Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
1. Donald Kwok vs. Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation April 28, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent corporation for the recovery of accumulated
vacation and sick leave credits before the NLRC. Petitioner clung to the verbal contract with Mr. Lim,
the President of the respondent corporation and his father-in-law for his claims. Petitioner obtained
favorable judgment. In their appeal, respondent averred that the position the petition held was not
entitled cash conversions of vacation and sick leave credits. The decision of the Labor Arbiter was
reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the reversed decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the verbal contract in favor of petitioner is valid.
RULING:
NO. It is true that for a contract to be binding on the parties thereto, it need not be in writing unless
the law requires that such contract be in some form in order that it may be valid or enforceable or that
it be executed in a certain way, in which case that requirement is absolute and independent. (Art.
1356, NCC) But the court disbelieved petitioners testimony and gave credence and probative weight
to the collective testimonies of the employees and officers of the respondent corporation, including
Mr. Lim, whom the petitioner presented as a hostile witness. Even assuming that the petitioner was
entitled of such benefits, there was no record to show the record of absences to arrive at the actual
number of leave credits. There was no conformity of such agreement with the Board and if so, such
claim was already barred by prescription under Article 291 of the Labor Code.
Facts: Claiming financial losses, Linton implemented a compressed workweek by reducing from six
to three the number of working days with the employees working on a rotation basis.
Issue: Was there an illegal reduction of work hours?
Held: In Philippine Graphic Arts, Inc. v. NLRC, the Court upheld for the validity of the reduction of
working hours, taking into consideration the following: the arrangement was temporary, it was a
more humane solution instead of a retrenchment of personnel, there was notice and consultations
with the workers and supervisors, a consensus were reached on how to deal with deteriorating
economic conditions and it was sufficiently proven that the company was suffering from losses. The
Bureau of Working Conditions of the DOLE released a bulletin which states that a reduction of the
number of regular working days is valid where the arrangement is resorted to by the employer to
prevent serious losses due to causes beyond his control, such as when there is a substantial slump in
the demand for his goods or services or when there is lack of raw materials. Although the bulletin
stands more as a set of directory guidelines than a binding set of implementing rules, it has one main
consideration, consistent with the ruling in Philippine Graphic Arts Inc., in determining the validity of
CTATM
2 | L a b o r L a w 1 C a s e D i g e s t ( 4 t h B ATC H )
reduction of working hours that the company was suffering from losses. A close examination of
petitioners financial reports showed that while Linton suffered from losses for that year, there
remained enough earnings to sufficiently sustain its operations. Financial losses must be shown
before a company can validly opt to reduce the work hours of its employees. However, to date, no
definite guidelines have yet been set to determine whether the alleged losses are sufficient to justify
the reduction of work hours. If the standards set in determining the justifiability of financial losses in
retrenchment (Art 283) or suspension of work (Art 286) were to be considered, Arco would fail to
meet the standards. On the one hand, Article 286 applies only when there is a bona fide suspension of
the employers operation of a business or undertaking for a period not exceeding six (6) months; but
in this case, Linton continued its business operations during the effectivity of the compressed
workweek, which was more than 6 months. On the other hand, for retrenchment to be justified, any
claim of actual or potential business losses must satisfy the following standards: (1) the losses
incurred are substantial and not de minimis; (2) the losses are actual or reasonably imminent; (3)
retrenchment is reasonably necessary and is likely tobe effective in preventing expected losses; and
(4) the alleged losses, if already incurred, or the expected imminent losses sought to be forestalled, are
proven by sufficient and convincing evidence. Linton failed to comply with these standards.
Facts: Tryco Pharma Corp. is a manufacturer of veterinary medicines. Tryco and BMT (rank-in-file
union) signed separate MOA, providing for a compressed workweek. The MOA was entered into
pursuant to DO No. 21, Series of 1990, Guidelines on the Implementation of Compressed Workweek.
As provided in the MOA, 8:00 a.m. to 6:12 p.m., from Monday to Friday, shall be considered as the
regular working hours, and no overtime pay shall be due and payable to the employee for work
rendered during those hours. However, should an employee be permitted or required to work beyond
6:12 p.m., such employee shall be entitled to overtime pay. Tryco informed the BWC of the DOLE of
the implementation of a compressed workweek in the company. Meantime, Tryco received a Letter
from the Bureau of Animal Industry of the Department of Agriculture reminding it that its production
should be conducted in San Rafael, Bulacan, not in its main office in Caloocan City. The concerned
employees were directed to report at the companys plant site. BMT opposed the transfer of its
members to San Rafael, Bulacan, contending that it constitutes unfair labor practice. In protest, BMT
declared a strike, claiming that the transfer was inconvenient and amounts to ULP.
Issue: Is Tryco guilty of unair labor practice?
Held: Absent any evidence that the Bureau of Animal Industry conspired with Tryco, the allegation is
not only highly irresponsible but is grossly unfair to the government agency concerned. The transfer
of its production activities to San Rafael, Bulacan, regardless of whether it was made pursuant to the
letter of the Bureau of Animal Industry, was within the scope of its inherent right to control and
manage its enterprise effectively. Managements prerogative of transferring and reassigning
employees from one area of operation to another in order to meet the requirements of the business is,
therefore, generally not constitutive of constructive dismissal. Indisputably, in the instant case, the
CTATM
3 | L a b o r L a w 1 C a s e D i g e s t ( 4 t h B ATC H )
transfer orders do not entail a demotion in rank or diminution of salaries, benefits and other
privileges of the petitioners. Mere incidental inconvenience is not sufficient to warrant a claim of
constructive dismissal. Personal inconvenience or hardship that will be caused to the employee by
reason of the transfer is not a valid reason to disobey an order of transfer.Moreover, the adoption of a
compressed workweek scheme in the company will help temper any inconvenience that will be caused
the petitioners by their transfer to a farther workplace.
The transfer orders do not amount to ULP. Contrary to BMTs claim, mere transfer of its members
will not paralyze and render the union ineffective. The union was not deprived of the membership of
the petitioners whose work assignments were only transferred to another location. There was no
showing or any indication that the transfer orders were motivated by an intention to interfere with the
petitioners right to organize. The MOA is enforceable and binding against the petitioners (esp. waiver
of overtime). Where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full
understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and
reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. Notably, the MOA
complied with the following conditions set by the DOLE, under D.O. No. 21.
4 | L a b o r L a w 1 C a s e D i g e s t ( 4 t h B ATC H )
the status of Roa, he is considered a regular employee of the hotel since his job was in
furtherance of the restaurant business of the hotel. Granting that Roa was initially a
contractual employee, by the sheer length of service he had rendered for the company, he had
been converted into a regular employee.
CA held that the dismissal was due to retrenchment in order to avoid or minimize business
losses, which is recognized by law under Art. 283 of the Labor Code.
ISSUES:
- WON there was employer-employee relationship between the two, and if so,
- WON Roa was validly terminated
RULING:
- YES. Employer-employee relationship existed between the parties.
o Roa was undeniably employed as a pianist of the restaurant. The hotel wielded the
power of selection at the time it entered into the service contract dated Sept. 1, 1992 with
Roa. The hotel could not seek refuge behind the service contract entered into with Roa.
It is the law that defines and governs an employment relationship, whose terms are not
restricted to those fixed in the written contract, for other factors, like the nature of the
work the employee has been called upon to perform, are also considered.
o The law affords protection to an employee, and does not countenance any attempt to
subvert its spirit and intent. Any stipulation in writing can be ignored when the
employer utilizes the stipulation to deprive the employee of his security of tenure. The
inequality that characterizes employer-employee relationship generally tips
the scales in favor of the employer, such that the employee is often scarcely
provided real and better options.
o The argument that Roa was receiving talent fee and not salary is baseless. There is no
denying that the remuneration denominated as talent fees was fixed on the basis of his
talent, skill, and the quality of music he played during the hours of his performance.
Roas remuneration, albeit denominated as talent fees, was still considered as included
in the term wage in the sense and context of the Labor Code, regardless of how
petitioner chose to designate the remuneration, as per Article 97(f) of the Labor Code.
o The power of the employer to control the work of the employee is considered the most
significant determinant of the existence of an employer-employee relationship. This is
the so-called control test, and is premised on whether the person for whom the
services are performed reserves the right to control both the end achieved and the
manner and means used to achieve that end.
o Lastly, petitioner claims that it had no power to dismiss respondent due to his not being
even subject to its Code of Discipline, and that the power to terminate the working
relationship was mutually vested in the parties, in that either party might terminate at
will, with or without cause. This claim is contrary to the records. Indeed, the
memorandum informing respondent of the discountinuance of his service because of the
financial condition of petitioner showed the latter had the power to dismiss him from
employment.
- NO. Roa was not validly terminated.
o The conclusion that Roas termination was by reason of retrenchment due to an
authorized cause under the labor Code is inevitable.
o Retrenchment is one of the authorized causes for the dismissal of employees recognized
by the Labor Code. It is a management prerogative resorted to by employers to avoid ro
to minimize business losses. On this matter, Article 283 of the Labor Code states:
CTATM
5 | L a b o r L a w 1 C a s e D i g e s t ( 4 t h B ATC H )
Petition denied.
5. Hilario Rada vs. NLRC, January 9, 1992
205 SCRA 69 Labor Law Labor Standards Hours of Work OT Pay of a Project Based
Employee
In 1977, Hilario Rada was contracted by Philnor Consultants and Planners, Inc as a driver. He was
assigned to a specific project in Manila. The contract he signed was for 2.3 years. His task was to drive
employees to the project from 7am to 4pm. He was allowed to bring home the company vehicle in
order to provide a timely transportation service to the other project workers. The project he was
assigned to was not completed as scheduled hence, since he has a satisfactory record, he was recontracted for an additional 10 months. After 10 months the project was not yet completed. Several
contracts thereafter were made until the project was finished in 1985.
At the completion of the project, Rada was terminated as his employment was co-terminous with the
project. He later sued Philnor for non payment of separation pay and overtime pay. He said he is
CTATM
6 | L a b o r L a w 1 C a s e D i g e s t ( 4 t h B ATC H )
entitled to be paid OT pay because he uses extra time to get to the project site from his home and from
the project site to his home everyday in total, he spends an average of 3 hours OT every day.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rada is entitled to separation pay and OT pay.
HELD: Separation pay NO. Overtime pay Yes.
Separation Pay
The SC ruled that Rada was a project employee whose work was coterminous with the project for
which he was hired. Project employees, as distinguished from regular or non-project employees, are
mentioned in Section 281 of the Labor Code as those where the employment has been fixed for a
specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the
time of the engagement of the employee.
Project employees are not entitled to termination pay if they are terminated as a result of the
completion of the project or any phase thereof in which they are employed, regardless of the number
of projects in which they have been employed by a particular construction company. Moreover, the
company is not required to obtain clearance from the Secretary of Labor in connection with such
termination.
OT Pay
Rada is entitled to OT pay. The fact that he picks up employees of Philnor at certain specified points
along EDSA in going to the project site and drops them off at the same points on his way back from
the field office going home to Marikina, Metro Manila is not merely incidental to Radas job as a
driver. On the contrary, said transportation arrangement had been adopted, not so much for the
convenience of the employees, but primarily for the benefit of Philnor. As embodied in Philnors
memorandum, they allowed their drivers to bring home their transport vehicles in order for them to
provide a timely transport service and to avoid delay not really so that the drivers could enjoy the
benefits of the company vehicles nor for them to save on fair.
6. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company vs. Lepanto Local Staff Union, August 20,
2008
Facts:
7 | L a b o r L a w 1 C a s e D i g e s t ( 4 t h B ATC H )
However, for overtime work, which extends beyond the regular day shift (7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.),
there [will] be no night differential pay added before the overtime pay is calculated.
During the effectivity of the first three CBAs, petitioner paid night shift differentials to other
workers who were members of respondent for work performed beyond 3:00 p.m. Petitioner also paid
night shift differential for work beyond 3:00 p.m. during the effectivity of the 4th CBA. However,
petitioner alleges that the payment of night shift differential for work performed beyond 3:00 p.m.
during the 4th CBA was a mistake on the part of its accounting department.
Respondent Union filed a complaint with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board,
alleging that petitioner failed to pay the night shift differential and longevity pay of respondents
members as provided in the 4th CBA. Petitioner and respondent failed to amicably settle the dispute
so they agreed to submit the issue to a voluntary arbitrator (VA).
VA ruled in favor of respondent (Union) that the inclusion of paragraph 3, Section 3, Article
VIII of the 4th CBA disclosed the intent of the parties to grant night shift differential benefits to
employees who rendered work beyond the regular day shift. The Voluntary Arbitrator ruled that if the
intention were otherwise, paragraph 3 would have been deleted.
CA affirmed VA and held that petitioners act disclosed the parties intent to include employees
in the second shift in the payment of night shift differential.
Issue:
The issue is whether workers are entitled to night shift differential for work performed beyond
the regular day shift, from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.
Held.
CTATM
8 | L a b o r L a w 1 C a s e D i g e s t ( 4 t h B ATC H )
YES. SC affirmed CA. The first paragraph of Section 3 provides that petitioner shall continue to
pay night shift differential to workers of the first and third shifts. It does not provide that workers who
performed work beyond the second shift shall not be entitled to night shift differential. The inclusion
of the third paragraph is not intended to exclude the regular day shift workers from receiving night
shift differential for work performed beyond 3:00 p.m. It only provides that the night shift differential
pay shall be excluded in the computation of the overtime pay.
The CA correctly ruled that petitioner failed to present any convincing evidence to prove that
the payment was erroneous. In fact, the Court of Appeals found that even after the promulgation of
the Voluntary Arbitrators decision and while the case was pending appeal, petitioner still paid night
shift differential for work performed beyond 3:00 p.m. It affirms the intention of the parties to the
CBA to grant night shift differential for work performed beyond 3:00 p.m.
Doctrines:
The terms and conditions of a collective bargaining contract constitute the law between the
parties. If the terms of the CBA are clear and have no doubt upon the intention of the contracting
parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall prevail.
In order to ascertain the intention of the contracting parties, the Voluntary Arbitrator shall
principally consider their contemporaneous and subsequent acts as well as their negotiating and
contractual history and evidence of past practices.
7. Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc. vs. Antonio Bautista, May 16, 2005
458 SCRA 578 Labor Law Labor Standards Service Incentive Leave Pay Curious Animal
Doctrine
Antonio Bautista was employed by Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc. in May 1995. He was assigned to
the Isabela-Manila route and he was paid by commission (7% of gross income per travel for twice a
month).
In January 2000, while he was driving his bus he bumped another bus owned by Auto Bus. He
claimed that he bumped the he accidentally bumped the bus as he was so tired and that he has not
slept for more than 24 hours because Auto Bus required him to return to Isabela immediately after
arriving at Manila. Damages were computed and 30% or P75,551.50 of it was being charged to
Bautista. Bautista refused payment.
Auto Bus terminated Bautista after due hearing as part of Auto Bus management prerogative.
Bautista sued Auto Bus for Illegal Dismissal. The Labor Arbiter Monroe Tabingan dismissed
Bautistas petition but ruled that Bautista is entitled to P78,117.87 13 th month pay payments and
P13,788.05 for his unpaid service incentive leave pay.
CTATM
9 | L a b o r L a w 1 C a s e D i g e s t ( 4 t h B ATC H )
The case was appealed before the National Labor Relations Commission. NLRC modified the LAs
ruling. It deleted the award for 13th Month pay. The court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC.
Auto Bus averred that Bautista is a commissioned employee and if that is not reason enough that
Bautista is also a field personnel hence he is not entitled to a service incentive leave. They invoke:
Art. 95. RIGHT TO SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE
(a) Every employee who has rendered at least one year of service shall be entitled to a yearly service
incentive leave of five days with pay.
Book III, Rule V: SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE
SECTION 1. Coverage. This rule shall apply to all employees except:
(d) Field personnel and other employees whose performance is unsupervised by the employer
including those who are engaged on task or contract basis, purely commission basis, or those who are
paid in a fixed amount for performing work irrespective of the time consumed in the performance
thereof; . . .
ISSUE: Whether or not Bautista is entitled to Service Incentive Leave. If he is, Whether or not the
three (3)-year prescriptive period provided under Article 291 of the Labor Code, as amended, is
applicable to respondents claim of service incentive leave pay.
HELD: Yes, Bautista is entitled to Service Incentive Leave. The Supreme Court emphasized that it
does not mean that just because an employee is paid on commission basis he is already barred to
receive service incentive leave pay.
The question actually boils down to whether or not Bautista is a field employee.
According to Article 82 of the Labor Code, field personnel shall refer to non-agricultural employees
who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the
employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.
As a general rule, field personnel are those whose performance of their job/service is not supervised
by the employer or his representative, the workplace being away from the principal office and whose
hours and days of work cannot be determined with reasonable certainty; hence, they are paid specific
amount for rendering specific service or performing specific work. If required to be at specific places
at specific times, employees including drivers cannot be said to be field personnel despite the fact
that they are performing work away from the principal office of the employee.
Certainly, Bautista is not a field employee. He has a specific route to traverse as a bus driver and that
is a specific place that he needs to be at work. There are inspectors hired by Auto Bus to constantly
check him. There are inspectors in bus stops who inspects the passengers, the punched tickets, and
the driver. Therefore he is definitely supervised though he is away from the Auto Bus main office.
On the other hand, the 3 year prescriptive period ran but Bautista was able to file his suit in time
before the prescriptive period expired. It was only upon his filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal,
one month from the time of his dismissal, that Bautista demanded from his former employer
commutation of his accumulated leave credits. His cause of action to claim the payment of his
accumulated service incentive leave thus accrued from the time when his employer dismissed him and
failed to pay his accumulated leave credits.
Therefore, the prescriptive period with respect to his claim for service incentive leave pay only
commenced from the time the employer failed to compensate his accumulated service incentive leave
pay at the time of his dismissal. Since Bautista had filed his money claim after only one month from
the time of his dismissal, necessarily, his money claim was filed within the prescriptive period
provided for by Article 291 of the Labor Code.
CTATM
10 | L a b o r L a w 1 C a s e D i g e s t ( 4 t h B A T C H )
The transfer of an employee involves a lateral movement within the business or operation of the
employer, without demotion in rank, diminution of benefits or, worse, suspension of employment
even if temporary. The recall and transfer of security guards require reassignment to another post and
are not equivalent to their placement on floating status. Off-detailing security guards for a reasonable
period of six months is justified only in bona fide cases of suspension of operation, business or
undertaking.
The Case
This is the rationale used by the Court in dismissing the two consolidated petitions
for certiorari before us, seeking the reversal of the Decision dated August 25, 1995, and the
Resolution date October 24, 1995, both promulgated by the National Labor Relations Commission [1] in
NLRC Case No. V-0317-94 (RAB VII-01-0097-94, RAB VII-020173-94, and RAB VII-01-0133-94).
In the action for illegal dismissal and payment of salary differential, service incentive leave pay
and separation pay filed by private respondents, Labor Arbiter Dominador A. Almirante rendered a
Decision, which disposed:[2]
WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] judgment is hereby rendered ordering xxx Sentinel Security
Agency, Inc. jointly and severally with xxx Philamlife, Cebu Branch, to pay complainants the total
amount of [s]ixty [t]housand [o]ne [h]undred [t]welve [p]esos and 50/100 (P60,112.50) in the
concept of 13th month pay and service incentive leave benefits as computed by our Labor Arbitration
Associate whose computation is hereto attached and forming part thereof. [3]
On appeal, the NLRC modified the labor arbiters Decision. The dispositive portion of the NLRC
Decision[4]reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED in so far as the award of 13 th month pay for
the previous years which is hereby excluded. Further, xxx Sentinel Security Agency, Inc. is hereby
ORDERED to pay complainants separation pay at the rate of month pay for every year of service and
for both xxx Philippine American Life Insurance, Inc. and Sentinel Security Agency, Inc. and/or
Daniel Iway to pay to the [complainants] jointly and severally their backwages from January 16, 1994
to January 15, 1995 and the corresponding 13th month pay for the said year. The monetary awards
CTATM
11 | L a b o r L a w 1 C a s e D i g e s t ( 4 t h B A T C H )
hereby granted are broken down as follows [into separation pay, back wages, 13 th month pay and
service incentive leave pay]:
x x x x x x x x x.[5]
The challenged Resolution denied reconsideration for lack of merit.[6]
The Facts
Respondent Commission ruled that the complainants were constructively dismissed, as the recall
of the complainants from their long time post[s] at [the premises of the Client] without any good
reason is a scheme to justify or camouflage illegal dismissal.
CTATM
12 | L a b o r L a w 1 C a s e D i g e s t ( 4 t h B A T C H )
It ruled Superstar Security Agency, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission [8] and A Prime
Security Services, Inc. vs. national Labor Relations Commission [9] were not applicable to the case at
bar. In the former, the security guard was placed on temporary off-detail due to his poor performance
and lack of elementary courtesy and tact, and to the cost-cutting program of the agency. In the latter,
the relief of the security guard was due to his sleeping while on duty and his repeated refusal to
resume work despite notice.
In the present case, the complainants case, the complainants were told by the Agency that they
lost their assignment at the Clients premises because they were already old, and not because they had
committed any infraction or irregularity. The NLRC applied RA 7641,[10] which gives retirement
benefits of one-half month pay per year of service to retirable employees, viz.:
xxx As stated earlier xxx, the complainants were in the service of [the Client] for nearly twenty (20)
years in the cases of Helcias Arroyo and for more than twenty (20) years in the cases of Veronico
Zambo and Rustico Andoy, which long years of service [appear] on record to be unblemished. The
complainants were then confronted with an impending sudden loss of earning for while the order of
[the Agency] to immediately report for reassignment momentarily gave them hope, there was in fact
no immediate reinstatement. While it could have been prudent for the complainants to wait, they
were set unstable and were actually threatened by the statement of the personnel in charge of [the
Agency] that they were already old, that was why they were replaced.
Against these glaring facts is the new Retirement Law, R.A. 7641 which took effect on January 7, 1993
giving retirement benefits of month pay per year of service to an employee upon reaching retirement
age to be paid by the employer, in this case at quiet a sizeable amount and in not so long due time as
some of the complainants were described as already old.
As complainants were illegally dismissed, the NLRC ruled that they were entitled to the twin
remedies of back wages for one (1) year from the time of their dismissal on January 15, 1994, payable
by both the Client and the Agency, and separation pay one-half month pay for every year of service
payable only by the Agency. Reinstatement was not granted due to the resulting antipathy and
resentment among the complainants, the Agency and the Client.
Hence, this petition.[11]
The Issues
CTATM
13 | L a b o r L a w 1 C a s e D i g e s t ( 4 t h B A T C H )
In sum, the resolution of these consolidated petitions hinges on (1) whether the complainants
were illegally dismissed, and (2) whether the Client is jointly and severally liable for their thirteenthmonth and service incentive leave pays.
The Courts Ruling
14 | L a b o r L a w 1 C a s e D i g e s t ( 4 t h B A T C H )
not given any. In fact, the contention of complainant is that the Agency constructively dismissed
them. Abandonment has recently been ruled to be incompatible with constructive dismissal. We, thus,
rule that complainants did not abandon their jobs. [17] We will now demonstrate why we believe
complainants were illegally dismissed.
In several cases, the Court has recognized the prerogative of management to transfer an employee
from one office to another within the same business establishment, as the exigency of the business
may require, provided that the said transfer does not result in a demotion in rank or a diminution in
salary, benefits and other privileges of the employee; [18] or is not unreasonable, inconvenient or
prejudicial to the latter;[19] or is not used as a subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an
undesirable worker.[20]
A transfer means a movement (1) from one position to another of equivalent rank, level or salary,
without a break in the service; [21] and (2) from one office to another within the same business
establishment.[22] It is distinguished from a promotion in the sense that it involves a lateral change as
opposed to a scalar ascent.[23]
In this case, transfer of the complainants implied more than a relief from duty to give them time
to rest a mere changing of the guards. Rather, their transfer connoted a reshuffling or exchange of
their posts, or their reassignment to other posts, such that no security guard would be without an
assignment.
However, this legally recognized concept of transfer was not implemented. The agency hired new
security guards to replace the complainants, resulting in a lack of posts to which the complainants
could have been reassigned. Thus, it refused to reassign Complainant Andoy when he reported for
duty on February 2, 4 and 7, 1994; and merely told the other complainants on various dates from
January 25 to 27, 1994 that they were already too old to be posted anywhere.
The Agency now explains that since, under the law, the Agency is given a period of not more than
six months to retain the complainants on floating status, the complaint for illegal dismissal is
premature.This contention is incorrect.
A floating status requires the dire exigency of the employers bona fide suspension of operation,
business or undertaking. In security services, this happens when the clients that do not renew their
contracts with a security agency are more than those that do and the new ones that the agency
gets. However, in the case at bar, the Agency was awarded a new contract by the Client. There was no
surplus of security guards over available assignments. If there were, it was because the Agency hired
new security guards. Thus, there was no suspension of operation, business or undertaking, bona fide
or not, that would have justified placing the complainants off-detail and making them wait for a
period of six months. If indeed they were merely transferred, there would have been no need to make
them wait for six months.
The only logical conclusion from the foregoing discussion is that the Agency illegally dismissed
the complainants. Hence, as a necessary consequence, the complainants are entitled to reinstatement
and back wages.[24] However, reinstatement is no longer feasible in this case. The Agency cannot
reassign them to the Client, as the former has recruited new security guards; the complainants, on the
other hand, refuse to accept other assignments.Verily, complainants do not pray for reinstatement; in
fact, they refused to be reinstated. Such refusal is indicative of strained relations. [25] Thus, separation
pay is awarded in lieu of reinstatement.[26]
Second Issue:
Clients Liability
CTATM
15 | L a b o r L a w 1 C a s e D i g e s t ( 4 t h B A T C H )
The Client did not, as it could not, illegally dismiss the complainants. Thus, it should not be held
liable for separation pay and back wages. But even if the Client is not responsible for the illegal
dismissal of the complainants, it is jointly and severally liable with the Agency for the complainants
service incentive leave pay. In Rosewood Processing, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission,
[27]
the Court explained that, notwithstanding the service contract between the client and the security
agency, the two are solidarily liable for the proper wages prescribed by the Labor Code, pursuant to
Article 106, 107 and 109 thereof, which we quote hereunder:
ART. 106. Contractor or subcontractor.Whenever an employer enters into a contract with another
person for the performance of the former[s] work, the employees of the contractor and of the latter[s]
subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in accordance
with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor or subcontractor
to such employees to the extent of the work performed under the contract, in the same manner and
extent that he is liable to employees directly employed by him.
The Secretary of Labor may, by appropriate regulations, restrict or prohibit the contracting out of
labor to protect the rights of workers established under this Code. In so prohibiting or restricting, he
may make appropriate distinctions between labor-only contracting and job contracting as well as
differentiations within these types of contracting and determine who among the parties involved shall
be considered the employer for purposes of this Code, to prevent any violation or circumvention of
any provision of this Code.
xxx In such cases [labor-only contracting], the person or intermediary shall be considered merely as
an agent of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if
the latter were directly employed by him.
ART. 107. Indirect employer.The provisions of the immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply
to any person, partnership, association or corporation which, not being an employer, contracts with
an independent contractor for the performance of any work, task, job or project.
ART. 109. Solidary liability.The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, every
employer or indirect employer shall be held responsible with his contractor or subcontractor for any
violation of any provision of this Code. For purpose of determining the extent of their civil liability
under this Chapter, they shall be considered as direct employers.
Under these provisions, the indirect employer, who is the Client in the case at bar, is jointly and
severally liable with the contractor for the workers wages, in the same manner and extent that it is
liable to its direct employees. This liability of the Client covers the payment of the service incentive
leave pay of the complainants during the time they were posted at the Cebu branch of the Client. As
service had been rendered, the liability accrued, even if the complainants were eventually transferred
or reassigned.
The service incentive leave is expressly granted by these pertinent provisions of the Labor Code:
ART. 95. Right to service incentive leave.(a) Every employee who has rendered at least one year of
service shall be entitled to a yearly service incentive leave of five days with pay.
(b) This provision shall not apply to those who are already enjoying the benefit herein provided, those
enjoying vacation leave with pay of at least five days and those employed in establishments regularly
CTATM
16 | L a b o r L a w 1 C a s e D i g e s t ( 4 t h B A T C H )
employing less than ten employees or in establishments exempted from granting this benefit by the
Secretary of Labor after considering the viability or financial condition of such establishment.
(c) The grant of benefit in excess of that provided herein shall not be made a subject of arbitration or
any court [or] admnistrative action.
Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code, an unused service incentive
leave is commutable to its money equivalent, viz.:
Sec. 5. Treatment of Banefit. - The service incentive leave shall be commutable to its money
equivalent if not used or exhausted at the end of the year.
The award of the thirteenth-month pay is deleted in view of the evidence presented by the Agency
that such claim has already been paid to the complainants. Obviously then, the award of such benefit
in the dispositive portion of the assailed Decision is merely an oversight, considering that Respondent
Commission itself deleted it from the main body of the said Decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are
hereby AFFIRMED, but the award of the thirteenth-month pay is DELETED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
9. JPL Marketing Promotions vs. Ca, NLRC, July 8, 2005
July 8, 2005
TINGA, J.:
CTATM
17 | L a b o r L a w 1 C a s e D i g e s t ( 4 t h B A T C H )
WON private respondents are entitled to separation pay, 13th month pay and service
incentive leave pay - YES
What should be the reckoning point for computing said awards. From the time the
employees severed their ties with JPL
ratio
18 | L a b o r L a w 1 C a s e D i g e s t ( 4 t h B A T C H )
Under Arts. 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, separation pay is authorized only in
cases of dismissals due to any of these reasons: (a) installation of labor saving
devices; (b) redundancy; (c) retrenchment; (d) cessation of the employer's
business; and (e) when the employee is suffering from a disease and his
continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health and to
the health of his coemployees.
As a measure of social justice in those cases where the employee is validly
dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his
moral character, but only when he was illegally dismissed
Under Sec. 4(b), Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules to Implement the
Labor Code that provides for the payment of separation pay to an employee
entitled to reinstatement but the establishment where he is to be reinstated has
closed or has ceased operations or his present position no longer exists at the
time of reinstatement for reasons not attributable to the employer.
The common denominator of the instances where payment of separation pay
is warranted is that the employee was dismissed by the employer.
In the instant case, there was no dismissal to speak of. Private respondents
were simply not dismissed at all, whether legally or illegally. What they received
from JPL was not a notice of termination of employment, but a memo informing
them of the termination of CMCs contract with JPL. More importantly, they
were advised that they were to be reassigned. At that time, there was no
severance of employment to speak of.
(MAIN TOPIC)
Furthermore, Art. 286 of the Labor Code allows the bona fide suspension of the
operation of a business or undertaking for a period not exceeding six 6 months,
wherein an employee/employees are placed on the socalled floating status.
When that floating status of an employee lasts for more than six months, he may
be considered to have been illegally dismissed from the service. Thus, he is entitled
to the corresponding benefits for his separation, and this would apply to
suspension either of the entire business or of a specific component thereof.
As clearly borne out by the records of this case, private respondents sought
employment from other establishments even before the expiration of the six (6) month period provided by law. As they admitted in their comment, all three of
them applied for and were employed by another establishment after they received
the notice from JPL.
JPL did not terminate their employment; they themselves severed their relations
with JPL. Thus, they are not entitled to separation pay.
The Court is not inclined in this case to award separation pay even on the
ground of compassionate justice.
The Court of Appeals relied on the cases wherein the Court awarded separation
pay to legally dismissed employees on the grounds of equity and social
consideration.
CTATM
19 | L a b o r L a w 1 C a s e D i g e s t ( 4 t h B A T C H )
Nonetheless, JPL cannot escape the payment of 13th month pay and service
incentive leave pay to private respondents. Said benefits are mandated by law and
should be given to employees as a matter of right.
They were not given their 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay
while they were under the employ of JPL. Instead, JPL provided salaries which
were over and above the minimum wage.
The Court rules that the difference between the minimum wage and the actual
salary received by private respondents cannot be deemed as their 13th month pay
and service incentive leave pay as such difference is not equivalent to or of
the same import as the said benefits contemplated by law.
The computation for both benefits should only be up to 15 August 1996,
or the last day that private respondents worked for JPL.
To extend the period to the date of finality of the NLRC resolution would
negate the absence of illegal dismissal, or to be more precise, the want of
dismissal in this case. Besides, it would be unfair to require JPL to pay
private respondents the said benefits beyond 15 August 1996 when
they did not render any service to JPL beyond that date.
10.
National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority vs. NWSA
Consolidated Union, August 31, 1964
20 | L a b o r L a w 1 C a s e D i g e s t ( 4 t h B A T C H )
ISSUE: Whether the intervenors are managerial employees within the meaning of
Republic Act 2377 and, therefore, not entitled to the benefits of Commonwealth Act No.
444, as amended;
HELD: NO.
Section 2 of Republic Act 2377 provides.
Sec. 2.This Act shall apply to all persons employed in any industry or occupation,
whether public or private, with the exception of farm laborers, laborers who prefer to be
paid on piece work basis, managerial employees outside sales personnel, domestic
servants persons in the personal service of another and members of the family of the
employer working for him.
The term managerial employee in this Act shall mean either (a) any person whose
primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which he is employed
or of a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof, or (b) any officer or
member of the managerial staff.
One of the distinguishing characteristics by which a managerial employee may be known
as expressed in the explanatory note of Republic Act No. 2377 is that he is not subject to
the rigid observance of regular office hours. The true worth of his service does not
depend so much on the time he spends in office but more on the results he
accomplishes. In fact, he is free to go out of office anytime.
NON-MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES COVERED BY COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 444.
Employees who have little freedom of action and whose main function is merely to
carry out the companys orders, plans and policies, are not managerial employees and
hence are covered by Commonwealth Act No. 444.
The philosophy behind the exemption of managerial employees from the 8-Hour Labor
Law is that such workers are not usually employed for every hour of work but their
compensation is determined considering their special training, experience or knowledge
which requires the exercise of discretion and independent judgment, or perform work
related to management policies or general business operations along specialized or
technical lines. For these workers it is not feasible to provide a fixed hourly rate of pay
or maximum hours of labor.
The intervenors herein are holding position of responsibility. One of them is the
Secretary of the Board of Directors. Another is the private secretary of the general
manager. Another is a public relations officer, and many chiefs of divisions or sections
and others are supervisors and overseers. Respondent court, however, after examining
carefully their respective functions, duties and responsibilities found that their primary
duties do not bear any direct relation with the management of the NAWASA, nor do
they participate in the formulation of its policies nor in the hiring and firing of its
employees. The chiefs of divisions and sections are given ready policies to execute and
standard practices to observe for their execution. Hence, it concludes, they have little
freedom of action, as their main function is merely to carry out the companys orders,
plans and policies.
21 | L a b o r L a w 1 C a s e D i g e s t ( 4 t h B A T C H )
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari filed by the petitioner seeking to
annul the decision of the labor arbiter and the resolution of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) (Third Division, Quezon City) finding that petitioner
illegally dismissed private respondent Renato Siojo from his employment. The labor
arbiter ordered petitioner to pay Siojo the unexpired portion of his contract equivalent
to three months salaries and attorneys fees. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision
of the labor arbiter and later dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The relevant facts are as follows:
Sometime in January 1994, private respondent Renato Siojo was hired as a Second
Officer of Stolt Falcon, a vessel of petitioner Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services, Inc., for a
period of nine months with a basic salary of US$1,024.00. He boarded the vessel on
February 22, 1994, and immediately commenced to discharge his duties and
responsibilities as Second Officer. After working for just two months, however, he was
sent home and it was only upon his arrival in Manila that he learned of the reason for
his termination.
For its part, petitioner claimed that after a month on board the Stolt Falcon, Siojo
started committing acts of gross insubordination towards his superiors by refusing to
communicate with them with regard to navigation, safety, and cargo. He also allegedly
failed to acknowledge or relay to the relieving personnel/officer any bride night order
and wilfully refused to take part in cargo operations. Furthermore, on at least three
occasions, he refused to wear his safety hat during mooring and unmooring, in violation
of the companys safety procedures.
It was also alleged that Siojo refused to follow instructions given by the Chief Officer
regarding cargo operations and did not read the Cargo Safety Data Sheets, such that , on
one occasion, he blew the lines against a closed shore connection valve resulting in the
spillage of 100 litters of cargo into the deck air compressor tank.
Thus, on March 28, 1994, Siojo was summoned to explain his attitude to the master
of the vessel. He, however, allegedly became very agitated and rude, stating that he
should not be made to sign any statement. Convinced that Siojos acts of insubordination
and hostile attitude were prejudicial to the safety and operations of the vessel, and
finding that he failed to perform his duty as deck officer as confirmed by his
unsatisfactory ratings, his superiors recommended his discharge.
On the other hand, Siojo insisted that all the acts imputed to him were fabricated by
petitioner in order to avoid its liability for his illegal dismissal. In support of his
allegations, Siojo submitted photocopies of the ships logbook for the period March 25 to
April 11, 1994, showing that there was no report of any offense or violation of company
rules he had supposedly committed. He pointed out that the logbook had no entries of
the infractions he allegedly committed on March 27 and 28, 1994, respectively.
On June 21, 1996, Labor Arbiter Manuel Caday ruled that Siojo was dismissed
without just cause and without being accorded due process. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
CTATM
22 | L a b o r L a w 1 C a s e D i g e s t ( 4 t h B A T C H )
23 | L a b o r L a w 1 C a s e D i g e s t ( 4 t h B A T C H )
representing the day and the second digit, the month. In any case, the Philippine Consul
General in Rotterdam would not have authenticated the documents if they were indeed
anomalous or irregular.
On this point, it should be observed that the entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. This means that such evidence is satisfactory only if they are
uncontradicted by contrary evidence. In the case at bar, the employee refuted the
authenticity of the notices of investigation and termination, presenting for his part
photocopies of certain pages of the vessels logbook showing that there was, in fact, no
record of the violations he was accused of.
Furthermore, the labor arbiters finding that 3/5/94 meant March 5, 1994, not May
3, 1994, is logical since the documents were authenticated by Philippine consular
officials whose customary manner of writing dates in numbers is by making the first
digit represent the month, the second digit the day, and the last digits the year. Second,
petitioner could have presented other evidence to support its allegation that the
documents were indeed authenticated on May 3, 1994, but it did not. It is a basic rule in
evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation. [4] While technical rules
are not strictly followed in the NLRC, this does not mean that the rules on proving
allegations are entirely dispensed with. Bare allegations are not enough; these must be
supported by substantial evidence at the very least.
Petitioner further asserts that even assuming that Siojo was not afforded the
opportunity to explain his side, his discharge was not thereby rendered illegal since
there was just cause for his removal, that is, gross insubordination. In support of this
argument, petitioner relies on the ruling in Wenphil Corp. vs. NLRC[5], as reiterated
in Cathedral School of Technology vs. NLRC,[6] where it was held that an employee who
was dismissed for just cause but was not given an notice and hearing is not entitled to
reinstatement and back wages. In such case, the employer should be made to pay an
indemnity for his failure to observe the requirements of due process.
The rule is well established that in termination cases, the burden of proving just and
valid cause for dismissing an employee rests on the employer and his failure to do so
shall result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified. [7] In the present case, petitioner
failed to prove by substantial evidence that Siojo indeed committed acts of
insubordination which would warrant his dismissal. Its reliance on Wenphilis, therefore,
misplaced since in that case, there was just cause for the employees dismissal.
Article 277 of the Labor Code provides, inter alia:
(a) xxx xxx xxx"
"(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their
right to be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause
and notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the
worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice
containing a statement of causes for termination and shall afford the latter
ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with assistance of his
CTATM
24 | L a b o r L a w 1 C a s e D i g e s t ( 4 t h B A T C H )
CTATM
25 | L a b o r L a w 1 C a s e D i g e s t ( 4 t h B A T C H )
Facts
Canoy and Pigcaulan were both employed by SCII as security guards and were
assigned to SCIIs different clients. Subsequently, however, Canoy and Pigcaulan filed
with the Labor Arbiter separate complaints for underpayment of salaries and nonpayment of overtime, holiday, rest day, service incentive leave and 13th month
pays. Respondents, however, maintained that Canoy and Pigcaulan were paid their just
salaries and other benefits under the law; that the salaries they received were above the
statutory minimum wage and the rates provided by the Philippine Association of
Detective and Protective Agency Operators (PADPAO) for security guards; that their
holiday pay were already included in the computation of their monthly salaries; that
they were paid additional premium of 30% in addition to their basic salary whenever
they were required to work on Sundays and 200% of their salary for work done on
holidays; and, that Canoy and Pigcaulan were paid the corresponding 13 th month pay for
the years 1998 and 1999. Labor arbiter favored to the Petitioner and NLRC affirmed the
decision of the labor arbiter. Respondent appeal to the Court of Appeals set aside the
ruling of the NLRC and Labor Arbiter. Hence, the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari.
Issues
Ruling
The Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached to the
petition was executed by Pigcaulan alone, it was plainly and particularly indicated under
the name of the lawyer who prepared the same, Atty. Josefel P. Grageda, that he is
the Counsel for Petitioner Adbuljuahid Pigcaulan only. In view of these, there is
therefore, no doubt, that the petition was brought only on behalf of Pigcaulan. Since no
appeal from the CA Decision was brought by Canoy, same has already become final and
executory as to him. Canoy failed to show any reasonable cause for his failure to join
Pigcaulan to personally sign the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. It is his duty, as
a litigant, to be prudent in pursuing his claims against SCII, especially so, if he was
indeed suffering from financial distress.
The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC erred in this regard. The handwritten itemized
CTATM
26 | L a b o r L a w 1 C a s e D i g e s t ( 4 t h B A T C H )
FACTS:
A case was filed against CIT by, Panfilo Canete, et al., teachers of CIT, for non-payment
of: a) cost of living allowances (COLA) under Pres. Dec. Nos. 525, 1123, 1614, 1678 and
1713, b) thirteenth (13th) month pay differentials and c) service incentive leave. CIT
maintained that it had paid the allowances mandated by various decrees but the same
had been integrated in the teacher's hourly rate. It alleged that the payment of COLA by
way of salary increases is in line with Pres. Dec. No. 451. It also claimed in its position
paper that it had paid thirteenth month pay to its employees and that it was exempt
from the payment of service incentive leave to its teachers who were employed on
contract basis. Minister of Labor and Employment issued the assailed Order and held
that the basic hourly rate designated in the Teachers' Program is regarded as the basic
CTATM
27 | L a b o r L a w 1 C a s e D i g e s t ( 4 t h B A T C H )
hourly rate of teachers exclusive of the COLA, and that COLA should not be taken from
the 60% incremental proceeds of the approved increase in tuition fee.
In a nutshell, the present controversy was precipitated by the claims of some school
personnel for allowances and other benefits and the refusal of the private schools
concerned to pay said allowances and benefits on the ground that said items should be
deemed included in the salary increases they had paid out of the 60% portion of the
proceeds from tuition fee increases provided for in section 3 (a) of Pres. Decree No. 451.
Petitioner assails the aforesaid Order in this Special Civil Action of certiorari with
Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order. The Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order on December 7, 1981 against the enforcement of the questioned
Order of the Minister of Labor and Employment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not allowances and other fringe benefits of employees may be charged
against the 60% portion of the incremental proceeds provided for in sec. 3(a) of Pres.
Dec. No. 451.
RESOLUTION:
This Court has consistently held, beginning with the University of the East case, that if
the schools have no resources other than those derived from tuition fee increases,
allowances and benefits should be charged against the proceeds of tuition fee increases
which the law allows for return on investments under section 3(a) of Pres. Dec. No. 451,
therefore, not against the 60% portion allocated for increases in salaries and wages.
28 | L a b o r L a w 1 C a s e D i g e s t ( 4 t h B A T C H )
While coming to the aid of the private school system by simplifying the procedure for
increasing tuition fees, the Decree imposes as a condition for the approval of any such
increase in fees, the allocation of 60% of the incremental proceeds thereof, to increases
in salaries or wages of school personnel. This condition makes for a quid pro quo of the
approval of any tuition fee hike by a school, thereby assuring the school personnel
concerned, of a share in its proceeds. The condition having been imposed to attain one
of the main objectives of the Decree, which is to help the school personnel cope with the
increasing costs of living, the same cannot be interpreted in a sense that would diminish
the benefit granted said personnel.
29 | L a b o r L a w 1 C a s e D i g e s t ( 4 t h B A T C H )
Issue: Whether or not the monthly pay of the covered employees already includes what
Article 94 of the Labor Code requires as regular holiday pay benefit in the amount of his
regular daily wage.
Held: In excluding the union members the benefits of the holiday pay law, public
respondent predicated his ruling on Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Rules to
implement Article 94 of the Labor Code promulgated by the then Secretary of Labor and
Policy Instructions No. 9. In Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union
(IBAAEU) vs. Inciong, this Court's Second Division, speaking through former Justice
Makasiar, expressed the view and declared that the section and interpretative bulletin
are null and void, having been promulgated by the then Secretary of Labor in excess of
his rule-making authority. The questioned Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated
Rules and the Secretary's Policy Instruction No. 9 add another excluded group, namely,
'employees who are uniformly paid by the month'. While the additional exclusion is only
in the form of a presumption that all monthly paid employees have already been paid
holiday pay, it constitutes a taking away or a deprivation which must be in the law if it is
to be valid. An administrative interpretation which diminishes the benefits of labor
more than what the statute delimits or withholds is obviously ultra vires. Ruled in favor
of the petitioners. Presidential Executive Assistant and the Acting Secretary of labor are
set aside, and the award of the Arbitrator reinstated.
FACTS:
The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), through Undersecretary
Cresenciano B. Trajano, issued an Explanatory Bulletin, wherein it clarified, that
employees are entitled to 200% of their basic wage, which, apart from being Good
Friday, and, therefore, a legal holiday, is also Araw ng Kagitingan, which is also a legal
holiday, even if unworked. Despite the explanatory bulletin, petitioner Asian
Transmission Corporation opted to pay its daily paid employees only 100% of their basic
pay. Respondent Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATLU) protested. In
accordance with Step 6 of the grievance procedure of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement existing between petitioner and BATLU, the controversy was submitted for
voluntary arbitration. The Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision
directing petitioner to pay its covered employees "200% and not just 100% of their
regular daily wages for the unworked.
In deciding in favor of the Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATLU),
the Voluntary Arbitrator held that Article 94 of the Labor Code provides for holiday pay
for every regular holiday, the computation of which is determined by a legal formula
which is not changed by the fact that there are two holidays falling on one day; and that
that the law, as amended, enumerates 12 regular holidays for every year, and should not
CTATM
30 | L a b o r L a w 1 C a s e D i g e s t ( 4 t h B A T C H )
31 | L a b o r L a w 1 C a s e D i g e s t ( 4 t h B A T C H )
In any event, Art. 4 of the Labor Code provide that all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of its provisions, including its implementing rules
and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor. For the working mans welfare
should be the primordial and paramount consideration. Moreover, Sec. 11, Rule IV,
Book III of the Omnibus Rules to Implement the Labor Code provides that "Nothing in
the law or the rules shall justify an employer in withdrawing or reducing any benefits,
supplements or payments for unworked regular holidays as provided in existing
individual or collective agreement or employer practice or policy. From the pertinent
provisions of the CBA entered into by the parties, petitioner had obligated itself to pay
for the legal holidays as required by law.
CTATM