CASE 1

LAMBINO VS. COMELEC

[G.R. No. 174153; 25 Oct 2006]
Facts:
Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change
the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will
ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the
support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their
petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art
7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form
of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of
enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA
6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative.
Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution.
Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to
the Lambino Groups petition.
Held:
According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for
conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of
discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.
1.

The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
Direct Proposal by the People
The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of
the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders
the initiative void.

2.

The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision
through Initiatives
The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision,
it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only

amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change,
therefore a constitutes a revision.
3.

A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition
violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before
complying with RA 6735
Petition is dismissed.
CASE 2
Drilon vs Ermita
Question Hour EO 464
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the
Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said
anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee
issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before the
committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads
cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief
of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said
requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled.
Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately. EO 464 basically prohibited
Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the
department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are
covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are
covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the
National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may
be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without
first securing the presidents approval. The department heads and the military officers who were
invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the
scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President
Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her
approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were
made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged
that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation
and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the
provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the
1987 Constitution. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of
Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly
investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the

end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far
incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry
with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative
body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse
must be had to others who do possess it. Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question
Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a
complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of
Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also,
in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21
would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter,
may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was
thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was
meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other,
should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates
to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information
that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour,
the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section
21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power
of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress
exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the
President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except
through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive
branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by
a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1,
limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section
22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is
discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department
heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the
refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is
subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the
President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of
powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when
the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section
21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.

CASE 3
BAYAN VS. ERMITA
Facts: Petitioners come in three groups.
Bayan, et al, Jess del Prado, et al, , Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al, KMU, et al.,
The rally was scheduled to proceed along Espaa Avenue in front of the University of Santo
Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street
and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries
on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested
in the case of Bayan, et al allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that
their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on
October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No.
880
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4,
5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR, "Calibrated Preemptive Response". They
seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR
policy recently announced.
Bayan et al argued that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly
regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of
venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public
assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not
content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words
"lawful cause," "opinion," "protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not
espoused by the government. Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies
to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based
legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.
Issue: Whether or not the implementation of B.P. No. 880 volated their rights as organizations
and individuals when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005
Held: Petitioners standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right as citizens to engage in
peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly
affected by B.P. No. 880 which requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in the
nations streets and parks. They have, in fact, purposely engaged in public assemblies without the
required permits to press their claim that no such permit can be validly required without violating
the Constitutional guarantee. Respondents, on the other hand, have challenged such action as
contrary to law and dispersed the public assemblies held without the permit.
Sec. 4 Art. III Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances

The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of
grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys
primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a
functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and
unprotected
Rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances and, for that
matter, to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to engage in
peaceful concerted activities. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution,
particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article IX, and Section 3 of
Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements defending and promoting
the peoples exercise of these rights
It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a
restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies, it as a "contentneutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public
assemblies that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it
content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not
be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and
"influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any
subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of grievances" come from the
wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the
protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the
rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public
order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health
the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must
be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by
some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as
unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of
public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious,
"maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the
mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the constitutionallysound "clear and present danger" standard.
In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in safeguarding liberty by giving local
governments a deadline of 30 days within which to designate specific freedom parks as provided
under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no such parks are so identified in accordance with
Section 15 of the law, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city concerned shall in
effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind shall be required to hold an
assembly therein. The only requirement will be written notices to the police and the mayors
office to allow proper coordination and orderly activities.
CASE 4
LADLAD
G.R. Nos. 172070-72 June 1, 2007

vs.

VELASCO

Facts:
Beltran Petition:
On February 24, 2006, PGMA signed Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 declaring a State of
National Emergency. Following that, police officers arrested Crispin Beltran on while he was en
route to Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him in Camp Crame.
Beltran was arrested without a warrant and the arresting officers did not inform Beltran of the
crime for which he was arrested.
He was subjected to a first inquest involving the crime of inciting to sedition. This was based on
a speech Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in Quezon City on 24 February 2006. Inquest
prosecutor found probable cause.
BASIS: joint affidavit of Beltrans arresting officers who claimed to have been present at the
rally.
He was also subjected to a second inquest involving the crime of rebellion conducted by DOJ
state prosecutors.
The inquest was based on two letters from CIDG executive officer and deputy director. The
letters contained results of CIDGs investigation implicating Beltran, et al as leaders and
promoters of an alleged foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo government. DOJ state prosecutors
found probable cause.
Beltran opposes the second inquest finding probable cause that he committed rebellion and that
such inquest was void.
Ladlad and Maza petitions:
Ladlad, Maza, et al were called for a preliminary investigation for the crime of rebellion.
Basis of the PI: results of the CIDG investigation, culled from the Beltran inquest.
During the PI, CIDG presented a masked man, later identified as Jaime Fuentes, who claimed to
be an eyewitness against petitioners. Velasco, who was the prosecutor, gave copies of the
affidavit of Fuentes to media members present during the proceedings.
Ladlad moved for the inhibition of Velasco citing lack of impartiality and independence,
considering the political milieu under which petitioners were investigated, the statements that the
President and the Secretary of Justice made to the media regarding petitioners case, and the
manner in which the prosecution panel conducted the preliminary investigation.
Furthermore, they contend that the PI was tainted with irregularities as not pursuant to Rule 112
Sec3.

Issues:
1.
WON
the
inquest
for
rebellion
against
Beltran
was
valid?
2. WON there is probable cause to indict Beltran for rebellion?
3. WON the PI conducted against Ladlad and Maza were tainted with irregularity? YES.

NO.
NO.

Held:
1)
The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is Void. Inquest proceedings are proper
only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without warrant.
The joint affidavit of Beltrans arresting officers15 states that the officers arrested Beltran,
without a warrant,16 for Inciting to Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor
could only have conducted as he did conduct an inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no other.
Consequently, when another group of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest
proceeding for Rebellion, they overstepped their authority rendering the second inquest void.
None of Beltrans arresting officers saw Beltran commit, in their presence, the crime of
Rebellion. Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that Beltran had
just committed Rebellion, sufficient to form probable cause to believe that he had committed
Rebellion. What these arresting officers alleged in their affidavit is that they saw and heard
Beltran make an allegedly seditious speech on 24 February 2006.
2)
Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by rising publicly and
taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said
Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or
any body of land, naval, or other armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the
Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done
in furtherance of a political end. The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the
inquest of Beltran for Rebellion consisted of the affidavits and other documents25 attached to the
CIDG letters. We have gone over these documents and find merit in Beltrans contention that the
same are insufficient to show probable cause to indict him for Rebellion.
Assuming that Beltran is a member of the CPP, which Beltran does not acknowledge, mere
membership in the CPP does not constitute rebellion.
3)
The prosecutors failed to comply with Section 3a of Rule 112 which provides that the complaint
must be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, subscribed and
sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their
absence or unavailability, before a notary public. Here, the prosecutors treated the unsubscribed
letters of Tanigue and Mendoza of the CIDG, PNP as complaints and accepted the affidavits
attached to the letters even though some of them were notarized by a notary public without any

showing that a prosecutor or qualified government official was unavailable as required by

Section 3(a) of Rule 112.
Section 3(b) of Rule 112 also mandates that the prosecutor, after receiving the complaint, must
determine if there are grounds to continue with the investigation. If there is none, he shall
dismiss the case, otherwise he shall issue a subpoena to the respondents. Here, after receiving
the CIDG letters, respondent prosecutors peremptorily issued subpoenas to petitioners requiring
them to appear at the DOJ office on 13 March 2006 to secure copies of the complaints and its
attachments.
During the investigation, prosecutors allowed the CIDG to present a masked Fuentes who
subscribed to an affidavit before respondent prosecutor Velasco. Velasco proceeded to distribute
copies of Fuentes affidavit not to petitioners or their counsels but to members of the media who
covered the proceedings. Indeed, by peremptorily issuing the subpoenas to petitioners, tolerating
the complainants antics during the investigation, and distributing copies of a witness affidavit to
members of the media knowing that petitioners have not had the opportunity to examine the
charges against them, respondent prosecutors not only trivialized the investigation but also lent
credence to petitioners claim that the entire proceeding was a sham. Hence, the court concluded
that there was indeed partiality on the part of the prosecutors who conducted the PI.
CASE 5
Neri vs Senate Committee

Facts:
Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman Benjamin
Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project.
He then informed President Arroyo of the bribery attempt, in which she instructed him not to
accept the bribe.
When probed by the senate, Neri refuses to give some more information regarding the alleged
bribery going on behind the NBN Project. When asked further regarding the conversation
between Neri and President Arroyo on matters of the NBN project, he calls for Executive
Privilege.
Executive Privilege is the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the
courts, and the Congress.
The Senate issued a contempt order against Neri and directed his arrest and detention.

Petitioners claims:
The President is entitled to the confidentiality of her correspondences. This is necessary for the
protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in
Presidential decision-making.
If the president is not protected by the confidentiality of conversations, it will hamper her in the
effective discharge of her duties and responsibilities. It might also impair our economic relations
with China.

Senates defense:
1. This is a violation to the people's right to information.
2. The Congress has a need to investigate the matter as it is crucial in their legislation of a
potential bill.
3. They contend that their Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation are
beyond the reach of this Court.
Rulings:
1. The right to information does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information
under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential conversations,
correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings.
2. Congress may only investigate into the areas in which it may potentially legislate or
appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the
other branches of the government. Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, it cannot
inquire into matters that are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it supplant the
Executive in what exclusively belongs to the Executive.
3. The Courts exercise of its power of judicial review is warranted because there appears to be
a clear abuse of the power of contempt on the part of respondent Committees.
In summary:
The Legislative Committee asks the Judiciary and the Executive branches to heed to their rules
of investigation in the aid of their legislation. They contend that their internal procedures and
deliberations should be respected and cannot be inquried into by this Court, supposedly, in
accordance with the principle of co-equal branches of government.
The legislative should also respect the Executive's power of "Executive Privilege" and the
judiciary's power for "Judicial Review".
The Senate's order of Contempt issued against Neri is hereby set aside.
CASE 6
G.R. No. 153176 March 29, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,vs. HON. ZEIDA AURORA B. GARFIN,
FACTS:
On June 22, 2001, private respondent was charged with violation of the "Social Security Act,".
That on or about February 1990 and up to the present, in the City of Naga, Philippines, within
the functional jurisdiction of SSS Naga Branch and the territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named accused, while being the proprietor of Saballegue Printing Press, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally refuse and fail and continuously refuse and
fail to remit the premiums due for his employee to the SSS in the amount of (P6,533.00),
representing SSS and EC premiums for the period from January 1990 to December 1999 (n.i.),
and the 3% penalty per month for late remittance in the amount of ELEVEN THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED FORTY-THREE PESOS and 28/100 (P11,143.28) computed as of 15 March 2000,
despite lawful demands by letter in violation of the above-cited provisions of the law, to the
damage and
prejudice of the SSS and the public in general.

The case was raffled to Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City.
Accused Serafin Saballegue pleaded not guilty to the charge and the case was set for pre-trial.5
Three days thereafter, the accused filed a motion to dismiss6 on the ground that the information
was filed without the prior written authority or approval of the city prosecutor as required under
Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court.
After considering the arguments raised, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss in its first
questioned Order dated February 26, 2002, to wit: After
considering the respective arguments raised by the parties, the Court believes and so resolves that
the Information has not been filed in accordance with Section 4, par. 3 of Rule 112 of the 2000
Rules on Criminal ProcedureRule 112, Section 4 x x x x x x No complaint or information may
be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or
approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his
deputy. Expresio unius est exclusio alterius.
The Information will readily show that it has not complied with this rule as it
has not been approved by the City Prosecutor.
This Court holds that the defendants plea to the Information is not a waiver to file a motion to
dismiss or to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. By express provision of the rules and
by a long line of decisions, questions of
want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether the approval of the city or provincial prosecutor is no longer
required.
HELD:
No. Under Presidential Decree No. 1275. The Regional State Prosecutor is clearly vested only
with the power of administrative supervision. As administrative supervisor, he has no power to
direct the city and provincial prosecutors to inhibit from handling certain cases. At most, he can
request for their inhibition. Hence, the said directive of the regional state prosecutor to the city
and provincial prosecutors is questionable to say the least.
Petitioner argues that the word "may" is permissive. Hence, there are cases when prior written
approval is not required, and this is one such instance. This is too simplistic an interpretation.
Whether the word "may" is mandatory or directory depends on the context of its use. We agree
with the OSG that the use of the permissive word "may" should be read together with the other
provisions in the same section of the Rule. The paragraph immediately preceding the quoted
provision shows that the word "may" is mandatory. It states: Sec. 4, Rule 112. x x x Within five
(5) days from his resolution, he (investigating prosecutor) shall forward the record of the case to
the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in
cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.
They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall
immediately inform the parties of such action. (emphasis supplied)
In sum, we hold that, in the absence of a directive from the Secretary of

Justice designating State Prosecutor Tolentino as Special Prosecutor for SSS

cases or a prior written approval of the information by the provincial or city
prosecutor, the information in Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597 was filed by an officer without
authority to file the same. As this infirmity in the information constitutes a jurisdictional defect
that cannot be cured, the respondent judge did not err in dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
CASE 7
NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
JUANITO G. ESPINO, Director IV, NCR, Commission on Audit, and ERNESTO C. EULALIA,
Resident Auditor, National Amnesty Commission. Respondents.
G. R. No. 156982 : September 8, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created on March 25,
1994 by then President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347.The NAC is tasked to
receive, process and review amnesty applications. It is composed of seven members: a
Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice,
National Defense and Interior and Local Government as ex officio members.6
It appears that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio members
turned over said responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria beginning
December 12, 1994.However, on October 15, 1997, NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on
audit the payment of honoraria to these representatives amounting to P255,750 for the period
December 12, 1994 to June 27, 1997, pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-038. On September
1, 1998, the NGAO upheld the auditors order and notices of disallowance were subsequently
issued
Issue:
COA Memo No. 97-038 was not published, valid?
Ruling:
Contrary to petitioners claim, COA Memorandum No.97-038 does not need, for validity and
effectivity, the publication required by Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2.Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after
such publication.
We clarified this publication requirement in Taada vs. Tuvera:10

[A]ll statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by
the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules
and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties. (Emphasis supplied.)
COA Memorandum No. 97-038 is merely an internal and interpretative regulation or letter of
instruction which does not need publication to be effective and valid. It is not an implementing
rule or regulation of a statute but a directive issued by the COA to its auditors to enforce the selfexecuting prohibition imposed by Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution on the President and
his official family, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives from holding multiple
offices and receiving double compensation.
CASE 8
Acebedo Optical vs Court of Appeals
Municipal Corporation Proprietary Functions Police Power
Acebedo Optical applied for a business permit to operate in Iligan City. After hearing the sides of
local optometrists, Mayor Cabili of Iligan granted the permit but he attached various
special conditions which basically made Acebedos dependent upon prescriptions to be issued by
local optometrists. Acebedo is not allowed to practice optometry within the city. Acebedo
however acquiesced to the said conditions and operated under the permit. Later, Acebedo was
charged for violating the said conditions and was subsequently suspended from operating within
Iligan. Acebedo then assailed the validity of the attached conditions. The
local optometrists argued that Acebedo is estopped in assailing the said conditionsbecause it
acquiesced to the same and that the imposition of the special conditions is a
valid exercise of police power; that such conditions were entered upon by the city in its
proprietary function hence the permit is actually a contract.
ISSUE: Whether or not the special conditions attached by the mayor is a valid exercise of police
power.
HELD: NO. Acebedo was applying for a business permit to operate its business and not to
practice optometry (the latter being within the jurisdiction PRC Board of Optometry).
The conditions attached by the mayor is ultra vires hence cannot be given any
legal application therefore estoppel does not apply. It is neither a valid exercise of police power.

Though the mayor can definitely impose conditions in the granting of permits, he must base
such conditions on law or ordinances otherwise the conditions are ultra vires. Lastly, the granting
of the license is not a contract, it is a special privilege estoppels does not apply.
CASE 9 (FULLTEXT)
GONZALO SY, doing business under the name and style of GONZALO SY
TRADING, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent-appellee.
De Santos, Balgos & Perez for petitioner-appellant.
F. E. Evangelista & Glecerio T. Orsolino for respondent-appellee.

MARTIN, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No.
81051, which was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals on August 28, 1975, raising the
question of whether or not petitioner-appellant's Special Import Permit granted by the Central
Bank of the Philippines authorizing it to import fresh fruits from Japan on a "no-dollar" basis has
already expired when it made the importations under litigation.
The petitioner-appellant is a trading company engaged in the importation of fresh fruits like
oranges, grapes, apples and lemons from the different parts of the world for the last nineteen
years. On September 28, 1968, it wrote to the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of the
Philippines, Mr. Amado R. Brias requesting authority to import from the country of Japan on
"no-dollar" basis fresh fruits in the total amount of US$715,000.00. The pertinent portions of
petitioner-appellant's letter 1 read.
We are importers for the last 19 years. Our line of business is the importation of fresh fruits like
fresh oranges, grapes and apples from various parts of the world.
We are fully aware of the Central Bank policies and regulations with respect to imports
particularly the effects of Central Bank Circular 260 to authorized agent banks. Our item of
importations which is fresh fruits calls for 175% Special Time Deposit for 120-days. With the
fast approaching Christmas season we are certain we cannot cope with the demands of our
buyers of fresh fruits under this requirement imposed on importers. We have brought this matter
to the attention of our various shippers of fresh apples from Japan for their proper guidance.
xxx xxx xxx

In this connection, we respectfully request your good office for an authority or issue us Special
Import Permit on No-Dollar Basis, to enable us to receive the goods from our reliable and
helpful suppliers who have complete trust and confidence in us. As manifested in their respective
letters to us, we can pay or remit them the payment of the fruits shipped to us even after the
season, which is around April of next year, and if our dollar position is favorable. We honestly
believe, that this offer from our suppliers is very inducive and if possible, we would not like to
miss this opportunity.
On October 2, 1968, Mr. Julian D. Mercado, the Executive Assistant to Deputy Governor Brias
denied the request, stating that "... since only the transactions specifically enumerated in Central
Bank Circular No. 247 dated July 21, 1967 are allowed as 'no-dollar importation', we regret to
advise that your request cannot be given due course by this office." 2
Petitioner-appellant sought a reconsideration of this denial on October 22, 1968 thru Deputy
Governor Amado R. Brias explaining that their "... case is a very special one and different from
regular importation," at the same time reminding that "... this item of fresh apples is very much
needed in the coming Christmas season and we are confident that if our request be given
consideration, we will be able to put good stock of fresh apples in the market at a cheaper cost
for the benefit of the consuming public." 3
Another letter was coursed by petitioner-appellant on November 6, 1968 to the Monetary Board
of the Central Bank thru Deputy Governor Amado R. Brias requesting "your good office for an
authority to import on no Letter of Credit basis, or issue us Special Import Permit for the amount
of US$715,000.00 on No-Dollar Basis, to enable us to import the fresh fruits which we need for
Christmas, from our reliable and helpful suppliers." In this letter, petitioner-appellant points out
that "the items called for such as apples, oranges and grapes are perishable in nature and can not
be stored for a longer period of time, and the main purpose of this importation is to serve the
requirements during the Christmas Season." 4
On November 19, 1968, the Monetary Board of the Central Bank issued Resolution No. 2038
approving petitioner-appellant's request for Special Import Permit on No-Dollar Basis, 5 thus:
The Board, by unanimous vote, authorized Gonzalo Sy Trading to import on a no- dollar basis,
without letters of credit, fresh fruits from Japan valued at $35000.00, subject to the special time
deposit of 100% which shall be held by the bank concerned for a period of 120 days as well as to
the normal customs duties and taxes. It is understood that there shall be no commitment on the
part of the Central Bank to provide foreign exchange to cover the said importation.
Deputy Governor Amado R. Brias communicated this approval of the request to petitionerappellant, thru its Assistant Manager, Mr. E. B. Pidlaoan on November 21, 1968. 6
On November 27, 1968, petitioner-appellant sent a letter 7 to the then Chairman of the Monetary
Board, Mr. Eduardo Romualdez, reading:
Thank you very much for your approval to our request for special permit to import on no-dollar
basis, without letter of credit fresh fruits valued at US$350,000.00.

We noted however, that 100% special time deposit for 120 days is required. We beg to point out
that this particular importation is only for the Christmas Season, and if we will deposit the
amount of about P1,400,000.00 which will not be touched for 120 days, and considering the fact
that on this importation alone, we will pay the government in the form of customs taxes and
duties, no less than P700,000.00, then we will be needing more than P3,000,000.00.
We beg to request therefore, for a reconsideration by your good office, and allow us to put up
20% special time deposit for 120 days instead of 100%.
The request was denied by Deputy Governor Brias in a letter, dated December 9, 1968. 8
Thereafter, on February 25, 1969, petitioner-appellant made his first importation from
Japan. 9 The bulk of the importations from August 7, 1969 thru November 5, 1969 came from
San Francisco, California and Australia. 10The importation on January 5, 1970, consisting of
fresh oranges and lychees came from Taipei, Taiwan, 11 while those of March 16, 1970,
consisting of fresh oranges, came from Israel. 12 For these importations, the Prudential Bank and
Trust Company acted as the agent of the Central Bank in the issuance of the corresponding
release certificates for the entry of the goods. By the beginning of June, 1970, the total amount
used out of the $350,000.00 Special Import Permit was already $314,142.51, leaving a balance
of $35,857.49. 13
As early as October 30, 1969, petitioner-appellant requested from Deputy Governor Amado R.
Brias 14 "an amendment of the country of origin of our importations to include other countries
except communist countries" since the fresh fruits from Japan "are seasonal (and) our shippers
cannot fully fill up our requirements to comply with their total commitments to us without
procuring from other sources like Australia, Taiwan, U.S.A. and other countries with whom we
have trade relations."
On November 19, 1969, the Deputy Governor, Mr. Amado R. Brias replied: 15
This has reference to your letter dated October 30, 1969 requesting amendment of the country of
origin of your importations of fresh fruits from Japan to include other countries except
communist countries as authorized by Monetary Board Resolution No. 2038 dated November 19,
1968.
We regret to inform you that the authority granted to you by the Monetary Board per abovestated MB Resolution No. 2038, was intended only for the Christmas season of 1968 and does
not extend through 1969. Furthermore, under existing regulations, importations of fruits are
covered by the moratorium on the opening of letters of credit.
It so happened that two days after or on November 21 1969, Director A. V. Antiporda, of the
Foreign Exchange Department of the Central Bank, wrote to Mr. Renato L. Santos, Assistant
Vice-President of the Prudential Bank and Trust Company, in reply to the letters of the latter,
dated November 14 and 19, 1969, 16 furnishing the Foreign Exchange Department copies of the
release certificates the Prudential Bank and Trust Company issued to Gonzalo Sy Trading. The
pertinent portion of Antiporda's letter 17 reads:

On the basis of your report that the total value of the shipments so far made by your client
against the $350,000.00 grant amounts to $144,306.15 only, you may continue to issue release
certificates to cover the No-Dollar importations of fresh fruits by your client, subject to the same
and conditions imposed by Monetary Board under the abovementioned resolution.
Then, on April 17, 1970, the Assistant to the Governor, Mr. Cesar Lomotan, informed the
Prudential Bank and Trust Company 18 that the authority granted to petitioner-appellant under
MB Resolution No. 2038 was intended only for the Christmas season of 1968 and does not
extend through 1969, enclosing therewith the letter, dated November 19, 1969, of Deputy
Governor Brias.
On May 27, 1970, petitioner-appellant notified Mr. Cesar Lomotan that the Prudential Bank and
Trust Company refused to issue them any release certificate for their importations due to his
letter of April 17, 1970. On June 3, 1970, petitioner-appellant sent a follow-up letter to Mr.
Lomotan, reiterating "our request for a reconsideration on the matter and to allow us utilize the
balance of our Permit in the amount of $35,857.49." In the same letter, petitioner-appellant
advised that "we have shipments coming on June 4th and June 6th respectively which is within
the balance of our permit."
On June 10, 1970, Deputy Governor Amado R. Brias wrote petitioner-appellant that its request
cannot be given due course, inviting attention to the basic letter of November 19, 1969,
informing it that the Special Import Permit was intended only for the Christmas season of 1968
and does not extend through 1969. 19
On June 5 and 16, 1970, the Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, Mr. Jose T. Viduya,
issued warrants of seizure and detention against:
1. 700 Cartons of Fresh Oranges, on board SS "Taviata";
2. 1,000 Cartons of Fresh Oranges, on board SS "Fernlake";
3. 500 Cartons of Fresh Oranges, on board SS "Arizona";
4. 100 Cartons of Fresh Lemons and 1000 Cartons of Fresh Oranges, on board SS "Turandot";
5. 560 Cartons of Fresh Apples on board SS "Anshun" and
6. 1,662 Cartons of Fresh Apples on board SS "Anshun.";
consigned to petitioner-appellant, with a total FOB value of US$17,568.49, "for having been
imported in violation of Central Bank Circular No. 289, in relation to Section 2530 (f) of the
Tariff and Customs Code." 20
On July 17, 1970, Deputy Governor Amado R. Brias wrote to the Commissioner of customs: 21

Since fresh fruits are classified as Non-Essential Consumer goods, and therefore banned under
Circular No. 289 dated February 21, 1970, it is requested that the above shipments (fresh
oranges, lemons and apples with total value of $21,763.00) be subject to appropriate seizure
proceedings. Likewise, all other importations of fresh fruits now under Customs custody should
be subjected to appropriate seizure proceedings and any release certificates issued by the banks
for such importations should be disregarded.
On July 30, 1970, the Collector of Customs issued a notice for the auction sale of the confiscated
June 1970 shipment on the following August 12. Whereupon, petitioner-appellant, along with
another importer, Tomas Y. de Leon, commenced an injunction suit before the Court of First
Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 80655, against the Commissioner and Collector
of Customs for the Port of Manila. On August 26, 1970, the Manila Court of First Instance,
presided over by trial Judge Federico C. Alikpala, ordered the release of the seized goods under
bonds totalling P513,865.46. However, the Commissioner and Collector of Customs elevated the
matter to this Court, seeking to have the August 26, 1970 order declared null and void. 22
Meanwhile, the second shipment consigned to petitioner-appellant arrived at the Port of Manila
on September 6 and 15, 1970. This shipment consisted of 1,000 cartons of fresh sunkist oranges,
1,000 cartons of fresh grapes and 100 cartons of fresh lemons, all valued at P71,549.49. Like the
June, 1970 importation, this September, 1970 shipment was also seized by the Customs
authorities.
On September 21, 1970, petitioner-appellant instituted before the Court of First Instance of
Manila the subject petition for mandamus with damages which was docketed as Civil Case No.
81051. This case was consolidated with Civil Case No. 80655 assigned to the sala, of trial Judge
Federico C. Alikpala upon motion of petitioner-appellant. 23 In this petition, petitioner-appellant
prayed for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to direct the Central Bank of the Philippines to
release the imported fruits and to provide the necessary release certificates therefor. Likewise, it
prayed for the award of damages amounting to P838,495.28.
On November 26, 1970, this Court promulgated its decision in the Alikpala case 24 sustaining the
Order of August 26, 1970, ordering the release of the June, 1970 importation upon bond, with a
directive to the importers, Gonzalo Sy Trading and Tomas Y. de Leon, to cause the reinsurance of
the bonds amounting to more than P340,000.00 not covered by reinsurance or to put up other
surety bonds acceptable to the Collector of Customs. In the following month, December, 1970,
the June, 1970 shipment was released to petitioner-appellant on bond.
On November 27, 1971, Judge Alikpala rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 81051 dismissing
petitioner-appellant's complaint for mandamus with damages and ordering the Collector of
Customs to proceed with the seizure proceedings it initiated against the June, 1970 importation
and, if favorable to the government, to enforce the same against the surety bonds of petitionerappellant posted upon the release of the goods in December, 1970. The shipment of September,
1970 was condemned and only the recovery of whatever charges and/or penalties against
petitioner-appellant was ordered.

From this adverse judgment, petitioner-appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the
Appellate Court certified the case to Us as involving only pure questions of law.
We rule that the Special Import Permit granted to petitioner-appellant on November 19, 1968,
allowing it to import fresh fruits from Japan on a "no-dollar" basis, has already lost its validity
when the questioned importations of June and September, 1970 were made.
1. It is one of the first principles in the field of administrative law that a license or a permit is not
a contract between the sovereignty and the licensee or permitee, and is not a property in any
constitutional sense, as to which the constitutional prescription against impairment of the
obligation of contracts may extend. A license is rather in the nature of a special privilege, of a
permission or authority to do what is within its terms. 25 It is not in any way vested, permanent,
or absolute. A license granted by the State is always revocable. As a necessary consequence of its
main power to grant license or permit, the State or its instrumentalities have the correlative
power to revoke or recall the same. And this power to revoke can only be restrained by
an explicit contract upon good consideration to that effect. 26 The absence of an expiry date in, a
license does not make it perpetual. Notwithstanding that absence, the license cannot last beyond
the life of the basic authority under which it was issued. 27
The series of correspondence exchanged between petitioner-appellant and respondent-appellee in
the case at bar plainly reveals that the Special Import Permit granted to petitioner-appellant
covers only the Christmas season of 1968. As reflected in its first letter, dated September 28,
1968, the cause or the compelling reason why petitioner-appellant sought for the Special Import
Permit on No-Dollar Basis was because the importation of fresh fruits calls for 175% Special
Time Deposit for 120 days and "(w)ith the fast approaching Christmas season,"petitionerappellant "cannot cope with the demands of [its] buyers of fresh fruits under this requirement
imposed on importers." Upon denial of its request, petitioner-appellant explained to Deputy
Governor Amado R. Brias in its letter of October 22, 1968 that their "..., case is a very special
one" and that "... this item of fresh apples is very much needed in the coming Christmas
season ..." Complementary to this letter, petitioner-appellant pointed out to the Monetary Board
in its letter of November 6, 1968 that "the items called for such as apples, oranges and grapes are
perishable in nature and cannot be stored for a longer period of time, and the main purpose of
this importation is to serve the requirements during the Christmas Season." After the Special
Import Permit was granted by the Monetary Board on November 19, 1968, petitioner-appellant
expressed its gratitude to the then Chairman of the Monetary Board, Mr. Eduardo Romualdez, in
a letter of November 27, 1968 and, at the same time, requested that it be allowed "to put up 20%
special time deposit for 120 days instead of 100%. again pointing out that "this particular
importation is only for the Christmas season ..." It was upon all these representations and
assurances by petitioner-appellant that the Monetary Board of the Central Bank finally issued the
Special Import Permit. As a result, the conclusion becomes inevitable that the Special Import
Permit thus granted lasts only until the Christmas Season of 1968.
The omission of an expiry date in the Special Import Permit affords no legal basis for petitionerappellant to conclude that the said permit is impressed with continuous validity, i.e., not merely
limited to the Christmas season of 1968. The totality of petitioner appellant's representations
which led to the issuance of the permit cannot be lightly glossed over. It was petitioner-appellant

itself which furnished the life span of the permit, consistently pointing out that "the main purpose
of this importation is to serve the requirements during the Christmas Season" of 1968. In the
logical sequence of things, no imperative reason arises for the Monetary Board to still specify the
expiry date of the permit. It would far-fetched for the Monetary Board to grant more than what
was asked for, considering that it was opposed to the granting of the permit from the very start,
in view of the existing stringent policies against "no-dollar" importation of "non-essential
consumer' goods like fresh fruits. That is why, the Monetary Board, while it thus issued the
Special Import Permit, subjected the same to a "special time deposit of 100% which shall be held
by the bank concerned for a period of 120 days as well as to the normal customs duties and
taxes." This requirement was maintained by the' Monetary Board even after petitioner-appellant
sought for a reconsideration thereof. Withal, it can be gleaned that petitioner-appellant's Special
Import Permit bears all the marks of a mere special concession from the issuing authority, to the
effect that no extensive privileges are licitly inferrable from it.
Petitioner-appellant mistakenly asserts that the continuous validity of its Special Import Permit
has already been passed upon by this Court in Commissioner of Customs v. Alikpala. 28 What was
raised in that case is the question of whether the Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila has
observed the rediments of administrative due process in ordering the seizure and sale at public
auction of petitioner-appellant's imported goods in particular that arrived in June, 1970, as well
as the question of the legality of the Collector's order requiring only cash bond, surety bond not
accepted, for the release of the goods. The Court made no ruling on the continuity of petitionerappellant's Special Import Permit after the Christmas season of 1968. Petitioner-appellant's
referral 29 to the statement of the Court that the November 21, 1969 letter of Mr. A. V. Antiporda,
Director of the Foreign Exchange Department, authorized the Prudential Bank and Trust
Company to 94 continue to issue release certificates to cover the No-Dollar importations of fresh
fruits by your client" misses the preceding prefatory statement of the Court in regard to the
details of the case, thus: "For a proper understanding and resolution of the issues it is necessary
to state the facts in greater detail, as they appear from the pleadings and memoranda submitted
by the parties as well as from the different documents attached thereto marked as annexes." In
other words, the subsequent statement of the Court on the Antiporda letter is but a portion of its
recital of the facts involved without necessarily making a resolution thereon.
2. Controversy rises between petitioner-appellant and respondent-appellee on the receipt of
Deputy Governor Brias letter, dated November 19, 1969, purportedly informing petitionerappellant that its Special Import Permit "was intended only for Christmas season of 1968 and
does not extend through 1969." While petitioner-appellant contends that the said letter was never
served upon it, respondent-appellee maintains that it is quite surprising for petitioner-appellant to
disclaim receipt thereof when all prior and subsequent letters from the Central Bank have been
satisfactorily received by it. This question is not of decisive import. The all-governing point is
the reasonable assumptions of petitioner-appellant's knowledge or awareness of the duration of
its Special Import Permit, since it was petitioner-appellant itself which established the terminal
date of its permit representing that "the main purpose of this importation is to serve the
requirements during the Christmas season" of 1968, upon which representationthe Monetary
Board finally granted the permit. The equitable principle of estoppel forbids petitioner-appellant
from taking an inconsistent position now and claims that the permit extends beyond the period it
itself asked for. Where conduct or representation has induced another to change its position in

good faith or the same is such that reasonable man would rely thereon, the consequences of such
conduct or representation cannot later on be disowned. 30 The preliminary representations and
assurances of petitioner-appellant, most important of which is the life span of the permit, are
deemed incorporated into the Special Import Permit subsequently issued. At most, the letter of
Deputy Governor Brias may serve only to remind petitioner-appellant of the resolutory period
of its permit. Whether there was such letter or not, the time limit proffered by petitionerappellant and approved by the Central Bank controls.
3. The doctrine of "promissory estoppel" is invoked by, petitioner-appellant to preclude
respondent-appellee from contesting the legality of its importations. Petitioner-appellant draws
authority from the letter of Director A. V. Antiporda, dated November 21, 1969, informing the
Prudential Bank and Trust Company that it "may continue to issue release certificates to cover
the No-Dollar Importations of fresh fruits by your client" after noting that only $144,306.15 has
been utilized out of the $350,000.00-permit. According to that doctrine, "an estoppel may arise
from the making of a promise even though without consideration, if it was intended that the
promise should be relied upon and in fact it was relied upon, and if a refusal to enforce it would
be virtually to sanction the perpetration of fraud or would result in other injustice." 31 Like the
related principles of volenti non fit injuria(consent to injury), waiver, and acquiescence, it finds
its origin generally in the equitable notion that one may not change his position and profit from
his own wrongdoing when he has caused another to suffer a detriment by relying on his
former promises or representations. 32 But, a promise cannot be the basis of an estoppel if any
other essential element is lacking. Justifiable reliance or irreparable detriment to the promises are
requisite factors. 33 We failed to see in Antiporda's letter the making of a promise upon which
petitioner-appellant couldjustifiably rely. On the contrary, while the letter advised the agent bank
that it may continue issuing release certificates to cover petitioner-appellant's "no-dollar"
importations of fresh fruits, it at the same time subjects the issuance of release certificates "to the
same terms and conditions imposed by the Monetary board" on the Special Import Permit, one of
which is the resolutory term of 1968. That is the import of the Antiporda's letter ex vi
termini.Director Antiporda could not have modified the Special Import Permit by creating a
longer period, for the plain reason that no such authority resides in him. An administrative officer
has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the
exercise thereof. 34 As earlier pointed out, it was the MonetaryBoard which issued the permit;
correspondingly, it too posseses the sole power to modify the same.
On the gratuitous assumption that the Antiporda's letter purported to impress, albeit erroneously,
that further importations could be made by petitioner-appellant beyond the Christmas season of
1968, the same produces no estoppel against the issuing authority. The long- settled
jurisprudence states that the "doctrine of estoppel" does not operate against the Government, of
which the Central Bank is an instrumentality, in its capacity as sovereign or asserting
governmental rights; the Government is never estopped by the mistake or errors on the part of its
agents. Moreover, estoppel cannot give validity to an act that is prohibited by law or against
public policy. 35 The erroneous application of the statute and enforcement of the law do not block
subsequent correct application thereof 36 or bar a future action in accordance with law. 37 To hold
that merely the Antiporda's letter could be the basis for such estoppel would be going in the
direction of suspending and repealing the conditions or terms of the Special Import Permit
without any action on the part of the Monetary Board. 38

4. The cases of Ramos v. Central Bank 39 and Commissioner of Customs v. Auyong Hian 40 cannot
be relied upon by petitioner-appellant to fore close the issue on the continuous validity of its
Special Import Permit. In Ramos, the Court held that after the Central Bank has made express
commitments to petitioners therein that it would support the Overseas Bank of Manila, and avoid
its liquidation if the petitioners would execute (a) the Voting Trust Agreement turning over the
management of OBM to the CB or its nominees, and (b) mortgage or assign their properties to
the Central Bank to cover the overdraft balance of OBM which petitioners did, the. Central Bank
may not retreat from its representations and liquidate the Overseas Bank of Manila, to the
prejudice of petitioners, depositors and other creditors, under the rule of "promissory estoppel."
The Central Bank cannot just unilaterally disregard its representations and promises to
rehabilitate and normalize the financial condition of the OBM without violating Article 1159 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides that "(o)bligations arising from contractshave
the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith," as
well as Article 1315, stating that "(c)ontracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that
moment the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated
but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good
faith, usage and law." In other words, by making the foregoing representations and commitments
to the OBM the Central Bank had thereby assumed a contractual obligation in favor of the OBM
such that it cannot unceremoniously ignore the same. No such kind of contractual obligation or
commitments have been perfected between the Central Bank and the petitioner-appellant in the
present case. The issuance of the Special Import Permit by the Monetary Board to the petitionerappellant can hardly be considered as constitutive of a contractual obligation assumed by the
Central Bank in favor of petitioner-appellant. This is because a permit is not, by its very nature, a
contract but a mere special privilege. For a permit to be impressed with a contractual character, it
must be categorically demonstrated that the very administrative agency, which is the source of
the permit, would place such a burden on itself. 41 Auyong Hian on the other hand, tells of an
importation of old newspapers in four shipments under a "no-dollar" arrangement, pursuant to a
license issued by the Import Control Commission. When the last shipment arrived in Manila, the
Customs authorities seized the same on the ground that the importation was made without the
license required under Central Bank Circular No. 45. 42While the seizure proceedings were
pending before the Collector of Customs, the President of the Philippines, acting through its
Cabinet, cancelled the aforesaid license for the reason that it was illegally issued "in that no
fixed date of expiration is stipulated." On review, the Court held that the cancellation of the
license on the sole ground that it does not bear ay expiry date even if the importation had already
been accomplished was inequitable. In the present case, however, no such cancellation of license
or permit appears the legality of the issuance of petitioner-appellant's Special Import Permit is
not in question. On the contrary, what is being sought in this case is the enforcement of the terms
and conditions of the Special Import Permit, one of which, is the resolutory period of 1968. As
earlier discussed, after the lapse of this period, the permit can no longer yield valid effect.
5. The authority of the Central Bank to regulate "no-dollar" imports, owing to the influence and
effect that the same may exert upon the stability of our peso and its international value, cannot be
seriously contested. Such authority clearly emanates from its broad powers to maintain our
monetary stability and to preserve the international value of our currency 43 as well as its
corollary power to issue such rules and regulations for the effective discharge of its
responsibilities and exercise of powers. 44 On February 31, 1970, the Central Bank promulgated

its Circular No. 269, prohibiting the importation of "non-essential consumer" goods like fresh
fruits. Section 5 thereof directs that "(a)uthorized agent banks may sell foreign exchange for
imports except those falling under the UC, SUC and NECcategories, without prior specific
approval of the Central Bank." In the recent case of Balmaceda vs. Corominas 45We ruled that
"the entry of NEC ("non-essential commodities") is thus halted at bay." With regard to "nodollar" imports, the Central Bank promulgated Circular No. 247 on July 21, 1967, specifically
enumerating the items exempted from the requirement of release certificates. The enumeration
mostly refers to personal effects and gifts of returning residents, tourists, immigrants, etc. Fresh
fruits are not included. Circular No. 247 was amended by Circular No. 294 on March 10, 1970,
providing that "(n)o-dollar imports not covered by Circular No. 247 shall notbe issued any
release certificates and shall be referred to the Central Bank for official transmittal to the Bureau
of Customs for appropriate seizure proceedings. " On March 20, 1970, Circular No. 295 was
passed. This circular reiterates the exemption of the "no-dollar" imports enumerated under
Circular No. 247 from the release certificate requirements, but imposes an express ban on all
other "no-dollar" imports not covered by Circular No. 247. These include "fresh fruits" like fresh
apples oranges, grapes, and lemons. 46 It can thus be readily seen that petitioner-appellant's "fresh
fruits" importations of June and September, 1970 violate the quoted Central Bank Circulars,
hence, liable to seizure action by the Customs authorities. While the said goods may not be
considered "merchandise of prohibited importation," they nevertheless fall within the other
category of merchandise imported "contrary to law", because regulations issued pursuant to
"customs law" form part thereof. The term "customs law" includes not only the provisions of said
law proper but also any regulations made pursuant thereto like the aforementioned Central Bank
circulars, 47 which also have the force and effect of law. 48 Consequently, violation of these
circulars comes within the purview of Section 2530 (f) of the Tariff and Customs Code, which
authorizes the forfeiture of "(a)ny article the importation or exportation of which is effected or
attempted contrary to law." 49
6. Petitioner-appellant disputes the disposition of the trial court directing the Collector of
Customs to proceed against the surety bonds it posted for the release of its June, 1970
importation sometime in December, 1970. There is no doubt that the surety bonds were posted
by petitioner-appellant in Civil Case No. 80655, which was terminated by the mutual agreement
of the parties 50 after the Court has handed down its decision thereon on appeal. 51 However, it
must be remembered that the said surety bonds were undertaken by petitioner-appellant for the
release of its June, 1970 importation. A fortiori in any litigation where in any litigation where the
release of this June, 1970 shipment is involved, the said surety bonds are answerable. The
statutory undertaking of a bond is to answer for all damages that may result from an injunction
should the court finally decide that the injunction was not proper or that the party in whose favor
the injunctive writ was issued was not entitled thereto. 52 Although petitioner-appellant's surety
bonds were filed in Civil Case No. 80655, the undertaking therein to answer for damages in case
the release of the June, 1970 shipment is found improper attaches to the present case, Civil Case
No. 81051. The case where the Surety bonds were posted is but incidental. The all-important
factor to consider is the event or judicial action secured by the bonds. Since the surety bonds in
question were intended to secure the liabilities which petitioner-appellant may incur for the
release of its June, 1970 importation, the said bonds can be proceeded against in any case where
the propriety of impropriety of said release has been resolved. The bonds become immediately
answerable for the undertaking once this condition has occurred. 53 It would be a useless expense

of judicial time and effort if the surety bonds were yet to be litigated in another suit just to
enforce the undertaking therein. This is specially true when the sufficiency or solvency of the
bonds has been previously passed upon by the same trial judge hearing the second case. Besides,
Civil Case No. 80655 has already been terminated by the mutual agreement of the parties such
that no enforcement of the undertaking of the bonds could be easily made therein. 54
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the lower court, subject matter of this present review, is
hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioner-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
CASE 10
PRIMITIVO LOVINA, and NELLY MONTILLA, plaintiffs-appellees
vs.
HON. FLORENCIO MORENO, as Secretary of Public Works and Communications, and
BENJAMIN YONZON, defendants-appellants
Facts:
Numerous residents of Macabebe, Pampanga complained that appellees had blocked the "Sapang
Bulati", a navigable river in the same municipality and asked that the obstructions be ordered
removed, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056. After notice and hearing to the parties,
the said Secretary of Public Works and Communications found the constructions to be a public
nuisance in navigable waters, and ordered the land owners, spouses Lovina, to remove five (5)
closures of Sapang Bulati. After receipt of the decision, the appellees filed a petition in CFI of
Manila to restrain the Secretary from enforcing his decision.
The trial court, after due hearing, granted a permanent injunction. It held that Republic Act No.
2056 is unconstitutional and that Sapang Bulati is not a navigable river but a private stream.
The appellees contention is that Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional because it invests the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications with sweeping, unrestrained, final and
unappealable authority to pass upon the issues of whether a river or stream is public and
navigable, whether a dam encroaches upon such waters and is constitutive as a public nuisance,
and whether the law applies to the state of facts, thereby Constituting an alleged unlawful
delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
Issue: Whether or not there is an unlawful delegation of judicial power.
Held:
The contentions of the appellees are not tenable. R.A. 2056 merely empowers the Secretary to
remove unauthorized obstructions or encroachments upon public streams, constructions that no

private person was anyway entitled to make, because the bed of navigable streams is public
property, and ownership thereof is not acquirable by adverse possession.
It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's power under the Act necessarily involves the
determination of some questions of fact, such as the existence of the stream and its previous
navigable character; but these functions, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely incidental
to the exercise of the power granted by law to clear navigable streams of unauthorized
obstructions or encroachments, and authorities are clear that they are, validly conferable upon
executive officials provided the party affected is given opportunity to be heard, as is expressly
required by Republic Act No. 2056, section 2.
The mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire the existence of certain facts and to
apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that
these acts may affect private, rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers. Accordingly,
a statute may give to non-judicial officers the power to declare the existence of facts which call
into operation its provisions, and similarly may grant to commissioners and other subordinate
officer, power to ascertain and determine appropriate facts as a basis for procedure in the
enforcement of particular laws.
It is noteworthy that Republic Act 2605 authorizes removal of the unauthorized dikes either as
"public nuisances or as prohibited constructions" on public navigable streams, and those of
appellees clearly are in the latter class.
In fine, it is held that Republic Act No. 2056 does not constitute an unlawful delegation of
judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works; that the findings of fact of the Secretary of
Public Works under Republic Act No. 2056 should be respected in the absence of illegality, error
of law, fraud, or imposition, so long as the said, findings are supported by substantial evidence
submitted to him.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the writs of injunction issued therein are annulled
and set aside.
CASE 11
EDU v ERICTA
35 SCRA 481
FERNANDO; October 24, 1970
NATURE
Petition for certiorari and prohibition
FACTS
-Galo, on his behalf and that of other motorists, filed on May 20, 1970 a suit for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the Reflector Law as an invalid
exercise of the police power, for being violative of the due process clause.
-This he followed on May 28, 1970 with a manifestation wherein he sought as an alternative

remedy that, in the event that respondent Judge would hold said statute constitutional,
Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land Transportation Commissioner, implementing such
legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power.
-On May 28, 1970, respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a preliminary injunction directed
against the enforcement of such administrative order.
-SolGen filed MFR
-On June 9, 1970, respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration of the order of
injunction, hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition
ISSUE
WON Admninstrative Order No. 2 is invalid for being contrary to the principle of non-delegation
of legislative power.
HELD
No.
-It is not to be lost sight of that under Republic Act No. 4136, of which the Reflector Law is an
amendment, petitioner, as the Land Transportation Commissioner, may, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, issue rules and regulations for its
implementation as long as they do not conflict with its provisions
-It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that
Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the
government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs
participate in its exercise.
-What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to
alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and
provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature.
-To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must
be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not
abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the
scope of his authority.
-A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not
be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to exercised under and
in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection call be made.
-The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of
flexibility and practicability.
-To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very
least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy.
A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be
carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of
the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.
-The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is
easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied
from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the

legislative objective is public safety.

-Justice Laurel: The principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself the
complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of
the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England but in
practically all modern governments. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life,
the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of
greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts."
-Justice J. B. L. Reyes in People vs. Exconde: "It is well establish in this jurisdiction that, while
the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress,
nevertheless the latter may constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that
the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and proved for
the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law in effect. All
that is required is that the regulation should germane to the objects and purposes of the
law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that
the law prescribes ... "
-Chief Justice, Concepcion: "It is one thing is to delegate the power to determine what the
law shall be, and another thing to delegate the authority to fix the details in the execution of
enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself. Briefly stated, the rule is that the delegated
powers fall under the second category, if the law authorizing the, delegation furnishes a
reasonable standard which "sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to act
so that it may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will."
-The Reflector Law, construed together with the Land Transportation Code, Republic Act No.
4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety
which is the prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical
affirmation of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules
and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental purpose. His power is
clear. There has been no abuse. His Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack, farfrom-formidable, launched against it by respondent Galo.
Disposition Petition is granted. The constitutionality of the Reflector Law and the validity of
Administrative Order No. 2 issued in the implementation thereof are sustained.
CASE 12 (FULLTEXT)
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), Petitioner,
vs.
ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD (ERB), and EDGAR L. TI, doing business under the
name and style of ELT ENTERPRISE, Respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:

Before us is this petition for review on certiorari to annul and set aside the decision1 dated
September 22, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 56946, which effectively
affirmed the Orders of the Energy Regulatory Board2 (ERB) dated October 22, 1999 and
December 27, 1999 in ERB Case No. 99-67.
The assailed CA decision upheld public respondent ERBs exercise of jurisdiction over cases
involving complaints for reconnection of electric service cut-off for alleged violation of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7832, otherwise known as the "Anti-electricity and Electric Transmission
Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994," as well as ERBs authority to issue a provisional order of
reconnection.
The factual background:
On October 18, 1999, herein private respondent Edgar L. Ti, doing business under the name and
style ELT Enterprise, filed a verified complaint3 before the ERB against petitioner Manila
Electric Company (MERALCO). In it, Ti alleged inter alia that MERALCO unlawfully
disconnected partially the electric service in his business establishment located at Little Baguio,
San Juan, Metro Manila and seized three (3) of his electric meters on mere suspicion of meter
tampering. Aggravating the situation, Ti adds, was the fact that the notice of disconnection was
served at night, while the actual disconnection was not done in the presence of the owner of ELT
Enterprise or his representative. The unauthorized disconnection, Ti claimed, has caused him
great damage which, if not immediately addressed, would result to irreparable injury. He thus
prayed that pending hearing of his complaint, docketed as ERB Case No. 99-67, electric service
be restored in his establishment.
In an Order dated October 22, 1999,4 the ERB, by way of provisional relief, ordered the desired
reconnection of electric service and, at the same, directed MERALCO to submit its comment on
the complaint.
On October 29, 1999, MERALCO moved for a reconsideration of the aforementioned
provisional reconnection order, alleging that an inspection conducted by its service inspectors
accompanied by elements of the Philippine National Police found Ti to have tampered three (3)
electric meters installed in his business premises by manipulating the dial pointers thereof. The
fraudulent act of Ti, according to MERALCO, constituted a violation of R.A. No. 7832 legally
warranting the immediate disconnection of the electric supply on his establishment, as provided
under Section 45 in relation to Section 66 thereof. MERALCO further argued that the ERB is
without jurisdiction to issue a provisional relief and order the restoration of electric service, that
authority being vested only on regular courts.
On the same day, MERALCO instituted a criminal complaint against Ti for violation of R. A.
No. 7832 before the Prosecutors Office of Rizal. The criminal complaint appears to be still
pending resolution.
On November 11, 1999, MERALCO filed its comment7 to Tis complaint in ERB Case No. 9967 and there moved for the dismissal thereof on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

On December 27, 1999, the ERB issued an Order8 denying MERALCOs motion for
reconsideration, thereby virtually reiterating the reconnection directive contained in its earlier
Order of October 22, 1999.9 Partly wrote the ERB in its December 27, 1999 Order:
[Petitioner MERALCOs] contention that this Board has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the instant complaint, which is the restoration of the partial shutdown of the electric service to
complainants building, cannot be upheld. The law gives consumers who have a cause of
grievance against any public utility, such as herein [petitioner] MERALCO, a complete, speedy
and adequate remedy. That is the purpose of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, creating
the Public Service Commission, this Boards predecessor office, and prescribing its duties and
powers, and the reason why it was enacted .10 (Words in bracket added.)
Dissatisfied, MERALCO went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, thereat docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 56946, assailing as having been issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, the ERBs orders dated October 22, 1999 and December 27, 1999.
Eventually, the CA, in a Decision dated September 22, 2000,11 veritably rejected MERALCOs
imputation of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the ERB and,
accordingly, affirmed the latters twin assailed orders and dismissed MERALCOs recourse
thereto. Partly says the CA in its decision:
The agency charged with regulatory and adjudicatory functions covering the energy sector is the
Energy Regulatory Board created under E.O. No. 172 dated May 8, 1987. The nucleus of the
ERB was the Board of Energy established by P.D. No. 1206 dated October 6, 1977, which had
the power to regulate and fix power rates to be charged by electric companies and to issue
certificates of public convenience for the operation of electric power utilities and services. 12
xxx xxx xxx
xxx. E.O. No. 172, dated June 5, 1987, saw the further need to create an independent body which
gave birth to the present ERB. The aim of course is to achieve a more coherent and effective
policy formulation, coordination, implementation and monitoring within the energy sector, and to
consolidate in one body all the regulatory and adjudicatory functions covering the energy
sector.13
xxx xxx xxx
There should be no debate then about ERBs possessing jurisdiction to regulate and adjudicate
matters relating to its functions as highlighted above. The law clearly affords any customer, like
private respondent, a plain, complete and adequate remedy for any grievance against a public
utility, and the ERB not only has the right, but the duty as well, to grant relief in proper cases.
Relevant provisions of the Public Service Act have been substantially carried over in statutes
creating independent specialized agencies, like ERB, with regulatory and adjudicatory powers.14
Hence, petitioner MERALCOs present recourse, on the following grounds:

A.
THE CONCLUSION OF THE [CA] THAT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS
JURISDICTION TO HEAR CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND
PETITIONER ARISING FROM VIOLATION OF THE SERVICE CONTRACT AND CASES
FALLING UNDER R.A. 7832 IS CONTRARY TO EXISTING LAW.
B.
THE [CA] ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS
AUTHORITY TO ISSUE PROVISIONAL REMEDY IN THE NATURE OF WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT IT HAS
THE POWER, IT VIOLATED R.A. 7832 WHEN IT ORDERED THE RECONNECTION OF
SERVICE WITHOUT THE REQUISITE BOND.15
The pivotal issue before the Court turns on whether or not public respondent ERB has
jurisdiction to order the reconnection of electric service in cases arising from alleged violation of
R. A. No. 7832.
Petitioner MERALCO urges the resolution of the issue in the negative on the rationale that there
is no provision in Executive Order (E.O.) No. 172, series of 1987, the ERB charter, granting that
agency adjudicative jurisdiction over violations of R. A. No. 7832, let alone order the restoration
of a disconnected electric service. Such jurisdiction, as petitioner insisted all along, is vested
with the regular courts.
The Court disagrees.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law.16 Corollary to this basic postulate is the general rule that the
jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the
complaint17 or petition and not in those of the defendants answer or similar responsive pleading.
To determine the ERBs jurisdiction, a look at the legislative history of the regulatory agencies
preceding it is apropos. These agencies and the corresponding statute or issuance creating each
are as indicated below:
1. The first regulatory body, the Board of Rate Regulation (BRR), was created by virtue of Act
No. 1779.18Its regulatory mandate under Section 5 of the law was limited to fixing or regulating
rates of every public service corporation.
2. In 1913, Act No. 230719 created the Board of Public Utility Commissioners (BPUC) to take
over the functions of the BRR. By express provision of Act No. 2307, the BPUC was vested with
jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public utilities and their properties and franchises.
3. On November 7, 1936, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 146, or the Public Service Act (PSA),
was passed creating the Public Service Commission (PSC) to replace the BPUC. Like the BPUC,

the PSC was expressly granted jurisdiction, supervision and control over public services, with
the concomitant authority of calling on the public force to exercise its power, to wit:
SEC. 13. Except as otherwise provided herein, the Commission shall have general supervision
and regulation of,jurisdiction and control over, all public utilities, and also over their property,
property rights, equipment, facilities and franchises so far as may be necessary for the purpose of
carrying out the provisions of this Act, and in the exercise of its authority it shall have the
necessary powers and the aid of the public force xxx xxx xxx. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 14 of C.A. No. 146 defines the term "public service" or "public utility" as including
"every individual, copartnership, association, corporation or joint-stock company, . . . that now or
hereafter may own, operate, manage or control within the Philippines, for hire or compensation,
any common carrier, xxx xxx, electric light, heat, power, xxx xxx, when owned, operated and
managed for public use or service within the Philippines xxx xxx." Under the succeeding Section
17(a), the PSC has the power even without prior hearing
(a) To investigate, upon its own initiative, or upon complaint in writing, any matter concerning
any public service as regards matters under its jurisdiction; to require any public service to
furnish safe, adequate and proper service as the public interest may require and warrant, to
enforce compliance with any standard, rule, regulation, order or other requirement of this Act or
of the Commission, xxx.
4. Then came Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1,20 reorganizing the national government and
implementing the Integrated Reorganization Plan. Under the reorganization plan, jurisdiction,
supervision and control over public services related to electric light, and power heretofore vested
in the PSC were transferred to the Board of Power and Waterworks (BOPW).
Later, P.D. No. 120621 abolished the BOPW. Its powers and function relative to power utilities,
including its authority to grant provisional relief,22 were transferred to the newly-created Board
of Energy (BOE).
5. On May 8, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 172 reconstituting the
BOE into the ERB, transferring the formers functions and powers under P.D. No. 1206 to the
latter23 and consolidating in and entrusting on the ERB "all the regulatory and adjudicatory
functions covering the energy sector."24 Section 14 of E.O. No. 172 states that "(T)he applicable
provisions of [C.A.] No. 146, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Service Act; xxx and
[P.D.] No. 1206, as amended, creating the Department of Energy, shall continue to have full force
and effect, except insofar as inconsistent with this Order."25
Given the foregoing consideration, it is valid to say that certain provisions of the PSA (C.A. No.
146, as amended) have been carried over in the executive order, i.e., E.O. No. 172, creating the
ERB. Foremost of these relate to the transfer to the ERB of the jurisdiction and control
heretofore pertaining to and exercised by the PSC over electric, light and power corporations
owned, operated and/or managed for public use or service. And as Section 17(a) of C.A. No. 146,
as amended, supra, provides, this jurisdiction and control includes the power to investigate any
matter concerning any public service and to require any public utility or public service

corporation to furnish adequate and proper service. Any suggestion that the transfer of PSCs
functions and powers to the ERB is inconsistent with E.O. No. 172 must be rejected, the
principal objective of the said issuance being precisely to reinforce the powers of the ERB as the
sole regulatory body over the energy sector.26
Needless to stress, petitioner MERALCO, being an electric service provider, is under the
regulatory jurisdiction and supervision of the ERB.
What remains to be determined then is whether or not, based on the allegations in private
respondent Tis complaint in ERB Case No. 99-67, the ERBs jurisdiction, supervision and/or
control over petitioner MERALCO is/are duly invoked.
The pertinent allegations in the complaint are, as follows:
3. [Respondent Ti] is the owner of ELT Center a consumer of electric light and power for its
8-storey building supplied by [Meralco] since his operation in October 1998 to the present.
4. That [Meralco] through its authorized inspectors, agents or representatives swooped down
on the ELT Building and proceeded by force, to disconnect the electric service of
[respondent Ti] and in the process seized three (3) electric meters . The claim of the raiding
team that the tampering on the electric meters confiscated was done "in flagrante delicto" is a
pure fabrication . without any factual basis. This unfortunate incident occurred on October 13
and 14, 1999 between the unholy hours of 11:30 pm 1:30 am .
5. That the Notices of Disconnection dated October 13, 1999 were served at the unholy hours of
the night when there was nobody in the premises to acknowledge receipt of the same. The
three (3) disconnection notices dated October 13, 1999 were served only on the security guard on
duty . xxx
xxx xxx xxx
11. A public service corporation like [Meralco] should not resort to unlawful acts in ferreting out
electric pilferers like what was done in the instant case .
12. [Meralco] should be reminded of its responsibility as a public service corporation which is
clothed with public interest not to resort to oppression and abuse of authority which do not speak
well of a giant corporation .27
It is fairly clear from the foregoing that the ERB can properly take cognizance of respondent Tis
complaint for reconnection of electric service in ERB Case No. 99-67, touching as it does on the
obligation of a public utility to supply adequate electricity and proper service to the consuming
public. It bears to reiterate that the ERB, by force of the aforecited Sections 13 and 17(a) of C.A.
No 146, as amended, in relation to Section 14 of E.O. No. 172, has jurisdiction, control and
supervision over all public services, their franchises and properties, with power to investigate
any matter respecting its jurisdiction and to require any public service to furnish safe, adequate
and proper service as the public interest may require. To us, the power of control and supervision

over public utilities would otherwise be a meaningless delegation were the ERB is precluded
from requiring a public utility to reconnect pending the determination of propriety of the
disconnection. For sure, respondent Tis complaint prayed for no other relief than the immediate
restoration in his business establishment of electric light and power service, to wit:
WHEREFORE premises considered, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Board to order
respondent Meralco to restore the partial shutdown of electric light and power service that it
unlawfully cut-off from the business establishment of herein complainant, pending notice and
hearing, and that the order granting provisional relief should be issued immediately upon the
filing of this complaint to prevent any further serious and irreparable damage and injury to
herein complainant.
That after, notice and hearing, the provisional relief herein Granted should be
made PERMANENT.28
There can be no quibbling that the ERB may investigate and ascertain the propriety of the
disconnection due to an alleged violation of R. A. No. 7832. Necessarily, in the course of such
investigation, the ERB may, if factually and legally justified, order the electric service provider,
petitioner MERALCO in this instance, to reconnect the consumers, private respondents in this
case, power supply and resume service. Compelling the complaining consumer to still go to court
to secure, if proper, a reconnection order, as petitioners line of argument urges, would be reading
into R. A. No. 7832 something not written therein.
In any event, Section 929 of R. A. No. 7832 speaks of restraining orders or writs of injunction
against the exercise by an electric provider of its right and authority "to disconnect" electric
service. Here, the provisional relief granted by the ERB in its challenged Order of October 22,
1999 is for reconnection precisely because petitioner MERALCO had already disconnected the
power supply to Tis premises.
In this connection, it is significant to note that under Section 6 itself of R. A. No. 7832, the right
and authority of a private electric utility to immediately disconnect an electric service upon
written notice or warning to a customer may be done "without the need of a court or
administrative order." We quote the pertinent provision of Section 6:
SEC. 6. Disconnection of Electric Service. The private electric utility or rural electric
cooperative concerned shall have the right and authority to disconnect immediately the electric
service after serving a written notice or warning to that effect, without the need of a court or
administrative order, and deny restoration of the same, when the owner of the house or
establishment concerned or someone acting in his behalf shall have been caught in flagrante
delicto doing any of the acts enumerated in Section 4(a) hereof, or when any of the
circumstances so enumerated shall have been discovered for the second time: xxx (Emphasis
supplied).
Inferentially, the express mention of an "administrative order" under the aforequoted provision
negates MERALCOs principal submission that only the regular courts may issue orders in
matters involving violations of R. A. No. 7832. And more specifically in the subject of

disconnection, the legislature thereby implicitly recognized the participation of an administrative

body although a public utility need not secure a prior order, whether from the court or from the
former, in order to effect a disconnection. Had the intention of Congress been to vest exclusively
on the regular courts cases involving violation of R. A. No. 7832, there is simply no sense for it
to include the term "administrative order" in Section 6.
The above conclusion is no more than being faithful to the rule that every part of a statute should
be given effect, a statute being enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodgepodge of
conflicting provisions.30 In line with this rule, it behooves courts to adopt a construction that will
give effect to every part of the statute, its every word, if at all possible.31
The criminal aspect of the alleged violation of R. A. No. 7832 is of course a different matter. A
circumspect look at E.O. No. 172 yields no indication that the ERBs jurisdiction extends to
adjudication of criminal complaints for infringement of R. A. No. 7832.
While a complaint for reconnection of a customers electric service is inter-related to the criminal
action for violation of R. A. No. 7832, the determination of the propriety of the reconnection
remains distinct and independent from the criminal action. The dominant and primordial
objective of a criminal prosecution is the punishment of the offender, while a complaint for
reconnection is intended merely to address a consumers grievance against an electric service
provider with respect to the generation, transmission and supply of electric service. In fact, any
determination or ruling in the reconnection case is without prejudice to the criminal liability
which may be imposed in the criminal action. There is absolutely no conflict between the
exercise by the ERB of its power to entertain a complaint for reconnection of electric service and
the regular courts jurisdiction to entertain and act on a criminal action against private respondent
Ti for violation of R. A. No. 7832. The reason therefor is not hard to discern: a criminal action
affects the social order while an action for reconnection of electric service pertains to the public
utilitys obligation to provide public service which partakes of the nature of a civil action and
affects private rights.32
It is petitioners posture that it is not within the ERBs power to grant a provisional relief. Hence,
its argument that the ERB gravely abused its discretion when it ordered MERALCO to
immediately reconnect Tis electric service pending hearing of the main action in ERB Case No.
99-67.
Again, the Court disagrees.
Petitioner has evidently lost sight of Section 8 of E.O. No. 172 which explicitly vests on the
ERB, as an incident to its principal functions, the authority to grant provisional relief, thus:
SEC. 8. Authority to Grant Provisional Relief. The [Energy Regulatory] Board may, upon the
filing of an application, petition or complaint or at any stage thereafter and without prior hearing,
on the basis of supporting papers duly verified or authenticated, grant provisional relief on
motion of a party in the case or on its own initiative, without prejudice to a final decision after
hearing, should the Board find that the pleadings, together with such affidavits, documents and

other evidence which may be submitted in support of the motion, substantially support the
provisional order: . (Emphasis and words in bracket supplied.)
Furthermore, Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure Governing Hearings
Before the ERB,33provides as follows:
Section 2. Provisional relief. Upon the filing of an application, petition or complaint, or at any
stage thereafter, the Board may grant on motion of the pleader or on its own initiative, the relief
prayed for without prejudice to a final decision after completion of the hearing should the Board
find that the pleading, together with the affidavits and supporting documents attached thereto and
such additional evidence as may have been presented, substantially support the provisional order;
Provided: That the Board may, motu proprio, continue to issue orders or grant relief in the
exercise of its powers of general supervision under existing laws. (Emphasis supplied.)
As hereinabove explained, the ERB is endowed with the authority to hear and adjudicate
complaints for reconnection of electric service and to grant provisional or ancillary relief during
the pendency of the main action. At bottom then, the ERB did no more than to exercise its legal
mandate when it ordered petitioner MERALCO to immediately restore the electric service at
respondent Tis business establishment pending hearing of the main case. The Court finds the
ERBs provisional action to be both factually and legally justified. Hence, the imputation of
grave abuse of discretion on its part is without leg to stand on.
Lastly, petitioner contends that the ERBs Order of October 22, 1999, directing the reconnection
of electric service at the business premises of respondent Ti is in the nature of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction which the ERB has no legal basis to issue. Petitioner cites in
this regard Section 9 of R. A. No. 7832 which reads:
SEC. 9. Restriction on the Issuance of Restraining Orders or Writs of Injunction. No writ of
injunction or restraining order shall be issued by any court against any private electric utility or
rural electric cooperative exercising the right and authority to disconnect electric service as
provided in this Act, unless there is prima facie evidence that the disconnection was made with
evident bad faith or grave abuse of authority. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court remains unconvinced.
Administrative agencies, such as the ERB, are not considered courts; they are neither part of the
judicial system nor are they deemed judicial tribunals.34 The prohibition against the issuance of
restraining order or writs of injunction does not thus apply to ERB as the term "court"
contemplated in the aforequoted provision refers to a regular court belonging to the judicial
department.
Parenthetically, Section 14 of R. A. No. 7832 authorizes the ERB to issue the necessary
implementing rules and regulations to ensure the efficient and effective implementation of its
provisions. Pursuant to such authority, the ERB, as aptly observed by the CA, has approved,
upon MERALCOs behest, the "Terms and Conditions of Service" which apply to and govern all
service connections in all places within its franchise area. Specifically, the "Terms and

Conditions of Service" provides the customer an understanding of the limitations attendant to his
use of the electric service by MERALCO and further sets forth the rights and responsibilities of
both the customer and MERALCO under the electric service. These rules, to borrow from the
assailed decision of the CA, clearly afford any customer, like private respondent Ti, a plain and
adequate remedy for any grievance against a public utility.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated September 22, 2000 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
CASE 13
Exec. Secretary v. Southwing Heavy Industries
GR Nos. 164171-2, 168741
20 February 2006
Ynares-Santiago, J.
Facts:
EO 156 was issued by PGMA in 2002, prohibiting the importation into the country of used motor
vehicles, subject to a few exceptions. Article 2, Section 3.1 enumerates the vehicles
excluded/exempted from the prohibition. Three separate actions for declaratory relief were filed
before an Olongapo RTC, asserting that Article 2, Section 3.1 is unconstitutional and illegal. The
RTC granted all the petitions and declared the EO unconstitutional.
Issue: W/N EO 156 is a valid exercise of police power.
Ruling:
EO 156 is VALID insofar as it applies to the Philippine territory outside the presently fenced-in
former Subic because
1. Its promulgation is actually authorized by the legislature (Tariff and Customs Code, Omnibus
Investment Code, Safeguard Measures Act); and
2. It is presumed that the EO duly complied with the procedures and limitations imposed by law,
absent any strong evidence to the contrary.
However, the proscription in the importation of used motor vehicles should be operative only
outside the Freeport and he inclusion of said zone within the ambit of prohibition is an invalid
modification of RA 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992). When the
application of an administrative issuance modifies existing laws or exceeds the intended scope,
the issuance becomes void, not only for being ultra vires but also for being unreasonable.
Doctrine:
For an administrative issuance to be valid, it must comply with the following:
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;

2. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;

3. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and
It must be reasonable.
CASE 14
Globe Telecoms v NTC
G.R. No. 143964
July 26, 2004
FACTS:
1. On 4 June 1999, Smart filed a Complaint with public respondent NTC, praying that NTC order
the immediate interconnection of Smarts and Globes GSM networks. Smart alleged that Globe,
with evident bad faith and malice, refused to grant Smarts request for the interconnection of
SMS.
2. Globe filed its Answer with Motion to Dismiss on 7 June 1999, interposing grounds that the
Complaint was premature, Smarts failure to comply with the conditions precedent required in
Section 6 of NTC Memorandum Circular 9-7-93,19 and its omission of the mandatory
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.
3. On 19 July 1999, NTC issued the Order now subject of the present petition.
a. both Smart and Globe were equally blameworthy for their lack of cooperation in the submission
of the documentation required for interconnection and for having unduly maneuvered the
situation into the present impasse
b. NTC held that since SMS falls squarely within the definition of value-added service or
enhanced-service given in NTC Memorandum Circular No. 8-9-95 (MC No. 8-9-95) the
implementation of SMS interconnection is mandatory
c. The NTC also declared that both Smart and Globe have been providing SMS without authority
from it
4. Globe filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition25 to nullify and
set aside the Order and to prohibit NTC from taking any further action in the case. Globe
a. reiterated its previous arguments that the complaint should have been dismissed for failure to
comply with conditions precedent and the non-forum shopping rule.
b. claimed that NTC acted without jurisdiction in declaring that it had no authority to render SMS,
pointing out that the matter was not raised as an issue before it at all.
c. alleged that the Order is a patent nullity as it imposed an administrative penalty for an offense for
which neither it nor Smart was sufficiently charged nor heard on in violation of their right to due
process
5. The CA issued a TRO on 31 Aug 1999.
6. In its Memorandum, Globe called the attention of the CA in an earlier NTC decision regarding
Islacom, holding that SMS is a deregulated special feature and does not require the prior
approval of the NTC. Globe that its departure from its ruling in the Islacom case constitutes a
denial of equal protection of the law.
7. On 22 Nov 1999, the CA affirmed in toto the NTC Order.
8. On 21 December 1999, Globe filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, seeking to reconsider
only the portion of the Decision that upheld NTCs finding that Globe lacked the authority to

provide SMS and its imposition of a fine. After the Court of Appeals denied the Motion , Globe
elevated the controversy to this Court
ISSUES:
1. Whether NTC may legally require Globe to secure NTC approval before it continues providing
SMS;
2. Whether SMS is a VAS under the PTA, or special feature under NTC MC No. 14-11-97; and
3. Whether NTC acted with due process in levying the fine against Globe

1.
2.
a.
b.
4.
a.
b.

c.
5.
a.

RULING:
The petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 22 November
1999, as well as its Resolution dated 29 July 2000, and the assailed Order of the NTC dated 19
July 1999 are hereby SET ASIDE.
The assailed NTC Decision invokes the NTC Implementing Rules of the PTA (MC No. 89-95) to justify its claim that Globe and Smart need to secure prior authority from the NTC
before offering SMS.
The statutory basis for the NTCs determination must be thoroughly examined.
Next, the regulatory framework devised by NTC in dealing with VAS should be
examined. In short, the legal basis invoked by NTC in claiming that SMS is VAS has not been
duly established. The fault falls squarely on NTC.
NTC violated several of these cardinal rights due Globe in the promulgation of the assailed
Order.
The NTC Order is not supported by substantial evidence. Neither does it
sufficiently explain the reasons for the decision rendered.
Globe and Smart were denied opportunity to present evidence on the issues
relating to the nature of VAS and the prior approval. Another disturbing circumstance attending
this petition is that until the promulgation of the assailed Order Globe and Smart were never
informed of the fact that their operation of SMS without prior authority was at all an issue for
consideration.
The imposition of fine is void for violation of due process. The matter of whether
NTC could have imposed the fine on Globe in the assailed Order is necessarily related to due
process considerations
In summary:
there is no legal basis under the PTA or the memorandum circulars promulgated
by the NTC to denominate SMS as VAS, and any subsequent determination by the NTC on
whether SMS is VAS should be made with proper regard for due process and in conformity with
the PTA;
the assailed Order violates due process for failure to sufficiently explain the reason for the
decision rendered, for being unsupported by substantial evidence, and for imputing violation
to, and issuing a corresponding fine on, Globe despite the absence of due notice and hearing
which would have afforded Globe the right to present evidence on its behalf

CASE 15
YAZAKI TORRES MANUFACTURING vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR. NO. 130584; JUNE 27, 2006
FACTS:
The Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) is the government agency tasked with the
administration of the PAG-IBIG[2][2] Fund (Fund) created under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1530, signed into law on June 11, 1978. The Fund has been intended for housing purposes to be
sourced from voluntary contributions from its members.
On December 14, 1980, P.D. No. 1530 was amended by P.D. No. 1752 providing that
membership in the Fund is mandatory for all gainfully-employed Filipinos.
On June 17, 1994, P.D. No. 1752 was amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7742 which took
effect on January 1, 1995. Under the new law, the coverage of the Fund extends to all members
of the Social Security System and Government Service Insurance System, as well as their
employers. However, membership is voluntary for employees earning less than P4,000.00 a
month.
Employees who are non-members of the employers private plan at the time of the certificate of
waiver or suspension of coverage is granted shall continue to be mandatorily covered by the
Fund and their employer is required to set aside and remit to the Fund the employee
contributions together with the employer contributions.
Yazaki Torres Manufacturing, Inc., petitioner herein, a corporation organized under Philippine
laws, applied for and was granted by the HDMF a waiver from the Fund coverage for the period
from January 1 to December 31, 1995. The HDMF found that petitioners retirement plan for its
employees is superior to that offered by the Fund. Such waiver or suspension may be granted by
the Fund on the basis of actual certification that the waiver or suspension does not contravene
any collective bargaining agreement, any other existing agreement or clearly spelled out
management policy and that features of the plan or plans are superior to the Fund and continue to
be so. Provided further, That the application must be endorsed by the labor union representing a
majority of the employees or in the absence thereof by at least a majority vote for all the
employees in the said establishment in a meeting specifically called for the purpose; Provided
furthermore, That such a meeting be held or conducted under the supervision of an authorized
representative from the Fund. The certificate of waiver or suspension of coverage issued herein
shall only be for a period of one (1) year effective upon issuance thereof. No certificate of waiver
issued by the President of the Fund shall have retroactive effect. Application for renewal must be
filed within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the existing waiver or suspension and such
application for renewal shall only be granted based on the same conditions and requirements
under which the original application was approved.
ISSUE: Whether the HDMF exceeded its authority when it amended its original Rules and
Regulations.
HELD:
No. The legislative power is granted pursuant to Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution which

provides: SEC. 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the
people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
The legislative power has been described generally as the power to make, alter, and repeal laws.
The authority to amend, change, or modify a law is thus part of such legislative power. It is the
peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society.
However, the legislature
cannot foresee every contingency involved in a particular problem that it seeks to address. Thus,
it has become customary for it to delegate to
instrumentalities of the executive department, known as administrative agencies, the power to
make rules and regulations. This is because statutes are generally couched in general terms
which express the policies, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the
legislature. The details and manner of carrying out the law are left to the administrative
agency charged with its implementation. In this sense, rules and regulations promulgated by
an
administrative agency are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal
provisions that have the effect of law.[3][9] Hence, in
general, rules and regulations issued by an administrative agency, pursuant to the authority
conferred upon it by law, have the force and effect, or partake of
the nature, of a statute. The law delegated to the HDMF the rule-making power since this is
necessary for the proper exercise of its authority to administer the Fund. Following the doctrine
of necessary implication, this grant of express power to formulate implementing rules and
regulations must necessarily include the power to amend, revise, alter, or repeal the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
CASE 16
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION vs. GMA NETWORK
GR. 164026; December 23, 2008
FACTS:
On August 19, 1995, the petitioner, GMA NETWORK, INC., (GMA, for brevity), a domestic
corporation, filed an application for collective approval of various
amendments to its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws with the respondent Securities and
Exchange Commission, (SEC, for brevity). The amendments applied for include, among others,
the change in the corporate name of petitioner from Republic Broadcasting System, Inc. to
GMA Network, Inc. as well as the extension of the corporate term for another fifty (50) years
from and after June 16, 2000.
Upon such filing, the petitioner had been assessed by the SECs Corporate and Legal Department
a separate filing fee for the application for extension of
corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of its authorized capital stock plus 20% thereof or an
amount of P1,212,200.00.
On September 26, 1995, the petitioner informed the SEC of its intention to contest the legality
and propriety of the said assessment. However, the
petitioner requested the SEC to approve the other amendments being requested by the petitioner
without being deemed to have withdrawn its application for

extension of corporate term. On October 20, 1995, the petitioner formally protested the
assessment amounting to P1,212,200.00 for its application for extension of corporate term. On
February 20, 1996, the SEC approved the other amendments to the petitioners Articles of
Incorporation, specifically Article 1 thereof referring to the corporate name of the petitioner as
well as Article 2 thereof referring to the principal purpose for which the petitioner was formed.
ISSUE: Whether imposition of fees and charges on the basis of a memorandum circular was
valid
HELD:
No. Republic Act No. 3531 (R.A. No. 3531) provides that where the amendment consists in
extending the term of corporate existence, the SEC shall be
entitled to collect and receive for the filing of the amended articles of incorporation the same fees
collectible under existing law as the filing of articles of incorporation.[4][8] As is clearly the
import of this law, the SEC shall be entitled to collect and receive the same fees it assesses and
collects both for the filing of articles of incorporation and the filing of an amended articles of
incorporation for purposes of extending the term of corporate existence.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President
in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature, or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties.
A related factor which precludes consideration of the questioned issuance as interpretative in
nature merely is the fact the SECs assessment amounting to
P1,212,200.00 is exceedingly unreasonable and amounts to an imposition. A filing fee, by
legal definition, is that charged by a public official to accept
a document for processing. The fee should be just, fair, and proportionate to the service for
which the fee is being collected, in this case, the examination
and verification of the documents submitted by GMA to warrant an extension of its corporate
term. Rate-fixing is a legislative function which concededly has been delegated to the SEC by
R.A. No. 3531 and other pertinent laws. The due process clause, however, permits the courts to
determine whether the regulation issued by the SEC is reasonable and within the bounds of its
rate-fixing authority and to strike it down when it arbitrarily infringes on a persons right to
property. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
CASE 17
ALEGRE v COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS
53 PHIL 394
JOHNS; August 27, 1929

NATURE
Appeal from the decision of CFI
FACTS
- The petitioner for a number of years has been and is now engaged in the production of abaca
and its exportation to foreign markets. November 8, 1927, he applied to the respondent for a
permit to export one hundred bales of abaca to England, which was denied, and advised that he
would not be permitted to export the abaca in question without a certificate of the Fiber
Standardization Board. He then filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for a writ
of mandamus, alleging that the provisions of the Administrative Code for the grading, inspection
and certification of fibers and, in particular, sections 1772 and 1244 of that Code, are
unconstitutional and void.
Section 1244. A collector of customs shall not permit abaca, maguey, or sisal or other fibrous
products for which standard grades have been established by the Director of Agriculture to be
laden aboard a vessel clearing for a foreign port, unless the shipment conforms to the
requirements of law relative to the shipment of such fibers.
Section 1772. The Fiber Standardization Board shall determine the official standards for the
various commercial grades of Philippine fibers that are or may hereafter be produced on the
Philippine Islands for shipment abroad. Each grade shall have its proper name and designation
which, together with the basis upon which the several grades are determined, shall be defined by
the said Board in a general order. Such order shall have the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources; and for the dissemination of information, copies of the same
shall be supplied gratis to the foreign markets, provincial governors, municipal presidents, and to
such other persons and agencies as shall make request therefor. If it is considered expedient to
change these standards at any time, notice shall be given in the local and foreign markets for a
period of at least six months before the new standards shall go into effect.
Section 1788. No fiber within the purview of this law shall be exported from the Philippine
Islands in quantity greater than the amount sufficient to make one bale, without being graded,
baled, inspected, and certified as in this law provided.
- CFI held that sections 1722 and 1783 of the Administrative Code, as amended, are
unconstitutional and void. Hence, this appeal by defs.
ISSUE/S
1. WON the law in question delegates to the Fiber Board legislative powers or administrative
functions to carry out the purpose and intent (details) of the law for its more efficient
administration
HELD
- The act in question, is not a delegation of legislative power to the Fiber Board, and that the
powers given by the Legislature to the board are for an administrative purposes, to enforce and
carry out the intent of the law.
- The law provides in detail for the inspection, grading and bailing of hemp the Fiber Board with
the power and authority to devise ways and means for its execution. In legal effect, the
Legislature has said that before any hemp is exported from the Philippine Islands it must be
inspected, graded and baled, and has created a board or that purpose and vested it with the power
and authority to do the actual work. That is not a delegation o legislative power. It is nothing

more than a delegation of administrative power in the Fiber Board, to carry out the purpose and
intent of the law. In the very nature of things, the Legislature could not inspect, grade and bale
the hemp, and from necessity, the power to do that would have to be vested in a board of
commission.
- The petitioner's contention would leave the law, which provides for the inspection, grading and
baling of hemp, without any means of its enforcement. The criticism that there is partiality or
even fraud in the administration of the law is not an argument against its constitutionality.
Disposition The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the petition is dismissed.
CASE 18
PHILIPPINE LAWYERS VS AGRAVA
G. R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959
This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyers Association for prohibition and injunction
against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.
Facts:
On May 27, 1957, respondent Agrava issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for
June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as
patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law
and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members
of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training
are qualified to take the said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director
has been holding similar examinations.
Petitioner contends that anyone has passed the bar exams and is licensed by the Supreme Court
to practice law, has good standing, thus duly qualified to practice before the Patent Office, and
therefore the act of requiring members of the Bar in good standing to take and pass an
examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to be allowed to practice before
said office is a clear excess of his jurisdiction and violation of the law.
On the other hand, respondent claimed that he is expressly authorized by the law to require
persons desiring to practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they
are already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is
patterned after the United States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent
Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he had prescribed and scheduled.
(a) Attorney at law. Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any
United States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who fulfills
the requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice
before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys.
(c) Requirement for registration. No person will be admitted to practice and register unless he
shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the
Commissioner and furnish all requested information and material; and shall establish to the

satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute x x x In
order that the Commissioner may determine whether a person x x x has the qualifications
specified, satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, x x x an examination which is
held from time to time must be taken and passed. The Respondent states that the promulgation
of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the
United States Patent Law itself which provides:
The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may
prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons
representing applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of such persons,
agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons,
that they shall show they are of good moral character and in good repute, are possessed of the
necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other persons valuable service,
and are likewise to competent to advise and assist applicants or other persons in the presentation
or prosecution of their applications or other business before the Office. x x x
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the
provisions of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations
requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an examination.
We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:
SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the
conduct of all business in the Patent Office.
Issue/s:
WHETHER OR NOT MEMBERS OF THE BAR SHOULD FIRST TAKE AND PASS AN
EXAMINATION GIVEN BY THE PATENT OFFICE BEFORE HE COULD BE ALLOWED
TO PRACTICE LAW IS THE SAID OFFICE.
whether or not appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of
patent applications, etc., constitute or is included in the practice of law.
WHETHER OR NOT DIRECTOR OF THE PATENT OFFICE IS AUTHORIZED TO
CONDUCT AN EXAMINATION FOR PATENT ATTORNEYS IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
Decision:
The petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby prohibited from
requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the same
before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office.
Ratio Decidendi:
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to
the practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing
may practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or
administrative, in the Philippines.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and
in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement
of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as
do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p.
262, 263). (Emphasis supplied).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of
any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,
the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of
legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of
legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public
that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning
and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to
clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953
ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is.
Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation
of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for
patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by
this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the
Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation
and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as
well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the
Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and
decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.
CASE 19
: People of the Phils v Que Po Lay
CITATION: 94 Phil 640 | GR No. 6791, March 29, 1954

FACTS:
The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and US
money orders amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to the Central Bank as
required under Circular No. 20.
Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official Gazette only on
Nov. 1951 after the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay.
Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating Central
Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265 sentencing him to suffer 6 months
imprisonment, pay fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to become
effective and subject violators to corresponding penalties.
HELD:
It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and regulations
of the Central Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation should be published before
becoming effective. This is based on the theory that before the public is bound by its contents
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published for the people
to be officially and specifically informed of such contents including its penalties.
Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with
costs de oficio.
CASE 20
Tanada vs. Tuvera (146 SCRA 446)
FACTS: Petitioner is Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public
concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, as
well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official
Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication of the law is a requirement for its effectivity
HELD: Publication is mandatory even if the law provides its own date of effectivity.

REASONING: The clear object of the publication is to give the general public adequate
notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
CASE 21
PASCUAL VS. BME [28 SCRA 345; G.R. NO. 25018; 26 MAY 1969]
Facts: Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against
the Board of Medical Examiners. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of
an administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he
would present as his first witness the petitioner. Thereupon, petitioner, through counsel, made of
record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against
himself. Petitioner then alleged that to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of
Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the
constitutional
right
against
self-incrimination.
The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner to
the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only
when a question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged
that the right against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.
Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the
first witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in
an administrative charge for malpractice. Hence, this appeal by respondent Board.
Issue: Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the complainants violates
the
Self-Incrimination
Clause.
Held: The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner
for alleged malpractice, respondentBoard of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the
self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without
his consent. The Court found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that
"the accused in acriminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also,
to take the witness stand." If petitioner would be compelled to testify against himself, he could
suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner.
The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence: "The accused has a perfect right
to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." It is the right of a
defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand

with

undiluted,

unfettered exercise of

his

own

free

genuine

will."

The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands
for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed,
such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive
to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the
democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous
crimes is given due weight. The constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect
a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.
CASE 21 (A)
MANUEL F. CABAL, petitioner, vs. HON. RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., and THE CITY
FISCAL
OF
MANILA, respondents.
CONCEPCION,
J.:
Col. Jose C. Maristela filed with the Secretary of National Defense a letter-complaint charging
petitioner Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the AFP, with "graft, corrupt practices,
unexplained wealth, and other equally reprehensible acts". The President of the Philippines
created a committee to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth. The Committee ordered
petitioner herein to take the witness stand in the administrative proceeding and be sworn to as
witness for Maristela, in support of his aforementioned charge of unexplained wealth. Petitioner
objected to the order of the Committee, invoking his constitutional right against selfincrimination. The Committee insisted that petitioner take the witness stand and be sworn to,
subject to his right to refuse to answer such questions as may be incriminatory. This
notwithstanding, petitioner respectfully refused to be sworn to as a witness to take the witness
stand.
The Committee referred the matter to the Fiscal of Manila, for such action as he may deem
proper. The City Fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a "charge" of contempt
for failing to obey the order of the Committee to take the witness stand. The "charge" was
assigned to the sala of respondent judge Kapunan. Petitioner filed with respondent Judge a
motion to quash, which was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Committee's order requiring petitioner to take the witness stand
violates
his
constitutional
right
against
self-incrimination.
HELD: Yes.
Although the said Committee was created to investigate the administrative charge of unexplained
wealth, it seems that the purpose of the charge against petitioner is to apply the provisions of the
Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or
employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee
and his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property. However, such
forfeiture has been held to partake of the nature of a penalty. As a consequence, proceedings for
forfeiture of property are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in
criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses against themselves are applicable thereto.
No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. This

prohibition against compelling a person to take the stand as a witness against himself applies to
criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for
forfeiture of property by reason of the commission of an offense, but not a proceeding in which
the
penalty
recoverable
is
civil
or
remedial
in
nature.
The privilege of a witness not to incriminate himself is not infringed by merely asking the
witness a question which he refuses to answer. The privilege is simply an option of refusal, and
not a prohibition of inquiry. A question is not improper merely because the answer may tend to
incriminate but, where a witness exercises his constitutional right not to answer, a question by
counsel as to whether the reason for refusing to answer is because the answer may tend to
incriminate
the
witness
is
improper.
The possibility that the examination of the witness will be pursued to the extent of requiring selfincrimination will not justify the refusal to answer questions. However, where the position of the
witness is virtually that of an accused on trial, it would appear that he may invoke the privilege
in
support
of
a
blanket
refusal
to
answer
any
and
all
questions.
Note: It is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer
incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand.
CASE 22
CARIO vs. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991
FACTS:
Some 800 public school teachers undertook mass concerted actions to protest the alleged
failure of public authorities to act upon their grievances. The mass actions consisted in staying
away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable
assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an order to return to work within
24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the
Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90
days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was
consequently formed to hear the charges.
When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers
staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary
Carino decreed dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran,
Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation
of the right of the striking teachers to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to
SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission
on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they
suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for
reasons completely unknown to them.
While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it
earlier, upholding the Sec. Carinos act of issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR
continued hearing its case and held that the striking teachers were denied due process of law;

they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;
there had been violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to
investigate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific cases such as
the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights.
HELD:
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not
meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or
duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. To
be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally
and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.
CASE 23
HARVEY V. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO [162 SCRA 840; G.R. NO. 82544; 28 JUN 1988]
Wednesday, February 04, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following: American nationals
Andrew Harvey, 52 and Jonh Sherman 72. Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58. All
reside at Pagsanjan Laguna respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission
Orders to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to apprehended petitioners at
their residences. The Operation Report read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two
young boys. Richard Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den
Elshout in the after Mission Report read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his
care
and
subjects
confirmed
being
live-in
for
sometime
now.
Seized during the petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of
suspected child prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex.
Posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found.
Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were apprehended 17
February1988 after close surveillance for 3 month of the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the
arrested aliens opted for self-deportation. One released for lack of evidence, another charged not
for pedophile but working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face deportation
proceedings. On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against aliens for being

undesirable

aliens

under

Sec.69

of

Revised

Administrative

Code.

Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for violation of Sec37, 45 and 46
of Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special
Inquiry III commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988 but was not
granted by the Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988 Petitioners filed a petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus. The court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending
determination
of
existence
of
probable
cause.
(2) Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents.
(3) Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners.
Held: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared
policy of the state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well being of
the youth. The arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause determined after close
surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest
and seizure of articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful
arrest; therefore the articles are admissible evidences (Rule 126, Section12 of Rules on Criminal
Procedure).
The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute
rule. There are at least three exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.)
Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In view of the foregoing, the
search done
was
incidental
to
the
arrest.
The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their
arrest and estops them from questioning its validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and the
hearing presently conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their detention legal. It is a
fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not be granted when confinement is or has become
legal,
although
such
confinement
was
illegal
at
the
beginning.
The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance with
Sec37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised
Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported upon
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by
the Board of Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation against them.
Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and never construed as a punishment but
a preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary
Court proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien

intended to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with assistance of a
counsel
if
desired.
Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the authority of
the sovereign power. It a police measure against the undesirable aliens
whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and
tranquility of the people.
CASE 24 (FULLTEXT)
DESTILERIA LIMTUACO &
CO., INC. and CONVOY
MARKETING CORPORATION,
Petitioners,

- versus -

G.R. No. 164242

Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

ADVERTISING BOARD OF
THE PHILIPPINES,
Promulgated:
Respondent.
November 28, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The present dispute focuses mainly on the power of the Advertising Board of
the Philippines (AdBoard) to require its clearance prior to commercial advertising and to impose sanctions
on its members who broadcast advertisements without its clearance.
AdBoard is an umbrella non-stock, non-profit corporation created in 1974[1] composed of several
national organizations in the advertising industry, including: Advertising Suppliers Association of the
Philippines (ASAP), Association of Accredited Advertising Agencies Philippines (4As), Cinema
Advertising Association of the Philippines (CAAP), Independent Blocktimers Association of the
Philippines (IBA), Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), Outer Advertising Association of
the Philippines (OAAP), the Marketing & Opinion Research Society of the Philippines (MORES),
Philippine Association of National Advertisers (PANA) and the Print Media Organization (PRIMO).
Destileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. (Destileria) was formerly a member of PANA.

In January 2004, Destileria and Convoy Marketing Corporation (Convoy), through its advertising
agency, SLG Advertising (SLG), a member of the 4As, applied with theAdBoard for a clearance of the
airing of a radio advertisement entitled, Ginagabi (Nakatikim ka na ba ng Kinse Anyos).
AdBoard issued a clearance for said advertisement. Not long after the ad started
airing, AdBoard was swept with complaints from the public. This prompted AdBoard to ask SLG for a
replacement but there was no response. With the continued complaints from the public, AdBoard, this
time, asked SLG to withdraw its advertisement, to no avail. Thus, AdBoard decided to recall the clearance
previously issued, effective immediately.[2] Said decision to recall was conveyed to SLG
and AdBoard's members-organizations.[3]
Petitioners protested the AdBoard's decision, after which, they filed a Complaint which was later
on amended, for Dissolution of Corporation, Damages and Application for Preliminary Injunction with
prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, docketed as Civil
Case No. 04-277.[4] The Amended Complaint sought the revocation/cancellation of AdBoard's registration
and its dissolution on the grounds, inter alia, that it was usurping the functions of the Department of Trade
and Industry (DTI) and the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) by
misrepresenting that it has the power to screen, review and approve all radio and television
advertisements. Petitioners seek the nullity of AdBoard's Code of Ethics for Advertising and ACRC
Manual of Procedures for Screening and Filing of Complaints and Appeals.[5]
On May 20, 2004, AdBoard issued ACRC Circular No. 2004-02, reminding its membersorganizations of Article VIII of the ACRC Manual of Procedures, which prohibits the airing of materials not
duly screened by it.
Petitioners then filed with the Ombudsman a complaint for misconduct and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service against AdBoard's officers.
On July 16, 2004, petitioners filed the present petition for writ of prohibition and preliminary
injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners argue that their right to advertise is a constitutionally protected right, as well as a
property right. Petitioners believe that requiring a clearance from AdBoardbefore advertisements can be
aired amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law. They also argue
that AdBoard's regulation is an exercise of police power which must be subject to constitutional
proscriptions.
On the other hand, AdBoard seeks the dismissal of the petition for failure to observe the rule on
hierarchy of courts and for failure to comply with certain requirements for the filing of the petition, namely:
statement of material dates, attachment of certified true copy of ACRC Circular No. 2004-02, and defect in
the certification of non-forum shopping.
As to the merits of petitioners' arguments, AdBoard counters that it derives its authority from the
voluntary submission of its members to its jurisdiction. According toAdBoard, there is no law that
prohibits it from assuming self-regulatory functions or from issuing clearances prior to advertising.

The petition is bereft of merit.

First of all, the petition filed in this case is one for prohibition, i.e., to command AdBoard to desist
from requiring petitioners to secure a clearance and imposing sanctions on any agency that will air,
broadcast or publish petitioners' ads without such clearance.[6]
Under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for petitioners to be entitled to such recourse, it
must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or
person exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or
person has acted without or in excess of its/his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there
is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[7]
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function by which he has the power to determine what
the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and
adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the action and
discretion of public administrative officers or bodies, which are required to investigate facts or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to
exercise discretion of a judicial nature. Ministerial function is one which an officer or tribunal performs in
the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his/its own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.[8]
The acts sought to be prohibited in this case are not the acts of a tribunal, board, officer, or person
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. [9] What is at contest here is the power and
authority of a private organization, composed of several members-organizations, which power and authority
were vested to it by its own members. Obviously, prohibition will not lie in this case. The definition and
purpose of a writ of prohibition excludes the use of the writ against any person or group of persons acting in
a purely private capacity, and the writ will not be issued against private individuals or corporations so acting.
[10]

Moreover, it appears that petitioners already filed Civil Case No. 04-277, wherein they sought the
revocation/cancellation of AdBoard's registration and dissolution and the nullity of AdBoard's Code of
Ethics for Advertising and ACRC Manual of Procedures for Screening and Filing of Complaints and
Appeals (ACRC Manual), with the RTC. Although dubbed differently, the present petition is obviously an
attempt on petitioners' part to have AdBoard's authority challenged in yet another forum. This is a clear act
of forum shopping on petitioners' part.
Forum shopping has been defined as the institution of two (2) or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition or the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of
seeking another (and possibly favorable) opinion in another forum other than by appeal or the special civil
action of certiorari.[11] The test in determining the presence of forum shopping is whether in the two or
more cases pending, there is identity of: (a) parties; (b) rights or causes of action; and (c) reliefs sought,
[12]
such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res adjudicata in the action under consideration: all the requisites, in fine, of auter action pendant.[13]

Civil Case No. 04-277 and the present petition both involve the same parties. The petitioners in this
case are Destileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. and Convoy Marketing Corp., while the respondent
is AdBoard. On the other hand, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 04-277 also are petitioners, while the
defendant is still AdBoard, only with the addition of Oscar T. Valenzuela, who is the Executive Director
of AdBoard.
Both cases also raise practically the same basic causes of action/issues and seek the same relief.
The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same
evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of
the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same,
and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action. [14] The principle applies even if
the reliefs sought in the two cases may be different.[15] Otherwise, a party could easily escape the operation
of resjudicata by changing the form of the action or the relief sought.[16]
There is identity in the causes of action in Civil Case No. 04-277 and the present petition for
prohibition inasmuch as there is identity in the facts and evidence essential to the resolution of
the identical issue raised in these cases. Both cases were instituted after AdBoard recalled the clearance
for petitioners' Ginagabi advertisement, and its members refused to air the same. Also, the main issue
raised in the present petition and one of the issues raised in Civil Case No. 04-277 refer
to AdBoard's authority and the legality of theAdBoard Code of Ethics and ACRC Manual. The
determination of this issue in either case would clearly amount to res judicata in regard to the
other. Consequently, the present petition should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
CASE 25 (FULLTEXT)
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and
LORELIE B. SOLIDUM, Branch
Manager, Cubao Branch,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 164790

Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,
- versus NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,

Promulgated:
GLORIA DE LOS SANTOS,
Respondent.
August 29, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
AN ESTRANGED wife who was not dependent upon her deceased husband for support is
not qualified to be his beneficiary.
The principle is applied in this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA), awarding benefits to respondent Gloria de los Santos.
The Facts
Antonio de los Santos and respondent Gloria de los Santos, both Filipinos, were married
on April 29, 1964 in Manila. Less than one (1) year after, in February 1965, Gloria left Antonio
and contracted another marriage with a certain Domingo Talens in Nueva Ecija. Sometime in
1969, Gloria went back to Antonio and lived with him until 1983. They had three children: Alain
Vincent, Arlene, and Armine.
In 1983, Gloria left Antonio and went to the United States (US). On May 8, 1986, she
filed for divorce against Antonio with the Superior Court of Orange, Sta.
Ana,California. On May 21, 1983, she executed a document waiving all her rights to their
conjugal properties and other matters. The divorce was granted on November 5, 1986.
On May 23, 1987, Antonio married Cirila de los Santos in Camalig, Albay. Their union
produced one child, May-Ann N. de los Santos, born on May 15, 1989. On her part, Gloria
married Larry Thomas Constant, an American citizen, on July 11, 1987, in the US.
On May 15, 1989, Antonio amended his records at the Social Security System (SSS). He
changed his beneficiaries from Mrs. Margarita de los Santos to Cirila de losSantos; from Gloria
de los Santos to May-Ann de los Santos; and from Erlinda de los Santos to Armine de los Santos.
Antonio retired from his employment on March 1, 1996, and from then on began
receiving monthly pension. He died of respiratory failure on May 15, 1999. Upon his death,
Cirila applied for and began receiving his SSS pension benefit, beginning December 1999.
On December 21, 1999, Gloria filed a claim for Antonios death benefits with
the SSS Cubao Branch. Her claim was denied because she was not a qualified beneficiary of
Antonio. The SSS letter of denial dated September 1, 2000 stated:

We regret to inform you that your claim is denied for the following reason/s:

We received documents showing that you have remarried in the United States to one
Larry T. Constant. You were also the one who filed for petition for dissolution of your marriage
with the deceased member, which was in fact granted by the Superior Court of
California, County of Orange.
These circumstances are sufficient ground for denial as the SSS law specifically defines
beneficiaries as the dependent spouse, until he or she remarries, the dependent legitimate,
legitimated or legally adopted and illegitimate children who shall be the primary beneficiary. x
x x[2]
SSC Disposition
Gloria elevated her claim to the Social Security Commission (SSC). On February 12,
2001, she filed a petition to claim death benefits, with a prayer that she be declared the rightful
beneficiary of the deceased Antonio.[3]
The SSC motu proprio impleaded Cirila as respondent in the case, it appearing that she
was another claimant to the death benefits of Antonio. Upon receipt of the summons, Cirila
moved to dismiss the petition of Gloria. She argued that Gloria had no personality to sue
because the latter is neither a dependent nor a beneficiary of Antonio, as evidenced by the E-4
form accomplished and submitted by him when he was still alive. Gloria had also remarried an
American citizen in the US. And that she, Cirila, was the true and legal wife of Antonio.
Cirila likewise reasoned out that the authority to determine the validity of the two
marriages of Antonio lay with the regular courts. Since Gloria had already filed for settlement of
the intestate estate of Antonio before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the petition she filed with
the SSC should be considered as forum shopping.
Gloria opposed the motion to dismiss. She contended that her marriage to Larry Constant
was not the subsequent marriage contemplated under the Social Security Law (SS Law) [4] that
would disqualify her as a beneficiary; that the decree of divorce issued by a foreign state
involving Filipino citizens has no validity and effect under Philippine law. Lastly, Gloria
remonstrated that there was no forum shopping because the petition she filed before the RTC did
not involve the issue of her entitlement to SSS benefits.
The SSC denied the motion to dismiss. After submission of position papers from both
sides, it issued a Resolution, dated February 13, 2002,[5] dismissing Glorias petition with the
following disposition:
WHEREFORE, this Commission finds, and so holds, that May-Ann de los Santos,
daughter of Antonio and private respondent Cirila de los Santos is the secondary beneficiary of
the former and as such, she is entitled to the balance of her fathers five-year guaranteed pension.
Accordingly, the SSS is hereby ordered to compute the balance of the five-year
guaranteed pension less the amount of P21,200 representing the total of the monthly pensions
and dependents pension previously received by private respondent Cirila Nimo and minor MayAnn de los Santos, respectively, and to pay the latter, through her natural guardian Cirila Nimo,

the difference between the two amounts, if any. If there was overpayment of pension, the private
respondent is hereby ordered to forthwith refund the amount thereof to the SSS.
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[6]
The SSC deemed that Gloria abandoned Antonio when she obtained a divorce against
him abroad and subsequently married another man. She thus failed to satisfy the requirement of
dependency required of primary beneficiaries under the law. The Commission likewise rejected
her efforts to use the invalidity of the divorce, which she herself obtained, to claim benefits from
the SSS for her personal profit.
However, despite all the sophistry with which petitioner, through her counsel, sought to
justify her acts in the USA, the petition must fail. The petitioner, who was primarily responsible
for obtaining the decree of marital dissolution from an American court, now wishes to invoke the
very invalidity of her divorce and subsequent marriage in order to lay hands on the benefit she
seeks. It is sheer folly, if not downright reprehensible, for the petitioner to seek to profit from
committing an act considered as unlawful under Philippine law. This Commission will not allow
itself to be used as an instrument to subvert the policies laid down in the SS Law which it has
sworn to uphold at all times. x x x[7] (Emphasis added)
The SSC added that since the marriage of Antonio to Cirila was void, the latter was
likewise not a qualified beneficiary. The fruit of their union, May-Ann, was considered as an
illegitimate child and qualified as a secondary beneficiary. May-Ann was entitled to 50% of the
share of the legitimate children of Antonio in accordance with Section 8(k) of the SS Law.
[8]
However, considering that the legitimate children of Antonio have reached the age of
majority, May-Ann is the only remaining qualified beneficiary and was thus entitled to 100% of
the benefit.
R.A. No. 8282, which is the law in force at the time of retiree Antonios death on May 15,
1999, provides as follows:
Section 12-B. Retirement Benefits. x x x
(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his
retirement shall be entitled to receive the monthly pension. Provided, That if he has no primary
beneficiaries and he dies within sixty (60) months from the start of his monthly pension, his
secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent to the total monthly
pensions corresponding to the balance of the five-year guaranteed period, excluding the
dependents pension. (Emphasis supplied)
Since Antonio de los Santos retired on March 1, 1996, and began receiving monthly
pension since then, the determination of who his primary beneficiaries were at that times should
be based on the relevant provisions of the applicable prevailing law then, R.A. No. 1161, as
amended, which is quoted hereunder:

Section 8. Terms Defined. x x x

xxxx
(k) Beneficiaries. The dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children who
shall be the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents, and subject to the
restrictions imposed on dependent children, the legitimate descendants and illegitimate
children who shall be the secondary beneficiaries. In the absence of any of the foregoing, any
other person designed by the covered employee as secondary beneficiary. (Emphasis supplied)
Applying these provisions to the case at hand, May-Ann de los Santos as the illegitimate
child of Antonio and Cirila is considered her fathers secondary beneficiary who, in the absence
of a primary beneficiary x x x, becomes entitled to the balance of the five-year guaranteed
pension as Antonio died just three (3) years after he began receiving his retirement pension,
pursuant to Section 12-B par. (d) of the SS Law, as amended.[9]
CA Decision
Gloria appealed the above SSC Resolution to the CA. She insisted that she, as the legal
wife, was the qualified beneficiary to Antonios death benefits.
The CA agreed with the SSC in its determination that the marriage of Gloria and Antonio
subsisted until his death and the subsequent marriages contracted by both of them were void for
being bigamous. But contrary to findings of the SSC, the CA found that being the legal wife,
Gloria was entitled by law to receive support from her husband. Thus, her status qualified Gloria
to be a dependent and a primary beneficiary under the law. The dispositive portion of the CA
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Petition for Review is GRANTED and
the appealed Resolution dated February 13, 2003, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent SSS is DIRECTED to compute the amount of benefits to which petitioner
is entitled under the law.[10]
Issues
Petitioner SSS and the concerned Branch head present a lone issue for Our consideration:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENT IS STILL QUALIFIED AS A PRIMARY BENEFICIARY OF
DECEASED SSS MEMBER ANTONIO, UNDER SECTION 12-B IN RELATION TO
SECTION 8(e) and (k) OF THE SS LAW.[11]

The controversy revolves on who between respondent Gloria, the first wife who divorced
Antonio in the US, or Cirila, the second wife, is his primary beneficiary entitled to claim death
benefits from the SSS.
Our Ruling
At the outset, let it be recalled that in 2005, this Court ruled in Dycaico v. Social Security
System[12] that the proviso as of the date of retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Republic Act No.
8282,[13] which qualifies the term primary beneficiaries, is unconstitutional for it violates the
due process and equal protection clauses. For ready reference, the concerned provision is
reproduced below:
SECTION 12-B. Retirement Benefits. (a) A member who has paid at least one hundred
twenty (120) monthly contributions prior to the semester of retirement and who (1) has reached
the age of sixty (60) years and is already separated from employment or has ceased to be selfemployed or (2) has reached the age of sixty-five (65) years, shall be entitled for as long as he
lives to the monthly pension; Provided, That he shall have the option to receive his first eighteen
(18) monthly pensions in lump sum discounted at a preferential rate of interest to be determined
by the SSS.
xxxx

(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his
retirement shall be entitled to receive the monthly pension; Provided, That if he has no primary
beneficiaries and he dies within sixty (60) months from the start of his monthly pension, his
secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent to the total monthly
pensions corresponding to the balance of the five-year guaranteed period, excluding the
dependents pension. (Emphasis added)
In deciding that death benefits should not be denied to the wife who was married to the
deceased retiree only after the latters retirement, this Court in Dycaico reasoned:
x x x In particular, the proviso was apparently intended to prevent sham marriages or
those contracted by persons solely to enable one spouse to claim benefits upon the anticipated
death of the other spouse.
x x x However, classifying dependent spouses and determining their entitlement to
survivors pension based on whether the marriage was contracted before or after the retirement
of the other spouse, regardless of the duration of the said marriage, bears no relation to the
achievement of the policy objective of the law, i.e., provide meaningful protection to members
and their beneficiaries against the hazard of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death and
other contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial burden. x x x[14]

That said, the reckoning point in determining the beneficiaries of the deceased Antonio
should be the time of his death. There is no need to look into the time of his retirement, as was
the course followed by the SSC in resolving the claim of respondent. We note, however, that
considering the circumstances of this case, the Dycaico ruling does not substantially affect the
determination of Antonios beneficiaries.
The SS Law clearly and expressly provides who are the qualified beneficiaries entitled to
receive benefits from the deceased:
Section 8. Terms Defined. For the purposes of this Act, the following terms shall,
unless the context indicates otherwise, have the following meanings:
xxxx

(e)

Dependents The dependents shall be the following:

(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;
(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not
gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over twenty-one (21)
years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and
incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; and
(3) The parent who is receiving regular support from the member.
xxxx
(k) Beneficiaries The dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the dependent
legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children, who shall be the primary
beneficiaries of the member: Provided, That the dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled
to fifty percent (50%) of the share of the legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children:
Provided, further, That in the absence of the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted
children of the member, his/her dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to one hundred
percent (100%) of the benefits. In their absence, the dependent parents who shall be the
secondary beneficiaries of the member. In the absence of all of the foregoing, any other person
designated by the member as his/her secondary beneficiary.
As found by both the SSC and the CA, the divorce obtained by respondent against the
deceased Antonio was not binding in this jurisdiction. Under Philippine law, only aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.[15] The divorce
was obtained by respondent Gloria while she was still a Filipino citizen and thus covered by the
policy against absolute divorces. It did not sever her marriage ties with Antonio.
However, although respondent was the legal spouse of the deceased, We find that she is
still disqualified to be his primary beneficiary under the SS Law. She fails to fulfill the
requirement of dependency upon her deceased husband Antonio.

Social Security System v. Aguas[16] is instructive in determining the extent of the required
dependency under the SS Law. In Aguas, the Court ruled that although a husband and wife are
obliged to support each other, whether one is actually dependent for support upon the other
cannot be presumed from the fact of marriage alone.[17]
Further, Aguas pointed out that a wife who left her family until her husband died and
lived with other men, was not dependent upon her husband for support, financial or otherwise,
during the entire period.
Said the Court:
In a parallel case involving a claim for benefits under the GSIS law, the Court defined
a dependent as one who derives his or her main support from another. Meaning, relying on, or
subject to, someone else for support; not able to exist or sustain oneself, or to perform anything
without the will, power, or aid of someone else. It should be noted that the GSIS law likewise
defines a dependent spouse as the legitimate spouse dependent for support upon the member or
pensioner. In that case, the Court found it obvious that a wife who abandoned the family for
more than 17 years until her husband died, and lived with other men, was not dependent on her
husband for support, financial or otherwise, during that entire period. Hence, the Court denied
her claim for death benefits.
The obvious conclusion then is that a wife who is already separated de facto from her
husband cannot be said to be dependent for support upon the husband, absent any showing to
the contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that the husband and wife were still living together at the
time of his death, it would be safe to presume that she was dependent on the husband for support,
unless it is shown that she is capable of providing for herself.[18]
Respondent herself admits that she left the conjugal abode on two (2) separate occasions,
to live with two different men. The first was in 1965, less than one year after their marriage,
when she contracted a second

marriage to Domingo Talens. The second time she left Antonio was in 1983 when she
went to the US, obtained a divorce, and later married an American citizen.
In fine, these uncontroverted facts remove her from qualifying as a primary beneficiary of
her deceased husband.
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is GRANTED and
the
appealed
Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the Social Security Commission
isREINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
CASE 26 (FULLTEXT)
VIVA
FOOTWEAR
MANUFACTURING G.R. No. 163235
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
Present:

- versus -

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

SECURITIES
AND
Promulgated:
EXCHANGECOMMISSION,
PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK and PHILIPPINE BANK
OF COMMUNICATIONS,
April 27, 2007
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari are the Decision[1] dated August 4, 2003 and Resolution[2] dated
April 21, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72271, which affirmed the July 16,
2002 Order[3] of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Order had dismissed the
petition for rehabilitation filed by herein petitioner.
The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:

Petitioner Viva Footwear Manufacturing Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in

the manufacture of rubber footwear. Respondents Philippine National Bank (PNB) and
Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) are two of petitioners creditors.
In 1996, petitioner filed with the SEC a petition for rehabilitation and for declaration in a
state of suspension of payments. [4] An Order[5] dated June 20, 1996, declaring petitioner in a state
of suspension of payments, was forthwith issued by the SEC.
PNB filed an Opposition[6] to the petition for rehabilitation, alleging that the rehabilitation
applied for was no longer feasible. To determine the feasibility of petitioners rehabilitation plan,
an Interim Management Committee was formed, composed of representatives from petitioner,
PNB, and PBCom.
In 1998, petitioner submitted a Revised and Combined Rehabilitation Plan, which
included Coco Manila Food Corp.[7] Petitioner subsequently filed an urgent motion for
consolidation[8] with Coco Manila Food Corp.s petition for rehabilitation and for declaration in a
state of suspension of payments. Finding no merit in the said motion, the SEC denied it.[9]
Thereafter, the Interim Management Committee submitted its report [10] recommending
approval of the aforesaid Revised and Combined Rehabilitation Plan. However, only petitioner
and PNB signed the said report because PBCom objected to the consolidated rehabilitation of
petitioner and Coco Manila Food Corp.[11] Nonetheless, about three years later, PBCom filed a
Manifestation[12] conforming to the said consolidated rehabilitation.
In the interim, petitioner filed a motion[13] to transfer the case to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) claiming that the newly enacted Securities Regulation Code[14] transferred SEC
jurisdiction over rehabilitation cases to the RTC.
Petitioner also submitted a Second Revised Rehabilitation Plan, but PNB objected to the
said plan.[15] On May 27, 2002, petitioner submitted a Third Revised Rehabilitation Plan.
[16]
However, the SEC found the said plan incomplete and unfeasible. [17] Thus, the SEC, in its
impugned Order, dismissed the petition for rehabilitation. In the same Order, the SEC denied
petitioners motion to transfer the case to the RTC explaining that the Securities Regulation Code
provides that the SEC shall retain jurisdiction over pending rehabilitation cases filed as of June
30, 2000.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration [18] of the said Order, which it subsequently
withdrew[19] explaining that it intended to elevate the matter to the Court of Appeals. However,
upon review, the appellate court affirmed the SEC Order. Petitioners motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:

I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED, AND ITS ERROR WAS
COMMITTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OR LACK
OF JURISDICTION, IN ITS AFFIRMANCE OF THE RESPONDENT COMMISSIONS
ORDER DATED 16 JULY 2002, DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR REHABILITATION
WHEN THE LATTER UNREASONABLY SAT ON THE PETITION BEFORE IT, AND
AFTER ALMOST SEVEN (7) YEARS OF INORDINATE DELAY, IT RULED THAT IT
COULD NO LONGER BE REHABILITATED.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ITS ERROR WAS
COMMITTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OR LACK
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR REHABILITATION
SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF A MEMORANDUM REPORT WHICH WAS NOT MADE
KNOWN TO THE PETITIONER NOR WAS THE LATTER PROVIDED A COPY THEREOF
IN VIOLATION OF THE PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.[20]
Simply stated, the issue is whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error
in affirming the SEC Order dismissing the petition for rehabilitation.
Petitioner contends that the SEC committed gross dereliction of public duty when it sat
for seven years on the petition for rehabilitation despite numerous motions for speedy resolution
of said petition. Petitioner argues the long lapse of time reckoned from the submission of the
original rehabilitation plan up to the dismissal of the petition for rehabilitation diminished, if not
extinguished, petitioners chance to rehabilitate the company as favorably endorsed by the
Interim Management Committee. Petitioner also alleges its right to due process was violated
when the SEC referred the rehabilitation plan to the Financial Analysis and Audit Division
without notice to petitioner.
On the other hand, the SEC counters that the delay, if any, was attributable to petitioners
own fault. The SEC further claims that petitioners Third Revised Rehabilitation Plan was not
feasible; hence, the dismissal of the petition for rehabilitation was but proper. The SEC maintains
that petitioner was duly afforded the right to due process.
For its part, PNB argues that the SEC correctly dismissed the petition for rehabilitation
for being unfeasible. As for the alleged breach of petitioners right to due process, PNB points
out that the SECs referral of the petition to its Financial Analysis and Audit Division was just a
regular internal matter and did not constitute a violation of petitioners rights.
PBCom, on the other hand, explained that it had no participation in the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceeding initiated by PNB against petitioner, the circumstance giving rise to the

principal issue in this case. Thus, it neither joins nor opposes petitioner or any of the other
respondents.
After a careful study of the records of the case and the parties submissions, we find the
petition bereft of merit.
Petitioners claim that the SEC sat for seven long years on its petition for rehabilitation is
inaccurate and misleading. Records show that while the petition for rehabilitation and for
declaration in a state of suspension of payments was filed as early as 1996, petitioner had revised
its rehabilitation plan several times since. In 1998, it revised its original rehabilitation plan. In
2001, petitioner again revised its rehabilitation plan. Finally, on May 27, 2002, petitioner
submitted its Third Revised Rehabilitation Plan. Therefore, the SEC Order of July 16,
2002 cannot be said to be unreasonably overdue. If at all, the said Order, issued less than two
months from the submission of the third and final rehabilitation plan, was timely.
As for the SECs dismissal of the petition for rehabilitation, we see no error or abuse of
discretion. On the contrary, we find supported by facts on record the SEC finding that the
rehabilitation plan was not viable, thus:
First, based on petitioners performance for the last three years, petitioner appears to be
not financially sound. It has high current ratios and beyond standard debt-equity ratios.
Second, petitioners audited financial statements for the same period do not reflect the
companys true financial condition. The reported total liabilities averaged only about thirty-one
percent (31%) of the alleged outstanding loan balances of P201.365 million with six banks.
Should the said total loan balances be included, petitioner will appear insolvent and financially
unsound.
Third, petitioners bulk of current assets consists of inventories and supplies averaging
about 86% of the total current assets. This casts doubt on the marketability of the companys
merchandise especially when it starts to operate beyond the present 20% working capacity. On
the other hand, petitioners existing fixed assets appear to be fully depreciated as the resulting net
book value of the assets in 1999 is nearly equal to the reported value of the land amounting to
P1.148 million. In fact, in 2000 and 2001, even the land appears to have been depreciated since
the resulting net book value is less than the valuation of the land.
Fourth, petitioner has just started producing Ethyl Vinyl Acetate (EVA) sheets and has
yet to show proof of its share in the market and profitability. Despite the reported sales of 30,000
EVA sponge sheets in 2001, total sales actually declined by sixteen percent (16%) compared to
2000 sales. Admittedly, the company failed to meet its target of 20-35% profit margin due to
emergence of competitors from China and Vietnam.
In view of the foregoing reasons, the Commission hereby finds petitioners rehabilitation
plan not viable. Accordingly, the instant motion [for approval of the rehabilitation plan]
is DENIED.[21]

In administrative proceedings such as the instant case, only substantial evidence or that
amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion is required. Thus, findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies are generally accorded
respect and even finality by this Court, if supported by substantial evidence, in recognition of
their expertise on the specific matters under their consideration.[22]
As for the petitioners allegation of lack of due process, we stress that in administrative
proceedings, due process simply means an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the order
complained of; it cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict jurisprudential sense. A
respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the preliminary findings
and recommendations; he is entitled only to a reasonable opportunity to be heard, and to the
administrative decision based on substantial evidence.[23] Note that it is the administrative
order, not the preliminary report, which is the basis of any further remedies the losing party in
an administrative case may pursue.[24]
Thus, petitioner has no right to be notified of the preliminary report by the Financial
Analysis and Audit Division of the SEC. Petitioners claim that the SECs referral of the petition
for rehabilitation to the said division violated its right to due process deserves no consideration.
Petitioners right to administrative due process only entitles it to an opportunity to be heard and
to a decision based on substantial evidence. No more, no less.
The Court of Appeals therefore neither erred nor committed grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the Order of the SEC dismissing the petition for rehabilitation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated August 4,
2003 and Resolution dated April 21, 2004, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72271,
which affirmed the July 16, 2002 Order of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
CASE 27
VELMONTE VS BALMONTE
170 SCRA 256
Facts: Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 4 June 1986, requesting to be
"furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who
were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos" and
also to "be furnished with the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan.

Expenses in connection herewith shall be borne by" Valmonte, et. al. Due to serious legal
implications, President & General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred the letter to the
Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS, Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro replied that it is his opinion "that a
confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever
they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it
would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts."
On 20 June 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and
Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, Valmonte wrote Belmonte another letter,
saying that for failure to receive a reply "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever
action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public
interest." On 26 June 1986, Ricardo Valmonte, Oswaldo Carbonell, Doy Del Castillo, Rolando
Bartolome, Leo Obligar, Jun Gutierrez, Reynaldo Bagatsing, Jun "Ninoy" Alba, Percy Lapid,
Rommel Corro, and Rolando Fadul filed a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary
injunction invoke their right to information and pray that Belmonte be directed: (a) to furnish
Valmonte, et. al. the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7
election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to
furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans;
and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information.
Issue: Whether Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS
records on behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa
members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.
Held: The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the
administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds
assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of PD 1146, as amended (the
Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977), provide for annual appropriations to pay
the contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as
employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees
to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with
utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus,
one of the reasons that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law (CA 186, as amended) was the
necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the
Systems [Second Whereas Clause, PD 1146.] Consequently, as Feliciano Belmonte himself
admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" It is therefore the legitimate concern of
the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing
the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers
were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the
GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks
with the greatest degree of fidelity and that all its transactions were above board. In sum, the
public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged
borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern. Still,
Belmonte maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It
is argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of information.
Yet, Belmonte has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as

regards the documents subject of the present petition. His position is apparently based merely
on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only
declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government,
policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the
people themselves as the repository of all State power.

CASE 28 (FULLTEXT)
DR. CASTOR C. DE JESUS,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 171491

Present:

- versus -

RAFAEL D. GUERRERO III,

CESARIO R. PAGDILAO, AND
FORTUNATA B. AQUINO,
Respondents.

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO, and
ABAD, JJ.
Promulgated:
September 4, 2009

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DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision[1] dated September 30, 2005 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 83779, and its
Resolution[2] dated February 9, 2006 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Culled from the records are the following facts:
Nilo A. Bareza, Records Officer III of the Philippine Council for Aquatic and Marine
Research and Development (PCAMRD), made out a check payable to himself and drawn against
the Asean-Canada Project Fund, a foreign-assisted project being implemented by PCAMRD. To
avoid being caught, Bareza stole Land Bank Check No. 070343 from the trust fund of the
PCAMRD from the desk of Arminda S. Atienza, PCAMRD Cashier III. He filled out the check
for the amount of P385,000.00, forged the signatures of the authorized signatories, made it
appear that the check was endorsed to Atienza, and with him as the endorsee, encashed the check
that was drawn against the PCAMRD Trust Fund. Then, he deposited part of the money to the
Asean-Canada Project Fund and pocketed the difference.[3]

Atienza discovered that the check in question was missing on the third week of February
1999 while preparing the Report of Checks Issued and Cancelled for the Trust Fund for the
month of January. Not finding the check anywhere in her office, Atienza called the bank to look
for the same. She was shocked to learn from a bank employee that the check had been issued
payable in her name. When Atienza went to the bank to examine the check, she noticed that her
signature and the signature of Dir. Rafael D. Guerrero III (Guerrero), PCAMRD Executive
Director, were forged. She also found out that Bareza appeared to be the person who encashed
the check.[4]
Bareza admitted his wrongdoings when he was confronted by Atienza about the incident,
but begged that he be not reported to the management. Bareza also promised to return the money
in a few days. Against her good judgment, Atienza acquiesced to Barezas request, seeing
Barezas remorse over his transgressions. But Atienza also felt uneasy over her decision to keep
silent about the whole thing, so Atienza persuaded Bareza to inform Fortunata B. Aquino
(Aquino), PCAMRD Director of Finance and Administrative Division, about what he
did. Bareza, however, decided to confess to Carolina T. Bosque, PCAMRD Accountant III,
instead.[5]
When Bareza revealed to Bosque what he had done, he was also advised to report the
matter to Aquino, but, Bareza became hysterical and threatened to commit suicide if his
misdeeds were ever exposed. Due to his fervent pleading and his promise to repay the amount
he took, Bosque, like Atienza, assented to his plea for her to remain silent.[6]
True to his word, Bareza deposited back P385,000.00 to the PCAMRD account
on February 25, 1999.[7]
On July 27, 2001, following rumors that an investigation will be conducted concerning
irregularities in the said project, Bareza set fire to the PCAMRD Records Section in order to
clear his tracks.[8]
A fact-finding committee was thus created by virtue of PCAMRD Memorandum Circular
No. 30 to investigate the burning incident and forgery of checks by Bareza. After investigation,
the fact-finding committee found sufficient evidence to charge Bareza with dishonesty, grave
misconduct and falsification of official document. [10] The fact-finding committee likewise found
sufficient evidence to charge Atienza with inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of
official duties[11] and Bosque with simple neglect of duty.[12]
[9]

Concomitant to the above findings, Guerrero formed an investigation committee to

conduct formal investigations on the charges filed against Bareza, Atienza and Bosque. [13] The
investigation committee found Bareza guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct and
recommended his dismissal from the service. It also found sufficient basis to uphold the charge
filed against Atienza and Bosque, and recommended a minimum penalty of six (6) months and
one (1) day suspension for Atienza, and a maximum penalty of six (6) months suspension for
Bosque.[14]

On September 10, 2001 the PCAMRD adopted the findings of the investigation
committee but imposed only the penalty of six (6) months suspension on Atienza and only three
(3) months suspension on Bosque.[15]
Not convinced with the results of the investigation and the penalties imposed on Bareza,
Atienza and Bosque, petitioner exerted efforts to obtain a copy of the complete records of the
proceedings had. Upon reading the same, petitioner was of the opinion that the investigation
conducted by the fact-finding committee and investigation committee was perfunctorily and
superficially done, and made only to whitewash and cover-up the real issues because the report
exonerated other persons involved in the crimes and omitted other erroneous acts. According to
him, these circumstances led to partiality in deciding the charges. Hence, petitioner filed with
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon(Ombudsman) a complaint against Guerrero,
Cesario R. Pagdilao (Pagdilao), PCAMRD Deputy Executive Director, and Aquino, among
others, for incompetence and gross negligence.[16] The case was docketed as OMB Case No. LA-02-0209-D.
In their Joint Counter-Affidavit and Complaint for Malicious Prosecution [17] dated July 9,
2002, the respondents argued that the complaint is wanting in material, relevant and substantive
allegations and is clearly intended only to harass them. Furthermore, they contended that
petitioner failed to identify the persons he claims were exonerated, and worse, petitioner failed to
state with particularity their participation in the crimes.[18]
In his Consolidated Reply and Counter-Affidavit[19] dated July 25, 2002, petitioner belied
the allegation of the respondents that his complaint was lacking in substance. He stressed that
the report of the investigation committee that was submitted by the respondents reinforced his
claim that the investigation relative to the forgery and arson case was indeed perfunctory and
superficial, designed only to whitewash and cover-up the real issues. To bolster his contention,
he pointed out that the sworn affidavit of Bareza revealed that the latter was able to use certain
funds of the Asean-Canada Project by encashing blank checks that were previously signed by
Pagdilao. Thus, he averred that the failure to implicate Pagdilao as a conspirator to the crime of
forgery shows that the investigation was just a farce. Petitioner also claimed that Atienza and
Bosque were not charged with the proper administrative offense to avoid their dismissal from the
service. Petitioner pointed to the command responsibility of respondents over Bareza, Atienza
and Bosque. He maintained that had they been prudent enough in handling PCAMRDs
finances, the forgery of checks and the arson incident could have been avoided. Furthermore,
petitioner alleged that being the head of PCAMRD, Guerrero should have pursued investigations
on the criminal aspect of the cases of forgery and arson because a huge amount of government
money was involved therein. His act, therefore, of declaring the cases closed after the conduct of
the investigations in the administrative aspect only is contrary to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) because its object is to conceal more big anomalies and
issues.[20]
In a Decision[21] dated August 5, 2002, the Ombudsman recommended the dismissal of
the administrative case filed against the respondents for lack of merit. It agreed with the
respondents that the complaint was couched in general terms that contains no material, relevant

and substantial allegation to support the theory of cover-up or whitewash. The Ombudsman also
held that there is nothing to sustain petitioners allegation that Pagdilao should be implicated in
the forgery because petitioner failed to sufficiently prove that the check that was signed in blank
by Pagdilao was Land Bank Check No. 070343, or the subject check encashed by Bareza. Even
assuming that the forged check was the one signed in blank by Pagdilao, the Ombudsman opined
that the latter still cannot be said to have participated in the forgery because the check was in the
custody and safekeeping of Atienza, the cashier, when it was stolen. In the same vein, the
Ombudsman found no adequate basis in the petitioners allegation that Guerrero charged Atienza
and Bosque with erroneous administrative infractions to lessen their liability, noting
that Guerrero merely adopted the recommendation of the fact-finding and investigation
committees as to what they should be charged with. The Ombudsman added that Guerrero
cannot be indicted for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 or be held administratively
liable for his failure to initiate criminal cases against Bareza, Atienza and Bosque because he had
no personal knowledge of the commission of the crimes allegedly committed by them.[22]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the Ombudsman denied it in an
Order dated November 25, 2003. According to the Ombudsman, nowhere in petitioners
complaint did he allege that respondents should be blamed for arson and forgery because of
command responsibility. It held that petitioners averment of the same only in his reply-affidavit
and in his motion for reconsideration should be disregarded altogether since it materially and
belatedly alters his original cause of action against the respondents, which cannot be allowed.[24]
[23]

Not accepting defeat, petitioner elevated the matter by way of a petition for
review under Rule 43 before the appellate court. Petitioner claimed that the Ombudsman
gravely erred when it recommended the dismissal of the charges against the respondents and
denied his motion for reconsideration despite the existence of a prima facie case against them for
incompetence and gross negligence.
[25]

On September 30, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the August
5, 2002 Decision and November 25, 2003 Order of the Ombudsman in OMB Case No. L-A-020209-D. The appellate court found that the Ombudsman correctly dismissed the complaint
against the respondents. The appellate court held that petitioner questioned the handling of the
PCAMRD finances without specifying the particular acts or omissions constituting the gross
negligence of the respondents. The charges, being broad, sweeping, general and purely
speculative, cannot, by their nature, constitute a prima facie case against the respondents.[26]
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said Decision but it was denied by the
appellate court in the Resolution dated February 9, 2006.
Hence, the present petition raising the following issues for our resolution:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE
AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DENIED IN ITS DECISION PETITIONERS
PETITION AND AFFIRMED THE OMBUDSMANS DECISION OF AUGUST 5, 2002
IN OMB-L[-A]-02-020[9]-D, RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF THE CASE BY RELYING

SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY ON THE GENERAL RULE/PRINCIPLE THAT THE

COURTS WILL NOT INTERFERE IN THE INVESTIGATORY AND PROSECUTORY
POWERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN, IGNORING THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE
PRESENCE OF COMPELLING REASONS AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE
EXERCISE THEREOF.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS
REVERSIBLE ERROR AND A GRAVE MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND
MISAPPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE IS NO PRIMA
FACIE OR PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST RESPONDENTS, [THAT] IF CONSIDERED,
WILL ALTER THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE
AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENTS ARE NOT
ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE.[27]
Simply put, we are asked to resolve whether the appellate court erred in affirming the
dismissal of the complaint. We hold that it did not.
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is
substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, the complainant has the burden of proving by
substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not
evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation
likewise cannot be given credence. Hence, when the complainant relies on mere conjectures and
suppositions, and fails to substantiate his allegations, the administrative complaint must be
dismissed for lack of merit.[28]
Mainly, petitioner ascribes incompetence and gross negligence to respondents because
according to him, the fraudulent use of PCAMRD funds and arson would not have happened had
they not been remiss in the performance of their duties. Specifically, he averred that Guerrero,
being the head of PCAMRD, should have seen to it that all the resources of the government are
managed and expended in accordance with laws and regulations, and safeguarded against loss
and waste; Pagdilao should have ensured that the signed blank checks were used for what they
were intended; and that anomalies would have been avoided had Aquino supervised Bareza,
Atienza and Bosque, her subordinates, properly and efficiently. In sum, petitioner argues that
they are accountable because of command responsibility.[29]
We agree with the appellate court and the Ombudsman that the complaint against the
respondents should be dismissed. A perusal of petitioners allegations clearly shows that they are
mere general statements or conclusions of law, wanting in evidentiary support and
substantiation. It is not enough for petitioner to simply aver that respondents had been derelict in

their duties; he must show the specific acts or omissions committed by them which amount to
incompetence and gross negligence. This, he failed to do. Hence, the complaint was correctly
dismissed for lack of merit.
Petitioners allegation that he has specified the acts and omissions of respondents which
show that they are guilty of dishonesty and falsification lacks merit. Aside from the fact that
nowhere in the records does it appear that he has indeed shown the particular acts or omissions
of respondents constituting dishonesty or which amounted to falsification of whatever nature, it
must be emphasized that the case he filed before the Ombudsman was an administrative
complaint for incompetence and gross negligence. Hence, these are the two charges he needed to
prove by substantial evidence, not any other crime or administrative infraction. At the very least,
petitioner should have shown how his accusations of dishonesty and falsification constituted
incompetence and gross negligence on the part of the respondents.
To further persuade us that his complaint was wrongly dismissed, petitioner argues that
he had in his petition established the existence of probable cause to hold respondents liable for
violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
[30]
He then concludes that if there is sufficient basis to indict the respondents of a criminal
offense then with more reason that they should be made accountable administratively
considering the fact that the quantum of evidence required in administrative proceedings is
merely substantial evidence.[31]
This argument likewise has no merit. It is worthy to note that petitioner is merely
proceeding from his own belief that there exists sufficient basis to charge respondents
criminally. This is not within his province to decide. He could not arrogate unto himself the
power that pertains to the proper authorities enjoined by law to determine the absence or
existence of probable cause to indict one of a criminal offense.
More importantly, an administrative proceeding is different from a criminal case and may
proceed independently thereof.[32] Even if respondents would subsequently be found guilty of a
crime based on the same set of facts obtaining in the present administrative complaint, the same
will not automatically mean that they are also administratively liable.
As we have said in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza[33] and which we
have reiterated in a host of cases, [34] a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily
result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondents acquittal will
not necessarily exculpate them administratively. The basic premise is that criminal and civil
cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first
two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.[35]
It must be stressed that the basis of administrative liability differs from criminal
liability. The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based
on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the
purpose of criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime. [36] To state it simply, petitioner
erroneously equated criminal liability to administrative liability.

Neither will the allegation of the principle of command responsibility make the
respondents liable. In the absence of substantial evidence of gross negligence of the respondents,
administrative liability could not be based on the principle of command responsibility.
[37]
Without proof that the head of office was negligent, no administrative liability may
attach. Indeed, the negligence of subordinates cannot always be ascribed to their superior in the
absence of evidence of the latters own negligence. [38] While it may be true that certain
PCAMRD employees were sanctioned for negligence and some other administrative infractions,
it does not follow that those holding responsible positions, like the respondents in this case, are
likewise negligent, especially so when the contentions of petitioner remain unsubstantiated.
WHEREFORE, there being no sufficient showing of grave and reversible error in the
assailed decision and resolution, the petition is DENIED. Said Decision datedSeptember 30,
2005 and Resolution dated February 9, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83779
are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
CASE 29 (FULLTEXT)
SHERLITA O. TAN,
Complainant,

A.M. No. RTJ-06-1982

(Formerly A.M. No. 05-12-757-RTC)

- versus JUDGE REXEL M. PACURIBOT,

Regional Trial Court, Branch
27, GingoogCity,
Respondent.
x---------------------x
JOHANNA M. VILLAFRANCA,
Complainant,

A.M. No. RTJ-06-1983

(Formerly A.M. No. 05-12-757-RTC)

- versus Present:
JUDGE REXEL M. PACURIBOT,
Regional Trial Court, Branch
27, GingoogCity,
Respondent.
x---------------------x
ANONYMOUS
WRITERS,

LETTERComplainant,

- versus -

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,

JUDGE REXEL M. PACURIBOT,

Regional Trial Court, Branch
27, GingoogCity,
Respondent.

CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
Promulgated:
December 14, 2007

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
Per Curiam:
These consolidated-complaints filed against Executive Judge Rexel M. Pacuribot (Judge
Pacuribot) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gingoog City, Branch 27, consist of the
following:
1. Affidavit-Complaint[1] dated 4 December 2005 filed by Sherlita O. Tan (Ms. Tan),
Court Stenographer of RTC, Branch 27, Gingoog City, and affidavit-complaint[2]dated 20
December 2005 filed by Johanna M. Villafranca (Ms. Villafranca), Clerk II, Gingoog City Parole
and Probation Office, charging Judge Pacuribot with sexual harassment;
2. Letter[3] dated 4 April 2005 from concerned citizens, asking for the relief of Judge
Pacuribot on the grounds that he has been terrorizing and harassing most of the employees, both
casual and contractual, of the Hall of Justice of Gingoog City; and
3. An undated letter[4] from concerned citizens also asking the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) to investigate the illicit relationship of Judge Pacuribot and a certain
Sheryl Gamulo. They informed the OCA that Sheryl Gamulo bore two acknowledged children
of Judge Pacuribot, the eldest of whom named Rexell Pacuribot was born on 15 October 2004,
and the second child was born on 2 September 2005, both at Maternity Hospital, Cagayan de Oro
City.
On 14 December 2005, OCA issued a Memorandum[5] recommending that:

1.

The complaint of Ms. Sherlita Tan be referred to the Committee on Decorum and
Investigation of the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City for investigation;

2.

the complaint of Ms. Johanna M. Villafrancia be docketed as a regular administrative

matter

3.

Judge Pacuribot be required to comment on the complaint of Ms. Villafranca; and

4.

Judge Pacurribot be suspended immediately until further orders from this Court.[6]
On 7 March 2006, we issued a resolution amending Section 8 of A.M. No. 03-03-13-SC,
approving all the other recommendations of OCA and suspending Judge Pacuribot, thus:
With respect to all the other recommendations of the OCA, finding them to be in accord
with existing laws, the same are hereby APPROVED. In particular, Judge Rexel Pacuribot is
immediately SUSPENDED until further notice from this Court. He is likewise DIRECTED to
comment on the complaints of Mesdames Tan and Villafranca within ten days. The complaint,
however, of Ms. Sherlita Tan should be docketed as a regular administrative matter to be
consolidated with that of Ms. Johanna M. Villafrancas for proper disposition in line with the
foregoing discussions.[7]
On 25 October 2006, the court referred the case to Justice Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores of the
Court of Appeals, Cagayan De Oro City Station, for investigation, report and recommendation
within 90 days from notice thereof.
On 8 October 2007, Investigating Justice Dy Liacco Flores submitted her Report [8] with
the following findings:
Tans story
Ms. Tans nightmare as an underling of respondent judge started on 20 October 2004 a
Wednesday. Having officially filed a half-day leave, she went to Cagayan de Oro City to attend
a wedding ceremony at six oclock in the evening at Pryce Plaza Hotel. She stood as one of the
principal sponsors to a couple named Kimberly Castillon and Thomas Elliot. At around 8:00
oclock in the evening, while relishing the gala portion during the wedding reception (when
the newly weds dance and guests pin peso bills on their attire), she received from [Judge
Pacuribot] a call through her mobile phone, asking when is she going back to Gingoog City. She
said she intends to go back right after the wedding reception. [Judge Pacuribot] offered to bring
her to Agora Bus Terminal but she politely refused the offer saying that she will just take a taxi in
going there. Taking her answer as declining his offer, he ordered her to come out, displaying
short temper, saying he was already waiting outside the hotel. To hint at urgency, he told her that
he just slipped out from the Masonic Meeting he was attending and will immediately return to it

right after he will have shuttled her there. Aware that he has the tendency to humiliate anyone in
public when he is angry, she decided to abruptly leave the wedding reception and comply.
xxxx
Coming out into the lobby of the hotel, Ms. Tan saw respondent judge [Judge Pacuribot]
inside his car, alone. When she came near, he opened the car door for her and she took her
seat. Then, angrily he asked: What took you so long? She kept mum. She saw in between
their seats his clutch bag with his short firearm. That sight frightened her although she was
consoled by the thought that she would soon get rid of him at the bus terminal. Pryce Plaza
Hotel to the bus terminal would be about twenty (20) minutes ride, traffic considered.
Unfortunately, [Judge Pacuribot] had other ideas. Along the way to the bus terminal, he
drove in to what looked like a compound. She unexpectedly saw that his car entered a small
garage, and when it stopped, the roll down shutter quickly locked up from behind. She was
brought not to the bus terminal but to a motel whose name she came to recognize only after the
incident as the City Lodge Motel in Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City. She felt deceived. Knowing
the implications, she protested: Why did you bring me here, sir? Didnt I tell you that I will just
take a taxicab to the Agora Terminal? He rudely told her: Shut up! As if you are still a
virgin! Respondent judge [Judge Pacuribot] then directed her to get down the car. Timorously,
she obeyed. As soon as she went down his car, she looked for a possible exit and found
none. All she saw was a door which opened. He ushered her into the room, walking closely
from behind her. He locked the door.
Ms. Tan, scared and confused, walked to the comfort room, where she pretended to
relieve herself. There, she again looked for a possible exit. Again, she found none. After a short
while, she heard [Judge Pacuribot] asking: What are you doing there? Whats taking you so
long? Remembering, that he has a gun, she came out of the comfort room. To her dismay, she
found him nude in bed and fear overcame her more.
[Judge Pacuribot] ordered Ms. Tan to undress. Her reluctance made her move slowly. He
let out more impatience asking: Whats taking you so long to undress? Excite me! She
refused at first, but he became furious. At that moment too, she saw his gun on what seemed to
her was headboard of the bed. Frightened, she undressed, retaining her bra and panty. He asked
her to kiss him and she obeyed half-heartedly. While she was kissing his neck, he expressed
dissatisfaction by asking: You dont know how to kiss! How do you do it with Ramon? Get
into sex right away without any preliminaries? Ramon is her husband. She was quiet.
[Judge Pacuribot] ordered her to lie down on the bed. She yielded out of fear. He pulled
her bra and panty, kissed her neck and lips, and sucked her tongue and breasts. Minutes after, he
inserted his penis to her vagina. While he did a push and pull motion, she was complaining:
You are so rude, Sir! We work in the same office yet you disgrace me! He told her
angrily: Shut up! Concentrate! See! Its softening.... She recalled that he tried several times to
stiffen his penis but he seemingly has some erection problem. At his attempt for coitus, she felt
the penetration was just slight. Later, he was getting exhausted and was breathing hard. He
would rest each time he failed to have full enjoyment. While he rested, she would ask him to let

her go, but angrily he refused. Instead, he would forcibly ride on top of her again and make
more attempts at coitus until he finally gave up. He said to her: It wont stiffen because I have
been forbidden to eat many kinds of food such as meat which gives energy.
After a while, Ms. Tan saw [Judge Pacuribot] got up from bed, took his gun, and peeped
through the window of the motel. This time, she once again implored him, Sir, Ill just take a
taxi to Agora. He answered: Ill bring you there. At the time, she was so confused that she
cannot recall whether he made payment in the motel. She could not concentrate anymore.
The two left the motel in his car. However, instead of conducting her to the bus terminal,
again [Judge Pacuribot] brought Ms. Tan to another place . . . this time to Discovery Hotel
adjacent toLimketkai Center, Cagayan de Oro City. When she protested, he told her that it would
be safer for her to sleep there instead of traveling alone. It was around 10 oclock in the
evening. Still unrelieved of her fright which Ms. Tan calls shock, or rattled, she failed to ask
for help, nor did she think of escaping. She was not even able to call her husband. She was even
wondering whether anyone will help her if the judge will do anything to her. After he partially
settled the rooms bill, he warned her not to leave until his return the following morning saying
he was returning to the Masonic Conference. After he left, she asked a bellboy if she could
leave, but the bellboy told her that she should first settle the hotel bill before she can check
out. Unfortunately, she had no money enough to pay the balance of the hotel bill. Meantime,
through his cell phone, he kept calling her that night and threatening her to watch out in the
office if she would disobey. She was crying in the hotel. She was terrified of what he will do to
her and her family, and what reaction her husband would make once he learns of what happened
to her. She was scared that her husband might kill [Judge Pacuribot] and her husband would be
harmed in turn.
At around 7 a.m. of the following morning, [Judge Pacuribot] arrived. He came panting
and rested in bed while Ms. Tan just stood by. She saw him put his gun near the bed. She
recounted the events that happened after, as follows:
Q:
A:

What did he do, if any?

He ordered me again saying: Make Love to me!

Q:
A:

What was your reaction, if any?

I refused.

Q:
A:

What was his reaction, if any?

He angrily shouted at me: My goodness! Why are you so slow? As if you are a virgin!

Q:
A:

What did you feel, if any?

I was terrified of him.

Q:
A:

What did you do, if any?

I was forced to go near him, kissed his neck, but [I] stopped.

Q:

Why did you stop?

A:

I was disgusted with what I was doing and with him.

Q:
A:

What was his reaction, if any?

He angrily told me: You dont know how to make love! How do you do it with Ramon? You
simply have sex without foreplay? Kayati ba sab?

Q:
A:

What was your reaction, if any?

I felt helpless and kept quiet.

Q:
A:

What happened next, if any?

He ordered me saying: Suck it!

Q:
A:

What did he want you to suck on him?

His penis.

Q:
A:

What did you do, if any?

I refused.

Q:
A:

What was his reaction, if any?

He got angry, pulled my hair and pushed my face to his penis saying: suck it! Let it in till deep
your throat! Let my penis reach your throat!

Q:
A:

What did you do, if any?

I gasped for breath so that when I opened my mouth, his penis entered my mouth.

Q:
A:

What happened next, if any?

He tightened his hold on me so I was forced to suck his penis afraid that he might break my
neck.

Q:
A:

What happened next, if any?

His penis reached my throat and I felt nauseated so I ran to the bathroom and vomited.

Q:
A:

What happened next, if any?

I stayed in the bathroom for a while because I was not feeling well.

Q:
A:

What was his reaction, if any?

He angrily ordered me to go to him and lie beside him and I obeyed.

Q:
A:

What happened next, if any?

He rode on top of me again and tried to insert his penis into my vagina.

Q:
A:

What happened next, if any?

His penis could hardly stiffen.

Q:
A:

What was his reaction, if any?

He got angry saying: It cant enter! Your vaginas too small.

Q:
A:

What did he do next, if any?

He spread my two (2) legs wide apart and tried to insert his penis but it did not stiffen.

Q:
A:

What happened next, if any?

He pulled my head towards him by pulling my hair.

Q:
A:

What was your reaction, if any?

I told him: Dont pull my hair, sir! Its very painful! What a sadist you are!

Q:
A:

What was his reaction, if any?

He just kissed my lips, neck, sucked my nipple and mashed my breast by saying: This is the
breast of a lustful woman while continuing to suck my neck and breast.

Q:
A:

What happened next, if any?

He said: Im going to plant lots of kiss marks here to let the people know that you passed
through my hands.

Q:
A:

What was he referring to as here?

My neck.

Q:
A:

What was your reaction, if any?

I cried.

Q:
A:

What happened after that, if any?

He rested while I went crying to the bathroom, washed my body then dressed up.
Ms. Tan again pleaded for [Judge Pacuribot] to let her go. This time, [Judge Pacuribot]
assented, but he offered to bring her to the bus terminal. Traumatized, she refused the offer. She
told him that she will just take a taxi and will have breakfast at the Ororama. Still he insisted to
shuttle her there. Thus, at about past 8:00 oclock in the morning, he left her at Ororama Cogon,
Cagayan de Oro City.
Ms. Tan did not report to the office the next working day, that was 22 October 2004 a
Friday. She absented herself from her work because she still had noticeable number of kiss
marks on her neck. She only reported on Monday and covered her kiss marks with her hair. At
the office, [Judge Pacuribot] told her not to file anymore her leave for October 20 and 21, 2004
while bragging, Ako na gud ni, kinsay magbuot nako? (It is me, who will prevail against me?)
Ms. Tan told no one of her traumatic experience and carried on as if nothing
happened. But from then on, [Judge Pacuribots] advances on her went on unabated even in the
office. Whenever she would go inside his chamber, at times, he would grab her blouse, mash her
breast, and kiss her neck saying that she smells so sweet. At times, he would touch the crotch of
her pants or pull the string of her panty. On 13 October 2005, he did the same indignities to her
in the presence of Placido Abellana, the court aide, and the latter just pretended to see nothing by
turning his back. Every time she would resist and/or evade his sexual advances, he would shame

her before her officemates at a later time. He also told her to send him text messages of
endearment. She was warned that her failure to comply, or to receive his call, or reply to his text
messages will have an adverse effect on her performance rating.
The situation got worse for Ms. Tan when respondent judge [ Judge Pacuribot] indicated
his interest in renting a room in her house which she used as her home office. Ms. Tans house is
near the Police Station and the courthouse. Initially, she candidly told him that the said room is
not for rent. She even refused him in the presence of her officemates who cannot comprehend
why she should not allow him to rent the room considering that it would be an additional income
for her. At that time, they were unaware what she was going through.
Ms. Tan brought her commercial calendar to their office. It has her picture. Having seen
it, [Judge Pacuribot], in the presence of Ms. Tan, instructed Placido Abellana, the court aide, to
mount her calendar at the door of his chamber, saying: Whoever removes the calendar would
take a scolding from me. Dont remove Shirleys calendar. I like that hot babes. Then,
pointing to her picture, he added: Thats my idol, the hot babes Kikay! As he was still trying
to persuade her then to let him rent a room in her house, he said in jest to Placido Abellana: If I
rent the room, I will call Shirly she will massage me and step on my back and I will feel good
because Shirley is sexy.
With the pressure on her to rent him a room being kept, Ms. Tan eventually yielded, but
she erected a wall between his rented room and her house, and provided for him a separate
ingress and egress. Nonetheless, when her husband is not around, she would find him knocking
on her window and ordering her to go to his room.
Ms. Tan claims that if [Judge Pacuribot] could not have his way with her because she
resists, he would scold her in his chamber and would also humiliate her in the presence of her
officemates. She would also receive threats from him as regards her performance rating. In fact,
her Very Satisfactory rating in the previous years of her service went down to Satisfactory
for the period of January to June 2005, the first and only time that she was given such a rating.
Because of the very oppressive ways of [Judge Pacuribot], Ms. Tan eventually suffered
from what doctors call chronic fatigue syndrome and was hospitalized in December 2005. Dr.
Virgilio Lim of Lipunan Hospital of Gingoog City treated her. Dr. Lim testified that emotional
stresses of a patient could lead to chronic fatigue syndrome.
Ms. Tans helplessness against the sexual abuses and advances of her judge was gnawing
on her. She found it revolting. She finally mustered enough courage to come out in the open to
free herself. She executed an Affidavit Complaint sworn before a woman Clerk of Court of
Cagayan de Oro City on 06 December 2005. She flew to Manila and went to the Supreme Court
on 08 December 2005 to file her administrative case against her superior. In February 2006, she
filed criminal charges of rape, acts of lasciviousness and sexual harassments against [Judge
Pacuribot] before the City Prosecutor of Gingoog City. At the onset, no lawyer
in Gingoog City would even want to accept her case. The criminal cases were dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction. She re-filed the case with the Prosecutors Office of Cagayan de Oro City. They
were also dismissed.

Villafrancas Story
Ms. Villafranca first met respondent judge [Judge Pacuribot] sometime in November
2004 at the lobby near the Probation Office at the Hall of Justice of Gingoog City where she
holds office. When [Judge Pacuribot] passed by, she was then talking to a certain Dondi
Palugna, her childhood friend who at that time was [Judge Pacuribots] driver. Short
introductions followed.
On 18 December 2004, Ms. Villafranca received a call through her cell phone from
[Judge Pacuribot]. To Ms. Villafranca, the call was unexpected. After their talk, he asked her if
he could call again for chitchat. She answered Ok lang. She asked him how he got her mobile
number. He said he got it from Dondi Palugna. Later, she began to receive text messages from
him, telling her how beautiful and sexy she is, how the mini skirt suited her, etc. She courteously
acknowledged his praises and said thank you to him. Then, he started inviting her for
dinner. Knowing him to be married and the fact that she is married, she declined these
invitations citing an inoffensive excuse which is her evening teaching sessions at Bukidnon State
College, Gingoog City. But she found him persistent. One time, he took offense at her refusal,
saying Why dont you come with me? I AM A JUDGE! Why should you refuse me? Why do
you go with Dondi and not with me when I AM A JUDGE? At another instance, he even asked
her why she goes with Dondi Pallugna, a drug addict, and not him a judge. Although scared of
his outbursts, which by reputation he was known, she politely explained to him that his driver
Dondi Pallugna was her childhood friend. Still, she had to dodge his persistence.
In avoidance, Ms. Villafranca requested for a transfer to Probation Office, Cagayan de
Oro City. This was in February 2005. She was asked to make a written request which she failed
to file due to heavy work load. At that time, the Regional Office of the Probation Office for
Region X was about to hold a Timestral Conference. Venue of the Conference
was Gingoog City and so the host office for that conference was the Gingoog City Parole Office
where Ms. Villafranca works. She was assigned to take charge of the hotel accommodations of
participants in the conference. For that reason, she was too busy attending to her assigned task
that she failed to prepare the written request. Accordingly, nothing materialized out of her
intended transfer.
Although calls of [Judge Pacuribots] were unwanted, but Ms. Villafranca wanted to be
polite to him for two (2) reasons: his status as a judge and his reputation, in the Hall of Justice,
as terror which caused most people to fear him. So, she took his calls politely, gave him
respect, and when she had to turn down his call, she had to do it courteously like: Ok, sir, I still
have work to do, I cannot talk long.
In the last week of February 2005, Ms. Villafranca got a call from [Judge Pacuribot] who
was fuming mad because she refused his dinner invitations. Scared, she finally relented. It was
scheduled on 22 February 2005 which turned out to be her worst nightmare.
February 22, 2005 came. [Judge Pacuribot] asked Ms. Villafranca to choose a
restaurant. She singled out The Mansion in Gingoog City for good reasons. The Mansion is

owned by her relative. On that account, she thought that in the place she will be safe. She
planned to invite one of her relatives in that restaurant during the dinner. By arrangement, she
was to be picked up at 7 p.m. at the school gate.
A few minutes past 7 p.m., on the appointed date, [Judge Pacuribot], driving his car,
fetched Ms. Villafranca. He opened the car door to her and she took her seat. While she was
talking to him, she saw him brought out his clutch bag, took out his gun, cocked it and put it in
between them. Frightened that it may blow off anytime, she voiced out her fears of guns. He
quickly replied that guns are for the safety of judges who are prone to ambushes.
Noticing that [Judge Pacuribot] was driving towards the opposite direction of The
Mansion, she told him they are driving the wrong way. But she was told that they are going
to Butuan City as he knew a great dining place there. While driving with his left hand, [Judge
Pacuribot] would hold his gun with his right hand and put it down every now and then when he
had to change gear. This scared her even more and she started shaking in fear. She observed that
he was over speeding and would honk his horn furiously so the other drivers would allow him to
overtake. She started having frightening thoughts like imagining being killed if she resists and
be left along the road. She feared for her life, and of her children.
After about an hour, Ms. Villafranca noticed that [Judge Pacuribot] turned right from the
national highway, and a little farther, he honked his horn, entered a garage which then
immediately closed as soon as his car entered. It was late for her to realize that he brought her to
a motel in Butuan City. She became numbed with fear. He alighted from the car carrying his
gun, and opened the door on her side. She asked him: Why are you taking me here? You told
me we were going to a restaurant. He ignored her. He told her to get out of the car. Sensing
she was uncooperative because she would not get down, he grabbed her from the car. She tried
to resist but she was numbed with fear. She wanted to get away but she could not seem to
move. He pushed her in the room. She attempted to go out of the room but he locked the door
and blocked it with his body. She pleaded to him to let her go because her children and family
are looking for her. Then, [Judge Pacuribot] grabbed Ms. Villafranca by her shoulders and tried
to kiss her. She evaded by backing out from him and turning her face away. As she continued to
back away from him, she fell on the bed while he immediately laid on top of her. She felt his
hands groping all over her body, as he tried to kiss her. She kept on pleading to him to let her go;
that she wants to go home because her kids are looking for her. He lifted her blouse, unbuttoned
and unzipped her pants while she was pushing him away. But he was too strong and big for
her. She tried to get up when he took off his pants and brief, but he was fast and was soon on top
of her. As he pinned her down on the bed, she could hardly move and found him too heavy. All
along she was trembling in fear and was crying while pleading to him for mercy. But he could
not be dissuaded. On cross examination, [Judge Pacuribots] counsel asked her some details on
this incident, as follows:
Atty. Kho:
Q:
A:

You said you were brought to Butuan City in a motel. Do you remember the name of the motel?
No, I dont.

Q:
A:

Could you remember the size of the room that you were in on that day which you claim
on February 22, 2004?
Im sorry, Attorney, everything seems to be so blurred during that time. All I could really
remember was asking him to take me home because it was not agreed that I go with him in a
motel but in a restaurant at Mansion by the sea at Gingoog City.

Q:
A:

So you dont remember really anything else?

I remember what happened to me.

Q:
A:

Why, what happened to you?

When he forced himself to me.

Q:
A:

When you say he forced himself to you, what do you mean?

When he was on top of me and he was kissing me. God, I can feel and I can remember how
heavily he was breathing in my face and he was kissing me all over and he was trying to position
himself inside of me. Those are what I can remember and I kept on telling him: No! I want to
go home to my children. I wanted to go home because my family will be looking for me.
What? Did he listen to me? No, he kept on telling me I am emancipated. Nobody will look for
me.

Q:
A:

What were you wearing at that time on February 22?

I was wearing pants and a blouse.

Q:
A:

Were you undressed at that time?

I am sorry?

Q:
A:

Were you undressed?

Undressed? He undressed me.

Q:
A:

He undressed you?
Yes.

Q:

Nothing left?
(No reply).
Ms. Villafranca felt that her legs were being parted as [Judge Pacuribot] tried to insert his
penis into her vagina, but she could sense he had difficulty with erection. She felt penetration
was slight. She recalled that he tried penetration more than three times, but was
unsuccessful. She felt his heavy breathing while he planted vile kisses on her neck and
chest. Her repeated pleas for mercy had not done her any good. Not long after, he rolled over
with her and she found herself on top of him. He grabbed her hair and pushed down her face to
his penis, and forced her to do oral sex on him instead. She resisted, but he insisted saying that it
was what he wanted, otherwise she would be put to harm. She took it to mean that he will kill
her if she refuses him. Scared, she relented and had oral sex on him. She felt shamed as she
sucked his limp penis. She was disgusted with him, with herself and the very act itself. Still not
having an erection, he released his grip on her. While she was physically and emotionally

exhausted, she continued crying for mercy, but [Judge Pacuribot] was boasting that nobody in his
right mind would refuse his demands as he could easily cause damage to anybodys honor if he
wanted to.
Ms. Villafranca then got up, and put on her underwear and pants. [Judge Pacuribot] also
got up and took his cell phone. She pulled the sheets to cover herself because her blouse was on
the opposite side of the bed. However, he pulled the sheets from her and pushed her to the bed
half naked. She braced herself with her arms so that the she would not be pinned down on the
bed again. But to her surprise, he took a picture of her, using his cell phone. She was
petrified. He then looked at the picture commenting that it was no good because she was not
smiling, so he ordered her to smile as he will take another picture of her. Although she defied
him, yet he did take another picture of her. She the hurriedly put on her blouse while he dressed
up, fixed himself and tucked his shirt and his gun.
After [Judge Pacuribot] settled the bill, he led her out of the room. Ms. Villafranca
shrugged him off. At the garage, she was ushered to the front seat of the car. She was dying to
go home. He drove back to Gingoog City. On their way back, she turned her back on him,
closed her eyes, covered her face with hand, and pretended to be asleep. Later, he informed her
of their approach to GingoogCity. She asked him to drop her off at the old Caltex gasoline
station along the national highway. From there, she hailed a motorela, went home, took a long
bath to wash his marks of her. At about 11 p.m., she fetched her children from her fathers
house. When asked where she had been, she gave her father a lame excuse that she went out
with her friends.
Ms. Villafranca reported to work the next day. There had been some phone calls in their
office. Like any other office, whoever has the convenience to answer at the time would pick up
the phone. [Judge Pacuribot] had called twice their office already and when her officemates
answer the phone, he would just hang the line. When the phone rung again, she picked it up. It
was [Judge Pacuribot] on the other end. After recognizing her voice, he belittled her yelling:
Prostitute! Devil! Animal! Why dont you pick up the phone? She was consumed with fear,
and meekly told him that she was just busy. Days passed as he continued to threaten her with the
publication of her half naked picture. She tried to pacify him sensing that he could make real his
threats. Being married to an overseas worker with two kids, she was so scared of figuring in a
scandal. Her fright of him was burdensome. He would send her text messages telling her of
sweet nothings, but every time she would ignore them, he would burst in anger and would renew
his threats. At times, she made excuses, like having no cell phone load, but he would insist that
she should secure a load, otherwise he would shame her. He was far too wise to accept
excuses. Her constant fear made her succumb to his blackmails.
[Judge Pacuribot] was always demanding that Ms. Villafranca send him text messages
and letters expressing nonsense, a matter she could not understand then. She thought it was only
to feed his ego. On cross examination, [Judge Pacuribots] counsel asked why she complied with
these orders. She answered:
Atty. Kho:

Q:
A:
Q:
A:

In your affidavit, do you remember having said that the respondent is forcing you to send to him
text messages?
Yes.
And you complied with the sending of these text messages?
Yes, because one day when I was not able to text he called me and he screamed at me over the
phone and then he said: Burikat, animal ka, yawa ka, imo gibuhat dili ko nimo i-ignore. This
will be the last time na imo ko i-ignore sa text or sa tawag nako. Otherwise, you will pay for it.

Atty. Ignes translating:

You whore, you devil, you animal, dont you dare! This will be the last time you will ignore me
in my call, otherwise you will pay for it.
Atty. Kho:
Q:
A:

Why did you allow him to do that to you?

Because he constantly tells me that he will develop that picture, he will show that to my motherin-law and then he will destroy me and he will create scandal in Gingoog City.

Q:

Is it not that you are well-connected? Your grandmother is the mayor. Did you not report it to
her?
My husband is not around, Attorney.

A:
Q:
A:

And?
And what? How would I explain to them that I was there? How he took my picture? How am I
going to? I dont know. I just wanted to protect my family from any shame, from any
scandal. And he knew that it would be his hold to me. And he knew that I would be very careful
with the name that my family had, that is why he is constantly threatening me with such same
arguments, you know. Ikaw and madaot ani. Imo ning kuan tana.

Atty. Ignes:
You will be destroyed because of this.
Atty. Kho:
Q:
A:

So, you admit that you sent him a lot of text messages?
I did not deny it in my affidavit. I had it in my affidavit, that there were text messages and
forced notes written for him.
[Judge Pacuribot] also asked her to send him cards with amorous messages. On these,
she was also grilled on cross examination. It went as follows:
Atty. Kho:

Q:

You mean you often wrote some notes?

A:

Yes. I may even have some drafts there wherein he even edited it.

Q:
A:

What kind of notes were they?

Love notes and there was a time he made me write a letter to my mother-in-law which the very
next day I was posting myself at the Post Office awaiting for that
letter to come so that I
could intercept it.

xxxx
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

Also attached to the Comment of respondent are some notes already marked as Annex 9. Could
you go over some of these notes and tell us if this is your handwriting? Annexes 9 and 9B.
I will not deny that I wrote these letters but they were under his supervision just like the ones he
made to my mother-in-law and to my husband.
You mean to say you were writing the letters?
Yes. He will dictate to me what to do, what to say.

xxxx
Q:
A:

So you were acting like a stenographer who writes down his dictation?
I did not act like a stenographer who wrote down his dictation. But I acted like a victim who is
under threat by some

Q:

The words here in Annexes 9-A and 9-B, you mean to say all of these are his words, the
respondent?
As I said Attorney, yes, under his dictation, under his supervision. Do you know what is this?

A:

Atty. Kho:
No. Do not ask me a question. You are not allowed to do that.
Witness (continuing)
While I was doing those writing, I felt that all my limbs were so tired. I felt so heavy
writing those letters.
Atty. Kho:
Q:
A:

So you admit sending the respondent a lot more letters that the ones Ive presented you?
I admit that I wrote those letters under his supervision, yes.

Q:
A:

All of the letters that you sent were all under his supervision?
As I said, yes, under his supervision. There were times that he would even call me to his
chamber to have some cards signed.

Q:

So, aside from notes, you also sent him cards?

A:

Yes, I recall signing them because he would ask me to do so.

xxxx
Justice Flores:

Q:
A:

When you said that the judge would even call you to his chamber to sign cards, what kinds of
cards?
Greeting cards, Your Honor.
Atty. Kho:

Q:
A:

Hallmark?
I dont recall. I would just easily sign them, do whatever he wanted and then after he is done
touching me I would ask myself to leave.

Q:
A:

So, you also sent him lots of greeting cards?

I did not send your client. He gave it to himself.

Q:
A:

I am going to show you one last card. Tell me, is this one of the cards that you said you signed?
Im going to give this to you. For submission.
Yes.

Q:
A:

This is one of the cards that you signed?

One of those cards that I signed.

xxxx
Q:
A:

Miss Witness, the handwriting on this card now marked as Exhibit 6, on the second line of the
handwriting are the words Love you, Bi. Could you tell us what is the meaning of the word
Bi, if you know?
It has no significance with me because your client dictated it to me.

Q:
A:

So, it was dictated only.

As I said, he dictated words to me.
Ms. Villafrancas resistance would always be met with a threat to divulge the incident in
the motel. Although she yielded to these promptings of sending him text messages or cards or
notes, she never understood why [Judge Pacuribot] behaved so. It was late in the day when
enlightenment came to her that all his orders to her to send him amorous text messages, letters
and cards were not to feed his ego but to prepare for his defense even while she was as
submissive as a lamb. In his Comment to the administrative charge against him, he cited the text
messages, letters and cards he induced her to send to him to deflect her charges of rape and
unprofessional conduct and prove them untrue. He cited them in his Comment as her
manifestation of fatal attraction to him.

xxxx
There had been occasions when [Judge Pacuribot] summoned Ms. Villfranca to his
chambers on the pretext of discussing probation matters, but once inside his chamber, he would
lock the door, grab her, kiss her, put kiss marks on her neck and chest. He would pull her hair
and push her down to his crotch and demand that she performs oral sex on him. Her
overpowering fear of him and the scandal he can inflict on her family made her yield to
him. When she would disobey him he would call her cell phone with lots of insults like calling
her burikat or with his threats.
Also, [Judge Pacuribot] demanded food from Ms. Villafranca which the latter had to
bring to his room in Ms. Tans house. Her fear of dire consequences of her resistance absorbed
her. When demanded to bring food, she would comply out of fear. In her words, Yes, I went
because he would put me under pressure and under fire. She went not only because of his
constant threat of making public his cell phone picture of her, half naked, but also because of
his added threat that he is going to tell my mother-in-law; that he is going to destroy me; that I
am nobody; that my family is no good and he would call me burikat, burikat (whore). He
would call me that name yawa ka, animal ka. Sumunod ka nako. She was angst-ridden with
the set up. She was fearful that somebody might see her in his rented room or on her way to it
or back. She was made to go there about eight (8) times. All these instances, she saw him
display his gun. She found him too selfish and an ingrate. Once, on his demand to bring food,
she brought him only pansit and lumpia which was no longer crisp. Unappreciative, he furiously
stabbed his plate with fork, breaking it and carped that she served him food which is not fit for a
judge, and suited only to her seaman husband. He also made her eat with him on occasions
which she abhorred so much because according to her he ate like a pig eating fast with
shoulders hunched, elbows on the table, mouth noisily chewing the food.
When grilled on those eight (8) times, the following exchanges between [Judge
Pacuribots] counsel and Ms. Villafranca took place:
Atty. Kho:
Q:
A:

In all of these times, 8 times which you said, you did not care to offer any resistance?
I had offered a lot of resistance, Attorney, but your client would make it a point that I should not
refuse him.

Q:
A:

You tried to resist?

I had evaded him many times, many times but he would always point out that I should not refuse
him, otherwise he will destroy me and he did eventually when I finally had the courage to put up
with him, you know.
(The witness is crying at the witness stand)

Q:
A:

During those 8 times which you said you went to the room of respondent at Sherlita Tans place
which is near the police station and the LTO, was there a time that you shouted?
I could not shout, Im scared.

Q:
A:

You were scared of what?

Scared of your client.

Q:
A:

Of the person?
Yes and how intimidating he could be and how evil he could be.
After eating, Ms. Villafranca would be ordered to take off her clothes; then, [Judge
Pacuribot] would lay on top of her for his sexual pleasures. But penetration would be slight
because, as usual, he had difficulty with erection. As a consequence, he would push her down to
his organ and order her to do oral sex on him. She detested his routine of putting kiss marks on
her neck and chest which he intentionally used so that, as he told her, people would know that he
owned her. At times, she left his rented room wearing a hooded jacket in order o hide her face
fearful that certain people might recognize her along the way. There were times she also left his
room without underwear because he would not give it to her. She hated his sexual abuses, but
she was more afraid of causing scandal to her family.
In April 2005, after having dinner with [Judge Pacuribot] in his rented room, Ms.
Villafranca was pulled by her hair and was asked, [w]ho owns you now? She answered in fear
you. He looked very pleased. Then, he told her to leave her husband and promised to help
her file a marriage annulment complaint in Gingoog City. She did not say a word. He went on
top of her and pulled her hair demanding for an answer. Terrified, she said opo. Then, she
was forced to have sex with him.
[Judge Pacuribot] wanted to destroy the relationship Ms. Villafranca has with her
husband and his family. He forced her to write a letter, asking for a break up of marriage from
her husband which [Judge Pacuribot] edited. He also ordered her to write to her mother-in-law
with whom she had some difficulty in their in-law relationship, to say she wanted a marriage
break-up. She told him she does not need to write letters to her mother-in-law. What for? But
he insisted. Her hands felt heavy writing them, in fact it took her three drafts to write as shown
in Exhibits B, C and D of Ms. Villafranca. Discontented with her drafts, he took away the
last from her, edited it, and told her he will mail it to her mother-in-law. Thinking he will make
good of his threat, the following day she posted herself outside the Gingoog City Post Office for
a long time and waited for the mailing of said letter so that she can intercept it. No one
came. She instructed the postal clerk that if there is a letter intended for her mother-in-law, she
should not give it to her mother-in-law but to her instead.
Meantime, Ms. Villafrancas morbid fear of [Judge Pacuribot], his threat to mire her and
her family in scandal and her guilt toward her family had been sucking her into a vortex of
emotional and physical collapse. She bore the immense pain of yielding to him. She seemingly
could not withstand the humiliation for being involved in forced sordid incidents with [Judge
Pacuribot] whom she detested.
On 9 May 2005, seemingly depressed for her accumulated frustrations for not being able
to see her way out of her predicament, Ms. Villafranca, sent a text message to her husband who
was then working aboard a foreign vessel. Her text message went this way: Whatever will

happen to me, you take care of the kids. He asked: Whats wrong? She answered: I cannot
fully disclose to you everything but in due time I will. Whatever happens to me, just take care of
the kids and that I love them. Her disturbing message constrained her husband to pre-terminate
his employment contract and rushed home to Gingoog City on 15 May 2005. She then
personally told [Judge Pacuribot] to stop calling her or asking for food, but he grabbed her hair,
twisted her head and planted a kiss mark on her neck, telling her that it would send a message to
her husband that he, not her husband, owned her. Still, she was not prepared to make her
revelations to her husband.
In the third week of May 2005, Ms. Villafranca was persistently instigated by [Judge
Pacuribot] to file an annulment case against her husband. Later, he asked her to sign what Ms.
Villafranca calls a ridiculous document he drafted wherein it purported to show that she and
her husband agreed that each of them may freely cohabit with a third person. She signed it in the
face of his threats. Worse, he asked her to ask her husband to sign the same document.
On 25 May 2005, at the Hall of Justice in Gingoog City, Ms. Villafranca was summoned
to [Judge Pacuribots] chamber. Once inside, he slapped her for not filing her petition for
annulment of marriage and hit her head with clenched fist. Then, he planted on her neck kiss
marks which he said he wanted her husband to see. Indeed, when her husband found her with
kiss marks, she suffered from her husbands beating.
Citing her husbands beating her, Ms. Villafranca pleaded to [Judge Pacuribot] to stop
molesting her. He countered with an unusual suggestion File a rape case against him. When
she refused, the threat of the dire consequences of her refusal came again. She still kept from her
husband what she was going through.
But [JudgePacuribot] seized another incident to destroy her more. On 15 June 2005, he
reported in writing to the superiors of Ms. Villafranca superiors in local office and superiors
in Manila alleging her negligence allegedly committed on 6 June 2005 in forgetting to shut off
the air-con unit in their Probation Office. Her local superior in the Probation Office referred to
her the letter of [Judge Pacuribot]. She prepared an explanation which her local superior used as
letter to the judge. Thinking that because she authored that letter, the explanation there covered
already her side, she did not write nor see the judge anymore. This further infuriated him.
xxxx
In July 2006, Ms. Villafrancas request for transfer was granted and she started working
in Cagayan de Oro City on 17 July 2006. The transfer of assignment resulted in her constant
separation from her nine (9) year old son and four (4) year old daughter, plus the great
inconvenience of a 2 hours bus ride from Gingoog City one way, and transportation
expenses. She would usually go home toGingoog City to be with her family and children on
weekends, or every now and then, and sometimes late at night.
After her transfer to the Probation Office in Cagayan de Oro City on 17 July 2006, Ms.
Villafranca was able to tell her husband what she went through. Before that, she just could not

find the courage to tell him because she was scared. When she was twitted on cross examination
on how so long that she was scared, she said:
Atty. Kho:
Q:
A:

So, what you told him at that time was that you were scared?
Attorney, I was walking in fear most of those times and even up to now when I came home I am
walking in fear. I dont know if Im safe. I dont know if the next day I will be dead. I dont
know. Those were the times when I asked my husband to accompany me because Im always
scared all the time. Even if I just go out of the gate ask my husband to accompany me.
(At this juncture, witness is sobbing)
Ms. Villafranca decided to fight back with this administrative charge. She subscribed her
Affidavit-Complaint before State Prosecutor Roberto A. Escaro on 13 December 2005. In Ms.
Villafrancas Complaint she prayed that [Judge Pacuribot] be found guilty of gross violation of
the Judicial Code Of Professional Responsibility (Code of Judicial Conduct) for being totally
unfit to stay in the Judiciary and she prayed that he be ordered immediately dismissed from
service. She also prayed that [Judge Pacuribot] be immediately ordered to cease and desist from
causing any further assault on her person, in her personal and professional capacity.
On the same day, Ms. Villafranca submitted her Affidavit-Complaint to the Office of the
Court Administrator. [Judge Pacuribot] filed his Comment. Among others, he cited that Ms.
Villafranca was fatally attracted to him and that he refused to reciprocate because he is a
judge and happily married, and for the reason that Ms. Villafrancas misdirected adoration is
atrociously immoral. Ms. Villafranca filed a Rejoinder refuting point by point the defenses of
[Judge Pacuribot] and calling them lies. Ms. Villafranca said his defenses are presumptuous and
revolting because in the Hall of Justice, female personnel invariably veer away from his path in
trepidation. She asserts that [Judge Pacuribots] extramarital indiscretions are well known, if
not well documented, in Gingoog City, that it is common knowledge that his mistress Sheryl
Gamulo, whom [Judge Pacuribot] housed in Motomull St., Gingoog City, gave birth to two (2)
children by [Judge Pacuribot] on 16 October 2004 and 02 September 2005 at the Maternity
Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City; that the eldest child was baptized in Opol, Misamis Oriental with
Atty. Wilfredo Bibera, his clerk of Court, and Dondi Pallugna, his driver, as baptismal
sponsors. Ms. Villafranca claims therein that respondent judge is also known to have sired a
daughter in Ozamiz City now about ten (10) years old whose picture has been circulated in the
Hall of Justice and that [Judge Pacuribots] immorality most probably inflicted on victimized
women is a sick source of scandal and gossip in the city.
To be able to put behind her harrowing experience, Ms. Villafranca applied for leave of
absence with their office to work abroad knowing that [Judge Pacuribots] order in People v.
Anude and his letter to her superiors have effectively made her lose that desired
promotion. Eventually she left the country on 2 October 2006 for Dubai, UAE to work and
forget her past even if her leave of absence in their office was not yet approved. On 18 March
2007, she returned to testify in this case after struggling against employment restrictions and

financial constraints, she not having been half a year yet abroad. On 22 March 2007, when asked
on the witness stand when she will leave again for Dubai, she said: I want to leave the country
as much as possible and stay out of here. I dont want to be reminded of what happened to
me. At the time she testified in March 2007 in this case, her leave of absence in the Probation
Office was not yet granted.
In his Comment,[9] Judge Pacuribot denied the charges of Ms. Tan and Villafranca for
lack of factual and legal bases; and opposed the allegations on the ground that the same were
motivated by revenge and were part of a comprehensive and sinister plan to drive him out of
service.
Judge Pacuribot made total denial of Ms. Tans charges against him and claimed that the
alleged incidents on 20 and 21 October 2004 were big lie[s], a fraud, a hoax and
deception. He insisted that he could not have committed the acts complained of by Ms. Tan
because in his first five months in office, he was busy planning what to do and how to quickly
dispose of the almost 500 cases he inherited, including the new ones raffled to him.
In particular, Judge Pacuribot denied the alleged rape incidents on 20-21 October 2004 in
Cagayan de Oro City, and interposed the defense of alibi. He contended that he was in
faraway Gingoog City, which is 120 kilometers away from Cagayan de Oro City. He stated that
on Mondays, he reports for his duties in Gingoog City, and goes home to Cagayan de Oro City
only on Fridays. He maintained that on 20 October 2004, a Wednesday, at 7:00 p.m., he went out
of his chambers with his court aide Placido Abellana, Jr., and his security officer SPO1 Ronald
Espejon. They proceeded to Garahe Sugbahan Grill for dinner. After dinner, Espejon and
Abellana escorted him back to his boarding house. Abellana left him at 9:00 p.m. while Espejon
went home at about 11:00 p.m.
Judge Pacuribot admitted that he did not hold trial on 21 October 2004, a Thursday,
because the scheduled settings were all cancelled that day which cancellation was made a week
before. He averred that on the same day, he was writing decisions in his chambers. In the
evening, he asked Abellana to buy food and they ate supper with Espejon. Abellana left him
about 8:00 p.m. while Espejon left at about 10:00 p.m.
He, thus, concluded that it was impossible for him to be with Ms. Tan on 20 and 21
October 2004, a Wednesday and a Thursday, respectively. He argued that no proof existed to
show his physical presence in Cagayan de Oro City on those dates; hence, the presumption of his
continuing physical presence in his station during the inclusive period alluded to ran in his favor.
Judge Pacuribot also cited several factors which made Ms. Tans allegations
unbelievable:
1. Ms. Tans behavior was not reflective of a rape victim. Ms. Tan did not immediately
report the incident to the authorities. As a 43-year-old lady who is no longer nave and having
assisted as stenographer in countless rape cases, she should know how important it is to
immediately report the incident.

2. Judge Pacuribot pointed to Ms. Tans admission that she did not put up a struggle
when he allegedly brought her to City Lodge Motel and Discovery Hotel. Had she wanted to
catch the attention of employees, she could have done so. He also stressed that what Ms. Tan
called a headboard where he allegedly put his gun in the motel room was merely less than one
inch in width, too narrow for a .45 cal. gun to rest.
3. On 25 November 2004, a month and three days after the alleged rape, Ms. Tan invited
all her officemates, including him, to her birthday party held at her home, where she sang and
danced. She displayed her dancing skills then. She even taught him how to dance the
swing. Again, during the Courts Christmas Party in December 2004, she socialized with her
fellow workers, including him, and even performed the kikay dance during the program.
4. On 1 Septemeber 2005, all the staff of Judge Pacuribot, including Ms. Tan, attended
his birthday party at his house in Cagayan de Oro City, where she merrily danced with dance
instructors and posed with Judge Pacuribots wife.
5. On May 2006, five months after she filed the administrative charge against Judge
Pacuribot, Ms. Tan joined the Search for Mrs. Gingoog City Contest as one of the candidates and
she paraded in the gymnasium, all smiles, while attired in an elegant gown.
6. Judge Pacuribot alleged that Ms. Tan and her husband were publicly known to be
putting up a faade that all was well with them, although they constantly quarreled and had been
sleeping in separate rooms already.
Judge Pacuribot disputed Ms. Tans version of how he became the lessee of a room at Ms.
Tans house. He claimed that in January 2005, she came to know that he was looking for a new
boarding house and she offered two small rooms at her house available for rent. He chose the
one facing the Police Station of Gingoog City, which he claimed to be only about five meters
more or less from the room he rented. He paid an advance rental of P5,000.00.
Judge Pacuribot denied sexually harassing Ms. Tan. In refuting her claim that he sexually
harassed her in his chambers, he countered that this could not have happened as his court aide,
Placido Abellana, was always in his chamber with him. If Abellana was out on an errand, his
security officer, SPO1 Ronald Espejon, temporarily took over. There had never been any
moment in his chambers that he was without companion. There was always either his court aide
or his security officer with him. Even when he had visitors, his court aide was still in his
chambers to maintain transparency and avoid unwarranted talk. Once in a while, his branch
clerk of court, Atty. Willfredo Bibera, Jr., would go to his chambers to confer with him regarding
cases. Sometimes, too, his security officer Espejon would take his blood pressure in his
chambers. Under these circumstances, Judge Pacuribot argued that no sexual harassment could
have occurred. He also called attention to the fact that Ms. Tans affidavit and testimony
presented the dates of the alleged sexual harassments as follows:
27 October 2004
03 November 2004

06 January 2005
08 August 2005

25 November 2004
08 December 2004
09 December 2004
05 January 2005

03 October 2005
04 October 2005
11 October 2005
13 October 2005[10]

The 6 January 2005 alleged incidents were followed only on 8 August 2005, thus, belying Ms.
Tans claim that the sexual harassments were done regularly. Also, Ms. Tans allegation that he
sexually harassed her on 25 November 2005 was incredible, because on that date she was on her
birthday leave, and was busy preparing the dishes she was going to serve them during her
party. He emphasized that the criminal complaints for rape, acts of lasciviousness and sexual
harassments filed by Ms. Tan against him with the City Prosecutors Office in Gingoog City and
Cagayan de Oro City were all dismissed.
Judge Pacuribot explained that these administrative and criminal charges filed against
him by Tan and Villafranca were part and parcel of a grand plot hatched by Ronnie Waniwan, a
radio commentator, to oust him from office. He claimed that Waniwan was then facing four
counts of libel in his sala. The City Prosecutor recommendedP50,000.00 bail for each. When
Waniwan filed a motion to reduce bail bond, respondent denied it for several reasons, i.e., (1)
there was a previous conviction, (2) he was not from Gingoog City, and (3) when a warrant for
his arrest was issued, he went into hiding instead of surrendering. Waniwan filed a motion for
respondent to inhibit himself, which the latter denied. As a consequence, Waniwan spent 13 days
in jail for failure to put up a bail bond. Judge Pacuribot learned that Waniwan had contacted the
NPA for Judge Pacuribots liquidation as revealed in the affidavits of two captured NPA
sparrow unit members. He discovered that Waniwan with Mesdames Tan and Villafranca plotted
and conspired to destroy him after his personal talk with other media men including Jonas
Bustamante, Jerry Orcullo and Jessie Mongcal.
Judge Pacuribot believed that Ms. Tan succumbed to the egging of Waniwan to jump the
gun on him. Ms. Tan knew that her job was in danger because of her growing inefficiency, a
subject of his several warnings, since her inefficiency would essentially affect the performance
of his court, a scenario which he abhorred, having been a consistent performer in the disposal of
cases during his days as labor arbiter. In fact, he considered Ms. Tan the most inefficient among
the four stenographers he had. She was allegedly lazy, inarticulate in the English language, and
flawed in spelling, which hampered her effectiveness in preparing transcriptions. Worse, due to
her moonlighting as manager of the Tan-Hoegee Internet Caf, she would usually go home
during office hours to catch some sleep. He believed that his good relationship with her soured
when he asked Ms. Tan to be more focused on the job; that he was going to move to a new
house; and when he did not let her borrow P200,000.00, or at least be a guarantor of her loan.
Anent the written charges of Ms. Villafranca, Judge Pacuribot specifically denied all
material allegations therein for being untrue. In particular, he denied the alleged rape incident
on 22 February 2005 in Butuan City. He asserted that he never went out alone at night
in Gingoog City, knowing the place to be dangerous, and the fact that PNP confirmed to him that
he was in the list of those slated for liquidation by the NPA. Hence, he insisted that he neither

invited Ms. Villafranca for dinner, nor did he travel fromGingoog City to Butuan City during
night time.
Judge Pacuribot claimed that on 22 February 2005, at 5:00 oclock more or less in the
afternoon, he asked a certain Fil Sumaylo to buy and cook a big fish and ten pieces of small
octopus because they would have dinner at the latters house. At about 6:30 p.m., respondent
went with his security officer Espejon and court aide Abellana to Sumaylos house. His branch
clerk of court, Atty. Bibera, was also there. After dinner, Espejon and Abellana escorted him
back to his boarding house at about 11:00 p.m. Abellana left ahead, while Espejon left at
about 11:30 p.m.
Also, Judge Pacuribot gave several reasons why he would not venture at all to go
to Butuan City alone. He said he was security conscious, considering that he handled drug cases
and other high-profile cases. He had also received NPA threats on his life. He claimed
that Butuan City was about 80 kilometers from Gingoog City and he would not go there and risk
his life for a woman he barely knew.
In denying Ms. Villafrancas allegations of sexual harassment and acts of lasciviousness,
Judge Pacuribot pointed out that the acts of grabbing, kissing and performing oral sex in his
chambers could not have happened as his court aide, Abellana, who is the uncle of Ms.
Villafranca, was always present in his chambers, aside from the fact that his chamber was just
beside the room of the staff.
Judge Pacuribot contended that Ms. Villafrancas charges were improbable. He assessed
her to be a very intelligent woman with a strong personality. Ms. Villafranca is well connected,
because she is a recognized illegitimate daughter of a certain Polkem Motomull, a one-time
member of the Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental and nephew of Mrs. Ruthie Guingona,
incumbent City Mayor of Gingoog City. A sister of her father is the Assistant City Auditor of
Gingoog City, while Judge Pacuribots predecessor, Judge Potenciano de los Reyes, is her
fathers first cousin-in-law. RTC Judge Downey Valdevilla of Cagayan de Oro City is also her
uncle; and even Judge Pacuribots court aide, Abellana, is her fathers first cousin. Considering
the big family of Ms. Villafranca, anyone will think, not just twice, but several times, before
doing anything against her. Ms. Villafranca will not just allow herself to be raped and beaten by
a stranger like him in Gingoog City. He found out that, as indicated in the police blotter
of Gingoog City, Ms. Villafranca reported that she was raped and mauled by Mr. Ricky Lee
Villfranca, her husband, who carted away important belongings at about 2:00 a.m. of 26 May
2005. He claimed that if Ms. Villafranca could report her husband to the police for said offense,
then she should have reported him also to the police if her allegations were true.
Judge Pacuribot denied calling Ms. Villafranca through her cellphone. On the contrary, it
was she who was calling him. She also sent him adoring or alluring text messages including
seductive notes and poems. He claimed that being a happily married man, he ignored the
flirtatious and seductive advances of Ms. Villafranca, to her consternation and bewilderment. He
claimed that her adulation of him came to an abrupt end and metamorphosed into an intense
hatred and dislike after he issued the 6 June 2005 Order in Criminal Case No. 2004-2879
entitled, People v. Anunde pointing out her incompetence, inexperience and unprofessional

attitude toward her work. He opined that the charges of Ms. Villafranca are typical under the
adage, Hell hath no fury than a woman scorned.
Judge Pacuribot further complained that Ms. Villafranca would follow up cases of her
relatives in his sala.
After weighing the evidences and arguments of all the parties, Investigating Justice DyLiacco Flores found:
FATHERHOOD UNPROVEN
On the Anonymous Letters about [Judge Pacuribots] illegitimate fatherhood, the
Investigator finds the claim unsupported by any documentary evidence. Although the
certification of the hospitals administrative officer proves correct the claim in the anonymous
letter as to (1) the hospital; (2) the identity of the mother; (3) the number of children delivered;
and (4) the date of birth of the two children, but it did not shed light on the identity of the
childrens father. In this case, the certificates of birth of the two (2) children mentioned in the
anonymous letter showing [Judge Pacuribots] fatherhood would be the best evidence adequate
to prove the claim. With no-record-of-birth-certifications issued by the local civil city registrar
and the office of the Civil Registrar General, no finding of guilt can be made.
RAPE AND SEXUAL HARASSMENTS PROVEN BEYOND REASONBLE DOUBT
Ms. Villafrancas story of rape and repeated sexual harassments is credible. [Judge
Pacuribots] defense of denial and alibi failed to overcome complainants evidence.
On the rape in Butuan City motel, [Judge Pacuribot] insists on the improbability of his
presence at the scene of the crime because he alleges that he does not go out at night in Gingoog
City without company for two (2) reasons that he is security conscious and that there is an NPA
threat on his person.
Firstly, [Judge Pacuribots] being security conscious is no proof of improbability in going
to Butuan City. So many criminals are security conscious yet they go out alone at night to
commit a crime. Hence, his being security conscious could not have deterred him to go out.
Secondly, his claim of an NPA threat on his person is suspect. He claims that he learned
he was marked for NPA liquidation when he was given a copy of the affidavits of two (2)
captured NPAs named Marvin Lumod and Rico Roselem marked as Exhibits 22 and 23
respectively. Unfortunately, these two (2) affidavits will not help [Judge Pacuribot]. Marvin E.
Lumods Affidavit is dated 20 June 2006 while Rico A. Roselems Affidavit is dated 19 June
2006. The incident in Butuan City occurred on 22 February 2005. The reason, therefore, in not
wanting to go out at night without company on 22 February 2005 was still absent. [Judge
Pacuribots] alibi that he was in Gingoog City on 22 February 2005 is backed up by the
testimonies of SPO1 Ronald Espejon and Placido Abellana. But these two are his loyals aside
from the fact that Abellana, as his court aide, is also one whose employment is under control and

supervision of [Judge Pacuribot]. Thus, on that account, their testimony must be taken with
grain of salt. Their testimony cannot discredit the straightforward testimony of Ms. Villafranca
on how [Judge Pacuribot] deceived her twice on the purpose and on the place. He invited her
for dinner but ravished her instead. They agreed on The Mansion in Gingoog City for the dinner,
yet drove her to a Butuan City motel.
[Judge Pacuribot] asks: Why did Ms. Villafranca not report to the authorities that he
sexually assaulted her, if true, when she even reported to the police that her husband raped her on
26 May 2005? [Judge Pacuribot], to prove that Ms. Villafranca reported to the Police, presented
Annex 3, a certified copy of an entry in the Police Blotter of Gingoog City. [Judge Pacuribot]
should have noted that in that certified copy, it is shown that it was his security officer, SPO1
Ronald Espejon, not Ms. Villafranca, who had the report entered in the police blotter. The
certification did not say that Ms. Villafranca appeared at all in the Police Station and had the
incident blottered. All that Ms. Villafranca did was to ask Espejon for assistance because he was
beaten by her husband.
[Judge Pacuribot] claims that the administrative charge is Ms. Villafrancas reprisal
against him. He claims that Ms. Villafranca appears to be fatally attracted to him and that he
remains steadfast in his refusal to reciprocate he atrociously immoral and misdirected adoration
to him. He claims the administrative charge is proof of the fury of a woman scorned. On the
fatal attraction [Judge Pacuribot] cited the text messages, notes and cards he claims Ms.
Villfranca sent him. Ms. Villaffranca explained how he has always demanded of her to send him
those, the reason for which she could not fathom then. He would even have cards in his chamber
and then summon her to sign them. When she resists, he would let out a barge of insults and
threats. [Judge Pacuribots] possession of those letters, cards, and text messages was adequately
explained by Ms. Villafranca.
[Judge Pacuribots] theory of Ms. Villafrancas fatal attraction and misdirected
adoration of him is funny. He never disputed the testimony of the two (2) complainants that
[Judge Pacuribot] is reputed in the Hall of Justice as terror, that he is fond of humiliating
people in public, using excoriating language on his victim, that female employees avoid him and
veer away from him when they meet in the Hall of Justice. He also failed to specifically deny
the claim of Ms. Villafranca that he housed his mistress, Sheryl Gamulo, in Motomul St.,
Gingoog City. He also failed to specifically deny her claim that he sired a ten (10) year old
daughter in Ozamis City. Will all the dark side of his character publicly known, hardly would a
twenty-nine (29) year-old, very pretty married woman who [Judge Pacuribot] claims is very
intelligent fall for such character. Thus, [Judge Pacuribots] claim of Ms. Villafrancas fatal
attraction and misdirected adoration of him becomes incredible.
[Judge Pacuribot] asks why did Ms. Villafranca allow herself to be raped and victimized
over a prolonged period of time when there were people capable of helping or protecting her
considering her illustrious, although illegitimate, lineage? Further, if he committed sexual
abuses on Ms. Villafranca at his rented room which was very near the police station, why did she
not shout or report to the police?

The fact that Ms. Villafranca is well connected in Gingoog City was actually not a boon
but a bane. It was on that account that she wanted to protect at all costs their family from any
scandal. [Judge Pacuribot] capitalized on it with his constant threat that he will bring scandal to
them by making public her half naked picture taken in the motel. Her wanting to protect her
family from shame cowed her into silence and submission. Her testimony demonstrates that. It
reads:
Atty. Kho:
Q:
A:

A cellphone picture that is what you are afraid of?

No, also his added threats that he is going to tell my mother-in-law, that he is going to destroy
me, that I am nobody, that my family is no good, and that he would call me burikat,
burikat. He would call me that name. Yawa ka. Animal ka. Sumunod ka nako.
(Atty. Ignes Div. Clerk of Court interpreting:)
Burikat means a whore. You lewd devil, and you have to follow me.
xxxx

Q:
A:

Why did you allow him to do that to you?

Because he constantly tells me that he will develop that picture, he will show that to my motherin-law and then he will destroy me and he will create a scandal in Gingoog City.

Q:
A:

Is it not that you are well-connected?

My husband is not around, Attorney.

Q:
A:

And?
And what? How could I explain to them that I was there? How he took my picture? How am I
going to? I dont know. I just wanted to protect my family from my shame, from any
scandal. And he knew that it would be his hold to me. And he knew that I would be very careful
with the name that my family had, that is why he is constantly threatening me with such same
argument, you know: Ikaw and madaot ani. Ino ning huan tanan.

(Atty. Ignes:)
You will be destroyed because of this.
Ms. Villafranca said she was scared of [Judge Pacuribots] person and how intimidating
he could be and how evil he could be. She feared him because when she resists him he would
tell her madaot ka ani. (You will be destroyed because of this.) So she had to yield to him
because she knew he could do what he threatens to do to destroy her. She points to the Order
dated 6 June 2005 in People v. Anude of how indeed he had destroyed her.
[Judge Pacuribot] claims in his Comment and Consolidated Memorandum that Ms.
Villafranca is a very intelligent girl and with strong personality, reasons why it is improbable to

make her a victim of rape and sexual harassments. And yet, when he issued the Anude Order, he
made her look like she is an irredeemable incompetent who cannot spell, who uses high
falutin words in her Post Sentence Investigation Report which she herself may not have
understood, whose sentence construction is horrendous, her proper noun is written with small
letter and that her adjectives or adverbs do not fit the things or persons described. [Judge
Pacuribot] engages in double talk.
In the three paged Anude Order, [Judge Pacuribot] tried to show that Ms. Villafrancas
incompetence is toxically mixed with acute haughtiness because Ms. Villafranca refuses to
consult the judge or see him or refused to come to him even when summoned repeatedly. [Judge
Pacuribot] should not gripe. He summoned Ms. Villafranca to his chamber on 25 May
2005. Once inside, [Judge Pacuribot] slapped her for not filing her petition for annulment of
marriage and her head with his clenched fist. He planted on her neck kiss marks which he said
he wanted her husband to see. When Ms. Villafrancas husband saw them later, he beat her. At
2:00 am of 26 May 2005, SPO1 Ronald Espejon claims that Ms. Villafranca called him for
assistance. It was the start of Ms. Villafrancas growing defiance to [Judge Pacuribot], a fact that
roiled him to point of issuing the Anude Order eleven (11) days later.
[Judge Pacuribot] also belittled Ms. Villafranca repeatedly in said Order by referring to
here as MERE Clerk II/understudy Johanna M. Villafranca of Gingoog City Parole and
Probation Office, calling her visibly inexperienced mere clerk, very raw, and that her report
was atrocious. He ordered her Post Sentence Investigation Report returned OFFICIALLY to
the superior of Ms. Villafranca for proper corrections. [Judge Pacuribot] stated therein that Ms.
Villafranca cannot be located in her office as she is always absent per information in her
office. He stated that she should not be allowed to practice making post sentence investigation in
preparation for a desired promotion.
The Anude Order is the classic proof of how Ms. Villafrancas disobedience to [Judge
Pacuribot] ended up in her destruction Madaut ka ani. The Order destroyed her person and
her career. Therein, he has beaten Ms. Villafrancas career to a pulp. Any superior of Ms.
Villafranca who will read the Anude Order will block any desire of Ms. Villafranca for
promotion which the latter was aiming for at the time. She rued with tears how the Anude
Order displaced her from her job.
[Judge Pacuribots] repeated harping in said Order about Ms. Villafrancas failure to
consult him and to come to him even when summoned, rendered more believable Ms.
Villafrancas claim that [Judge Pacuribot] would summon her to his chamber on the pretext of
official matters and thereafter subject her to his lasciviousness conduct.
[Judge Pacuribots] claim that Ms. Villafranca was part of Ms. Waniwans conspiracy was
unproven. All the Sun Star pictures of Ms. Tans filing of the criminal complaint before the City
Prosecutors Office did not show at any instance the face of Ms. Villafranca. Also, she made it
clear in her testimony that sometime in February 2006, when Ms. Tan filed her criminal
complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor, two other media men called her up to see if
they can get a copy of her Affidavit-Complaint. But she refused to prevent the public from
knowing what she went through.

Indubitably, Ms. Villafrancas testimony and the anguish that came with it can only come
from a very sad experience. Even on the very delicate matters where [Judge Pacuribot] had
stripped her mercilessly of her dignity and womanhood, Ms. Villafranca was frank and
straightforward, proof of how outraged she was when [Judge Pacuribot] had raped her and had
sexually harassed her repeatedly.
Her spontaneity in answering the cross examination questions, the anguish she revealed
in court, her very natural and coherent way of telling how she was ravished and abused
repeatedly as an underling leaves no room to doubt her testimony and the things she said under
oath in her Affidavit Complaint, her Rejoinder, and her Sworn Statement. Her tears could only
be the clues to her righteous indignation against the indignities she suffered from [Judge
Pacuribot]. Indeed, the conviction to reveal the truth must have been so strong that she had to
come back to the country hurdling employment restrictions and the difficulty of not having saved
enough yet for her trip back just to testify in this case.
[Judge Pacuribots] claim that her administrative charge is a fabrication is unacceptable
against the avalanche of Ms. Villafrancas evidence. The Investigator cannot find any valid
reason to sustain [Judge Pacuribots] denial and alibi as a defense.
[Judge Pacuribot] is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge of rape
in Butuan City and guilty of multiple sexual harassment committed inside respondent judges
chamber and in his rented room in Gingoog City. His claim that Ms. Villafrancas charge is a
fabrication is unacceptable considering the avalanche of evidence against him.
While [Judge Pacuribot] committed physical assault on Ms. Villafranca on 25 May 2005
when after summoning her to his chamber, he slapped her for not filing the petition to annul her
marriage and hit her head with his clenched fist, the same is deemed absorbed by the offense of
sexual harassment considering that brute force and intimidation had always been used by [Judge
Pacuribot] to commit said offenses.
On the eight (8) occasions that [Judge Pacuribot] had carnal knowledge of Ms.
Villafranca in his rented room while [Judge Pacuribots] gun was always displayed on the table,
implying the commission of rape, the same are treated as sexual harassments only for Ms.
Villafrancas failure to state when they were committed and to provide details on those
occasions.
Ms. Tans agony started with [Judge Pacuribots] deception. He made her believe he will
bring her in his car to the bus terminal from Pryce Plaza Hotel, only to surprise her after riding
with him by bringing her to the City Lodge Motel to ravish her. Again, while about to leave City
Lodge Motel, he deceived her again by telling her that he will bring her now to the bus terminal,
only to bring her to the Discovery Hotel, so that he can ravish her some more later. Aside from
deception, [Judge Pacuribot] uses extravagantly another tool intimidation. Immediately after
Ms. Tan settled herself on the front seat on that infelicitous night of 20 October 2004, he
immediately had his bag between them, the bag Ms. Tan knows contains [Judge Pacuribots]
gun. Also, he used on her an uncouth language in a loud voice, an irrational temper, a fake

message of urgency to rattle Ms. Tan and make her jump to obedience without thinking. By the
time Ms. Tan realized [Judge Pacuribots] repulsive intentions, it was too late to fight back
because she had been trapped in the motel.
His repeated intimidating warnings on Ms. Tan that she could harm her if she disobeys
were indeed proven true. On 24 November 2004, Ms. Tan was severely and publicly scolded
before her office mates, a fact that was affirmed by Atty. Wilfredo Bibera. Her performance
rating from Very Satisfactory slipped down to Satisfactory in 2005.
[Judge Pacuribot] uses force and cruelty on his hapless victims. When he ordered her to
do oral sex on him and she refused, he pulled her hair and pushed her face to his penis with an
order: Suck it. Let it in till deep your throat. Let my penis reach your throat. He tightened his
hold on her that she was frightened he might break her neck. In pain, she had to plead: Dont
pull my hair, sir. Its very painful. What a sadist you are. While he was sucking her nipple and
mashing her breasts, he was telling her: This is the breast of a lustful woman. While he was
planting vile kisses on her neck to produce chiquinini on her, he told her: I am going to plant
lots of kiss marks here to let the people know that you passed through my hands. Upon hearing
it, Ms. Tan cried. Indeed, [Judge Pacuribot] is a sadist beyond description capable of declaring
his unconcealed intention to parade her to the public as his victim.
At the trial, when issues would touch on her tender feelings towards her family or when it
would recall [Judge Pacuribots] cruelty that crushed her respectability or the delicateness of her
womanhood, she would invariably sob on the witness stand. The way he ravished her and
sexually harassed her showed how irrationally lewd or unbearably cruel he was.
Even when Ms. Tan was already abused, still the thought that he is her superior had never
been lost to her. Ms. Tan has always addressed him Sir.
Why did you bring me here, Sir? Didnt I tell you I will just take a taxi to Agora Terminal?
Dont pull my hair, Sir. It is very painful. What a sadist you are.
You are so rude, Sir, we work in the same office yet you disgrace me.
Sir, I just take a taxi to Agora.
[Judge Pacuribots] moral ascendancy over Ms. Tan was an undeniable factor to her blind
submission to his depravity.
[Judge Pacuribot] pointed to Ms. Tans inefficiency, her not being a happily married
woman, that her husband is a wife beater and a violent man, that she is in financial straits who
even run to him for help. It is precisely these weaknesses, personal problems, and economic
difficulties which added to Ms. Tans inability to fight back and made her so submissive. She
was the ideal prey. As she was made to admit during her cross examination, she is the lone
breadwinner in the family with two (2) children to support.

[Judge Pacuribot] challenges Ms. Tans claim of rape and repeated sexual harassments by
arguing, to wit:
Why did she not refuse to go with respondent when he allegedly fetch her at Pryce Plaza Hotel
on 20 October 2004 and instead go voluntarily with him?
At the Discovery Hotel, if indeed she stayed and slept there all by herself, why did she not
escape or call for help and instead wait for respondent to arrive the next morning? So that he can
sexually assault her again? Or why did she fail to ask for help from any of the hotel staff or from
anybody while in the Discovery Hotel?
If she immediately reported to the police authorities the maltreatment of her son by her
husband, why did she not complain of the alleged incidents of sexual harassments and acts of
lasciviousness she experienced from the respondent?
Despite her claims of having been subjected to rape, sexual harassment and acts of
lasciviousness, why did she gleefully socialize with respondent during their Christmas party and
respondents birthday celebration?
Ms. Tan had only two (2) options
Lose her job by promptly fighting back at [Judge Pacuribot]; or
Keep her job tolerating him with muffled defiance.
Ms. Tan had correctly assessed the far reaches of his influence. When she was looking
for a lawyer to help her file the administrative charge, no lawyer in Gingoog City would like to
accept her case. She had to look for one in Cagayan de Oro City. She was thus correct to
wonder while she was in Discovery Hotel whether anyone there would come her aid if [Judge
Pacuribot] will start harming her.
Ms. Tan as a victim cannot be put in the same footing as other rape victims where the
offender holds no control on the victims survival and has no moral ascendancy over
her. Fighting back immediately against the offender is a rational move. In the case at bench,
[Judge Pacuribots] moral ascendancy and influence over her was a given. It was that together
with his flair to humiliate people and his blackmails which made her succumb to his sexual
abuses. Ms. Tan values her job; in fact, she consciously keeps track of her performance ratings.
An underling who believes that her immediate superior wields control over her continued
employment or sudden separation from service will cower in fear to the point of tolerating the
indignities committed on her. As [Judge Pacuribot] impressed on her, looking for a new job at
her age is not easy.
At the time that [Judge Pacuribot] was taking advantage of Ms. Tan, [Judge Pacuribots]
proverbial explosives temper and short fuse were being put to good use to terrorize her with
remarkable frequency. That dark spot in his character which has been brought up front in other

peoples consciousness in the months following his arrival in the Hall of Justice as a terror is
enough intimidation. To Ms. Tan, to submit now and complain later is a good, albeit
temporary, shelter against immediate public humiliation or job separation. Thus, Ms. Tans
failure to report to the police is understandable.
Also, [Judge Pacuribot] seems to have a masterful skill on how to exploit his victims
weaknesses. Ms. Tan is a stenographer, a position she has difficulty coping with because as
[Judge Pacuribot] noted, her spelling, her grammar and her knowledge of the English language
are not at par with the demands of her job. He has warned her of her inefficiency and of
staying late in the evening as manager of the internet caf. He pointed to her joining without
prior SC permission a trip to Hongkong on a weekend in a packaged tour for stenographers in
Cagayan de Oro City. Thus, with such faults and difficulties, she is the ideal prey. Her fear of
losing a source of livelihood has made her behave submissive to him.
[Judge Pacuribots] alibi that on October 20 and 21, 2004, he was in Gingoog City and it
was impossible for him to be in Cagayan de Oro City on those days does not impress. It fails to
establish the impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime. With the convenience of his
car, [Judge Pacuribot] could travel and be in different places, one after another in a short
time. After all, the incidents on October 20 and 21, 2004 were all beyond office hours.
To support [Judge Pacuribots] claim that he was present on those days in Gingoog City,
he presented his Certificate of Service for the month which shows that he was only on leave
on October 4 to 7, 2004.
Noteworthy is the testimony of Ms. Tan stating that when she met [Judge Pacuribot] on
Monday in their office after the rape incident, the latter told her not to file anymore her leave for
October 20 and 21, 2004 and bragging, Ako na gud ni, kinsay magbuot nako? (It is me, who
will prevail against me). If he can forego the filing of application for leave for his subordinates,
much more is there reason for him not to submit an application for leave for his own absence
reason why his Certificate of Service for the month of October is not reliable.
On 21 October 2004 a Thursday, all schedule of hearing were cancelled and [Judge
Pacuribot] said that they were cancelled the week before. Was the cancellation the week before
due to the fact that [Judge Pacuribot] received the notice of their Masonic Conference scheduled
on October 20 in Cagayan de Oro City? It was [Judge Pacuribot] who informed Ms. Tan of that
Masonic Conference that evening of October 20. Ms. Tan could not just have invented that idea
of a Masonic Conference. That is the reason why the cancellation of hearing on October 21 casts
doubt on [Judge Pacuribots] alibi.
Mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a witness. A mere denial, like
alibi, is a self-serving negative evidence, which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight
than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between a
categorical testimony that rings of truth on one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former is
generally held to prevail.

[Judge Pacuribot] cites Ms. Tans merry behavior during the Christmas Party and his
Birthday Party in Cagayan de Oro City as hardly the behavior of a rape victim or a victim or
repeated sexual harassments. Normally, such a victim is expected to behave with animosity and
grievance toward the offender. Unfortunately for her, she cannot afford to display such
animosity and grievance unless it is at the cost of her job. If she cannot defy his demands when
he victimizes her, shouldnt her economic realities prompt her to win her war with
friendship? [Judge Pacuribot] should be reminded that in sexual harassments under Section 3 of
RA No. 7877, an offense is committed regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement
for submission is accepted by the subject of said act.
Ms. Tans testimony was clear, frank and consistent. Her candid and clear-cut account of
how respondent judge had been deceitful and intimidating in his dealings with her that evening
has inspired belief. And throughout her testimony, she succeeded in revealing how [Judge
Pacuribot] took full advantage of his moral ascendancy over her as his underling, destroying
whatever resistance she could put up by belittling her, outwitting her and insulting her to reduce
her to submission.
There is no standard reaction of a victim in a rape incident. In fact, not every victim of
rape can be expected to act in conformity with the expectations of anyone who has not been
subjected to the same danger at any time. The workings of a human mind placed under
emotional stress are unpredictable; people react differently.
Investigator, thus, finds [Judge Pacuribot] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges
of rape committed on October 20 and 21, 2004 in Cagayan de Oro City, and guilty of sexual
harassments committed in respondent judges chamber in RTC, Branch 27, Hall of
Justice, Gingoog City against Ms. Sherlita O. Tan.
One can see in these two cases a common strategy used by [Judge Pacuribot] in achieving
his vile purposes. He used deceit on Ms. Tan. He used deceit on Ms. Villafranca. He used
intimidation on Ms. Tan and he used it on Ms. Villafranca. He makes use of a substantial
blackmail against both.
In the case of People v. Fernandez, the Supreme Court had occasion to instruct us on the
effects of intimidation, thus:
Physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats and intimidation are
employed, and the victim submits herself to her attackers because of fear. Besides, physical
resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman involuntarily succumbed to the lust
of an accused. Rape victims show no uniform reaction. Some may offer strong resistance while
others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. The use of a weapon, by itself, is
strongly suggestive of force or at least intimidation, and threatening the victim with a gun is
sufficient to bring her into submission. Thus, the law does not impose upon the private
complainant the burden of proving resistance.
[Judge Pacuribot] computed nine (9) months, twenty-one (21) days as interval from the
time Ms. Villafranca claimed she was raped on 22 February 2005 to 13 December 2005 when she

filed the complaint. Ms. Tan also filed her administratively charge only thirteen (13) months of
being his superiors prey. Did delay cast doubt on the truthfulness of their claim?
In the case of People v. Aguero, Jr., where there was a two (2) years delay in the filing of
the complaint for rape, the Supreme Court said:
As to the alleged two-year delay in the filing of the complaint, suffice it to say, that
complainants failure to promptly report the incident does not sufficiently detract from her
credibility and cannot be taken against her. It has been held that a rape victims delay or
hesitation in reporting the crime does not destroy the truth of the complaint and is not an
indication of deceit as it is common for a rape victim to prefer silence for fear for her aggressor
and lack of courage to face the public stigma of having been sexually abused.
In the case of People v. Espinosa, where the criminal complaint was filed about one and a
half years from commission of the offense, the Supreme Court said:
x x x Delay in reavealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated
charge. Many victims of rape never complain or file criminal charges against the rapist, for they
prefer to silently bear the ignominy and pain, rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk
the offenders making good on his threats. This is understandable, considering the inbred
modesty of Filipinas and their aversion to the public disclosure of matters affecting their honor.
Delay in the filing of the charges does not necessarily undermine the credibility of
witnesses.
The Supreme Court has deemed delay as justified when there is fear of reprisal, social
humiliation, familial considerations and economic reasons. In the case of Ms. Tan, her tormentor
is her superior who constantly dangles his influence and power over her and her job. As regards
Ms. Villafranca, the threat to destroy her, her family and her familys good name was ever
present; thus, haunting her emotionally and psychologically. The delay in reporting the rape
cases committed by [Judge Pacuribot] has been justified.
On the repeated sexual harassments and violence committed separately on the persons of
Ms. Tan and Ms. Villafranca within the chamber of [Judge Pacuribot], the latter deems them
improbable because of the situation in his chamber. He points out that outside his chamber is the
staff room and there is a glassed window that divides them. Ms. Villafranca cited the incident on
13 October 2005 where [Judge Pacuribot] did lascivious acts on her inside the chamber in the
presence of Placido Abellana, the court aide, and the latters just turned his back and pretended to
see nothing.
In the case of People v. Lavador, the rapist-appellant argued that rape was impossible due
to the presence of the victims son on her side. The Supreme Court said:
Nor can we accept the argument that the rape was improbable due to the presence of
Nonilunas sons by her side. This Court has repeatedly declared that lust is no respecter of time
and place and rape can be committed even in places where people congregate: in parks, along

the roadside, within the school premises, inside the house where there are several occupants and
even in the same room where other members of the family are sleeping. x x x.
[Judge Pacuribots] defense of improbability cannot, therefore, be accepted.
[Judge Pacuribot] declares that the charges against him are complainants tools of
revenge against him. He cites his Order in People v. Anude and his letter reporting Ms.
Villafrancas negligence as reasons from Ms. Villafrancas anger and resentment. Against Ms.
Tan, he cites his warning against her inefficiency as stenographer, her moonlighting in her
internet cafhis refusal to grant her a loan ofP200,000.00 or being her guarantor.
In the case of Simbajon v. Esteban, the Supreme Court in believing the testimony of the
complainant saying:
The investigating judge correctly disregarded the respondents imputation of ill motive
on the part of complainant. No married woman would cry sexual assault, subject herself and
her family to public scrutiny and humiliation, and strain her marriage in order to
perpetuate a falsehood.
Indeed, it is against human nature for a married woman to fabricate a story that would not
only expose herself to a lifetime of dishonor, but destry her family as well. Besides, there is no
sufficient evidence of any ill-motive imputable to Mesdames Tan and Villafranca to narrate
anything other than their respective desire to tell the truth and seek redress for the wrong
inflicted on each of them. For the kind of reputation [Judge Pacuribot] has in the Hall of Justice
and by his behavior where he projects himself as full of influence and power, these two women
will be the last to even cross the path of respondent judge without just cause. Thus, the
presumption applies that, one will not act and prevaricate and cause damnation to one who
brought him no harm or injury.
[Judge Pacuribots] theory that all these charges are part of the sinister plan to oust [Judge
Pacuribot] from office at the instigation of Ms. Waniwan is far fetched.
On 8 December 205, or earlier, when Ms. Tan filed her complaint, there was no Mr.
Waniwan to speak of. Mr. Waniwan only materialized in February 2006 when she filed the same
charges against [Judge Pacuribot] before the City Prosecutor of Gingoog City. Media men at the
slightest clue of a scoop hound without let up those who could be sources of
information. When the media men became nosey, it was already in February 2006 when Ms. Tan
filed the case in the Prosecutors Office. By then, the filing of the administrative charge of Ms.
Tan and Ms. Villafranca was fait accompli. In the case of Ms. Villafranca, the Waniwan theory is
patently absurd. Two media men were eager in February 2006 to take hold of Ms. Villafrancas
affidavit but she refused them staunchly. It is incredible that two (2) married women would
prevaricate against a person who has power and control over their jobs at the mere urging of Mr.
Waniwan is irrelevant. In People v. Mortales, the Supreme Court, speaking through now Chief
Justice Renato Puno, appositely said:

No married woman would subject herself to public scrutiny and humiliation to foist a
false charge of rape. Neither would she take the risk of being alienated from her husband and her
family. The fact that the victim resolved to face the ordeal and relate in public what many
similarly situated would have kept secret evinces that she did so to obtain justice. Her
willingness and courage to face the authorities as well as to submit to medical examination are
mute but eloquent confirmation of her sincere resolve.
Finally, it may be true there are minor and trivial discrepancies in Ms. Tans testimony,
but they neither impair the integrity of the victims evidence as a whole nor reflect negatively on
the witness honesty. Such inconsistencies, which might have been caused by the natural
fickleness of memory, even tend to strengthen, rather than weaken the credibility of the witness,
for they shake off the suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.
In sum, [Judge Pacuribot] should be made administratively liable for the charges against
him in A.M. Nos. RTJ-06-1982 and RTJ-06-1983.
Blacks Law Dictionary defines integrity to mean soundness or moral principle and
character. It is said to be synonymous with probity, honesty, and uprightness. The
evidence adduced indubitably show that [Judge Pacuribot] lacks the honesty in dealing with his
two subordinates herein. Not only did he fail to live up to the high moral standard expected of a
member of the Judiciary but he has transgressed the norms of morality expected of every person.
[Judge Pacuribots] offenses in raping his victims and sexually harassing them were
committed with aggravation. He knew they were married but instead of helping strengthen or
protect their marriage, he tried his best to destroy their marital bonds.
Indeed, [Judge Pacuribots] reprehensible acts amount to gross misconduct, and
immorality the depravity of which is quite rare. They undoubtedly violated the Code of Judicial
Conduct. They are classified as severe charges under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 22 of the same Rules, any of the following sanctions may be imposed if
the respondent is guilty of a serious charge:
1.
Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court
may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, That the forfeiture
of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2.
Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more that three (3)
but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3.

A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

In Simbajon v. Esteban, the respondent Judge Esteban, for his sexual advances on one of
his female subordinates which consisted of grabbing her, kissing her all over her face,
embracing her and touching her right breast was preventively suspended for the duration of the

investigation until further notice AND was subsequently dismissed from service with forfeiture
of all retirement benefits except leave credits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch
or instrumentality of the government, including government owned or controlled corporations.
Herein [Judge Pacuribots] conduct is far worse that those of Judge Esteban. [Judge
Pacuribots] acts indubitably went far beyond the bounds of decency and morality. He raped and
repeatedly sexually assaulted, not only one, but two female, married subordinates. He did not
only violate his victims womanhood and their dignities as persons but he aimed to weaken, then
eventually destroy two families. By such act, [Judge Pacuribot] disgraced his noble office, as
well as the judiciary, in the eyes of the public. He has shown himself unworthy of the judicial
robe.
When the fading sobs of two tearful women finally died down and their copious tears
dried in the numerous hankies that absorbed them what emerges is a figure that unmistakably
exudes the abominable torpedo of marital bonds, a practicing deceiver and a merciless pervert
whose face is unrecognizable as he is hooded with a judicial robe that helps conceal his dark
side. His family, wife and children may have all been innocently kept away from knowing this
dark side and to spare them from the afflictive and crushing humiliation of having a husband and
father of such a character, may the foregoing description be a for your eyes only to the
members of the highest court and the court administrator.
Thus, Investigating Justice Dy-Liacco Flores recommended:
This finding is made with full awareness of the recent Supreme Court ruling on quantum
of evidence required in the cases at bench. In the 7 August 2007 case of Alquizar v. Carpio, et
al., the Supreme Court pronounced that:
x x x. In administrative or disciplinary proceedings, the burden of proving the allegations
in the complaint rests on the complainant. While substantial evidence would ordinarily suffice to
support a finding of guilt, the rule is a bit different where the proceedings involve judges charged
with grave offense. Administrative proceedings against judges are, by nature, highly penal in
character and are to be governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases. The quantum of proof
required to support the administrative charges or to establish the ground/s for the removal of a
judicial officer should thus be more than substantial; they must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. To borrow from Reyes v. Mangino:
Inasmuch as what is imputed against respondent Judge connotes a misconduct so grave that,
if proven, would entail dismissal from the bench, the quantum of proof required should be more
than substantial.
It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does
not mean such a degree of proof as to exclude the possibility of error and produce absolute
certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in
an unprejudiced mind. The evidence adduced here overwhelmingly established moral certainty

that respondent judge raped and sexually harassed complainant Mesdames Tan and Villafranca
on separate and repeated occasions.
xxxx
Having found [Judge Pacuribot] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses of rape
and repeated sexual harassments, the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of
retirement benefits except accrued leave credits is hereby recommended.[11]
We agree in the recommendation of the Investigating Justice.
We have reviewed the record of this case and are thereby satisfied that the findings and
recommendations of the Investigating Justice are in truth adequately supported by the evidence
and are in accord with applicable legal principles. We therefore resolve to adopt such findings
and recommendations relative to the administrative liability of the respondent judge for grave
misconduct and immorality.
The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer
justice, but also upon the perception and confidence of the community that the people who run
the system have administered justice. At times, the strict manner by which we apply the law
may, in fact, do justice but may not necessarily create confidence among the people that justice,
indeed, has been served. Hence, in order to create such confidence, the people who run the
judiciary, particularly judges and justices, must not only be proficient in both the substantive and
procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must possess the highest integrity,
probity, and unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and in their private
lives. Only then can the people be reassured that the wheels of justice in this country run with
fairness and equity, thus creating confidence in the judicial system.
With the avowed objective of promoting confidence in the Judiciary, the Code of Judicial
Conduct has the following provisions:
Canon I
Rule 1.01:
independence.

A Judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and

Canon II

Rule 2.00:
all activities.

A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in

Rule 2.01:
A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
We have repeatedly reminded members of the Judiciary to so conduct themselves as to be
beyond reproach and suspicion, and to be free from any appearance of impropriety in their

personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their official duties but also in their everyday
lives. For no position exacts a greater demand on the moral righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the Judiciary. Judges are mandated to maintain good moral character
and are at all times expected to observe irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage public
decency. We have adhered to and set forth the exacting standards of morality and decency,
which every member of the judiciary must observe. [12] A magistrate is judged not only by his
official acts but also by his private morals, to the extent that such private morals are externalized.
[13]
He should not only possess proficiency in law but should likewise possess moral integrity for
the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright man.
We explained the rationale for requiring judges to possess impeccable moral integrity,
thus:
The personal and official actuations of every member of the Bench must be beyond
reproach and above suspicion. The faith and confidence of the public in the administration of
justice cannot be maintained if a judge who dispenses it is not equipped with the cardinal judicial
virtue of moral integrity, and if he obtusely continues to commit an affront to public decency. In
fact, moral integrity is more than a virtue; it is a necessity in the judiciary.[14]
We also stressed in Castillo v. Calanog, Jr.[15] that:
The code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of [even] a
whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to
his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a
public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with
propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained, a judges official life can not simply
be detached or separated from his personal experience. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept
restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal
behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above
suspicion.
Judge Pacuribot miserably failed to measure up to these exacting standards. He behaved
in a manner unbecoming a judge and model of moral uprightness. He betrayed the people's high
expectations and diminished the esteem in which they hold the Judiciary in general.
It is well settled that in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of
proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. Substantial evidence is that
amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.[16] In the cases at bar, the complainants Ms. Tan and Ms. Villafranca were able to
adequately substantiate their allegations.

We find totally unacceptable the temerity of Judge Pacuribot in subjecting the

complainants, both his subordinates, to his unwelcome sexual advances and acts of
lasciviousness. Over long periods of time, he persistently solicited sexual favors from Ms.Tan
and Ms. Villafranca. When they refused, he made their working conditions so unbearable that
Ms. Tan was eventually forced to transfer to another office and Ms. Villafranca to seek
employment abroad. Certainly, no judge has a right to solicit sexual favors from any court
employee, even from a woman of loose morals. [17] Judge Pacuribots conduct indubitably bears
the marks of impropriety and immorality. Not only do his actions fall short of the exacting
standards for members of the judiciary; they stand no chance of satisfying the standards of
decency even of society at large. His severely abusive and outrageous acts, which are an affront
to women, unmistakably constitute sexual harassment because they necessarily x x x result in
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee[s].[18]
We need not detail again all the lewd and lustful acts committed by Judge Pacuribot in
order to conclude that he is indeed unworthy to remain in office. The narration of the
Investigating Justice was sufficiently thorough and complete. The audacity under which the
sexual violation of the complainants were committed and the seeming impunity with which they
were perpetrated by Judge Pacuribot shock our sense of morality. All roads lead us to the
conclusion that Judge Pacuribot has failed to behave in a manner that will promote confidence in
the Judiciary. His actuations, if condoned, would damage the integrity of the Judiciary,
fomenting distrust in the system. Hence, his acts deserve no less than the severest form of
disciplinary sanction -- dismissal from the service.
On his part, Judge Pacuribot put up the defense of denial, attributing ill feelings and bad
motives to Ms. Tan and Ms. Villafranca.
Already beyond cavil is the evidentiary rule that mere denial does not overturn the
relative weight and probative value of an affirmative assertion. Denial is inherently a weak
defense. To be believed, it must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability; otherwise,
such denial is purely self-serving and is with no evidentiary value. Like the defense of alibi,
denial crumbles in the light of positive declarations. [19] Denial cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused by the witnesses who had no ill motive to testify falsely. Moreover,
in the case at bar, there is utter lack of basis to sustain the purported ill motives attributed by
Judge Pacuribot to the complainants. The Investigating Justice correctly disregarded Judge
Pacuribots imputation. No married woman would cry sexual assault, subject herself and her
family to public scrutiny and humiliation, and strain her marriage in order to perpetrate a
falsehood.[20] The only plausible and satisfactory explanation for us is that the charges against
respondent are true.
Judge Pacuribot and his witnesses failed to overcome the evidence presented by the
complainants.
Let it be remembered that respondent has moral ascendancy and authority over
complainants, who are mere employees of the court of which he is an officer. His actuations are
aggravated by the fact that complainants are his subordinates over whom he exercises control

and supervision, he being the executive judge. He took advantage of his position and power in
order to carry out his lustful and lascivious desires. Instead of acting in loco parentis over his
subordinate employees, he was even the one who preyed on them, taking advantage of his
superior position.[21]
In sum, we concur with the Investigating Justice in holding that complainants were able
to muster the requisite quantum of evidence to prove their charges against Judge Pacuribot. By
having sexual intercourse with Ms Tan and Ms. Villafranca, his subordinates, respondent violated
the trust reposed on his high office and completely failed to live up to the noble ideals and strict
standards of morality required of members of the Judiciary.
Having tarnished the image of the Judiciary, we hold, without any hesitation, that Judge
Pacuribot be meted out the severest form of disciplinary sanction - dismissal from the service for
the charges of sexual harassment against him.
We, however, find the complaints of the Anonymous Letter Writers without
merit. Beyond the bare allegations that Judge Pacuribot maintained an illicit relationship with a
certain Sheryl Gamulo and fathered two children with her, there is nothing in the records that
would indicate that he, indeed, committed the crime charged. We have stressed time and again
that allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence. Mere allegation is not evidence and is not
equivalent to proof.[22] The letter dated 4 April 2005 from concerned citizens asking for the
relief of Judge Pacuribot on the grounds that he has been terrorizing and harassing most of the
employees has been rendered moot by the disposition of these cases.
All those who don the judicial robe must always instill in their minds the exhortation that
[T]he administration of justice is a mission. Judges, from the lowest to the highest levels are
the gems in the vast government bureaucracy, beacon lights looked upon as the embodiments of
all that is right, just and proper, the ultimate weapons against injustice and oppression. The
Judiciary hemorrhages every time a Judge himself transgresses the very law he is sworn to
uphold and defend at all costs. This should not come to pass.[23]
WHEREFORE, Judge Rexel M. Pacuribot is hereby DISMISSED from the service for
gross misconduct and immorality prejudicial to the best interests of the service, with forfeiture of
all retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government,
including government-owned and controlled corporations, except the money value of accrued
earned leave credits. Respondent judge is hereby ORDERED to cease and desist immediately
from rendering any order or decision; or from continuing any proceedings, in any case
whatsoever, effective upon receipt of a copy of this Decision. Lastly, respondent judge
is REQUIRED to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be disbarred as a member of the
Philippine Bar.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Department of Justice for appropriate action.
This Decision is immediately executory. The Office of the Court Administrator shall see
to it that a copy of this resolution be immediately served on respondent.

SO ORDERED.
CASE 30
Soriano vs MTRCB (Laguardia)
Ang Dating Daan host Eliseo S. Soriano uttered the following statements in his TV program
against Michael Sandoval (Iglesia ni Cristos minister and regular host of the TV program Ang
Tamang Daan):
Lehitimong
anak
ng
demonyo[!]
Sinungaling
[!]
Gago ka talaga[,] Michael[!] [M]asahol ka pa sa putang babae[,] o di ba[?] []Yung putang
babae[,] ang gumagana lang doon[,] []yung ibaba, dito kay Michael[,] ang gumagana ang
itaas, o di ba? O, masahol pa sa putang babae []yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga
demonyong ito.
As a result, The MTRCB initially slapped Sorianos Ang Dating Daan, which was earlier given a
G rating for general viewership, with a 20-day preventive suspension after a preliminary
conference. Later, in a decision, it found him liable for his utterances, and was imposed a threemonth suspension from his TV program Ang Dating Daan. Soriano challenged the order of the
MTRCB.
HELD:
The SC ruled that Sorianos statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the
average child, and thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected speech. Citing
decisions from the US Supreme Court, the High Court said that the analysis should be context
based and found the utterances to be obscene after considering the use of television
broadcasting as a medium, the time of the show, and the G rating of the show, which are all
factors that made the utterances susceptible to children viewers. The Court emphasized on how
the uttered words could be easily understood by a child literally rather than in the context that
they
were
used.
The SC also said that the suspension is not a prior restraint, but rather a form of permissible
administrative sanction or subsequent punishment. In affirming the power of the MTRCB to
issue an order of suspension, the majority said that it is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly
impose under its charter without running afoul of the free speech clause. visit
fellester.blogspot.com The Court said that the suspension is not a prior restraint on the right of
petitioner to continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already issued to
him by MTRCB, rather, it was a sanction for the indecent contents of his utterances in a G
rated TV program. (Soriano v. Laguardia; GR No. 165636, April 29, 2009)
Dissenting Opinion:
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in a separate dissenting opinion, said that a single government
action could be both a penalty and a prior restraint. The Chief Magistrate pointed out that the

three month suspension takes such form because it also acts as a restraint to petitioners future
speech and thus deserves a higher scrutiny than the context based approach that the majority
applied. In voting to grant Sorianos petition, the Chief Justice said that in the absence of proof
and reason, he [Soriano] should not be penalized with a three-month suspension that works as a
prior restraint on his speech.
CASE 31 (FULLTEXT)
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA) (PSLINKTUCP), petitioner, vs. PERLITA BATHAN-VELASCO, Officer in Charge, Bureau of Labor
Relations, ALERT AND CONCERNED EMPLOYEES FOR BETTER SSS (ACCESS),
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court, with prayer for temporary restraining order, filed by Social Security System
Employees Association (SSSEA), seeking to annul and set aside the Order of the Bureau of
Labor Relations[1] dismissing the election protests or motions to annul the certification elections
among the rank and file SSS employees.
On September 28, 1989, respondent Alert and Concerned Employees for Better Social
Security System (ACCESS) filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition for certification
election to determine the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file
employees of respondent Social Security System (SSS).
On August 24, 1990, the Bureau of Labor Relations ordered a certification election to be
conducted among the rank and file employees of the Social Security System in its main office
and regional branches.
Petitioner Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) (PSLINK-TUCP) was
one of the contending parties in the certification election, with respondent Alert and Concerned
Employees for Better SSS (ACCESS) as the other party.
On October 11, 1991, the certification elections were held, with ACCESS garnering 1,378
votes, SSSEA obtaining 1,116 votes, and No Union collecting 40 votes.[2]
On October 16, 1991, SSSEA filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations, an election protest
and/or motion to annul the certification Election. Director Calleja of the Bureau of Labor
Relations, in an Order dated March 20, 1992, denied the protest and/or motion.
On September 29, 1992, SSSEA filed an Election Protest and/or Motion to Nullify
Certification Elections in the SSS Regional Office After October 11, 1991.
On November 18, 1992, respondent Velasco denied the Election Protest and/or Motion to
Nullify Certification Elections in the Regional Offices After October 11, 1991, declared
ACCESS the winner in the certification election, and certified ACCESS as the sole and exclusive

bargaining representative of all the rank and file employees of SSS for the purpose of negotiating
an agreement with the latter.[3]
On January 25, 1993, respondent Velasco denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
The rule is well-entrenched that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before
resorting to the courts.[4] The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to
ones cause of action.[5] This rule would not only give the administrative agency an opportunity
to decide the matter by itself correctly, but would also prevent the unnecessary and premature
resort to courts.[6]
In this case, petitioner failed to take an appeal from the order of the Director, Bureau of
Labor Relations to the Secretary of Labor, pursuant to Article 259 of the Labor Code.[7]
Absent a showing that petitioner had availed itself of an exhausted the appropriate
administrative remedies, a premature resort to the courts would result in the dismissal of the
petition.
Moreover, the issues raised by petitioner call for a review of the factual findings of public
respondent. Petitioner argues that the certification election should not have proceeded because
of the pendency of a formal charge of a company-initiated, dominated, or supported union with
the bureau of Labor Relations.[8] Petitioner further contends that no certification election was
held in the regional offices of respondent SSS on October 11, 1991, resulting in incomplete
certification election, thereby rendering null and void the proclamation of ACCESS as the winner
of the election.
Unfortunately for petitioner, factual issues are not proper subjects of an original petition
for certiorari before the Supreme Court, as its power to review is limited to questions of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion of judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals or officials.
[9]
Judicial review does not extend to an evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which
the proper labor officer or office based his or its determination.[10]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

CASE 32 (FULLTEXT)

RAMON R. YAP,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 158562

Present:

- versus -

PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:

COMMISION
ON
AUDIT,
April 23, 2010
Respondent.
x----------------------- -------------------------x
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, in accordance with Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary
injunction. The said Petition seeks to annul and set aside the following decisions of respondent
Commission on Audit (COA): (1) COA Decision No. 2002-213 [1] dated September 24, 2002 on
the Request of Mr. RAMON YAP for reconsideration of the decision of the Director, Corporate
Audit Office II (CAO II), affirming the disallowance of various allowances and reimbursements
paid to him in his capacity as Vice-President for Finance and Treasurer of the Manila Gas
Corporation (MGC); and (2) COA Decision No. 2003-087[2] dated June 17, 2003, denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts of this case as gathered from the assailed COA Decision No. 2002213[3] are as follows:

x x x Ramon R. Yap is holder of a regular position of Department Manager of the National

Development Company (NDC), a government-owned and controlled corporation with original
charter. He was appointed by the Board of Directors, Manila Gas Corporation (MGC), a
subsidiary of NDC as Vice-President for Finance effective June 14, 1991 while remaining as a
regular employee of NDC. The additional employment entitled him to honoraria equivalent to
fifty percent (50%) of his basic salary at NDC and various allowances attached to the office.
In the course of the regular audit, the Corporate Auditor, MGC issued the following notices of
disallowances against Mr. Ramon R. Yap:
Notice of
Disallowance
ND 99- 03(98)MGC

Date

Amount

03/26/99 P3,330.00

ND 99-10(98)MGC

04/12/99

2,848.00
1,500.00

ND 99-12(98)MGC

04/12/99

789.00

ND 99-16(98)MGC

09/09/99

4,180.56

ND 99-07(98)IIGSI

08/28/99 11,500.00

ND 99-14(98)IIGSI
08/31/99 7,000.00
ND 99-09(99)MGC
05/26/00 119,508.90
ND 2000-01(99)MGC 03/31/00 2,304.32
ND 2000-08(99)MGC 03/31/00 21,523.00
ND 2000-07(99)MGC 03/31/00 445.00
1,862.00
ND 2000-01(99)MGC 5/11/00

35,433.70

Nature
Subscription to National
Geographic and Readers
Digest
Car maintenance
allowance
Annual fee of VISA card
Representation expense
on a Sunday
Fellowship with other
PCA club Members on
Sunday
Car maintenance
allowance
Executive check-up
Monthly allowance
Car maintenance
allowance
Monthly allowance
Car maintenance
allowance
Car maintenance
allowance
Gasoline allowance and
drivers subsidy

which were predicated on the ground that appellants appointment to MGC in addition to his
regular position as Department Manager III of NDC and the subsequent receipt of the questioned
allowances and reimbursements from the former directly contravened the proscription contained
in Section 7 (2) and Section 8, Article IX-b of the Constitution to wit:
Section 7. x x x

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no

appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
Section 8. x x x
No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double or
indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, x x x
Mr. Yap appealed the Auditors disallowances primarily contending that the questioned
benefits were all approved by the MGC Board of Directors. x x x x.
Petitioners appeal was denied by the CAO II, [4] which affirmed the MGC Corporate
Auditors findings that the allowances and reimbursements at issue were given in violation of
Sections 7(2) and 8, Article IX-b of the 1987 Constitution.
Unperturbed, petitioner sought a reconsideration of the CAO II ruling from respondent
COA via a Letter[5] addressed to the COA Chairman wherein he argued that his assignment to
MGC was required by the primary functions of his office and was also authorized by law, namely
Executive Order No. 284 issued on July 25, 1987, the pertinent provision of which provides:
SECTION 1. Even if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, a
member of the Cabinet, undersecretary, assistant secretary or other appointive official of the
Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions
in the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation
therefore: Provided, That this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to
boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman. (Emphasis supplied.)
In turn, respondent COA denied petitioners appeal in herein assailed COA Decision No.
2002-213.[6] It upheld the CAO IIs ruling that characterized the disallowed allowances and
reimbursements as prohibited by the Constitution. Furthermore, it also ruled that the said
allowances and reimbursements claimed by petitioner failed to pass the test of public purpose
requirement of the law and further emphasized that it is not enough that payments made to
[petitioner] be authorized by the Board of Directors of the MGC but it is likewise necessary that
said payments do not contravene the principles provided for under Section 4 of [Presidential
Decree No.] 1445 on the use of government funds, more specifically on the public purpose
requirement that is provided in Section 4(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known
as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, to wit:
Section 4. Fundamental Principles. Financial transactions and operations of any
government agency shall be governed by the fundamental principles set forth hereunder, to wit:
xxxx

(2) Government funds or property shall be spent or used solely for public purposes.
In elaborating this point, respondent COA stated that:
x x x [T]his Commission sees no connection to link payments for subscription to the National
Geographic and Readers Digest, car maintenance allowance, annual fee of VISA card,
representation on a Sunday, a non-working day, fellowship with PCA club members to social
services, promotion of the general welfare, social justice as well as human dignity and respect for
human rights, slum clearance, low-cost housing, squatter resettlement, urban and agrarian reform
and the like. For it is not enough that payments made to him be authorized by the Board of
Directors of the MGC but it is likewise necessary that said payments do not contravene the
principles provided for under Section 4 of P.D. 1445 on the use of government funds.
Viewed from all the foregoing premises, it is regretted that the herein request for
reconsideration of Mr. Yap is DENIED. Accordingly, the audit disallowances as heretofore
mentioned are affirmed in toto.[7]
A Motion for Reconsideration[8] was subsequently filed by petitioner, but this was likewise
denied by respondent COA in COA Decision No. 2003-087,[9] wherein it ruled that although
petitioner was correct in arguing that there was no legal impediment to the validity of petitioners
appointment as Vice-President and Treasurer of MGC and to his entitlement to compensation for
the second office, [s]ince the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 has been upheld by
the Court insofar as other appointive officials are concerned x x x[,] however, of more
important consideration is the condition sine qua non, that government funds or property shall
be spent or used solely for public purpose (Section 4(2), PD 1445). Therefore, respondent COA
affirmed its original finding that the disallowed allowances and reimbursements did not satisfy
the public purpose requirement. The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby
DENIED and the assailed COA Decision No. 2002-213 dated September 24, 2002 is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
Hence, this Petition wherein petitioner puts forth the following grounds in support:
I
RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON AUDIT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT USED AS A BASIS
THE PUBLIC PURPOSE REQUIREMENT IN AFFIRMING THE QUESTIONED
DISALLOWANCES
II

RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK

OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DISALLOWANCES ON A GROUND
[different from the ground] RELIED UPON BY THE RESIDENT AUDITOR
III
ASSUMING, WITHOUT CONCEDING, THAT THE PUBLIC PURPOSE REQUIREMENT IS
RELEVANT TO THE PRESENT CASE, RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON AUDIT STILL
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISALLOWED ALL THE ALLOWANCES RECEIVED BY
HEREIN PETITIONER[10]
We rule to deny the instant Petition.
As regards the first ground, petitioner puts forward the argument that although it cannot
be denied that the MGC, being a government-owned and controlled corporation, is under the
jurisdiction of respondent COA, the respondents act of subjecting the salaries, allowances and
benefits of MGC employees to the public purpose test is not only wrong, but also an act of
grave abuse of discretion since the said salaries, allowances and benefits are intended to
compensate MGC employees for services performed on behalf of the corporation. According to
petitioner, if the public purpose requirement will be applied in auditing these salaries,
allowances and benefits being given to government employees, no such compensation could ever
pass audit, as, by their very nature, they are solely intended to benefit their recipients, who are
the employees of the government department, office, agency or corporation concerned.[11]
We cannot countenance petitioners misleading assertion on this point. The mere act of
disbursing public funds to pay the allowances and salaries of government employees does not by
itself constitute release of government funds for public purpose as petitioner would want us to
believe; otherwise, as petitioner dares to conclude, no salary, benefit or allowance would ever
pass the requisite government audit. This is a rather simplistic and narrow view of the nature of
government employee compensation. Not unlike other government expenditures, it is necessary
that the release of public funds to pay the salaries and allowances of government employees must
not contravene the law on disbursement of public funds. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
1445 lays out the basic guidelines that government entities must follow in disbursing public
funds, to wit:
Section 4. Fundamental principles. Financial transactions and operations of any
government agency shall be governed by the fundamental principles set forth hereunder, to wit:
(1)
No money shall be paid out of any public treasury or depository except in
pursuance of an appropriation law or other specific statutory authority.
(2)
Government funds or property shall be spent or used solely for public
purposes.
(3)
Trust funds shall be available and may be spent only for the specific purpose for
which the trust was created or the funds received.

(4)
Fiscal responsibility shall, to the greatest extent, be shared by all those exercising
authority over the financial affairs, transactions, and operations of the government agency.
(5)
Disbursements or disposition of government funds or property shall invariably
bear the approval of the proper officials.
(6)
Claims against government funds shall be supported with complete
documentation.
(7)
All laws and regulations applicable to financial transactions shall be faithfully
adhered to.
(8)
Generally accepted principles and practices of accounting as well as of sound
management and fiscal administration shall be observed, provided that they do not contravene
existing laws and regulations. (Emphases supplied.)
To summarize, any disbursement of public funds, which includes payment of salaries and
benefits to government employees and officials, must (a) be authorized by law, and (b) serve a
public purpose.
In this regard, it is necessary for this Court to elaborate on the nature and meaning of the
term public purpose, in relation to disbursement of public funds. As understood in the
traditional sense, public purpose or public use means any purpose or use directly available to the
general public as a matter of right. Thus, it has also been defined as an activity as will serve as
benefit to [the] community as a body and which at the same time is directly related function of
government.[12] However, the concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here
as elsewhere, the idea that public use is strictly limited to clear cases of use by the public has
been discarded.[13] In fact, this Court has already categorically stated that the term public
purpose is not defined, since it is an elastic concept that can be hammered to fit modern
standards. It should be given a broad interpretation; therefore, it does not only pertain to those
purposes that which are traditionally viewed as essentially government functions, such as
building roads and delivery of basic services, but also includes those purposes designed to
promote social justice. Thus, public money may now be used for the relocation of illegal
settlers, low-cost housing and urban or agrarian reform. [14] In short, public use is now equated
with public interest,[15] and that it is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a
limited number of persons.[16]
To our mind, in view of the public purpose requirement, the disbursement of public
funds, salaries and benefits of government officers and employees should be granted to
compensate them for valuable public services rendered, and the salaries or benefits paid to such
officers or employees must be commensurate with services rendered. In the same vein,
additional allowances and benefits must be shown to be necessary or relevant to the fulfillment
of the official duties and functions of the government officers and employees. We cannot accept
petitioners theory that the compensation and benefits of public officers are intended purely for
the personal benefit of such officers, or that the mere payment of salaries and benefits to a public
officer satisfies the public purpose requirement. That theory would lead to the anomalous
conclusion that government officers and employees may be paid enormous sums without limit or
without any justification necessary other than that such sums are being paid to someone

employed by the government. Public funds are the property of the people and must be used
prudently at all times with a view to prevent dissipation and waste.
With regard to the second ground, petitioner underscores the fact that respondent COA
abandoned the ground of double compensation as a basis for the questioned disallowances and
affirmed the same on the new ground that the allowances did not meet the test of public purpose
requirement. Petitioner argues that this was an arbitrary and whimsical action on the part of
respondent COA, since petitioner had already legally justified his opposition to the ground
originally cited by the MGC Corporate Auditor in support of the questioned disallowances, and
yet respondent COA affirmed said disallowances on a new ground failure to pass the public
purpose requirement - that was never mentioned in the findings made by the MGC Corporate
Auditor and the CAO II ruling that was appealed to respondent COA by the petitioner. [17] In
response, respondent COA maintains that there is no provision in the Constitution, the
Government Auditing Code or the Administrative Code that restricts its power and authority to
examine and audit government expenditures to merely reviewing and deciding on the validity of
the findings and conclusions of its auditors.[18]
In resolving this issue, it is imperative that we examine the powers vested in respondent
COA by the pertinent laws of the land. The 1987 Constitution has made the COA the guardian
of public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenue
and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property including the exclusive authority to
define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods for such
review, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations.[19] Section 11, Chapter 4,
Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 echoes this constitutional mandate
given to COA, to wit:
Section 11. General Jurisdiction. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power,
authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and
receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or
pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a postaudit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal
autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such nongovernmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the
Government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a
condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control system of the audited
agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or
special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the
general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve
the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to
define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required
therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.

In light of these express provisions of law granting respondent COA its power and
authority, we have previously ruled that its exercise of its general audit power is among the
constitutional mechanisms that give life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of
government.[20] Furthermore, we have also declared that COA is endowed with enough latitude to
determine, prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures of government funds.[21]
Based on the foregoing discussion and due to the lack or absence of any law or
jurisprudence saying otherwise, we rule that, in resolving cases brought before it on appeal,
respondent COA is not required to limit its review only to the grounds relied upon by a
government agencys auditor with respect to disallowing certain disbursements of public
funds. In consonance with its general audit power, respondent COA is not merely legally
permitted, but is also duty-bound to make its own assessment of the merits of the disallowed
disbursement and not simply restrict itself to reviewing the validity of the ground relied upon by
the auditor of the government agency concerned. To hold otherwise would render COAs vital
constitutional power unduly limited and thereby useless and ineffective.
As a third ground for the petition, petitioner also contends that assuming, without
conceding, that the other allowances and benefits do not pass the public purpose test, the rest
of the allowances, such as the basic monthly allowances, executive check-up and the gasoline
allowances should not be disallowed, as they are normally given to officers of corporations,
whether private or government-owned and controlled.[22]
We cannot uphold petitioners plausible but unsubstantiated argument on this point since,
as previously discussed, respondent COA is in the best position to determine which allowances
and benefits may be properly allowed under the circumstances, as it is the sole constitutional
body mandated to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of,
and expenditures or uses of funds and property owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations such as the MGC and the
NDC in the case at bar. Even if we assume the truth of petitioners assertion that the said
allowances are normally given, this fact alone does not operate to preclude respondent COA
from performing its constitutional mandate.
That certain allowances are enjoyed by corporate officers in the private sector does not
justify the grant of the same benefits to similarly designated public officers, even if they are
officers of government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs), which perform purely
proprietary functions. As aptly observed by the Solicitor General, the funds of GOCCs are still
public funds and that is precisely the reason such funds are subject to audit by the COA. Thus,
there is a valid distinction between the officers of public corporations and those of private
corporations.
To reiterate, the public purpose requirement for the disbursement of public funds is a
valid limitation on the types of allowances and benefits that may be granted to public officers. It
was incumbent upon petitioner to show that his allowances and benefits were authorized by law

and that there was a direct and substantial relationship between the performance of his public
functions and the grant of the disputed allowances to him.
While subscriptions to newspapers and magazines by government offices may be justified,
petitioners personal subscriptions to magazines and the annual fee of his credit card cannot ipso
facto be considered as part of his remunerations or benefits as a public official.
There is likewise no evidence that the purported representation and fellowship
expenses on weekends are necessary and related to petitioners work as Vice-President of
Finance and Treasurer of the MGC. We find no reason to believe that as an MGC officer, his
duties include business relations or clientele-building functions, since a finance officer and
treasurer, even in the private sector, is ordinarily tasked with accounting, disbursement and
custody of corporate funds.
Medical expenses, such as those for an executive check-up, may be justified if
specifically authorized by the appropriate laws, rules or circulars. However, petitioner failed to
point to the existence of such law or regulation applicable to his case. It also appears from the
records that petitioner already receives medical benefits from the NDC, [23] and that the ground
cited by the MGC Corporate Auditor for the disallowance of his expense for executive check-up
was his own failure to submit appropriate supporting documents to claim such benefit.[24]
The COAs disallowance of the car maintenance, gasoline allowance and drivers subsidy
was likewise in order since petitioner neither alleged nor proved that these benefits were also
authorized by law or regulation.[25] He did not even allege that the car was an official company
vehicle or that the driver was an employee of the MGC. On the contrary, the MGC Corporate
Auditor found that the vehicle involved was the personal vehicle of petitioner, although it was
granted to him under an NDC car plan, and that he was already receiving gasoline and/or
transportation allowance from the NDC.[26] It was also found that petitioner reported to the MGC
office, at most, once a week to attend meetings; and documents, which required his signature,
were often brought to him at the NDC. [27] Since petitioner did not dispute these findings, he
failed to show that the grant of similar or additional gasoline and transportation benefits to him
by the MGC was warranted.
In order to demonstrate the legality of the grant of his benefits, it was insufficient for the
petitioner to assert that the disputed allowances and benefits were approved by the board of
directors of the MGC. Such board action should in itself be authorized by law or regulation or
have valid legal basis. Otherwise, it becomes an illegal corporate act that is void and cannot be
validated.[28] In this case, the MGC board action that permitted the disallowed disbursements
was not shown to have complied with Section 15(d) of both Republic Act No. 8522 and
Republic Act No. 8745, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998 and the
General Appropriations Act of 1999, respectively, which provide:
Sec. 15. Restrictions on the Use of Government Funds. No government funds shall be
utilized for the following purposes:
xxxx

d. To pay honoraria, allowances or other forms of compensation to any government

official or employee, except those specifically authorized by law;
xxxx
The provisions of this Section shall also apply to government- owned and/or controlled
corporations.
On a final note, petitioner claims that respondent COA acted with grave abuse of
discretion since, as a result of the disallowances, petitioner in effect rendered his services to
MGC for free. This, petitioner points out, would constitute unjust enrichment on the part of
MGC.[29]
We have ruled before that there is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a
benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains the money or property of another against
the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience. [30] In the case at bar, the
assailed COA Decision No. 2002-213 dated September 24, 2002 and the CAO IIs
1st Indorsement dated December 12, 2000 recognized that petitioners appointment to the Board
of Directors of MGC entitled him to honoraria equivalent to fifty percent (50%) of his basic
salary at NDC and various allowances attached to the office. [31] Furthermore, petitioners own
assertion in his Motion for Reconsideration of COA Decision No. 2002-213 belies his claim of
being totally uncompensated, since petitioner stated therein that [a]s the NDC representative in
MGC, he was not getting the entire compensation package for such position. [32] Thus, petitioner
did not render his services to MGC for free, because it did not appear that his honoraria were
among the expenditures that were disallowed by respondent COA.
We have previously declared that it is the general policy of the Court to sustain the
decisions of administrative authorities, especially one that was constitutionally created like
herein respondent COA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers, but also of
their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. It is, in fact, an oft-repeated
rule that findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when
the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave
abuse of discretion.[33] Thus, only when the COA acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may this Court
entertain a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[34]
There is grave abuse of discretion when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment
rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism. [35] In the case at
bar, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent COA in issuing the assailed
Decisions. On the contrary, we hold that respondent COAs pronouncements in both assailed
rulings were made in faithful compliance with its mandate and in judicious exercise of its general
audit power as conferred on it by the Constitution and the pertinent laws.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed COA
Decision No. 2002-213 dated September 24, 2002 and COA Decision No. 2003-087 dated June
17, 2003 are both AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
CASE 33
Pharmaceutical & Health Care Assn. Of the PH vs Duque III
G.R. No. 173034 (October 9, 2007)
In this case, the Court noted the provision of CEDAW on pregnancy and lactation, and set the
constitutional parameters for the implementation of a law promoting breastfeeding, among
others.
Facts: Petitioners sought to nullify A.O. No. 2006-0012 entitled, Revised Implementing Rules
and Regulations x x x (RIRR) of E.O. 51, or what is popularly known as the Milk Code. The
Milk Code was issued by President Corazon Aquino on 28 October 1986, by virtue of the
legislative powers granted to the President under the Freedom Constitution. [In 1990, the
Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Art. 24 of said
instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and
child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are
informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. (Such subjects are similarly covered under the
CEDAW.)] More than a decade later, on 15 May 2006, the DOH issued the assailed RIRR (which
was to take effect on 7 July 2006). Subsequently, on 28 June 2006, the Petitioner, representing its
members-manufacturers of breast milk substitutes, assailed the RIRR by positing the latters
invalidity as it contained provisions that were deemed unconstitutional, such as several
preambular clauses to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected,
and that, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breast
milk substitutes.
Held: The petition was partially granted. 4(f), 11 and 46 of the RIRR were declared null and
void for being ultra vires.
Noting that CEDAW only provides, in general terms, that the country must diminish infant and
child mortality and inform society of the advantages of breastfeeding, the Court held that 4(f)
and 11 of the RIRR insofar as it absolutely prohibited the advertising, promotion, and
marketing of breast milk substitutes, and 46, as it provided for administrative sanctions not
found in the Milk Code. The questioned rules went beyond the provisions of the Milk Code,
thereby amending and expanding the coverage of the said law. However, the rest of the RIRR
were deemed constitutional, especially those relating to the power delegated to the Department
of Health to ensure that there is adequate, consistent and objective information on breastfeeding
and use of breastmilk substitutes, supplements and related products; and the power to control
such information.
CASE 34
Mirasol v DPWH

Admin Order No. 1 - Revised Rules and Regulations governing limited access
facilities/highways
Dept. Order No. 74 North/South Luzon Expressway as limited access highway.
Dept. Order No. 215- Coastal Road- as limited access highway
Dept. Order # 123 400 cc motorized vehicle allowed in limited access highways.
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari
Facts: Sec Raquiza of DPWC issued AO 1 which prohibits motorcycles on limited access
highways.
Petitioner filed petition for declaratory judgment with application for TRO and injunction.
Petition sought declaration of nullity of AO 1, DO 74, DO 123, DO 215.
TRO has been granted
RTC dismissed petition but declaring DO 123 VOID for the reason that it is violative of
equal protection clause.
Motion for Reconsideration- Denied, hence a petition in SC.
Issue: Whether or not AO 1 and DO 123 unconstitutional.
Held: DO 74 and DO 215 VOID DPWH has no authority to declare certain expressways as
limited access facilities.
DPWH has no authority to regulate activities relative to transportation
Transportation Regulatory Board cannot derive its power from DPWH for the reason that
DPWH can not delegate power which it does not possess.
DOTC not DPWH has the authority to regulate, restrict or prohibit access to limited access
facilities.
AO 1 does not impost unreasonable restrictions.
Merely outlines several precautionary measures, to which toll ways users must adhere.
Reasons:
Rules to ensure safety.
Uninhibited flow of traffic.
Toll way is not an ordinary road, special purpose which necessitates the imposition of guidelines
in the manner of its use and operation.
Rights restricted does not invalidate rules.
Reason measure of validity of governmental regulation.
AO 1 not oppressive in requiring other means of transportation it is a condition/requirement for
the use of facility.
Police Power use of reason and not oppressive.
The petition has been granted partially DO 74, 215, 123 VOID
AO 1 VALID
CASE 35

Boracay Landowners vs DENR

NOTE: This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 167707 (Secretary of DENR vs Yap).
Land Titles and Deeds Land Classifications Boracay Cases Positive Act by
the Government in Reclassifying Lands
These are two consolidated cases. In G.R. No. 167707, Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al filed for
declaratory relief to have a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling
purposes for the land theyve been occupying in Boracay. Yap et al alleged that Proclamation No.
1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied
lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12,
1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and
paid realty taxes on them.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for
declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the
public domain. It formed part of the mass of landsclassified as public forest, which was not
available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the
Revised Forestry Code. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable,
whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership. RTC Ruled in favor of Yap et al. The
OSG appealed.
G.R. No. 173775
During the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, PGMA issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying
Boracay Island into four hundred(400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and
six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and
disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of
the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area
reserved for forest land protection purposes. This was on May 22, 2006
Subsequently, Dr. Orlando Sacay, and other Boracay landowners in Boracay filed with this Court
an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They
allege that the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay.
They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time
immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands
and building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.
The OSG again opposed Sacays petition. The OSG argued that Sacay et al do not have a vested
right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land
pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island
are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the
executive department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain
into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to
release the lots for disposition.
ISSUES: Whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for
respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay
Island.
HELD: The SC ruled against Yap et al and Sacay et al. The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all
lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands that have not

been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of
the inalienable public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, there must be a positive act of the government, such as
an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes. In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented. The records are bereft of
evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were
subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such wellnigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by
private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed.
Also, private claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay
Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926 ipso facto converted the island
into private ownership. Private claimants continuedpossession under Act No. 926 does not
create a presumption that the land is alienable. It is plain error for petitioners to argue that
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private
individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law.
There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No.
141, namely:
(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time
immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and
(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first element of
possession. The SC noted that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private claimants
were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this
Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.
Yap et al and Sacay et al insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in
possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the
island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and investments give them a vested
right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically
give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land
they are presently occupying. The SC is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the
evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private
claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions
in Boracay even with their continued possession and considerable investment in the island.
CASE 36 (NO CASE IN THE SYLLABUS)

CASE 37
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) vs DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE
DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR. vs
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD, & AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. vs COMELEC
Qualifications of a Senator or a Member of the HOR
In 2002, RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented. Sec
36 thereof requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary
and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged
before the prosecutors office with certain offenses. On 23 Dec 2003, COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local
elections. Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for re-election in the May elections, filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of
RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to
those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from
implementing Resolution No. 6486. According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a
maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of
the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and
Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug
test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as
drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or
COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 is an amendment to the Constitution on the
qualifications of Senators.
HELD: Pimentels contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is
basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is
null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must
conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their
defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to
the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. The provision
[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has
undergone mandatory drug test. Is not tenable as it enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC
cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and
regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in
addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to
meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The
right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted
impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.

CASE 38
Simon vs. CHR (G.R. No. 100150 Jan 5, 1994)
CHRs power to cite for contempt should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted
operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers.
A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in
his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management
Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents
(being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said
notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within
which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition
notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be
removed to give way to the "People's Park". On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President
Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR
against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to
be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the
private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was
docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580. On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the
petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution
of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to
appear before the CHR. In an Order, dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in
contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the
"order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them.
Issue: Whether or not the CHR has jurisdiction:
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose
stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of
Quezon City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners for contempt;
Held: a) Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily
apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its
attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance,
mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of
prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5)
salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious." While the
enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a
statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the
delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the
CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that
"Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the
authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation." In the particular case at
hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and

carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is

planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA
of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The
consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed
paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first
place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards
hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not
prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia
of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving
civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution.
b) No, on its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational
guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with
the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised
rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the
appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of
Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to
violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its
investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against
persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant
information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work.
The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance before us,
however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does
not possess.
CASE 39
1. Blanco v. The Board of Medical Examiners
46 Phil. 190 (1924)
Facts:
The petitioners took the examinations prescribed by law for a physicians certificate and
apparently passed the same. The Board of Medical Examiners thereupon submitted the final
results of the examinations to the Department Head for confirmation. But the Secretary of the
Interior held the matter in abeyance, pending the outcome of an investigation conducted by the
Undersecretary of the Interior.
The finding of the special investigator was that the questions on the subjects of the medical
examinations had leaked out before said dates. Following the recommendation of the
Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Interior annulled the results of the examinations.
The last paragraph of section 776 of the Medical law, as found in the Administrative Code, and
as last amended by Section 10 of act No. 3111, provides that the results of all examinations
including the average and grades obtained by each applicant, shall be submitted for confirmation

to the Department Head (secretary of the Interior) and made known to the respective candidates
within one month after the date of the examinations.
Issue:
Is this duty of the Secretary of the Interior Ministerial in nature?
Held:
No.
1. Duty of Secretary under the law.
Under the plain terms of the Medical Law, it is the discretionary duty of the Secretary of the
Interior to confirm or as in this instance, to annul the report of the medical examiners. To hold
that the secretary of the Interior must in all cases confirm, shutting his eyes to any irregularity, no
matter how glaring, would convert him to an automatic rubber stamp for imprinting the requisite
approval. That the Department Secretary who appoints the members of the Board Medical
Examiners, who has the power of confirmation of the report of the Board, cannot do more than
perform the clerical duty of approving the results of the examinations, under any and all
circumstances, is too specious an argument to merit serious consideration.

2. Mandamus not available to review exercise of discretion by a public officer.

It is elementary law that the writ of mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of
the discretion of a public officer. Where the law imposes upon a public officer the right and duty
to exercise judgement, in reference to any matter to which he is called upon to act, it is his
judgement that is to be exercised and not that of court. If the law imposes a duty upon a public
officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary and nor ministerial.
3. Mandamus may issue to correct abuse of discretion.
It is likewise elementary law that mandamus may issue to correct abuse of discretion, if the case
is otherwise proper. But here, the record discloses that the Secretary of the Interior did not
exercise the power granted to him to manifest injustice, or with gross abuse.
CASE 40
NG GIOC LIU V SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
85 PHIL 842
REYES; March 31, 1950
FACTS
-Ng Gioc Liu presented to the DFA a letter from the Commissioner of Immigration, requesting
that the Philippine Consulate at Amoy, China, be authorized to issue a returning resident visa to
Mariano Uy as an emancipated minor son of said Ng Gioc Liu, the Commissioner being satisfied
that this minor was born in Manila in 1928, but that, having gone to China in 1930 to study and

having stayed there since then, he has to have a visa to return to the Philippines.
-The Commissioner's request was not granted, hence, this petition to compel the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs to authorize the issuance of the visa in question.
ISSUE
WON the giving of a visa is not a ministerial act that may be compelled by mandamus
HELD
Yes.
-The Immigration Act of 1940, which is still in force, permits resident aliens who leave the
Philippines provided they have not relinquished their residence here. Upon returning they are
considered non-immigrants, but they are required by section 10 of the Act to present for
admission into the Philippines unexpired passports and valid passport visas issued by a consular
officer. Section 12 direct that passport visa be not issued to an applicant who fails to establish
satisfactorily his non-immigrant status or whose entry into the Philippines would be contrary to
the public safety.
-The determination of whether or not an applicant for a visa has a non-immigrant status and
whether or not his entry into this country would be contrary to public safety, is not a simple
ministerial function. It involves the exercise of discretion and cannot therefore be controlled by
mandamus.
-The fact that the Commissioner of Immigration has made his own investigation and is himself
satisfied that the applicant is entitled to his claim is immaterial. For the consular officers are not
bound by the findings and conclusions of the immigration office
Disposition Petition is denied
CASE 41
LOURDES D. RUBRICO, et al.,Petitioners, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, et al,
Respondents
FACTS:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 19of
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule), Lourdes D. Rubrico, Jean Rubrico Apruebo, and
Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel assail and seek to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated July 31, 2008.
The petition for the writ of amparo dated October 25, 2007 was originally filed before
this Court. After issuing the desired writ and directing the respondents to file a verified written
return, the Court referred the petition to the CA for summary hearing and appropriate action.
On April 3, 2007, armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security
Squadron (AISS, for short) based in Fernando Air Base in Lipa City abducted Lourdes D.
Rubrico (Lourdes), then attending a Lenten pabasa in Bagong Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite, and
brought to, and detained at, the air base without charges. Following a week of relentless
interrogation - conducted alternately by hooded individuals - and what amounts to verbal abuse
and mental harassment, Lourdes, chair of the Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa Adhikan, was

released at Dasmarias, Cavite, her hometown, but only after being made to sign a statement that
she would be a military asset.
Lourdes has filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for kidnapping
and arbitrary detention and administrative complaint for gross abuse of authority and grave
misconduct against Capt. Angelo Cuaresma (Cuaresma), Ruben Alfaro (Alfaro), Jimmy Santana
(Santana) and a certain Jonathan.
The petition prayed that a writ of amparo issue, ordering the individual respondents to
desist from performing any threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the
Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file information for kidnapping qualified with
the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also prayed for damages and for
respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
Before the CA, respondents filed, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), a
joint return on the writ specifically denying the material inculpatory averments against them. The
OSG also denied the allegations against the following impleaded persons, namely: Cuaresma,
Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes, for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form
a belief as to the allegations truth. And by way of general affirmative defenses, answering
respondents interposed the following defenses: (1) the President may not be sued during her
incumbency; and (2) the petition is incomplete, as it fails to indicate the matters required by Sec.
5(d) and (e) of the Amparo Rule.
Commenting on the return, petitioners pointed out that the return was no more than a
general denial of averments in the petition. They, thus, pleaded to be allowed to present evidence
ex parte against the President, Santana, Alfaro, Capt. Cuaresma, Darwin Sy, and Jonathan.
After due proceedings, the CA rendered, on July 31, 2008, its partial judgment, subject of
this review, disposing of the petition but only insofar as the answering respondents were
concerned. The CA decision rendered DISMISSINGthe instant petition with respect to
respondent Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, Supt. Edgar B. Roquero,
P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio C. Gomez (ret.) and the Office of the Ombudsman.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in dismissing the petition
and dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent?
HELD:
Petitioners first take issue on the President's purported lack of immunity from suit during
her term of office. The 1987 Constitution, so they claim, has removed such immunity heretofore
enjoyed by the chief executive under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency,
may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of
State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is

important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to
fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and
judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his
usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the
Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.
While in a qualified sense tenable, the dismissal by the CA of the case as against Gen.
Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon is incorrect if viewed against the backdrop of the stated rationale
underpinning the assailed decision vis--vis the two generals, i.e., command responsibility. The
Court assumes the latter stance owing to the fact that command responsibility, as a concept
defined, developed, and applied under international law, has little, if at all, bearing in amparo
proceedings.
The doctrine has recently been codified in the Rome Statuteof the International Criminal
Court (ICC) to which the Philippines is signatory. Sec. 28 of the Statute imposes individual
responsibility on military commanders for crimes committed by forces under their control. The
country is, however, not yet formally bound by the terms and provisions embodied in this treatystatute, since the Senate has yet to extend concurrence in its ratification.
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should,
at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the
duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to
devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered
by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to
fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to
administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there be any.
Petitioners, as the CA has declared, have not adduced substantial evidence pointing to
government involvement in the disappearance of Lourdes. To a concrete point, petitioners have
not shown that the actual perpetrators of the abduction and the harassments that followed
formally or informally formed part of either the military or the police chain of command.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing or violation that
would warrant a finding of liability against the person charged. Per the CA's evaluation of their
evidence, consisting of the testimonies and affidavits of the three Rubrico women and five other
individuals, petitioners have not satisfactorily hurdled the evidentiary bar required of and
assigned to them under the Amparo Rule . In a very real sense, the burden of evidence never
even shifted to answering respondents. The Court finds no compelling reason to disturb the
appellate court's determination of the answering respondents role in the alleged enforced
disappearance of petitioner Lourdes and the threats to her family's security.
Similarly, there appears to be no basis for petitioners allegations about the OMB failing
to act on their complaint against those who allegedly abducted and illegally detained Lourdes.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the OMB has taken the necessary appropriate action on said
complaint.
The privilege of the writ of amparo, to reiterate, is a remedy available to victims of extra-

judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of similar nature, regardless of whether
the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a private
individual.
At this juncture, it bears to state that petitioners have not provided the CA with the
correct addresses of respondents Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes. The mailed
envelopes containing the petition for a writ of amparo individually addressed to each of them
have all been returned unopened. And petitioners motion interposed before the appellate court for
notice or service via publication has not been accompanied by supporting affidavits as required
by the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the appealed CA partial judgmentdisposing of the underlying
petition for a writ of amparo without (1) pronouncement as to the accountability, or lack of it, of
the four non-answering respondents or (2) outright dismissal of the same petition as to themhews
to the prescription of Sec. 20 of the Amparo Rule on archiving and reviving cases.
Parenthetically, petitioners have also not furnished this Court with sufficient data as to where the
afore-named respondents may be served a copy of their petition for review.
The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the
rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of
this life.It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the
prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to
be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and
undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to
secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.
In their petition for a writ of amparo, petitioners asked, as their main prayer, that the
Court order the impleaded respondents "to immediately desist from doing any acts that would
threaten or seem to threaten the security of the Petitioners and to desist from approaching
Petitioners, their residences and offices where they are working under pain of contempt of [this]
Court."
As the CA, however, formulated its directives, no definitive time frame was set in its
decision for the completion of the investigation and the reportorial requirements. It also failed to
consider Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon's imminent compulsory retirement from the
military and police services, respectively. Accordingly, the CA directives, as hereinafter
redefined and amplified to fully enforce the amparo remedies, are hereby given to, and shall be
directly enforceable against, whoever sits as the commanding general of the AFP and the PNP.
Given the above perspective and to fully apply the beneficial nature of the writ of amparo
as an inexpensive and effective tool to protect certain rights violated or threatened to be violated,
the Court hereby adjusts to a degree the literal application of Secs. 22 and 23 of the Amparo Rule
to fittingly address the situation obtaining under the premises. Towards this end, two things are at
once indicated: (1) the consolidation of the probe and fact-finding aspects of the instant petition
with the investigation of the criminal complaint before the OMB; and (2) the incorporation in the
same criminal complaint of the allegations in this petition bearing on the threats to the right to
security. Withal, the OMB should be furnished copies of the investigation reports to aid that body
in its own investigation and eventual resolution of OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. Then, too, the OMB
shall be given easy access to all pertinent documents and evidence, if any, adduced before the

CA. Necessarily, Lourdesshould be allowed, if so minded, to amend her basic criminal complaint
if the consolidation of cases is to be fully effective.
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS this petition for review and makes a decision:
(1) Affirming the dropping of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo from the petition for a writ of
amparo;
(2) Affirming the dismissal of the amparo case as against Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, and P/Dir.
Gen. Avelino Razon, insofar as it tended, under the command responsibility principle, to attach
accountability and responsibility to them, as then AFP Chief of Staff and then PNP Chief, for the
alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the ensuing harassments allegedly committed
against petitioners. The dismissal of the petition with respect to the OMB is also affirmed for
failure of the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for the
enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed; and
(3) Directing the incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP, or his successor, and the incumbent DirectorGeneral of the PNP, or his successor, to ensure that the investigations already commenced by
their respective units on the alleged abduction of Lourdes Rubrico and the alleged harassments
and threats she and her daughters were made to endure are pursued with extraordinary diligence
as required by Sec. 17 of the Amparo Rule. They shall order their subordinate officials, in
particular, to do the following:
(a) Determine based on records, past and present, the identities and locations of respondents Maj.
Darwin Sy, a.k.a. Darwin Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, and
one Jonathan; and submit certifications of this determination to the OMB with copy furnished to
petitioners, the CA, and this Court;
(b) Pursue with extraordinary diligence the evidentiary leads relating to Maj. Darwin Sy and the
Toyota Revo vehicle with Plate No. XRR 428; and
(c) Prepare, with the assistance of petitioners and/or witnesses, cartographic sketches of
respondents Maj. Sy/Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, and a
certain Jonathan to aid in positively identifying and locating them.
The investigations shall be completed not later than six (6) months from receipt of this Decision;
and within thirty (30) days after completion of the investigations, the Chief of Staff of the AFP
and the Director-General of the PNP shall submit a full report of the results of the investigations
to the Court, the CA, the OMB, and petitioners.
This case is accordingly referred back to the CA for the purpose of monitoring the investigations
and the actions of the AFP and the PNP.
Subject to the foregoing modifications, the Court AFFIRMS the partial judgment dated July 31,
2008 of the CA.
SO ORDERED.

CASE 42
CANLAS vs NAPICO HOMEOWNERS
GR No. 182795, June 5, 2008
Facts:Petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in the Brgy. Manggahan, Pasig
City. Their dwellings have either been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is
about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment.Petitioners claim that respondents hold
fraudulent and spurious titles. Thus, the petition for writ of amparo. The rule on writ of amparo is
a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private
individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings or disappearances.
Issue: WON the writ of amparo is a correct remedy for the petitioners.
Ruling: No. The writ of amparo does not cover the cause of the petitioners. The threatened
demolition of a dwelling by a virtue of a final judgment of the court is not included among the
enumeration of rights covered by the writ. Also, the factual and legal basis for petitioners claim
to the land in question is not alleged at all in the petition.

CASE 43
MAYOR FELIPE K. CONSTANTINO, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
SEPT. 13, 2007; G.R. No. 140656
FACTS:
That on or about February 28, 1996, in Davao City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused Felipe K. Constantino, a public
officer, being then the Mayor of the Municipality of Malungon, Sarangani Province, committing
the crime herein-charged in relation to, while in the
performance and taking advantage of his official functions, with evident bad faith, manifest
partiality or through gross inexcusable negligence, and
conspiring and confederating with accused Norberto N. Lindong, President and Chairman of the
Board of the Norlovanian Corporation, Davao City, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and
criminally enter into a Lease Agreement for the rental of various heavy equipments (sic) for a
period of six (6) years for
and in consideration of the sum of PESOS: TWO HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND
ONE HUNDRED ELEVEN and 11/100 (P257,111.11) per month or a total consideration of
PESOS: EIGHTEEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED ELEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
NINETY-NINE and 92/100 (P18,511,999.92) and a guaranty deposit of PESOS: ONE MILLION
SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND (P1,780,000.00) contrary to the express mandate of
Resolution No. 2, series of 1995, of the Municipal Planning and Development Council
implementing Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 198, series of 1995 and Sangguniang Bayan
Resolution No. 21 dated February 22, 1996 authorizing the Municipal Mayor of Malungon to
enter into an agreement for the purchase of heavy equipments (sic) on a five-year term basis for
and in consideration of the amount of PESOS: TWO MILLION TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND

(P2,200,000.00) per year or a total consideration of only PESOS: ELEVEN MILLION

(P11,000,000.00), thus, giving said Norlovanian Corporation, which was fully paid for the
Guaranty Deposit and was actually paid heavy equipment rentals for the period March 5 to
May 6, 1996 in the aggregate sum of PESOS: TWO MILLION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTYSEVEN
THOUSAND NINETY and 91/100 (P2,177,090.91), unwarranted benefits and advantage and
causing undue injury to the government. Constantino and Lindong were found guilty.

ISSUE:
Whether judgment by an administrative body may be disturbed by a judicial tribunal.
HELD:
Yes. Although the instant case involves a criminal charge whereas Constantino involved an
administrative charge, still the findings in the latter case are
binding herein because the same set of facts are the subject of both cases. What is decisive is that
the issues already litigated in a final and executory
judgment preclude by the principle of bar by prior judgment, an aspect of the doctrine of res
judicata, and even under the doctrine of law of the case, the re-litigation of the same issue in
another action.[15][47] It is well established that when a right or fact has been judicially tried
and determined
by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive
upon the parties and those in privity with them.[16][48]
The dictum therein laid down became the law of the case and what was once irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule or decision continues to
be binding between the same parties as long as the facts on which the decision was predicated
continue to be the facts of the case before the court. Hence, the binding effect and enforceability
of that dictum can no longer be resurrected anew since such issue had already been resolved and
finally laid to rest, if not
by the principle of res judicata, at least by conclusiveness of judgment.[17][49]
It may be true that the basis of administrative liability differs from criminal liability as the
purpose of administrative proceedings on the one hand is mainly
to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public
trust. On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal
prosecution is the punishment of crime.[18][50] However, the dismissal by the Court of the
administrative case against Constantino based on the same subject
matter and after examining the same crucial evidence operates to dismiss the criminal case
because of the precise finding that the act from which liability
is anchored does not exist.
It is likewise clear from the decision of the Court in Constantino that the level of proof required
in administrative cases which is substantial evidence
was not mustered therein. The same evidence is again before the Court in connection with the
appeal in the criminal case. Ineluctably, the same evidence

cannot with greater reason satisfy the higher standard in criminal cases such as the present case
which is evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
CASE 44
RUIVIVAR vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
GR. No. 165012; SEPT. 16, 2008
FACTS:
On May 24, 2002, the private respondent filed an Affidavit-Complaint charging the petitioner
before the Ombudsman of serious misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a public official, abuse of
authority, and violations of the Revised Penal Code and of the Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
[21][6] The private respondent stated in her complaint that she is the President of the
Association of Drug Testing Centers (Association) that conducts drug testing and medical
examination of applicants for drivers license. In this capacity, she went to the Land
Transportation Office (LTO) on May 17, 2002 to meet with representatives from the Department
of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and to file a copy of the Associations request to
lift the moratorium imposed by the LTO on the accreditation of drug testing clinics. Before
proceeding to the office of the LTO Commissioner for these purposes, she passed by the office of
the petitioner to conduct a follow up on the status of her companys application for accreditation.
While there, the petitioner -- without provocation or any
justifiable reason and in the presence of other LTO employees and visitors -- shouted at her in a
very arrogant and insulting manner, hurled invectives upon
her person, and prevented her from entering the office of the LTO Commissioner. The petitioner
also accused the private respondent of causing intrigues against her at the DOTC. To prove her
allegations, the private respondent presented the affidavits of three witnesses.
The Ombudsman furnished the petitioner a copy of the Complaint-Affidavit and required her to
file her counter-affidavit. In her Counter-Affidavit, the
petitioner denied the private respondent's allegations and claimed that she merely told the private
respondent to bring her request to the LTO Assistant
Secretary who has the authority to act on the matter, not to the DOTC. The petitioner also
claimed that the private respondent also asked her to lift the
moratorium and pressured her to favorably act on the private respondents application for
accreditation. To prove these claims, petitioner presented the
affidavits of her two witnesses.
The Ombudsman called for a preliminary conference that the parties attended. The petitioner
manifested her intent to submit the case for resolution. The
Ombudsman then directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. Only the petitioner
filed a Memorandum where she stressed that the complaint is not properly substantiated for lack
of supporting affidavits and other evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for certiorari under rule 65 is the proper and only available remedy
when the penalty imposed in an administrative complaint with the office of the ombudsman is
considered final and unappealable.

HELD:
No. The appropriate remedy, under the circumstances, is not the appellate remedy provided by
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court but a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of these Rules. Moreover, The exhaustion principle applies when the ruling court or
tribunal is not given the opportunity to re-examine its findings
and conclusions because of an available opportunity that a party seeking recourse against the
court or the tribunals ruling omitted to take. Under the
concept of due process, on the other hand, a violation occurs when a court or tribunal rules
against a party without giving him or her the opportunity to be
heard.] Thus, the exhaustion principle is based on the perspective of the ruling court or tribunal,
while due process is considered from the point of view
of the litigating party against whom a ruling was made. The commonality they share is in the
same opportunity that underlies both. In the context of the
present case, the available opportunity to consider and appreciate the petitioners counterstatement of facts was denied the Ombudsman; hence, the
petitioner is barred from seeking recourse at the CA because the ground she would invoke was
not considered at all at the Ombudsman level. At the same
time, the petitioner who had the same opportunity to rebut the belatedly-furnished affidavits of
the private respondents witnesses was not
denied and cannot now claim denial of due process because she did not take advantage of the
opportunity opened to her at the Ombudsman level.
Under these circumstances, we cannot help but recognize that the petitioners cause is a lost one,
not only for her failure to exhaust her available
administrative remedy, but also on due process grounds. The law can no longer help one who
had been given ample opportunity to be heard but who did not take full advantage of the
proffered chance. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we
hereby DENY the petition.