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Intellectual Analysis
of Religion
Contesting Hindutva
[We reproduce here the correspondence between
EPW reader Paresh Malakar and author Sumanta
Banerjee.]
Dear Mr Banerjee,
vol lI no 33
EPW
LETTERS
Sumanta Banerjee
EPW
HYDERABAD
Prejudiced Hangover
reputed research institution in Kolkata had invited an Australian citizen of Bangladeshi origin as visiting professor for a week. The citizen concerned
is a retired professor of the University of
Western Sydney and had held high posts
both in the UN Department of Economic
and Social Affairs, New York and UN
Economic and Social Commission for
Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok. However,
he has been denied a visa by the Government of India. The scholar had applied
for a visa to visit the research institute.
However, he was asked so many questions
and over such a long period, that the
time scheduled for visiting the institute
lapsed. What reason can our Ministry of
External Affairs advance for such behaviour which smacks of the worst days of
McCarthyism in the US?
Amiya Bagchi
Emeritus Professor,
Institute of Development Studies Kolkata
Erratum
In the editoral Open Season for Bullies
(6 August 2016, p 8), the last sentence of the
second to last paragraph should have read
as follows.
It is equally important to remember those
who were assassinatedM M Kalburgi,
Narendra Dabholkar, and Govind Pansare
and the suicide of Rohith Vemula, whom
the Prime Minister forgot to mention in his
many public utterances.
The error is regretted. Ed
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vol lI no 33
EPW
Sharmilas Message
By breaking her fast, Irom Sharmila compels us to think about the efficacy of such tactics.
EPW
vol lI no 33
EDITORIALS
vol lI no 33
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EDITORIALS
vol lI no 33
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COMMENT
EPW
vol lI no 33
point. If the model law is treated as the foundation and customised to specific contexts of states, it would help evolve a harmonised tax system. The focus should be on system harmonisation
rather than harmonisation of rates across the states. Special
provisions have been made in the law for special category
states. The rationale for introducing the GST is to have a simplified tax system, minimise distortions and maximise gains in
economic efficiency. This, in turn, requires minimum exemptions, a broadening of the tax base and a low tax rate. It is hoped
that the special provisions do not become the norm and complicate the tax system. These special provisions should be used
judiciously, if not eliminated gradually.
Decisions in the GST Council will be taken through a voting
process with the central government having a weight of one-third
of the total votes cast and state governments (taken together)
having a weight of two-thirds. As formulated, the centre, individual
states and all states put together will lose fiscal autonomy as far
as changes in the GST design are concerned. Surrendering fiscal
autonomy for levying taxes that provided more than two-thirds
share of state revenue in the past which is likely to go up after
the GST is in place needs careful consideration. Due to the rigid
voting mechanism to arrive at decisions, it can be contended
that a certain amount of inflexibility has been introduced into
the system. This issue is much more important for the states
than the union government.
It is important to recognise that the GST is a destination-based tax
levied at the point of consumption. There will be gainers and losers
when the destination principle is adopted. As the act has made a
provision for 100% compensation to the states for a period of five
years; this should help overcome transitional issues relating to
revenue losses. Hopefully, the design of the GST will increase the
tax base and eliminate tax-induced fragmentation of markets.
However, it is about time that unrealistic expectations and the
hype surrounding the GST be moderated. If implemented correctly, the new GST should result in efficiency gains leading to higher
revenues and faster economic growth. This will be possible if the
GST Council functions as a professional body and is able to rise
above narrow partisan and political interests.
Pinaki Chakraborty (pinaki.chakraborty@nipfp.org.in) is at the National
Institute of Public Finance and Policy.
COMMENT
EPW
vol lI no 33
References
Artu, E, S Chaudhuri and J McLaren (2010):
Trade Shocks and Labor Adjustment: A Structural Empirical Approach, American Economic
Review, Vol 100, No 3, pp 100845.
Feyrer, J (2009): The 1967-75 Suez Canal Closure:
Lessons for Trade and the Trade-income Link,
VoXEU.org, 23 December, http://voxeu.org/
article/1967-75-suez-canal-closure-lessons-trade.
vol lI no 33
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COMMENTARY
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vol lI no 33
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14
References
Irfan, Hakeem (2015): All Financial Powers with
Centre: J&K FM Haseeb Drabu, Economic Times,
21 May.
Jameel, Yusuf (2016): The Non-Lethal Weapon
that Maims and Blinds, Asian Age, 20 June.
JKCCS (2013): Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of
Civil Society Demands Disbanding of VDCs
(Village Defense Committees) and Ikhwans in
India Occupied Kashmir, 16 August.
(2016): Composition of VDCs Has Led to Communal Polarisation, January.
Kashmir Reader (2016): Drabu Gives Break-up of
PMs `80,000 cr Package, 18 June.
Navlakha, Gautam (2008): Jammu and Kashmir:
Winning a Battle Only to Lose the War?,
Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 43, No 45,
8 November.
(2015): Hubris of Propaganda on Kashmir,
Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 50, No 52,
26 December.
Sengupta, Nitish (1996): Enquiry on Amarnath Yatra
Tragedy Committee Report, Department of Kashmir Affairs, Government of India, December.
Sharma, Arun (2016): BJP MLA Who Led Murder
Accused to Ministers House Was Named
in FIR, Indian Express, 15 March.
vol lI no 33
EPW
COMMENTARY
Subramaniam vs Subramanian
Has Profit Taken Precedence Over People?
Saurabh Chandra
14
vol lI no 33
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EPW consults referees from a database of 200+ academicians in different fields of the social
sciences on papers that are published in the Special Article and Notes sections.
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
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vol lI no 33
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20
Notes
1
Of course, the leaders of the Shanghai Commune were neither democratically elected, nor
were mechanisms put in place for the people to
control them, nor did the people have the
right to recall them; all three being basic
democratic principles of the Paris Commune.
The last, the 11th thesis, the famous one, reads:
The philosophers have only interpreted the
world; the point however is to change it. And,
the third, not that famous but equally important, thesis, in part, reads: The materialist
doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing and that, therefore, changed
men are products of other circumstances and
changed upbringing, forgets that circumstances
are changed precisely by men and that the educator must himself be educated. ... The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of
human activity can only be conceived and rationally understood as revolutionary practice.
vol lI no 33
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COMMENTARY
Karnatakas Changing
Fiscal Landscape
Finances after FFC
Pranay Kotasthane, Varun K Ramachandra
20
vol lI no 33
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COMMENTARY
(`crore)
Type
201415 RE
201415 Actual
201516 BE
201516 RE
201617 BE
Percentage Change
201415 RE vs
201516 BE
68,554
4,465
73,019
15,397
3,953
16,525
35,875
1,08,894
70,180
4,688
74,868
14,654
3,635
10,985
29,273
1,04,141
76,445
5,206
81,651
24,790
2,072
7,847
34,709
1,16,360
75,568
5,411
80,979
23,983
3,481
9,287
36,751
1,17,730
83,864
6,220
90,084
26,978
2,796
10,898
40,672
1,30,756
11.5
16.6
11.8
61.0
-47.6
-52.5
-3.3
6.9
Percentage Change
201415 Actual vs
201516 RE
7.7
15.4
8.2
63.7
-4.2
-15.5
25.5
13.1
10.9
14.9
11.2
12.5
-19.7
17.4
10.7
11.1
19.5
32.7
20.3
84.1
-23.1
-0.8
38.9
25.6
BE refers to budget estimates, RE refers to revised estimates and actuals refer to budget account numbers.
Source: Karnataka State Budget 201617.
Economic & Political Weekly
EPW
vol lI no 33
21
COMMENTARY
noted that this comparison is not exhaustive owing to the difficulty in mapping
schemes meant for the welfare of SCs/
STs within the Karnataka budget.
In the Core category of schemes,
Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana
(PMGSY) allocations have increased tremendously, providing an opportunity to
the state to accelerate its rural connectivity efforts. Programmes at the elementary levelsSarva Shiksha Abhiyan and
Mid-day Mealshave also received greater grants at Karnatakas level. The union
governments focus on housing for all
has resulted in greater receipts for this
programme for Karnataka as well. Receipts
under the umbrella Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) have, however,
decreased by nearly 21% in Karnataka.
Overall, we calculate an increase of 56.3%
in the receipts for the Core Schemes.
Given these changes in the receipts, it
would now be prudent to look at the
trends in expenditures over the last two
years since the FFC recommendations
came into effect.
Restructuring Expenditure
The Karnataka governments expenditures
between 201516 (BE) and 201516 (RE)
have seen a marginal increase of 1.4%.
Whereas there has been a significant jump
of 26.6% between 201415 (actuals) and
Core of the
Core Schemes
Core Schemes
Index
Scheme Name
201415
Actual
MGNREGA
32,456
NSAP
7,084
Umbrella SC programme
2,677
Umbrella ST programme
1,593.7
Sub-total
43,810.9
Green revolution (Krishonnati +
Rashtriya Krishi Vikas Yojana)
18,266
National Health Mission (NHM)
(Rural +Urban +AYUSH)
18,411
Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY)
9,960
Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana
(PMAY) (Rural + Urban)
11,096
Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA)
24,039.1
Umbrella Integrate Child Development Services 17,984.6
Swachh Bharat
12,799.9
Mid-day Meals
10,446.6
Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban
Transformation (AMRUT)
0
Sub-total
1,23,003.1
35,754
9,074
2,968
1,957
49,753
38,500
9,500
4,349
1,759
54,108
68.5
16.9
7.7
3.1
96.3
7.7
4.7
46.5
-10.1
8.8
1,716.9
133.4
85.1
6.3
1,941.7
1,359
532.1
210.9
119.4
2,221.4
1,359
532.1
141.7
72.9
2,105.7
0.0
0.0
-32.8
-38.9
-5.2
12,784.3
12,979
7.7
1.5
747.8
589.2
663.4
12.6
19,013
15,188
20,037
19,000
11.9
11.2
5.4
25.1
350.7
494.4
881.1
128
826.2
808
-6.2
531.3
11,231
21,899
16,711.4
9,227
9,185.6
20,075
22,500
16,273
11,300
9,700
11.9
13.3
9.6
6.7
5.7
78.8
2.7
-2.6
22.5
5.6
370.3
668.6
595.1
561
596.8
429.1
256.3
1,137.9
198
347
653.1
1083.7
887.8
337
564.3
52.2
322.9
-21.9
70.2
62.6
3,463.7 7,295.5
11,8703 1,39,159.5
4.3
82.3
110.6
28.1
0
4,384.6
31.3
3,998.1
425.3
6,248.9
1,257.1
56.3
vol lI no 33
BE refers to budget estimates, RE refers to revised estimates and actuals refer to budget account numbers.
Source: Union Government Budget 201617, Karnataka State Budget 201617.
22
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Conclusions
By seeking to provide greater fiscal
autonomy to the states the FFC award
has marked a new phase in unionstate
relations in India. While there were
worries in the aftermath of the award
about cuts by the union in the social
sector, Karnataka has allayed these fears
by increasing its spending in the social
sector. Similarly, there were fears that
increased autonomy would lead to
increases in indiscriminate spending by
states because they were fiscally
irresponsible (Mundle 2016). However,
Karnatakas experience thus far has
largely been positive. The increase in
receipts has been prudently utilised in
the social and economic sectors. The
state has also focused on increasing
capacity (overall capital outlay is up by
31%) since the FFC recommendations
came into effect. That said, there is
much more that the state can do by
cutting down on ill-targeted subsidies
and transfersespecially in sectors like
power, social welfare and agriculture
and focusing on critical growth areas
such as health.
While Karnataka benefited from FFC
recommendations, the union governments response has partly undone these
advantages.3 The restructuring of CSS
and increases in the contribution of
states for some of these schemes has
meant that Karnatakas destiny is still
tied to a number of CSS being run by the
union. This is compounded by the fact
that the union government has continued
the trend of raising money through cesses and surcharges, effectively reducing
REFERENCES
Bhattacharjee, Govind (2016): Will Federalism At
Work Let Populism Thrive? Statesman, 3 March,
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Chakraborty, Pinaki and Manish Gupta (2016):
Evolving CentreState Financial Relations, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 51, No 16, pp 4346.
FICCI (2015): Highlights of 14th Finance Commission Report, February, Federation of Indian
Chambers of Commerce and Industry, viewed
on 30 April 2016, http://ficci.in/SPdocument/20563/Highlights_14thFinance_Commission_
Report.pdf.
Finance Commission (2015): Report of the Fourteenth Finance Commission, http://finmin.nic.
in/14fincomm/14fcreng.pdf.
Jefferson, Mark (1939): The Law of the Primate
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pp 226 32.
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thewire.in/2016/03/06/the-shifting-political-economy-of-centrally-sponsored-schemes-24009/.
Kotasthane, Pranay and Varun K Ramachandra
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Nos 4647, pp 1620.
Mundle, Sudipto (2016): Trust in States Fiscal Responsibility Vindicated, Livemint, 15 April,
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com/Opinion/pLACsDUcLIeGjaD0YuLFBO/Trust-in-states-fiscal-responsibility-vindicated.html.
NITI Aayog (2015): Executive Summary, Report of
the Sub-group of Chief Ministers on Rationalisation of Centrally Sponsored Schemes, October,
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RBI (2015): Issues and Perspectives, in State Finances: A Study of Budgets of 201415, Reserve
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lakh and More (nd): Table 3, Provisional Population Totals Paper 2 of 2011: India (Vol II), Census of India 2011, viewed on 1 May 2016, http://
censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-results/paper2/
data_files/India2/Table_3_PR_UA_Citiees_1Lakh_and_Above.pdf.
vol lI no 33
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KL
CG
TN
AP
KA
OR
.5
JH RJ
UP
EPW
MH
WB
MP
PB
UK
DL
HR
AS
GJ
JK
BR
0
0
.2
.4
.6
vol lI no 33
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Interstate Variations
The rest of the article uses the aggregate
of divorce and separation as an indicator
of marriage dissolution. Figure 2 maps
this aggregate figure across states and
union territories. It reveals large spatial
variations in overall marriage dissolution
rates. The North-east region appears to
have relatively greater rates overall. The
rest of the country shows a striking North
South division, with the region to the south
of the Vindhyas having distinctly greater
divorce and separation rates than the region to the north. This corresponds with
other NorthSouth distinctions made in
the demography literature, most notably
that of Dyson and Moore (1983) who argue that the Southern region has relatively greater female autonomy. Among
Northern states with relatively low rates
of marriage dissolution, Bihar (BR), UP,
and Haryana (HR) stand out. Among
Southern states with relatively higher
rates, Kerala (KL) and Tamil Nadu (TN)
stand out, along with the curious case of
Chhattisgarh.
(2.5,7)
(1.5,2.5)
(1,1.5)
(.5,1)
26
(0,.5)
Figure 3: Divorce Rates, Separation Rates, and Gender Differences in the North-east States
women (%)
The states of Indias North-east (Meghalaya (ML), Mizoram (MZ), Sikkim (SK),
Tripura, Nagaland (NL), Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Assam) deserve a special focus for at least two reasons. First,
tribal customary laws allow for unions
which are informal and where cohabiting
couples are deemed married (Nongbri
2003; Xaxa 2004). Second, conventional
wisdom attributes relatively higher status of women in this region, partly due
to the practice of matrilineal kinship systems and matrilocal residence among
some tribes. However, traditional sociological markers of autonomy such as the
participation of women in the labour market, economic decision-making, freedom
of movement and access of and control
over economic assets (Bloom, Wypij and
Gupta 2001; Dyson and Moore 1983; Jejeebhoy and Sathar 2001) may not be the
best indicators to assess womens agency
in the North-east, given the limitations
imposed by geography, livelihood patterns, out-migration, and insufficient
political participation (Nongbri 2001).
The mapping exercise of Figure 2 had
suggested that marriage dissolution rates
Men (%)
vol lI no 33
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COMMENTARY
compared especially to
the North calls for deeper
scrutiny to explore the
underlying factors. The
regional variation in marriage dissolution reported
here overlaps with regional
variation in female autonomy made previously in
the literature (Dyson and
Moore 1983 and others),
and it will be useful to explore this connection. It
will also be important to
understand why urban
rural differences in marriage dissolution
are not particularly stark, and the implications for relative cultural change.
rural (%)
urban (%)
notes
1
Absence of Substantial
RuralUrban Differences
Figure 4 shows the difference in aggregate rates of marriage dissolution for
rural and urban areas in large states.
While one might expect urban rates to
be substantially greater than rural rates,
it is striking that this is not the case. In
fact, the states with the relatively higher
ruralurban gaps (Andhra Pradesh,
Karnataka, and Kerala) have higher rates
in rural rather than urban areas.
For Future Work
This article has reported divorce and
separation rates recorded in the Census
2011 and explored the considerable degree
of variation in these rates across states.
The fact that marriage dissolution rates
are higher in Indias South and North-east
Economic & Political Weekly
EPW
vol lI no 33
References
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Belliappa, J (2013): Gender, Class and Reflexive
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on Maternal Health Care Utilization in a North
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Variations in Divorce: Effects of Womens Power,
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Notions of Love, and Kinship Support amongst
Poor Women in Delhi, Contributions to Indian
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Autonomy in India and Pakistan: The Influence
of Religion and Region, Population and Development Review, Vol 27, No 4, pp 687712.
Kumar, V A (2012): Judicial Delays in India: Causes
and Remedies, Journal of Law, Policy and
Globalization, Vol 4, pp 1621.
Leonetti, D L and D C Nath (2009): Age at First
Reproduction and Economic Change in the
Context of Differing Kinship Ecologies, American
Journal of Human Biology, Vol 21, No 4, pp 43847.
Mand, K (2008): Marriage and Migration through
the Life Course: Experiences of Widowhood,
Separation and Divorce amongst Transnational
Sikh Women, Rajni Palriwala, and Patricia
Uberoi, Marriage, Migration and Gender (eds),
New Delhi: Sage, pp 286302.
Nongbri, T (2001): Democracy, Gender and Tribes: A
Critical Appraisal of Indias Constitutional Policies, Indian Anthropologist, Vol 31, No 2, pp 114.
(2003): Development, Ethnicity and Gender:
Select Essays on Tribes in India, New Delhi,
Rawat Publications.
Palriwala, R and P Uberoi (2008): Exploring the Links:
Gender Issues in Marriage and Migration, Rajni
Palriwala and Patricia Uberoi (eds), Marriage,
Migration and Gender, New Delhi: Sage, pp 2362.
Pothen, S (1989): Divorce in Hindu Society, Journal
of Comparative Family Studies, Vol 20, No 3,
pp 37792.
Unisa, S (1999): Childlessness in Andhra Pradesh,
India: Treatment-Seeking and Consequences,
Reproductive Health Matters, Vol 7, No 13,
pp 5464.
Xaxa, V (2004): Women and Gender in the Study
of Tribes in India, Indian Journal of Gender
Studies, Vol 11, No 3, pp 34567.
27
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28
press was owned by him, Babasaheb considered himself a tenant and paid a rent of
`50 per month to the trust. It came to be
occupied by bhangarwallas and it was a
challenge to evacuate them when the
trust wanted to build a hall there in the
1970s. But due to the concerted efforts of
one of the trustees, P L Lokhande and
Yashwantrao Ambedkar (Babasahebs
son), the plot was vacated. A small hall
was built in 1975 which housed some offices and provided shelter to poor Dalit
visitors to Mumbai.
Later, in the 1990s, the Ambedkar
Bhavan came up and it soon became a
centre for Dalit and progressive activists
who held meetings, conferences and other
programmes there. It also provided shelter
to needy Dalits who came for medical
treatment or other work to Mumbai. It
also served as the community hall where
marriages took place. Among its many
rooms, two were occupied by Prakash and
Anandraj Ambedkar as offices of their
Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha and the Republican Sena, respectively. The other
rooms were in the possession of the trust.
The press housed the antique machines
of the press; old issues of the Janata and
Prabuddha Bharat, and important pamphlets and documents of various movements, and the office of the Bharatiya
Bauddha Mahasabha (Indian Buddhist
Society). During the demolition, many
of these historical documents were reportedly lost, stolen or destroyed.
Land Grab Intrigues
Ratnakar Gaikwad, ex-IAS officer who
retired as chief secretary to the Government of Maharashtra and holds the post of
state information commissioner after retirement submitted a change report to
the Charity Commissioner which was
challenged by the chairman of the trust
and is pending with the Charity Commissioners office. As a result, the changes
could not be incorporated into Schedule I
and the property card.
Gaikwad says that building a 17-storey
building would be the fulfilment of
Babasahebs dream. He has already submitted the building plans to the municipal
authorities and reportedly got their
approval. What Gaikwad revealed with
pride to the public is that the building will
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president-obama-a-smooth-brexit-process-isin-everyone-s-interest/50000260-2980109.
DSouza, Radha (2016a): From Great Britain to
Little England, Economic & Political Weekly,
Vol 51, No 28, pp 2022.
(2016b): Chilcot Report and How Democracy
Actually Works in the West, Vol 51, No 29,
http://www.epw.in/journal/2016/28/web-exclusives/chilcot-report-and-how-democracy-actually-works-west.html.
Office of the Press Secretary (2016): Remarks by
President Obama, President Tusk of the European
Council, and President Juncker of the European
Commission after USEU meeting, 8 July, The
White House, Washington DC, https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/08/
remarks-president-obama-president-tusk-european-council-and-president.
Rankin, Jennifer and agencies (2016): John Kerry:
Brexit Could Be Walked Back, Guardian,
29 June, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
2016/jun/29/john-kerry-brexit-could-bewalked-back-david-cameron.
Rampton, Roberta and Kylie Maclellan (2016):
Obama Exhorts Britain to Stay in EU, Warns
on Trade If It Leaves, Reuters, 22 April, http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-obamaidUSKCN0XH2U6.
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References
BBC News (2016): Brexit: EU Says No Compromise
on Freedom of Movement, 29 June, http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36659900.
Brown, Enos (2002): The Jamaican Experience
with the Movement of Natural Persons in the
Provision of Services, paper presented to the
Joint World Trade OrganizationWorld Bank
symposium on Movement of Natural Persons
(Mode 4) under General Agreement on Trade
in Services, Geneva, Switzerland, 1112 April,
http://www.revistainterforum.com/english/
articles/042902artprin_en1.html.
James, William and Paul Taylor (2016): EU Tells UK
Single Market Access Requires Full Free Movement, Reuters, 29 June, http://www.reuters.
com/article/us-britain-eu-wrapup-idUSKCN0ZF29S.
Mukherjee, Arpita and Tanu M Goyal (2013):
Examining Mode 4 Commitments in India and
the EUs Agreements: Implication for the IndiaEU BTIA, Working Paper No 396, February,
Indian Institute of Management Bangalore,
http://www.iimb.ernet.in/research/sites/default/files/WP%20No.%20396_0.pdf.
Watt, Nicholas (2012): European Commission
Criticised for Racist Ad, Guardian, 6 March,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/
mar/06/european-commission-criticised-racist-ad.
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in the Europe of the past, and the immigrant-phobic nationalism in presentday Europe.
The Eurocentric understanding of
nationalism fails to recognise that outside
the West, in many countries, including
India, nationalism is primarily a handiwork of the necessity to unshackle the
vestiges of colonialism. In these countries,
despite occasional aberrations, nationalism is still predominantly conceived as
a nation-building apparatus, and in the
current neo-liberal world increasingly as
an ideological commitment to shield the
most vulnerable from the onslaught of
global capitalism. This ilk of nationalism
is sans any centrifugal imperialist aspirations. The overbearing insistence on
retaining a monolithic understanding of
nationalism that emerges in the sole
light of Europes grisly history amounts
to a failure, or flagrant refusal, to accept
the multiplicity of nationalisms roots,
contexts, aims, journeys and destinations
outside the West. Ignorance is tolerable
when admitted, but insufferable when
wrapped in the arrogance of awareness.
In the aftermath of my experiment on
social media, many Western commentators whose familiarity with the Indian
case was minimal, became India experts
in minutes, and felt confident enough to
utter strong judgments about Indias
gains in the case of the UK remaining in
the EU. It is West-centric education that
arms them with this confidence, which
may well be construed as epistemological hubris.
Big Indian Capital: Many Indian companies, such as Tata Motors, are not
merely tapping the UK market, they have
actually shifted primary manufacturing
to the UK. They are treating India as a
market for the finished products.
The core capital of many of these
Indian capitalists has been amassed
primarily in India through crony capitalism, through forcible eviction of farmers, through extirpating legitimate business competition by extralegal means.
Capital thus amassed in India is then
being invested in the UK, generating jobs
in the UK. The resemblance between this
current process and the process of 19th
37
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Notwithstanding the
conventional narratives of the
anti-immigrant sentiments
holding sway during the
referendum for Brexit, an
empirical investigation of the
possible factors leading to Brexit
does not show any significant
correlation between the share of
migrants from European Union
countries and the regions that
voted for Brexit. Share of social
security transfers in income was
most important in determining if
a region voted leave. Decreased
employment opportunities and
increased hardships that
necessitate reliance on welfare
payments could have fuelled
the anti-immigrant and
anti-European sentiment.
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Figure 1: Correlation between Leave Vote Percentage and EU to UK Population Ratio by NUTS 3 Regions
40
35
R2 ==0.4115
R
0.4115
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
-5
X-axis indicates percentage of leave votes in each NUTS 3 region, y-axis indicates number of EU-born residents per 100
UK-born residents in each region.
Figure 2: Correlation between Leave Vote Percentage and CAGR of Disposable Income Per Head, 19972014
5.5
5
4.5
2 ==0.2311
0.2311
RR
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
X-axis indicates percentage of leave votes in each NUTS 3 region, y-axis indicates the CAGR disposable income per head for
each region over the period 19972014.
Figure 3: Correlation between Leave Vote Percentage and Social Benefits Received Per Household as a
Share of Gross Disposable Income, 2014
50
2 = 0.5419
RR
= 0.5419
40
30
20
10
Share of
Difference in
CAGR of
Benefits, Benefits Share,
GDHI
2014
19972014
Per Head
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
X-axis indicates percentage of leave votes in each NUTS 3 region, y-axis indicates the share of social benefits received per
household in gross disposable income of each region in 2014.
23.29
31.26
-7.98
-8.10
120
0.000
-0.15
4.84
-4.99
-9.26
120
0.000
3.32%
3.07%
0.25%
3.02
120
0.0015
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the odds of voting leave by 2%. This result has to be treated carefully, for these
are nominal figures and do not take into
account real changes. Nevertheless, this
is a finding that deserves a lot more scrutiny and investigation.
Figure 4: Correlation between Leave Vote Percentage and Change in the Share of Social Benefits
Received Per Household to Gross Disposable Income, 19972014
15
R = 0.5613
10
-5
-10
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
X-axis indicates percentage of leave votes in each NUTS 3 region, y-axis indicates the change in the share of social benefits
received per household in gross disposable income of each region over the period 19972014.
1.30358
0.8874
0.001
0.060
1.0118
0.0000974
0.173
0.042
EPW
1.9715 0.000
0.8808 0.036
1.0216 0.037
0.00111 0.050
BREXIT EFFECT
42
References
Davies, Will (2016): Thoughts on the Sociology
of Brexit, Political Economy Research Centre,
24 June, http://www.perc.org.uk/project_
posts/thoughts-on-the-sociology-of-brexit/.
McGill, Andrew (2016): Who Voted for the Brexit?,
The Atlantic, 25 June, http://www.theatlantic.
com/international/archive/2016/06/brexit-votestatistics-united-kingdom-european-union/
488780/.
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Satish Deshpande
Caste is one of the oldest concerns of the social sciences in India that continues to be relevant even today.
The general perception about caste is that it was an outdated concept until it was revived by colonial policies and
promoted by vested interests and electoral politics after independence. This hegemonic perception changed irrevocably
in the 1990s after the controversial reservations for the Other Backward Classes recommended by the Mandal Commission,
revealing it to be a belief of only a privileged upper caste minority for the vast majority of Indians caste continued
to be a crucial determinant of life opportunities.
This volume collects significant writings spanning seven decades, three generations and several disciplines, and discusses
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relationship between caste and class, the interplay between caste and politics, old and new challenges in law and policy,
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Authors: Satish Deshpande Irawati Karve M N Srinivas Dipankar Gupta Andr Bteille Rajni Kothari Kumkum Roy Sukhadeo Thorat
Katherine S Newman Marc Galanter Sundar Sarukkai Gopal Guru D L Sheth Anand Chakravarti Carol Upadhya Ashwini Deshpande
Meena Gopal Baldev Raj Nayar Gail Omvedt Mohan Ram I P Desai K Balagopal Sudha Pai Anand Teltumbde Surinder S Jodhka
Ghanshyam Shah Susie Tharu M Madhava Prasad Rekha Pappu K Satyanarayana Padmanabh Samarendra Mary E John Uma Chakravarti
Prem Chowdhry V Geetha Sharmila Rege S Anandhi J Jeyaranjan Rajan Krishnan Rekha Raj Kancha Ilaiah Aditya Nigam M S S Pandian
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Contact: info@orientblackswan.com
Economic & Political Weekly EPW AUGUST 13, 2016 vol lI no 33
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Losers Poker
A Negative Institutional Disruption
Sumit K Majumdar
46
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than they might have received in benefits. They have boosted the population of
working-age individuals and have arrived with skills contributing to the human capital of countries where they
have resettled.
Evaluating the impact of immigration
on Britains labour markets, which has
been the principal economic factor driving the pro-Brexit broadcast, the British
governments Home Office and the
Department for Business, Innovation and
Skills (2014) have found little evidence
that migration has caused significant
displacement of natives from the British
labour market in periods when the economy is strong. There has been little evidence so far of a significant impact from
European migration on native employment. Where displacement effects have
been observed, these have tended to be
concentrated on lower-skilled natives.
Where there has been a displacement
effect from a particular cohort, this dissipates over time, as immigrants are
assimilated into the economy.
A survey (Kerr and Kerr 2011) of the
academic literature on migration impact
established that immigrants do not have
it as good as the natives, and they experience lower employment and wages at
entry. Even though these differences
diminish, migrants experience permanently weakened labour market success.
Thus, the likelihood of adverse labour
market effects from immigration are
much weaker for natives than perceived
and quite overstated.
The common man in Britain might
feel put out because much of the states
resources go to support newcomers. This
fear has been used to make their case by
Brexit purveyors. As immigrants are
often outside the labour market, it is
assumed that they spend more time on
welfare and social assistance relative to
natives. This assumption is not confirmed. Immigration is viewed negatively as a burden on public finances as
well; however, the empirical estimates
of the scale of fiscal impact of immigration show trivial impact.
All of these arguments have not mattered to the purveyors of the Brexit campaign. They have sought to engender a
social structure based on a medieval
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Ulster: The Irishs troubles are simmering below the surface. Peace is recent and
fragile. The borders between Northern
and Southern Ireland have only recently
been opened.
Ireland was partitioned into the separate countries now called Ireland and
Northern Ireland, the latter being a part of
Great Britain and also called Ulster. Ireland is a part of the EU. In the referendum,
Northern Ireland voted to stay on in the EU.
The Irish see themselves as Europeans.
Should Brexit happen, then Northern
Irelands borders with Southern Ireland
will close, and standard border control
processes will apply. Given an Irish
predilection to be European, this may
motivate Northern Ireland and Southern
Ireland to get together. This can happen as
a result of a merger, such that all of Ireland
is one country within Europe. A United
Ireland can be Brexits consequence.
Alternatively, Northern Ireland can
wish to go solo, detach from Great Britain,
re-invent itself as Ulster, and get back
into Europe. Then, both parts of Ireland
can be self-governing entities as members of the EU.
Bradfordistan: Perhaps the deep-rooted
desire of the British to go solo emanates
from the heart of England. At this heart
of England, the domino effect may have
its most evocative outcome.
In every major British city, such as
Birmingham, Bradford, Chesterfield,
Luton, Coventry, Derby, Hull, Leeds,
Leicester, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham, Oldham, Sheffield and Wolverhampton, there is a sizeable non-native
immigrant population from all over the
world. This group of urban humanity
contributes the bulk of the economic
product of the regions. The immigrants
have their own individual identities, and
contribute materially to a collective
identity for the region. At some point,
the collective ethnic identity across the
urban areas will demand scope for
political self-expression and desire to be
autonomous. This region has GDP of a
compelling magnitude, and the desire
for the residents to be masters of their
own destiny cannot be denied.
Collectively, the urban centres and the
rural hinterlands making up these cities
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she knows it. Some influential opinionmakers on both sides of the channel say
that perhaps a Norway-type arrangement may be possible. Norway is outside
the EU but has full access to the EUs single
market, since it accepts the main principle
of the EUfreedom of movement. However, this is the sticking point for Britain.
In the remainleave referendum this was
the main point of contention. Johnson
who led the leave campaign frightened
citizens with the spectre of a million
Turks descending on Britain. But, on this
issue of freedom of movement, there is
no meeting ground between the EU and
Britain. The German Chancellor Angela
Merkel, often called, and rightly so, the
Chancellor of Europe, warned against
cherry-picking: if Britain wants access to
the European single market, it must also
accept the EU principle of free movement
of peoples.
The referendum also put the focus on
a problem that the occupants of 10
Downing Street did not seem to have
taken seriouslythe dissolution of the
UK. The Scots agreed to stay in the UK
in the 2014 referendum provided that
England stays in the EU. The same is the
case with Northern Ireland. Both Scottish
and Irish leaders have talked of leaving
the UK in order to join the EU. What an
irony of history then that the UK
emerged from the union of England and
Scotland in 1707 and today this ancient
kingdom faces dissolution. What will
remain will be a little England.
The referendum has raised questions
in the minds of citizens of those countries where issues of immigration, globalisation and terrorism are of concern.
Asia too is faced with the same issues.
Members of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA)Canada, US
and Mexicotoo are contending with
the same problems.
Of course there are terrible simplifiers
(as the French say) who argue that there
are clear solutions to these problems. US
presidential candidate Donald Trump
says he would build a wall between the
US and Mexico to keep Mexicans out. This
referendum has deeply disturbed the
politics of many EU countries. Marine Le
Pen, leader of the anti-immigrant, racist
party, the National Front, has asked for
Economic & Political Weekly
EPW
BOOK REVIEW
Two Oral Narratives from the Countryside of Maharashtra takes off from where
the work was halted due to Sontheimers
untimely death in 1992. These ovis along
with a few others were first published in
Marathi and edited by Sontheimers collaborators Ramdas Atkar and Rajaram
Zagade and his colleague Anne Feldhaus
in 2006. In the present volume, Feldhaus has edited with Atkar and Zagade
two of the ovis from the Marathi publication, one dedicated to god Biroba and
the other to god Dhuloba, translated
them with extensive notes and provided
a scholarly introduction. The book is
divided into three parts. The Introduction examines the relationship the
Dhangars share with their ovis. Based
on an empathetic understanding of the
ovis, it describes the pastoralists way of
life that is so important in formulating
their world and their ideas of gender,
purity, chastity, their very identity. The
second and the third part consist of translations of the ovi of Biroba and ovi
of Dhulobatwo important Dhangar
deities. The translated ovis form a significant contribution to published primary source materials for understanding
the Indian society.
vol lI no 33
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Gyan Avenue 12 Pragati Market Ashok Vihar Phase-2 Delhi-110052 Ph.: 011-47034999, 9811692060
E-mail: books@gyanbooks.com Showroom: 5 Ansari Road Daryaganj, New Delhi-110002, PH.: 011-43029145
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note
1
Books Received
A Prasanna Kumar, M Jagadeswara Rao and
R Sudarsana Rao (eds) (2015); Selected Works
of Prof Sarveswara Rao: A Humane Economist,
Visakhapatnam: Bhavaraju Family, pp xvi +
274, price not indicated.
Ahmed Mubarki, Meraj (2016); Filming Horror:
Hindi Cinema, Ghosts and Ideologies, New Delhi,
London, California and Singapore: Sage Publications, pp xvi + 197, `695.
Ali, Zaheer (ed) (2016); Secularism Under Siege: Revisiting the Indian Secular State, Delhi: Aakar
Books, pp 416, `1,195.
Arthur, C J (ed) (2014); Marxs Capital: A Student
Edition, Delhi: Aakar Books, pp xxviii + 384, `325.
Brimnes, Niels (2016); Languished Hopes: Tuberculosis, the State and International Assistance in
Twentieth-century India, New Delhi: Orient
Blackwan, pp xiv + 318, price not indicated.
(2016); Ambedkar: Writings & Speeches (Volume II: Scholarly Writings), New Delhi and
Seattle, Washington: Konark Publishers, pp vii
+ 454, `3,500 (for set of 5).
(2016); Ambedkar: Writings & Speeches (Volume III: Autobiographical, Social Speeches and
Speeches on Guidance to Followers), New Delhi
and Seattle, Washington: Konark Publishers,
pp 519, `3,500 (for set of 5).
Dhanagare, D N (2016); Populism and Power: Farmers Movement in Western India, 19802014,
(2016); Ambedkar: Writings & Speeches (Volume IV: Speeches on Economics, Religion and
58
`895.
(2016); Ambedkar: Writings & Speeches (Volume V: Political Speeches), New Delhi and Seattle, Washington: Konark Publishers, pp 411,
`3,500 (for set of 5).
Jal, Murzban and Zaheer Ali (eds) (2016); What Ails
Indian Muslims, Delhi: Aakar Books, pp 302,
`895.
Jha, D N (ed) (2013); Contesting Symbols and Stereotypes: Essays on Indian History and Culture,
Delhi: Aakar Books, pp viii + 247, `550.
Khan, Zeeshan (2016); Right to Passage: Travels
Through India, Pakistan and Iran, New Delhi,
London and Singapore: Sage Publications,
pp xii + 390, `595.
Kohli, Kanchi and Manju Menon (eds) (2016); Business Interests and the Environmental Crisis,
New Delhi, California, London and Singapore:
Sage Publications, pp xxxviii + 244, `845.
Kumar, Rajiv and Omita Goyal (eds) (2016); Thirty
Years of SAARC: Society, Culture and Development, New Delhi, California, London and Singapore: Sage Publications, pp xxii + 257, `695.
Lal, M B (2016); Indian Family Planning, Kolkata:
Power Publishers, pp 224, `330.
vol lI no 33
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54
book reviewS
Innovations in Family Planning: Case Studies
from India edited by Jay Satia, Kavita Chauhan, Aruna
Bhattacharya and Nirmala Mishra (2016); New Delhi: Sage
Publications; pp 292, `850.
maternal, newborn, child, and adolescent health) seek to provide. This is because family planning is not only important for population growth control, but
also for averting unplanned and unsafe
pregnancies, thereby, reducing maternal, infant, and child mortality, and improving reproductive health. However,
there are many social and physical barriers to contraceptive use. The authors attempt to deal with these barriers by using a two-pronged approach: Creating
an Enabling Environment through Advocacy (Section 5) and Creating Demand
through Behaviour Change Communication, Awareness Generation and Incentives (Section 6).
In Section 5, the authors stress the
need for advocacy by bringing to the
fore two facts. First, the family planning
methods have been disproportionately
skewed in favour of female sterilisation.
Second, the use of intrauterine contraceptive devices (IUCDs; the only longterm reversible contraceptive choice
available) is marred by various misconceptions and myths. Thus, advocacy is
essential to expand the access to and
choice of contraceptive methods by dispelling myths, analysing local contexts,
community-level participation, incorporating the role of media and advertising,
and, lastly, effective monitoring.
The cases under study are those of the
Advocating Reproductive Choices (ARC;
a coalition of like-minded organisations,
both at national and state levels), Family
Planning Association of India, and Population Foundation of India (with focus
on Bihar and Uttar Pradesh [UP]). All three
of these represent a paradigmatic shift
in approach, from population stabilisation
to one where gender equality and a clientcentred approach are given priority.
Section 6 of the book focuses on behavioural changes and awareness generation among people by looking at initiatives like Pehel, which have been successful in creating demand for quality
family planning and reproductive health
services, with a special stress on safe and
affordable IUCD implants. The reason for
their success has been that they have
successfully embedded themselves in
vol lI no 33
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EPW
Attention ContributorsI
The EPW has been sending reprints of articles to authors. We are now discontinuing the practice.
We will consider sending a limited number of reprints to authors located in India when they make
specific requests to us.
We will, of course, continue to send a copy of the print edition to all our authors whose contributions
appear in that particular edition.
vol lI no 33
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56
related policies by learning from particular experiences and adapting them to suit
specific contexts. These innovations focus on meeting the priority needs of
family planning, ranging from individuallevel interventions like delaying first
pregnancy to policy-level interventions
like improving the quality of healthcare
service delivery.
The book, thus, can serve as an important document for anyone involved
in programme planning, health policy
formulation, healthcare service delivery
vol lI no 33
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INSIGHT
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INSIGHT
exact problem with Naiks rhetoric is crucial, for many of the forms of Naiks dangers, notably Naiks justification of crime
and punishment, strikingly mimic the operation of the modern world. This is also
how he has been able to gain legitimacy
amidst an audience which is more modernised than not.
The fact that he wears a three-piece
suit, talks in perfect English and invokes
science and logic are only motifs. Naiks
charm is in the form of his speeches, the
premises of unbelief from which he persuades, his employment of conspiracy
theories of scientific facts and statistics,
and the discourses of modernity that he
draws from. These together play with the
anyway murky division of the secular
and the sacred in the modern world and
make it surprisingly simple for him to
fool a generation of Muslims left to deal
with insecurities coming from crimes
they did not themselves commit.
1 Helping Muslims Frame
a Response
It is a matter of deep irony to the current
situation that Naiks first claim to fame on
cable TV in the 2000s was through talking
about misrepresentation of Islamic terrorism in the media. In his talk Islam and
Media: Peace or War, and in many others
with similar names, Naik would say that
international media is projecting Islam as
though it is a religion of terror, they are
picking a few black sheep and projecting as if Islam is asking them to do these
illegal activities (YouTube 2012b). His advice to Muslims was not to be apologetic
when pestered by others with questions
regarding terrorism and Islam. We should
not become defensive and say, Oh no some
Muslims do it, not me we should know
how to turn the tables over should use
the force of the opponent to throw him
over (YouTube 2012b). A well-prepared
opening sentence Muslims should keep
ready to handle jibes about Islamic terrorism, Naik has said in multiple lectures, is to
ask which human being killed the most
number of people in the world. Who is the
man who has killed the maximum number of human beings in the world? ... Hitler,
you dont get an award for guessing, it is
common knowledge. So which Madrasa
did Hitler pass from? (YouTube 2012b).
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4 A Rational Religion
Naik then walks on lines that Enlightenment thinkers envisaged for religion,
and the divisions they formulated, and
comes across as charmingly transgressive when he is able to use its flaws to his
advantage, for example, by simply showing that he can make an attempt justifying polygamy, however contorted, without invoking any religious obligation.5
The idea of a rational religion emerged
from the premise of distinguishing sacred
and profane time. Charles Taylor, in his
monumental work A Secular Age, shows
that the idea of the secular developed
with Latin Christendom as one term of a
dyadthe secular had to do with the
centurythat is, with profane time
and it was contrasted with what related
to the eternal, or to sacred time (Taylor
2011: 32). Certain times, places, institutions and actions were seen as related to
sacred or higher times, while others were
for profane time alone (Taylor 2011: 32).
Thus, in initial understandings of secular
spaces and times, even when the temporal
and celestial can be conceived separately,
they function in a dyad where both are
necessary to understand the meaning of
the other. The reference to secular is distinct from but not opposed to sacred and
eternal time (Taylor 2011: 32).
With people like Newton however, we
see a partial move where the natural world
begins to be seen as a whole functioning
independently, but nevertheless held from
above by gods will. It is a further development of this, from the 17th century on,
where the secular went from being
what is different from the sacred, to the
sphere which is natural, and the bare
minimum, and thus fundamentally opposed to the sacred, which is the supernatural and thus excessive to meaning
in the natural world. In the new version
of social life, secular was all there was.
As Taylor points out, the word secular
was still the same, but its meaning had
changed, the contrast was no longer with
another temporal dimension, in which
spiritual institutions had their niche;
rather, the secular was, in its new sense,
opposed to any claim (Taylor 2011: 33).
Thus all goals now had to be thiswordly and justified only if it involved
human flourishing, peace, prosperity, etc.
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5
6
7
References
Audi, Robert and Nicholas Wolterstorff (1997): Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate, Lanham:
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
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Brahmins (4)
Rajputs (40)
Mahajans (10)
Gurjars (140)
MBCs (21)
Khatiks (25)
Other SCs (28)
Bhils (12)
3
8
-
1
22
2
52
-
3
10
5
56
6
3
-
5
3
20
5
12
2
1
4
10
10
26
11
1
2
3
5
-
2
25
10
40
5
15
3
-
1
28
8
75
16
1
5
3
Source: Fieldwork.
The Khatiks, traditionally a community of butchers, were landless and lived in perpetual poverty. As the local village economy
was not able to sustain their livelihoods, some of the Khatiks
started working outside the village. A few of them started their
careers as labourers, saved some money, and utilised that money
to take on small contracts. Slowly, some of them became big contractors. With urbanisation, the trade in goats became more
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better than those of the upper castes in the village. They own
modern cars, television sets and telephones. They have government jobs. Most of the political personalities of the area visit
their homes. They have connections in the bureaucratic world.
Lalchand keeps a licensed gun in his drawing room. The Khatiks indulge in what T Veblen (1912) calls conspicuous consumption of goods. But, all these symbolisms have only limited
use in enhancing their social status in the village, since the importance of status symbolism does not help much in the village,
where the past history and present position of the Khatiks is
known to everyone. Their quick economic and political rise has
only complicated the situation.
The biggest issue in the village today is the mismatch between the status, role, and the position of Khatiks below the
pollution line in the local caste hierarchy. The important point
is that they have not achieved the type of status upper castes
would have at a similar level of economic and political standing. They say that though they have everything and are willing
to contribute to the collective life of the village, they are still being stigmatised by other castes.6 Thus, the Khatiks remain secluded from the social life of the village. Though they keep their
frustration under wraps, the moment they get a chance they are
more than willing to express it. They try to compensate their
deprivation in social life by overreacting to certain issues,
particularly, if the issue has the potential to portray the social
position of the upper castes in poor light.
Exchange of Conflict
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since both Ramdharilal and Mahesh were from the same political faction. It was said that Mahesh was the main financier
of Ramdharilals election campaign. The Mahesh group had
never reconciled to its defeat in the panchayat election and he
was waiting to settle the score. Soon, Mahesh found his
chance. The government had allotted some revenue land to a
barber family. The Khatiks, who were already using this site
for garbage disposal (one of the methods to capture common
land) refused to vacate the land. The barbers called the villagers, including the newly elected sarpanch Heeralal to arbitrate
the matter. Though in the new panchayati raj scheme the sarpanch has no judicial power, people generally call the sarpanch to enhance the legitimacy of the decision being taken.
The sarpanch reached the site and told the Khatiks to vacate
the land. There were arguments between the sarpanch and
the Khatiks in which the sarpanch used some foul language
against the Khatiks. In retaliation, Mahesh slapped the
sarpanch. Maheshs opponents advised the sarpanch to lodge a
first information report (FIR) against Mahesh, but the Gurjars
said that the FIR would confirm that a Khatik had slapped a
Gurjar. Maheshs father (Lalchand) requested Nahar Singh to
step in and resolve the matter within the village. Though the
matter was resolved within the village and the sarpanch did
not file an FIR, it gave rise to more bitterness between these
groups.7
What follows is another instance of conflict in the village.
The village hospital had a doctor, a compounder, and two lady
nurses. The compounder, a local person, had been with the
hospital for 12 years, and was also running his private clinic
and a medical shop in the village. The doctor too had a private
practice, and it is difficult to pinpoint the reason, but there was
tension between the doctor and the compounder. The doctor
was unmarried and, since there was no restaurant in the village, he used to share food with the nurses. Sometimes the
doctor used to watch television at the nurses house till late in
the night, since their house was located near the doctors residence. The doctor learnt that some villagers had written to the
sarpanch that he had illicit relations with the nurses. The
doctor saw the hand of the compounder and a section of the
Khatiks in this allegation. The compounder wanted the doctor
to leave the village so that, alleged the doctor, the compounder
could continue with his private practice.
The doctor, who earlier used to stay in a house belonging to
one of the Khatiks, but later on had shifted to a Mahajans
house, alleged that when he was staying with the Khatiks,
they were constantly talking to the doctor about these nurses.
The Khatiks took the shifting of the doctor from their house as
an insult and were waiting to settle the score with the doctor.
Very soon the Khatiks got a chance to do so. The compounder
was transferred to the district headquarters and approached
the villagers, the Khatiks in particular, for assistance in getting his transfer revoked. The villagers were told to meet the
chief medical officer (CMO) and demand that a compounder be
appointed in the hospital. But, in front of the CMO, the Khatiks
started accusing the doctor of having illicit relations with the
hospital nurses. An application was written in which the
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Raghubir Singh was expelled from the Congress. Now, the Gunsagar group, with which Mahesh was aligned, would not share
the dais with Raghubir Singh. But, Heeralal would not allow the
inauguration of the building in the absence of Raghubir Singh.
What is the nature of the dispute-settling mechanism in this
type of emerging collectivity? One of the institutions through
which the collective issues of the village are decided is the village panchayat, composed of the village elders. How is this
panchayat constituted? In the panchayat meeting held on Holi,
when the issue of a Balai was being deliberated, somebody
screamed from the audience, Call the village! Then, came a
prompt reply from another person sitting in the same audience, that the village is already there, though not more than
a hundred people were physically present. The truth is that the
panchayat is constituted in such a manner that it includes in its
decision-making body the heads of different castes, clans and
bhagals of the village. It is the duty of those present in the panchayat to convince the members of their respective clans and
castes to accept the verdict of the panchayat.
The traditional panchayat met on Holi. One of the issues the
panchayat resolved was that the elder brother of Heeralal (current
sarpanch) had accused Rooplal (previous sarpanch) of playing a
role in the premature burning of the Holika (bonfire lit on Holi).
Rooplal indulged in this act, alleged Heeralals brother, with the
intention to capture the common land located near his house.
Rooplal had passed away, and his son Ramdharilal had brought
the Holika issue to the notice of the panchayat. However, now
there was an altered power equation in the village. After the panchayat election, Heeralal had become the sarpanch of the panchayat. The elders who were part of the panchayat did not want to
antagonise any of the parties to the dispute, and advised both Ramdharilal and Heeralal to forgive each other and forget the issue.
The second issue the panchayat dealt with was the case of a
Balai, whose children had refused to perform some customary
calling. The old Balai was threatened with dire consequences, if
he refused to perform the traditional calling. The Balai accepted
the verdict of the panchayat with folded hands and assured the
panchayat that though he could not force his children to engage
in this work, he would do his job until death. In the cases
mentioned above, the panchayat was able to resolve the issues
because the parties concerned were not only present at the
panchayat meeting, but were very much willing to accept the
verdict of the panchayat. But, this was the limit of the panchayat. The panchayat could not take up the most contentious
issue, the inauguration of the new hospital building, because it
has been losing its representative character. There are different reasons for this, but I shall point out only those that have
direct bearing upon the issue I have been discussing here.
In Rampur, the panchayat becoming non-representational
has a lot to do with the conflict between the status and role of
the lower castes, of the Khatiks in particular. The dominant
Khatiks do not participate in the panchayat meetings as they
do not want to sit separately on the lower part of the platform
(the panchayat is held on the higher part of the platform at the
Charbhuja Temple). In the panchayat meeting that was held on
Holi, the Khatiks were neither present, as was the case with
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The faction leaders in Rampur are attached to some political parties or factions and there is compulsion on their part to bring their
respective leaders to the village. The middle-level leaders need
an audience so that they remain relevant among the people, as
well as in the higher political establishment. Heeralal invited the
MLA (member of the legislative assembly) and pradhan to inaugurate the water pump set he had got installed near his house.
Both the local MLA and pradhan visited Rampur. However, the
inauguration ceremony was not held at the Charbhuja Temple or
in the school, but near Heeralals house. The sarpanch had fulfilled his ambition. Thereafter, it was Ram Singhs turn to get his
leader to the village. There was drought in the state, and for the
BJP the main role as an opposition party was to expose the inefficiency of the state government in providing drought relief
to the people. Gulabchand Kataria, a leading leader of the BJP,
visited the village. The meeting venue was the government school,
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down the status of these castes, but running away from an issue
becomes the marker of the declining status of the caste concerned.
The victory of a particular caste on a particular issue does
not solve the problem, but is only a step forward in the
ongoing social struggle, where those who feel defeated try to
get their revenge in the next round. In between the two
struggles, these caste groups analyse past issues and plan for
the future. There is always a possibility that a small issue or
an argument may turn into a bigger one, and sometimes
engulf the entire community. Conflict is inbuilt in this
collectivity. People live together, but separately. This is the
way life goes on.
Honour of the Village
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Notes
1 This study is the product of the doctoral dissertation I wrote at the University of Delhi (2000
07). The major part of the fieldwork was conducted during 200002, but subsequently I revisited the field. Most of the events described
here occurred during the years I stayed in the
village. To make the paper easily readable, I am
cataloguing the names of the main players here.
Mahesh is a dominant young Khatik, having a
Robin Hood image in the village. Rooplal Gurjar
was a highly respected sarpanch of the panchayat.
Ramdharilal is his son, claiming Rooplals legacy.
Nahar Singh was a dominant Rajput, who
passed away when I was doing fieldwork, and
Ram Singh, his grandson, claims his legacy.
Heeralal Gurjar is presently the sarpanch of the
panchayat. Though there are 14 castes in the village, due to space constraints I have dealt with
only three politically significant castes.
2 Migration has affected the everyday power
structure in the village. There is more migration from among the Rajputs and Gurjars
(Table 2), and minimally from among the Khatiks. Thus, in the village, the Khatiks are more
visible and politically active. But, they know
their limitations: if the situation becomes unmanageable, other castes may take revenge,
particularly during some festival when most of
them are present in the village. This curtails
the Khatiks political power and they cannot go
beyond a point against other castes.
3 A clarification is necessary to understand the
complexities that exist between the political
and social aspects of caste. There are intracaste divisions among all the politically significant castes. While a majority of the members
from a particular caste support a particular
political party, a reflection of the relation between traditional caste and modern politics, a
section from among them has crossed over to
the rival political camp. But, when it comes to
social matters, particularly those issues which
have the potential to upgrade or downgrade
the social status of a caste group, the entire
caste unites against the rival caste. One can see
this situation among the Khatiks who are vertically divided politically, but when it comes to
an issue that has the potential to raise their status, they unite behind Mahesh. Thus, the political anatomy of a caste changes as per the context. However, this type of fluidity in sociopolitical relations produces various types of intercaste and intra-caste complexities, and caste
solidarity remains fragile and elusive.
4 This point may be contested, but the truth is
that those SCs whose occupations got positively integrated with the market are better developed economically than other SCs. Once the
SCs had money from this positive integration,
they gave up their traditional occupations. The
social differentiation among the SCs has its
root in this positive integration of a section of
the SCs traditional occupations with the market. In Uttar Pradesh, the Jatavs (Lynch 1968)
and Khatiks (Bellwinkel-Schempp 2005), and
in Bihar, the Chamars (Singh 2005) are more
developed because their traditional occupation
became positively integrated with the market.
5 Sanskritisation, which is the process by which a
low Hindu caste, or tribal or other group,
changes its customs, ritual, ideology, and way of
life in the direction of a high, and frequently,
twice-born caste (Srinivas 1966: 6), has remained an important source of social mobility in
pre- and post-independence India. However, this
method of social mobility is not very helpful to
those castes whose position in the caste hierarchy is below the pollution line (Bailey 1957).
6 A lot of literature by Dalits has mushroomed in
recent years (Sattanathan 2007; Valmiki 2003;
Kamble 2008) where these writers narrate how
and in what manner they faced various types of
prejudice, hurdles and discrimination not only
72
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11
when they were trying to break the caste barriers, but even when they had achieved considerable success in their lives.
L Coser (1968) makes a distinction between realistic and non-realistic conflicts. In a realistic
conflict, the conflict is viewed by the participants as a means towards the achievement of
specific goal, a means that might be abandoned, if other means appears to be more effective. A non-realistic conflict allows no
functional alternative of means, since it is not
aimed at the attainment of a concrete result,
but an expression of offensive impulse. It
seems that the behaviour of the Khatiks during
the conflict has a lot to do with hostility, aggression, resentment, hatred and like, which
is the product of their exclusion from social
spaces in everyday life. Thus, sometimes it becomes difficult to understand why the situation
went out of control on some trivial matter.
Ritual and mythology represents an ideal
version of the social structure. It is the model of
how people suppose their society to be organised, but it is not necessarily the goal towards
which they strive. It is a simplified description
of what is, not a fantasy of what might be. But
the statements made in rituals are vague statements; they have not the quality of scientific
descriptions (Leach 1954: 286).
Numerous studies describe the way traditional
social institutions are disintegrating in the
post-independence social order. Some notable
studies include Bteille (1971), Bailey (1957),
Chakravarti (1975), Srinivas (1966), Chauhan
(1967), Gupta (2005), and Nagaraj (2010).
These studies present the various dimensions
of social changes and the way different caste
groups formalise their relations with others.
Way back in 1964, H R Isaacs (1964: 174) commented about the economically better off Dalits
in Maharashtra: Many more ex-Untouchables
want not to leave Hindu fold but to achieve
touchability inside of it. Let each one remain in
his caste, but let every caste be touchable. Variations of this formula appeared frequently in the
talk of ex-Untouchables [ex, since Isaacs says
that in theory caste untouchability has been
abolished] who were not followers of Ambedkar,
who never dreamed of being anything but Hindus, who wanted to live in caste groups as they
always had, but only to cease being partials, to
become touchables. Ambedkar was probably
emphasising this point when he warned that in
politics we will be recognising the principle of
one man one vote and one vote one value. In our
social and economic life, we shall, by reason of
our social and economic structure, continue to
deny the principle of one man one value. How
long we shall continue to live this life of contradiction? (GoI 1950: 979).
Society is not a material entity, it is a sentiment. Society, as Durkheim understood it is
not identical with the group of individuals that
compose it and their dwelling place. Rather, it
is above all a composition of ideas, beliefs, and
sentiments of all sorts which realise themselves through individuals. Foremost of these
ideas is the moral ideal which is its principle
raison dtre. To love ones society is to love this
ideal, and one loves it so that one would rather
see society disappear as a material entity than
renounce the ideal which it embodies. Not only
is society not identical with an external material entity, it is something deeply inner, since
for Durkheim it is the source of morality, personality, and life itself at the human level. It is
something on which we all depend whether we
know it or not (Bellah 1973: ix). This phenomenon finds its expression in urban villages located within the heartland of metropolitan cities for decades, where the rules of interaction
among its inhabitants are different from those
of neighbouring modern colonies.
References
Bailey, F G (1957): Caste and the Economic Frontier:
A Village in Highland Orissa, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Bellah, Robert N (1973): Introduction, Emile Durkheim: On Morality and Society, Robert N Bellah (ed), Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, pp ixlv.
Bellwinkel-Schempp, M (2005): Pigs and Power:
Urban Space and Urban Decay, Urbanisation
and Governance in India, E Hurst and M Mann
(eds), New Delhi: Manohar, pp 20126.
Bteille, A (1971): Caste, Class, and Power: Changing Patterns of Stratification in a Tanjore Village, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Chakravarti, A (1975): Contradiction and Change:
Emerging Patterns of Authority in a Rajasthan
Village, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Chauhan, B R (1967): A Rajasthan Village, New
Delhi: Vir Publishing House.
Coser, L (1968): Conflict: Social Aspects, International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Volume 3, David L Sills (ed), New York: Macmillan
and Free Press, pp 23236.
Delige, Robert (2011): Caste, Class and Untouchability, A Companion to the Anthropology of
India, Isabelle Clark-Dces (ed), West Sussex,
UK: Wiley-Blackwell, pp 4561.
GoI (1950): Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol 11,
New Delhi: Government of India.
Gupta, D (2005): Whither the Indian Village: Culture and Agriculture in Rural India, Economic
& Political Weekly, Vol 40, No 8, pp 75158.
Isaacs, H R (1964): Indias Ex-Untouchables, New
York: Harper Torch Books.
Kamble, Baby (2008): The Prisons We Broke, Trans
Maya Pandit, Chennai: Orient Longman.
Leach, E R (1954): Political Systems of Highland
Burma: A Study of Kachin Social Structure,
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Lynch, Owen M (1968): The Politics of Untouchability: A Case from Agra, India, Structure and
Change in Indian Society, M Singer and
B S Cohn (eds), Chicago: Aldine Publishing
Company.
Nagaraj, D R (2010): The Flaming Feet and Other Essays: The Dalit Movement in India, P C Shobhi
(ed), Ranikhet: Permanent Black.
Svl, Minna (2001): Low Caste But Middleclass: Some Religious Strategies for Middleclass Identification in Hyderabad, Contribution to Indian Sociology, Vol 35, No 3,
pp 293318.
Sattanathan, A N (2007): Plain Speaking: A Sudras
Story, New Delhi: Permanent Black.
Singh, Shashi B (2005): Limits to Power: Naxalism
and Caste Relations in a South Bihar Village,
Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 40, No 29,
pp 316775.
Srinivas, M N (1966): Social Change in Modern
India, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Valmiki, Omprakash (2003): Joothan: A Dalits Life,
Trans Arun Prabha Mukherjee, Calcutta:
Samya.
Veblen, T (1912): The Theory of the Leisure Class: An
Economic Study of Institutions, New York:
Macmillan.
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weight for age) were used as indicators for childhood malnutrition. For mothers, we calculated the body mass index (BMI),
and used the standard cut-off of 18.5 to classify malnutrition
status among them.
In addition to the anthropometry, we developed a pretested
questionnaire to capture the social, economic and demographic status of these families, as well as to understand the illness
and care-seeking history of the children. The survey collected
data on food availability at household level through on-spot
checks; food intake levels of children and mothers through a
semi-quantitative, 24-hour food recall method; and utilisation
of schemes such as the public distribution system (PDS) and
the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Gaurantee
Act (MGNREGA). In addition to these interviews, we conducted
six focus group discussions (FGDs) with mothers and grandmothers to understand social norms, perceptions, constraints
faced by them and their experiences surrounding food availability, dietary practices, and caregiving of young children.
2 Results
Profile of the Population
Of the 500 families surveyed, over 75% were tribal and another
5% belonged to low-caste groups. The male heads of about
40% of them were migrants, and 42% of them worked in unskilled
jobs. Out of the 695 children studied, about half of them were
girls. About 50% of the mothers did not receive any formal schooling. Twenty percent of the total mothers interviewed reported
the death of at least one of her children in the past, and more than
50% of the mothers did not receive any formal schooling.
The study found very high rates of malnutrition among the
children. On comparison, the nutritional status of these children was found to be significantly worse than their counterparts from other areas in the state and in the country (Table 1).2
Over half of the children we met were stunted and underweight, whereas about one-third of them were wasted. We
found no significant differences in malnutrition among
migrant and non-migrant households or between boys and
girls. However, the malnutrition levels among the tribal children
we studied were significantly higher than the non-tribal children, with the incidence of wasting being 26.7% versus 7.3%,
respectively. We also found high levels of malnutrition among
mothers: as many as 54.6% of them were malnourished.
Table 1: Comparison of Malnutrition Rates among Children under Study
(n = 695) with State and National Level Data for Rural Areas
Indicator
Prevalence of Malnutrition
among Children
(under three years)
in the Study Area,
Dominated by Tribal,
Migrant Communities (%)
Prevalence of
Malnutrition
among Children
(under five years)
in Rural
Rajasthan (%)
Prevalence of
Malnutrition
among Children
(under five years)
in Rural India (%)
Stunting
53
39
42
Severely stunted
28
19
19
Wasting
33
15
15
Severely wasted
Underweight
53
34
32
Severely underweight
26
12
11
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The food intake of the children under study was highly inadequate. Figure 1 shows the results from a 24-hour food recall for
children between 6 and 35 months. Only about 28% of the
children consumed milk. Almost none of them had consumed
egg, meat or fish over last 24 hours. Fewer than 10% of the
children reported consuming appropriate and nutritional food
items such as daliya (porridge), rice, pulses and vegetables or
fruits, and even those who consumed these items, had it in
very small quantities (Table 2). A significant proportion of children were given tea, biscuits, and some namkeen (fried snacks).
While many of them were reported to have been given roti
(bread), in absence of active feeding and inability of children
(especially of six to 24 months) to bite and chew, the median
number of rotis consumed in last 24 hours was less than one.
In addition to inadequate quantities, the eating and feeding
habits were also found to be suboptimal. One tribal shared, If
the child is young, (we) give him some milk. If he is older, we
give (him) a roti (he) keeps wandering around, breaking
(and eating) one-one piece. In FGDs, many mothers reported
that it was commonplace for them to feed young children rotis
mashed with water and chilli, or, in season with kairi (raw
mango) chutney.
Table 2: Median Amounts of Food Consumed by Children (by age in months)
in Last 24 Hours
Food Item
Milk (ml)
Tea (ml)
Chapattis (number)
Biscuits (number)
Cooked rice (grams)
Vegetables (grams)
Daal (grams)
05
611
1223
2435
90
0
0.25
0
0
0
0
75
55
0.5
2
25
0
0
120
70
0.5
2
25
40
37.5
100
75
0.75
3
50
32
32
We also asked mothers for information on their food consumption in last 24 hours. While 90% of them reported having eaten a roti (median number of rotis: 2), less than half had
consumed any pulses (49%), and less than two-thirds (65%)
had consumed any vegetables in the past 24 hours. Only about
5% had consumed any milk, and none had consumed any egg
or meat. These findings made it clear that the children and
their mothers in these communities were eating extremely
75
SPECIAL ARTICLE
poorly, and that was the most immediate cause for low nutrition levels.
Food Availability at Home: Missing Fulcrum
Our spot assessments of food availability at the household level revealed a glaring reality of lack of food, especially nutritious food. While most households had some cereals (87%),
more than half (56%) did not have any pulses and about a
quarter (26%) did not have any cooking oil at home on the day
of visit. Even those families that were found to have these
items had them in small amounts (a median of 1 kg of pulse
and half a litre of cooking oil). Very few households had any
vegetables (14.4%), fruits (2.4%), and almost none had any
milk, eggs or meat.3
In our interviews and FGDs, mothers cited two key reasons
for non-availability of nutritious food. First, they stressed on
high levels of water scarcity, which significantly reduce the
quantity and variety of food that households are able to grow
on their small plots of land. Lack of water also prevents them
from rearing cattle, further restricting the availability of milk:
Cattle also need to eat and fodder requires water to grow
those who have water can rear (cattle), one mother opined on
the subject. Second, families repeatedly highlighted the unfeasibility of purchasing vegetables, fruits, milk, eggs or other nutritious foods from the market, given their meagre incomes
from casual manual labour, and high prices of the food. Stressing on their inability to purchase food items, one mother
shared with us: Only when our children fall ill do we go and
buy some milk worth `510 otherwise we cannot afford to
buy milk. The study made it evident that the two key assets
that these families possess are land and their bodies (labour),
and neither generates enough resources to ensure adequate
nutritious food.
Migrant households were slightly better-off economically
than the non-migrant households (27% of the migrant households fell in the highest economic quartile as compared to 22%
of the non-migrant households in our sample), though that did
not significantly affect the availability of food at the household
level and the reported improvement in purchasing power was
limited. However, non-tribal households had higher availability of food at the household level as compared to tribal families.
The absence of food in tribal families was further compounded by lack of knowledge on appropriate feeding practices. We asked the mothers to provide estimates of how much a
child (with a similar age as their own child) should be eating
every day, if there were no constraints on availability of food.
Most mothers reported highly suboptimal amounts: the
median number of katoris (small bowl or cup) of milk that a
child should consume as reported by mothers of children of
611 months was 0 (interquartile range or IQR: 0,1). Whereas,
the response of mothers with children that were 1236 months
old was 1 (IQR: 1,1).
We also asked the mothers whether they considered their
children as normal or weak. We then compared their
responses with the childs malnutrition status as per anthropometry. The analysis revealed that in 66% of the cases where
76
Elder brother
Father
During the time that mothers spent away from their home,
the duty of care typically fell on other members of the family
such as elderly grandparents or elder siblings (Figure 2). In a
significant proportion (16%) of households, the elder girl sibling, barely a teen herself, would have to take care of the
younger children during her mothers absence, forcing them
out of school. In many cases, children under three years were
AUGUST 13, 2016
vol lI no 33
EPW
SPECIAL ARTICLE
left to fend for themselves. Clearly these care options are inadequate and unacceptable.
The study found that such deficient care practices were far
more common among migrant families. The absence of male
member(s) due to seasonal migration was found to significantly reduce the human resources available at home to manage
children and all the other labour-intensive facets of rural life
in this region. Moreover, the absence of male heads of family
also appeared to reduce the overall social capital available to
women in seeking help and cooperation from other family
members or neighbours to care for children. Many mothers reported feeling extremely anxious about these childcare problems: Yes, we are always worried. My mind is always there
he may be crying; an animal could trample over him; he may
be eating soil ... his feet might be burning ... (but) we have to
go to collect firewood. Everyone has to.
It is hardly suprising that children brought up on very limited resources and inadequate care faced a high and recurrent
incidence of illness. The study found that a large proportion of
children (64%) fell ill at least once in last one month. Twenty
percent of them were ill on the day of the survey, and 12% reported falling ill more than once in the past one month. Fever,
diarrhoea, cough and difficulty in breathing were the most
common symptoms reported. While most of the mothers
(94%) reported having sought care when their children fell ill,
more than half of them went to private informal providers,
and another 10% sought care from a traditional healer. They
incurred a median cost of `150 for each illness episode. Only
one-fourth reported seeking care from a public facility. Our
study suggests that poor nutrition and lack of care predisposes
these children to illnesses. Moreover, illness is seen to further
suppress the appetite of these children as well as lead to the
loss of minimal amounts of nutrients consumed by them.
Any set of solutions that seek to address the high levels of child
malnutrition in southern Rajasthan must be based on a full
appreciation of the dynamics surrounding the factors of food
and care, which in turn, are shaped by the areas tribal, high
seasonal migration character. As for children specifically from
migrant households, our study did not find any significant difference in their nutrition levels as compared to children from
non-migrant, tribal households in the region.
Table 3: Utilisation of Anganwadis by Children between 6 and 35 Months
and Lactating Mothers
Information
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the child was actually found to be malnourished. It is important to recognise here that this is not wilful ignorance, but an
indication of high levels of deprivation in the area. Among
tribal, migrant communities of southern Rajasthan, discomfort, illness and undignified life have become normalised. Perceptions related to child malnutrition should be viewed as
part of these structural features that shape the everyday
existence of these families. In this environment of persistent
destitution, weak and underdeveloped bodies of children that
are prone to illnesses have become the prevailing norm. An
important role of womens collectives is to challenge this
world view and to create a community-level vision and discourse around child well-being. Our experience suggests,
that with some support and resources, such collectives can be
powerful agents of change.
Womens collectives also provide an opportunity for empowerment of women, which is widely understood as having a
positive impact on the nutritional outcomes of children. The
Coalition for Sustainable Nutrition Security in India (2012)
brings together evidence from six countries including Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Mexico, Thailand and Vietnam to highlight the widespread relevance of this aspect. In southern
Rajasthan, the absence of male heads of family in many
migrant households typically reduces the social capital
possessed by women and makes it harder for them to navigate
the public sphere to access their entitlements or to seek cooperation from the community.
However, this vacuum also creates an opportunity for women
to emerge as de facto heads of family, to find their voice, and
engage in actions to improve the nutritional aspects of their
childs life. These collectives could emerge as creative, supportive spaces for women to sit together and identify their
needs in the context of child malnutrition and evolve feasible
local solutions. The collectives could potentially act as an
important convergence point to drive the mutually-reinforcing
solutions proposed in this paper: encouraging homestead
farming of nutritious foods among women in the community;
supporting women in seeking their PDS entitlements; spreading awareness on malnutrition; managing or monitoring the
crches; and devising quick recipes and other solutions for
busy mothers to provide appropriate feed and care to young
children.
4 Conclusions
EPW Index
An author-title index for EPW has been prepared for the years from 1968
to 2012. The PDFs of the Index have been uploaded, year-wise, on the EPW
website. Visitors can download the Index for all the years from the site. (The
Index for a few years is yet to be prepared and will be uploaded when ready.)
EPW would like to acknowledge the help of the staff of the library of the
Indira Gandhi Institute for Development Research, Mumbai, in preparing the
index under a project supported by the RD Tata Trust.
vol lI no 33
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
Notes
1
References
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Salumbar Block, Udaipur District, Rajasthan,
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Human Development Research Paper, United
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EPW
India, International Food Policy Research Institute, Leveraging Agriculture for Improving
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Affairs, Government of India, http://www.rajcensus.gov.in/Pe_data.html.
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and Child Development, Government of India
and United Nations Childrens Fund, http://
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RSOC%20_02-07-2015.pdf.
(2014b): Rapid Survey of ChildrenRajasthan
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Gulati, A, A Ganesh-Kumar, G Shreedhar and
T Nandakumar (2012): Agriculture and Malnutrition in India, Food and Nutrition Bulletin,
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Nutrition Driven: How to Realize the Elusive
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TransfersI: Impact on Poverty, Economic &
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through PDS in All States, 6 February, http://
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Jha, Raghbendra, R Gaiha and A Sharma (2009):
Calorie and Micronutrient Deprivation and
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Jha, Raghbendra, Sambit Bhattacharyya and Raghav Gaiha (2011): Social Safety Nets and Nutrient Deprivation: An Analysis of the National
Rural Employment Guarantee Program and
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Economic & Political Weekly, Vol XLVI, No 4445,
pp 3649.
Khera, Reetika and Jean Drze (2013): Rural Poverty and the Public Distribution System, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol XLVIII, Nos 4546.
Panagariya, Arvind (2013): Does India Really Suffer from Worse Child Malnutrition Than SubSaharan Africa?, Economic & Political Weekly,
Vol 48(18), pp 98111.
Sharma, Amrita, Santosh Poonia, Zaineb Ali
and Rajiv Khandelwal (2014): Their Own
Country: A Profile of Labour Migration from
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20141014050600.
Srivastava, Ravi and S K Sasikumar (2003): An
Overview of Migration in IndiaIts Impacts
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June_26_2013_.pdf.
81
NOTES
Multiplier Effect of
Self-help Groups
Disha Bhanot, Varadraj Bapat
82
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NOTES
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Likewise, the extent of deposit penetration would be the sum total of the
number of savings deposit accounts and
the number of deposit account holders
through SHGs. The number of deposit account holders through SHGs is calculated
as per the relationship given below:
Number of deposit account holders
through SHGs = Number of deposit accounts of SHGs
where = (Average number of members
in a SHG Adjustment Factor).
The average membership in an SHG is
taken as 13 members, as per NABARD
(2013) report. The aggregate number of
deposit accounts would include savings
account of the group. Hence, to avoid
double counting, adjustment factor takes
value of 1. Thus, = (131) = 12.
The indicators used to measure performance on financial inclusion, after incorporating for SHG membership data in
relevant dimensions of financial inclusion are listed in Table 1.
In this study, performance on financial
inclusion is separately assessed for rural
and urban areas. Contribution of SHGs to
financial inclusion performance across
rural and urban areas is calculated by
considering the ratio of spread of SHGs in
80:20 (this ratio is reported by Venkatachalam and Jayaprakash 2004). This
ratio is also substantiated by Reddy and
Reddy (2008) as they report that spread of
SHG programme is heavily concentrated
in rural areas.
The methodology discussed above
helps to ascertain the impact of SHGs on
all India financial inclusion performance.
Table 1: Financial Inclusion Dimensions and Indicators, Incorporated for SHG Data
Dimension
Indicators
Significance
Branch Penetration
Credit Penetration
Deposit Penetration
Rural
Urban
Total
3.69
10.37
5.57
3.56
10.29
5.45
2004
SBAs to Total Population
With SHG
Without SHG
2008
SBAs to Total Population
With SHG
Without SHG
4.2
12.52
6.58
7.06
20.49
11.02
3.19
11.89
5.68
3.85
18.57
8.19
2012
SBAs to Total Population
With SHG Without SHG
8.1
21.56
12.91
4.4
19.44
8.97
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83
NOTES
Figure 3: Number of Small Borrowers in Rural and Urban Areas, 200012
2000
2004
2008
Source of raw data: RBI, BSR, 20002012 and NABARD, SMFI, 20002012.
2012
2012
2011
500
2,000
2010
1,258
1,000
4,000
2009
1,387
1,680
Rural
2008
1,277
1,547
Urban
6,000
2007
1,500
2,161
2,000
8,000
2006
2,831
With SHG Contribution
2005
3,500
10,000
2000
3,595
4,000
2,500
2012
Source of raw data: RBI, BSR, 20002012 and NABARD, SMFI, 20002012.
3,000
2011
2012
2010
2000
2004
2008
Source of raw data: RBI, BSR, 20002012 and NABARD, SMFI, 2000-2012.
2009
2008
200
2007
100
600
400
2006
200
2005
249
248
Rural
800
2004
257
314
2004
326
Urban
2003
300
372
2002
400
1,200
1,000
2003
500
1,400
2002
1,600
2001
600
575
2001
686
700
2000
Source of raw data: RBI, BSR, 20002012 and NABARD, SMFI, 20002012.
Rural
Urban
Total
18.34
105.53
42.86
18.07
105.36
42.61
2004
Deposit Accounts to
Total Population
With SHG
Without SHG
19.91
103.55
43.84
17.86
102.27
42.01
2008
Deposit Accounts to
Total Population
With SHG
Without SHG
2012
Deposit Accounts to
Total Population
With SHG Without SHG
26.57
125.11
55.64
42.47
172.88
82.11
20.66
121.57
50.43
33.44
167.71
74.26
Table 4: Financial Inclusion Indicators in India, Incorporated for SHG Data, 200012
FI Dimensions
2000
Branch Penetration
(Number of bank branches per lakh population)
Credit Penetration
(Number of SBAs and number of borrowers through
SHGs per lakh population)
Deposit Penetration
(Number of deposit accounts, directly
and through SHGs per lakh population)
Rural
4.69
Urban
12.62
Total
6.92
Rural
3,690
Urban
10,374
Total
5,569
Rural
18,348
Urban 1,05,536
Total
42,863
2004
4.13
11.73
6.3
4,200
12,524
6,581
19,914
1,03,555
43,846
2008
2012
3.79
4.24
13.75
17.54
6.73
8.29
7,067
8,100
20,494
21,561
11,027
12,192
26,579
42,464
1,25,110 1,72,880
55,644
82,110
Source of Raw Data: RBI, BSR, 20002012 and NABARD, SMFI, 20002012.
vol lI no 33
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85
DISCUSSION
86
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DISCUSSION
EPW
DISCUSSION
With this, the EPWRF ITS now has 16 modules covering a range of macro-economic, nancial and social data.
vol lI no 33
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DISCUSSION
References
Bajpai, Shiva and Acharya Arumuganathaswami
(2016): Teaching of Hinduism in the California
State School System: Evaluation and Recommendations, June, document, Hinduism Today,
EPW
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vol lI no 33
org/edits-proposed-south-asia-faculty-group/.
(2015): South Asia Studies Faculty Review of
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(2016a): Dont Replace India with South Asia
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(2016b): South Asia Faculty Cover Letter 2,
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(2016c): unpublished document, https://www.
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89
DISCUSSION
Debate or Debasement?
A Rejoinder to Vamsee Juluri
Chinnaiah Jangam
EPW
DISCUSSION
Partha Chatterjee and others have provided fascinating theoretical and historical analyses of this basic historical
process. To further understand how the
territorial imagination of Bharat/Hindu
nation matured during colonial times,
one may refer to Manu Goswamis
Producing India: From Colonial Economy
to National Space (2004). The idea of
imagining ancient India as Hindu is the
product of Orientalism and Brahmin
leaders like Bal Gangadhar Tilak were
inspired by Max Muller, who traced the
roots of the Vedas to the Arctic. This
idea in the course of time became a
potent political weapon in the hands of
Hindu fundamentalists who now claim
a natural right over the nation and its
imagination. This imaginary concept delivered political dividends and continues
to do so. In addition, they have also
attempted to co-opt Afghanistan, Nepal,
Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Maldives as part
of this imagined Hindu India and have
quibble with the entity of South Asia.
Juluri claims that the petition campaign
by the Scholars for People had the
support of more than 25,000 people,
including several non-Hindu, and even
non-Indian persons, and also that
several academics and secular public
intellectuals joined the Scholars for People
forum, and several academics also wrote
independently to the Instructional Quality
Commission to express their opposition
to the SAFG position. Yes, numbers do
speak well, but one needs to ask who are
these people signing and endorsing the
project? The majority of them are caste
Hindus of privileged backgrounds who
have never borne the burden of caste
stigma and never experienced violence
and humiliations imposed by Brahminical
Hinduism. Can Juluri get even a hundred Dalits to sign his petition? This
reflects the problem in the politics of
the majority.
Juluri questions my position on Sheldon
Pollock and Wendy Doniger who were
viciously targeted by the Hindu right in
India and outside. I may disagree with
some of their views but I stand with
them as a South Asian historian, in defending their freedom to write and critically engage with the production of
knowledge. About Hinduism, Juluri says
90
References
PerpetratorVictim Doublespeak
of Diasporic Identity
Juluris chooses to gloss over the cultural
and social (capital) advantages needed
to gain privileged access to education
and resources to migrate to privileged
first world countries like the United
States, and land in privileged positions.
Juluri asks me as to introspect whether
beneficiaries of colonialism as he calls
us would really be struggling so hard
to contest ignorant and racist textbook
content from the colonial era in 21st
century America. This position of victimhood with respect to racism and minority status is simultaneously ironical
and surreal.
available at
Gyan Deep
Near Firayalal, H. B. Road
Ranchi 834 001,
Jharkhand
Ph: 0651-2205640
vol lI no 33
EPW
CURRENT STATISTICS
Foreign TradeMerchandise
The year-on-year (y-o-y) inflation rate based on WPI increased to 1.6% in June
2016 against (-)2.1%, a year ago. The index for primary articles rose by 5.5% in
June 2016 against (-)0.5% in June 2015, as the index for food articles grew
sharply by 8.2% compared to 3.1% in the respective month. The index for fuel
and power continued to decline for 20th month in a row, however, at a
decelerated rate of (-)3.6% in June 2016 from (-)8.9%, a year ago. The index for
manufactured products increased by 1.2% in June 2016 against a fall of (-)0.8%
in June 2015.
The merchandise trade deficit narrowed to $8.1 billion (bn) in June 2016 from
$10.8 bn, a year ago. After declining for 19 months in a row, exports registered a
positive growth of 1.3% in June 2016 to $22.6 bn from $22.3 bn in June 2015.
Imports fell by (-)7.3% to $30.7 bn in June from $33.1 bn, a year ago. Exports
declined by (-) 2.1% to 65.3 bn and imports by (-)14.5% to $84.5 bn during April
June 201617, from $66.7 bn and $98.9 bn, respectively, during corresponding
period last year. The trade deficit narrowed substantially by 40.3% to $19.2 bn
during AprilJune 201617 compared to $32.2 bn, during same period last year.
The CPI inflation rate inched up to 5.77% in June 2016 compared to 5.76% in
May 2016 and 5.4%, a year ago. The consumer food price index rose sharply
by 7.8% in June 2016 compared to 5.5%, in June 2015. The CPI-rural and CPIurban inflation rate increased to 6.2% and 5.3%, respectively, in June 2016
from 6.1% and 4.6%, respectively, in the corresponding month last year. As
per the Labour Bureau data, the CPI inflation rate for agricultural labourers
increased to 6% in June 2016 from 4.5% in June 2015, and the inflation rate for
industrial workers remained at 6.1% in June 2016.
The index of industrial production grew by 1.2% in May 2016 compared to 2.5%, a
year ago, with manufacturing segment registering a fractional growth of 0.7%
compared to 2.1%. Mining segment grew moderately to 1.3% in May 2016 from 2.1%
recorded in May 2015 and electricity generation slowed down by 4.7% compared to
6.0%, a year ago. As per use based classification, the growth rate of capital goods
declined to -12.4% in May 2016, from 3.0% in May 2015. Growth in consumer
durable goods segment rose by 6.0% but that in consumer non-durables segment
fell to -2.2% in May 2016, compared to -3.9% and -1.0%, respectively, a year ago.
Year-on-Year in %
2
1.6%
1
June 2016
($ bn)
Over Month
(%)
22.6
30.7
8.1
1.8
7.9
29.4
Exports
Imports
Trade deficit
Over Year
(%)
(AprilJune)
(201617 over 201516) (%)
1.3
-7.3
-25.0
-2.1
-14.5
-40.3
2016
-1
28
2015
-2
$24 billion
$22 billion
-2.1%
-3
January
February
March
April
May*
June*
$7 billion
Oil Imports
$9 billion
Over Month
Over Year
100
20.1
14.3
14.9
65.0
1.4
2.9
2.9
3.4
0.2
1.6
5.5
8.2
-3.6
1.2
All commodities
Primary articles
Food articles
Fuel and power
Manufactured products
6.0
9.9
12.9
10.3
3.0
2.0
3.0
6.1
-0.9
2.4
-2.5
0.3
3.4
-11.7
-1.1
$8 billion
Trade Deficit
-12
2015
$11 billion
2016 JUNE
JUNE
Oil refers to crude petroleum and petroleum products, while non-oil refers to all other commodities.
12
Year-on-Year in %
9
201617
7.8%
2.5%
1.2%
Consumer Food
6
5.8%
CPI
3.9%
3
201516
0
-4
April
A September O
May*
Miscellaneous
Jan
2016
M*
Weights
Over
Month
Over Year
100
14.2
75.5
10.3
3.6
5.1
3.9
0.6
1.2
1.3
0.7
4.7
2.8
1.5
2.3
8.4
2.4
2.2
2.0
5.6
45.7
8.8
15.7
29.8
8.5
21.3
5.3
10.7
4.1
-1.3
-7.4
3.8
3.9
-12.4
3.6
1.1
6.0
-2.2
7.0
6.4
1.7
-3.4
-12.6
2.8
3.6
-2.9
2.4
3.0
11.1
-1.7
J*
General index
Mining
Manufacturing
Electricity
* Data is provisional.
Source: Central Statistics Office (CSO), Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Base: 2012=100.
Over
Month
Over
Year
Rural (2012=100)
131.8
1.2
6.2
6.2
5.6
Urban (2012=100)
128.1
1.2
5.3
5.7
4.1
277.0
0.7
6.1
6.3
5.6
869.0
1.0
6.0
6.6
4.4
CPI: Occupation-wise
* May 2016 are quick estimates; Base: 200405=100; Source: Central Statistics Office.
* Provisional. Source: CSO (rural and urban), Labour Bureau (IW and AL).
Comprehensive current economic statistics with regular weekly updates are available at: http://www.epwrf.in/currentstat.aspx.
Economic & Political Weekly
EPW
vol lI no 33
91
CURRENT STATISTICS
Q1
201516
Q2
1406817
294338
832420
48976
42871
-40831
620869
661700
-49687
2534903
(8.2)
(9.0)
(8.3)
(23.0)
(16.3)
Q3
1422029
322557
828754
48434
38194
-55355
625875
681230
-36835
2567778
(11.6)
(-0.6)
(7.5)
(9.2)
(15.4)
(2.2)
(20.6)
(0.3)
(1.1)
(4.6)
(8.3)
1495823
261886
843733
45077
37174
-45813
636468
682281
21305
2659185
Q4
(1.5)
(33.2)
(3.7)
(16.0)
(10.8)
(2.0)
(5.7)
(6.6)
1539614
223826
903344
52521
55036
-13988
625191
639179
29933
2790285
Q1
(6.6)
(-3.3)
(5.4)
(21.6)
(32.2)
1504442
293720
891627
50754
43138
-60253
585324
645577
761
2724188
(-6.3)
(-6.1)
(6.7)
Q2
(6.9)
(-0.2)
(7.1)
(3.6)
(0.6)
1511464
333116
909117
51068
42932
-78201
599264
677465
-7146
2762350
(-5.7)
(-2.4)
(7.5)
Q3
(6.3)
(3.3)
(9.7)
(5.4)
(12.4)
1618333
269808
853858
48547
42192
-59076
579684
638760
78020
2851682
(-4.3)
(-0.6)
(7.6)
Q4
(8.2)
(3.0)
(1.2)
(7.7)
(13.5)
(-8.9)
(-6.4)
(7.2)
1666888
230308
886147
55448
45549
-15520
613471
628991
143210
3012029
(8.3)
(2.9)
(-1.9)
(5.6)
(-17.2)
(-1.9)
(-1.6)
(7.9)
Q3
Current account
Merchandise
Invisibles
Services
of which: Software services
Transfers
of which: Private
Income
Capital account
of which: Foreign investment
Overall balance
-7721
-38635
30913
19982
17844
16428
16521
-5497
22864
13194
13182
Q1
-707
-31560
30854
20036
17382
16425
16600
-5607
30085
22993
30149
-6132
-34175
28043
17751
17512
16153
16267
-5861
18637
10226
11430
201516 ($ mn)
Q2
Q3
-8559
-37173
28614
17835
18058
16263
16421
-5484
8121
3150
-856
Q4
-7121
-33975
26854
18013
18556
15250
15305
-6408
10915
11256
4056
201415 (` bn)
Q4
Q3
-338
-24755
24417
16077
17328
14961
15146
-6621
3455
7259
3274
-478 [-1.5]
-2393
1915
1238
1105
1017
1023
-340
1416 [4.5]
817
816 [2.6]
Q1
-44 [-0.1]
-1964
1920
1247
1082
1022
1033
-349
1872 [5.6]
1431
1876 [5.6]
201516 (` bn)
Q3
Q2
-389 [-1.2]
-2169
1780
1127
1111
1025
1033
-372
1183 [3.7]
649
725 [2.3]
-556 [-1.7]
-2415
1859
1159
1173
1057
1067
-356
528 [1.6]
205
-56 [-0.2]
Q4
-469 [-1.4]
-2240
1770
1187
1223
1005
1009
-422
720 [2.1]
742
267 [0.8]
-23 [-0.1]
-1671
1648
1085
1170
1010
1022
-447
233 [0.6]
490
221 [0.6]
` crore
$ mn
Variation
22 July
2016
24 July
2015
31 Mar
2016
Over
Month
Over
Year
2268320
339734
2125240
333270
2229020
337605
-16260
1663
185750
10541
114840
11961
Monetary Aggregates
` crore
Over Year
Aggregate deposits
Demand
Time
Cash in hand
Balance with RBI
Investments
of which: Government securities
Bank credit
of which: Non-food credit
Capital Markets
S&P BSE SENSEX (Base: 197879=100)
S&P BSE-100 (Base: 198384=100)
S&P BSE-200 (198990=100)
CNX Nifty (Base: 3 Nov 1995=1000)
Net FII Investment in equities ($ Million)*
201213
108086
-14361
82800
-485
Variation
Financial Year So Far
201617
Financial Year
201314
251570
16769
201415
201516
322660
40486
218620
16297
Financial Year
201415
Outstanding
2016
Over Month
12058530
142870 (1.2)
1152110 (10.6)
356250 (3.4)
440910 (3.8)
1678470
972450
9394140
13460
-190
2870
140080
100
(-0.0)
(0.3)
(1.5)
(0.7)
239210
96650
813850
2400
(16.6)
(11.0)
(9.5)
(21.7)
53080
-15830
322520
-3530
(3.8)
(-1.8)
(3.9)
(-24.2)
81210
-17380
379060
-1990
(5.1)
(-1.8)
(4.2)
(-12.9)
104760
58760
965330
-1270
(9.2)
(7.8)
(14.9)
(-39.2)
140360
79650
800150
12620
(11.3)
(9.8)
(10.7)
(640.6)
211080
98200
757310
860
(15.2)
(11.0)
(9.2)
(5.9)
3690210
7827630
2580060
2061980
2162840
66260
51590
57080
32770
-2850
(1.8)
(0.7)
(2.3)
(1.6)
(-0.1)
391940
668910
237760
149110
262090
(11.9)
(9.3)
(10.2)
(7.8)
(13.8)
290880
109000
91650
135840
-27710
(9.7)
(1.5)
(4.1)
(7.6)
(-1.4)
451720
24570
46340
82420
-17900
(13.9)
(0.3)
(1.8)
(4.2)
(-0.8)
335850
777430
287280
275010
217860
(12.4)
(13.7)
(17.6)
(16.8)
(14.4)
-37480
604430
326710
-137040
195710
(-1.2)
(9.4)
(17.0)
(-7.2)
(11.3)
231100
753340
283070
202530
252280
(7.7)
(10.7)
(12.6)
(11.4)
(13.1)
1736180
413070
13590
3770 (0.2)
-6960 (-1.7)
340 (2.6)
201516
699620
698370
-12270
2424700
22600
971820
39160
38930
-57430
-13970
690
-28680
(5.9)
(5.9)
(-127.2)
(-0.6)
(3.1)
(-2.9)
248340 (16.7)
20220 (5.1)
-6480 (-32.3)
214250
215890
-20550
177790
2360
111760
(44.1)
(44.7)
(-248.2)
(7.9)
(11.7)
(13.0)
39520 (2.7)
-72710 (-15.6)
5480 (37.6)
120850
121440
-194230
119630
810
74790
(33.2)
(33.6)
(-95.9)
(5.6)
(4.2)
(9.5)
39300
2972
201112
Outstanding
2016
Over Month
201516
9671440
866160
8805280
65900
388450
2796070
2794380
7292300
7188910
29 July
2016
28052
8856
3692
8639
170188
Over Year
(1.8)
(4.3)
(4.8)
(3.1)
(0.5)
117650
-4080
121730
3860
2360
43690
43530
53620
47040
(1.2)
(-0.5)
(1.4)
(6.2)
(0.6)
(1.6)
(1.6)
(0.7)
(0.7)
Month
Ago
26740
8336
3477
8204
168289
841330
89890
751430
11550
25400
158170
158580
650340
654830
(9.5)
(11.6)
(9.3)
(21.3)
(7.0)
(6.0)
(6.0)
(9.8)
(10.0)
Year
Ago
27563
8492
3522
8375
169388
(6.0)
(8.7)
(11.9)
(8.1)
(7.0)
296830
-17760
314590
1000
-10030
146070
146050
105540
92090
201314
1127560 (13.4)
110090 (9.2)
109020 (34.0)
-1280 (-39.5)
147250 (11.3)
35860 (8.3)
12630 (644.4)
215150 (14.9)
36260 (7.8)
860 (5.9)
274630
273810
-316810
41220
700
17640
108120
107150
14070
244460
2000
150810
-334180
-336610
145030
324760
2090
-58050
60470
63520
102030
256200
2470
168910
344150
-22840
366990
8460
1000
170560
170450
42680
44550
(64.6)
(64.5)
(-104.0)
(1.7)
(3.2)
(1.8)
(18.3)
(18.1)
(32.4)
(15.7)
(13.0)
(21.8)
(3.7)
(-2.6)
(4.3)
(14.7)
(0.3)
(6.5)
(6.5)
(0.6)
(0.6)
201516
Trough
Peak
24674
7656
3193
7546
-
22952
7051
2938
6971
-
955110
51620
903480
5380
34080
206720
207540
733640
731610
(14.1)
(7.8)
(14.8)
(13.3)
(12.1)
(10.3)
(10.4)
(13.9)
(14.2)
827720
80110
747620
7480
56740
279010
278560
542320
546340
22386
6707
2681
6704
149745
(10.7)
(11.2)
(10.7)
(16.3)
(17.9)
(12.6)
(12.6)
(9.0)
(9.3)
201314
29044
8980
3691
8834
-
(-47.8)
(-48.2)
(0.0)
(18.0)
(12.1)
(-6.9)
Financial Year
201415
201314
28209
8875
3697
8666
-
201516
1067450 (10.1)
72710 (4.4)
-88750 (-17.7)
-1860 (-12.0)
Variation
Financial Year So Far
201617
(3.5)
(-2.2)
(4.1)
(1.9)
(-2.7)
(5.9)
(5.9)
(1.6)
(1.4)
1032790 (10.9)
(18.8)
(18.1)
(17.2)
(18.0)
(9.9)
27957
8607
3538
8491
168116
(24.9)
(28.3)
(31.9)
(26.7)
(12.3)
(16.6)
(17.6)
(0.0)
(12.0)
(12.7)
(21.5)
201516
794010
94970
699030
4090
14370
133680
134180
713200
702370
(9.3)
(12.0)
(9.0)
(7.7)
(3.9)
(5.4)
(5.4)
(10.9)
(10.9)
201516
25342
7835
3259
7738
166107
(-9.4)
(-9.0)
(-7.9)
(-8.9)
(-1.2)
* = Cumulative total since November 1992 until period end | Figures in brackets are percentage variations over the specified or over the comparable period of the previous year | (-) = not relevant | - = not available | NS = new series | PE = provisional estimates
Comprehensive current economic statistics with regular weekly updates are available at: http://www.epwrf.in/currentstat.aspx.
92
vol lI no 33
EPW
Outright
July 2016
July 2015
201617*
201516*
Repo
Volume
(` Cr)
Number
of Trades
Volume
(` Cr)
172945
80923
443020
312422
2114509
853105
5291454
3415709
14169
11232
54542
42794
1972741
1457379
7178277
5552377
8647
3518
5538
3810
EPW
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
2041
2042
2043
2044
2045
2055
Total
July 2016
201617*
9916
12774
13163
27830
136864
49708
15694
188908
78727
101665
474575
6207
8435
362004
430797
0
4775
2487
11502
3140
1589
0
0
1019
1954
1050
1219
1921
6821
5838
2141
1962723
25729
69183
50552
114154
463990
104772
72431
435309
198760
285550
1074347
34711
16364
752477
968272
0
12525
7016
27720
5585
7652
0
0
1180
5085
2263
4919
6081
19818
18769
5325
4790539
2 Netting Factor
Number
of Trades
105725
37092
66143
41655
13149
15036
13493
33848
369830
8466
42323
187963
1170340
294312
251069
42058
339057
0
107945
0
22167
21150
30
191
1132
0
0
4
6885
4642
7240
10405
25249
4578
0
2992562
616
432
613
437
85771
56053
80655
56657
a Securities
Net
Netting
(` Cr)
Factor (%)
Gross
(` Cr)
4251970
2310480
12634451
8968081
1446559
876148
4736196
3430389
Gross
(` Cr)
65.98
62.08
62.51
61.75
4381799
2334558
12944400
9158961
b Funds
Net
(` Cr)
Netting
Factor (%)
Central Govt
Dated
531170
410577
1755904
1497437
87.88
82.41
86.44
83.65
1962723
741799
4790539
3022545
a Outright Trades
Treasury
Bills
93145
90963
329000
316202
(0.44)
(0.50)
(0.45)
(1.13)
(12.36)
(0.28)
(1.41)
(6.28)
(39.11)
(9.83)
(8.39)
(1.41)
(11.33)
(0.00)
(3.61)
(0.00)
(0.74)
(0.71)
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.04)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.23)
(0.16)
(0.24)
(0.35)
(0.84)
(0.15)
(0.00)
(100)
July 2016
201617*
3.17
3.28
5 Cr
% to Total
Value
% to Total
Trades
% to Total
Value
50.88
54.40
20.81
22.77
0.43
0.42
> 5 Cr <=10 Cr
% to Total
% to Total
Trades
Value
25.49
23.61
>10 Cr<=20 Cr
% to Total
% to Total
Trades
Value
20.83
19.74
6.89
6.28
> 20 Cr
% to Total
% to Total
Trades
Value
Outright
Cooperative Banks
Financial Institutions
Foreign Banks
Insurance Companies
Mutual Funds
Others
Primary Dealers
Private Sector Banks
Public Sector Banks
Total
5.33
0.27
23.88
0.90
7.99
0.84
16.97
13.29
30.54
100.00
9.71
9.01
Buy
CBLO Lending
Reverse Repo
(Funds Lending)
1.94
0.00
21.60
3.63
23.55
0.00
2.38
10.05
36.85
100.00
Uncollateralised
Money Market
Lending@
Forex
42.81
6.33
0.00
16.80
34.05
100.00
0.08
0.01
42.95
21.31
35.65
100.00
6.19
0.44
3.23
9.36
49.43
9.47
0.01
2.56
19.31
100.00
Outright
Repo
13.57
12.43
Period
5.32
0.75
0.18
0.00
23.83 24.79
0.80
0.17
7.02
0.00
0.51
3.68
17.76
31.93
14.13 29.80
30.45
8.89
100.00 100.00
OTC
1.32
8.53
13.18
0.00
16.61
11.81
6.03
24.34
18.18
100.00
Trades
% Share
9007
4638
26963
5.29
5.73
6.06
Value (` Cr)
Trades
% Share
NDS-OM
Value (` Cr)
% Share
11.44
17.36
16.29
161397
76335
417686
94.71
94.27
93.94
1841820
706436
4442936
88.56
82.64
83.71
237828
148366
864888
Outright
Period
Proprietary
Trades
Volume
152374
73584
387923
Cash
Trades
Tom
Value
(` Cr)
July 2016
201617*
2697
12252
Trades
1881075
776328
4636402
($ Mn)
Spot
Value
(` Cr)
($ Mn)
106464
482355
Trades
129225
576105
Proprietary
Trades
Volume
20571
7339
55097
6791
5338
26133
Trades
($ Mn)
1383414
6214650
233434
76778
655052
Forex
1.61
13.59
31.91
34.05
18.85
100.00
0.09
0.00
43.30
21.71
34.89
100.00
Period
275
269
1198
205612
928122
(` Cr)
6484 455255
30109 2188209
Total
Value
($ Mn)
Trades
Value
(` Cr)
Trades
($ Mn)
July 2016
201617*
33.34
33.12
1 mn
% to Total Value
4.42
4.34
% to Total Trades
42.29
41.73
June 2016
June 2015
93
Top 5
29.79
26.85
Top 10
49.87
46.88
Top 15
64.46
60.80
Top 20
73.89
71.82
* Data pertains to April 2016June 2016.
12.83
12.42
> 1 mn <= 5 mn
% to Total Trades
% to Total Value
12.33
12.42
9.09
9.02
> 5 mn <= 10 mn
% to Total Trades
% to Total Value
0.57
0.53
62213
43270
249068
24674
27397
Gross
($ Mn)
0.75
0.76
201617*
201516*
Settlement Period
< 30 Days
% to Total
% to Total
Trades
Value
201516*
68.26
84.55
89.81
92.56
77.91
88.10
92.17
94.87
July 2016
July 2015
201617*
57.37
87.94
46.97
78.22
63.16
93.51
63.36
84.50
50.72
84.25
68.89
90.14
54.93
87.88
47.02
78.48
63.44
91.70
Cooperative Banks
Foreign Banks
Public Sector Banks
Private Sector Banks
Mutual Funds
Primary Dealers
Top 5
Top 10
Top 15
Top 20
July 2016
July 2015
201617*
201516*
32.26
46.46
56.56
63.48
31.96
49.45
59.24
66.43
32.05
47.13
56.86
64.06
32.64
49.73
59.59
66.82
1446617
5609772
25424
102694
3.35
3.32
2899
7684
Rate
Security
6.45
6.45
6.40
6.46
6.45
7.88% GS 2030
8.27% GS 2020
7.59% GS 2026
7.68% GS 2023
7.59% GS 2029
69.06
69.77
> 1 Year
% to Total
% to Total
Trades
Value
1733233
6304967
Trades
Value
Rate
529
272
304
199
212
48214
41015
28714
19473
17975
6.20
6.35
6.28
6.31
6.22
Foreign Banks
Public Sector Banks
Private Sector Banks
Cooperative Banks
Financial Institutions
Cash
Tom
Spot
Forward
42.95
35.65
21.31
0.08
0.01
43.30
34.89
21.71
0.09
0.00
37.06
37.59
25.02
0.32
0.00
42.78
29.93
27.22
0.07
0.00
18805
69780
Value
94.58
95.19
Total
Number
Volume
of Trades
(` Crore)
286616
695195
53954
48475
34016
33389
30633
> 20 mn
% to Total Trades
% to Total Value
10.72
11.45
Term
Number
Volume
of Trades
(` Crore)
207
165
138
195
190
468812
2136965
> 10 mn <= 20 mn
% to Total Trades
% to Total Value
1.24
1.13
201617*
80.32
88.84
92.58
95.01
Trades
% to Total Value
July 2015
72.90
89.70
93.34
95.44
Categories
15906
62096
7.83% GS 2018
7.49% GS 2017
8.07% GS 2017
7.59% GS 2026
8.27% GS 2020
Average
Value
(` Cr)
($ Mn)
July 2016
Spot
Trades
Value
Daily Average
Trades
Value
July 2016
33875
18101
1694
905
28.83
27.75
July 2015
35302
20071
1535
873
49.12
48.08
July 2016
15.99
24.67
23.77
30.54
17.66
15.40
39.51
27.22
3.07
2.16
201516*
151180
80597
1890
1007
63.66
62.75
July 2015
17.56
24.61
20.50
24.13
16.42
14.00
41.85
34.41
3.66
2.84
201617*
17.55
26.90
24.39
29.32
15.62
14.00
38.55
26.97
3.89
2.82
73.34
74.51
201415*
133794
73983
1632
902
@: Call and Term Money Segment. (i) Figures in brackets are percentage to total, (ii) Tables 1 to 11 relate to Government Securities Market, (iii) Tables 12 to 14 relate to Money Market, and (iv) Tables 15 to 20 relate to Forex Market. Source: Clearing Corporation of India Limited (CCIL).
< 1 mn
% to Total Trades
July 2016
201617*
51271
2489
169534
12585
Overnight
Number
Volume
of Trades
(` Crore)
Security
Constituent
Trades
Volume
922900
685432
3354347
Uncollateralised
Money Market
Borrowing@
133292
258040
569263
1031527
Repo
Constituent
Trades
Volume
Forward
Value
(` Cr)
800550
468173
2864617
1736061
Top 5
Top 10
Top 15
Top 20
48.23
48.05
15 Forex Settlement
Settlement Period
State
Govt
58641
20343
171916
76962
% Share
July 2016
July 2015
201617*
b Repo
Treasury
Bills
Sell
CBLO Borrowing
Central Govt
Dated
Period
State
Govt
Settlement Period
201516*
(0.54)
(1.44)
(1.06)
(2.38)
(9.69)
(2.19)
(1.51)
(9.09)
(4.15)
(5.96)
(22.43)
(0.72)
(0.34)
(15.71)
(20.21)
(0.00)
(0.26)
(0.15)
(0.58)
(0.12)
(0.16)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.02)
(0.11)
(0.05)
(0.10)
(0.13)
(0.41)
(0.39)
(0.11)
(100)
CURRENT STATISTICS
Secondary Market Transactions in Government Securities, Forex Market and Money MarketJuly 2016
POSTSCRIPT
FILMS
An important paradigm shift is noticed in the representas the quintessential Other, Kashmiras represented
tion of Kashmir with the film Roja (1992), made by Mani
in Bollywood or, rather, in Hindi cinemaappears
Ratnam, which forced Indians to take cognisance of the
rather skewed, from a perception point of view,
rise of militancy or armed freedom movements in the
with little emphasis laid on any subjective attempt to underValley. Roja, which was awarded a prize for national
stand either the people or the landscape. Kashmir was
integration in 1993, marked a significant intervention in
certainly the perfect destination for filming romantic interrendering the burning Kashmir issue in Indias popular
ludes between the hero and heroine as seen in landmark
imagination. The film marked a leap of imagination in
films such as Kashmir ki Kali, for instance. The young and
terms of the sheer geographical movement of the lead
ravishingly beautiful Sharmila Tagore, attired in exquisitely
protagoniststhey are Tamilians who are transported
embroidered pherans and adorned in traditional silver
from the southern extreme of India to the high north domijewellery, amidst the scenes on the shikara on Dal lake,
nated by snow-covered mountains. While Arvind Swamys
embodied the ultimate romantic Indian imagination of an
character is employed by an intelligence agency of the Indiidyllic and unperturbed Kashmir. The tall chinar trees and
an government, Madhoos character, as Swamys wife, is
rolling green meadows of the Kashmir Valley formed the
that of an innocent, god-fearing young girl whose
backdrop for the declaration of love and the
...it may be
sense of wonder at the overpowering beauty of
dramatisation of romance. Indeed, for the audisaid, that the
Kashmir is surely shared by the average Indian
ence, the appreciation would have been not only
representation of
in the audience.
of the beautiful Sharmila Tagore, but also of the
Kashmir in such
The film brings to light the political reality
breathtaking landscapeTareef karu kya uski
films was largely
of Kashmir and the fact that the landscape
jisne tumhe banaya (Do I praise you or the one
on the basis of the
can no longer be seen in terms of scenic beauty
who created you?)
landscape as scenic,
merely but implies the imposition of structures
So, it may be said that the representation of
uninterrupted.
of stateist surveillance. Images of uniformed
Kashmir in such films was largely on the basis of
Stock characters
armed personnel, tanks and a generally grim
the landscape as scenic, uninterrupted. Stock
and archetypes
and sombre atmosphere dominates the urban
characters and archetypes included figures like
included figures
spaces in Srinagar as represented in the film. The
boatmen and tourist guides who are ingratiatingly
like boatmen and
film conveys a foreboding aura in the Valley and
eager to please the tourists from the plains. They
tourist guides who a sense of tensions simmering below the surface
are granted little agency, and should be seen as
are ingratiatingly
which threaten to rupture the veneer of calm
human extensions of a mute landscape that does
eager to please
achieved by a overwhelming military presence
not speak for itself in any way. The narratives are
the tourists from
that relegates the civilian to an anonymous and
mostly geared towards the movement towards
the plains
invisible entity.
the big city where the hero and heroine must
Roja places before us the menacing figure of the terrorist,
actualise the rest of their conjugal lives together. Hence, the
a much-feared and reviled figure who is the actualisation
picture postcard element is retained in the narrative logic
of an opaque hatred for the Indian state. This is the person
of Hindi cinema.
for whom many brave armymen have laid down their lives
Interestingly, the problematic acquisition of Kashmir by
for the sake of Bharat Mataa discourse of nationalism
the Indian state at the moment of independence is largely
that was being framed in the context of the rise of saffron
elided over, and the long history of the suppression of the
politics in the country. This discourse was also part of a
right to self-determination of the people, right from the
pressing need of the Indian state to legitimise its presence in
Mughal era, is not raised at all vis--vis the fetishisation of
Kashmir and the need to rationalise crackdowns and atrocibeauty. This forms the larger discourse of Indian nationalism
ties which were effected on the civilian population to hunt
and the framework of the secular politics of the Indian state.
down terror suspects.
It also indicates the homogenising of Kashmiri identity in
The image of Arvind Swamys characterhis hands tied,
terms of a largely Muslim identity, ignoring the significant
trying to salvage the burning tricolour, with the strains of
presence of Hindu Pandits and the largely Buddhist populaBharat Mata jaan se bhi pyara hai playing in the background
tion in Ladakh.
94
vol lI no 33
EPW
POSTSCRIPT
FILMS
EPW
vol lI no 33
NE
95
POSTSCRIPT
MUSINGS
Lingo Bingo
to glamorise, I am aware of the situation within the state, especially between tribals and non-tribals. But perhaps these
should not be seen not as problems but as mere complications
good and bad. In the case of Tripura, Bangla rules; it is still the
Travelling through Kolkata, the overwhelming
language of the marketplace as it is (or was) for much of the
feeling is that language, especially in the markets,
North East. Perhaps its Tripuras ties and proximity to Banglahas changedfor reasons of politics, the
desh have nurtured this. The problems arise when Bangla
economy and hegemony.
and the same might be said for Hindiis no longer confined
to the marketplace but follows the people home as well.
Avner Pariat
For the Khasi, this language shift (from Bangla to Hindi) is
a kind of inimical reminder about what partition did. Living at
am in Kolkata. At least I think this is Kolkata. I was told
the edge of the Shillong plateau, right next to the economically
that I would be journeying into the heartland of the
significant settlement of Shilot (Sylhet), the Wars (a Khasic
bhadralok and the East Bengalis of Shillong coloured my
group), in particular, were quick to take advantage of their
expectations and bias. Upon arrival, though, I feel as though
strategic positions and traded in areca, oranges and other
some things have been missed. Like the city, the information
produce with traders from the plains of Bangladesh. Later on,
seems hardly fresh. It is not current.
they added iron works and limestone to their list. The latter,
As I walked within the various bazaars and commercial
from factories established by the colonials, eventuestablishments, besides the madding drone and
The language of
ally made their way as cement to various parts of
unnecessary cacophony, there was something that
the market has
struck me. The language of the market has changed.
changed. Hindi has Bengal. Kolkata, the then capital of Imperial InHindi has replaced Bangla as the pre-eminent lanreplaced Bangla as dia, would not have materialised but for the calcium carbonate sourced from tribal lands.
guage, as it has replaced Assamese and Khasi. Hindi
the pre-eminent
Post-partition, because of border demarcations
might not be the language of the customersthey
language, as it has
and the wars, many Khasi states like Rambrai
might still (jingoistically, at times) prefer their
replaced Assamese
and Nongstoin lost many haats to East Pakistan
mother tongues and good bania customer care will
and Khasi
and hence revenue. This was perhaps the most
make it compulsory to engage with them along their
compelling reason why Wickliffe Sing Syiem did not want
lines but it is the language of the machinery, that system
his uncle to sign the Instrument of Accession on behalf of
beyond the customerthe manufacture, transport and taxaNongstoin state. It was a business decision in its own way.
tion before a product or service is delivered to a customer.
I think one must be careful in assuming total loss of agenHindi, once upon a time, shared the platform but has now
cy for the Khasis, though. Many elites of Khasi society still
nudged the others clear off it. The most obvious reason for this
continue in the limestone trade with Bangladesh but the
is that most of the production of goods is done in states and
haat as a community space has receded. The market (for
territories that are Hindi-speaking (in the NCR area) or are aclimestone, mostly) exists but participation in the market is
tively involved in peddling Hindi currency (like Maharashtra).
no longer as it once was. It is tighter now and closed off to
The economyso say Marxistsultimately influences everyall but the wealthy. It is no longer about small traders but
thing else. Language, it would seem, is just as susceptible.
big merchants. As far as I have
For the majority, the prima lingua
LAST LINES
seen, one need not even use
is unquestionably Hindi. That, in
Bangla in the transactions. A
itself, does not pose a problem were
phone call in Hindi to the operait not for the fact that there is a
tors on the other side of the borpolitical dimension and a hegemder is readily understood and
ony involved. The case of Kolkata
deals can be closed smoothly. In
reveals this. Imagine two Bengalis
this way, India oozes over interhaggling in Hindi over a dinner!
national borders.
In rural Tripura, I was fortunate
Today most, if not all, of
enough to see how people really
Meghalayas goods and services
negotiated numerous spaces in
come through Assam and yet we
the affairs of their lives. A Halam
dont need Assamese most of
man might have to meet a Reang
the time. It is a peculiar situation
butcher, when Kokborok is used;
that betrays a lopsided power
he might then need to meet a lawrelationship.
yer, when he has to dip into his
bag of linguistic skills to come up
Avner Pariat (abner.pariah@gmail.com) is a
with Bangla. While not wishing
Khasi writer and film-maker.
96
vol lI no 33
EPW
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"Every commercial film is actually only the preview of that which it promises and will never
deliver." Theodor W Adorno
The success of Rajinikanth-starrer Kabali was expected. There was considerable hype and
corresponding expectations prior to the release of the movie. Apart from the usual excitement that
a Rajini movie generates in the Tamil public, Kabali was anticipated by intellectual circles as well
because of its critically acclaimed director, P Ranjith, of Madras (2014) fame.
This anticipation was based on an understanding that Kabali would be a pro-Dalit movie. But
contrary to such readings, Ranjiths product has a universalist focus to it, that of an alternate Tamil
nationalism.
Ranjiths first movie Attakathi (2012) was a light hearted romantic comedy located in a Chennai
suburb. Madras (2014), which won the director much fame, was based in the predominantly urban
working class area of North Chennai. In contrast to his first movie, Madras had strong political
overtones and dealt with the social and political ambitions of subaltern classes. In interviews,
Ranjith claimed that the movie is about Dalits in an urban scenario.
However, as far as Kabali is concerned, he has denied that it is a Dalit-oriented movie. It is about
the struggles of Malaysian Tamils against repression by the Malaysian state, the racism they face
from the relatively well-off Chinese, and also about internal divisions of caste. The stress
throughout the film is on Tamil unity. The Tamil nationalist subtext is too obvious to miss.
But then, the obvious is always ever elusive.
Kabalis Story
Kabali is the story of a Malaysian Tamil gangster who fights for the rights of the Tamils in that
country. Originally part of an anti-establishment labour movement led by a charismatic Tamil
leader, Tamilnesan, Kabali takes over the leadership of the movement after the leader is
assassinated by other Tamils working for a Chinese mobster.
Later, in the course of a gang war, Tamilnesans son betrays Kabali and gets killed by him. A series
of violent events separate Kabali from his family, and a series of violent events reunites them later
in the movie.
Though little is revealed about the criminal activities of Kabalis gangs, they are shown to be
running several social and welfare services for Malaysian Tamils.
Kabali also attacks other gangs who are involved in drug smuggling and the flesh trade. The
Manichean division between the moral gangster and the immoral gangster is evident. Supporting
the immoral gangster, a Chinese don, are Tamil collaborators who abuse Kabali for his low
origins. In the end, Kabali triumphs over them all, only to get assassinated by a Tamil from his own
side who has gone over to the Malaysian state.
Images of significant leaders cross the screen space at various junctures to establish Kabalis antiestablishment tenorAmbedkar, Che Guevara, Malcolm X and Nelson Mandela. However, one
crucial leader who is curiously absent is Periyar (E V Ramaswamy). Incidentally, Periyar had toured
Malaysia and had conducted anti-caste meetings there and his 1929 visit is said to have been
instrumental in the formation of the Adi Dravidar Sangam and the Tamil Self-respect Association.
Perhaps his inclusion may have ruffled Rajinikanth, who is reputed to be a devout Hindu and has
also expressed sympathy for the Hindu right in the past. However, the omission also needs to be
seen in the wake of contemporary Tamil nationalist discourse in Tamil Nadu.
A debate which is being played out in a most unfortunate manner among activist circles in Tamil
Nadu is the question of Tamil Nationalism versus Periyarism, as if there is an inherent
irreconcilable antagonism between the two. The theoretical godfather of a dominant trend of Tamil
nationalism is Arignar Guna, incidentally an intellectual from the DalitParaiyar caste. The
followers of his theory believe in a pure Tamil ethnic entity, that is that certain castes are Tamil,
and others non-Tamil.
This variant of Tamil nationalism is fuelled by ethno-chauvinism, xenophobia, hyper-masculinity,
ressentiment towards those identified as impure Tamils, and implicit casteism (or explicit, in
cases of parties like the Vanniyar dominated Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK).
The accusation of these Tamil nationalists is that Periyarism is politically bankrupt, and in this
criticism, they share a common stage with parliamentary leftists, a few Dalit groups and
Brahminical Hindu nationalists. It is of concern that many of these Tamil nationalist groups are
trying to appropriate the political symbols of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) while
being totally ignorant of the radical emancipatory politics of the Tigers. While they are indeed
opposed to the Sri Lankan state, their position on caste, gender, class, and imperialism leaves much
to be desired.
The social composition of the Tamil nationalist groups by and large consists of lower-middle-class
and intermediate castes, and includes some representation from Dalit castes. These are aggregates
of individuals who feel left out by mainstream Dravidian parties, who have a nave consciousness of
Tamil pride as a resistance to oppression, but are not theoretically acute enough to form a radical
alternative to mainstream political parties.
Given that all left parties in the state have consistently failed to address the class and caste
question in a manner that takes into account the specificity of Tamil Nadu, those who seek an
alternative to the mainstream political parties find it in the rhetoric of the Tamil nationalist
speakers.
While contemporary Tamil nationalist leaders have attracted big crowds at events, the recent Tamil
Nadu state elections show that they have failed to win in a single constituency. Among these Tamil
nationalists are casteist parties like the PMK, which caters only to the Most Backward Class (MBC)
community of the Vanniyars, and to Dalit groups like the Viduthalai Siruthaigal Katchi. These
groups once showed promise but have now turned sectarian and are considerably watered down,
having no significance beyond their limited constituencies.
Such outfits capture considerable attention through flashy events and demonstrations. There is
little or no discussion on ideology or on geo-politics: a crucial question, considering the strategic
location of the Tamil population. What instead is often articulated is Tamil pride and offences
against it, glory of Tamil pasts, and vague promises of a utopian Tamil society.
This Tamil nationalism appears as an alternative to the mainstream, but in effect, does little to dent
it. Often, it ends up degenerating into a particularist caste politics.
A real radical politics, Slavoj Zizek argues, is determined not by what it is fighting against but by
what it is fighting for. What is needed, he says, is the absent third, a strong radical-emancipatory
opposition (Zizek 2014: 121). But the function of an effective ruling ideology lies precisely in the
suppression of that radical core that has the potential to generate such an opposition.
The conscious or unconscious omission of Periyar in a cultural product that seeks to address the
problems of all Tamils prevents the product from achieving its full potential. Kabalis Tamil
nationalism does appear a step in the right direction. But its radicalism could have been
strengthened by the inclusion of the informed insights of Periyar.
This criticism apart, it is of much political interest to consider how the Tamil nationalist subtext has
been handled by Ranjith in his movie.
Reading Kabali
Films that have an exclusive focus on Tamils living outside India are a rare find in Kollywood. While
there have been Tamil nationalistic films, rarely have they addressed the political concerns of
Tamils outside India, or even outside Tamil Nadu for that matter. As Velayutham rightly observes,
The population of the state of Tamil Nadu remains the single largest market for Tamil films.
For these audiences, films depicting diasporic Tamils appear to be less attractive. For them, Tamil
cinema is about Tamils for Tamils in India (Velayutham 2008: 178).
In this, Ranjith has to be lauded for making a film where the plot is centred in Malaysia and where
Tamil Nadu figures only momentarily (albeit significantly, for it is in Chennai that the reunification
of Kabalis family occurs). The Malaysian Tamil community, however, is not shown as a unified lot.
Kabali makes frequent references to how the divisions among the Tamils are their weaknesses.
Kabali emerges as the supreme leader who tries to bring about unity among all Tamils,
irrespective of their particularist caste differences, despite the hurdles posed by the other.
Kabalis self-definition here is important. He says he is a Tamil, from a subaltern background, and
laments that Tamils carry the baggage of caste wherever they go. Only the otherbe it the rival
Chinese don or his supposedly upper-caste Tamil stoogesabuse him for being of a lower social
rank.
It is only in the gaze of the other that Kabali is shown to be inferior. He identifies his own self
primarily as a Tamil, fighting for the rights of all Tamils, a believer in strength through unity. The
other sees a lower caste in Kabali; Kabali sees a Tamil in his self.
Here you have the classic Fanonist position: the racist other (in this case, the casteist) seeks to lock
the oppressed in a particularist, inferiorised identity, but the oppressed seeks his emancipation
through a genuine universalism that unsettles all identities. Partha Chatterjee writes that caste
politics has not found a ground on which it can be superseded by a new universal form of
community (1994: 208).
Kabali is precisely a struggle to find that community in a Tamil nationalism that would sublate
particularist caste identities in a universal Tamil body-politic.
Eelam Tamil nationalists could draw their own parallels from the movie: this was much like the
low caste LTTE leadership that claimed to represent all the Tamils who were being rejected by
liberal high caste Tamils. The latter preferred to collaborate with the Sri Lankan state rather than
References
Chatterjee, Partha (1994): Caste and Subaltern Consciousness, Subaltern Studies VI: Writings on
South Asian History and Society, Ranajit Guha (ed), New Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp
169209.
Velayutham, Selvaraj (ed) (2008): The Diaspora and the Global Circulation of Tamil Cinema, in
Tamil Cinema: The Cultural Politics of Indias Other Film Industry, Oxon: Routledge, pp 172188
Zizek, Slavoj (2014): Trouble in Paradise: From the End of History to the End of Capitalism,
London: Allen Lane.
Tags:
Kabali
Rajinikanth
Periyar
Self-respect Association
Tamils in Malaysia
Kollywood
Dalits in Kollywood
Dalits in Indian films
Adi Dravidar Sangam
Racism in Malaysia
Caste in Cinema
Tamil Nationalism
LTTE
Universalist vs Particularist
Periyar and Tamil Nationalism