Criminal Law

(CRIMINAL LAW) BOOK I

I. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
I- Criminal Liability
(1) Eduardo Magsumbol v. People
G.R. No. 207175. November 26, 2014
FACTS:
At around 11:00 oclock in the morning of February 1, 2002, Caringal, the overseer of a onehectare unregistered parcel of land located in Candelaria, Quezon, and co-owned by Menandro, saw the
four accused, along with seven others, cutting down the coconut trees on the said property. Later, the men
turned the felled trees into coco lumber. Caringal did not attempt to stop the men from cutting down the
coconut trees because he was outnumbered. Instead, Caringal left the site and proceeded to San Pablo City
to inform Menandro about the incident.
On February 3, 2002, Menandro and Caringal reported the incident to the police. Thereafter, the
two, accompanied by SPO1 Manalo, went to the coconut plantation only to discover that about thirty three
(33) coconut trees (subject trees) had been cut down. Atanacio testified that he authorized his brothers-inlaw, Magsino and Magsumbol, to cut down the coconut trees within the boundary of his property, which
was adjacent to the land co-owned by Menandro. Atanacio admitted that he had never set foot on his
property for about 20 years already and that he was not present whenthe cutting incident happened.
Defense witness Brgy. Captain Arguelles testified that on January 28, 2002, Magsumbol,
Magsino, Ramirez, and Inanoria came to his office seeking permission to cut down the coconut trees
planted on the land of Atanacio.
All the accused vehemently denied the charges against them. Ramirez and Magsumbol claimed
that only the coconut trees which stood within the land owned by Atanacio.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not malice and intent to gain, as elements of the crime of theft, are present
(2) Whether or not accused is guilty of the crime of theft
HELD:
No. Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code provides for who are liable for theft. Paragraph 2 of
such provision states that theft is likewise committed by any person who, after having maliciously
damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by
him. To warrant a conviction under the aforecited provision for theft of damaged property, the prosecution
must prove beyond reasonable that the accused maliciously damaged the property belonging to another
and, thereafter, removed or used the fruits or object thereof, with intent to gain. Evidently, theft of
damaged property is an intentional felony for which criminal liability attaches only when it is shown that
the malefactor acted with criminal intent or malice. Criminal intent must be clearly established with the
other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed.
In the case at bar, criminal intent substantiated to justify the conviction of Magsumbol and his co-accused
was not present. There is no dispute that the land co-owned by Menandro is adjacent to the land owned by
Atanacio. The prosecution claimed that the thirty three (33) cut coconut trees were planted within the land
co-owned by Menandro. The uncertainty of the exact location of the coconut trees negates the presence of
the criminal intent to gain. At any rate, granting arguendo that the said coconut trees were within
Menandros land, no malice or criminal intent could be rightfully attributed to Magsumbol and his coaccused.

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(2) People V Dionaldo

G.R. No. 207949. September 9, 2015.

PERLAS-BERNABE,J

FACTS:
On July 23, 2014, the Court rendered its Resolution in this case finding accused-appellants Armando
Dionaldo y Ebron, Renato Dionaldo y Ebron (Renato), Mariano Gariguez, Jr. y Ramos, and Rodolfo
Larido y Ebron (accused-appellants) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide.
On September 16, 2014, the Court received a letter from the Bureau of Corrections informing the
Court of the death of one of the accused-appellants in this case, Renato, on June 10, 2014, as evidenced by
the Certificate of Death attached thereto. Renatos death transpired before the promulgation of the Courts
July 23, 2014 Resolution in this case, i.e., when his appeal before the Court was still pending resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability, as well as civil liability.
HELD:
Yes. The Court ruled that like in People v. Amistoso, the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto.
Consequently, Renatos death on June 10, 2014 renders the Courts July 23, 2014 Resolution
irrelevant and ineffectual as to him, and is therefore set aside. Accordingly, the criminal case against
Renato is dismissed.
Following Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and, by analogy, the ruling of the Supreme Court
in People vs. Bayotas, 236 SCRA 239 (1994), the death of the accused during the pendency of the case
extinguishes the criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto.
Art.89.How criminal liability is totally extinguished.Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor
is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
III- Proximate Cause
IV- Impossible Crimes
V- Stages of Execution
a. Consummated theft
(3) Canceran V People
G.R. No. 206442

July 1, 2015

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
On October 6, 2002, at more or less 12:00 noon, at Ororama Mega Center Grocery Department,
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, Jovito Canceran, allegedly took and carried away 14 cartons
of Ponds White Beauty Cream valued at P28,627,20. Consequently, the accused was charged of the crime
of theft. Based on the testimonies presented by Damalito Ompoc, a security guard; and William Michael
N. Arcenio, the Customer Relation Officer, Canceran approached one of the counters in Ororama pushing
a cart which contained two boxes of Magic Flakes for which he paid P1,423.00. However, when
Ompoc went to the packer and asked if the boxes had been checked, they found out that the contents of
the two boxes were not Magic Flakes biscuits, but 14 smaller boxes of Ponds White Beauty Cream worth

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P28,627.20. Accused hurriedly left and a chase ensued however upon reaching the Don Mariano gate,
while attempting to ride a jeepney he stumbled. When questioned, he offered his personal effects to pay
for.
Canceran vehemently denied the charges against him. He claimed that he was in Ororama to buy
medicine for his wife. According to him, a male person of around 20 years of age requested him to pay for
the items in his cart at the cashier and that he only obliged with the request of the unnamed person
because he was struck by his conscience.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the accused is guilty of the crime of consummated theft.
HELD:
In its Judgment, dated September 20, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Canceran guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of consummated Theft. On appeal, he raised the issue of double
jeopardy as the first criminal case for theft was already dismissed and yet he was convicted in the second
case. The Court of Appeals (CA) held that there could be no double jeopardy because he never entered a
valid plea; thus the first jeopardy never attached.
To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy
must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.
(4) Roque V People
G.R. No. 193169.April 6, 2015.

Justice Antonio T. Carpio

FACTS:
The incident happened on November 22, 2001, during the Thanksgiving Day of Brgy. Masagana,
Pandi, Bulacan. Brothers Reynaldo and Rodolfo Marquez were celebrating at the house of Bella SalvadorSantos when they spotted Rogelio dela Cruz to join them. At that moment, Rogelio Roque, the petitioner,
and his wife was passing by on board a tricycle. Roque, believing that the shout was directed at him,
stopped the vehicle and mouthed curses to Rodolfo. Reynaldo apologized for the misunderstanding which
Roque didnt appreciate.
Rodolfo asked for assistance from the barangay chairman to settle the misunderstanding.
Reynaldo proceeded to Roques house and once again apologized for the misunderstanding. Roque
entered the house and when he went out he was holding a gun and suddenly fired at Reynaldo who was hit
in his right ear. Roque hit Reynaldo on the nape and kicked the victim on the face and back. Reynaldo
pleaded for help but Roque threatened those around not to get involved. Fortunately, Reynaldos parents
arrived and took him to a local hospital for emergency medical treatment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Roque is guilty of frustrated homicide
RULING:
Yes. Roque is guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide.
In attempted or frustrated homicide, the offender must have the intent to kill the victim. If there is
no intent to kill on the part of the offender, he is liable for physical injuries only. If intent to kill is
sufficiently established, regardless of whether the injuries suffered would have healed within nine to thirty
days, the crime committed is frustrated homicide.
In the present case, the victim received two gunshot wounds in the head, thus, the location of the
wounds plus the nature of the weapon used indicates that Roques objective is not just to warn or

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incapacitate a supposed aggressor. He had all the intention to kill Reynaldo and would have succeeded if
he had a better aim. Moreover, the fact that Roque prevented barangay officials from intervening and
helping the bleeding victim further exhibited his intent to kill.

(5) Alfredo de Guzman, Jr. v. People

G.R. No. 178512. November 26, 2014
Facts:
On December 24, 1997, at aboutten oclock in the evening, Alexander Flojo (hereafter
"Alexander") was fetching water below his rented house at 443 Aglipay Street, Old Zaniga St.,
Mandaluyong City when suddenly Alfredo De Guzman (hereafter "Alfredo"), the brother of his land lady,
Lucila Bautista (hereafter "Lucila"), hit him on the nape. Alexander informed Lucila about what Alfredo
did to him. Lucila apologized to Alexander by saying, "Pasensya ka na Mang Alex" and told the latter to
just go up. Alexander obliged and went upstairs. He took a rest for about two hours. Thereafter, at around
12:00 to 12:15 A.M., Alexander went down and continued to fetch water. While pouring water into a
container, Alfredo suddenly appeared in front of Alexander and stabbed him on his left face and chest.
Cirilino Bantaya, a son-in-law of Alexander, saw the latter bleeding on the left portion of his body
and begging for help. Alexander then told Cirilino that Alfredo stabbed him. Cirilino immediately loaded
Alexander into his motorcycle (backride) and brought him to the Mandaluyong City Medical Center.
Upon arrival at the hospital, the doctors immediately rendered medical assistance to Alexander. Alexander
stayed in the emergency room of said hospital for about 30 to 40 minutes. Then, he was brought to the
second floor of the said hospital where he was confined for two days.
On the other hand, Alfredo denied having stabbed Alexander. According to him, on December 25,
1997 at around midnight, he passed by Alexander who was, then, fixing a motorcycle. At that point, he
accidentally hit Alexanders back, causing the latter to throw invective words against him. He felt insulted,
thus, a fistfight ensued between them.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is criminally liable for the crime of frustrated homicide?
Held:
Yes. The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as
manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound but
did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstances for murder
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present.
The petitioner adamantly denies that intent to kill was present during the fistfight between him
and Alexander. The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of the offender to
kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a
specific intent that the State must allege in the information, and then prove by either direct or
circumstantial evidence, as differentiated from a general criminal intent, which is presumed from the
commission of a felony by dolo. Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by the courts only
through external manifestations.
In Rivera v. People, we considered the following factors to determine the presence of intent to
kill, namely: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds

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sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during, or immediately after the killing
of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the
accused. We have also considered as determinative factors the motive of the offender and the words he
uttered at the time of inflicting the injuries on the victim. Here, both the trial and the appellate court
agreed that intent to kill was present. We concur with them.
Contrary to the petitioners submission, the wounds sustained by Alexander were not mere
scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger or as the result of a fistfight between them. The petitioner wielded
and used a knife in his assault on Alexander. The medical records indicate, indeed, that Alexander
sustained two stab wounds, specifically, one on his upper left chest and the other on the left side of his
face. The petitioners attack was unprovoked with the knife used therein causing such wounds, thereby
belying his submission, and firmly proving the presence of intent to kill.
VI- Conspiracy and proposal
(6) FRANSDILLA V PEOPLE
G.R. No. 197562.April 20, 2015.

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno

FACTS:
On February 20,1991, Aurora Engson Fransdilla, the accused went to the house of Lalaine and
Cynthia Yreverre, the private complainants. She presented herself as a person coming from the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and was looking for Cynthia. Lalaine allowed Fransdilla
entry to the house. During their conversation, Fransdilla asked for a telephone, kept on dialing and
claimed that the person being called was not answering. After a while, Fransdilla kept on doing different
things to distract Lalaines attention. It was at such time that four men suddenly entered the house and
announced hold-up.
The four men searched her entire room and took the cash vault, all the jewelries and things that
they saw. Fransdilla and the other accused left the house at the same time
Fransdilla insist innocence and claimed that she is not a co-conspirator in the robbery case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Fransdilla is guilty of conspiracy.
RULING:
Yes. Fransdilla is a conspirator on the robbery case.
The courts rejected Fransdillas contention and had established her active participation in the
robbery through Lalaines testimony.
According to Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. To be validly held
as a co-conspirator, direct acts of the accused must show a persons active participation in the crime
agreed to be committed, a passive conspirator cannot be held part of the conspiracy without such direct
acts unless such person is the mastermind.
In the case at bar, Fransdillas active participation was established when she facilitated the access
into the house by presenting herself as an employee of POEA. Thus, it has been held that conspiracy can
be presumed from the mode and manner of how the offense was committed or how the acts of the several
accused evidence a common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. Once
conspiracy is established, the act of each conspirator is the act of all.
VII- Continuing Crime
VIII- Compound Crime/Complex Crime

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B. CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY

I- Justifying Circumstances
- Self-Defense
(7) People V Samson
G.R. No. 214883.

September 2, 2015.

MENDOZA,J.

FACTS:
On June 27, 2002, CRISTINA SAMSON (Cristina) was in their house watching television together
with her children when her husband, Gerry Delmar (Gerry), who was drunk at that time, arrived. Gerry
asked Cristina if she had cooked food already but the latter answered in the negative because she had no
money to buy food. Gerry scolded and uttered words against her, and then slapped her. They had an
altercation for about ten (10) minutes when Cristinas father arrived and pacified them. Gerry left but after
thirty (30) minutes, he returned.
Upon Gerrys arrival, there were two conflicting testimony between Cristina and her daughter,
Christine Delmar (Christine). Cristina claimed that she got the knife from her husband who fell down after
she pushed him. After taking possession of the deadly weapon, she told her husband not to come near her.
She was holding the knife near her chest and pointed towards him when he suddenly grabbed her and that
was the time that the knife went in contact with her husbands chest.
Christine, however, perceived it differently. According to her, she witnessed the fight between her
parents. She narrated that as the fight escalated, her mother was able to get hold of a knife, which was
inserted in the roof, and used it in stabbing her father.
Both the RTC and the CA believed the version of the daughter Christine.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in not appreciating the justifying circumstance of self-defense in favor
of Cristina.
HELD:
Yes. The CA erred in not appreciating the justifying circumstance of self-defense in favor of Cristina.
To invoke self-defense, in order to escape criminal liability, it is incumbent upon the accused to
prove by clear and convincing evidence the concurrence of the following requisites under the second
paragraph of Article 11 of the RPC: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
(1) Unlawful aggression. In the case at bench, the unlawful aggression would have ceased if he just
walked away from the scene considering that Cristina had gained the upper hand, being the one in
possession of the knife. Instead, Gerry chose to ignore her plea not to come near her and continued
moving towards her without regard to his safety despite the fact that the knife was pointed towards his
direction.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed. In the case at bench, the lone stab wound located
on the victims chest supports the argument that Cristina feared for her life and this fear impelled her to
defend it by stabbing him. Moreover, the fact that Gerry was no longer armed does not negate the
reasonableness of the means employed by Cristina.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation. The Court cannot sustain the trial courts observation that it was
Cristina who provoked her husband when she suddenly pushed him. Her shoving him cannot be

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considered a sufficient provocation proportionate to the act of aggression.

- State of Necessity
- Fulfillment of Duty
- Obedience to a lawful order of a superior
- Battered Woman Syndrome
(8) Dinamling V People
G.R. No. 199522. June 22, 2015
FACTS:
On March 14, 2007, a drunken Ricky Dinamling ordered AAA, his 5-year partner whom he has two
common children, to leave their rented house alleging that she was using the place as a whorehouse
wherein she would bring in her partners. At first AAA was hesitant to leave because she cannot carry her
children and their things but decided otherwise when the accused threw the feeding bottle of her baby. Six
days later, Dinamling arrived at the house where AAA stayed and ordered her to come out. And when she
finally did, the accused punched her at the left ear which caused it to bleed.
AAA then left for the barangay captains house but the accused caught up with her and kicked her
until she fell to the ground. Not contented with his brutality, Dinamling pulled down AAA's pants and
panty and shouted at her while people looked on. Dinamling then threw the pants and panty back at AAA
and shouted her family name. The victim later found out that she was pregnant and suffered incomplete
abortion because of her partners physical abuse. As a result of the above incidents, Ricky Dinamling was
charged in two (2) criminal information in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for violation of Section 5(i), in
relation to Section 6(f) of RA No. 9262.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of violating Republic Act (RA) No. 9262, otherwise known as
the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004.
RULING:
Yes. The testimonies of AAA and her mother DDD were suffice to establish the elements of the
crime as defined in Section 5(i) of RA No. 9262 and as alleged in the two information filed against
Dinamling.The Regional Trial Court rendered its decision on August 4, 2009 finding Dinamling guilty of
both charges. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTCs decision but with modifications on the
penalties. The accused then filed a petition before the Supreme Court assailing the findings of the CA for
allegedly disregarding his defenses of denial and alibi as well as in discounting the supposedly
exculpatory nature of a part of a prosecution witness' testimony. He claimed that the witness, Dr. Diaz,
testified that she was unsure if the abortion was a result of the mauling that AAA suffered or could have
been caused by an infection or other factors. The Supreme Court resolved to deny the petition for lack of
merit, however some of the penalties imposed by the appellate court were modified.
The petition raises issues that call for an examination of the factual findings of the trial court and the
appellate court. As a general rule, under Rule 45, no questions of fact but only questions of law may be
raised in a petition for review brought before this Court. Time and again, the Court has consistently
declared that questions of facts are beyond the pale of a petition for review. Factual findings of the trial
court, particularly when affirmed by the appellate courts, are generally binding in the Supreme Court.
II- Exempting Circumstances
- Insanity

- Minority

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(9) People V Wile

G.R. No. 208066.

April 12, 2006.

Leonardo- de Castro, J

FACTS:
The accused-appellants in this case are John Glenn Wile, Efren Buenafe, Jr., Mark Robert Lariosa,
and Jaypee Pineda, and the private complainants, [AAA] and [BBB], are all minors. They were all
students of Memorial High School.
Private complainants knew the accused-appellants and that they belonged to a fraternity known as
"Sana Wala Akong Kaaway" or "SWAK." The complainants confirmed that the very persons who
perpetrated the sexual molestations on them were the four mentioned names. They detailed what each of
the accused-appellants had done and their collective participations in the referred molestations.
However, John, Mark and Jaypee were minors when they committed the crime. They were either
sixteen or seventeen years old. But by the time of the hearing of the case, the accused-appellants were
already beyond 21 years old-- John and Mark are 27 years old, while Jaypee is 26 years old.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (Republic Act No. 9344) is still
applicable to the accused-appellants John, Mark, and Jaypee.
HELD:
Yes. The Court held that they can still avail of the provisions of Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act.
According to Section 40 of RA 9344, If said child is conflict with the law has reached eighteen
( 18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the
child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for
a certain: specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
By the time of trial, John and Mark are twenty-seven (27) years old, while Jaypee is twenty-six (26)
years old. Nevertheless, accused-appellants John, Mark, and Jaypee are still entitled to the benefit of
Section 51 of Republic Act No. 934455 even when they are already beyond twenty-one (21) years of age.
Upon order of the court, accused-appellants may serve their sentences at an agricultural camp or any other
training facility, controlled by the Bureau of Correction, in coordination with the Department of Social
Welfare and Development, in lieu of a regular penal institution.
(10) People V. Ancajas
G.R. No. 199270,

October 21, 2015

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:
AAA is a nineteen-year old household help of the spouses Constantino and Elvira Cueva. After her
employer permitted her to go to her parents' house, she met appellants Vergel and Allain on her way home.
The two wanted to go with her but she refused. They suddenly held her hands but she was able to free
herself. At first she thought of returning to her employers' house but decided otherwise because she
needed to bring money for her parents.
Thinking that appellants had already left, she continued walking to her parents' house but appellants
reappeared and succeeded in taking her away. When she regained consciousness, she noticed that she was
only wearing her t-shirt as her bra, panty and maong pants were on her side. She felt pain all over her
body and that her vagina hurt and was covered with blood.
The spouses Cueva accompanied AAA to the police station in Bogo, Cebu to report the rape
incident. Dr. Mary Ann Jabat of the Severo Verallo Memorial District Hospital, Bogo, Cebu, conducted an
examination on AAA and issued a Medical Certificate dated July 17, 1998 revealing that AAA had
lacerations in the perineum and hymen (at 3 o'clock and 10 o'clock positions). She said that the lacerations
in the perineum and the hymen were due to the insertion of a foreign object or the male organ and that the
presence of spermatozoa signifies recent sexual intercourse.

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Premises considered, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found accused Vergel Ancajas and Allain
Ancajas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua. On appeal, one of the appellants claimed the mitigating circumstance of minority.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of minority suspends the conviction of the minor
accused.
HELD:
Pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the Regional Trial Court ruled that the said
penalty should be applied and imposed regardless of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of
minority. The Supreme Court however ruled in the contrary. Republic Act (RA) No. 9344, otherwise
known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, provides for its retroactive application, as held in
People v. Sarcia.
Hence, RA No. 9344 should be considered in determining the imposable penalty on appellant Allain
even if the crime was committed seven years earlier. Section 6 of RA No. 9344 provides that a child
fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from
criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20
of this Act. Thus, appellant Allain shall be confined in an agricultural camp or other training facility
pursuant to Section 51 of RA No. 9344. The case against appellant Allain Ancajas shall
be REMANDED to the trial court for appropriate disposition in accordance with Section 51 of Republic
Act No. 9344.
- Accident
III- Mitigating Circumstances
-Praeter Intentionem
-Immediate vindication of a grave offense
- Sufficient Provocation
- Passion/Obfuscation/ Voluntary Surrender
(11) PEOPLE V OLIVERIO
G.R. No. 211159.March 18, 2015.

Carpio

FACTS:
The witnesses, Rudipico Pogay and Dominador Panday, testified that on October 2, 2003, they saw
Rodulfo Gulane, the victim, walking five meters away from them while Marcelino Oloverio, the accused,
was trailing behind the victim. Oloverio allegedly tapped Gulanes right shoulder and hacked him on the
chest and extremities with a bolo until Gulane collapsed on the ground and later died.
After the incident, Oliverio went to the municipal hall to surrender to authorities. He admitted that
he stabbed Gulane because he cannot bear the insulting remarks Gulane had been throwing against him.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Oliverio is guilty of murder with the aggravating circumstance of treachery
(2) Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of volluntary surrender and passion and
obfuscation can be appreciated.
RULING:
(1) No. Oliverio is guilty of homicide.
The court ruled that in order to sustain a conviction for murder, the following elements must be
proven: (1) that a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) that the killing was attended by any of
the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248; and (4) the killing is not parricide or infanticide. In

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the case at bar, Oliverio was positively identified by the witness as the person who killed Gulane and that
the intent to kill was established by the number of stab wounds incurred by the victim and the admission
of guilt by Oliverio.
Treachery, however, was not sufficiently established in the case. For treachery to be appreciated,
the following elements must be present: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and (2) the means of execution was deliberately or
consciously adopted. The court held that mere suddenness in attack is not a sole basis in finding treachery.
It has been established that Oliverio tapped the shoulder of Gulane to call his attention and waited until the
victim faced him before he started the stabbing. And although the attack was sudden, it arose from
provocation since Gulane had been insulting and mocking Oliverio. The insults were sufficient
provocation on Oliverios part to stab the victim. Therefore, the absence of treachery reduced the crime to
homicide.
(2) Yes. The presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and passion and
obfuscation was appreciated by the court. In People v. Lobino, there is passion and obfuscation when the
crime was committed due to an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts,
or due to a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason.

IV- Aggravating Circumstances

- Recidivism
-Reiteracion
- Treachery
(12) PEOPLE V. DIMACUHA
G.R. No. 191060.February 2, 2015.

DEL CASTILLO,J.:

FACTS
Appellants Edgar Allen Alvarez (Alvarez) and Rodel Caballero (Caballero), together with the
accused who remain at-large, were charged with the crime of murder for the fatal shooting of Nicanor
Morfe Agon (Agon). However, they insisted that the evidence was insufficient to warrant their conviction.
On 2004, the above named accused planned to kill Nickanor Morfe Agon as they followed him
first from the cockpit. While the latters car was about to turn, it slowed down and at that juncture, and
taking advantage of superior strength armed with several guns, they fired at him for many times hitting the
different parts of his body thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused are guilty of murder with the aggravating circumstance of treachery.
RULING:
Yes, the accused were guilty of murder with the aggravating circumstance of treachery.
The elements of the crime of murder are: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him or her;
(3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide, which have been
established by the prosecution. The prosecution established that appellants killed Agon through the
witnesses composed of the gunman himself and two other self-confessed former members of their group
Black Shark. Their testimonies pointed to appellants as among those who planned and executed the
killing of Agon.
Moreover, the fatal shooting of Agon was attended by treachery. For treachery to be properly
appreciated, two conditions must be present: (1) at the time of the assault, the victim was not in a position

Criminal Law

to defend himself; and (2) the offender consciously adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of
attack employed by him. These conditions were present in the killing of Agon. The assault upon Agon was
deliberate, swift and sudden, denying him the opportunity to protect or defend himself. He was unarmed
and unaware of the plot of appellants to kill him. Moreover, the means, method or manner of execution of
the attack was deliberately and consciously adopted by appellants, the same being in accordance with their
groups plan to liquidate Agon.
Appellants Edgar Allen Alvarez and Rodel Caballero were guilty of the crime of murder and were
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

(13) People v. Matibag

G.R. No. 206381

March 25, 2015

FACTS:
On or about March 27, 2005 at around 8:40 oclock [sic] in the evening at Iron Street, Twin Villa
Subdivision, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a Beretta Caliber .9MM Pistol with Serial
No. 3191M9, a deadly weapon, with intent to kill and with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said pistol one Enrico
Clar de Jesus Duhan, while the latter was completely defenseless, thereby hitting him and causing gunshot
wounds at his head and chest, which directly resulted to the victims death. That the special aggravating
circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearm is attendant in the commission of the offense.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not there is treachery
(2) Whether or not Daniel Matibag can invoke self defense
HELD:
(1) Yes. Under Article 14 of the RPC, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. In this case, the prosecution was able to prove that Matibag, who was armed
with a gun, confronted Duhan, and without any provocation, punched and shot him on the chest. Although
the attack was frontal, the sudden and unexpected manner by which it was made rendered it impossible for
Duhan to defend himself, adding too that he was unarmed. Matibag also failed to prove that a heated
exchange of words preceded the incident so as to forewarn Duhan against any impending attack from his
assailant.
(2) No. Daniel Matibag cannot invoke self-defense. This finding of treachery further correlates to
Matibags plea of self-defense. Note that by invoking self-defense, Matibag, in effect, admitted to the
commission of the act for which he was charged, albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would have
exculpated him. With this admission, the burden of proof shifted to Matibag to show that the killing of
Duhan was attended by the following circumstances: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. Among the foregoing elements, the most
important is unlawful aggression. It is well-settled that there can be no self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to selfdefense. Jurisprudence states that not every form or degree of aggression justifies a claim of self-defense.
For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or
imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude, as against the one claiming
self-defense. Evidently, the treacherous manner by which Matibag assaulted Duhan negates unlawful
aggression in the sense above-discussed. As mentioned, the prosecution was able to prove that the attack
was so sudden and unexpected, and the victim was completely defenseless.

(14) PEOPLE V. SAMUYA

G.R. No. 213214.April 20, 2015

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno

Criminal Law

FACTS:
Eugene and Rudy Samuya were charged with the crime of murder. It has been stated that in the
evening of November 19, 2006, Florenio Castro, Anthony Dumalaog, Jonel Samuya, and the victim,
Gabriel Samonte, were sitting outside Florenios house in Sta. Cruz, Aklan when Rudy arrived. He asked
for the whereabouts of a certain Nat-nat. When Anthony answered that Nat-nat wasnt around, Rudy
pointed a gun at him. Eugene arrived and without warning shot Gabriel in the chest, he was able to run
away. When Eugene and Rudy left the scene, Florenio went to look for Gabriel. However, Gabriel was
found dead in a kangkong swamp.
Eugene contends that he merely acted in self-defense and claimed that Gabriel rushed towards
them with a knife in hand.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Eugene is criminally liable for murder with treachery.
RULING:
Yes. Eugene is guilty of murder with treachery.
In order to convict a person charged with the crime of Murder, the prosecution must establish
beyond reasonable doubt that: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him or her; (c) the killing was
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) the killing
does not constitute Parricide or Infanticide.
In People v. Tan, the Court held that the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack,
without the slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked. Additionally, in People v. Perez, the
court has established that a frontal attack does not necessarily rule out treachery. It may still be
appreciated if the attack was so sudden and so unexpected that the deceased had no time to prepare for his
defense. In this case, it has been proven by testimonies from witnesses that Eugenes attack on Gabriel
which was so swift and sudden and without any warning made it impossible for Gabriel to defend himself.
Thus, treachery is to be appreciated.
Eugenes contention that he acted in self-defense is without merit. There was no existence of
unlawful aggression to justify or mitigate the commission of the crime. For unlawful aggression to justify
or mitigate a crime, it must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, and not
merely threatening and intimidating attitude, towards the one claiming self-defense.

- Abuse of Superior Strength

(15) People V. Adriano
G.R. No. 205228,

July 15, 2015

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS:
On or about March 13, 2007, around 8:00 o'clock in the morning, in Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva
Ecija, Rolly Adriano shot several times with assorted firearms Danilo Cabiedes, hitting him on the
different parts of his body, resulting in his death. Based on the testimonies of PO1 Garabiles and PO2
Santos, they were on their way to Camp Olivas, Pampanga, riding a motorcycle along Olongapo-Gapan
National Road, when they saw the passenger on the front seat of a Toyota Corollo shot the Honda CRV
which caused the vehicle to swerve and fall in the canal in the road embankment. Four (4) armed men then
suddenly alighted from the Corollo and started shooting at the driver of the CRY, who was later identified
as Cabiedes. During the shooting, a bystander, Bulanan, who was standing near the road embankment,
was hit by a stray bullet. Later, both Cabiedes and Bulanan died from fatal gunshot wounds.
When arraigned, Adriano pleaded not guilty. The other accused, Lean Adriano alias "Denden," Abba
Santiago y Adriano, John Doe, and Peter Doe remained at large. Adriano testified that at the time of the

Criminal Law

incident, he was at his house in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga, washing the clothes of his child. After
leaving his child at his mother's house, Adriano then went to the cockpit arena to watch cockfights, where
he saw his friend, Danilo Dizon (Dizon).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction of Adriano with the charge of (1) murder and (1) homicide is correct
HELD:
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found accused ROLLY ADRIANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Murder for the death of Cabiedes and Homicide for the death of Ofelia Bulanan. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the ruling of the RTC however the Supreme Court qualified both killings to MURDER.
Bulanan's death was by no means deliberate however due to the presence of the aggravating circumstance
of treachery, the crime is qualified to murder.
On the alibi as defense, time and again, the Supreme Court ruled alibis like denials, are inherently
weak and unreliable because they can easily be fabricated. For alibi to prosper, the accused must
convincingly prove that he was somewhere else at the time when the crime was committed and that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene. As admitted, Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga was
only less than an hour away from the crime scene, Barangay Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. Hence, it
was not physically impossible for Adriano to be at the crime scene at the time of the incident. An alibi
cannot prevail over the testimonies of credible witnesses, who positively identified Adriano as one of the
perpetrators of the crime.
- Evident Premeditation
(16) PEOPLE vs. VILLARIEZ
G.R. No. 211160.
September 2, 2015.*

CARPIO,J

FACTS:
On July 3, 1995, at around 3:30 oclock in the afternoon at the compound of the Catholic Cemetery
in Brgy. Casanayan, Pilar, Capiz, Reggie Villariez, all armed with guns of unknown caliber and with intent
to kill, without any warning or provocation, shot from behind Enrique Olimba, thereby inflicting upon the
latter a fatal gunshot wound in the body causing the instantaneous death of said Enrique Olimba.
Ana, the victims daughters and a witness of the crime, testified that on 3 July 1995, that while
praying a novena before the burial of a deceased uncle, she, who was on top of a tomb and about eight
meters from her father, heard a gun explode. When she turned to look at her father, she saw him spinning.
Ana then shouted to her mother that her father was shot. Ana ran towards her father and saw Villariez
waving a gun, accompanied by his brothers Amado and Tomas. Ana held her fathers head with her dress
drenched in blood. She asked her father the identity of the person who shot him. At the brink of death and
with a voice she could hardly hear, her father uttered the name Toti. Thereafter, she ran towards the road
and told her mother to bring her father to the hospital. She also saw Villariez and his two brothers pointing
their guns to people who were scampering away. The three then fled on a motorcycle.
On 20 July 1995, warrants of arrest were issued against the three accused brothers Villariez,
Amado, and Tomas. Amado and Tomas surrendered and posted bail.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime was committed with the qualifying aggravating circumstances of treachery
and known premeditation.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals in appreciating treachery as a qualifying
circumstance. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim,
depriving the victim of any chance to defend himself. Here, Randy witnessed that it was Villariez who
shot his father at the back. Enrique, deep in thought while listening to the burial service, was unprepared

Criminal Law

and had no means to put up a defense. Enrique was shot unexpectedly which insured the commission of
the crime without risk to Villariez. This treacherous act qualified the killing to murder.

(17) People V. Parba

G.R. No. 214506,

October 19, 2015

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS:
On the 6 day of January, 1997 at about 6:55 A.M. in the City of Cebu, the accused assaulted and
shot Mark P. Navaja with the gun, hitting the latter on his head and inflicting upon him wounds which
consequently led to the victims death. Upon arraignment, Parba pleaded not guilty. However, his claim
was belied by the testimony of a security guard of the Salazar Institute of Technology (SIT) who was then
buying cigarettes from a vendor stationed near the main gate of the school. He narrated that Parba, who
was then seated beside the vendor, stood up, pulled a gun from his belt bag, and shot Narvaja at the back
of the head while the latter was helping his daughter disembark from a motorcycle. The security guards
then chased after the accused however, Parba pointed a gun at them, prompting them two to seek cover.
th

In its decision, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Parba with the crime of murder. The
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA), however the court modified the awards of damages
in favor of Navajas heirs. Hence the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA correctly upheld Parbas conviction for Murder
HELD:
The Supreme Court found the petition bereft of merit. In order to convict a person charged with the
crime of Murder, the prosecution must establish the following elements beyond reasonable doubt. One of
the circumstances which qualifies the killing to Murder is the existence of treachery. There is treachery
when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. As narrated, Catapan personally witnessed Parba
pull out a gun and shoot Navaja in the head, which led to his untimely demise. There was no break in the
chain of events that would cause any doubt as to the truth and veracity of the FACTS which point to the
guilt of Parba.
Moreover, the prosecution witnesses, who were merely bystanders at the time the crime occurred,
were not impelled by any improper motive to falsely testify against Parba. Thus, Parba's alibi fails to
convince the Court. On the matter of damages, when death results from the commission of a crime, the
heirs of the victim are entitled to the following awards: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the
victim without need of evidence other than the commission of the crime; (b) actual or compensatory
damages to the extent proved, or temperate damages when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot be provided with certainty; (c) moral damages; and (d) exemplary damages when the crime
was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.
- Ignominy
V- Alternative Circumstances
C. PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE Principal
I- Accomplice
II- Accessories
III- Anti Fencing Law

Criminal Law

D. PENALTIES
- Subsidiary Imprisonment
- Indeterminate Sentence Law
- Modification and Extinction of Criminal Liability

BOOK II Crimes Against National Security (Arts. 114-123)

- Treason
- Piracy
B. Crimes Against Fundamental Laws of the State
C. Crimes Against Public Order
-Rebellion
- Sedition
-Inciting to Sedition
D. Illegal Possession of Firearms
(18) JACABAN V PEOPLE
G.R. No. 184355.
March 23, 2015

Justice Diosdado M. Peralta

FACTS:
On July 16, 1999, a search warrant was implemented by Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task
Force (PAOCTF) within the premises Arnulfo Jacaban, the accused, at J. Labra St., Guadalupe, Cebu City.
The said search was headed by Police Senior Inspector Ipil H. Dueas.
They searched Jacabans house in the presence of Jacaban himself and three barangay tanods. One
of the police officers found a .45 caliber gun on Jacabans ceiling. Jacaban grappled with the police officer
but failed to get hold of the said gun. Other firearms and ammunitions were recovered from the searched
premises.
A certification from Police Officer IV Dionisio V. Sultan, Chief Clerk of the Firearms and
Explosives Division of the Philippine National Police-Visayas (FED PNP-Visayas) confirmed that
Jacaban was not licensed to possess any kind of firearm or ammunition.
Jacaban claims that he does not own the confiscated firearms but belongs to his uncle.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jacaban is guilty of illegal possession of firearms
RULING:
Yes. Jacaban is guilty of the crime charged.
The essential elements of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions are: (1) the
existence of subject firearm; and, (2) the fact that the accused that possessed or owned the same does not
have the corresponding license for it. Thus, ownership is not an essential element of the said crime. Mere
possession, which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive possession or the said
firearm, is under ones control and management.
In the present case, it has been proved the essential elements of the crime charged under PD 1866
as amended by RA 8294 were present. The existence of the confiscated firearms and the ammunitions
were established through the testimony of one of the police officers. An inventory of the confiscated

Criminal Law

items, which was made in the presence of Jacaban and three barangay tanods who all voluntarily signed
the inventory receipt, was presented.
Furthermore, Jacabans act of rushing towards the room when the .45 caliber gun was found and
the act of grappling with the police officer to take hold of the gun proved that he had constructive
possession of the said firearm.
- Direct Assault
- Evasion of Service of Sentence
E. Crimes Against Public Interest
-Falsification
(19) Navaja V De Castro
G.R. No. 182926.June 22, 2015

Peralta

FACTS:
The instant case arose from a Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent DKT Philippines, Inc.,
represented by Atty. Edgar Borje, against petitioner Ana Lou B. Navaja, alleging that while she was still
its Regional Sales Manager, she falsified a receipt by making it appear that she incurred meal expenses in
the amount of P1,810.00, instead of the actual amount of P810.00, at Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, and
claimed reimbursement for it.
However, upon recent field investigation of Navajas expenses in Bohol, it was found that the actual
amount she incurred at Gardens (sic) Cafe is only Php810.00 Photocopy of the duplicate original official
receipt (pink copy) certified true and correct by the cashier of Gardens Cafe.
Evidently, Navaja falsified the receipt in Bohol upon receiving it with the intent of causing damage
to DKT.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Navajo is guilty of falsification of documents.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner is guilty of falsification.
According to Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, Falsification by private individual and use of
falsified documents.The penalty of prisin correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine
of not more than P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
2.Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in
any private document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.
In the case at bar, the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in
paragraph 7, enumerated in Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code; the falsification was committed in any
private document; and the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least was committed with
intent to cause such damage.
Thus the offender is guilty of charge.
(20) BALASBAS V. MONAYAO
G.R. No. 190524
February 17, 2014
FACTS:

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Criminal Law

In May 19, 2003, petitioner Atty. Michaelina Ramos Balasbas filed with the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) a letter-complaint accusing respondent Patricia B. Monayao - then
employed by the DSWD - of misrepresentation, fraud, dishonesty and refusal to implement an October 6,
1998 Order ISSUEd by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in a land dispute
filed sometime in 1987 by petitioners brother against respondents father. It appears that in said case,
despite judgment rendered in the said dispute awarding one-half of the disputed land to Balasabas brother
and Monayaos subsequent notarized waiver of her rights to her half, the latter illegally sold the portion,
over which she had waived her rights, to her children via a 1992 deed of sale purportedly executed by her
father, which was simulated considering that as early as 1987, respondents father was already deceased.
Balasbas claimed that the actions of respondent violated the civil service laws and amounted to grave
misconduct and immorality.
Since Monayao was no longer an employee of DSWD but with the local government of the
municipality of Alfonso Lista in Ifugao Province, Balasbas addressed her complaint to the Office of the
Mayor of Alfonso Lista. However, Mayor Lista refused to take action on the complaint because the acts
complained of were not in relation to the latters duties and responsibilities as Municipal Population
Officer. Moreover, the CSC-Office for Legal Affairs held that the CSC had no jurisdiction over
petitioners complaint as it stemmed from a private transaction between them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals grievously erred when it sustained the decision of the Civil
Service Commission in finding that the acts and omissions of respondent, arising out of her private
transactions, do not constitute administrative offenses which said commission could take cognizance of
and do not reflect on her moral fitness and integrity as a public servant.
RULING:
No, the Court of Appeals did not grievously erred when it sustained the decision of the Civil
Service Commission in finding that the acts and omissions of respondent, arising out of her private
transactions, do not constitute administrative offenses.
The Supreme Court said that while the law and justice abhor all forms of abuse committed by
public officers and employees whose sworn duty is to discharge their duties with utmost responsibility,
integrity, competence, accountability, and loyalty, the Court must protect them against unsubstantiated
charges that tend to adversely affect, rather than encourage, the effective performance of their duties and
functions.
Without a doubt, respondents supposed dishonest acts and misrepresentations committed in
relation to a land dispute arising from her private dealings cast doubt on her fitness to discharge her
responsibilities as a public official. However, petitioners accusations do not appear to hold water. From
an examination of all her letters, pleadings, and other submissions, it is evident that she offered nothing
more than bare imputations against the respondent.
-Usurpation
F. Crimes Relative to Opium and Other Prohibited Drugs
(21) PEOPLE v. SONJACO
G.R. No. 196962
June 08, 2016
FACTS:
On August 6, 2005, two (2) criminal cases were filed against accused-appellant, JOAN SONJACO Y
STA. ANA, CRIMINAL CASE NO. 05-1506 and CRIMINAL CASE NO. 05-1507, after a zero point one
five (0.15) gram of Methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), classified as a dangerous drug, was found
in her possession during a buy-bust operation. PO1 Flonorio Marmonejo, Jr. acted as the poseur-buyer and
upon consummation of the transaction then revealed himself as a police officer. He immediately
apprehended Sonjaco and apprised her of her constitutional rights.

Criminal Law

Accused-appellant vehemently denied the indictment. She claimed innocence and asserted that she had
been at her mother-in-law's house when three (3) police officers entered the house and forcibly brought
her to the police station and there attempted to extort money from her in exchange for her liberty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of violating Sections 5 and 11 of Article II of R.A. No.
9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
RULING:
On July 10, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes charged. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTCs decision and reiterated that
the testimony of the poseur-buyer sufficiently established all the elements of the crimes charged.
Appellant appealed her conviction before the Supreme Court but it found no merit in the appeal. The
prosecution was able to establish with moral certainty the following elements required for all prosecutions
for illegal sale of dangerous drugs:
(1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti
or the illicit drug as evidence.
The commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs like shabu, merely requires the
consummation of the selling transaction, which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the
seller. The crime is already consummated once the police officer has gone through the operation as a
buyer whose offer was accepted by the accused, followed by the delivery of the dangerous drugs to the
former.
(22) PEOPLE vs. BASILIO
G.R. No. 195774. February 23, 2015

DEL CASTILLO,J.:

FACTS:
In the morning of November 2, 2006, five police authorities conducted a buy bust operation against a
certain Kagi who was said to be active in the illegal sale of drugs. Among the team members, SPO1
Chua was designated as the poseur-buyer and was thus provided with a P100-bill as purchase money,
while the rest of the team served as backups. Upon reaching the target area in Manila, SPO1 Chua
approached Kagi, later identified as the appellant, who was sitting on the street pavement and told the
latter that he was going to score. Appellant got the money from SPO1 Chua and in turn handed to the
latter a small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. Thereafter,
Kagi was arrested and SPO1 Chua placed the marking LBH on the plastic sachet, turned over the same
to their investigator, and later on was forwarded to the Manila Police District (MPD) Crime Laboratory.
The qualitative examination of the specimen revealed that it weighed 0.083 gram and tested positive for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
ISSUE
Whether the lower courts correctly convicted appellant of the offense of illegal sale of shabu.
RULING
Yes, the lower courts correctly convicted appellant of the offense of illegal sale of shabu because all
elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs were established in this case.
To obtain a conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 involving a buy-bust
operation, the following essential elements must be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object of the sale and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its payment. What
is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti as evidence. Thus, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the
receipt by the seller of the marked money consummate the illegal transaction.
Further, the prosecution witnesses positively identified appellant as the seller of the substance to the
poseur-buyer, SPO1 Chua, for the sum of P100.00 and the substance upon examination by Forensic

Criminal Law

Chemical Officer PSI Reyes tested positive to methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

(23) People v. Dalawis

GR no. 197925

November 9, 2015

FACTS:
At around 4 o'clock in the afternoon of November 1, 2004, an asset of P02 Christian Boy Garcia
Aranza arrived at the police station with information that shabu could be purchased from a certain Edwin
Dalawis of Barangay (Brgy.) Sta. Clara, Batangas City. Acting on said information, Aranza, together with
SP04 Delfin Alea, P03 Nestor Dimaano, P03 Jayn Gonda, P02 Villas, P02 De Chavez and P02 Lindbergh
Yap, formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation. Upon the orders of Alea, Aranza marked a P500 bill
with his initials "CGA" to be used as the marked money for the operation. They then proceeded to Brgy.
Sta. Clara, Batangas City, with Aranza, Alea, Dimaano, De Chavez, Yap and the asset, aboard a tinted van,
while Villas and Gonda were on motorcycles. Their departure was recorded in the police blotter.
At Brgy. Sta. Clara, Aranza frisked the asset to ensure that he did not have anything illegal in his
possession, gave him the marked money, and told him to walk towards the place where he would meet the
appellant, a Shell Gasoline Station. The policemen followed the asset thereto, and watched from the
opposite portion of the station in the tinted van. Aside from appellant who was already thereat, they also
saw the notorious drug pusher named Robert Lagmay operating under the alias "Tagpi" coming out from
Villa Anita. Thereafter, at a distance of more or less seven (7) meters, the policemen saw the asset hand
the marked money to appellant who, in tum, handed a small transparent plastic sachet they suspected to
contain shabu. Their asset, then, signaled to the policemen the consummation of the transaction by
scratching his head. Upon seeing the signal, they immediately alighted from the van to apprehend the
appellant. P02 Aranza confiscated the marked money from appellant's right hand, while his asset turned
over to him the plastic sachet. At the same time, P02 De Chavez was also able to confiscate a sachet filled
with what they suspected was shabu from the notorious drug pusher, Lagmay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in its decision and that the existence of the marked money prior to
the alleged buy bust was not duly proven in court as the police officer who recorded the pre-operation
events made no mention of any marking on the buy-bust money
HELD:
No. the appellate court sustained the appellant's conviction with a correction as to the trial court's
recommendation of no parole for its finding of habitual delinquency. It found too trivial appellant's
imputation as to the failure of the policemen to record in the pre-operation report the markings on the
P500 bill, citing the ruling in People v. Concepcion, et al., that the recording of the buy-bust money in the
police blotter is immaterial to the prosecution of illegal drugs. Neither is it required that the confidential
informant put his tip down in writing. The CA ruled that what is material in the prosecution of illegal sale
of regulated or prohibited drugs is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in the court of the corpus delicti of the crime.

(24) People v. Rowena Tapugay y Ventura

G.R. No. 200336
February 11, 2015
FACTS:
On 28 November 2003, at around 7 oclock in the evening, the Chief of the Intelligence Section of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Laoag City, SPO3 Rovimanuel Balolong (SPO3 Balolong),
received a phone call from a concerned citizen reporting the illegal drug activities of Rowena Tapugay
(Rowena). SPO3 Balolong immediately relayed the information to their Chief of Police, Col. Joel D.
Pagdilao. A team composed of SPO3 Balolong, SPO2 Ernesto Bal, PO1 Jonel Mangapit, and PO2

Criminal Law

Dominic Garcia (PO2 Garcia) was immediately formed to conduct a buy-bust operation. Upon arrival at
the locus criminis at around 8 oclock in the evening, PO2 Garcia walked towards three (3) women who
were then conversing, while the other members of the team strategically positioned themselves. PO2
Garcia approached the woman in a red sleeveless shirt and told her that he was going to buy shabu worth
(Php500.00).
PO2 Garcia then handed to appellant the marked Five Hundred Peso (Php500.00) bill. Appellant
thereafter pocketed the money and asked PO2 Garcia to come near her. Appellant then reached inside her
jeans pocket to get the shabu and handed it to PO2 Garcia.
It was at this time that PO2 Garcia introduced himself as a police officer and grabbed
appellant. The other members of the team then rushed in to assist PO2 Garcia in arresting the suspect.
SPO3 Balolong recovered from Rowena the marked Php500.00 bill. Appellant was not able to produce
any document showing her authority to sell shabu when asked by SPO3 Balolong.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt in violation of Republic Act
No.9165 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
HELD:
Yes. In the prosecution of a case of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the
prosecution is able to establish the following essential elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object of the sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its payment.
What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation
in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the
receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction. After a
careful evaluation of the records, we find that these elements were clearly met. The prosecutions evidence
positively identified PO2 Garcia as the buyer and Rowena as the seller of the shabu. Likewise, the
prosecution presented in evidence one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing shabu as the object
of the sale and the marked Php500.00 as consideration thereof. Finally, the delivery of the shabu sold and
its payment were clearly testified to by the prosecution witnesses.

(25) PEOPLE V. ENUMERABLE

G.R. No. 207993. January 21, 2015

CARPIO,J.:

FACTS:
On May 27, 2004 at Petron Gasoline Station located at Lipa City, Gerardo de Villa, without
authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver, dispose or give away
to Po3 Villas, a police officer-poseur-buyer, 9.88 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride locally
known as shabu, a dangerous drug, contained in three (3) plastic sachets. Appellant pleaded not guilty to
the offense charged.
Using two (2) pieces of marked P500.00 bills and boodle money, the police asset who posed as a
buyer transacted with the alias Gerry upon his arrival at the gas station. After the exchange of the marked
money and the three (3) plastic sachets of shabu placed in a black plastic box, alias Gerry was placed
under arrest. The three (3) sachets ofshabu were turned over to the Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory,
pursuant to the request for laboratory examination of P/Supt. Fausto Manzanilla, Jr., Chief of Police,
Batangas City PNP on May 27, 2004 at 5:25 p.m. However, that Crime laboratory indorsed the request
with the specimens on June 4, 2004 at 2:30 p.m. to the Regional Crime Laboratory in Calamba City.
ISSUE:

Criminal Law

Whether or not the prosecution established the identity and integrity of the confiscated illegal
drug, which is the corpus delicti of the offense charged against appellant.
RULING:
No, the prosecution was not able to establish the identity and integrity of the confiscated illegal
drug, which is the corpus delicti of the offense charged against appellant.
InPeople v. Watamama, the Court held that in all prosecutions for the violation of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the the prosecution must ensure that the substance
presented in court is the same substance seized from the accused.
In this case, there was a glaring gap in the custody of the illegal drug since the prosecution failed
to sufficiently establish who had custody of the illegal drug from the moment it was allegedly transmitted
to the Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory on 27 May 2004 until it was allegedly delivered to the
Regional Crime Laboratory on 4 June 2004. There was no evidence presented how the confiscated sachets
of shabu were stored, preserved or labeled nor who had custody prior to their delivery to the Regional
Crime Laboratory and their subsequent presentation before the trial court. This is evident from the
testimony of PO3 Villas, who stated he had no knowledge on who had custody of the sachets
of shabu from 27 May 2004 until 4 June 2004.
Therefore, the Court ordered that acquittal of the appellant Gerardo Enumerable y De Villa based
on reasonable doubt and ordered for his immediate release from detention, unless he is detained for any
other lawful cause.
(26) PEOPLE V. MERCADO
G.R. No. 207988.
March 11, 2015

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno

FACTS:
On July 27, 2007, the police received information that a certain Bryan Mercado y Sarmiento, was
selling Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu). TheAnti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operation Unit
(SAID-SOU) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) organized a buy-bust operation with SPO2 Wilfredo
Quillan as team leader. PO3 Galvez stood as a poser buyer of the illegal drug. When the sale was
consummated, PO3 Galvez introduced himself as a police officer, arrested Mercado.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mercado is guilty of illegal possession and sale of dangerous drugs
RULING:
Yes. Mercado is guilty of illegal possession and sale of dangerous drugs.
It has been established that there is presumption of regularity in the police officers performance of
their official duty. Aside from that the police officers who participated in the buy-bust operation appeared
credible and reliable since there absence of any ill motive on their part to perform the alleged charges
drawn by Mercado.
Moreover, a valid buy-bust operation that led to the arrest of Mercado was conducted. PO3 Galvez
himself testified that there was an actual exchange of the marked money and the prohibited drug.
In People v. De Leon, the Supreme Court expressed that a buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment
whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the
execution of their criminal plan. Thus, the operation is legal and has been proved to be an effective
method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is
undertaken.
Jurisprudence had pronounced repeatedly that mere possession of a prohibited drug constitutes
prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of
any satisfactory explanation. Mercado failed to present evidence that would rebut his possession of shabu,
thus, it has been established that he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

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People V Cayas
G.R. No. 215714, August 12, 2015
FACTS:
On April 19, 2005, a civilian informant came to the police station to report the rampant sale of
illegal drugs by one Efren Cayas at Sitio Baho, Barangay Calamba, Cebu City. Before the buy-bust
operation, the team composed of SPO1 Toring, the team leader, PO3 Romualdo Aana (PO3 Aana), PO1
Crecito Matugas (PO1 Matugas) and PO1 Blones, held a briefing. SPO1 Toring designated the civilian
informant to act as the poseur-buyer, furnishing the same with the buy-bust money of P100 bearing serial
number EW850747.
6

Thereafter, the civilian informant went ahead of the members of the team to the location while the latter
proceeded to the area on-board their respective motorcycles. Upon arrival, the members of the team
strategically positioned themselves. While the transaction was ongoing between the civilian informant and
the appellant under a lighted lamp post, PO3 Aana and PO1 Blones hid in a nearby dark shanty which was
about six meters away from the former. On the other hand, SPO1 Toring was about 10 meters away from
the civilian informant and the appellant. PO1 Blones testified that he saw the civilian informant get the buybust money of P100 from his pocket and hand it to appellant. The latter in turn gave to the civilian
informant the plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu.
8

SPO1 Toring corroborated PO1 Bloness testimony claiming that there was an exchange of money
and an item between appellant and the civilian informant. Then the civilian informant executed the prearranged signal that the sale was consummated by scratching his head with his right hand. Immediately,
PO3 Aana, PO1 Matugas and PO1 Blones rushed to the scene. The said police officers arrested appellant
and informed him of his constitutional rights. PO1 Blones was able to retrieve the buy-bust money from
appellant. PO1 Blones then gave the buy-bust money to PO3 Aana. On the other hand, the civilian
informant turned over the seized sachet ofshabu to SPO1 Toring. Upon arriving at the police station,
SPO1 Toring gave the seized sachet ofshabu to PO1 Blones, who placed the markings ECB-04-19-05.
PO1 Blones then prepared the required letter-request. Accompanied by SPO1 Toring, PO1 Blones
personally brought the said letter-request dated April 19, 2005 together with the marked sachet
of shabu to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.
11

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant is guilty guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the accused-appellant Efren Basal Cayas (appellant) isguilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.In sum, SC find no reversible error committed
by the RTC and CA in convicting appellant of illegal sale of drugs. It is settled that the factual findings of
the CA affirming those of the trial court are binding on this Court unless there is a clear showing that such
findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.This case is no exception to the
rule. All told, this Court thus sustains the conviction of the appellant for violation of Section 5, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165.
G. Crimes Against Public Morals
- Immoral Doctrines, Obscene Publications and Exhibits
-AntiTrafficking Persons Act
H. Crimes Committed by Public Officers
- Malversation

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(27) MESINA v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 162489 June 17, 2015
FACTS:
On July 9, 1998, an information was filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) charging Bernardo U.
Mesina with qualified theft. However, upon reinvestigation, the information filed was amended charging
him with malversation of public funds instead. The accused worked as a Cashier in the City Treasurers
Office of Caloocan City and as such he was accountable for the public funds collected and remitted to
him.
In the afternoon of July 6, 1998, Mesina went to the Mini City Hall located at Camarin Road District
I to collect the weeks collection. Ms. Rosalinda Baclit, Officer-In-Charge of collection, remitted to him
the total amount of Php 468, 394.46 and the accused together with Ms. Irene Manalang, OIC of the Cash
Receipt Division, signed the liquidation statements acknowledging receipt and collection thereof.
However, Ms Baclit was informed later that same afternoon that the collection for the Patubig
amounting to P167, 870.90 was not remitted.
While Baclit positively asserted that the money was turned over to Mesina, the latter insisted on not
receiving the amount. However, after his vault was opened and inspected, he admitted later on that he had
indeed collected the total amount of Php 468, 394.46 from Ms. Baclit, but denied misappropriating,
misapplying, and embezzling the collection. He maintained that the Patubig collection was found
complete in his vault during the inspection.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of Malversation of Public Funds
RULING:
On November 8, 2001, the RTC found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
malversation of public funds defined and penalized under Article 217 paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code. The elements of the crime charged were duly established against the petitioner. His failure to have
the Patubig collection duly forthcoming upon demand by the duly authorized officer was prima facie
evidence that he had put such missing fund to personal use. Considering that it was merely prima facie
and therefore allowed him to provide a rebuttal, he did not do so. He not only did not account for the
collection upon demand but even steadfastly denied having received it up to the time of the inspection of
the sealed vault which revealed that the money was even short by P37, 876.98.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTCs decision on July 24, 2003 with modifications on the
imposed penalties. Upon Mesinas appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed the lower courts decision
however; the court ruled against him and affirmed the decision of the CA.
-Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019)
(28) PDIC V Casimiro
G.R. No. 206866.September 2, 2015 PERLAS-BERNABE,J
FACTS:
On June 18, 2010 petitioner Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) filed a case against
private respondents of the crimes of Direct Bribery and Corruption of Public Officials, defined and
penalized under Articles 210 and 212 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), respectively, as well as violation
of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, entitled the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Specifically, private respondents were being sued in the following capacities: (a) Cu (together with
members of his family) as the 85.99% owner of Bicol Development Bank, Inc. (BDBI); (b) Zate as
Chairman/President of BDBI; and (c) Apelo as a former employee of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP) who acted as the Bank Officer-in-Charge that examined BDBIs books and records as of
September 30, 2001.
In the course of the receivership, Arsenia T. Gomez (Gomez), a former Cashier, Service Officer, and
Treasurer of BDBI until its closure, went to the PDIC and submitted an Affidavit dated January 12, 2010

Criminal Law

outlining the alleged irregularities committed by private respondents when BDBI was still in operation.
According to Gomez, on November 16, 2006, Cu instructed her to take money from the vault in the
amount of P30,000.00 and to deposit the same to Apelos bank account in Philippine National BankLegazpi City Branch under Account Number 224-521-5625. When Gomez asked for the reason, Cu
replied Professional Fee natin sa kanya yan. On further orders/directives from Cu and Zate, additional
deposits were made to Apelos bank account on two (2) separate dates, specifically April 20, 2007 and
October 3, 2007, in the respective amounts of P60,000.00 and P50,000.00.
On January 24, 2012, the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal complaint for lack of probable cause.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding no probable cause to indict
private respondents of the crimes charged.
HELD:
Yes. The Court is convinced that there is probable cause to indict private respondents of the crimes
charged against them. Hence, the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it ordered the dismissal of the criminal complaint against private respondents.
Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the Ombudsman gravely abused its
discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint against private respondents for lack of probable cause, as
will be explained hereunder.
As already stated, Apelo was accused of committing the crime of Direct Bribery, which has the following
elements: (a) that the accused is a public officer; (b) that he received directly or through another some gift
or present, offer or promise; (c) that such gift, present or promise has been given in consideration of his
commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something which
is his official duty to do; and (d) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public
officer.
On the other hand, Cu and Zate were accused of committing the crime of Corruption of Public Officials,
the elements of which are as follows: (a) that the offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts or
presents to a public officer; and (b) that the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents are given
to a public officer under circumstances that will make the public officer liable for direct bribery or indirect
bribery. In addition, all private respondents were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
(29) ZAPANTA V PEOPLE
G.R. Nos. 192698-99.April 22, 2015

Justice Antonio T. Carpio

FACTS:
Dr. Ang, the private complainant, received an application for a loan from a certain Erlinda GalvezSultan who offered a lot as a mortgage. The said lot was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-256662 in the name of Zenaida Galvez-Lamparero, et al. However, Dr. Ang was informed that the
said mortgaged property had been subject to a sale transaction and that TCT No. T-256662 has been
cancelled. He made a formal request to the Registry of Deeds for a certified true copy of TCT No. T256662.
Zapanta, the Vault/Records Keeper, said that the original copy of TCT No. T-256662 cannot be
located. Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF), Davao Satellite Office conducted an
investigation on the matter and confirm the absence of the said title from the vault. The Chief Investigator
prepared an Investigation Report and submitted the same to the Ombudsman. The said report highlighted
irregularities committed by Zapanta and Atty. Aludia Gadia, the Registrar of Deeds.
During trial, a derivative title of TCT No. T-256662 surfaced and was registered under First
Oriental Property Ventures, Inc. (FOPVI) where signatures of Atty. Gadia appeared on all pages.
ISSUE:

Criminal Law

Whether or not Zapanta and Atty. Gadia is guilty of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019)
RULING:
Yes. Both Zapanta and Atty. Gadia are guilty of violation of R.A. No. 3019.
In Ampil v. Office of the Ombudsman, the court provided the following elements of the offense
falling under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019: (1) The offender is a public officer; (2) The act was done in
the discharge of the public officers official, administrative or judicial functions; (3) The act was done
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and (4) The public officer
caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference.
In the case at bar, Atty. Gadias disregard to the established rules in land registration evince bad
faith manifest bias towards FOPVI. She committed scandalous irregularities in the procedure in
registering TCT No. T-285369, but without the proper cancellation of TCT No. T-256662, which caused
advantage and preference to FOPVI, to the damage and injury of Dr. Ang. The act of concealing TCT No.
T-256662 constituted a breach of trust in the official care of the said certificate of title.
However, the court held that there is no clear basis for the conviction of Zapanta. Pieces of
circumstantial evidence are not sufficient to convict Zapanta of the crimes charged. The circumstances
presented do not lead to the logical conclusion that Zapanta supported the commission of the crime.
Moreover, there is no proof that he allowed an outsider inside the vault or that he knew of the
unauthorized withdrawal of the subject title and consented to it. There is nothing to indicate that he was
simply negligent in securing the safety of the subject certificate of title under his custody. And even if he
was negligent, it would be incompatible with conspiracy because negligence denotes the absence of intent
while conspiracy involves a meeting of the minds to commit a crime.
-Anti-Plunder Act
I- Crimes Against Persons
i Parricide
(30) People V Guting
G.R. No. 205412.
September 9, 2015

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,J

FACTS:
On or about 4:50 in the rainy afternoon of July 30, 2006 at Plaridel St., Poblacion B, Camiling,
Tarlac, the Adrian Guting, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with evident
premeditation, that is, having conceived and deliberated to kill his own father Jose Guting, 67 years old,
married, while inside their residential house, and armed with a bladed weapon, suddenly and unexpectedly
stabbed several times the victim, employing means, manner and form in the execution thereof which
tender directly and specially to insure its commission without danger to the person of said accused, the
result of which attack was that said victim received multiple stab wounds on his body which directly
caused his instantaneous death.
Thirty minutes later, Adrian personally went to Camiling Police Station and surrendered himself and
the bladed weapon he used in killing his father to the police authorities of the said police station.
When his mother learned about the incident, Adrian did nothing to appease his responding mother.
It has always been said that criminal case are primarily about human nature. Here is a case of a son
doing nothing to explain the death of his father to his grieving mother. Such inaction is contrary to human
nature.
When he was detained after police investigation, Adrian did not object to his continued detention.

Criminal Law

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of parricide.
HELD:
Yes. The Court held he is guilty of parricide.
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines Parricide as follows: Any person who shall kill his
father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his
spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty ofreclusion perpetua to death.
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3)
the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The key element in Parricide
other than the fact of killing is the relationship of the offender to the victim. 23 All the elements are
present in this case. Jose, the victim, was killed by accused-appellant, his own son. Accused-appellants
birth certificate, which was presented before the RTC, establishes that accused-appellant was the
legitimate son of Jose and Flora.
ii. Death under Exceptional Circumstances
iii. Murder
(31) PEOPLE v. WAHIMAN
G.R. No. 200942 June 16, 2015
FACTS:
On April 2, 2003, at around 10 o'clock in the evening, Buensuceso, a manager of Stanfilco-Dole,
Phils, in Malaybalay City, was on his way back to the company staff house when he was gunned down by
persons riding in tandem on a black motorcycle. David Azucena (Azucena), who was the guard on duty
that time, positively identified one of the assailants as Jorie Wahiman y Rayos, the accused.
The prosecution submitted as evidence the accused-appellants extrajudicial confession admitting to
the killing of Buensuceso taken during the preliminary investigation of the case. However during trial,
Rayos belied the extrajudicial confession and the positive identification of the eyewitness. He claimed that
he was in another location attending the birthday celebration of his brother-in-law when the victim was
gunned down.
With the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) conviction, Rayos, on appeal,
argued that when his supposed extrajudicial confession was being taken, Atty. Michael Florentino Dumlao
(Atty. Dumlao), the lawyer who supposedly assisted him, was not around. He arrived only when he was
about to sign the extrajudicial confession.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of murder
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed with modifications the assailed October 13, 2011 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 00830-MIN finding appellant Jorie Wahiman y Rayos guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. Although he denied giving an extrajudicial confession,
the court further stressed that appellant's conviction was not based solely on his extrajudicial confession.
The prosecution sufficiently presented their evidence and the eyewitness positively identified the accused
whom he saw about 5 meters away from the Isuzu pick-up of the victim.
While accused-appellant claimed that he was in another location at the time of the commission of the
crime, he was not able to establish that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime
scene. The burden of proof rests upon him; thus it must be satisfied clearly and convincingly before the
court.

Criminal Law

(32) PEOPLE V. DILLA

G.R. No. 200333

January 21, 2015.

DEL CASTILLO,J.:

FACTS:
Appellant Domingo Dilla y Paular was charged with the crime of murder for the death of his brother,
Pepito Dilla y Paular (Pepito). Based on the evidence presented by the prosecution, it was shown that at
around 5:30 in the afternoon of July 22, 2003, at SitioIlaud, Himaao, Pili, Camarines Sur, Pepito was
working on his farm when Domingo suddenly appeared and shot the victim with a gun hitting him on his
left thigh. The victim managed to run but was overtaken by Domingo who then stabbed him with a bolo.
The son of the victim, Pepito, Jr., and Mary Jane Renegado, witnessed the incident.
Domingo presented a different version. He claimed that Pepito went to his house and challenged him
to a fight. They had a fight and during the struggle, he struck the victim with a wrench. He denied having
fired the gun. He pointed to somebody allegedly wearing a hat who could have shot and stabbed Pepito.
Both the RTC and CA found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
properly sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts erred in finding him guilty of the charge arguing that there was no direct
proof showing that he actually killed the victim.
RULING:
No. The courts did not erred in finding him guilty of the charge. A careful review of the records of
the case, the Court finds the appeal to be lacking in merit. The records belie appellants contention that
there was no direct proof identifying him as the perpetrator of the crime. The testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Pepito, Jr. and Renegado established that it was Domingo who mercilessly killed his brother,
Pepito. The testimony of Pepito, Jr. was corroborated in all material points by the testimony of Renegado.

(33) People V. Babor

G.R. No. 215319 October 21, 2015

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

FACTS:
In the evening of January 25, 2005 at Sitio Mologpolog, Barangay Nalundan, Bindoy, Negros
Oriental, Philippines Apolonio Babor hacked Bartolome Amahit many times with the use of long bolo
"pinuti." When arraigned on 27 June 2005, accused-appellant, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded "not
guilty" to the crime charged. However, the trial court gave weight to the testimony of Babors wife, Marife
who was also the daughter of the victim, that indeed it was her husband (accused-appellant) who killed her
father. Treachery was likewise established since the victim was sleeping when he was hacked. Treachery
is a qualifying circumstance necessary for a murder conviction, paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.
Accused-appellant belied the charges and claimed that he has no motive in killing in his father-inlaw. Then again, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted the accused-appellant of the crime of murder
stating that the accused-appellant's defense of denial as flimsy saying that if it was true that he was hacked
inside the house of his parents-in-law, he could have shouted for help and not just jumped out of the
window and ran inside the sugarcane field. The trial court then reminded that denial, like alibi, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of murder even without motive.
HELD:

Criminal Law

Yes. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the lower courts decision and rejected the contention of
accused-appellant that his guilt was not proved because his motive was not established. The CA held that
motive is not an element of murder. The Supreme Court likewise ruled in the affirmative. The elements of
murder are: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was with the attendance
of any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
(4) the killing constitutes neither parricide nor infanticide.
The court is we are convinced that Marifes testimony was consistent with the post-mortem examination
results indicative of the location of the fatal wounds numbered 3, 4 and 5 at the head and face of the victim.
We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusion of the RTC and CA.

iv. Homicide
(34) OCAMPO V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 194129, June 15, 2015
FACTS:
On June 1, 2001, the accused-appellant, PO1 CRISPIN OCAMPO Y SANTOS was charged with the
crime of Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) after attacking, assaulting and
using personal violence upon MARIO DE LUNA y HALLARE. Ocampo fired his service firearm at the
victim, a .9 mm Barreta Pistol with Serial No. M19498Z, hitting him on the chest and other parts of his
body. The gunshot wounds sustained by De Luna were fatal and mortal, which directly and immediately
caused his death thereafter.
In his arraignment, the accused-appellant plead not guilty. While he admitted to having shot the
victim to death, he claimed that it was in self-defense. Defense witness Marita averred that the shooting
incident was precipitated by the victim's unprovoked knife attack upon accused-appellant. The latter was
allegedly left with no other recourse but to use his service firearm to neutralize the aggressor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of homicide despite the justifying circumstance of
self-defense
RULING:
On May 10, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide. When the accused admitted that he indeed shot the victim and anchored
his justification of the felonious act on self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove the justifying
circumstance to the satisfaction of the court which he failed to do. His tale of self-defense was negated by
the physical evidence, specifically the trajectory of the bullets that penetrated the victim's body. For selfdefense to prosper, the following requisites must be met:
(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel the attack; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person engaged in selfdefense.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant, but modified some of the
monetary damages awarded. On appeal, the Supreme Court carefully reviewed the case records and found
the accused-appellant's conviction proper. The courts a quo have correctly appreciated the facts. Their
Decisions are fully supported by evidence on record including the transcript of stenographic notes, which
are extant and complete.
v. Anti-Hazing Law
vi. Unintentional Abortion
vii. Mutilation

Criminal Law

viii. Less serious physical injuries

ix. Rape
(35) PEOPLE v. BULAWAN
G.R. No. 204441
June 08, 2016
FACTS:
AAA, BBB and CCC are daughters of accused-appellant MICHAEL KURT JOHN BULAWAN Y
ANDALES, a tricycle driver. On February 5, 2009, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of rape
against BBB and with the crime of acts of lasciviousness against CCC before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 96, Baler, Aurora. Bulawan presented himself as the lone witness and during trial, he
pleaded not guilty for both crimes. He claimed that while in prison, his daughter AAA confided to him that
the complaints of BBB and CCC were fabrications and that the sisters filed false complaints against him
just to extort money.
The RTC however decided against the accused-appellant. He was found guilty of rape by sexual
assault however he was acquitted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness. The Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the RTCs decision but modified the conviction to qualified rape. On appeal, accused-appellant
contests before the Supreme Court the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt by the RTC and CA
claiming that the prosecution failed to prove the elements of the crime of rape. He cited that the even the
medico-legal report does not support the finding of rape.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape
RULING:
The Supreme Court dismissed the accused-appellants appeal as his only defense was to deny that he
had sexually abused his daughter. The appellants denial cannot overcome the victims affirmative and
categorical declarations of his culpability. Since majority of the rape cases only have the testimonies of the
offended party, the court has acknowledged that it is difficult to have corroborating testimonies in rape
cases. Even when the medico-legal report did not contain any finding of injury, the Court affirmed the
conviction of rape as it was supported by a conclusive, logical and probable testimony by BBB herself.
The court has often stated that denial must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability otherwise,
it is purely self-serving and without merit.

(36) PEOPLE v. PATENTES

G.R. No. 190178.
February 12, 2014

PEREZ, J.

FACTS:
The victim, AAA, claimed that she was forced and threatened by the accused Felimon
Zamora to stay with him in their house from December 5-12, 1998. While with him, she asserted
that she was constantly raped, physically abused, and was always threatened with bodily harm if
she would dare escape or divulge her situation to someone. On 13 December 1998, to free herself from
her predicament, AAA convinced appellant that she will marry him. Appellants mother accompanied
AAA to the latters house to discuss the marital plans with AAAs family. When AAAs mother asked for a
private moment, she confessed about the incident.
Dr. Samuel Cruz, the City Health Officer of Davao City, testified the following observations about
AAA: (1) contusion on the breast caused by a kiss mark; (2) hymen was intact and can readily admit a
normalsized erect male penis without sustaining any injury; and (3) vaginal canal was negative for
spermatozoa. Dr. Cruz also added that he cannot tell whether it was AAAs first sexual intercourse as the
vagina was not injured but had healed lacerations.

Criminal Law

On the other hand, Felimon Zamora argued that if AAA really was raped for more than an entire
week, it is perplexing why she did not escape, or even seek the help of the neighbors despite several
opportunities to do so. He further alleged that AAAs failure to escape and her helping in the household
chores in his house prove that she was not raped and that they had consensual sexual intercourse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Felimon Zamora is guilty of the crime rape against AAA.
RULING:
No, Felimon Zamora is not guilty of the crime rape against AAA. In reviewing rape cases, the
Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to accuse a man of rape is easy, but to disprove the
accusation is difficult, though the accused may be innocent; (2) the testimony of the complainant should
be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merit and should not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
The absence of external signs or physical injuries does not negate the commission of rape since
proof of injuries is not an essential element of the crime. In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to
present any scintilla of proof to support its claim. In fact, contrary to the prosecutions claim that AAA
was dragged, tied, mauled, slapped and boxed, the medical certificate revealed no telltale sign of the
prosecutions allegations. Moreover, the medical examination was conducted the day after AAAs
supposed escape from appellant which showed that AAA had no external signs of physical injuries, save
for a kiss mark. The numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of private complainant have created
reasonable doubt in the Supreme Courts mind. The prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of
establishing with moral certainty the truthfulness of the charge that appellant had carnal knowledge of
AAA against her will using threats, force or intimidation.
x. Rape by force or intimidation
(37) PEOPLE V BUAT
G.R. No. 206267. March 25, 2015

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno

FACTS:
AAA, the victim, lives with her parents and siblings in Pagadian City. On June 30, 1996, BBB, the
mother of AAA, requested DDD, the sister of AAA who was married to Ronnie Buat, the accused, to sleep
in the house because she was going to attend to a wake in Dumaguete City and CCC, the father of AAA
was on night duty as a security guard. Buat went with DDD to sleep on her parents house.
AAA slept in the living room next to her twin nephews, DDD and Buat. However, she was
awakened by a half-naked Buat lying on top of her. Buat covered AAAs mouth and threatened her with a
knife and then proceeded with the rape.
A medical examination that was conducted to AAA days after the incident showed that she suffered
healed lacerations in the hymen.
Buat contends that inconsistencies and improbabilities in the testimony of AAA constitutes a
failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Buat is guilty of the crime, rape
RULING:
Yes. Buat is guilty of raping AAA.
The courts held that trivial inconsistencies in the victims testimony do not impair her credibility;
such statements do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape.

Criminal Law

Moreover, the contention of Buat that AAA never exerted any physical struggle or made any real
resistance against his sexual advances was not taken by the courts. In People v. Banig, the court held that
it is not necessary on the part of the victim to put up a tenacious physical struggle when threats and
intimidation are employed and the victim submits herself to the embrace of her rapist because of fear. In
the case at bar, when Buat pointed a knife at AAA impelled her to submit to his sexual advances.
Furthermore, the court puts great weight on the factual findings of the judge who conducted the
trial of the case and heard the testimonies of the witnesses themselves especially in rape cases.
x. Statutory rape
(38) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESv. ARSENIO D. MISA III
G.R. No. 212336
July 15, 2015
FACTS:
AAA testified that on October 18, 2004 as she and BBB, her younger sister, were walking back to school
after taking their lunch at home, appellant called out to the sisters. Appellant told them that he would tell
AAA's fortune by reading her palm. When AAA asked why that was so, appellant ignored . Appellant then
handed AAA twenty pesos and BBB five pesos. After handing BBB the money, the appellant then told her
to go to class. Out of fear, BBB obeyed
Near a farm lot. Appellant dragged AAA to an area where several banana trees grew. Appellant
thereafter ordered AAA to lie down on the ground. He undressed her and proceeded to take liberties on her
person. He took off her underwear and licked her vagina. Appellant then removed his pants and had carnal
knowledge with AAA making her bleed. Throughout the ordeal appellant held a sharp pointed object to
coerce her into submission.
After appellant was done, he left AAA in the middle of the banana farm. AAA then went to the house
of the barangay tanod, a friend of her father, to seek help. The barangay tanod assisted and escorted AAA
to the police station and informed AAA's parents of what had just transpired. They reported the incident
then proceeded to the hospital for examination.
BBB corroborated AAA's testimony up to the point where she was ordered by the appellant to enter
her classroom.
ISSUE :
Whether or not the accused committed statutory rape
HELD :
Yes, it is affirmed that the accused has committed a statutory rape.
For a successful prosecution for the crime of statutory rape there are two elements which must be
proven: (1) that the victim was under 12 years of age at the time of the incident and (2) carnal knowledge
by the assailant of the victim. Both must be proven before an accused may be found guilty of statutory
rape.Absent AAA's certificate of live birth and other means by which her age as alleged in the Information
could have been ascertained beyond doubt, this Court is constrained to agree with the CA and deem the
crime committed as simple rape.
People v. Francasio Delfin
G.R. No. 190349
December 10, 2014
FACTS:
On May 27, 2001 at around 10:00 to 11:00 p.m., "AAA," then an 11-year old girl, was watching
television in a store at the public market in Naval, Biliran. When she went outside the public market,
appellant summoned her. "AAA" tried to run away, but appellant threatened to shoot her with a slingshot.
She thus approached appellant hesitantly. When already near him, appellant suddenly grabbed "AAAs"

Criminal Law

hand and dragged her to the second floor of a newly-constructed commercial building facing the public
market.
When they were already in a secluded portion, appellant undressed "AAA," spread her thighs, and
inserted his penis into her vagina, causing her pain and horror. Once satiated, appellant gave
"AAA" P100.00 and told her not to tell anyone about the incident or her family will be harmed.
The second rape incident happened during the evening of June 30, 2001. At about 11:00 p.m.,
"AAA" was sleeping inside a jeepney parked outside a billiard hall when appellant focused a flashlight on
her face. He then went inside the jeepney and removed "AAAs" panty and again raped her by inserting
his penis into her vagina which caused "AAA" pain.
After having difficulty in urinating and experiencing pain and swelling in her abdomen, "AAA" told
her aunt, "BBB," about the rape incidents and pointed to appellant as her rapist. Suspecting that "AAA"
was suffering from vaginal infection due to the rape, "BBB" brought "AAA" to the hospital.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is criminally liable for simple rape
HELD:
Yes. The elements of rape under are the following: (1) that the offender is a man; (2) that the
offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and, (3) that such act is accomplished by using force or
intimidation. These elements are present in this case. "AAAs" testimony established that appellant, a man,
had carnal knowledge of her, a young lass. She positively identified appellant as the one who raped her.
Aside from being clear and straightforward, her recollection of the material details of her harrowing
experience at the hands of the appellant is consistent. Moreover, the medical findings of Dr. Edano
corroborated "AAAs" testimony as the same showed that her hymen was lacerated at 6 oclock position.
There is sufficient basis, therefore, to conclude that carnal knowledge in fact took place. Further,
appellant, in committing the crime used force, threat, and intimidation. Per "AAAs" testimony, she was
forced to approach appellant because he threatened to shoot her with his slingshot. When "AAA" was
already near the appellant, he suddenly grabbed her and dragged her to the second floor of a commercial
building near the market. He then took off her panty, forcefully laid her down on top of folded cartons,
spread her thighs apart and inserted his penis into her vagina. After ravishing "AAA," appellant threatened
to kill her and her family should she tell anyone about the incident. Verily, these satisfy the third element,
that is, that the carnal knowledge was accomplished by using force, threat or intimidation.

xi. rape by sexual assault

(39) PEOPLE V. CARRERA
G.R. No. 215731.September 2, 2015

VILLARAMA, JR.,J

FACTS:
On or about June 13, 2004 in the Municipality of Barotac Viejo, Province of Iloilo at around 7:00
oclock on a rainy evening, AAA was walking on her way home from a tailor shop in poblacion Barotac
Viejo. Some ten (10) meters away from her house, a man who AAA recognized to be Carrera suddenly
emerged from a dark portion of the street and waylaid AAA.
Carrera reacted by uttering the following ominous lines: hipos karon, patyon ta (Quiet! Or else I
will kill you), after which he grabbed AAAs arm and dragged her toward a nearby church. Carrera then
pulled down AAAs garterized shorts and panty with his free hand while she was pinned down and then
forced to kiss her. AAA struggled, only to be overpowered by the stronger Carrera. She tried kicking and
boxing him, but her position on the ground proved to be an obstacle. She shouted for help, but the heavy
downpour drowned her voice.
AAA continued struggling and crawling until her attacker loosened his hold on her arm, enabling
AAA to move both her hands and to break free. Upon this chance, AAA ran toward their house half-

Criminal Law

naked. The sight of AAA when she reached home without any underwear, with blood on her legs and mud
all over her body impelled the shocked mother to immediately repair to the nearby police station to report
the incident.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape by sexual assault
HELD:
Yes. The accused was proven to commit the crime rape by sexual assault beyond reasonable doubt.
Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, enumerates the manner by which rape by
sexual assault is committed:
1.By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
2.By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof shall commit an
act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument
or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Clearly then, rape can be committed either through sexual intercourse or by sexual assault. Rape by
sexual assault is committed under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 and through any of
the means enumerated under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A. The gravamen of rape through sexual assault is
the insertion of the penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into
another persons genital or anal orifice. It is also called instrument or object rape or gender-free
rape.25

(40) RICALDE V. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 211002.January 21, 2015

LEONEN,J.:

FACTS
Accused Richard Ricalde (Ricalde) was charged with rape through sexual assault because he, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inserted his penis into the anus of XXX who was then
ten (10) years of age against his will and consent. Ricalde, then 31 years old, was a distant relative and
textmate of XXX, then 10 years old.
It was around 2:00 a.m. when XXX awoke as he felt pain in his anus and stomach and something
inserted in his anus. He saw that Ricalde fondled his penis. When Ricalde returned to the sofa, XXX
ran toward his mothers room to tell her what happened. He also told his mother that Ricalde played with
his sexual organ.
The medico-legal testified that it found no physical signs or external signs of recent trauma [in
XXXs] anus, or any trace of spermatozoa. Ricalde pleaded not guilty during his arraignment.
ISSUE
Whether or not the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt petitioners guilt for the crime of rape
through sexual assault.
RULING

Criminal Law

Yes, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Ricalde was guilty for the crime of rape
through sexual assault.
The Anti-Rape Law of 1997 classified rape as a crime against persons and amended the Revised
Penal Code to include Article 266-A on rape through sexual assault: Article 266 states that rape is
Committed (1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances: a) Through force, threat, or intimidation; b) When the offended party is deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious; c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and d)
When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present; 2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances
mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another
person.
In the case at bar, the trial court found that XXXs straightforward, unequivocal and convincing
testimony sufficiently proved that petitioner committed an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into
XXXs anal orifice. There was no showing of ill motive on the part of XXX to falsely accuse petitioner. In
a long line of cases, the Supreme Court has given full weight and credit to the testimonies of the child
victim by saying that [y]outh and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Hence, XXX,
then only 10 years old, had no reason to concoct lies against petitioner.
xi. Rape with homicide
(41) PEOPLE v. BRONIOLA
G.R. No. 211027,
June 29, 2015

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:
In the morning of February 28, 2000, AAA, a Grade VI student, left her house for school but was
unable to return home that day. After reporting the incident and searching for her, BBB, her father, found
her lifeless body the next day in a grassy lot near an uninhabited farm hut at Sitio Kabanatian, Barangay
Tumanding, Arakan, Cotabato. Alfredo Abag, a resident of the same barangay, testified that he met
accused-appellant Jose Broniola in a shortcut road passable only to people and animals and noticed that he
had scratches on his face and traces of blood on his lagaraw.
Information charging the appellant of the crime of rape with homicide was filed by the assistant
provincial prosecutor. It was learned that the families of the victim and the accused had a previous rift
because the father of Broniola was killed by the son-in-law of the victim's father. The accused-appellant
denied the prosecution's defense and claimed that he never left their house at the time of the crime as well
as meeting Abag in the shortcut road.
He further denied knowing the victim's family and in fact was not aware that the killer of his father
was the son-in-law of the victim's father. According to him, there was no direct evidence since nobody
witnessed the actual rape and killing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of rape with homicide
RULING:
While nobody witnessed the actual rape and killing of AAA, direct evidence is not a condition sine
qua non to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence,
the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. The trial court
found the testimony of Abag to be straightforward, categorical and convincing and gave no credence to
appellants denial and alibi as it failed to show the impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime.

Criminal Law

With the prosecution's circumstantial evidence, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted the
accused-appellant of the crime of rape with homicide. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
and then concurred by the Supreme Court. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral FACTS
and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and
common experience. Section 4, Rule 133, of the Revised Rules of Evidence, as amended, sets forth the
requirements of circumstantial evidence that is sufficient for conviction:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The FACTS from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
Considering all the circumstances mentioned and in light of previous rulings, the court is satisfied
that the evidence adduced against appellant constitutes an unbroken chain leading to the one fair and
reasonable conclusion that appellant was the perpetrator of the crime.
x. Anti Child Abuse Law
J. Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security
Kidnapping
(42) People v. De Guzman
G.R. No. 214502
November 25, 2015
FACTS:
On October 1, 2010, appellant, while in Isetann Mall, Recto, Manila, sought help from
complainant AAA. Appellant requested that AAA accompany him to the bank so that he may be able to
withdraw funds. However, appellant was unable to withdraw money since he did not have with him
suitable identification cards. Appellant asked AAA if he could stay at his house. On October 6, 2010,
appellant, at around 2:30 p.m. and accompanied by AAA, CCC, and their friend Vincent went to Citibank,
Paseo de Roxas, Makati, to withdraw P500, 000.00. Appellant went inside the bank while the other three
waited for him at a fast food restaurant across the street. AAA went with appellant first to the bank
ostensibly to fill out the forms. However, neither AAA nor the appellant returned to the restaurant where
the other two waited until 7:00 p.m. CCC and Vincent went to the bank and tried to ascertain if AAA and
appellant were there but the bank was empty. When they returned home, they were informed that AAA
and appellant were not there. Based on AAA's testimony, appellant enticed him to accompany him to
Cogeo, Antipolo. Appellant told AAA that his bodyguards told CCC and Vincent that they were going to
Antipolo. They left the bank at 3:00 p.m. and rode the MRT to Antipolo to an old decrepit house. It was
there that AAA was detained from October 6 to October 14, 2010.
Appellant threatened him not to go out of the house because his bodyguards were watching him.
Out of fear, AAA sold his cell phone in the market so that he would have money to provide for food and
he allowed appellant sexual liberties on his person. In the evening of October 14, 2010, a neighbor
knocked on the door and demanded that appellant surrender AAA. The neighbor had seen the evening
news which featured AAA as a missing person. Appellant told AAA to hide in the bathroom. A policeman
knocked at the bathroom door and told AAA to come out. Both AAA and appellant were brought to the
police station where AAA's statement was taken.
ISSUE:
Whether appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention.
HELD:
Yes. The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty,
coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect the same. The crime of serious illegal
detention consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure, but also of detaining him or depriving him
in any manner of his liberty. When deprivation of liberty occurs under any of the circumstances listed

Criminal Law

under Article 267, paragraph 4 is present, the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is
consummated. Evidence clearly showed that AAA was deprived of his liberty when he yielded to the
dictates of appellant and did not leave the house out of fear. Appellant instilled such fear into AAA making
him believe that he is a Sultan who has bodyguards constantly watching AAA's every move. The minor
AAA thus realized he was already being detained ("nakakulong") being under the control of his captor,
appellant, who will prevent him from leaving should he attempt to do so. The fact that AAA voluntarily
went with appellant to Antipolo, upon appellant's pretension that he had to open the vault of his house, is
immaterial. What is controlling is the act of the accused in detaining the victim against his or her will after
the offender is able to take the victim in his custody. In short, the carrying away of the victim in the crime
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention can either be made forcibly or, as in the instant case,
fraudulently.

i. Kidnapping of Mistaken Identity

(43) PEOPLE v. GREGORIO
G.R. No. 194235,
June 08, 2016

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:
Filed before the Regional Trial Court on October 21, 2002 was Jay Gregorio with the crime of
kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The accused-appellants
kidnapped JIMMY TING y SY for the purpose of extorting money in the amount of Fifty (50) million
pesos. Lucina, Jimmys mother, was the one who constantly communicated with the kidnappers since his
abduction on October 8, 2002. Because of her severe nervousness, she requested the kidnappers to let her
nephew, Marlon, bring the ransom to them, which the kidnappers acceded to.
While Marlon was on his way to deliver the money, the Response and Manhunt Team
simultaneously flagged down a Mitsubishi Lancer with plate number UJH 480 and retrieved Jimmy, who
was seated behind the driver. After talking to his mother, he then informed the rescue team that there
might still be a chance to catch the other kidnappers as his family was still about to meet the kidnappers
for the ransom payout. When Marlon handed the man the ransom, he got the chance to see the kidnappers
face who he positively identified as accused-appellant Ricardo. During the arraignment, the accusedappellants pleaded not guilty to the crime charged against them and Ricardo even denied ever meeting
Marlon and receiving ransom from the latter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellants are guilty of the crime of kidnapping with ransom despite
their claim of mistake of fact.
RULING:
The RTC promulgated a Decision on October 10, 2005 finding accused-appellants Jay, Rolando,
and Ricardo guilty as principals and accused-appellants Efren and Danilo guilty as accomplices of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom. The Court of Appeals then affirmed with modification the judgment of
the RTC. On appeal, accused-appellants contend before the Supreme Court that they were made to believe
that they were merely escorting Jimmy, a VIP, during his vacation in Ilocos Norte and that Jojo
orchestrated the kidnapping to get money and left the unwitting accused-appellants to suffer the
consequences.
The Supreme Court found no merit in the appeal. The elements of kidnapping as embodied under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, having been sufficiently proven, and the appellants, being private
individuals, having been clearly identified by the kidnap victim, the Court affirms the finding of
appellants' guilt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Since Republic Act No. 9346 already prohibited
the imposition of the death penalty, the accused-appellants are sentenced to reclusion perpetua in lieu of
death, without eligibility for parole.
ii. Grave Threats

Criminal Law

(44) JAMACA, v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 183681
July 27, 2015
FACTS:
Private complainant Atty. Emilie Bangot filed a complaint for Grave Threats against petitioner
with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, docketed as OMB-MIL-CRIM-97-0754. He
likewise filed a similar complaint before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City.
In a Resolution dated January 26, 1998, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military
dismissed the complaint on the ground that the accusation against petitioner was unfounded, based solely
on the statement of one Rustom Roxas that there were no threatening words uttered by petitioner. A
petition for certiorari was filed with this Court to assail said ruling of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military, but the same was dismissed in a Resolution dated July 29, 1998.
On [or] about July 22 1997 in the evening, at Kalambaguhan/Burgos Streets, Cagayan de Oro
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to kill and moved by personal resentment which he entertained against Atty. Emelie P. Bangot, Jr.,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously threaten the latter with the infliction upon him of a
wrong amounting to a crime subject to a condition, by threatening to kill the offended party thus uttering
or shouting words in the presence of, and within the hearing distance of Jay Jay R. Bangot (son of
offended party) KUNG MATANGTANG AKO SA TRABAHO, BUAKON KO ANG ULO NI ATTY.
BANGOT .. which means in English: "If I will loss my work I will break the head of Atty. Bangot ...", or
words of similar import, directed to the said offended party, Atty. Emelie P. Bangot, Jr., without however
attaining accused's purpose, thereby casting fear upon offended party's person and endangering his life.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of grave threats
HELD:
Yes, prosecution evidence established beyond any reasonable doubt that petitioner is indeed guilty of
grave threats.
The judgment is hereby rendered finding accused SPO2 Rolando Jamaca guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the offense of GRAVE THREATS defined and punishable under
paragraph 2 of Art. 282 of the Revised Penal Code without attendance of any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances.
Consequently, pursuant to said law, he is hereby sentenced with the accessories of the law as
provided by Art. 44 of the Revised Penal Code, to an imprisonment of two (2) months and one (1) day to
be served at the City Jail, Cagayan de Oro City and to pay a fine in the sum of Five Hundred Pesos
(500.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency computed at the rate of one (1) day for each
eight pesos but in no case will it exceed one-third of the term of the sentence.No pronouncement as to the
credit of preventive imprisonment since accused immediately put up a bond for his temporary liberty
without waiting for his arrest.
iii. Grave Coercion
iv. Unjust Vexation
v. Anti-Wire Tapping Act
K. Crimes Against Property

i. Robbery with Homicide

(45) PEOPLE V DE LEON
G.R. No. 197546.March 23, 2015

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno

Criminal Law

FACTS:
Emilio Prasmo, the victim was walking along Sta. Lucia Street, Novaliches, with her wife, Erlinda
A. Prasmo on March 2, 2002. They were on their way to RP Market when the accused-appellants, Bayani,
Danilo, Antonio and Yoyong De Leon blocked their way. Danilo was armed with a sumpak or fire piston
suddenly hit Emilio with a bakal, while Antonio hacked the victim with a lead pipe and the back portion of
his head and torso. They took Emilios money and fired the gun at the victims chest. When Emilio was
slumped to the ground, Yoyong hit the victim with a lead pipe on the neck and on his back. Erlinda tried
calling for help but nobody came because Bayani, armed with a gun, threatened possible aids. When the
accused-appellants left, Emilio was rushed to the hospital but eventually died.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellants are criminally liable for Robbery with Homicide
RULING:
No. The De Leon siblings are criminally liable for Murder.
The court held that the siblings are not guilty of the crime robbery with homicide because the
prosecution failed to establish the crime of robbery. In People v. Nimo, for conviction of the crime of
robbery with homicide, robbery must be proven as conclusively as the killing itself.

ii. Robbery with Rape

iii. Theft
(46) MEDINA v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 182648
June 17, 2015
FACTS:
On September 12, 2002, a criminal complaint for simple theft against Herman Medina was filed by
Purita Lim, representing her brother Henry Lim, a registered owner of SangyongKorando Jeep with Plate
No. WPC-207. The vehicle was involved in an accident that caused damage to its roof and door which
required them to engage the services of Medina, who was a mechanic and maintaining a repair shop in
Buenavista, Santiago City, Isabela. At the time the jeep was delivered to Medina's shop, it was still in
running condition and serviceable. But, a reasonable time elapsed and no repairs were made on the jeep.
In the morning of September 4, 2002, Danilo Beltran as instructed by Purita, retrieved the jeep from
Medina's shop, however he found out that the jeep no longer had its alternator, starter, battery, and two
tires with rims worth P5,000.00, P5,000.00, P2,500.00, and P10,000.00. Before starting his repair, he
reported the incident to Purita. In his arraignment, Medina pleaded not guilty, claiming that he took and
installed the missing parts on Lim's another vehicle, an Isuzu pick-up, which was also being repaired in
his shop.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of simple theft
RULING:
On March 31, 2005, the Regional Trial Court found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of simple theft. As defined and penalized, the elements of the crime are:
(1) there was taking of personal property;
(2) the property belongs to another;
(3) the taking was done with intent to gain;

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(4) the taking was without the consent of the owner; and
(5) the taking was accomplished without the use of violence against, or intimidation of persons or
force, upon things. Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful
taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation.
The word "take"' in the Revised Penal Code includes any act intended to transfer possession which
may be committed through the use of the offenders' own hands, as well as any mechanical device. The
accused acknowledged without hesitation the taking of the missing parts and put up the defense that they
were installed in the pick-up owned by Lim however Medina unsatisfactorily discharged the burden of
proof that the items were indeed lawfully taken.
On Medinas petition, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTCs decision and opined that his
excuse was lame and flimsy. On appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed in toto the
lower courts decision convicting Medina for the crime of simple theft.

iv. Qualified theft

(47) SAN DIEGO V PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 176114
April 8, 2015
Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
FACTS:
Grace San Diego, the accused-petitioner, was the accountant of Obando Fisherman's MultiPurpose Cooperative, Inc. (OFMPCI) from January 1993 to March 11, 1997. San Diego was in charge of
all accounting and business transactions of the cooperative, performing both the functions of a teller and
cashier, therefore, had all the access to the cash vaults and accounting records.
When San Diego stopped reporting to work on March 12, 1997, the General Manager instructed
the bookkeeper, Angelita Dimapelis to conduct a bank reconciliation to establish San Diegos
accountability. The bank records showed a huge discrepancy between the report and the supposed cash
position of the cooperative.
The Cooperative charged San Diego of qualified theft.
San Diegos side claimed that the adjustments made to the cash position during the bank
reconciliation caused the difference in amounts. Furthermore, San Diego contends that there was failure to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. And if guilty, she should be charged of estafa with abuse of
confidence instead of qualified theft.
ISSUE:
Whether or not San Diego is guilty of Qualified Theft
RULING:
Yes. San Diego is guilty of the crime Qualified Theft.
San Diegos contention that she is only guilty of estafa with abuse of confidence is without merit.
According to Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, Estafa has the following elements (1) that the money,
goods and other personal property was received in trust or on a commission, or for the administration of
such funds, or it was under an obligation which involved the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the
same; (2) that the accused misappropriated or converted money or property or there was denial of such
receipt; (3) and that the misappropriation or conversion or denial was to the prejudice of another; and (4)
there was demand by the offended party to the offender.
The Court added that juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right
over the thing transferred and this he may set up even against the owner. It has been established that San
Diego did not receive the sum of money in trust or on commission or for administration.

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Furthermore, San Diegos contention that her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt was
not taken. The audit report of the independent auditor of the cooperative since 1992, Alfonso Picasio,
which was presented before the courts was taken as in accordance with the standard and generally
accepted accounting principles. The said report was accompanied by certifications from several banks of
the cooperative to support the balance arrived. Thus, the courts take full faith and credit on the said audit
report.
Mel Carpizo Candelaria v. People
G.R. No. 209386
December 8, 2014
FACTS:
In the morning of August 23, 2006, Viron Transit Corporation (Viron) ordered 14,000 liters of diesel
fuel (diesel fuel) from United Oil Petroleum Phils. (Unioil), a company owned by private complainant
Jessielyn Valera Lao (Lao). Petitioner Mel Carpizo Candelaria, a truck driver employed by Lao, was
dispatched to deliver the diesel fuel in Laon Laan, Manila. However, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon
of the same day, Viron informed Lao through a phone call that it had not yet received its order. When Lao
called Candelaria on his mobile phone, she did not receive any response. Thereafter, or at around 6
oclock in the evening of the same day, Romano returned alone to Unioils office and reported that
Candelaria poked a balisong at him, prompting Lao to report the incident to the Anti Carnapping Section
of the Manila Police District (MPD), as well as to Camp Crame. In his defense, Candelaria demurred to
the prosecutions evidence, arguing that there was no direct evidence that linked him to the commission of
the crime, as Lao had no personal knowledge as to what actually happened to the diesel fuel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Candelaria is guilty of the crime of Qualified Theft on the basis of circumstantial
evidence
HELD:
Yes. The elements of Qualified Theft, punishable under Article 310 in relation to Article 309 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, are: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said property
belongs to another;(c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the owners
consent; (e) it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force
upon things; and (f) it be done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC.
In this case, there is a confluence of all the foregoing elements. Through the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses, it was sufficiently established that the 14,000 liters of diesel fuel loaded into the
lorry truck with plate number PTA-945 driven by Candelaria for delivery to Viron on August 23, 2006 was
taken by him, without the authority and consent of Lao and that Candelaria abused the confidence reposed
upon him by Lao, as his employer.
Candelaria maintains that he should be acquitted considering that his conviction was based merely
on circumstantial evidence. The Court is not convinced.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt Circumstantial evidence
suffices to convict an accused only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads
to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person. Here, the RTC, as correctly affirmed by the CA, found that the attendant circumstances in this case
amply justify the conviction of Candelaria under the evidentiary threshold of proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. These circumstances are: (a) on August 23, 2006, Viron ordered 14,000 liters of diesel
fuel from Laos Unioil; (b) as driver of Unioil, Candelaria was given the task of delivering the same to
Viron in Laon Laan, Manila; (c) Candelaria and his helper Romano left the company premises on the same
day on board the lorry truck bearing plate number PTA-945 containing the diesel fuel; (d) at around 5
oclock in the afternoon of the same day, Viron informed Lao that its order had not yet been delivered; (e)
Candelaria failed toreply to Laos phone calls; (f) later in the day, Romano returned to the Unioil office
sans Candelaria and reported that the latter threatened him with a weapon; (g) Lao reported the incident

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tothe MPD and Camp Crame; (h) the missing lorry truck was subsequently found in Laguna, devoid of its
contents; and (i) Candelaria had not reported back to Unioil since then. Threading these circumstances
together, the Court perceives a congruent picture that the crime of Qualified Theft had been committed
and that Candelaria had perpetrated the same.
v. Anti-Carnapping Law
(48) PEOPLE vs. ASAMUDDIN
G.R. No. 213913.September 2, 2015

VILLARAMA, JR.,J

FACTS:
Emelina Gloria hired Julkipli Asammudin as messenger in E. Gloria Money Changer, Mandaluyong
City, sometime in 2006, with the main function of delivering local or foreign currencies to clients or other
money changers. Assigned to appellant to be used in the performance of his work is a blue Honda XRM
motorcycle with plate number UU 9142.
On or about the 11th day of July 2007 at 12:30 in the afternoon, in the City of Mandaluyong,
Philippines, the appellant, took and carried away a motorcycle, Honda XRM, amounting to P49,000.00
without Emelinas consent. Although prior to that, she tasked him to proceed to Mabini and Manila, and has
even permitted him to use the service motorcycle.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused violated R.A. 6539, the Anti- Carnapping Act of 1972.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the accused has violated RA. 6539
The elements of Carnapping as defined under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6539, as amended, are:
(1)the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another;
(2)the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons or by using force upon things; and
(3)the taking is done with intent to gain.37
All these elements were established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. Unlawful taking,
or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the
moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.
In the present case, the Solicitor General aptly argued that appellants failure to return the motorcycle
to Emelina after his working hours from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. constitutes unlawful taking. Emelina
lodged a complaint against appellant with the PNP-CIDG for the loss of the service motorcycle confirming
that appellants continued possession thereof is without her authority.
vi. Estafa
(49) PEOPLE vs. TIBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 209655-60.January 14, 2015

PERLAS-BERNABE,J.:

FACTS:
The Tibayan Group Investment Company, Inc. (TGICI) is an open-end investment company
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on September 21, 2001. Following an
investigation in 2002, the SEC found out that TGICI was selling securities to the public without a
registration statement, submitted a fraudulent Treasurers Affidavit, provided false assurance to its clients
about high interest returns, and gave invalid postdated checks of principal investment and monthly interest
earnings. The office closed down without paying private complainants, thus, they were constrained to file
criminal complaints against the incorporators and directors of TGICI. Multiple criminal cases were filed
against the latter for Syndicated Estafa. In defense, Puerto claimed that his signature in the Articles of

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Incorporation of TGICI was forged and that since January 2002, he was no longer a director of TGICI. For
Tibayan, she claimed that her signature in the TGICIs Articles of Incorporation was a forgery, as she was
neither an incorporator nor a director of TGICI.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Syndicated Estaf.
RULING:
Yes, the accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Syndicated Estafa.
Item 2(a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the RPC provides that Swindling (estafa) is committed by any
person who shall defraud another (1) by means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud and (2) by using fictitious name, or
falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business, or
imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits. In relation, Section 1 of PD 1689 states
swindling (estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed with the
intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation
results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed bymembersor funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.
In the case at bar, all the elements of Syndicated Estafa are present in this case, considering that: (a)
the incorporators/directors comprising more than five (5) people, made false pretenses and representations
to the investing private complainants regarding a supposed lucrative investment opportunity; (b) the said
false pretenses and representations were made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud; (c)
private complainants invested their hard earned money into TGICI; and (d) the incorporators/directors of
TGICI ended up running away with the private complainants investments, obviously to the latters
prejudice. Hence, the court convicted Palmy Tibayan (Tibayan) and Rico Z. Puerto were convicted of the
crime of Syndicated Estafa.

(50) BURGOS v. ELADIO SJ.

G.R. No. 219468

June 08, 2016

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
On April 26, 2012 petitioner Jose Burgos Jr. filed a letter of complaint before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, Taytay, Rizal, charging respondents spouses Eladio and Arlina Naval and their
daughter, Amalia Naval of the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents. Petitioner
narrated that on November 19, 1996 he mortgaged a lot he owned with an area of 1,389 square meters
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 550579 to a certain Antonio Assad. And in order to
avoid foreclosure, Burgos decided to obtain a loan from the Navals. The respondents agreed and asked
Burgos to sign some blank documents in return to which he and his wife faithfully complied.
In February 2011, Burgos surprisingly discovered that TCT No. 550579 was cancelled, and a new
one was issued, TCT No. 644582, in favor of the spouses Naval, revealing that the blank documents which
he and his wife previously signed turned out to be a receipt and a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject
lot. Criminal Case No. 13-45768 was then filed, accusing respondents of having committed the aforesaid
crime. Before arraignment, respondents filed a motion to quash based on the ground that their criminal
liability has been extinguished due to prescription.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Estafa case on the
ground of prescription.
RULING:

Criminal Law

No. The RTC essentially observed that the prescriptive period for the alleged crime commenced
from the time Burgos had constructive notice of the alleged falsification, when the document was
registered with the Register of Deeds on April 1, 1998. Therefore, since more than ten (10) years had
elapsed when the information was filed in 2013, the subject crime had already prescribed. Unstirred,
petitioner then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which the court subsequently dismissed due to
his failure to join the People in his certiorari petition required by the Administrative Code of 1987.
On appeal, Burgos averred that the CAs decision citing grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, the Supreme Court finds for respondents. It must be noted that
while the criminal case of Estafa was dismissed, the CA's dismissal of certiorari petition is without
prejudice to petitioners filing of the appropriate action to preserve his interest in the civil aspect of the
Estafa, provided that the parameters of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure are complied with.
Any misgivings regarding the propriety of that disposition is for the People, thru the OSG, and not
for Burgos to argue. As earlier stated, Burgos's remedy is to institute a civil case under the parameters of
Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
vii. BP 22
viii. Other Deceits
ix. Arson
x. Malicious Mischief
K. Crimes Against Chastity
i. Qualified Seduction
ii. Acts of Lasciviousness
iii. Forcible Abduction
iv. Anti Sexual Harassment Act
L. Crimes Against Civil Status
i. Bigamy
M. Crimes Against Honor
i. Libel
(51) ALMENDRAS, JR. vs. ALMENDRAS
G.R. No. 179491
January 14, 2015

SERENO,CJ.:

FACTS:
On February 1996, petitioner, Alejandro C. Almendras, Jr., sent letters with similar contents to House
Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. and Dr. Nemesio Prudente, President of Oil Carriers, Inc, requesting their
assistance in circulating the information contained in the letter to concerned officials and secretariat
employees of the House of Representatives. The controversial portion of the first and second letters
indicated that his brother, ALEXIS DODONG C. ALMENDRAS, should not be vested with any
authority to liaison or transact any business with any department, office, or bureau, public or otherwise,
that has bearing or relation with his (petitioner) office, mandates or functions because he was a reknown
blackmailer and a bitter rival in the 1995 election. He also mentioned in the letter that Dodong caused
pain to their family when he filed cases against them, including his brothers, sisters, and mother.
Dodong, on the other hand, found his brothers act to be libelous as it manifested bad faith and
malice to destroy his good name.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the letters are libelous in nature.
RULING:

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Yes, the letters are libelous in nature. The Supreme Court duly proved that all the elements of libel
are present in the case.
For an imputation to be libelous under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, the following
requisites must be present: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given
publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable. Consequently, under Article 354, every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if true, if no good intention and justifiable motive is shown.
In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and
should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by the
persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense. In the instant
case, the letters tag respondent as a reknown blackmailer, a vengeful family member who filed cases
against his mother and siblings, and with nefarious designs. Even an impartial mind reading these
descriptions would be led to entertain doubts on the persons character, thereby affecting that persons
reputation.
Therefore, such publication created upon the minds of the readers a circumstance which brought discredit
and shame to respondents reputation.
ii. Slander
iii. Intriguing Against Honor
N. Criminal Negligence