BELGICA VS OCHOA

FACTS
In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary
funds of Members of the Legislature funds under the Priority Development Assistance Fund to
the Presidential Pork Barrel under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
2013, the (NBI) began its probe into allegations that the government has been defrauded of
some P10 Billion using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government
agencies for scores of ghost projects. The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of 6
whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation had swindled billions of pesos from the
public coffers for "ghost projects" using 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade. As for the
Presidential Pork Barrel, whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the
operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform
beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Following the expose, private petitioners filed
petitions of Certiorari, Prohibition with Prayer for the Immediate Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction and a cease and desist order be
issued restraining the Corresponding Respondents from releasing such funds and declare both
the for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executives lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and
void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and
justiciable controversy?
2. Whether or not the issues raised in the consolidated petitions subject to judicial review?
HELD
Yes, there exist as an actual and justiciable controversy. Jurisprudence provides that an
actual case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute. The requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of "ripeness," a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has
had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic
positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System. Also, the consolidated
cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for they
are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to
petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
Yes, the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are subject to judicial review. The
"limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies carries the
assurance that "the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government." In other words, The Supreme Court cannot subject political questions to a judicial
review. A political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
The issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which are
within its province to resolve.The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an
issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one
which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. To assess the validity of the
system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are
incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power.
More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to
exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides: "The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court

and in such lower courts as may be established by law. It includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."

FRANCISCO VS HRET
FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representative (HOR) adopted a resolution that the Committee
on Justice to conduct an investigation on the expenditure of the Chief Justice of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF). It was alleged that has been some irregularity in the JDF. June 23,
2003, Joseph Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and
seven other associate justices on the grounds of culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal
of public trust and other crimes. On October 13, 2993, the House Committee on Justice
dismissed the case for lack of substance.
On October 23, 2003 a second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide, less than
the one-year bar written in the Constitution and the rules of the HOR. This led to several
petitions questioning the constitutionality of the filing the second impeachment complaint by
Congress.
Congress contented that the Supreme Court had no power to question the said impeachment
proceedings. They argue that it is lodged within Congress to file for impeachment complaints, as
provided in the Constitution. They added that inquiry of the Supreme Court would tantamount to
the violation of the separation of power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment
proceedings
HELD:
No, the power of judicial review does not extend to cases arising from impeachment
proceedings
Judicial power is defined as the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
The power of judicial review has been further expounded in the case of Angara vs Electoral
Commissions where it reads that In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
However, in the case at bar, impeachment complaints are excluded from the coverage of
judicial review, as they are political in nature. The Senate has the sole power to try

impeachment cases. The Supreme Court can exercise its judicial power

only if

constitutionality is involved.

ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION

FACTS:
Angara won the election as a member of the National Assembly for the first district of
Tayabas and took his oath of office. Private Respondents Ynsua, Castillo and Mayor filed a
motion of protest praying that Ynsua be declared as the member of the National Assembly in
the first district of Tayabas or the election be nullified. Angara filed a motion to dismiss the
protest, that said protest in question was filed out of time with accordance with the law but
the Electoral Commission denied his petition. This resulted to the current petition to this Court, a
writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission taking further
cognizance of Ynsuas protest. Petitioner Angara contended that the Constitution confers
exclusive jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of contested
elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear
the case.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission
and the subject matter of the controversy
2.

Whether or not the Electoral Commission has acted without r excess of jurisdiction

in adopting its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935.

HELD:
Yes, the court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
(Section 4 Art. VI 1935 Constitution).
No, The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua
against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the
National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest against
the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent
the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

When the new National Assembly approved petitioner Angara by Resolution No. 8 on December
3, 1935 the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing the date
as the last day for filing of election protest which is December 9, 1935, the same date
respondent Ynsua filed a protest. If the resolution passed by the National Assembly had the
effect of limiting or tolling the time for the presentation of protest the implications would be that
the National Assembly had already barred the presentation of protest before the Electoral
Commission had time to deliberate. If said resolution by the National Assembly were to be
sustained, it would result in depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its
constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said
election protests.

TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC

FACTS:
The election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention was held on November 10, 1970.
After the said election, the Convention held an inaugural session on June 1, 1971. On
September 28, 1971, Organic Resolution No. 1 which seeks to amend Section 1 of Article
V of the Constitution, lowering the voting age to 18 was approved by the Convention and
that a plebiscite shall take place with the local elections on November 1971 for the partial
amendment.
President Diosdado Macapagal called upon the COMELEC to help the Convention implement
the said resolution. On September 30, 1971, COMELEC resolved to inform the
Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite together with the elections on
November 8, 1971. The authority of the President of the Convention to implementing Organic
Resolution No. 1 was approved.
Petitioner Arturo Tolentino contended that under Section 1 Article XV of the Constitution, the
proposed amendment in question couldnt be presented to the people for ratification
separately from each and all of the other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the
Convention. He filed a petition for prohibition against COMELEC praying that Organic
Resolution No. 1 and acts in obedience to the resolution shall not be considered constitutional.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the said case.
2. Whether or not Organic Resolution No. 1 is constitutional.
RULING:
YES. The Court has at all to hamper and hamstring the noble work of the Constitutional
Convention. Much less no desire does the Court want to pass judgment on the merits of the
proposal to allow these eighteen years old to vote. But like the Convention, the Court has its

own duties to the people under the Constitution, which is to decide in appropriate cases with
appropriate parties Whether or not the mandates of the fundamental law are being complied
with.
The case at bar is justiciable. As held in Gonzales vs. COMELEC the issue whether or not a
resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the constitution is a justiciable
one and thus subject to judicial review.
Organic Resolution No. 1 is unconstitutional. Organic Resolution No. 1 and the implementing
acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite
on 08 November 1971, as well as the resolution of the respondent COMELEC complying
therewith are declared null and void.
The court is of the conviction that in providing for the questioned plebiscite before it has finished,
and separately from, the whole draft of the constitution it has been called to formulate, the
Conventions Organic Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent acts of the Convention implementing
the same violate the condition in Section 1, Article XV that there should only be one election or
plebiscite for the ratification of all the amendments the Convention may propose.

JAVELLANA VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al

FACTS:
January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed a prohibition case against the respondents, with the
intention to restrain them from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed
constitution not found in the 1935 Constitution. Petitioner upheld that the respondents are
acting in excess of jurisdiction and without authority in implementing proposed constitution.
Petitioner Javellana also alleged that the announcement of President Marcos of the immediate
implementation of the New Constitution, thru his cabinet members, he is acting without or
in excess of his jurisdiction. On January 23 of the same year, similar actions were filed by
Vidal Tan and among others. Petitioners pray for the nullification of PROCLAMATION 1102
(CITIZENS ASSEMBLIES) and any order, decree, proclamation having the same import and
objective and proclamation, which are similar in objective. The Court required the respondents
to answer the said allegations and petitions. In their comments, the respondents point out 1)
"the Court is without jurisdiction to act on these petitions"; 2) the questions raised therein are
"political in character and therefore no justiciable"; 3) "there substantial compliance with
Article XV of the 1 Constitution"; 4) "(t)he Constitution was properly submitted the people in
a free, orderly and honest election; 5) "Proclamation No. 1102, certifying the results of the
election, is conclusive upon the courts"; and 6) "(t)he amending process outlined in Article XV of
the 1935 Constitution is not exclusive of other modes of amendment."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the issue on the validity of Proclamationn No. 1102 is a justiciable controversy
HELD:
Yes, the issue on the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable controversy.
On the issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the
validity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. Justices
Makalintal and Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their
discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "inasmuch as
it is claimed there has been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of
whether or not there has actually been such an approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court
should keep hands-off out of respect to the people's will, but, in negative, the Court may
determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution
been complied with." Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court
hold that the issue is political and "beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry."
The Supreme Court held that the issue under consideration are justiciable, not political, is plain
and simple. One of the principal bases of the non-justifiability of so-called political questions is
the principle of separation of powers. Each branch of the government is supreme and
independent of the others, and each is devoid of authority, not only to encroach upon the powers
or field of action assigned to any of the other departments, but, also, to inquire into or pass upon
the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by the
other departments provided that such acts, measures or decisions are within the area
allocated thereto by the Constitution.

SALVADOR OCAMPO ET AL v TOMAS CABAGIS

FACTS:
On December 26, 1908, the assailed judgment was rendered by the Court. Such judgment
was brought in question by the plaintiffs who sought for its cancellation and annulment of
the entry of judgment and the recall of the remittitur and the record of the case to this Court.
The motion was based on their theory that no final judgment has ever been entered.
In support of their theory, there is also this certain provision of a law which provides that,
Section 15 of Act. No. 136. "In the determination of causes all decision of the Supreme Court
shall be given in writing, signed by the judges concurring in the decision, and the grounds of the
decision shall be stated as briefly as may be consistent with clearness."cralaw

And that the decision of December 26, 1908, although in writing and signed by the four justices
who concurred therein, had no grounds stated in it, and hence, shall be rendered ineffective
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the decision dated December 26, 1908 given by the Court shall be
rendered ineffective as it lacked, in its form, grounds or bases as required by the law,
particularly, Section 15 of Act No. 136.
RULING:
No, the Court ruled that the decision dated December 26, 1908 remains effective even
without its grounds or bases included in its writing. The motion for cancellation of the decision
was denied.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
The provisions of section 15 of act no. 136 are directory. Section 15 of act no. 136, which
provides that, in the determination of causes, all decisions of the supreme court shall be given
in writing, signed by the judges concurring in the decision, and that the grounds of the decision
shall be stated as briefly as may be consistent with clearness is merely directory and not
mandatory. It is not unusual for the majority of the members of a court to agree to a common
conclusion, while being unable to agree upon the grounds or reasons leading to that conclusion.
Individuals have different methods of reasoning, but the conclusion of the majority of a court,
regardless of the views of the members as to the reasons that induce that conclusion.
The judicial action of the Supreme Court cannot be controlled by legislative direction. the
same section expresses a proper rule which will be observed by the court unless there be some
substantial reason for the nonobservance thereof; but, if such reason exists, the judicial action
cannot be controlled by legislative direction. In holding that this statute is directory, the court
assumes that the legislature did not extend to control the action of the court against its judicial
judgment. The doctrine is well established in the various states of the union that the legislatures
have no power to establish rules that operate to deprive the courts of their constitutional
authority to exercise the judicial functions. A constitutional court when exercising its proper
judicial functions can no more be unreasonably controlled by the legislature than can the
legislature when properly exercising legislative power to be subjected to the control of the
courts. Each acts independently within its exclusive field.
Noncompliance with section 15 of act no. 136 does not affect decisions.
noncompliance with the requirements of section 15 of act no. 136 does not render the
judgments of the court ineffective. A strict and literal compliance with this statute would often
render it impossible for the court to decide a case. The act declares the manner in which the
Supreme Court shall perform the strictly judicial act of giving final expression to its decision, but
it does not say that the failure to comply therewith shall render the decision ineffective.

LANSANG VS. GARCIA

FACTS:

Former President Ferdinand Marcos announced the issuance of Proclamation No. 889 which
suspended the writ of habeas corpus. Such proclamation was due to the throwing of two hand
grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 (in Plaza Miranda) causing the death of 8 people
and many more injured, including practically all of the candidates, some of whom sustained
extensive, as well as serious, injuries which could have been fatal had it not been for the timely
medical assistance given to them.
The petitioners in this case, who, having been arrested without a warrant therefor and then
detained, filed petitions for writ of habeas corpus. They now question the constitutional validity
of the proclamation.
Respondents, however, in their answer, contends that the determination thus made by the
President is "final and conclusive upon the court and upon all other persons" and "partake(s) of
the nature of political question(s) which cannot be the subject of judicial inquiry," pursuant to
Barcelon v. Baker, 5 Phil. 87, and Montenegro v. Castaeda, 91 Phil. 882
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents contention is correct
HELD:
No. This case abandons the doctrines in the cases of Barcelon and Montenegro
Upon mature deliberation, a majority of the Members of the Court had, however, reached,
although tentatively, a consensus to the contrary, and decided that the Court had authority to
and should inquire into the existence of the factual bases required by the Constitution for the
suspension of the privilege of the writ
RATIO DECIDENDI:
Incidentally, even the American jurisprudence (yung dalwang cases na asa contention ng
respondents) is neither explicit nor clear on the point under consideration. Although some cases
purport to deny the judicial power to "review" the findings made in the proclamations assailed in
said cases, the tenor of the opinions therein given, considered as a whole, strongly suggests the
court's conviction that the conditions essential for the validity of said proclamations or orders
were, in fact, present therein, just as the opposite view taken in other cases had a backdrop
permeated or characterized by the belief that said conditions were absent.
Hence, the dictum of Chief Justice Taney to the effect that "(e)very case must depend on its own
circumstances.
The Supreme Court has the authority under the Constitution to inquire into the existence of a
factual basis for the issuance of a presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus for the purpose of determining the constitutional sufficiency thereof. [Lansang
vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448(1971)]
Article VII of the Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of
powers underlying our system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere.

However, the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. It goes hand in hand
with the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the
suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the
Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the
Judicial Department

VINUYA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, established for the purpose of
providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the
Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department
through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese
officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort women stations in
the Philippines. However, officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners,
and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had
already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between
the Philippines and Japan.
Petitioners argue that the general waiver of claims made by the Philippine government in
the Treaty of Peace with Japan is void. They claim that the comfort women system established
by Japan, and the brutal rape and enslavement of petitioners constituted a crime against
humanity, sexual slavery, and torture. They allege that the prohibition against these international
crimes is jus cogens norms from which no derogation is possible; as such, in waiving the claims
of Filipina comfort women and failing to espouse their complaints against Japan, the Philippine
government is in breach of its legal obligation not to afford impunity for crimes against humanity.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were
dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement
of 1956. In addition, respondents argue that the apologies made by Japan have been
satisfactory, and that Japan had addressed the individual claims of the women through the
atonement money paid by the Asian Womens Fund.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing
petitioners claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.
HELD:
No. The petition lacks merit.
RATIO DECIDENDI:

From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive
prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan.
The Supreme Court held in the case of Taada v. Cuenco, that political questions refer "to those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality of a particular measure."
Certain types of cases often have been found to present political question. One such category
involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that "[t]he conduct of the foreign
relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislative--'the political'--departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done
in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision."
However, not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts
certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements.
However, the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals
against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is
demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches.

MAMBA VS. LARA, ET AL

FACTS:
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan passed a Resolution authorizing Governor Edgar R.
Lara (Gov. Lara) to engage the services of and appoint Preferred Ventures Corporation as
financial advisor or consultant for the issuance and flotation of bonds to fund the priority projects
of the governor without cost and commitment. Through a Resolution, SP ratified the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) entered into by Gov. Lara and Preferred Ventures
Corporation. The MOA provided that the provincial government of Cagayan shall pay Preferred
Ventures Corporation a one-time fee of 3% of the amount of bonds floated.
The latter approved Resolution authorizing Gov. Lara to negotiate, sign and execute contracts or
agreements pertinent to the flotation of the bonds of the provincial government in an amount not
to exceed P500 million for the construction and improvement of priority projects to be approved
by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
The majority of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan approved Ordinance
No. 19-2002, authorizing the bond flotation of the provincial government in an amount not to
exceed P500 million to fund the construction and development of the new Cagayan Town
Center. The Resolution likewise granted authority to Gov. Lara to negotiate, sign and execute
contracts and agreements necessary and related to the bond flotation subject to the approval
and ratification by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Subsequently, the planning, design,

construction, and Site Development of the New Cagayan Town Center was awarded to Asset
Builders Corporation for a fee of P213, 795,732. 39.
Petitioners Manuel N. Mamba, Raymund P. Guzman and Leonides N. Fausto filed a Petition for
Annulment of Contracts and Injunction with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of
Preliminary Injunction against Gov. Edgar R. Lara, Jenerwin, et al, in connection with the New
Cagayan Town Center project. The RTC issued the assailed Order denying the Motion to Admit
Amended Petition and dismissing the petition for lack of cause of action.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration to which respondents filed their respective
Oppositions. Petitioners then filed a Motion to Inhibit, which the court granted. Accordingly, the
case was re-raffled. The court issued a Resolution denying petitioners plea for reconsideration.
The court found the motion to be a mere scrap of paper as the notice of hearing was addressed
only to the Clerk of Court in violation of Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. As to the
merits, the court sustained the findings of Branch 5 that petitioners lack legal standing to sue
and that the issue involved is political.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioners have locus standi to file the petition?

Whether the acts/controversy is justiciable?

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that a taxpayer have a legal standing to sue where there is a
claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that the public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose, or that there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid
or unconstitutional law. A person suing as a taxpayer, however, must show that the act
complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. He
must also prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money
raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury because of the enforcement of the
questioned statute or contract. In other words, for a taxpayers suit to prosper, two requisites
must be met: (1) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or
instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed and (2) the
petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act. The petitioners have sufficient standing to file
the present suit. Accordingly, they should be given the opportunity to present their case before
the RTC.
Yes. It is within the ambit of judicial review; conferred upon Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality
of the government.

FORTUN VS. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

FACTS:
On November 23, 2009, heavily armed men, believed to be led by the ruling Ampatuan family,
gunned down and buried 57 innocent civilians on a highway in Maguindanao. This incident was
infamously known as the Maguindanao Massacre. In response to this carnage, on November
24, 2009, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1946, declaring a state of
emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and suppress
possible instances of lawless violence in Central Mindanao. On 2009, President Arroyo then
issued Presidential Proclamation 1959, declaring Martial Law and suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in that province, except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF).
On December 9, 2009, Congress, in joint session, convened pursuant to Section 18, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution, to review the validity of the Presidents action. However, on December
12, eight days after the subject issuance and before Congress could act, the President issued
Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in Maguindanao.
Petitioners Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun and others brought the present actions to challenge the
constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 affecting Maguindanao. However, the lifting of the
Proclamation before Congress could review it and before any serious question affecting the
rights and liberties of Maguindanaos inhabitants could arise, the Court deemed any review of its
constitutionality the equivalent of beating a dead horse.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the issue of Constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation 1959 is unavoidable.
RULING:
No. The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable.
RATIO:
President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to
review and validate or invalidate the same.
Although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court
must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated.
Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review
should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the
Presidents proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a
political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of
the Court

Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to
review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.
Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in just eight days, they have not been meaningfully implemented.
The military did not take over the operation and control of local government units in
Maguindanao. The President did not issue any law or decree affecting Maguindanao that should
ordinarily be enacted by Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported. Those
who were arrested during the period were either released or promptly charged in court. Indeed,
no petition for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court respecting arrests made in those
eight days. The point is that the President intended by her action to address an uprising in a
relatively small and sparsely populated province. In her judgment, the rebellion was localized
and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a determined and amply armed government presence.

TING HO VS TENG GUI

FACTS:
Felix Ting Ho, Jr., Merla Ting Ho Braden, Juana Ting Ho and Lydia Ting Ho Belenzo filed a case
against their brother, respondent Vicente Teng Gui. The disagreement involves a parcel of land
owned by Felix Ting Ho, and the improvements which should form part of the estate of their
deceased father, Felix Ting Ho, and the said land and improvements should be partitioned
equally among each of the siblings.
The Petitioners alleged that their father, Felix Ting Ho, died intestate on June 26, 1970, and left
upon his death an estate. According to petitioners, the said lot and properties were titled and tax
declared under trust in the name of respondent Vicente Teng Gui for the benefit of the deceased
Felix Ting Ho who, being a Chinese citizen, was then disqualified under the law to own public
lands in the Philippines; and that upon the death of Felix Ting Ho, the respondent took
possession of the properties for his personal exclusive use and benefit to their exclusion and
prejudice.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of the property owned by Felix Ting Ho who died intestate is void.
RULING:
No, the sale was not void. Under Article 1471 of the Civil Code, provided that if the price is
simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be shown to have been in reality a donation, or some
other act or contract. The sale in this case, was however valid because the sale was in fact a
donation. The law requires positive proof of the simulation of the price of the sale. But since the
finding was based on a mere assumption, the price has not been proven to be a simulation. It
can be assumed that the intention of Felix Ting Ho in such transaction was to give and donate
the improvements to his eldest son, Vicente Teng Gui.

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by
operation of law in view of petitioner's marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided
in cases of hereditary succession, respondent's disqualification from owning lands in
the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the
purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no
trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold otherwise would allow
circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity, is likewise
misplaced. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be
done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly

MULLER VS. MULLER

FACTS:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller, after marrying in residing
in Hamburg, Germany, decided to relocate in the Philippines. Respondent inherited his parent's
house in Germany, which he subsequently sold and used the proceeds to purchase land in
Antipolo, Rizal for P528,000 and construct a house for P2.3 million. The property was registered
under petitioner's name. The couple eventually separated and respondent filed for the
separation of properties.
The trial court terminated the regime of absolute community of property, decreed the separation
of properties, and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the country,
excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. The court held that the Antipolo
property was acquired by respondent's paraphernal funds but ruled that he could not recover his
funds because the property violated Section 7, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution: "save in cases
of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain".
Upon respondent's appeal, the Court of Appeal's modified the trial court's decision. It held the
following: respondent prayed for reimbursement of the purchase of the Antipolo and not
acquisition or transfer of ownership to him; petitioner's ownership over the property was in trust
for the respondent; petitioner ordered to reimburse respondent the cost of the land acquisition
and house construction, deducting any costs petitioner incurred for the property's preservation
and maintenance, or in the alternative to sell the house and lot if petitioner unable to reimburse
respondent out of her own money. Any profits from the sale should be divided in proportion to
the equity each has over the property. The case was remanded to the lower court for reception
of evidence as to the amount claimed by petitioner for the property's preservation and
maintenance.
Hence, petition for review to the Supreme Court. Petitioner contends that respondent, being an
alien, is disqualified from owning private lands in the Philippines and is attempting to circumvent
the constitutional provision. Respondent contends that following: merely praying for
reimbursement; funds paid by him for the property were in consideration of his marriage to

petitioner; the funds were given to petitioner in trust; and that equity demands that he be
reimbursed of his personal funds.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of
the Antipolo property.
HELD:
No, respondent is not entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of the
Antipolo property.
According to Section 7, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution, aliens are disqualified from acquiring
private lands. This is for the conservation of the national patrimony. Respondent admitted in to
the Court his knowledge of this constitutional prohibition. He cannot claim a right on the property
and his disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership
in trust is allowed. When the purchase is in violation of law, no trust can result in favor of the
party who is guilty of the fraud.
The principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity is misplaced. Equity
as a rule will follow the law - he who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity
must come with clean hands. A litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity if his conduct is
inequitable, unfair and dishonest, fraudulent or deceitful. Respondent cannot seek
reimbursement on the ground of equity wherein he knowingly bought the property despite the
constitutional prohibition.
Respondent's attempt to distinguish the transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is
futile. As held by Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court, an alien, with knowledge of the
constitutional prohibition to acquire Philippine property, has acquired no right whatever of the
property; attempts to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, is still a
violation of the Constitution; the sale to the alien is null and void.
Instant petition is granted. CA rule ordering petitioner to reimburse respondent for the costs of
the land acquisition and house construction are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.