Mateo, then acting president, was appointed president of PUP, with the result of
cutting Crisosotomos term short. Therefore, Crisosotomo became entitled only to
retirement benefits or the payment of separation pay. As a matter of fact, Crisostomo
has even asked President Aquino to consider him for appointment to the same position
after it had become vacant.

Sen. Robert Jaworski

Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) and
Sports and Games Entertainment Corporation (SAGE)
PAGCOR is a government owned and controlled corporation existing under P.D. No.
1869 issued on July 11, 1983 by then Pres. Ferdinand Marcos. It is granted the authority, rights
and privileges to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or
amusement places, sports, gaming pools, i.e. basketball, football, lotteries, etc. whether on land
or sea, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines.
On March 31, 1998, PAGCOR approved an instrument denominated as Grant of Authority and
Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming, which granted SAGE the
authority to operate and maintain Sports Betting station in PAGCORs casino locations, and
Internet Gaming facilities to service local and international bettors. Pursuant to the authority
granted by PAGCOR, SAGE commenced its operations by conducting gambling on the Internet
on a trial-run basis, making pre-paid cards and redemption of winnings available at various
Bingo Bonanza outlets.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition directly in this court praying that the grant
of authority by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE be nullified. Contending that PAGCOR is not
authorized to operate gambling in the internet by reason that at the time of its enactment in
1983, it couldnt have contemplated of internet gambling as it was inexistent at that time and
that PAGCOR committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted SAGE to operate gambling
on the internet.
WoN respondent PAGCOR is authorized under P.D. No. 1869 to operate gambling activities on
the internet.
Petition is granted, the grant of authority by PAGCOR to SAGE is declared null and void. The
grant of authority gives SAGE the privilege to actively participate, partake and share PAGCORs
franchise to operate a gambling activity. The grant of franchise is a special privilege that
constitutes a right and a duty to be performed by the grantee. PAGCOR has acted beyond the
limits of its authority when it passed on or shared its franchise to SAGE. While PAGCOR is
allowed under its charter to enter into operators and/or management contracts, it is not allowed
under the same charter to relinquish or share its franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise
to another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR cannot delegate its power in view of the legal
principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter

to show that it has been expressly authorized to do so. It is Congress that prescribes the
conditions on which the grant of the franchise may be made.

(HSBC) v. JOSE VERA, Judge ad interim of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU
UNJIENG (65 Phil 56)
November 16, 1937
- The criminal case, People v. Cu Unjieng was filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI) in Manila,
with HSBC intervening in the case as private prosecutor.
- The CFI rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from four years and two months of prision correccional to eight years of prison mayor.
(Jan. 8, 1934)
- Upon appeal, it was modified to an indeterminate penalty of from five years and six months of
prison correccional to seven years, six months and twenty-seven days of prison mayor, but
affirmed the judgments in all other respects.
- Cu Unjieng filed a Motion for Reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which
were all denied on December 17, 1935. Final judgment was entered on Dec. 18, 1935. He filed
for certiorari to the Supreme Court but got denied on Nov 1936. The SC subsequently denied Cu
Unjiengs petition for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial,
then remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of judgment.
- Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation before the trial court, under the provisions of Act
4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. He states he is innocent of the crime; he has no
criminal record; and that he would observe good conduct in the future.
- CFI Manila Judge Jose Vera set the petition for hearing for probation on April 5, 1937.
- HSBC questioned the authority of Vera to hold such hearings and assailed the constitutionality
of the Probation Act since it violates the equal protection of laws and gives unlawful and
improper delegation to provincial boards.
- Section 11 of Art 4221 states that the act shall only be applied in those provinces wherein the
probationary officer is granted salary not lower than provincial fiscals by respective provincial
- The City Fiscal of Manila files a supplementary petition affirming issues raised by HSBC, arguing
that probation is a form of reprieve, hence Act 4221 bypasses this exclusive power of the Chief
- Hence this petition in the Supreme Court.

1. Whether or not the constitutionality of Act 4221 has been properly raised in these proceedings;
2. If in the affirmative, whether or not Act 4221 is constitutional based on these three grounds:
a. It encroaches upon the pardoning power of the executive
b. It constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
c. It denies the equal protection of the laws

1. Yes. Constitutional questions will not be determined by the courts unless properly raised and
presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, lis mota.
Constitutionality issues may be raised in prohibition and certiorari proceedings, as they may also
be raised in mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus proceedings. The general rule states

that constitutionality should be raised in the earliest possible opportunity (during proceedings in
initial/inferior courts). It may be said that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws, as
in this case. The well-settled rule is that the person impugning validity must have personal and
substantial interest in the case (i.e. he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result of its
enforcement). If Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the People of the Philippines have substantial
interest in having it set aside.
a. No. There exists a distinction between pardon and probation. Pardoning power is solely
within the power of the Executive. Probation has an effect of temporary suspension,
and the probationer is still not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts
upon him as he remains to be in legal custody for the time being.
b. Yes. The Probation Act does not lay down any definite standards by which the
administrative boards may be guided in the exercise of discretionary powers, hence
they have the power to determine for themselves, whether or not to apply the law or
not. This therefore becomes a surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards. It
is unconstitutional.
c. Yes. Due to the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, some provinces may
choose to adopt the law or not, thus denying the equal protection of laws. It is

BPI Leasing vs CA
G.R. No. 127624
BLC is a corporation engaged in the business of leasing properties. In 1986, BLC paid the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue (CIR) a total of 1,139,041.49 representing 4% contractors percentage tax then
imposed by Section 205 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), based on its gross rentals from
equipment leasing for the said year amounting to 27,783,725.42.
On November 10, 1986, the CIR issued Revenue Regulation 19-86. Section 6.2 thereof provided that
finance and leasing companies registered under Republic Act 5980 shall be subject to gross receipt tax
of 5%-3%-1% on actual income earned. This means that companies registered under Republic Act 5980,
such as BLC, are not liable for contractors percentage tax under Section 205 but are, instead, subject to
gross receipts tax under Section 260 (now Section 122) of the NIRC. Since BLC had earlier paid the
aforementioned contractors percentage tax, it re-computed its tax liabilities under the gross receipts tax
and arrived at the amount of 361,924.44.
On April 11, 1988, BLC filed a claim for a refund with the CIR for the amount of 777,117.05, representing
the difference between the 1,139,041.49 it had paid as contractors percentage tax and 361,924.44 it
should have paid for gross receipts tax. Four days later the petitioner filed a petition for review with the
court of tax appeals (CTA).
CTA dismissed the petition and denied BLCs claim of refund. The CTA held that Revenue Regulation 1986, as amended, may only be applied prospectively such that it only covers all leases written on or
after January 1, 1987.
The CTA ruled that, since BLCs rental income was all received prior to 1986, it follows that this was
derived from lease transactions prior to January 1, 1987, and hence, not covered by the revenue
A motion for reconsideration was filed but was later on denied. Petitioner then appealed with the CA but
CA affirmed CTAs decision. Thus, this petition.
Petitioner: In seeking to reverse the denial of its claim for tax refund, BLC submits that the Court of
Appeals and the CTA erred in not ruling that Revenue Regulation 19-86 may be applied retroactively.
Respondent: Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the provision on the date of effectivity of
Revenue Regulation 19-86 is clear and unequivocal, leaving no room for interpretation on its prospective
application. In addition, respondents argue that the petition should be dismissed on the ground that the
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was signed by the counsel of record and not by BLC,
through a duly authorized representative, in violation of Supreme Court Circular 28-91.
SC: The Court agrees with respondents contention that the petition should be dismissed outright for
failure to comply with Supreme Court Circular 28-91, now incorporated as Section 2 of Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court. The records plainly show, and this has not been denied by BLC, that the certification was
executed by counsel who has not been shown to have specific authority to sign the same for BLC.
Jurisprudence provides that a certificate of non-forum shopping may be signed, for and on behalf of a
corporation, by a specifically authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be
disclosed in such document. This, however, does not mean that any lawyer, may routinely sign a

certification of non-forum shopping. The Court emphasizes that the lawyer must be specifically authorized
in order validly to sign the certification.
According to the SC, Corporations have no powers except those expressly conferred upon them by the
Corporation Code and those that are implied by or are incidental to its existence. These powers are
exercised through their board of directors and/or duly authorized officers and agents. Hence, physical
acts, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the
purpose by corporate bylaws or by specific act of the board of directors.
The SC further said, The records are bereft of the authority of BLCs counsel to institute the present
petition and to sign the certification of non-forum shopping. While said counsel may be the counsel of
record for BLC, the representation does not vest upon him the authority to execute the certification on
behalf of his client. There must be a resolution issued by the board of directors that specifically authorizes
him to institute the petition and execute the certification, for it is only then that his actions can be legally
binding upon BLC.
The reason why the certification against forum shopping is required to be accomplished by petitioner
himself is that only the petitioner has actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated similar actions or
proceedings in other courts or tribunals. Even counsel of record may be unaware of such fact.
Clearly, therefore, the present petition lacks the proper certification as strictly required by jurisprudence
and the Rules of Court.
BLC attempts to convince the Court that Revenue Regulation 19-86 is legislative rather than interpretative
in character and hence, should retroact to the date of effectivity of the law it seeks to interpret.
Administrative issuances may be distinguished according to their nature and substance: legislative and
interpretative. A legislative rule is in the matter of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a
primary legislation by providing the details thereof. An interpretative rule, on the other hand, is designed
to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.
The Court finds the questioned revenue regulation to be legislative in nature. Section 1 of Revenue
Regulation 19-86 plainly states that it was promulgated pursuant to Section 277 of the NIRC. Section 277
(now Section 244) is an express grant of authority to the Secretary of Finance to promulgate all needful
rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the NIRC.
Question on whether or not its application should be applied prospectively or retroactively
According to the court, The principle is well entrenched that statutes, including administrative rules and
regulations, operate prospectively only, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is manifest by express
terms or by necessary implication. n the present case, there is no indication that the revenue regulation
may operate retroactively. Furthermore, there is an express provision stating that it shall take effect
on January 1, 1987, and that it shall be applicable to all leases written on or after the said date. Being
clear on its prospective application, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without further
interpretation. Thus, BLC is not in a position to invoke the provisions of Revenue Regulation 19-86 for
lease rentals it received prior to January 1, 1987.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED, and the assailed decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.


-RA 9136 or EPIRA (Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001) was enacted on June 8, 2001 and took
effect on June 26, 2001. It provides, among others, for the abolition of ERB and the creation of ERC
(Energy Regulatory Commission).
-the Commissioners issued the guidelines for the selection and hiring of ERC employees, which states
that RA 6656 (An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the
Implementation of Government Reorganization) will not directly apply to ERCs current efforts to
establish a new organization. Civil Service laws, rules and regulations, however, will have suppletory
application to the extent possible in regard to the selection and placement of employees in the ERC.
-KERB insisted that EPIRA did not abolish the ERB but merely changed ERBs name to ERC and expanded
ERBs functions and objectives.
-KERB, fearful of the uncertainty of the employment status of its members, filed the present petition.
-Commissioners describe the status of ERB employees appointment in the ERC, wherein 96% of ERB
employees were rehired or opted to retire or be separated, and only 8 ERB employees could not be
appointed to new positions due to the reduction of ERC plantilla and the absence of positions
appropriate to their respective qualifications and skills.
ISSUE: WON Sec. 38 of EPIRA abolishing the ERB is constitutional
(1) YES. All laws enjoy presumption of constitutionality. To justify the nullification of a law, there must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. KERB failed to show any breach of the
[a] The power to create an office carries with it the power to abolish
A public office is created by the Constitution or by law or by an officer or tribunal to which the power to
create the office has been delegated by the legislature. The power to create an office carries with it the
power to abolish. Pres. Corazon Aquino, then exercising her legislative powers, created ERB by issuing
EO 172.
[b] Abolition of ERB is explicitly stated in EPIRA
The question of whether a law abolishes an office is a question of legislative intent. There should not be
any controversy of there is an explicit declaration of abolition in the law itself. Sec. 38 of EPIRA
explicitly abolished ERB.

[c] Abolition is different from removal

Abolition of an office and its related positions is different from removal of an incumbent from his office.
From a legal standpoint, there is no occupant in an abolished office. Where there is no occupant, there
is no tenure to speak of. Thus, impairment of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure does not
arise in the abolition of an office. On the other hand, removal implies that the office and its related
positions subsist and that the occupants are merely separated from their positions.
[d] Abolition was made in good faith
A valid order of abolition not only come from a legitimate body, it must also be made in good faith. An
abolition is made in good faith when [1] it is not made for political or personal reasons, or [2] when it
does not circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees. Abolition of an
office may be brought about by [a] reasons of economy, or [b] to remove redundancy of functions, or a
[c] clear and explicit constitutional mandate for such termination of employment. Where one office is
abolished and replaced with another office vested with similar functions, the abolition is a legal nullity.
When there is a void abolition, the incumbent is deemed to have never ceased holding office.
KERB asserts that there was no valid abolition of ERB, but merely a reorganization done in bad faith,
because ERC performs substantially the same functions as the ERB. The Court indeed finds that the ERC
assumed the functions of ERB. However, overlap in the functions of ERB and ERC does not mean that
there is no valid abolition of the ERB. The ERC has new and expanded functions which are intended to
meet the specific needs of a deregulated power industry.

WHEREFORE, there is a valid abolition of ERB.

[G.R. Nos. L-8895 & L-9191. April 30, 1957.]
EXEQUIEL SORIANO, ET AL., Petitioners-Appellees, v. SALVADOR ARANETA, ETC., ET AL., Respondents-Appellants.

San Miguel Bay is considered as the most important fishing area in the Pacific side of the Bicol region.
However, the operation of trawl fishing caused the depletion of the marine resources of that area. There arose
a general clamor among the majority of the inhabitants of coastal towns to prohibit this kind of operation in San
Miguel Bay.
In response to these pleas, the President (Ramon Magsaysay) issued on April 5, 1954, Executive Order No.
22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, but said executive order was amended by Executive Order
No. 66, apparently in answer to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur recommending the
allowance of trawl fishing during the typhoon season only. On November 2, 1954, however, Executive Order
No. 80 was issued reviving Executive Order No. 22, to take effect as originally provided therein.
CFI found EO 22 and its amendments invalid.
Whether the exercise of authority by the President by enacting EO 22 (amended by EO 66 and EO 80)
constituted undue delegation of legislative powers
No. For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small and immature fishes, Congress intended with the
promulgation of Act No. 4003 (Fisheries Act), to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing device like trawl nets
that could endanger and deplete the supply of sea food. To that end, it also authorized the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations such restrictions as he deemed necessary in
order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land.
Consequently, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is under the direction and control of the
President of the Philippines. The latter, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines
Sur issued Executive Order No. 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised
within the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said
coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern (Section 63, Revised Administrative Code) which
were in consonance and strict conformity with the law. The exercise of such authority did not, therefore,
constitute an undue delegation of the powers of Congress.

Trawl is a fishing net made in the form of a bag with the mouth kept open by a device the whole affair being towed, dragged,
trailed or trawled on the bottom of the sea to capture demersal, ground or bottom species (Executive Order No. 22, series of 1954).

-Revised Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the General Elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay
Officers provide for the election of 1st, 2nd, 3rd vice-presidents, auditors for Local Liga Chapter, and also
with the National Liga Chapter, but now with the addition of Secretary General for the latter.
-Viola, barangay chairman of Brgy 167 of Manila, questions the validity of the such provisions,
contending that the positions in question are in excess of those provided in the Local Government Code
(LGC) which mentions only those of president, vice president and 5 members of the board of directors
as elective positions, thus in violation of the principle that IRRs cannot add or detract from the
provisions of the law they are designed to implement.
ISSUE: WON (1) the provisions for the creation of such additional provisions is without the authority of
law; (2) if yes, in making a delegation of such power (to create additional positions) to the board of
directors of each chapter of the Liga ng mga Barangay, Congress provided a sufficient standard so that
administrative discretion may be canalized within proper banks that keep it from overflowing.
(1) With authority of law. The creation of the additional positions is authorized by the the Constitution
and By-laws of of the Liga ng mga Barangay and the LGC, which provides that The liga at the municipal,
city, provincial, metropolitan political subdivision and national levels directly elect a president, a vicepresident, and 5 members of the board of directors. The board shall appoint its secretary and treasurer
and create such other positions as it may deem necessary for the management of the chapter. This
provisions in fact requiresand not merely authorizesthe board of directors to create such other
positions as it may deem necessary for the management of the chapter.
(2) Yes. That Congress can delegate the power to create position such as these has been settled by our
decisions upholding the validity of reorganization statues authorizing the President of the Philippines to
create, abolish or merge offices in the executive department.
Statutory provisions authorizing the President of the Philippines to make reforms and changes in
government owned or controlled corporations for the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and
efficiency in their operations and empowering the Secretary of Education to prescribe minimum
standards of adequate and efficient instruction in private schools and colleges have been found to be
sufficient for the purpose of valid delegation. Judged by these cases, we hold that LGC, in directing the
board of directors of the liga to create such other positions as may be deemed necessary for the
management of the chapters embodies a fairly intelligible standard. There is no undue delegation of
power by Congress.

Justice Davides dissent and SCs answers:

(1) only board of director is vested with power to create other positions...there was no showing that
Barangay National Assembly was authorized to draft the Constitution and By-laws because he was
unable to find it.
--Barangay National Assembly is actually the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay (PKB) referred to
in the IRR of the LGC, which authorized the PKB to [1] exercise the powers and duties of the national
liga, and [2] draft or amend the constitution and by-laws of the national liga. And one of the powers
exercised by the national liga board is to create additional positions which it deemed necessary for the
management of a chapter.
(2) sec. 493 of LGC vests the power to create additional positions in the Board of Directors of the
chapter, and national level did not have that power.
--LGC provides: the liga at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and
national levels directly elect a president, a vp, and 5 members of the board of directors. The board shall
appoint its secretary and treasurer and create such other positions as it may deem necessary for the
management of the chapter.

March 28, 2013 ~ vbdiaz
G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010
x -x
G.R. No. 193036
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated
July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration,
and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot
adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All
it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt,
much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such
facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing
its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a
public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot
legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize
the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the
power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the Truth
Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of
the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the
Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their
peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may
be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents executive power
and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure
that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize
the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no
appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and
the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not
duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly
created for laudable purposes.
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of
Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must
have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which
they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of
each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers
of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by
the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity
of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any
personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits,
standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule. It provides that every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Real-party-in interest is the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a
public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the
general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a
sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Court,
however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental
importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in
the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The
powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of
the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is
the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and
determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating
bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that
he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution
and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to

appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of
the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the
President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be
allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no
impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all,
the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The
function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the
courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is limited to
obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its
apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to
treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection
clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the states duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the
test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The
clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported
cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the
previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is
not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and
selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the
authority to investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws
must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority
administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the



Petitioner Garcia is a Bachelor of Laws graduate and a first grade civil service eligible was
appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII under permanent status. She then appointed as Deputy
Register of Deeds III under a permanent status.

Later on, Executive Order No. 649 was issued which authorized the restructuring of the Land
Registration Commission (LRC) to National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration
(NALTDRA) and regionalizing the Offices of the Registers therein. By virtue of this, petitioner
Garcia was issued an appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II under temporary status for not
being a member of the Philippine Bar. She then appealed to Secretary of Justice.

Secretary of Justice denied the appeal of Garcia. And the motion for reconsideration was

Garcias temporary appointment was renewed. Later on, she was notified of the termination of
her services.

The Civil Service Commission on its issued resolution, directed that Garcia be restored to her
position as Deputy Register of Deeds II or its equivalent in the NALTDRA. Under the vested
right theory the new requirement of BAR membership to qualify for permanent appointment as
Deputy Register of Deeds II or higher, would not apply to Garcia but only to the filling up of
vacant lawyer positions on or after the date said Executive Order took effect. Since Garcia had
been holding the position of Deputy Register of Deeds II for quiet long, she should not be
affected by the operation of Executive Order No. 649.

NALTDRA assailed the validity of issued resolution of the CSC

Whether membership in the bar, should be required of and/or applied only to new applicants and
not to those who were already in the service of the LRC as deputy register of deeds at the time of
the issuance and implementation of the above said Executive Order.
Executive Order No. 649 authorized the reorganization of the Land Registration Commission
(LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA). It
abolished all the positions in the now defunct LRC and required new appointments to be issued
to all employees of the NALTDRA.

It mandates that from the moment an implementing order is issued, all positions in the Land
Registration Commission are deemed non-existent. There is an abolition of a position. After
abolition, there is in law no occupant. Thus, there can be no tenure to speak of. It is in this sense
that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does
not arise.

For an abolition of an office to be valid, it must be carried out by a legitimate body and must be
in good faith.

In the case at bar, it was by LEGITIMATE BODY. There is no dispute over the authority to
carry out a valid reorganization in any branch/agency of govt. It was also done in good faith. EO
No. 649 was enacted to improve the services and better systematize the operation of the Land
Registration Commission. Reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.
The requirement of BAR membership was intended to meet the changing circumstances and new
development of the times. Since Garcia is not a member of Bar, then she did not have such
qualification. It is thus clear that she cannot hold any key position in the NALTDRA, The
additional qualification was not intended to remove her from office. Rather, it was a criterion
imposed concomitant with a valid reorganization measure.

Vested Right Theory - There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even
an absolute right to hold it.

THEREFORE, the requirement shall also apply to those already in service.

Edu v Ericta Digest


1. Assailed is the validity of the Reflector Law and Admin Order No. 2 which implements it. Under the
law, a vehicle has to comply with the requirements of having reflective device prior to being registered
2. The respondent Galo on his behalf and that of other motorists, filed a suit for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the challenged Act as an invalid exercise
of the police power for being violative of the due process clause. This he followed on May 28, 1970 with
a manifestation wherein he sought as an alternative remedy that, in the event that respondent Judge
would hold said statute constitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land Transportation
Commissioner, now petitioner, implementing such legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of
legislative power.

Issue: W/N Reflector Law is unconstitutional, and w/n A.O.2 is valid

YES, both the law and AO 2 are valid.

It is thus obvious that the challenged statute is a legislation enacted under the police power to promote
public safety. What is delegated is authority which is non-legislative in character, the completeness of
the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed.

1. Police Power
It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. "the most essential,
insistent, and at least illimitable of powers," (Justice Holmes) aptly pointed out "to all the great public
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it
could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: "Needs that were
narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation.

2. Delegation of Legislative Power

It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not
delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception
that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the
authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the
completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To
determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed
to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions
when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a
complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. A
distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of
authority or discretion as to its execution to exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no
valid objection call be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the
necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that
the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the
charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its
limits, its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which
legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated
may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.

The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met.
The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and
purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public
- See more at: http://lawsandfound.blogspot.com/2012/11/edu-v-erictadigest.html#sthash.NOZZjflo.dpuf


G.R 102549

August 10, 1992

DILG and LUIS SANTOS (Secretary)

Facts: This case is a petition for review on certiorari involves the right of a public official to
engage in the practice of his profession while employed in the Government.
Petitioner Atty. Erwin Javellana was an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental.
He represented as counsel Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang, who filed a case against
City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia of Bago City to which the City Engineer was publicly
Oct. 5, 1989 City Engineer Ernesto Divinagracia filed an Administrative complaint against the
petitioner alleging that the latter is an incumbent member of the City Council and a lawyer by
profession who continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing authority for that
purpose from the Regional Director of the Department of Local Government, as required by
DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58.
A formal hearing of the complaint was conducted in Iloilo City. Meanwhile, the petitioner
requested for a permit in the DLG to continue his practice of law and which was granted by
Secretary Santos provided that such practice is not a conflict to his official functions.
On September 21, 1991, Secretary Luis T. Santos issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-81
setting forth guidelines for the practice of professions by local elective officials. On October 10,
1991, the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) was signed into law. Petitioner Javellana
filed a Motion to Dismiss the administrative case against him on the ground that the mentioned
Memorandums and Sec. 90 of RA 7160 are unconstitutional because the Supreme Court has
the sole and exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law. Petitioners motion to dismiss
was denied by the public respondents. So was his motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
petition for certiorari.
Issue: WoN Sec. 90 of the Local Govt. Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circulars violate
Art. 8, Sec. 5 of the Constitution.
Ruling: Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is completely
off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and
authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local Government Code and DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid
conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their
profession, in those instances where the law allows it.

Petitioner also violated the provision prohibiting a government official from engaging in the
private practice of his profession, if such practice would represent interests adverse to the
government because he acted as counsel of Javiero and Catapang against the City Engineer
whom is considered under the employ of the City.
As a matter of policy, this Court accords great respect to the decisions and/or actions of
administrative authorities not only because of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for
their presumed knowledgeability and expertise in the enforcement of laws and regulations
entrusted to their jurisdiction. With respect to the present case, we find no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondent DILG in issuing the questioned DLG Circulars Nos. 8030 and 90-81 and in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the administrative charge against


G.R. 95832

Aug. 10, 1992

Petitioner Peralta used to work at the Philippine Cotton Corporation, a GOCC under the
Dept. of Agriculture before he was appointed as Trade Specialist II on Sept. 25, 1989 in the
Dept. of Trade and Industry (DTI). He received his initial salary covering from the period of Sept.
25 to Oct. 31. Since he had no accumulated leave credits, DTI deducted from his salary the
amount corresponding to his absences during the covered period. His absences were both on
Friday namely Sept. 29 and Oct. 20 of 1989. The deduction was inclusive of Saturdays and
Sundays. Totaling 6 days worth of deductions.
The petitioner sent a memorandum to Amando Alvis (Chief, General Adminstrative Service)
inquiring on the law on salary deductions to which the latter replied citing the Handbook of
Information on the Philippine Civil Service which states that "when an employee is on leave
without pay on a day before or on a day immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or Holiday,
such Saturday, Sunday, or Holiday shall also be without pay.
Petitioner then sent a letter addressed to the CSC Chairman Patricia Sto. Tomas, arguing that a
reading of the Revised Administrative Code, R.A No. 2260, P.D No. 807 and the Civil Service
Rules and Regulation fails to disclose a specific provision which supports the CSC rule at issue.
That being the case, the petitioner contented that he cannot be deprived of his pay or salary
corresponding to the intervening Saturdays, Sundays or Holidays and that the withholding (or
deduction) of the same is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law.
The respondent CSC ruled that the DTI deduction was in order. Peralta filed a MR but was
denied for lack of merit explaining that a reading of Republic Act No. 2260 does not show that a
government employee who is on leave of absence without pay on a day before or immediately
preceding Saturdays, Sunday or legal holiday is entitled to payment of his salary for said days.
Hence, this petition in the SC.
Issue: WoN the CSCs policy mandating salary deductions (corresponding to the intervening
Saturdays, Sundays or Holidays where an employee without leave credits, was absent on the
immediately preceding working day) is valid
(During the pendency of this case, the CSC amended the questioned policy adopting the policy
that when an employee, regardless of whether he has leave credits or not, is absent without
pay on day immediately preceding or succeeding Saturday, Sunday or holiday, he shall not be
considered absent on those days. However, it doesnt make the case moot and academic
because the issue on WoN the policy adopted and in force since 1965 is valid or not, remains

The Court grants Peraltas contention declaring that the CSC resolutions are null and
void. The CSC resolutions were the result of the commissions interpretation of the provisions of
RA 2625 which amended the Revised Administrative Code. The CSC in its here questioned
Resolution No. 90-797 construed R.A. 2625 as referring only to government employees who
have earned leave credits against which their absences may be charged with pay, as its letters
speak only of leaves of absence with full pay. The respondent Commission ruled that a reading
of R.A. 2625 does not show that a government employee who is on leave of absence without
pay on a day before or immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday is entitled to
payment of his salary for said days.
When an administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy,
it merely interprets a pre-existing law; and the administrative interpretation of the law is at best
advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. Administrative
construction, if we may repeat, is not necessarily binding upon the courts. Action of an
administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an
error of law, or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly
conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment.
The fact remains that government employees, whether or not they have accumulated leave
credits, are not required by law to work on Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays and thus they can
not be declared absent on such non-working days. They cannot be or are not considered absent
on non-working days; they cannot and should not be deprived of their salary corresponding to
said non-working days just because they were absent without pay on the day immediately prior
to, or after said non-working days. A different rule would constitute a deprivation of property
without due process.