LUISITO P. BASILIO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, and FE ADVINCULA, respondents. Sc

Simplicio Pronebo was charged by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal with the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with double homicide and double
physical injuries

Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation, so that the above
judgment became final and executory.
Pertinently, the trial court also found that at the time of the vehicular
accident accused Simplicio Pronebo was employed as the driver of the
dump truck owned by petitioner Luisito Basilio.
On September 23, 1991, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution of
the subsidiary civil liability of petitioner Basilio.
The Court directed the issuance of a writ of execution against him for the enforcement
and satisfaction of the award of civil indemnity decreed in judgment on February 4,
1991

Issue: May the petitioner as employer file a Motion for Reconsideration

concerning civil liability decreed in the judgment if he is not a party to the
criminal case?
Held: The statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code.[17] This liability is enforceable in the same criminal proceeding
where the award is made.[18] However, before execution against an employer ensues,
there must be a determination, in a hearing set for the purpose of 1) the existence of
an employer-employee relationship; 2) that the employer is engaged in some kind of

industry; 3) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have
committed the offense in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily any offense he
commits "while" in the discharge of such duties; and 4) that said employee is insolvent.

There are two instances when the existence of an employer-employee relationship of

an accused driver and the alleged vehicle owner may be determined. One during the
criminal proceeding, and the other, during the proceeding for the execution of the
judgment. In both instances, petitioner should be given the opportunity to be heard,
which is the essence of due process

[G.R. No. 160355. May 16, 2005]

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF

EDUARDO

MANGAWANG

and

PEOPLE

OF

THE

PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Ernesto Ancheta was employed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) as
driver of one of its passenger buses. On July 23, 1993, an Information was filed with
the RTC of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, charging Ancheta with reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide.

The accused was assisted by Atty. Crispiniano Lamorena, Jr., whom the
PRBLI assigned as counsel de parte. Atty. Andres Pangilinan entered his
appearance as private prosecutor.
The trial court rendered judgment on November 12, 1999, convicting the accused of
the crime charged.

The accused appealed the decision to the CA. On November 10, 2000, the appellate
court issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal due to Anchetas failure to file his brief
as accused-appellant.

The employer filed a notice of appeal for the same has already
prescribed. The employer also invoked its right to be furnished copies of
By way of comment on the petition, the Solicitor General contends the
decision of the RTC was conclusive on the petitioner, not only with regard to
its civil liability but also as to the amount thereof, absent any collusion
between the accused-employee and the private complainant. The petitioner
was not a direct party in the criminal case; hence, was not entitled to a copy
of the decision of the RTC or to appeal therefrom. Hence, according to the
OSG, it cannot complain of denial of its right to due process.
Issue: whether the employer may appeal the judgment rendered against his
employee
Held:
No.
If the present appeal is given [due] course, the whole case against the accusedemployee becomes open to review. It thus follows that a penalty higher than that
which has already been imposed by the trial court may be meted out to him.
Petitioners appeal would thus violate his right against double jeopardy, since the
judgment against him could become subject to modification without his consent.

[25]

Indeed, to allow an employer to dispute its civil liability in the criminal

case via an appeal from the decision of the RTC would be to annul, nullify or
defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court

During the hearing of the motion for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution, the prosecution must prove that (a) the petitioner PRBLI was the
employer of the accused; (b) it was engaged in some kind of industry; (c)
the crime was committed by the employee in the discharge of his duties;
and (d) execution against the employee is unsatisfied. The prosecution
[28]

may offer in evidence the sheriffs return as prima facie evidence of the
insolvency of the accused.
The petitioner, as the employer of the accused, may adduce evidence on
questions which may be involved in the execution since the trial court which
rendered the decision has a general supervisory control over the process of
execution.

[29]

From a ruling adverse to the employer, it may appeal by writ of error on

questions of facts, or mixed questions of facts and of law, or by certiorari on
questions of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion of the trial court, thus:
It goes without saying that the determination thus made as regards the employers
subsidiary civil liability is not conclusive in the sense of being non-reviewable by
higher judicial authority. It may be appealed to a higher court at the instance of the
aggrieved party either the offended party or the employer by writ of error seeking
review of questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, or through a petition

for review on certiorari, limited to a consideration only of questions of law. Or

review may be sought by the institution of a special civil action of certiorari, upon
the theory that the determination was made by the trial court without or in excess of
its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.

[30]

G.R. No. 84516 December 5, 1989

DIONISIO CARPIO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SERGIO DOROJA, (Presiding Judge, MTC, Branch IV, Zamboanga City) and EDWIN
RAMIREZ Y WEE,respondents.
Sometime on October 23, 1985, accused-respondent Edwin Ramirez, while driving a passenger Fuso
Jitney owned and operated by Eduardo Toribio, bumped Dionisio Carpio, a pedestrian crossing the
street, as a consequence of which the latter suffered from a fractured left clavicle as reflected in the
medico-legal certificate and sustained injuries which required medical attention for a period of (3)
three months.
Edwin Ramirez was convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Less Serious Physical
Injuries
Thereafter, a writ of execution dated March 10, 1988 was duly served upon the accused but was,
however, returned unsatisfied due to the insolvency of the accused as shown by the sheriffs return.
Thus, complainant moved for a subsidiary writ of execution against the subsidiary liability of the
owner-operator of the vehicle. The same was denied by the trial court on the ground that, namely, the
decision of the appellate court made no mention of the subsidiary liability of Eduardo Toribio
Issue: whether or not the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be enforced in the same
criminal proceeding against the driver where the award was given, or in a separate civil action.
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the next
preceding article shall apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind
of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in
the discharge of their duties.

In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil liability in the criminal
action, it should be shown (1) that the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of industry, (2) that the
employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties and (3) that he is insolvent.
The subsidiary liability of the employer, however, arises only after conviction of the employee in the
criminal action. All these requisites present, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon
the employee's conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency.

G.R. No. L-25913

February 29, 1969

HEIRS OF RAYMUNDO CASTRO, petitioners,

vs.
APOLONIO BUSTOS, respondent.
Facts:

Respondent Apolonio Bustos was charged in the Court of First Instance of

Pampanga on October 26, 1962 with the crime of murder for the killing of
Raymundo Castro whose heirs are now the petitioners.
Issue: what civil liability arising from delict includes
Held:
"every person criminally liable for a felony is also civily liable." (Art. 100,
Revised Penal Code). This civil liability, in case the felony involves death,
includes indemnification for consequential damages (Art. 104, id.) and said
consequential damages in turn include "... those suffered by his family or by
a third person by reason of the crime."
the claim for damages that are recoverable in cases of death caused by a crime is brought either in the
criminal proceeding itself or in a separate civil action. In the instant case, recovery of such damages is
being sought in the criminal proceedings, but even if it were claimed otherwise, the indemnity and
damages would be the same, for generally, the items of damages are identical in both procedures, except

with respect to attorneys fees and expenses of litigation which can be awarded only when a separate civil
action is instituted (Art. 2208, Civil Code).
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.

Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof
on June 19, 1991. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992
at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest . Consequently, the
Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the
appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to
Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accusedappellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense
charged. The Solicitor General insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the
purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is
based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor
General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending
appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties.
Issue:
Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?

Held: From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. "the death of the accused prior

to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising
from and based solely on the offense committed.
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if
the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article
1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the
civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or
the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same
is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.