Dr.

RAM MANOHAR LOHIYANATIONAL LAW

UNIVERSITY, LUCKNOW

Interpretation of Statutes
FINAL DRAFT
Purposive Theory of Interpretation.

Submitted To:-

Submitted by:-

Mr. Manwendra Kumar Tiwari

Kumar Sourav

Assistant Professor (Law)

Semester 5
Roll - 72

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This project venture has been made possible due to the generous co-operation of various
persons. I, Kumar Sourav student of B.A., LLB (Hons.), Vth Semester would like to
express my sincere thanks and deep gratitude to Mr. Manwendra Kumar Tiwari
(Assistant Professor), without whose thorough and insightful guidance this project work
would not have been a success.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE NO.

Introduction.....................................................................................5

Fundamentals of Purposive Interpretation......................................6

The Theoretical Basis for Purposive Interpretation........................7

Indian Approach..............................................................................8

International Approach...................................................................10

Scope of Judicial Review vis-avis Legislative Policy....................11

Conclusion......................................................................................13

Bibliography....................................................................................14

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TABLE OF CASES

Shamrao V. Parulekar v District Magistrate, Thane Bombay

AIR 1952 SC 324
Molar Mal v Kay Iron Works Pvt. Ltd. AIR 2000 SC 1261
Mangin v Inland Revenue Commission [1971] 1 All ER 179
Stock v Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd. [1978] All ER 948
District Mining Officer v Tata Iron & Steel Co. AIR 2001 SC 3134
S.C. Advocates- on- Record Association & Ors. v Union of India AIR
1994 SC 268
Towne v Eisnerthought 245 U.S 418 (1918)
P.J Irani v The State of Madras AIR 1961 SC 1731
Secretary, Ministry of Chemicals & Fertilizers, Government of India v.
Cipla Ltd. and Ors AIR 2003 SC 3078

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INTRODUCTION

The word Interpretation in law has different meanings. Indeed, the word interpretation itself must be
interpreted. Legal interpretation can be defined as follows:
Legal interpretation is a rational activity that gives meaning to a legal text. The requirement of
rationality is key- a coin toss is not interpretive activity. Interpretation is an intellectual activity,
concerned with determining the normative message that arises from the text. What the text is and
whether it is valid are questions related to interpretation, but they are distinct from it. The existence of
legal text is assumed. The question is what meaning attached to the text. According to the definition,
then, interpretation shapes the content of the norm trapped inside the text. The text that is the object of
interpretation may be general (as in constitution, statute, case law or custom) or individual (as in
contract or will). It may be written (as in written constitution or judicial opinion) or oral (as in an oral
will or a contract implied-in-fact).
According to Barak the purposive method of interpretation is a normative concept that has two
foundations: subjective and objective purpose. The subjective purpose is the authorial intent (the goal
that the author seeks to achieve) and the objective purpose can be understood as the intention of the
system, in the sense that at the supreme level it actualizes the fundamental values of the legal system.
Aharon Barak has described the essence of purpose as follows: The purpose of a text is a normative
concept. It is a legal construction that helps the interpreter understands a legal text. 1 In determining
purpose, judges should look to the relevant context of the text, which is defined as the data that
provides information about the texts purpose. To Barak, in the context of constitutional law, purpose is
different from intent: The purpose of a constitution is not to realize the intent of the founders. The
purpose of a constitution is to provide a foundation for the social structure and its fundamental values.

1 http://www.pupress.princeton.edu/titles/7991.html
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Purposive construction has very often been employed in construction of laws passed to implement
international agreements or conventions and regulations made to give effect to the directions of the
council of European Communities.

FUNDAMENTALS OF PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION

This doctrine originates in Heydons Case where the Barons of the Exchequer resolved that for sure and
true interpretation of all statutes in general(be the penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the
common law), four things are to be discerned and considered:
1. What was the common law before the making of the Act?
2. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide?
3. What remedy Parliament has resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth?
4. The true reason of the remedy, end then the office of all the judges is always to make such
construction as shall:
a. suppress the mischief and advance the remedy; and
b. suppress subtle inventions and evasions for the continuance of the mischief pro privatecommode (for private benefit); and
c. add force and life to the cure and remedy according to the true intent of the makers of the
Act pro publico (for the public good).
The rule then directs that the courts must adopt that construction which shall suppress the mischief and
advance the remedy.2
An interpreter learns the intent through the language of the text as a whole and the circumstances
external to it, like the history of its creation. Purposive interpretation has three components: language,
purpose, and judicial discretion. There is no order for these components. Each interpreter starts with the
component that seems appropriate.

2 G.P Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Wadhwa Nagpur, New Delhi, 10 th ed,
2006. P. No. 106-107
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Purposive interpretation does not take place in separate stages; it is integrative. It does not first turn to
language and then to purpose; it does not first turn to one kind of purpose and then to the other. The
interpretive conception is holistic. The interpretive presumptions, both subjective and objective, apply
immediately with the start of the interpretive process, and they accompany it to its conclusion. Indeed,
purposive interpretation is a circular process.

THE THEORETICAL BASIS FOR PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION

There is no true interpretation. The text cannot establish what the best system of interpretation is for
understanding it, because we understand the text itself only through its interpretation. Interpretation is
not just discovery. It is also creation. The question is what creation is best. The fact that there is no
true interpretation does not mean that every interpretation is good or correct. Every legal community
develops a legal tradition and legal culture over the course of years. That development includes
establishing which systems of interpretation are legitimate and which are illegitimate. It establishes the
range of interpretive legitimacy.
The proposition that there is no true interpretation, and that interpretation is the product of social
consensus, does not mean that all systems on which members of society agree are equally good. One
should choose the best from among the accepted viewpoints. This choice should not reflect the
subjectivity of the judge. We should try to articulate criteria for choosing the proper interpretation. We
should justify our choice of a proper system of interpretation.
The goal of interpretation in law is to achieve the objectivein other words, the purpose of law.3 The
role of a system of interpretation in law is to choose, from among the semantic options for a given text,
the meaning that best achieves the purpose of the text. Each legal textwill, contract, statute, and
3 D. Brink, Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review, 17 Phil. and Pub. Aff.
105, 125 (1988).
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constitutionwas chosen to achieve a social objective. Achieving this objective, achieving this purpose,
is the goal of interpretation. The system of interpretation is the device and the means. It is a tool through
which law achieves self-realization. In interpreting a given text, which is, after all, what interpretation in
law does, a system of interpretation must guarantee that the purpose of the norm trapped in the textin
our terminology, the purpose of the textwill be achieved in the best way. Hence the requirement, that
the system of interpretation be a rational activity.

INDIAN APPROACH

In Shamrao V. Parulekar v District Magistrate, Thane Bombay4 the court reiterated the principle from
Maxwell: If one construction will lead to an absurdity while another will give effect to what common
sense would show was obviously intended, the construction which would defeat the ends of the Act
must be rejected even if the same words used in the same section, and even the same sentence, have to
be construed differently. Indeed, the law goes so far as to require the Courts sometimes even to modify
the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words if by doing so absurdity and inconsistency can be
avoided.
In Molar Mal v Kay Iron Works Pvt. Ltd.5 observed that court while reiterating that courts will have to
follow the rule of literal construction, which enjoins the court to take the words as used by the
Legislature and give it the meaning which naturally implies, held that there is an exception to that rule.
This Court said, That exception comes into play when application of literal construction of the words in
the statute leads to absurdity, inconsistency or when it is shown that the legal context in which the words
are used or by reading the statute as a whole, it requires a different meaning.

4 AIR 1952 SC 324

5 AIR 2000 SC 1261
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In Mangin v Inland Revenue Commission6 the Privy Council held: The object of the construction of a
statute, be it to ascertain the will of the legislature, it may be presumed that neither injustice nor
absurdity was intended. If, therefore a literal interpretation would produce such a result, and the
language admits of an interpretation which would avoid it, then such an interpretation may be adopted.
A classic example of correcting an error committed by the draftsmen in legislative drafting is the
substitution of the words defendants witnesses by this court for the words plaintiffs witnesses
occurring in Order VII Rule 14(4) of the Code, in Salem Bar-II. Order VII relates to the production of
documents by the plaintiff whereas Order VIII relates to production of documents by the defendant.
Under Order VIII Rule 1A (4) a document not produced by the defendant can be confronted to the
plaintiffs witness during cross- examination. By mistake instead of defendants witnesses, the word
plaintiffs witnesses have been mentioned in Order VII Rule (4). To avoid any confusion, it was
directed that till the legislature corrects the mistake, the words plaintiffs witnesses would be read as
defendants witnesses in Order VII Rule 4.
Justice G.P Singh extracts four conditions7 that should be present to justify departure from the plain
words of the statute from the decision of the House of Lords in Stock v Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd. 8 ...a
Court would only be justified in departing from the plain words of the statute when it is satisfied that
1. there is clear and gross balance of anomaly;
2. Parliament, the legislative promoters and the draftsman could not have envisaged such anomaly
and could not have been prepared to accept it in the interest of a supervening legislative
objective;
3. the anomaly can be obviated without detriment to such a legislative objective; and
4. the language of the statute is susceptible of the modification required to obviate and the
anomaly.

6 [1971] 1 All ER 179

7 G.P Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Lexis Nexis 12 th ed., 2010.P.No. 144
8 [1978] All ER 948
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In District Mining Officer v Tata Iron & Steel Co. 9 Supreme Court stated: The legislation is primarily
directed to the problems before the legislature based on information derived from the past and present
experience. It may also be designed by use of general words to cover similar problems arising in future.
But, from the very nature of things, it is impossible to anticipate fully in the varied situation arising in
future in which the application of the legislation in hand may be called for and words chosen to
communicate such indefinite referents are bound to be in many cases, lacking in clarity and precision
and thus giving rise to controversial questions of construction. The process of construction combines
both literal and purposive approaches. In other words, the legislative intention i.e. the true of legal
meaning of an enactment is derived by considering the meaning of the words used in the enactment in
the light of any discernible purpose or object which comprehends the mischief and its remedy to which
the enactment is directed. It is well known that an interpretation of the statute which harmonizes with
its a vowed object is always is to be accepted than the one which dilutes it.

INTERNATIONAL APPROACH

The problem of statutory interpretation has been a matter of considerable judicial debate in almost all
common jurisdictions. Felix Frankfurter dealt with this problem rather comprehensively in his sixth
annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture. The learned judge opined: Anything that is written may present
a problem of meaning, and that is the essence of the business of judges in construing legislation. The
problem derives from the very nature of words. They are symbols of meaning.
Friedrich Bodmer, a Swiss Philologist said: Words are not passive agents meaning the same thing and
carrying the same value at all times and in all contexts. They do not come in standard shapes and sizes
like coins from the mint, nor do they go forth with a degree to all the world that they shall mean only so
much, no more and no less. Through its own particular personality each word has a penumbra of
9 AIR 2001 SC 3134
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meaning which no draftsman can entirely cut away. It refuses to be used as a mathematical symbol. The
aforesaid formulation was cited with approval by the Constitutional Bench of Supreme Court of India in
S.C. Advocates- on- Record Association & Ors. v Union of India 10 Justice Holmes in Towne v
Eisnerthought11 in the same way by saying that a word is not a crustal, transparent and unchanged; it is
the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances
and the time in which it is used.
General judicial adoption of the term purposive construction is recent, but the concept is not new.
Viscount Dilhorne said that while it is now fashionable to talk of a purposive construction of a statute
the need for such a construction has been recognised since the seventeenth century. In fact the
recognition goes considerably further back than that.
In Francis Bennions Statutory Interpretation, purposive construction has been described in the
following manner: A purposive construction of an enactment is one which gives effect to the legislative
purpose bya. following the literal meaning of the enactment where that meaning is in accordance with the
legislative purpose, or
b. applying a stained meaning where the literal meaning is not in accordance with the legislative
purpose.

SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW VIS-A-VIS LEGISLATIVE POLICY

A policy decision, as is well known, should not be lightly interfered with but it is difficult to accept the
submissions made on the behalf of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants that the
10 AIR 1994 SC 268
11 245 U.S 418 (1918)
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courts cannot exercise their power of judicial review at all. By reason of any legislation whether enacted
by the legislature or by way of subordinate legislation, the State gives effect to its legislative policy.
Such legislation, however, must not be ultra vires the Constitution. A subordinate legislation apart from
being intra vires the Constitution, should not also be ultra vires the parent Act under which it has been
made. A subordinate legislation, it is trite, must be reasonable and in consonance with the legislative
policy as also give effect to the purport and object of the Act and in good faith.
In P.J Irani v State of Madras 12, SC has clearly held that subordinate legislation can be challenged not
only on the ground that it is contrary to the provisions of the Act or other statutes; but also if it is
violative of the legislative object. The provisions of the subordinate legislation can also be challenged if
the reasons assigned therefore are not germane or otherwise mala fide. The said decision has been
followed in a large number of cases by this Court. It is interesting to note that in Secretary, Ministry of
Chemicals & Fertilizers, Government of India v. Cipla Ltd. and Ors 13,this Court opined: It is
axiomatic that the contents of a policy document cannot be read and interpreted as statutory provisions.
Too much of legalism cannot be imported in understanding the scope and meaning of the clauses
contained in policy formulations. At the same time, the Central Government which combines the dual
role of policy-maker and the delegate of legislative power, cannot at its sweet will and pleasure give a
go-by to the policy guidelines evolved by itself in the matter of selection of drugs for price control. The
Government itself stressed on the need to evolve and adopt transparent criteria to be applied across the
board so as to minimize the scope for subjective approach and therefore came forward with specific
criteria. It is nobody's case that for any good reasons, the policy or norms have been changed or have
become impracticable of compliance.
The parameters of judicial review in relation to a policy decision would depend upon the nature as also
the scope and object of the legislation. No hard and fast rule can be laid down therefore. The court
normally would not, however, interfere with a policy decision which has been made by experts in view
of the fact that it does not possess such expertise. Divergent opinions, however, have been expressed by

12 AIR 1961 SC 1731

13 AIR 2003 SC 3078
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the authorities in this behalf. The scope and extent of judicial review of legislation, it is trite, would vary
from case to case.

CONCLUSION

We have experienced noteworthy changes over the interpretation of statutes. This change from literal to
purposive approaches has had significant effect on our legal system. So much so that the powers of the
legislative and judicial arms are beginning to come together. Parliament has enacted laws telling the
judicial branch how they must interpret legislation, and the judicial arm can read words into legislation
to promote what they believe is the apparent purpose of the legislature, when, in fact, unrestrained by
obedience to the specific words of the statute, they could be promoting their own policy agenda. In
relation to statutory interpretation and the purposive approach, what is at stake is the separation of
powers and respect by the judicial branch of government for the powers of the legislative branch. It is
clear that although the purposive approach may result in some benefits, its application brings with it
significant difficulties and problems.
All legal interpretation must start by establishing a range by establishing a range of semantic meaning
for a given text, from which the legal meaning is then drawn. In purposive interpretation, the texts
purpose is the condition for establishing which the semantic meanings yields the legal meaning. An
interpretation must be in the last resort either be literal or strained. A purposive construction must be
either purposive and literal or purposive and strained.
It has also been said that the application of purposive construction should not be taken into extremes;
that if there were many problems before the enactment of the statute it does not follow that in an effort
to solve some of them the Parliament intended to solve all; and that loyalty to the rule does not require
the adoption of a construction which leads manifestly to absurd results.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books

N.S Bindra, Interpretation of Statutes, The Law Book Company, Allahabad(1997)

G.P Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation,Wadhwa Nagpur,2006.

B.M Gandhi, Interpretation of Statutes,Eastern Book Company,Lucknow 2006.

E-book

Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law,Princeton University Press

Web Sources

www.legalservices.com
www.scconline.com
www.academia.edu

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