Statutory Construction Case Digest II-2

ALMORADIE, MA. CARIZA L.
People v Evangelista 253 SCRA 714 February 20, 1996

FACTS: GRILDO S. TUGONON was charged with frustrated homicide on the matter of
assaulting, attacking and stabbing ROQUE T. BADE, with intent to kill. TUGONON has inflicted
a stab wound on BADEs right liliac area. RTC sentenced him with a penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum period and ordered to pay the offended partys medical
expenses, without subsidiary imprisonment; moreover, the court appreciated on TUGONONs
favor the privileged mitigating circumstances and incomplete self-defense, and the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
On appeal, CA affirmed TUGONONs conviction, but reduced his sentence to an
indeterminate penalty of 2 months of arresto mayor as minimum to 2 years and 4 months of
prision correccional as maximum.
RTC Judge Antonio Evangelista thereafter set the case for re-promulgation wherein TAGONON
filed a petition for probation.
TAGONONs application for probation was later denied, upon the recommendation of the
probation officer on the ground that by appealing the sentence of the trial court, when he
could have applied for probation. TUGONON has already waived his right to make an
application. An order to arrest him was then released.
RTC thereafter set aside the probation officers recommendation, and granted TUGONONs
application for probation in its order dated April 23, 1993.
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion by granting TUGONONs
application for probation despite the fact that he has appealed judgment of conviction of the
trial court?
HELD: YES, because when TAGONON
filed his application for probation, PD No. 1990
already took effect, and it covers the prohibition that no application for prohibition shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of the
conviction, and that the filing of the application shall be deemed as a waiver of the right
to appeal.
TAGONON argues, however, that a distinction should be drawn between meritorious appeals
(like his appeal notwithstanding the appellate courts affirmance of his conviction) and
unmeritorious appeals. But the law does not make any distinction and so neither should the
Court. In fact if an appeal is truly meritorious the accused would be set free and not only
given probation.
The fact that he appealed meant that private respondent was taking his chances which the
law precisely frown upon. This is precisely the evil that the amendment in P.D. No. 1990
sought to correct, since in the words of the preamble to the amendatory law, probation was
not intended as an escape hatch and should not be used to obstruct and delay the
administration of justice, but should be availed of at the first opportunity by offenders who
are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated

PEOPLE v LEACHON 296 SCRA 163 September 25, 1998
FACTS: Two separate cases, pursuant to the resolution of MTC of San Jose Occidental
Mindoro, were filed against NOLI HABLO, EDMUNDO MAPINDAN and DIEGO ESCALA for
violation of PD 772 (Anti-Squatting Law), docketed as Criminal Case Nos. R-2877 and R-2828
at the RTC of Occidental Mindoro, which was presided by Judge EMILIO LEACHON.
These cases proceeded to trial. After presenting its evidence, the prosecution rested its
case, sending in a written offer of evidence on November 14, 1991. On August 18, 1992,
almost a year after the prosecution had rested, the respondent Judge issued an Order
dismissing the said cases motu proprio on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction. This prompted the petitioners to appeal via a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus at the Court of Appeals. The 12th Division of the Court of Appeals
then came out with a decision reversing the appealed Order of dismissal, ordering
continuation of trial of subject criminal cases.
On January 19, 1993, instead of conducting the trial, as directed by the Court of Appeals, the
respondent judge dismissed the cases motu proprio, once more, opining that P.D. 772 is
rendered obsolete and deemed repealed by Sections 9 and 10, Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution, which provide that urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their
dwellings demolished except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration interposed on January 29, 1993, having been denied
by the respondent Judge on February 4, 1993, petitioners found their way to this court via
the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing subject criminal cases for violation
of the Anti-Squatting Law, and in declaring the said law as repugnant to the provisions of the
1987 Constitution?
HELD: Presidential Decree No. 772, otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law, enjoys this
presumption of constitutionality. At the time the respondent Judge rendered the questioned
Decision and issued the orders of dismissal in 1993, Presidential Decree No. 772, AntiSquatting Law, was still effective. Neither has this Court declared its unconstitutionality,
notwithstanding the social justice provision of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution,
specifically on urban land reform and housing.
Judge Lancheon erred in predicating the validity or legality of eviction on the existence of a
resettlement plan and area. The constitutional requirement that the eviction and demolition
be in accordance with law and conducted in a just and humane manner does not mean that
the validity or legality of the demolition or eviction is hinged on the existence of a
resettlement area designated or earmarked by the government. What is meant by in

accordance with law and just and humane manner is that the person to be evicted be
accorded due process or an opportunity to controvert the allegation that his or her
occupation or possession of the property involved is unlawful or against the will of the
landowner; that should the illegal or unlawful occupation be proven, the occupant be
sufficiently notified before actual eviction or demolition is done; and that there be no loss of
lives, physical injuries or unnecessary loss of or damage to properties.
But then, this petition cannot now prosper because on October 27, 1997, Republic Act No.
8368 entitled, An Act Repealing Presidential Decree 772 Entitled Penalizing Squatting and
Other Similar Acts was enacted. Section 3 provides that all pending cases under the
provisions of PD 772 shall be dismissed upon the effectivity of this Act.
It is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored unless
it is manifest that such is the legislative intent. This doctrine is premise that the will of the
legislature cannot be overturned by the judicial function of construction and interpretation.

PEOPLE v LADJAALAM 340 SCRA 617 - September 19, 2000
FACTS: WALPAN LADJAALAM (also known as WARPAN) was charged with the following
offenses:
Maintaining a drug den in violation of Sec. 15-A, Article III of RA 6425
Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition in violation of PD 1886 as amended by RA 8294
Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide
Illegal Possession of Drugs in violation of Sec. 16, Art. III, in relation to Sec. 21, Art. IV of RA 6425
WARPAN was then acquitted for the crime charged on Illegal Possession of Drugs. His coaccused, Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini were all then dismissed for the
crimes charged reinvestigation.
The prosecution contended that on September 24, 1997, 30 policemen proceeded to the
house of WARPAN to serve a warrant of arrest when they were met by a volley of gunfire
coming from the second floor of the house, which was fired by WARPAN using M14 rifle. The
policemen took cover in the fence, and slowly went inside said house. After gaining
entrance, the policemen shouted, Dont shoot the second children. There are children. The
two officers then proceeded to the second floor where they saw WARPAN firing the rifle. As
he noticed the policemen presence, WARPAN went inside the bathroom, dismantled the
window and jumped the window to the roof of a neighboring house. He was then
subsequently arrested at the back of his house.
From WARPANs house, the following were seized: several firearms and ammunitions and 50
folded aluminum foils containing shabu.
Records established that WARPAN had not filed any application for license to possess
firearms and ammunition.
ISSUE: Whether or not WARPAN be convicted separately of illegal possession of firearms
after using said firearms in the commission of another crime?
HELD: NO. The court found him guilty of two offenses: (1) direct assault and multiple
attempted homicide with the use of a weapon and (2) maintaining a drug den.
The law is clear: The accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms,
provided that no other crime was committed by the person arrested. If the intention of the
law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have
expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish,
neither should [the courts].
The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates appellant of illegal possession of an
M-14 rifle, an offense which normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct
assault. While the penalty for the first is prision mayor, for the second it is only prision
correccional. Indeed, the accused may evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by
using such weapons in committing an even lighter offense, like alarm and scandal or slight
physical injuries, both of which are punishable by arresto menor. This consequence,
however, necessarily arises from the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is not subject to
the Courts review. Any perception that the result reached here appears unwise should be
addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a new meaning
detached from the manifest intendment and language of the legislature. [The Courts] task
is constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts,
and [this Court] have done so in this case.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain
meaning of RA 8294s simple language is most favorable to WARPAN. Verily, no other
interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent
to favor the accused. Accordingly, WARPAN cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of
illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide. Moreover, since
the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of
firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.
PEOPLE v DELOS REYES 229 SCRA 439 January 21, 1994
FACTS: RENATO DELOS REYES was charged with Violation of Sec. 15 of Art. III of RA 6425 for
his involvement in the sale and use of shabu at his residence. He was arrested after he
became a subject of a buy-bust operation. In the said operation, he sold aluminum foil
containing 0.02 grams of shabu to a poseur buyer after payment of PhP 100 (marked
money). Upon said payment, DELOS REYES was arrested.
Police officers were also able to recover several drug paraphernalia from his house. As a
defense, the accused asserts several irregularities on the matter of conduct of the buy-bust
operation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the buy-bust operation was legitimately conducted?
HELD: YES. DELOS REYESs defense that there was inducement, and not entrapment runs
counter to the evidence. The facts of the case show legitimate entrapment. A buy-bust
operation is a form of entrapment resorted to by peace officers to trap and catch a
malefactor in flagrante delicto and entrapment is no bar to prosecution and conviction, not
being prohibited by law. His assertion that he was framed up is the common defense put up
by persons who are accused of being drug pushers or sellers, and it can easily be fabricated.
DELOS REYES insists that he was framed-up by the apprehending police officers. Such a
charge of frame-up is the usual defense put up by persons who are accused of being drug
pushers or sellers, and is easily fabricated; strong and convincing proof is necessary to
overcome the findings of the trial court that the prosecution witnesses were telling the truth.
The statute, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, applies generally to all persons and proscribes the sale, administration,
delivery, distribution, transportation, and manufacture of dangerous drugs by any person,
and no person is presumed authorized to sell, etc., such drugs. Rather, any person claiming
the benefit of the exemption must prove that he falls under the protective mantle of the
exemption.
Alo, John Ericson

People v Pagpaguitan 315 SCRA 226 Sept. 27, 1999
FACTS: Roberto Salazar and Domingo Pagpaguitan were charged guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crim of rape. The private complainant is Evelyn Nalam, who is 14yrs old.
Roberto and Domingo went to see Evelyn at her employer's house at Montilla Blvd. and told
her that her father who was very angry with her and asked to get her back home to BitanAgan. Evelyn went with the two accused but they took him to the uninhavited farmhouse of
Roberto's grandfather. That's the time the accused used knives to threatened evelyn to kill
her if she will not follow them.
Upon entering the house, Roberto stayed at the door and Domingo started embracing,
kissing, boxing and raping Evelyn. Evelyn was pleading to Domingo not to do the evil acts
because he treated Domingo as his brother, still Domingo forced his way in to have a carnal
knowledge with Evelyn.
The next day, they went to Domingo's house, in the presence of Roberto Salazar, Domingo
again force himself upon her.
After few days, The complainant's relatives found her with Domingo. A meeting was held
before the purok president and brgy. captain between the parents of Domingo and Parents of
Evelyn. Domingo and Evelyn were both present. At the meeting Domingo proposed marriage
to the complainant, but the latter rejected the proposal.
Evelyn and her father executed affidavits at the police station and filed the complaint for
rape.
As Domingo's Defense, he said that he and Evelyn were living eloped already and living
together.
Issue: 1) WON 'love relationship' is a valid defense on the crime of rape
2) WON Roberto is also Guilty of Rape as a co-conspirator
Held: 1) NO. Mere assertion of a "love relationship" would not necessarily rule out the use
of force to consummate it. Much more so where such relationship was denied by the victim,
who resisted the brutal suitor.
Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, prior to its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659 and
Republic Act No. 8353, provided that:
Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1.
By using force or intimidation;
2.
When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and,
3.
When the woman is under twelve years of age or demented.
2) Yes. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, there was nothing unnatural
regarding complainant's testimony that Salazar only stood by the door and watched them. It
was precisely Salazar's role in the rape of complainant to stop the latter in the event that
she tried to run away.
The prosecution has also proved beyond a doubt that Salazar was Pagpaguitan's confederate
who ensured the success of Pagpaguitan's carnal plot.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the trial court finding appellants Domingo
Pagpaguitan and Roberto Salazar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED
Alo, John Ericson
People v Reyes 236 SCRA 264 Sept. 2, 1994
FACTS: Appellant Robert Reyes was caught in a buy-bust operation, the authorities got hold
of 0.07 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride from him.
RTC find him guilty of the offense charged, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
inprisonment.
Since he was caught in flagrante delicto, there is no need for a warrant of arrest.
The court noticed that the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed by R.A. No. 7659 as
the maximum penalty when the quantity of shabu involved in the offense is less than 200
grams and at the same time as the minimum penalty when the quantity of shabu involved is
200 grams or more. To avoid an incongruity in the application of the law as written, Section
17 of R.A. No. 7659 should be read correctly to provide a penalty ranging from prision
correccional to reclusion temporal only when the quantity involved is less than 20 grams.
ISSUE: 1) WON the court should harmonize conflicting provisions to give effect to the whole
law.
2) WON there is a retroactive effect if the court decided to modify the penalties for RA 7659
Held: 1) Yes. this Court has the duty to give a statute its logical construction as to
effectuate the intention of the legislature. The Court should harmonize conflicting provisions
to give effect to the whole law. This is to avoid an absurd conclusion with regard to the
meaning of the statute (Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456 [1912]).
2) Yes. Under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which has suppletory application to
special laws, penal laws shall be given retroactive effect insofar as they favor the accused.
Appellant is entitled to benefit from the reduction of the penalty introduced by R.A. No.
7659.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the modification that
appellant shall suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to TWO (2) years and FOUR (4) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Alo, John Ericson
People v Valdez 304 SCRA 140 March 3, 1999

FACTS: SPO1 Bernardo Mariano got an information from a civilian asset that an Ilocano
person was ready to transport marijuana. This asset described to him the physical
appearance of the suspect and possessing a green bag.
Samuel Yu Valdez was riding a bus when he was told by SPO1 Mariano to get out of the bus
and bring his bag with him, as he went out of the bus, he was ordered to open the bag and
there they found 2kilos of dried marijuana leaves.
As part of Valdez' defense, he claimed that the arrest was done without warrant, and the
evidence against him should be inadmissible in court.
Issue: WON warrantless arrest is lawful
Held: Yes. the constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits
of certain legal and judicial exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4)
consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and
emergency circumstances.[10]
On the other hand, a lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a
private person under the following circumstances:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In this case, appellant was caught in flagrante since he was carrying marijuana at the time
of his arrest. A crime was actually being committed by the appellant, thus, the search made
upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (a) of the foregoing provisions of
law, which allow a warrantless search incident to lawful arrest. While it is true that SPO1
Mariano was not armed with a search warrant when the search was conducted over the
personal effects of appellant, nevertheless, under the circumstances of the case, there was
sufficient probable cause for said police officer to believe that appellant was then and there
committing a crime.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The judgment of the lower court finding
appellant guilty of the crime illegal transport of marijuana and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua and to pay fine of P500,000.00 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
Alo, John Ericson
Perez v CA 255 SCRA 661 March 29, 1996
FACTS: On the issue of custody over the minor Ray Perez II, respondent Court of Appeals
ruled in favor of the boy's father Ray C. Perez, reversing the trial court's decision to grant
custody to Nerissa Z. Perez, the child's mother.
Ray Perez, private respondent, is a doctor of medicine practicing in Cebu while Nerissa, his
wife who is petitioner herein, is a registered nurse. After six miscarriages, two operations
and a high-risk pregnancy, petitioner finally gave birth to Ray Perez II in New York.
Instead of going back to the Philippines after giving birth, Nerissa changed her mind and
continued working in US as a registered nurse. Their prior plan was to reside permanently in
the Philippines.
Ray and Nerissa was no longer in good terms when Ray II had his first birthday. Nerissa filed
a petition for habeas corpus asking Ray to surrender the custody of their son.
As per Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by
the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant
considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent
chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother. unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.
The court of appeals decided in favor of the father since he has more time to take care of his
son because his working time as a Doctor is flexible and he lives near his mother where she
can ask for help on taking care of the baby. Meanwhile Ray's mother has 12hrs shift 3x a
week, and that simply shows that it would be harder for her.
ISSUE: WON the use of word shall in art. 363 is a mandatory in character.
Held: Yes. The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate that a child under seven
years of age shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word "shall" in Article 213 of the Family Code and
Rule 99, section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character. In the case
of Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson, 9 the Court declared:
The use of the word shall in article 363 10 of the Civil Code, coupled with the observations
made by the Code Commission in respect to the said legal provision, underscores its
mandatory character. It prohibits in no uncertain terms the separation of a mother and her
child below seven years, unless such separation is grounded upon compelling reasons as
determined by a court.
It is not difficult to imagine how heart-rending it is for a mother whose attempts at having a
baby were frustrated several times over a period of six years to finally bear one, only for the
infant to be snatched from her before he has even reached his first year. The mother's role
in the life of her child, such as Ray II, is well-nigh irreplaceable. In prose and poetry, the
depth of a mother's love has been immortalized times without number, finding as it does, its
justification, not in fantasy but in reality.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. Custody over the minor Ray Z. Perez II is
awarded to his mother, herein petitioner Nerissa Z. Perez. This decision is immediately
executory.
SO ORDERED.
ASTIBE, Maria Jennifer C.

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS v. CIR
302 SCRA 241, January 28, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner reported a net loss in 1986 and thus declared no tax payable. On 1987,
petitioner requested the respondent, among others, for a tax credit representing the
overpayment of taxes in the first and second quarters of 1985. Thereafter, petitioner filed a
claim for refund of creditable taxes withheld by their lessees from property rentals in 1985
and in 1986. Pending investigation, petitioner instituted a Petition for Review before the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
CTA denied the request of petitioner for a tax refund or credit for 1985 on the ground
that it was filed beyond the two-year period provided for by law. The petitioners claim for
refund in 1986 was likewise denied on the assumption that it was automatically credited by
PBCom against its tax payment in the succeeding year. MR was denied. CA affirmed the
decision in toto hence this petition.
Petitioner argues that the government is barred from asserting a position contrary to its
declared circular if it would result to injustice to taxpayers. Citing ABS CBN Broadcasting
Corporation vs. Court of Tax Appeals (1981), petitioner claims that rulings or circulars
promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue have no retroactive effect if it would
be prejudicial to taxpayers.
Respondent argues that the two-year prescriptive period for filing tax cases in court
concerning income tax payments of Corporations is reckoned from the date of filing the Final
Adjusted Income Tax Return, which is generally done on April 15 following the close of the
calendar year. Further, respondent Commissioner stresses that when the petitioner filed the
case before the CTA on November 18, 1988, the same was filed beyond the time fixed by
law, and such failure is fatal to petitioners cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the plea for tax refund or tax credits
on the ground of prescription
HELD:
No. The rule states that the taxpayer may file a claim for refund or credit with the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, within two (2) years after payment of tax, before any suit
in CTA is commenced. The two-year prescriptive period provided, should be computed from
the time of filing the Adjustment Return and final payment of the tax for the year.
Basic is the principle that taxes are the lifeblood of the nation. Due process of law
under the Constitution does not require judicial proceedings in tax cases. This must
necessarily be so because it is upon taxation that the government chiefly relies to obtain the
means to carry on its operations and it is of utmost importance that the modes adopted to
enforce the collection of taxes levied should be summary and interfered with as little as
possible.
From the same perspective, claims for refund or tax credit should be exercised within
the time fixed by law because the BIR being an administrative body enforced to collect
taxes, its functions should not be unduly delayed or hampered by incidental matters.
Any excess of the total quarterly payments over the actual income tax computed in
the adjustment or final corporate income tax return, shall either (a) be refunded to the
corporation, or (b) may be credited against the estimated quarterly income tax liabilities for
the quarters of the succeeding taxable year.
The corporation must signify in its annual corporate adjustment return (by marking
the option box provided in the BIR form) its intention, whether to request for a refund or
claim for an automatic tax credit for the succeeding taxable year. To ease the administration
of tax collection, these remedies are in the alternative, and the choice of one precludes the
other.
A memorandum-circular of a bureau head could not operate to vest a taxpayer with
shield against judicial action. For there are no vested rights to speak of respecting a wrong
construction of the law by the administrative officials and such wrong interpretation could
not place the Government in estoppel to correct or overrule the same [Tan Guan vs. Court of
Tax Appeals, 19 SCRA 903 (1967)].
PILAR VS. COMELEC 245 SCRA 759, July 11, 1995
FACTS:
On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. On March
25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy. In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065
dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the COMELEC imposed upon
petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for failure to file his statement of
contributions and expenditures. In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24, 1994, the COMELEC
denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner and deemed final M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and
94-0065. Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the
petition in a Resolution dated April 28, 1994. Petition for certiorari was subsequently filed to
the Supreme Court.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of
contributions and expenditures because he was a non-candidate, having withdrawn his
certificates of candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner posits that it is . . . clear from
the law that candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either won
or lost under Section 14 of R.A. 7166 entitled An Act Providing for Synchronized National
and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for
Other Purposes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 excludes candidates who already withdrew their
candidacy for election
HELD:
NO. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit. Well-recognized is the rule that where the law
does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish, ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemus. In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or
qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the
term every candidate must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his
campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Also, under the fourth paragraph of
Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided
that [t]he filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil,
criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred. Petitioners
withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine.
PINES CITY EDUCATIONAL CENTER V NLRC 227 SCRA 655, November 10, 1993
FACTS:
Private respondents were all employed as teachers on probationary basis by
petitioner Pines City Educational Center, represented in this proceeding by its President,
Eugenio Baltao. With the exception of Jane Bentrez who was hired as a grade school teacher,
the remaining private respondents were hired as college instructors. All the private
respondents, except Picart and Chan, signed contracts of employment with petitioner for a
fixed duration. On March 31, 1989, due to the expiration of private respondents contracts
and their poor performance as teachers, they were not filed of petitioners decision not to
renew their contracts anymore.
Private respondents filed complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter,
alleging that their dismissals were without cause and in violation of due process. Except for
private respondent Leila Dominguez who worked with petitioners for one semester, all other
private respondents were employed for one to two years. They were never informed in
writing by petitioners regarding the standards or criteria of evaluation as to enable them to
meet the requirements for appointment as regular employees. They were merely notified in
writing by petitioners, through its chancellor, Dra. Nimia R. Concepcion, of the termination of
their respective services as on March 31, 1989, on account of their low-par performance as
teachers.
Petitioners contended that private respondents separation from their employment,
apart from their poor performance, was due to the expiration of the period stipulated in their
respective contracts. In the case of private respondent Dangwa Bentrez, the duration of his
employment contract was for one year, or beginning June 1988 to March 1989whereas in the
case of other respondents, the duration of their contracts was for one semester, or
beginning November 1988 to March 1989. These stipulations are the laws that governed
their relationships, and there was nothing in said which was contrary to laws, moral, good
customs and public policy. They argued further that they cannot be compelled to enter into
new contracts with private respondents. They concluded that the separation of private
respondents from service was justified.
Labor Arbiter rendered decision in favor of the private respondents. On appeal to the
NLRC, the latter affirmed in toto in its resolution dated November 29,1990, with all additional
reasoning that the stipulation in the contract providing for a definite period in complaint is
obviously null and void, as such stipulation directly assails the safeguards laid down in
Article 280 (of the Labor Code) which explicitly abhors the consideration of written or oral
agreements in pertaining to definite periods in regular employment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is prima facie evidence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Labor Arbiter by want only, capriciously and maliciously disregarding provisions of the law
and jurisprudence laid down in decisions of the Honorable Supreme Court.
HELD:
Insofar as the private respondents who knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon fixed
periods of their employment are concerned, their services were lawfully terminated by
reason of the expiration of the periods of their respective contracts. These are Dangwa
Bentrez, Apollo Ribaya, Sr., Ruperta Ribaya, Virginia Boado, Cecilia Emocling, Jose Bentrez,
Leila Dominguez and Rose Ann Bermudez. Thus, public respondent committed grave abuse
of discretion in affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter ordering the reinstatement and
payment of fill backwages and other benefits and privileges.
With respect to private respondents Roland Picarta and Lucia Chan, both whom did
not sign any contract fixing the periods of their employment nor to have knowingly and
voluntarily agreed upon fixed periods of employment, petitioners had the burden of proving
that the termination of their services was legal. As probationary employees, they are
likewise protected by the security of tenure provision of the Constitution.
The resolution of NLRC dated November 29, 1990 is modified. Roland Picart and Lucia
Chan are ordered reinstated without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and their
backwages paid in full inclusive of allowances, and to their other benefits or their monetary
equivalent pursuant o Article 27 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 34 of RA 6715,
subject to deduction of income earned eelsewhere during the period of dismissal, if any, to
be computed from the time they were dismissed up to the time of their actual
reinstatement. The rest of the Labor Arbiters decision as affirmed by NLRC is set aside. The
temporary restraining order is made permanent.

PIMENTEL V COMELEC 289 SCRA 586, April 24, 1998
FACTS:
Petitioner Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., himself a senatorial candidate in the May 8, 1995
elections, filed a complaint with the COMELECs Law Department, against Atty. Dominador
Mico, Atty. Dionisio Caoili and Dr. Ofelia T. Pastor, Chairman, Vice-Chairman and MemberSecretary, respectively, of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Ilocos Norte, Marvelyn
Ramiro, Election Assistant for the COMELEC for San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte and member of the
support staff of the Provincial Board of Canvassers, and Flor Mercado, Elementary School
Principal of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Ilocos Norte and also a
member of the support staff of the Provincial Board of Canvassers with violation of Section
27 of Republic Act No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law. It has been
alleged that the respondents, acting together and conspiring with one another were
responsible for the falsification of the tallies for senatorial candidates Enrile, Drilon and
Mitra. The respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits and both parties submitted
their Memoranda. In Minute Resolution dated May 14, 1996, the COMELEC en banc resolved
to file criminal as well as administrative charges against respondents who did not dispute
the fact that there was really an irregular increase of votes for some senatorial candidates in
the Certificate of Canvass.
Mr. Pimentel, Jr. filed an amended complaint on December 13, 1995 charging Mrs.
Marvelyn Ramiro, Election Assistant of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte who dictated and prepared
the entries, respectively, from the statement of votes to the certificate of canvass.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. On August 13, 1996, the
COMELEC en banc issued the assailed Minute Resolution where it was resolved to dismiss
the complaint for lack of sufficient evidence to establish probable cause and, in the
administrative case, to reprimand respondents with stern warning that a repetition of the
same act in the future shall be dealt with accordingly. The Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation and Motion where he prayed for the nullification and setting aside of
COMELECs Minute. The respondents make use of the defense of honest mistake, simple
error, good faith, and the mere performance of ministerial duties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing its
earlier resolution by dismissing the complaint against private respondents for violation of
section 27(b) of ra no. 6646, on the ground of lack of sufficient evidence to establish
probable cause
HELD:
Yes. The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint
on the ground lack of sufficient evidence to establish probable cause, curiously after it had
previously found probable cause on the basis of the same evidence. Moreover, significantly,
it is on record that upon discovering the discrepancies while canvassing the returns in the
senatorial race and in obvious and manifest recognition of the gravity of the occurrence, the
COMELEC motu propio initiated an investigation. Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a
complaint initiated motu proprio by the Commission is presumed to be based on sufficient
probable cause for purposes of issuing subpoenas to the respondents. A rule in statutory
construction is that the word or is disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence
of one thing from other things enumerated unless the context requires a different
interpretation. In criminal and penal statues, like Section 27(b) of R.A. 6646, the word and
cannot be read or, and conversely, as the rule of strict construction apply, except when the
spirit and reason of the law require it. Thus, under the provision, two acts, not one, are
penalized: first, the tampering, increasing or decreasing of votes received by a candidate in
any election; and second, the refusal, after proper verification and hearing, to credit the
correct votes or deduct such tampered votes. The second part of the provision cannot be
conjoined with the first part and regarded as a mere element of one crime, as is the
interpretation of the COMELEC. Such cannot be the intent of the framers of the law, and it is
with grave abuse of discretion that the COMELEC gave Section 27(b) of R.A. No. 6646 of
interpretation it did.
Barangtay, Carlo Niel
PITC vs.COA, 309 SCRA 177, JUNE 25, 1999
Facts:
The PITC Board of Directors approved a Car Plan Program to purchase a vehicle, fifty percent
(50%) of the value of which shall be shouldered by PITC while the remaining fifty percent
(50%) will be shouldered by the officer. In addition, PITC will reimburse the officer concerned
fifty percent (50%) of the annual car registration, insurance premiums and costs of
registration of the chattel mortgage over the car for a period of five (5) years from the date
the vehicle was purchased. The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued
Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10) for the implementation of RA
6758 which discontinue all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary. The
COA disallowed the disallowed the yearly car registration and insurance premium made after
the effectivity of the said Circular on the ground that the said allowances were not included
on the fringe benefits or form of compensation allowed to be continued. COA denied the
appeal, as well as the motion for reconsideration, filed by PITC finding the appeal to be
devoid of merit.
Issues:
WON, legislature did not intend to revoke existing benefits being received by incumbent
government employees as of July 1, 1989 (including subject car plan benefits) when RA 6758
was passed;
WON, RA 6758 can repeal provisions of the Revised Charter of PITC and its amendatory laws
expressly exempting PITC from OCPC coverage.
Held:
Yes, the Court has confirmed in Philippine Ports Authority vs. Commission on Audit the
legislative intent to protect incumbents who are receiving salaries and/or allowances over
and above those authorized by RA 6758 to continue to receive the same even after RA 6758
took effect. In reserving the benefit to incumbents, the legislature has manifested its intent
to gradually phase out this privilege without upsetting the policy of non-diminution of pay
and consistent with the rule that laws should only be applied prospectively in the spirit of
fairness and justice. Based on the foregoing pronouncement, petitioner correctly pointed out
that there was no intention on the part of the legislature to revoke existing benefits being
enjoyed by incumbents of government positions at the time of the passage of RA 6758.
Yes, rules on statutory construction provide that a special law cannot be repealed, amended
or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication unless the legislative purpose to
do so is manifested that if repeal of particular or specific law or laws is intended, the proper
step is to so express it. The repeal by Section 16 of RA 6758 of all corporate charters that
exempt agencies from the coverage of the System was clear and expressed necessarily to
achieve the purposes for which the law was enacted. Henceforth, PITC should now be
considered as covered by laws prescribing a compensation and position classification system
in the government including RA 6758.

PITC vs. ANGELES, 263 SCRA 421, OCTOBER 21, 1996
Facts:
Remington Industrial Sales Corporation and Firestone Ceramics, Inc. applied for the authority
to import from Peoples Republic of China (PROC) with the PITC, in accordance with the
power vested on them by LOI 444. They were granted such authority after satisfying the
requirements for importers, and after they executed respective undertakings to balance
their importations from PROC with corresponding export of Philippine products to PROC.
Subsequently, for failing to comply with their undertakings to submit export credits
equivalent to the value of their importations, further import applications were withheld by
petitioner PITC from private respondents, such that the latter were both barred from
importing goods from PROC. The respondents filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus,
with prayer for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
to the Makati RTC. The lower court ruled that PITCs authority to process and approve
applications for imports from SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 444
and P.D. No. 1071, has already been repealed by EO No. 133, issued on February 27, 1987
by President Aquino.
Issues:
WON, EO No. 133 repealed LOI 444, being both issuances under executive directives.
Held:
No, as observed by the Supreme Court in Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs.
Torres, there is no need for legislative delegation of power to the President to revoke the
Letter of Instruction by way of an Executive Order. However, there is no indication in the
law of the removal of the powers of the PITC to exercise its regulatory functions in the area
of importations from SOCPEC countries. EO 133, as worded, is silent as to the abolition or
limitation of such powers, previously granted under P.D. 1071, from the PITC. Likewise, the
general repealing clause in EO 133 stating that all laws, ordinances, rules, and regulations,
or other parts thereof, which are inconsistent with the Executive Order are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly, cannot operate to abolish the grant of regulatory powers to the
PITC. There can be no repeal of the said powers, absent any cogency of irreconcilable
inconsistency or repugnancy between the issuances. The President, in promulgating EO 133,
had not intended to overhaul the functions of the PITC but to establish the DTI and
rearranging of the administrative functions among the administrative bodies affected by the
edict, but not an abolition of executive power. The absence of the regulatory power formerly
enshrined in the Special Provision of LOI 444, from Section 16 of EO 133, and the limitation
of its previously wide range of functions but this does not mean, however, that PITC has lost
the authority to issue the questioned Administrative Order. Thus, there is no real
inconsistency between LOI 444 and EO 133. Consistency in statutes as in executive
issuances, is of prime importance, and, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, all laws
are presumed to be consistent with each other. Where it is possible to do so, it is the duty of
courts, in the construction of statutes, to harmonize and reconcile them, and to adopt a
construction of a statutory provision which harmonizes and reconciles it with other statutory
provisions. The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of
an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the latter, since the
law may be cumulative or a continuation of the old one. The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the lower court.

Planters Assn., vs. PONFERRADA, 317 SCRA 463, OCTOBER 26, 1999
Facts:
Prior to the passage of Republic Act No. 6982, there were two principal laws providing
additional financial benefits to sugar farm workers, namely: Republic Act No. 809 and
Presidential Decree No. 621. Private respondent Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Company
(BISCOM) is engaged in the business of, among others, milling raw sugarcane of various
sugar plantations in their milling district. For the crop year 1991-1992, the sugar farm
workers share in BISCOM, under R.A. No. 809 amounted to P30, 590,086.92.10 and
P2,233,285.26 under P.D. No. 621, PhP 32,823.345.18 in total. Upon the effectivity of R.A.
No. 6982, the total workers benefit in BISCOMs milling district was P36,173,232.53.
Meanwhile, pending a definite ruling on the effect of R.A. No. 6982 to R.A. No. 809 and P.D.
No. 621, respondent Secretary of Labor issued Department Order No. 2 (1992), directing,
inter alia, the three milling districts in Negros Occidental, namely: SONDECO, San Carlos and
herein private respondent BISCOM, to continue implementing R.A. No. 809 per
recommendation of the Sugar Tripartite Council. The petitioner hence filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief against the implementation of the said D.O. No. 2 theorized that in view of
the substitution of benefits under Section 12 of R.A. No. 6982, whatever monetary rewards
previously granted to the sugar farm workers under R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621 were
deemed totally abrogated and/or superseded. The lower court denied the petition.
Issues:
WON, the application of RA 6982 substituted that of RA 809 and PD 621 in terms of financial
benefits for sugar farm workers.
Held:
No, the substitution of sugar workers benefits under RA 809 by RA 6982 is qualified by
Section 14 of the latter. This section provides that if the effect of such substitution will be to
diminish or reduce whatever monetary rewards sugar industry laborers are receiving under
RA 809, then such workers shall continue to be entitled to the benefits provided in such law.
It is a well-settled rule of legal hermeneutics that each provision of law should be construed
in connection with every other part so as to produce a harmonious whole and every meaning
to be given to each word or phrase is ascertained from the context of the body of the
statute. Ut magis valeat quam pereat. Consequently, laws are given a reasonable
construction such that apparently conflicting provisions are allowed to stand and given
effect by reconciling them, reference being had to the moving spirit behind the enactment of
the statute. It bears stressing that the primordial objective behind the enactment of R.A. No.
6982 was to augment the income of sugar workers by establishing a social amelioration
program in cases where sugar farm workers had none, and at the same time, to improve
whatever amelioration schemes already existing in the sugar districts concerned. The
circumstances involving subject milling districts (where the sugar farm workers are enjoying
benefits both from R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621 prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6982),
necessitate the grant of pecuniary advantage under R.A. No. 809 as a complement to R.A.
No. 6982. Otherwise, the workers would suffer a diminution of benefits. Between two
statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail. The
petition is denied and the assailed decision of the lower court is affirmed.

PLANTERS PRODUCTS. V CA 317 SCRA 195, October 22, 1999
Facts:
For the purpose of rehabilitating Philippine Planters, Inc., petitioner, imposed a charge of
P10.00 per bag of fertilizer on all domestic sales of fertilizer in the Philippines, as provided
for by Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 1465. Respondent Fertiphil Corporation, a domestic
entity engaged in the fertilizer business, questioned the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 and
brought an action to recover its accumulated payment in the Makati RTC. The court of origin
declared Letter of Instruction No. 1465 unconstitutional and ordered the petitioner to pay the
private respondent the amount it paid. A motion for execution pending appeal was issued
and directed the issuance of the corresponding writ of execution upon the posting by private
respondent of a bond which caused the closure of petitioners warehouse in Sta. Ana, Metro
Manila. The properties of Planters levied upon were sold at public auction, with Fertiphil as
the highest bidder. Petitioner filed with the Court a quo an Urgent Omnibus Motion, asked
for the approval of its supersedeas bond in the amount. Petitioner further prayed its omnibus
motion be heard on the following day. Five (5) days later, the petitioner brought a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals on the alleged ground that the lower court
unreasonably failed to act on its Urgent Omnibus Motion which was granted with a
Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the private respondent and all persons acting under
their supervision and/or instruction from executing any further. Petitioner asked the Court of
Appeals to admit its supplemental petition for certiorari imputing abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of the lower court in granting private
respondents motion for execution pending appeal, however, denied by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
WON, the unconstitutionality of LOI 1465 and the posting of bond by the respondent,
Fertiphil, warrants good reasoning.
Held:
No, the prevailing doctrine, Section 2, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, which is the same as
provided in paragraph 2, Section 2 of Rule 39 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is that
discretionary execution is permissible when good reasons exist for immediately executing
the judgment before finality or pending appeal or even before the expiration of the time to
appeal. Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances justifying the immediate
execution lest the judgment becomes illusory, or the prevailing party may after the lapse of
time become unable to enjoy it. The appellate Court should not normally disturb such
findings by the lower court, intervention by the appellate court may be proper, if it is shown
that there has been an abuse of discretion. The appeal was merely dilatory because the
assailed letter of instruction is unconstitutional, as well as the posting of bond by Fertiphil,
does not constitute good reason to justify execution pending appeal. Mere issuance of a
bond to answer for damages is no longer considered a good reason for execution pending
appeal. To consider the mere posting of a bond as a good reason would precisely make
immediate execution of judgment pending appeal routinary, the rule rather than the
exception. Well-settled is the rule that it is not for the trial court to determine the merit of a
decision it rendered as this is the role of the appellate Court. The rule on execution pending
appeal must be strictly construed being an exception to the general rule. Applying the rule
on statutory construction, it should be interpreted only so far as the language thereof fairly
warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general rule rather than the
exceptions. Petition granted, reviewed decision set aside.
Bondad, Jan Danielle R.
1. PNB vs. CA, 222 SCRA 134 (May 17, 1993)
Facts: To secure payments of the loan, Epifanio dela Cruz mortgages two lots to PNB. He
was not able to pay and eventually, PNB extrajudicially foreclosed the property and won as
highest bidder at an auction sale. Then, a final deed of sale was registered in the Registry of
Property in favour of PNB and the bank sold said lots to a third party.
Notices of sale of dela Cruz forclosed properties were published on March 28 (Friday), April
11 (Friday) and April 12 (Saturday). Section 3 of Act No. 3135 obliges that notice of auction
sale should be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks.
Issue: Whether or not PNB complied with the requirements of weekly publication of notice
on foreclosure of properties.
Held: No. Article 13 of NCC is completely silent as to the definition of a week. However, in
Concepcion vs Andueta, the term week was interpreted as the period of time consisting of
seven consecutive days without regard to the day of the week on which it begins. PNB failed
to comply herewith and therefore, auction sale was deemed void and did not carry any legal
effect.

2. PNB vs. CA, 337 SCRA 381 (August 8, 2000)
Facts: The Court of Appeals, in a prior case, held PNB/NIDC accountable to CBC only for the
amount of US$242,225.00, which was used for the repair and conversion of the M/V Asean
Liberty, as it was only this amount which CBC was able to prove as being a preferred
maritime lien. Moreover, such amount was to be paid by petitioners PNB/NIDC from the
proceeds of the foreclosure sale of the vessel M/V Asean Liberty. CBCs other claims of
US$648,000.54 and US$2.7 Million were found by the appellate court as not being in the
nature of maritime liens and as such, recoverable only from PISC, not from herein petitioners
PNB/NIDC.
Issue: Whether or not respondents claim is in the nature of maritime lien.
Held: No. The provisions of our Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 were patterned quite closely
after the U.S. Ship Mortgage Act of 1920. Significantly, the Federal Maritime Lien Act of the
United States, like our Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978, provides that any person furnishing
repairs, supplies, towage, use of dry dock, or marine railway, or Philippine other necessaries,
to any foreign or domestic vessel on the order of the owner of such vessel, or of a person
authorized by the owner has a maritime lien on the vessel, which may be enforced by suit in
rem. Being of foreign origin, the provisions of the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 may thus
be construed with the aid of foreign jurisprudence from which they are derived except
insofar as they conflict with existing laws or are inconsistent with local customs and
institutions.
3. PNB vs. Office of the President, 252 SCRA 5 (January 18, 1996)
Facts: Maglaya, et al. were buyer on instalment of subdivision lots from Marikina Village,
Inc. Even though the land purchase agreements implemented over the lots, MVI credited the
lots in favour of Philippine National Bank. Unaware of this mortgage, Maglaya, et al. duly
conformed to their obligations as lot buyers and built their houses on the lots under
consideration. Consequently, MVI failed to pay and PNB foreclosed on the mortgage and, as
the highest bidder, became owner of the lots. Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board ruled
that PNB may collect from Maglaya et al. only the remaining amortizations, in accordance
with the land purchase agreements they had previously entered into with MVI. OP, citing PD
957, or the Subdivision and Condominuim Buyers Protective Degree, agreed with HLURB.
PNB argued that the OP made a mistake in applying PD 957 because it was enacted only on
July 12, 1976 while the subject mortgage was in effect on December 18, 1975.
Issue: Whether or not PD 957 may be given retroactive effect.
Held: Yes. Although Article 4 of the Civil Code states that laws shall have no retroactive
effect unless provided, it is definite and unquestionable that PD 957 intended to cover real
estate mortgages executed prior to the enactment of the law because giving retroactive
effect will fulfil its purpose to protect innocent land buyers. The retroactivity of the law may
be deduced from the intent of the law to defend naive purchasers of lots from schemes
carried out by developers.
4. Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee vs. Desierto, 317 SCRA 272
(October 25, 1999)
Facts: On October 8, 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13,
creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, with the Chairman
of the PCGG as Chairman; the Solicitor General as Vice Chairman; and one representative
each from the Office of the Executive Secretary, Department of Finance, Department of
Justice, Development Bank of the Philippines, Philippine National Bank, Asset Privatization
Trust, Government Corporate Counsel, and the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee
Corporation as members. In its fourteenth (14th) report on Behest Loans to President Ramos,
dated 15 July 1993, the Committee reported that the Philippine Seeds, Inc., (hereafter PSI) of
which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were the Directors, was one of the twenty-one
corporations which obtained behest loans. On 2 March 1996, the Committee through
Orlando O. Salvador, the PCGG consultant detailed with the Committee, filed with the
Ombudsman a sworn complaint against the Directors of PSI namely, Jose Z. Osias, Pacifico E.
Marcos, Eduardo V. Romualdez, Fernando C. Ordoveza, and Juanito Ordoveza; and the
Directors of the Development Bank of the Philippines who approved the loans for violation of
paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices.
Issue: Whether or not the imprescriptible right of the State to recover ill-gotten wealth apply
to both civil and criminal cases.
Held: No. The so-called imprescriptibility as provided in Section 15 of Article XI of the
Constitution applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to
criminal cases, such as the complaint against the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968. This is
clear from the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission of 1986. Since the law alleged
to have been violated, i.e., paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3, R.A. No. 3019, as amended,
is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2
of Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides, Prescription shall begin to run from the day
of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from
the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment. In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved
party, to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions
were made because, as alleged, the public officials concerned connived or conspired with
the beneficiaries of the loans. Thus, the prescriptive period for the offenses with which the
respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the discovery of the
commission thereof and not from the day of such commission.
Borja, Mia Mariel Kathleen
PUNZALAN V COMELEC 289 SCRA 702 April 27, 1998
FACTS:
On May 24, 1995, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed Ferdinand Meneses
as the duly elected mayor, having garnered a total of 10,301 votes against Danilo
Manalastas' 9,317 votes and Ernesto Punzalan's 8,612 votes. On May 30, 1995, Danilo
Manalastas filed an election protest docketed as Election Case No. E-005-95 before the
Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, challenging the results of the elections in
the municipality's forty-seven (47) precincts. On June 2, 1995, Ernesto Punzalan filed his
own election protest docketed as Election Case No. E-006-95, also before the RTC in San
Fernando, Pampanga, questioning the results of the elections in one hundred and fifty seven
(157) precincts.
Since the two (2) election protests involved the same parties and subject matter, they were
ordered consolidated and were jointly tried by the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch
44. Succinctly, the election contests sought the nullification of the election of Meneses
allegedly due to massive fraud, irregularities and other illegal electoral practices during the
registration and the voting as well as during the counting of votes. By way of counter-protest
to the two (2) election protests, Meneses alleged that he, too, was a victim of massive fraud
and illegal electoral practices.
Punzalan contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring valid
(a) the ballots wherein the signatures of the BEI chairmen were different from their
respective signatures appearing on several COMELEC documents, (b) those group of ballots
allegedly written by one (1) hand and (c) a number of single ballots written by two (2)
persons. He argues that the trial court's findings on the authenticity of said handwritings
must prevail over the findings of the COMELEC because: 1) the finding of the Regional Trial
Court was based first on the findings of the revisors with the assistance of an expert witness
in the person of Atty. Desiderio Pagui; (2) the finding of the Regional Trial Court was arrived
at after an adversarial proceeding where both parties were represented by their lawyers and
the expert witness was cross-examined; and (3) on the other hand, the findings of the public
respondent were made unilaterally, without any hearing and without the presence of the
lawyers of the parties and of the parties themselves.
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
HELD:
NO. COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in G.R. No. 132435. The petitions in
G.R. Nos. 126669, 127900 and 128800 are rendered moot by the preceding disquisition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition in G.R. No. 132435 is hereby DISMISSED.
The status quo order issued by this Court on February 24, 1998 is LIFTED. The petitions in
G.R. Nos. 126669, 127900 and 128800 are rendered moot and academic by the foregoing
disquisition. Further, this decision is immediately executory in view of the shortness of time
between now and the next elections and to prevent the case from becoming moot and
academic. In the same manner, whether or not certain ballots were marked had been
addressed by the COMELEC by personally and actually examining the ballots themselves.
The court find no compelling reasons to disturb its findings.
On the issue of the genuineness of the handwriting on the ballots, it is observed that the
specimens examined by Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui, presented by Punzalan as an expert
witness, were mere certified true copies of the ballots and documents concerned.
RABOR V CSC 244 SCRA 615 May 31, 1995
FACTS:
Petitioner Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in the Office of the Mayor, Davao City. He
entered the government service as a Utility worker on 10 April 1978 at the age of 55 years.
Sometime in May 1991, Alma, D. Pagatpatan, an official in the Office of the Mayor of Davao
City, advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for retirement, considering that he had already
reached the age of sixty-eight (68) years and seven (7) months, with thirteen (13) years and
one (1) month of government service. Rabor responded to this advice by exhibiting a
"Certificate of Membership" issued by the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS")
and dated 12 May 1988. At the bottom of this "Certificate of Membership" is a typewritten
statement of the following tenor: "Service extended to comply 15 years service reqts." This
statement is followed by a non-legible initial with the following date "2/28/91." Thereupon,
the Davao City Government, through Ms. Pagatpatan, wrote to the Regional Director of the
Civil Service Commission, informing the latter of the foregoing and requesting advice "as to
what action be taken on this matter." Petitioner Rabor then sent to the Regional Director, a
letter asking for extension of his services in the City Government until he "shall have
completed the fifteen years service requirement in the Government so that he could also
avail of the benefits of the retirement laws given to employees of the Government." The
extension he was asking for was about two years. Asserting that he was "still in good health
and very able to perform the duties and functions of his position as Utility Worker," Rabor
sought "extension of his service as an exception to Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the
Office of the President." Petitioner Rabor contends that his claim falls squarely within the
ruling of this Court in Cena v. Civil Service Commission.
ISSUE:
WON Rabor is entitled to the extension of service applying the cena case.
HELD:
NO. ACCORDINGLY, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
Applying the results of the reexamination of Cena to the instant case, The court believed
and so hold that Civil Service Resolution No. 92-594 dated 28 April 1992 dismissing the
appeal of petitioner Rabor and affirming the action of CSRO-XI Director must be upheld and
affirmed.
RAMIREZ V CA 248 SCRA 590 Sept. 28, 1995
FACTS:
The Petitioner made a secret recording of the conversation that was part of the civil case
filed in the Regional Trial Court alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia vexed
insulted and humiliated her in a hostile and furios mood and in a manner offensive to
petitioners dignity and personality.
The Petitioner filed a criminal case for the violation of R.A 4200. Petitioner filed a motion to
Quash the information. The Trial Court granted the said motion. The private respondent filed
a Petition for Review with the Supreme Court which is referred the case to the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution. The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the trial
courts order as null and void after subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration by
the Petitioner.
ISSUE:
WON the provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private
conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.
HELD:
NO. The Petitioners contention that the phrase private communication in Section 1 RA
4200 does not include private conversations narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
communication to a point absurdity. WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at
bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
RCBC V IAC 320 SCRA 279 Dec. 9, 1999
FACTS:
On September 28, 1984, BF Homes filed a Petition for Rehabilitation and for Declaration of
Suspension of Payments with the SEC. RCBC, one of the creditors listed in BF Homes
inventory of creditors and liabilities, on October 26, 1984, requested the Provincial Sheriff of
Rizal to extra-judicially foreclose its real estate mortgage on some properties of BF Homes.
BF Homes opposed the auction sale and the SEC ordered the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction upon petitioners filing of a bond. Presumably unaware of the filing of
the bond on the very day of the auction sale, the sheriff proceeded with the public auction
sale in which RCBC was the highest bidder for the properties auctioned. But because of the
proceedings in the SEC, the sheriff withheld the delivery to RCBC of the certificate of sale
covering the auctioned properties.
On March 13, 1985, despite the SEC case, RCBC filed with RTC an action for mandamus
against the provincial sheriff of Rizal to compel him to execute in its favor a certificate of
sale of the auctioned properties.
On March 18, 1985, the SEC appointed a Management Committee for BF Homes.
Consequently, the trial court granted RCBCs motion for judgment on the pleading
ordering respondents to execute and deliver to petitioner the Certificate of Auction Sale.
On appeal, the SC affirmed CAs decision (setting aside RTCs decision dismissing the
mandamus case and suspending issuance to RCBC of new land titles until the resolution of
the SEC case) ruling that whenever a distressed corporation asks the SEC for rehabilitation
and suspension of payments, preferred creditors may no longer assert such preference but
stand on equal footing with other creditors. Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.
covering the auctioned properties.
On March 13, 1985, despite the SEC case, RCBC filed with RTC an action for mandamus
against the provincial sheriff of Rizal to compel him to execute in its favor a certificate of
sale of the auctioned properties.
On March 18, 1985, the SEC appointed a Management Committee for BF Homes.
Consequently, the trial court granted RCBCs motion for judgment on the pleading
ordering respondents to execute and deliver to petitioner the Certificate of Auction Sale.
On appeal, the SC affirmed CAs decision (setting aside RTCs decision dismissing the
mandamus case and suspending issuance to RCBC of new land titles until the resolution of
the SEC case) ruling that whenever a distressed corporation asks the SEC for rehabilitation
and suspension of payments, preferred creditors may no longer assert such preference but
stand on equal footing with other creditors. Hence, this Motion for
Reconsideration.
covering the auctioned properties.On March 13, 1985, despite the SEC case, RCBC filed with
RTC an action for mandamus against the provincial sheriff of Rizal to compel him to execute
in its favor a certificate of sale of the auctioned properties.On March 18, 1985, the SEC
appointed a Management Committee for BF Homes.Consequently, the trial court granted
RCBCs motion for judgment on the pleading ordering respondents to execute and deliver
to petitioner the Certificate of Auction Sale.On appeal, the SC affirmed CAs decision (setting
aside RTCs decision dismissing the mandamus case and suspending issuance to RCBC of
new land titles until the resolution of the SEC case) ruling that whenever a distressed
corporation asks the SEC for rehabilitation and suspension of payments, preferred creditors
may no longer assert such preference but stand on equal footing with other creditors.
Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
WON the suspension of actions for claims against BF HOMES shall take effect.
HELD:
YES. In fine, the Court grants the motion for reconsideration for the cogent reason that
suspension of actions for claims commences only from the time a management committee
or receiver is appointed by the SEC. Petitioner RCBC, therefore, could have rightfully, as it
did, move for the extrajudicial foreclosure of its mortgage on October 26, 1984 because a
management committee was not appointed by the SEC until March 18, 1985. WHEREFORE,
petitioners motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated September
14, 1992 is vacated, the decision of Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. SP-06313
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch 140, in Civil Case No. 10042 REINSTATED.
CAYETANO, KRISTINE S.
Republic vs. Marcopper - 335 SCRA 386 (July 10, 2000)
Facts: Respondent Marcopper Mining Coprporation (MMC) was issued a temporary permit
to operate a tailings sea disposal system. Before it expired, MMC filed an application for the
renewal thereof with the National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC). In the meantime, the
NPCC was abolished by EO No.192, and its powers and functions were integrated into the
Environmental Management Bureau and into the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB).
Subsequently, the DENR Secretary, in his capacity as Chairman of the PAB, issued an Order
directing MMC to "cease and desist from discharging mine tailings into Calancan Bay." This
was appealed by the MMC with the Office of the President (OP). The Office of the President
granted the urgent ex-parte partial motion for reconsideration in its Order dated May 13,
1988, with the provision that during the efficacy of the restraining order, MMC shall
immediately pay not less than P30,000.00 a day for the Calancan Bay Rehabilitation Project
(CBRP)under the supervision of the PAB. As such, MMC started remitting P30,000.00 a day,
to the Ecology Trust Fund (ETF) thereof. However, on June 30, 1991, MMC stopped
discharging its tailings in the Bay, hence, it likewise ceased from making further deposits to
the ETF.
In an Order dated April 23, 1997, the PAB ruled that the obligation of MMC to deposit
P30,000.00 per day to the ETF of the CBRP subsists, as provided for in the Order of the OP.
Since the Order of the OP was lifted only on February 5, 1993, the obligation of MMC to remit
was likewise extinguished only on said date and not earlier as contended by MMC from the
time it ceased dumping tailings into the Bay on July 1, 1991.
The PAB sought for the enforcement of the order issued by the OP, however, the CA acted on
Marcoppers petition and ordered the PAB to refrain and desist from enforcing aforesaid
Order dated April 23, 1997. The ruling of the CA that the PAB has been divested of
authority to act on pollution-related matters in mining operations is anchored on
the provisions of RA 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995).
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that RA No. 7942 repealed the provisions of RA
No. 3931, as amended by PD No. 984, with respect to the power and function of petitioner
PAB to issue, renew or deny permits for the discharge of the mine tailings
Held: Yes. The SC held that the CA erred in ruling that the PAB had no authority to issue
the Order dated April 23, 1997. The provisions of RA 7942 do not necessarily repeal RA
3931, as amended by PD 984 and EO 192. RA 7942 does not contain any provision
which categorically and expressly repeals the provisions of the Pollution Control
Law. Neither could there be an implied repeal. It is well-settled that repeals of
laws by implication are not favored and that courts must generally assume their
congruent application.
There is no irreconcilable conflict between the two laws. Section 19 of EO 192 vested the
PAB with the specific power to adjudicate pollution cases in general. Sec. 2, par. (a) of PD
984 defines the term pollution as referring to any alteration of the physical, chemical and
biological properties of any water, air and/or land resources of the Philippines , or any
discharge thereto of any liquid, gaseous or solid wastes as will or is likely to create or to
render such water, air and land resources harmful, detrimental or injurious to public health,
safety or welfare or which will adversely affect their utilization for domestic, commercial,
industrial, agricultural, recreational or other legitimate purposes.
On the other hand, the authority of the mines regional director is complementary to that of
the PAB. Section 66 of RA 7942 gives the mines regional director exclusive jurisdiction over
the safety inspection of all installations, surface or underground in mining
operations. Section 67 thereof vests upon the regional director power to issue orders
requiring a contractor to remedy any practice connected with mining or quarrying operations
which is not in accordance with safety and anti-pollution laws and regulations; and to
summarily suspend mining or quarrying operations in case of imminent danger to life or
property.
Thus, there is no genuine conflict between RA 7942 and RA 3931 as amended by PD 984
that precludes their co-existence. Moreover, it has to be conceded that there was no intent
on the part of the legislature to repeal the said law.
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan - 240 SCRA 376 (March 29, 1996)
Facts: Petitioner PCGG issued separate orders against private respondents Sipalay Trading
Corporation and Allied Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as SIPALAY and ALLIED)
to effect their sequestration. Two (2) separate petitions were filed by SIPALAY and ALLIED
before this Court assailing the sequestration orders. After the consolidation of these petitions
and the filing of the comments, other pleadings and certain motions by the parties, this
Court referred the cases to public respondent SANDIGANBAYAN for proper disposition.
Concerning SIPALAY shares of stock in Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corporation which owns
the Century Park Sheraton Hotel are, according to the PCGG, part of Lucio C. Tans ill-gotten
wealth. The PCGG on July 24, 1986 thus sequestered these SIPALAY shares under a
Sequestration Order. SIPALAY maintained that the sequestration was without evidentiary
substantiation, violative of due process, and deemed automatically lifted when no judicial
proceeding was brought against it within the period mandated under Article XVIII, Section 26
of the Constitution.
Anent ALLIED, its Valenzuela branch on August 13, 1986 was served a Search and Seizure
Order by agents of the PCGG directing to submit for search and seizure all bank documents
which the PCGG may find necessary and relevant to the investigation being conducted.
ALLIED contended that this order is not one for sequestration but is particularly a general
search warrant which fails to meet the constitutional requisites for its valid issuance.
The petitions were jointly heard by the SANDIGANBAYAN. However, what the PCGG filed
on July 7, 1993 was not a written formal offer of its evidence as directed by the
SANDIGANBAYAN, but a Motion To Dismiss the SIPALAY and ALLIED petitions.
Admittedly, this motion to dismiss came nearly 7 years after SIPALAY and ALLIED originally
filed their petitions before this Court on September 16, 1986 and August 26, 1986,
respectively. The ground was SIPALAYs and ALLIEDs alleged failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. The PCGG argued that SIPALAY and ALLIED should have first
appealed the sequestration orders to the Office of the President before challenging them in
court, invoking Sections 5 and 6 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations.
The PCGG lost in these cases. Likewise, the SANDIGANBAYAN in its now-assailed August 23,
1993 Decision voided the orders issued against SIPALAY and ALLIED. And after its motion for
reconsideration of the decision was denied in a Resolution promulgated on October 7, 1993,
the PCGG brought the instant petition.
Issues: Whether or not the Sandiganbayans denial of the PCGGs motion to dismiss the
SIPALAY and ALLIED petitions proper
Held: Yes. Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does
not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. The only effect of non-compliance with this rule is
that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to
dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can
take cognizance of the case and try it.
Such tarried maneuver made the PCGG guilty of estoppel by laches - Laches has
been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that which by exercising due diligence could nor should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
With its undenied belated action, 7 years in the making at that, it is only proper to presume
with conclusiveness that the PCGG has abandoned or declined to assert what it bewailed as
the SIPALAY and ALLIED petitions lack of cause of action.
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan - 293 SCRA 440 (July 31, 1998)
Facts: On July 16, 1987, petitioner PCGG filed before the Sandiganbayan a Complaint for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against Spouses Ferdinand
and Imelda Marcos et al. to recover from defendants their alleged ill-gotten wealth. Among
such properties mentioned in the Complaint were shares of stock in various corporations,
including PTIC and PLDT.
On May 4, 1993, private respondents filed a Motion seeking to declare the order of
sequestration against PHI automatically lifted due to: (1) the nonobservance by PCGG of its
own rules and regulations requiring the authority of at least two commissioners for the
issuance of sequestration orders; and (2) the failure of PCGG to file the appropriate judicial
action within the period prescribed under Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution,
or not later than 2 August 1987, since the sequestration order was issued on May 9, 1986,
which was a date before the ratification of the Philippine Constitution on February 1987.
The Sandiganbayan on August 29, 1994 Declared automatically lifted in the earlier
Resolution were the writs of sequestration that the PCGG had issued (a) against Prime
Holdings, Inc. (PHI) and (b) over 111,415 shares of stock of the Philippine
Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC) registered in the name of PHI. The later
Resolution denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the PCGG.
Disagreeing with the above rulings, the PCGG filed the instant petition for certiorari,
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the anti-graft court.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the sequestration orders against PHI and PHI-held shares in PTIC invalid
for it was signed by only one PCGG Commissioner in contravention of the PCGG Rules
requiring the authority of at least two commissioners
(2) Whether or not the sequestration orders be automatically lifted for failure of PCGG to
file the proper judicial action as contemplated under Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution.
Held:
(1) Yes. Section 3 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations, explicitly provides: A writ of
sequestration or a freeze or hold order may be issued by the Commission upon the
authority of at least two Commissioners, based on the affirmation or complaint of an
interested party or motu proprio when the Commission has reasonable grounds to
believe that the issuance thereof is warranted.
As a general rule, contemporaneous construction is resorted to for certainty and
predictability in the laws, especially those involving specific terms having
technical meanings. However, courts will not hesitate to set aside such executive
interpretation when it is clearly erroneous, or when there is no ambiguity in the
rule, or when the language or words used are clear and plain or readily
understandable to any ordinary reader without need for interpretation or
construction.
The construction advanced by petitioner creates rather than clears ambiguity. The fair and
sensible interpretation of the PCGG Rule in question is that the authority given by two
commissioners for the issuance of a sequestration, freeze or hold order should be evident in
the order itself. Simply stated, the writ must bear the signatures of two commissioners,
because their signatures are the best evidence of their approval thereof. Otherwise, the
validity of such order will be open to question and the very evil sought to be avoidedthe
use of spurious or fictitious sequestration orderswill persist.
(2) Yes. For orders issued before the ratification of this Constitution, the corresponding
judicial action or proceeding shall be filed within six months from its ratification. For
those issued after such ratification, the judicial action or proceeding shall be commenced
within six months from the issuance thereof. The sequestration or freeze order is
deemed automatically lifted if no judicial action or proceeding is commenced as herein
provided.
Petitioner contends that there is no need to file a separate action or to independently
implead PHI because PTIC has already been included in the list of alleged ill-gotten wealth of
defendants in said case. The court ruled that the filing of an action directly against a
sequestered corporation, or its impleading in a complaint for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, is
not necessary when (1) a formal complaint has already been filed against the persons
alleged to have unlawfully amassed wealth; (2) such complaint, whether in its body or in an
attachment or annex, refers to specific funds or properties, among which is the sequestered
entity or asset; and (3) such complaint was filed within the period prescribed in Section 26,
Article XVIII of the Constitution. These requisites do not obtain in the case at bar.
Prescription is a legal defense accorded any person against whom a judicial action
is belatedly brought after the lapse of the time specified by law. Here, it is the
Constitution itself which defines the period within which judicial proceedings may be brought
against sequestered entities. From the foregoing, it is clear that no judicial action was
instituted against the private respondents within the prescribed period.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for failure of petitioner to show grave abuse of
discretion on the part of Respondent Court. The assailed Resolutions of Respondent
Sandiganbayan are hereby AFFIRMED.
Republic vs. Republic - 265 SCRA 1 (November 28, 1996)
Facts: This case arose from a complaint filed by Republic Telephone Company, Inc.
(RETELCO, now PLDT), seeking to enjoin the Bureau of Telecommunications (BUTELCO, now
DOTC) from operating and maintaining their local telephone system in Malolos, Bulacan and
from soliciting subscribers in that municipality, alleging that such operations and
maintenance of the telephone system constituted an unfair and ruinous competition to the
detriment of RETELCO who is a grantee of both municipal and legislative franchises for the
purpose.
BUTELCO filed a motion to dismiss the aforesaid petition on the grounds that they are not
the indispensable and real parties in interest in the case and that RETELCO has no cause of
action against them. The motion was denied by IAC (now CA) and an Order was issued
restraining BUTELCO from operating and maintaining the local telephone system in Malolos
and from soliciting customers. The lower court, finding after trial that respondents BUTELCO
was duplicating the functions of RETELCO in contravention of E.O. No. 94, Series of 1947,
rendered a judgment making the preliminary injunction PERMANENT. Respondent appellate
court sustained the court a quos finding.
Hence this petition for certiorari of BUTELCO et al. against RETELCO and IAC.
Issues:
1. Whether or not RETELCO has the exclusive right in operating and maintaining a
telephone system in Government Offices in Bulacan
2. Whether or not the installation and operation of the telephone system by BUTELCO was
illegal
Held:
1. No. RETELCO did not, even under Section 79 (b) of E.O. No. 94, Series of 1947, have the
exclusive right to operate and maintain a telephone system in Malolos, Bulacan. There is
no clear showing by RETELCO, that its franchises are of an exclusive character. In fact,
the SC made it a matter of judicial notice that all legislative franchises for the operation
of a telephone system contain the following provision:
It is expressly provided that in the event the Philippine Government should desire to
maintain and operate for itself the system and enterprise herein authorized, the grantee
shall surrender his franchise and will turn over to the Government said system and all
serviceable equipment therein, at cost, less reasonable depreciation.
1 No. BUTELCOs initiative to operate and maintain a telephone system in Malolos,
Bulacan, was undertaken pursuant to Section 79 (b) of E.O. No. 94. Said provision vested
in BUTELCO the following powers and duties, among others:
(b) To investigate, consolidate, negotiate for, operate and maintain wire-telephone or radio
telephone communication service throughout the Philippines by utilizing such existing
facilities in cities, towns, and provinces as may be found feasible and under such terms and
conditions or arrangements with the present owners or operators thereof as may be agreed
upon to the satisfaction of all concerned x x x.
While SC affirmed in the previous case of Republic v. PLDT, that BUTELCO, under section 79
(b) of E.O. No. 94, may operate and maintain wire telephone or radio telephone
communications throughout the Philippines by utilizing existing facilities in cities, towns, and
provinces under such terms and conditions or arrangement with present owners or operators
as may be agreed upon to the satisfaction of all concerned, SC also at the same time
clarified that nothing in these provisions limits the Bureau to non-commercial activities
or prevents it from serving the general public.
In other words, BUTELCO cannot be said to be prohibited under the aforecited legal provision
from operating and maintaining its own telephone system in Malolos, Bulacan.
WHEREFORE, the petition is HEREBY GRANTED. The decision of respondent CA is hereby
reversed and set aside. The questioned writ of preliminary injunction made permanent by
respondent Court of First Instance (now the RTC) in its judgment, is hereby dissolved for
having been issued without legal basis.
Dimaano, Joielyn D.
SEGOVIA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, 288 SCRA 328, March 27, 1998
FACTS:
Urban filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against Perla Segovia, Reynaldo
Santiago, and Winifredo SM Pangilinan, all hold a regular executive positions in the National
Power Corporation (NPC)
A preliminary investigation was conducted after which Graft Investigation Officer submitted
a Resolution recommending that the petitioners be charged with a violation of Section 3(e)
of RA 3019 for having in one way or the other extended undue advantage to Joint Venture
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence
The case thus proceeded in the Sandiganbayan. The accused were arraigned and entered
pleas of not guilty; and a pre-trial was held which resulted in stipulation of facts embodied in
an order dated January 11, 1996.
Earlier, the People had filed a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite , invoking Section
13 of RA 3019., as amended, and relevant jurisprudence, and alleging that the information/s
is /are valid.
Petitioner opposed the motion. In their pleading, the theorized that the explicit terms of the
law notwithstanding, their suspension was not mandatory in the premises. The opposition
was overruled.
The Sandiganbayan handed down its Resolution suspending them for a period of ninety (90)
days. They held that the suspension was mandated under the law upon a finding that a
proper preliminary investigation had been conducted , the information was valid, and the
accused were charged with any of the crimes specified in the law; and stressed that its
authority and power to suspend the accused had been repeatedly upheld in several
precedents. It subsequently denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to place under preventive suspension
public officers who stand accused before it.
HELD:
It is mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to place under preventive Suspension public officers
who stand accused before it. When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for
any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law. Republic Act No. 3019
unequivocally mandates the suspension of a public official from office pending a criminal
prosecution against him. This Court has repeatedly held that such preventive suspension is
mandatory, and there are no ifs and buts about it.
Dimaano, Joielyn D.
SEMIRA COAL CORPORATION vs SECRETARY OF LABOR, 309 SCRA 292, June, 29,
1999
FACTS:
The petitioner, Semirara Coal Corporation, prays for the reinstatement of the Order of the
Med-Arbiter which excluded the members of Semirara Coal Corporation Supervisory Union
(SECCSUN) allegedly performing a managerial function, from participating in the certification
election among the petitioner's supervisory employees.
On August 21, 1990, a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid ruling was denied by the
Secretary of Labor. The petitioner filed its Manifestation and Motion for the reversal of the
Secretarys Decision but the Secretary of Labor denied for lack of merit the aforementioned
Manifestation and Motion of petitioner.
With the denial of its Manifestation and Motion, petitioner found its way to the court via the
present petition. The petition is not impressed with merit.
Are the supervisory employees of petitioner truly supervisory employees? The Med-Arbiter
and the Secretary of Labor in delving into this pivot of inquiry relied upon the: 1) April 10,
1984 Memorandum entitled Guidelines on Disciplinary Actions; 2) August 29, 1988
Memorandum entitled Processing of Disciplinary Action Cases;19 and 3) Standard Forms of
the Company Disciplinary Memoranda.
Petitioner has theorized that the above cited August 29, 1988 memorandum supersedes the
April 10, 1984 memorandum which expressly indicated the supervisory nature of the
immediate supervisors job. That the 1988 Memorandum vested in the supervisory
employees the power to discipline their subordinates is the bone of its contention. It is
averred that by virtue of the August 29, 1988 memorandum, the immediate supervisors
became managerial employees, and therefore, not entitled to participate in the certification
election.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the August 29, 1988 memorandum supersedes the April 10, 1984
memorandum which expressly indicated the supervisory nature of the immediate
supervisors.
HELD:
The August 29, 1988 memorandum does not supersedes the April 10, 1984 memorandum
which expressly indicated the supervisory nature of the immediate supervisors.A
conscientious scrutiny of the August 29, 1988 memorandum reveals that nothing therein
alters the nature of the duty of the members of SECCSUN from supervisory to managerial.
The duty to conduct a preliminary investigation with the HRD representatives, in the
memorandum in question, is a mere reiteration of the same duty stated in paragraph four
(4) of the April 10, 1984 company memorandum of petitioner.
The claim of petitioner that the Memorandum of 1988 lodged on the supervisors the
ultimate prerogative to determine the guilt of the erring employee and to impose the
penalty on him without an express grant of such power in the same memorandum relied
upon by the petitioner, creates a doubt as to the true status of the employees in the case.
This doubt militates against petitioners stand. Time honored is the rule that in interpreting
the Constitution and labor laws or rules and regulations implementing the constitutional
mandate, the Court has always adopted the liberal approach which favors the exercise of
labor rights.
Dimaano, Joielyn D.
STATE PROSECUTORS vs MURO, 236 SCRA 505, September 19, 1994
FACTS:
The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecution filed a complaint
against respondent Judge Muro on the ground of ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and
violation of the provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct. The case at bar involves the
prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in violation of the Central Bank Foreign
Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank Circular 960 filed by the members of the DOJ Panel
of Prosecutors.
The respondent judge dismissed all 11 cases solely on the basis of the report published from
the 2 newspapers, which the judge believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that
the Pres. of the Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions. The respondents decision
was founded on his belief that the reported announcement of the Executive Department in
the newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the court of its
jurisdiction to further hear the pending case thus motu propio dismissed the case. He further
contends that the announcement of the President as published in the newspaper has made
such fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for the judge to take judicial notice which is
discretionary on his part.
The complainants contend that the respondent judge erred in taking judicial notice on
matters he purported to be a public knowledge based merely on the account of the
newspaper publication that the Pres. has lifted the foreign exchange restriction. It was also
an act of inexcusable ignorant of the law not to accord due process to the prosecutors who
were already at the stage of presenting evidence thereby depriving the government the
right to be heard. The judge also exercised grave abuse of discretion by taking judicial notice
on the published statement of the President in the newspaper which is a matter that has not
yet been officially in force and effect of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial
notice on the statement of the president lifting the foreign exchange restriction published in
the newspaper as basis for dismissing the case.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held the respondent judge guilty for gross ignorance of the law. A
cursory perusal of the comment filed by respondent judge reveals that no substantial
argument has been advanced in plausible justification of his act. He utterly failed to show
any legal, factual, or even equitable justification for the dismissal of the eleven criminal
cases. The explanation given is no explanation at all. The strained and fallacious
submissions therein do not speak well of respondent and cannot but further depreciate his
probity as a judge.
SEPARATE OPINION:
It is an elementary principle in procedural law and statutory construction that the repeal of
a penal law deprives the court of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of
the old law prior to its repeal. Thus, where the crime no longer exists, prosecution of the
person charged under the old law cannot be had and the action should be dismissed.
Dismissing motu proprio the eleven criminal cases without affording the prosecution the
opportunity to be heard on the matter, erroneous though it may be, is not inescapably
indicative of bad faith. The immediate dismissal of the charges is a necessary consequence
of the belief that since the restrictions were lifted, no law was then being violated. It is an
elementary principle in procedural law and statutory construction that the repeal of a penal
law deprives the court of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old
law prior to its repeal. Thus, where the crime no longer exists, prosecution of the person
charged under the old law cannot be had and the action should be dismissed.
Dimaano, Joielyn D.
TIU vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 301 SCRA 278, January 20, 1999
FACTS:
On March 13, 1992, Congress, with the approval of the President, passed into law RA 7227.
This was for the conversion of former military bases into industrial and commercial uses.
Subic was one of these areas. It was made into a special economic zone. In the zone, there
were no exchange controls. Such were liberalized. There was also tax incentives and duty
free importation policies under this law.
On June 10, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 97 (EO 97),
clarifying the application of the tax and duty incentives. Nine days after, the President issued
Executive Order No. 97-A (EO 97-A), specifying the area within which the tax-and-duty-free
privilege was operative.
Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of EO 97-A for allegedly being violative of their
right to equal protection of the laws. This was due to the limitation of tax incentives to Subic
and not to the entire area of Olongapo. The case was referred to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court concluded that such being the case, petitioners could not claim that EO
97-A is unconstitutional, while at the same time maintaining the validity of RA 7227.
The court a quo also explained that the intention of Congress was to confine the covergae of
the SSE to the secured area and not to include the entire Olongapo City and other areas
mentioned in Section 12 of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not E.O. 97-A violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution
HELD:
The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The
classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those
belonging to the same class.
The court believe that it was reasonable for the President to have delimited the application
of some incentives to the confines of the former Subic military base. It is this specific area
which the government intends to transform and develop from its status quo ante as an
abandoned naval facility into a self-sustaining industrial and commercial zone, particularly
for big foreign and local investors to use as operational bases for their businesses and
industries. Why the seeming bias for big investors? Undeniably, they are the ones who can
pour huge investments to spur economic growth in the country and to generate employment
opportunities for the Filipinos, the ultimate goals of the government for such conversion. The
classification is, therefore, germane to the purposes of the law. And as the legal maxim goes,
The intent of a statute is the law.
Felipe, Patricia Anne Q.
Ty vs. Trampe, 250 SCRA 500 , December 01, 1995
FACTS: Ty challenged the validity of the schedule of values prepared solely by the
respondent municipal assessor respecting certain real properties of petitioners located in
Pasig, Metro Manila pursuant to R.A 7610. Petitioner holds that Presidential Decree No. 921
was not repealed by of R.A. 7160 and, therefore, applying the former, the schedule of values
should be made jointly by the city assessors in the districts of Metro Manila.
The repealing clause of R.A. 7160 found in the Section 534 thereof is hereby reproduced as
follows:
Sec. 534. Repealing Clause.
(c) . . . ; and Presidential Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 626, 632, 752, and 1136
are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and effect.
xxx xxx xxx
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charter, decrees, executive orders, proclamations
and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of
the provisions of this Code.
ISSUE: WON P.D. 921 was repealed by R.A. 7160
HELD: NO. It is obvious from the above provisions of R.A 7160, specifically Sec. 534, that
P.D. 921 was NOT EXPRESSLY repealed by said statute.
R.A. 7160 has a repealing provision and, if the intention of the legislature was to abrogate
P.D. 921, it would have included it in such repealing clause, as it did in expressly rendering of
no force and effect several other presidential decrees. Hence, any repeal or modification of
P.D. 921 can only be possible under par. (f) of said Section 534.which partakes of the nature
of a general repealing provision.
It is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An
implied repeal will not be allowed unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated
that the two laws are so clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot coexist. This is based on the rationale that the will of the legislature cannot be overturned by
the judicial function of construction and interpretation. Courts cannot take the place of
Congress in repealing statutes. Their function is to try to harmonize as much as possible,
seeming conflicts in the laws and resolve doubts in favor of their validity and co-existence.
URSUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 256 SCRA 147, April 10, 1996
Facts: Ursua went to the Office of the Ombudsman to serve the request of his lawyer to
obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. He was instructed by
the security officer to register in the visitors logbook. Instead of writing down his name,
Ursua wrote the name Oscar Perez, which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer
who should have brought the letter to that office in the first place. He did so with the prior
express consent of the messenger.
He was convicted for violation of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A.
No. 6085, otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases
ISSUE: WON Ursua is guilty of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085
HELD: NO. Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of
the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a
statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be
construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. [6] The court may consider the
spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers
For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb
the common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names
and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost
bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be
successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed
a thousand and one names. CA. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name,
unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil
register.
An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and
habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is
registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent
authority. A mans name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated
by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several
different names and these are known as aliases. Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a
different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or
indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from
that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This
is so in the case at bench.
There is no evidence showing that petitioner had used or was intending to use that name as
his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name Oscar Perez was made by
petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his
real identity. For, even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman,
petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the
Office of the Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public
records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper
circumstances.
Moreover, As C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute; it should be construed strictly against the State
and in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the
rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which
mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited.
Veterans Federation Party vs. Commission on Elections, 342 SCRA 244 , October 06, 2000
Facts: On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held
simultaneously with the national elections. The COMELEC proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list
representatives from twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two
percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system.
PAGASA alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list
representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under Section 5 (2), Article VI
of the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal application of the two
percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat this
constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52
party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House.
The COMELEC ordered the proclamation of thirty-eight (38) additional party-list
representatives "to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of
Representatives as provided under Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A.
7941.
ISSUE:
1. WON Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is mandatory
2. WON the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in
Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
HELD:
1. NO. Axiomatic is the rule that a provision of law must be read in harmony with the
other provisions.
Article VI, Section 5, subparagraph 1 of the Constitution provides that the House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members x x x
who shall be elected from legislative districts, x x x and those who x x x shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations. The record of the ConCom will show that the delegates considered this
provision as a grant of authority to the legislature, and hence should not be viewed as either
directory or mandatory. Section 5 further provides, under subparagraph (2) thereof, that the
party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. Axiomatic is the rule that a provision of
law must be read in harmony with the other provisions. Consequently, subparagraph (2)
should be accorded a similar treatment as subparagraph (1), i.e., that it is neither directory
nor mandatory, but simply a grant of legislative authority. The prerogative to determine
whether to adjust or change this percentage requirement rests in Congress.
Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial
agencies, is to apply the law as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. Unless
declared unconstitutional, ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by the proper tribunal, a
statute remains a valid command of sovereignty that must be respected and obeyed at all
times. This is the essence of the rule of law.
1 YES. The Court holds that the statutory provision on the two percent requirement is
precise and
crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not
interpretation or circumvention.
The framers of the constitution left the determination of the minimum-vote requirement to
Congress.
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties,
organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of
representation are actually represented in Congress.
Victoria vs. Commission on Elections, 229 SCRA 269 , January 10, 1994
FACTS: Due to the suspension of Governor Romeo Salalima of the Province of Albay, ViceGovernor Danilo Azana automatically assumed the powers and functions of the governor,
leaving vacant his post as vice-governor. Under the law, Azana's position as vice-governor
should be occupied by the highest ranking Sanggunian member, determined on the basis of
the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of
registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election. COMELEC
certified Calisin as first in the order of ranking with Victoria as second ranking member.
Victoria claims that the ranking of the Sanggunian members should not only be based on the
number of votes obtained in relation to the total number of registered voters, but also on the
number of voters in the district who actually voted therein. He further argues that a district
may have a large number of registered voters but only a few actually voted, in which case
the winning candidate would register a low percentage of the number of votes obtained.
Conversely, a district may have a smaller number of registered voters but may have a big
voters' turn-out, in which case the winning candidate would get a higher percentage of the
votes. Applying his formula, petitioner would come out to be the highest ranking Sanggunian
member.
ISSUE: WON the contention of Victoria is valid
HELD: NO. The law is clear that the ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the
basis of the proportion of the votes obtained by each winning candidate of the total number
of registered voters who actually voted. In such a case, the Court has no recourse but to
merely apply the law. The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the
legislature apart from the words (Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista, 207 SCRA 561 [1992]).
Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim, index animi sermo est
(speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by
the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from
construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to
have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are
found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there
should be no departure(Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 206 SCRA 701 (1992).
Fuerte, Ma. Florence R.
Alarilla vs Sandiganbayan - 338 SCRA 485 - August 22, 2000
Facts:
Alarilla, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan,
committing the crime herein charged in relation to and taking advantage of his official
functions, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously level and aim a .45 caliber
pistol at and threaten to kill one Simeon G. Legaspi, during a public hearing about the
pollution from the operations of the Giant Achievers Enterprises Plastic Factory and after the
said complainant rendered a privilege speech critical of the abuses and excesses of the
administration of said accused.
Issue:
Whether or not the first division of the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the offense charged in Criminal
Case # 23069 falls within its jurisdiction
Held:
No. Petition is dismissed
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time
of the institution of the action. Once the court acquires jurisdiction over a controversy, it
shall continue to exercise such jurisdiction until the final determination of the case and it is
not affected by subsequent legislation vesting jurisdiction over such proceedings in another
tribunal. A recognized exception to this rule is when the statute expressly provides, or is
construed to the effect that it is intended to operate upon actions pending before its
enactment. However, where such retroactive effect is not provided for, statutes altering the
jurisdiction of a court cannot be applied to cases already pending prior to their enactment.
The original information in Criminal Case No. 23069 was filed with the Sandiganbayan on
December 1, 1995, whereas the amended information was filed with the same court on
November 8, 1996 and admitted by the Sandiganbayan on January 30, 1997. The applicable
law at this time would be Presidential Decree No. 1606 (PD 1606), as amended by Republic
Act No. 7975 (RA 7975), 35 which took effect on May 16, 1995.36 Section 4 of PD 1606, as
amended by RA 7975,
Allarde vs The Commission on Audit - 218 SCRA 227 - January 29, 1993
Facts:
Rodolfo Allarde was the presiding Judge of Branch 80, Metropolitan Trail Court in Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila. He had resigned and it was accepted January 13, 1997. He applied for
retirement which the Supreme Court approved.
In addition to Allardes retirement pay, GSIS included P240,000 representing the 5-yr lump
sum of his P4,000 allowance from the Municipality of Muntinlupa. This was charged to the
Municipality of Muntinlupa in pursuance of Batas Pambansa Blg. 866, which was subject to
the availability of funds. The Metro Manila Authority had received news regarding this and
had denied Allarde of this benefit.
Issue:
Whether or not the allowance provided by the Municipality of Muntinlupa is included in his
retirement pay
Held:
Petition is denied.
It is clear that allowances that may be included must be either transportation, living and
representation allowance. Allarde failed to prove that the allowance he received from the
Municipality of Muntinlupa was either of this provided thus cannot be considered as
retirement gratuity.
It is an elementary principle of statutory construction that where the words and phrases of a
statute are not obscure or ambiguous, the meaning and intention of the legislature should
be determined from the language employed and where there is no ambiguity in the words,
there is no room for construction.
Accordingly, the provisions of Section 3, P.D, No. 1438, which are clear and unambiguous,
should be given their plain and natural meaning. Inasmuch as the law limits the computation
of the lump sum of 5 years' gratuity to "the highest monthly salary plus the highest monthly
aggregate of transportation, living and representation allowances that the judge was
receiving on the date of his retirement," it is understood that other allowances are excluded.
ALU-TUCP v NLRC - 234 SCRA 278 - August 2, 1994
Facts:
On 5 July 1990, petitioners filed separate complaints for unfair labor practice, regularization
and monetary benefits with the NLRC. The complaints were consolidated and after hearing,
the Labor Arbiter in a Decision dated 7 June 1991, declared petitioners regular project
employees who shall continue their employment as such for as long as such project activity
exists, but entitled to the salary of a regular employee pursuant to the provisions in the
collective bargaining agreement. It also ordered payment of salary differentials. Both parties
appealed to the NLRC from that decision. Petitioners argued that they were regular, not
project, employees. Private respondent, on the other hand, claimed that petitioners are
project employees as they were employed to undertake a specific project NSCs Five Year
Expansion Program.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are properly characterized as project employees rather than
regular employees of NSC
Held:
Yes. Petition is hereby dismissed.
Petitioners claim that their service to NSC of more than six (6) years should qualify them as
regular employees. Court believed this claim is without legal basis. The simple fact that the
employment of petitioners as project employees had gone beyond one (1) year, does not
detract from, or legally dissolve, their status as project employees. The second paragraph of
Article 280 of the Labor Code, quoted above, providing that an employee who has served for
at least one (1) year, shall be considered a regular employee, relates to casual employees,
not to project employees. In the case of Mercado, Sr. vs. National Labor Relations
Commission,11 this Court ruled that the proviso in the second paragraph of Article 280
relates only to casual employees and is not applicable to those who fall within the definition
of said Articles first paragraph, i.e., project employees.
The familiar grammatical rule is that a proviso is to be construed with reference to the
immediately preceding part of the provision to which it is attached, and not to other sections
thereof, unless the clear legislative intent is to restrict or qualify not only the phrase
immediately preceding the proviso but also earlier provisions of the statute or even the
statute itself as a whole. No such intent is observable in Article 280 of the Labor Code, which
has been quoted earlier
Atlas v Commissioner of Internal Revenue - 295 SCRA 721 - September 22, 1998
Facts:
Petitioner purchased from its suppliers, Petrophil and Mobil Oil, quantities of manufactured
oil and other fuels, like diesel and coco-diesel. It actually used these oils and fuels in its
mining operations to run various items of machinery and equipment, motors and vehicles;
Petrophil and Mobil Oil paid the specific taxes imposed by Sections 153 and 156 (formerly
Section 142 and 145) of the 1977 National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) on all the oils and
fuels they manufactured from which was drawn the quantity sold to the petitioner for use in
its operations. On June 14, 1956, Republic Act No. 1435, [An Act to Provide Means for
Increasing the Highway Discretionary Funds], granted in Section 5 thereof, a refund of 25%
of the specific taxes paid on oil products used by miners and forest concessionaires in
their operations.
Invoking Section 5 of Republic Act 1435, petitioner filed with the Court of Tax Appeals
several petitions seeking the refund of 25% of specific taxes paid but further denied,
wherein it was held that the refund privilege granted by Section 5 of R.A. 1435 was impliedly
repealed with the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 711, which took effect on July 1, 1975,
abolishing all special and fiduciary funds;
Issue:
Whether or not CA unnecessarily interpret section 5 of RA 1435, contrary to established
legal principles
Held:
No. Petition denied.
The Court held: A tax cannot be imposed unless it is supported by the clear and express
language of a statute; on the other hand, once the tax is unquestionably imposed, [a] claim
of exemption from tax payments must be clearly shown and based on language in the law
too plain to be mistaken. Since the partial refund authorized under Section 5, RA 1435, is in
the nature of a tax exemption, it must be construed strictissimi juris against the grantee.
Hence, petitioners claim of refund on the basis of the specific taxes it actually paid must
expressly be granted in a statute stated in a language too clear to be mistaken. Court have
carefully scrutinized RA 1435 and the subsequent pertinent statutes and found no
expression of a legislative will authorizing a refund based on the higher rates claimed by
petitioner. The mere fact that the privilege of refund was included in Section 5, and not in
Section 1, is insufficient to support petitioners claim. When the law itself does not explicitly
provide that a refund under RA 1435 may be based on higher rates which were nonexistent
at the time of its enactment, this Court cannot presume otherwise. A legislative lacuna
cannot be filled by judicial fiat.
GARCIA, DOREEN YSABELLE E.
BAGATSING V COMMITTEE 246 SCRA 334 July 14, 1995
FACTS:
PETRON was originally registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in 1966 under the corporate name "Esso Philippines, Inc." ESSO became a
wholly-owned company of the government under the corporate name PETRON and as a
subsidiary of PNOC.PETRON owns the largest, most modern complex refinery in the
Philippines. It is listed as the No. 1corporation in terms of assets and income in the
Philippines in 1993.
President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 50 in the exercise of her
legislative power underthe Freedom Constitution. Implicit in the Proclamation is the need to
raise revenue for the Government and the ideal of leaving business to the private sector by
creating the committee on privatization. The Government can then concentrate on the
delivery of basic services and the performance e of vital public functions.
The Presidential Cabinet of President Ramos approved the privatization of PETRON as
part of the Energy Sector Action Plan. PNOC Board of Directors passed a resolution
authorizing the company to negotiate and conclude a contract with the consortium of
Salomon Brothers of Hongkong Limited and PCI Capital Corporation for financial advisory
services to be rendered to PETRON. The Petron Privatization Working Committee (PWC) was
thus formed. It finalized a privatization strategy with 40% of the shares to be sold to a
strategic partner and 20% to the general public The President approved the 40% 40%
20% privatization strategy of PETRON.
The invitation to bid was published in several newspapers of general circulation, both local
and foreign. The PNOC Board of Directors then passed Resolution No. 866, S. 1993, declaring
ARAMCO the winning bidder. PNOC and ARAMCO signed the Stock Purchase Agreement, the
two companies signed the Shareholders' Agreement.
The petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 112399 sought: (1) to nullify the bidding conducted
for the sale of a block of shares constituting 40% of the capital stock (40% block) of Petron
Corporation (PETRON) and the award made to Aramco Overseas Company, B.V. (ARAMCO) as
the highest bidder and (2) to stop the sale of said block of shares to ARAMCO. The petition
for prohibition and certiorari in G.R. No. 115994 sought to annul the sale of the same block
of Petron shares subject of the petition in G.R. No. 112399.
ARAMCO entered a limited appearance to question the jurisdiction over its person, alleging
that it is a foreign company organized under the laws of the Netherlands, that it is not doing
nor licensed to do business in the Philippines, and that it does not maintain an office or a
business address in and has not appointed a resident agent for the Philippines.
Petitioners however, countered that they filed the action in their capacity as members of
Congress.
ISSUE:WON the Petitioners have a locus standi
HELD: Petition is DISMISSED.
LOCUS STANDI
In Philippine Constitution Association v. Hon. Salvador Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19,
1994, we held that the members of Congress have the legal standing to question the validity
of acts of the Executive which injures them in their person or the institution of Congress to
which they belong. In the latter case, the acts cause derivative but nonetheless substantial
injury which can be questioned by members of Congress (Kennedy v. James, 412 F. Supp.
353 [1976]). In the absence of a claim that the contract in question violated the rights of
petitioners or impermissibly intruded into the domain of the Legislature, petitioners have no
legal standing to institute the instant action in their capacity as members of Congress.
However, petitioners can bring the action in their capacity as taxpayers under the doctrine
laid down in Kilosbayan, Inc v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994).Under said ruling, taxpayers
may question contracts entered into by the national government or government-owned or
controlled corporations alleged to be in contravention of the law. As long as the ruling in
Kilosbayan on locus standi is not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and uphold the
legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present action.
PRIVATIZATION
The only requirement under R.A. No. 7181 in order to privatize a strategic industry like
PETRON is the approval of the President. In the case of PETRON's privatization, the President
gave his approval not only once but twice.
PETRON's privatization is also in line with and is part of the Philippine Energy Program under
R.A. No. 7638.Section 5(b) of the law provides that the Philippine Energy Program shall
include a policy direction towards the privatization of government agencies related to
energy.
BIDDING
On the claim that there was a failed bidding, petitioners contend that there were only three
bidders. One of them, PETRONAS, submitted a bid lower than the floor price while a second,
failed to pre-qualify.
Under said COA Circular, there is a failure of bidding when: 1) there is only one offeror; or (2)
when all the offers are non-complying or unacceptable. In the case at bench, there were
three offerors: SAUDI ARAMCO, PETRONAS and WESTMONT. While two offerors were
disqualified, PETRONAS for submitting a bid below the floor price and WESTMONT for
technical reasons, not all the offerors were disqualified. To constitute a failed bidding under
the COA Circular, all the offerors must be disqualified.
BAAS V CA 325 SCRA 259 February 10, 2000
FACTS:
On February 20, 1976, petitioner, Bibiano V. Baas, Jr. sold to Ayala
Investment Corporation (AYALA), 128,265 square meters of land located at Bayanan,
Muntinlupa, for P2,308,770.00. The Deed of Sale provided that upon the signing of the
contract AYALA shall pay P461,754.00. The balance of one million, eight hundred forty-seven
thousand and sixteen (P1,847,016.00) pesos was to be paid in four equal consecutive annual
installments, with twelve (12%) percent interest per annum on the outstanding balance.
AYALA issued one promissory note covering four equal annual installments. Each periodic
payment of P461,754.00 pesos shall be payable starting on February 20, 1977, and every
year thereafter, or until February 20, 1980.
The same day, petitioner discounted the promissory note with AYALA, for its face value of
P1,847,016.00, evidenced by a Deed of Assignment signed by the petitioner and AYALA.
AYALA issued nine (9) checks to petitioner, all dated February 20, 1976, drawn against Bank
of the Philippine Islands with the uniform amount of P205,224.00.
In the succeeding years, until 1979, petitioner reported a uniform income of P230,877.00 as
gain from sale of capital asset. In his 1980 income tax amnesty return, petitioner also
reported the same amount of P230,877.00 as the realized gain on disposition of capital asset
for the year.
On April 11, 1978, then Revenue Director Mauro Calaguio authorized tax examiners, Rodolfo
Tuazon and Procopio Talon to examine the books and records of petitioner for the year 1976.
They discovered that petitioner had no outstanding receivable from the 1976 land sale to
AYALA and concluded that the sale was cash and the entire profit should have been taxable
in 1976 since the income was wholly derived in 1976.
Tuazon and Talon filed their audit report and declared a discrepancy of P2,095,915.00 in
petitioners 1976 net income. They recommended deficiency tax assessment for
P2,473,673.00. Meantime, Aquilino Larin succeeded Calaguio as Regional Director of Manila
Region IV-A. After reviewing the examiners report, Larin directed the revision of the audit
report, with instruction to consider the land as capital asset. The tax due was only fifty (50%)
percent of the total gain from sale of the property held by the taxpayer beyond twelve
months pursuant to Section 34 of the 1977 National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). The
deficiency tax assessment was reduced P936,598.50, inclusive of surcharges and penalties
for the year 1976.
On June 27, 1980, respondent Larin sent a letter to petitioner informing him of the income
tax deficiency that must be settled immediately.
On September 26, 1980, petitioner acknowledged receipt of the letter but insisted that the
sale of his land to AYALA was on installment.
On June 8, 1981, the matter was endorsed to the Acting Chief of the Legal Branch of the
National Office of the BIR. The Chief of the Tax Fraud Unit recommended the prosecution of a
criminal case for conspiring to file false and fraudulent returns, in violation of Section 51 of
the Tax Code against petitioner and his accountants, Andres P. Alejandre and Conrado Baas.
On June 17, 1981, Larin filed a criminal complaint for tax evasion against the petitioner.
On July 1, 1981, news items appeared in the now defunct Evening Express with the headline:
BIR Charges Realtor and another in the defunct Evening Post with a news item: BIR raps
Realtor, 2 accountants. Another news item also appeared in the July 2, 1981, issue of the
Bulletin Today entitled: 3-face P1-M tax evasion raps. All news items mentioned
petitioners false income tax return concerning the sale of land to AYALA.
On July 2, 1981, petitioner filed an Amnesty Tax Return under P.D. 1740 and paid the amount
of P41,729.81. On November 2, 1981, petitioner again filed an Amnesty Tax Return under
P.D. 1840 and paid an additional amount of P1,525.62. In both, petitioner did not recognize
that his sale of land to AYALA was on cash basis.
Reacting to the complaint for tax evasion and the news reports, petitioner filed with the RTC
of Manila an action6 for damages against respondents Larin, Tuazon and Talon for extortion
and malicious publication of the BIRs tax audit report. He claimed that the filing of criminal
complaints against him for violation of tax laws were improper because he had already
availed of two tax amnesty decrees, Presidential Decree Nos. 1740 and 1840.
The trial court decided in favor of the respondents and awarded Larin damages, as already
stated. Petitioner seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its decision of November
29, 1991, the respondent court affirmed the trial courts decision, thus:
The finding of the court a quo that plaintiff-appellants actions against defendant-appellee
Larin were unwarranted and baseless and as a result thereof, defendant-appellee Larin was
subjected to unnecessary anxiety and humiliation is therefore supported by the evidence on

record.
Defendant-appellee Larin acted only in pursuance of the authority granted to him. In fact,
the criminal charges filed against him in the Tanodbayan and in the City Fiscals Office were
all dismissed. Baas, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 259, G.R. No. 102967 February 10,
2000
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether respondent court erred in ruling that there was no extortion attempt by BIR
officials;
2. Whether respondent court erred in holding that P.D. 1740 and 1840 granting tax
amnesties did not grant immunity from tax suits;
3. Whether respondent court erred in finding that petitioners income from the sale of
land in 1976 should be declared as a cash transaction in his tax return for the same
year (because the buyer discounted the promissory note issued to the seller on
future installment payments of the sale, on the same day of the sale);
4. Whether respondent court erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in
awarding damages to respondent Larin.
HELD:
1. Findings of fact by the Court of Appeals especially if they affirm factual findings of the
trial court will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court, unless these findings are not
supported by evidence.As repeatedly held, findings of fact by the Court of Appeals
especially if they affirm factual findings of the trial court will not be disturbed by this
Court, unless these findings are not supported by evidence. Similarly, neither should
we disturb a finding of the trial court and appellate court that an allegation is not
supported by evidence on record. Thus, we agree with the conclusion of respondent
court that herein private respondents, on the basis of evidence, could not be held
liable for extortion.
2. The mere filing of tax amnesty return under Presidential Decrees 1740 and 1840 does
not ipso facto shield the taxpayer from immunity against prosecutionto avail of a
tax amnesty granted by the government, and to be immune from suit on its
delinquencies, the taxpayer must have voluntarily disclosed his previously untaxed
income and must have paid the corresponding tax on such previously untaxed
income.
3. Although the proceed of a discounted promissory note is not considered part of the
initial payment, it is still taxable income for the year it was converted into cash. The
subsequent payments or liquidation of certificates of indebtedness is reported using
the installment method in computing the proportionate income to be returned, during
the respective year it was realized. Non-dealer sales of real or personal property may
be reported as income under the installment method provided that the obligation is
still outstanding at the close of that year. If the seller disposes the entire installment
obligation by discounting the bill or the promissory note, he necessarily must report
the balance of the income from the discounting not only income from the initial
installment payment.
4. Actual damages cannot be allowed unless supported by evidence on the recordthe
court cannot rely on speculation, conjectures or guesswork as to the fact and amount
of damages.The records of the case contain no statement whatsoever of the
amount of the actual damages sustained by the respondents. Actual damages cannot
be allowed unless supported by evidence on the record. The court cannot rely on
speculation, conjectures or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages. To
justify a grant of actual or compensatory damages, it is necessary to prove with a
reasonable degree of certainty, the actual amount of loss. Since we have no basis
with which to assess, with certainty, the actual or compensatory damages counterclaimed by respondent Larin, the award of such damages should be deleted.

BASBACIO V SEC OF JUSTICE 238 SCRA 5 November 7, 1994
FACTS:
Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were
convicted of frustrated murder and of two counts of frustrated murder for the killing of
Federico Boyon and the wounding of the latters wife Florida and his son Tirso, at Palo,
Calanuga, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, on the night of June 26, 1988. The motive for the killing was
apparently a land dispute between the Boyons and petitioner. Petitioner and his son-in-law
were sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their bonds had
been cancelled.
Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only petitioners appeal proceeded to judgment,
however, as the appeal of the other accused was dismissed for failure to file his brief.
On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on the
ground that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. He
had been pointed to by a daughter of Federico Boyon as the companion of Balderrama when
the latter barged into their hut and without warning started shooting, but the appellate court
ruled that because petitioner did nothing more, petitioners presence at the scene of the
crime was insufficient to show conspiracy.
Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, sec. 3(a), which
provides for the payment of compensation to any person who was unjustly accused,
convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal. The
claim was filed with the Board of Claims of the Department of Justice, but the claim was
denied on the ground that while petitioners presence at the scene of the killing was not
sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there was bad
blood between him and the deceased as a result of a land dispute and the fact that the
convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there was basis for finding that he was probably
guilty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the term unjustly accused, convicted, and imprisoned but
subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal refer to all kinds of accusation
and conviction
HELD: Petitioners contention has no merit.
It would require that every time an accused is acquitted on appeal he must be given
compensation on the theory that he unjustly convicted by the trial court. Such a reading of
Sec 3(a) is contrary to petitioners professed canon of construction that when the language
of the statute is clear, it should be given its natural meaning.
To say then that an accused has been unjustly convicted has to do with the manner of his
conviction rather than with his innocence. An accused may on appeal be acquitted because
he did not commit the crime, but that does not necessarily mean that he is entitled to
compensation for having been the victim of an unjust conviction. If his conviction was due
to an error in the appreciation of the evidence the conviction while erroneous is not unjust.
That is why it is not, on the other hand, correct to say as does respondent, that under the
law liability for compensation depends entirely on the innocence of the accused.
BAYAN V ZAMORA 342 SCRA 449 October 10, 2000
FACTS:
The Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on
August 30, 1951, To further strengthen their defense and security relationship. Under the
treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed
forces, public vessels, and aircraft.
On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of
US military bases in the Philippines.
On July 18, 1997 RP and US exchanged notes and discussed, among other things, the
possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).This resulted to a series of
conferences and negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter,
President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon
and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent
Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the
Philippines,the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for
concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners as legislators, non-governmental
organizations, citizens and taxpayers assail the constitutionality of the VFA and impute to
herein respondents grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.
Petitioner contends, under they provision cited, the foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently
met: a) it must be a treaty,b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by
congress, and c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what
is requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least twothirds of all the members of the senate.
ISSUE:Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article
XVIII of the Constitution?
HELD: Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign
military bases, troops or facieities should apply in the instant case.
The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the
Senate on treaties or international agreements. Sec. 21 Art. VII, which respondent invokes,
reads: No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in
by at least 2/3 of all the Members of the Senate. Sec. 25 Art. XVIII provides : After the
expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the RP and the US concerning Military Bases,
foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under
a treaty duly concurred in and when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of votes
cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a
treaty by the Senate by the other contracting state.
The first cited provision applies to any form of treaties and international agreements in
general with a wide variety of subject matter. All treaties and international agreements
entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage or particular
designation requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective.
In contrast, the second cited provision applies to treaties which involve presence of foreign
military bases, troops and facilities in the Philippines. Both constitutional provisions share
some common ground. The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Sec.
21 Art. VII, and that Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision is
immaterial.
Gargaritano, Angelo Ibaez
BAYLON vs CA 312 SCRA 502 Aug. 17, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner introduced Tomacruz to Luanzon, telling Tomacruz that Luaznon has been engaged
in business as a contractor for 20 years and urged the former to lend money to the latter.
Tomacruz lent Luanzon 150,000 and with the transaction, a promissory note acknowledging
receipt of the said amount and an obligation for payment on August 22, 1987, signed by the
latter, and Baylon as guarantor, was issued. With this Luanzon issued a postdated check.
Subsequently, Luanzon issued another check replacing the former, dated December 22,
1987. Several checks in the amount of 7500 each were also issued.
Day came that Tomacruz made a written demand to which Luanzon did not heed. She filed a
case for the collection of money against Luanzon, and petitioner, but summons was never
served upon Luanzon. Petitioner claims that Tomacruz did not give Luanzon the 150,000 as a
loan but rather as an investment and denied that she issued checks to guarantee payment.
Petitioners aver that if there was a loan, that Tomacruz has not exhausted the property of
the principal debtor nor has resorted to all legal remedies required by law. RTC ruled in favor
of Tomacruz. CA affirmed.
Baylon petitions that the respondent court erred in judgement finding her liable to Tomacruz,
the latter not having taken steps to exhaust the property of Tomacruz nor resorted to all
legal remedies provided by law against the principal debtor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner, as guarantor, should be liable.
HELD:
No. Without a doubt, the promissory notes content clearly established a creditor-debtor
relationship between Tomacruz and Luanzon. And if it is clear and leaves no doubt as to its
intention, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall control, without need of resorting to
extrinsic aids.
However, petitioner claims that she is but a guarantor and that the law, specifically Article
2058 of the Civil Code, provides that the principal debtors assets must first be exhausted
before resorting to the guarantors. Thus, the creditor can only hold the guarantor liable if
judgment has been obtained against the principal debtor and he is unable to pay. It is
premature for the Court to determine guarantors liability and entitlement to the
concomitant right (invoking benefit of excussion), without having obtained judgement
against the principal debtor.
Petition is granted and questioned CA decision and resolution are set aside.
BERCES vs GUINGONA 241 SCRA 539 Feb. 21 1995
FACTS:
Petitioner filed 2 administrative cases against Corral, incumbent mayor of Tiwi, Albay with
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay: 1) abuse of authority and oppression for nonpayment of accrued leave benefits due the petitioner; 2) dishonesty and abuse of authority
for installing a water pipeline for her private residence and clinic maintained and paid for by
the municipality.
Sangguniang Panlalawigan ruled in favor of the petitioner. 1) Corral is to give petitioner the
sum of money due him and is suspended for 2 months from office; 2) Corral is suspended for
3 months beginning after her service of the first penalty and is to reimburse the municipality
half the amount of what the latter paid for electric and water bills.
Corral appealed to the Office of the President for the stay of execution by virtue of Sec. 67(b)
of the Local Government Code. To which the Office of the President directed a stay of
execution governed by Sec. 68 of R.A. No 7160 and Sec. 6 of Administrative Order 18.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Petitioner then filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for mandatory preliminary injunction, assailing the
Order of the Office of the President as having been issued with grave abuses of discretion.
The petition was devoid of merit. But petitioner invoked the repealing clause of Sec. 530(f)
of R.A. No. 7160.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 68 of R.A. No. 7160 repealed Sec. 6 of Admin Order 18.
HELD:
No. It was ruled that Sec. 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and Sec. 6 of Admin Order 18 are not
irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant and the two must in fact be read together. The first
sentence of Sec. 68 provides appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or
executory, and this leaves room for construing as giving discretion to the reviewing officials
to stay the execution of the appealed decision. If there was intent to repeal Sec. 6 of Admin
Order 18, more direct language could have been used.
The term shall may be read either as mandatory or directory. Its meaning is dependent on
consideration of the entire provision where it is found, and its object and consequences
following the construing either way.
In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a
prior law unless there is an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy existing between
the 2 laws.
BLAQUERA vs ALCALA 295 SCRA 366 Sept. 11 1998
FACTS:
President Cory Aquino issued Admin Order 268 granting each official and employee of the
government the productivity incentive in a maximum amount equivalent to 30% of the
employees one month basic salary but cannot be less than 2,000. Admin Order provided
that incentive benefits shall be granted only for the year 1991.
Petitioners have been given incentive benefits for the year 1992. In 1993, President Ramos
issued Admin Order 29 allowing the productivity incentive benefits for 1992 in the maximum
amount of 1,000, and reiterating the prohibition under Sec. 7 of Admin Order 268, enjoining
the grant of the said benefits without prior approval of the President. Sec. 4 of Admin Order
29 directed all government departments, offices and agencies which authorized the
incentive for 1992 in excess of 1,000 to immediately cause the refund of the excess. In
compliance, head of the different agencies and departments deducted from the petitioners
salaries or allowances the amount needed to cover the alleged overpayments.
ADEPT is an association of PTA employees whose members were granted incentive bonus for
1992 pursuant to Rep Act No. 6971 or the Incentives Act of 1990. Corporate auditor
disallowed the act as it was in violation of Admin Order 29. ADEPT brought the appeal to
COA which denied it stating that Rep. Act No. 6971 refer only to business enterprises
including government owned/controlled corporations performing proprietary acts, under Sec.
3.
Petitioner contends that PTA is a government-owned and controlled corporation performing
proprietary functions. The Court reviewed its charter as established by Presidential Decree
No. 189.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PTA is covered by Rep Act 6971.
HELD:
No. PTA is a government-owned and controlled corporation with original charter subject to
Civil Service Law whose incentives award system is within the scope of Sec.1, Rule 10 of the
Omnibus Rules, implementing EO 292.
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted wit
reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together
with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. The
provisions of Rep Act 6971, taken together, reveal the legislative intent to include only
government-owned and controlled corporations performing proprietary functions within its
coverage.
BUENASEDA vs FLAVIER Sept. 11, 1993
FACTS:
NCMH Nurses Association filed a case of graft and corruption against Dr. Buenaseda and
other government officials of DOH. The Ombudmsan ordered the suspension of Buenaseda
and other DOH employees involved. Flavier, DOH secretary carried out their suspension.
Buenaseda filed for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus questioning the suspension order.
NCMH filed their comment on the petition and attached a Motion for Disbarment against
Buenasedas lawyers.
The said lawyers advised Buenaseda not to obey the suspension order. The Solicitor General
agreed with Buenasedas lawyers stating that the Ombudsman can only recommend
suspension but cannot order it himself, invoking Sec. 13(3), Article XI of the 1987
Constitution. The Solicitor General
ISSUE:
Can the Ombudsman impose the suspension?
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court clarified that what the Ombudsman issued was an order for
preventive suspension, in order for him to conduct such investigation in an expeditious and
efficient manner (Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770), and this is a procedural statute not a penal
statute. The need for the preventive suspension may arise from several causes, among
them, the danger of tampering or destruction of evidence in the possession of respondent;
the intimidation of witnesses, etc. The Ombudsman should be given the discretion to decide
when the persons facing administrative charges should be preventively suspended.
Penal statutes are strictly construed while procedural statutes are liberally construed. A
Code prescribing the procedure in criminal cases is not a penal statute and is to be
interpreted liberally. A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution
should be liberally construed for the advancement of the purposes and objectives for which
it was created.
Regarding the suspension the lawyers of Buenaseda and the Solicitor General brought
about, we look into the provision of law they invoked, Sec. 13(3), Article XI of the 1987
Constitution. Under the rule of Noscitor a sociis, the word "suspension" should be given the
same sense as the other words with which it is associated. When the constitution vested on
the Ombudsman the power "to recommend the suspension" of a public official or employees
(Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to "suspension," as a punitive measure. All the words associated
with the word "suspension" in said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases,
e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of
various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering the
company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated.
Garin, Diana M.
CAGAYAN SUGAR MILLING COMPANY VS. SECRETARY OF LABOR- 284 SCRA 150January 15, 1998
Facts: Petitioner impugns the decision of the respondent, dismissing its appeal and
upholding the Order of Regional Director, finding petitioner guilty of violating Regional Wage
Order No. RO2-021.Regional Wage Order No.
RO2-021 was issued by the Regional Tripartite Wage and Productivity Board, which provides
increase in the statutory minimum wages applicable to workers and employees in the
private sector of Region II.
Labor inspectors from the DOLE Regional Office examined the books of petitioner to
determine its compliance with the wage order. They found that petitioner violated the wage
order as it did not implement an across the board increase in the salary of its employees. At
the hearing at the DOLE Regional Office for the alleged violation, petitioner maintained that
it complied with Wage Order No. RO2-02 as it paid the mandated increase in the minimum
wage.
Petitioner appealed to public respondent. On the same time, the Regional Wage Board
issued Wage Order No. RO2-02-A, amending the earlier wage order, which is curative in
nature and shall retroact.
Respondent dismissed petitioners appeal and affirmed the Order of Regional Director.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
DOLE regional sheriff served on petitioner a notice of garnishment of its account with the Far
East Bank and Trust Company; he seized petitioners dump truck and scheduled its public
sale.
The Court issued a TRO enjoining respondents from enforcing the writ of execution. Upon
petitioners motion, the Court amended the TRO by also enjoining respondents from
enforcing the Decision of the Secretary of Labor and conducting further proceedings until
further orders from this Court.
Issue: Whether or not Wage Order no. RO2-02-A clearly provided for the fixing of a statutory
minimum wage rate and not an across the board increase in wages.
Held: No. It is not just to expect an employer to interpret a Wage Order to mean that it
grant an across the board increase where such interpretation is not sustained by its text.
Petitioner clearly complied with Wage Order RO2-02 which provided for an increase in
statutory minimum wage rates for employees in Region II. It is not just to expect petitioner
to interpret Wage Order RO2-02 to mean that it grant an across the board increase as such
interpretation is not sustained by its text. Indeed, the Regional Wage Board had to amend
Wage Order RO2-02 to clarify this alleged intent
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Secretary of Labor is set
aside for lack of merit.
Garin, Diana M.
Yuchengco vs. Republic- 333 SCRA 368-November 15, 2000
Facts: Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint with the Sandiganbayan against
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda Marcos and Prime Holdings,. Alleging ownership of the
properties of the Marcoses sought to be forfeited by the Republic. Thereafter, petitioner
Yuchengco filed a motion for intervention and complaint-in-intervention.
Petitioner paid a docket fee of P400.00 and petitioned to the Court that the Sandiganbayan
has no power or discretion to ignore or amend the provision in Section 11 of P.D. 1606
(which disallows any kinds of payments), simply on the basis of public policy. Petitioner
points out that Executive Order No. 14 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino did not amend
the said provision; hence, payment of docket fees in the Sandiganbayan is legally without
basis. In additions, the petitioners position that subsequent amendments to PD 1606 did not
expressly repeal Section 11; he also argues that R.A. 7975, having been promulgated on
March 30, 1995 should not be retroactively applied.
Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 14 issued by President Corazon Aquino amends
the provision of P.D. 1606
Held: Yes.Petitioner has failed to appreciate that the expansion of the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction to include civil cases impliedly amended the same and Section 1, Rule IV, Part I
of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, the Supreme Court enjoys exclusive
power to promulgate the rules on pleading, practice, and procedure. In addition, Republic
Act No. 7975 amended Section 9 of P.D. 1606 to read as follows: Rules of Procedure.The
Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court shall apply to all cases and proceedings
filed with the Sandiganbayan. x x x Hence, Rule 141 Section 7(a) of the Rules of Court
applies to petitioners complaint and/or amended complaints-in-intervention. This is not so,
as statutes regulating the procedure of the courts are applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, thus, retrospective in such sense and to that
extent.
Therefore, Executive Order No. 14 amended the contested provisions of P.D.1606
Garin, Diana M.
Castillex v Vasquez- 321 SCRA 393- December 21, 1999
Facts: Romeo Vasquez was driving a motorcycle around Fuente Osmea Rotunda. He was
traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any
protective helmet or goggles. Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad,manager of Appellant
Castilex Industrial Corporation drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of
going around the Osmea rotunda he made a short cut against the flow of the traffic.
In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other
causing severe injuries to the former. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the
Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. Thereafter, Vasquez died.
A criminal case was filed against Abad and it was commenced by the parents of the
deceased against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation.
The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents Vicente and Luisa Vasquez and ordered
Abad and Castilex to pay jointly and solidarily
Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and CASTILEX liable but
held that the liability of the latter is "only vicarious and not solidary" with the former. .
Upon CASTILEX's motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals modified its decision by
reducing the award of moral damages.
Hence, CASTILEX filed the instant petition contending that the Court of Appeals that ABAD
was deemed to have been always acting within the scope of his assigned task even outside
office hours because he was using a vehicle issued to him by petitioner;
Issue: Whether or not the accused is working within the scope of his assigned task
Held:No. The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the
service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions, while the fifth paragraph
encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task.
The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included.
Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or
industry, are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task,
even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their
functions.
ABAD, who was presented as a hostile witness, testified that at the time of the incident, he
was driving a company-issued vehicle, registered under the name of petitioner. He was then
leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after
having done overtime work for the petitioner.
The court states that the mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the
injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent
operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the
course or scope of his employment.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the petitioner's
office. Thereafter, he went to Goldie's Restaurant in Fuente Osmea, Cebu City, which is
about seven kilometers away from petitioner's place of business. A witness for the private
respondents, a sidewalk vendor, testified that Fuente Osmea is a "lively place" even at
dawn because Goldie's Restaurant and Back Street were still open and people were drinking
thereat. ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not
in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00
a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond the normal working hours. ABAD's working day had
ended; his overtime work had already been completed.
Thus, justice and equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the
consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle.
Garin, Diana M.
Centeno vs. Villalon-Pornillos- 236 SCRA 197- September 1, 1994
Facts: Sometime in the last quarter of 1985, the officers of a civic organization known as
the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of
renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno, the
chairman of the group, together with Vicente Yco, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a
resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the
solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
Based on the complaint of Judge Angeles, an information was filed against petitioner Martin
Centeno, together with Religio Evaristo and Vicente Yco, for violation of Presidential Decree
No. 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law, before the Municipal Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 2, and docketed as. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground
that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense, claiming that Presidential Decree
No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable or public welfare purposes, but not
those made for a religious purpose such as the construction of a chapel.
This was denied by the trial court, and petitioners motion for reconsideration having met
the same fate, trial on the merits ensued.The trial court rendered judgment finding accused
Vicente Yco and petitioner Centeno guilty
Both accused Centeno and Yco appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 10. However, accused Yco subsequently withdrew his appeal, hence the case
proceeded only with respect to petitioner Centeno.
Respondent Judge Villalon-Pornillos affirmed the decision of the lower court but modified the
penalty
The petitioner appealed the decision of the appellate court to the Supreme Court.
Issue: (1) the term religious purpose is not expressly included in the provisions of the
statute, hence what the law does not include, it excludes;
(2) penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused; and
Held: (1) Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention
of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the
familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its terms, is
expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have
made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning
and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
While it is true that there is no religious purpose which is not also a charitable purpose, yet
the converse is not equally true, for there may be a charitable purpose which is not
religious in the legal sense of the term. Although the term charitable may include
matters which are religious, it is a broader term and includes matters which are not
religious, and, accordingly, there is a distinction between charitable purpose and
religious purpose.
1 For, it is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly against
the State and liberally in favor of the accused. They are not to be extended or
enlarged by implications, intendments, analogies or equitable considerations. They
are not to be strained by construction to spell out a new offense, enlarge the field of
crime or multiply felonies. Hence, in the interpretation of a penal statute, the
tendency is to subject it to careful scrutiny and to construe it with such strictness as
to safeguard the rights of the accused. If the statute is ambiguous and admits of two
reasonable but contradictory constructions, that which operates in favor of a party
accused under its provisions is to be preferred.
JALALON, JEANINE VANESSA R.

CIR vs S.C. JOHNSON & SON- 309 SCRA 87- June 25, 1999
Facts: Pursuant to the license agreement entered into by private respondent S.C. Johnson
and Son, U.S.A., the private respondent was granted, among others, the right to use the
trademark, patents and technology of SC Johnson and Son, U.S.A. and was obliged to pay to
the latter royalties based on a percentage of net sales. The said royalties were subjected by
the government to a 25% withholding tax. Consequently, from July, 1992 to May, 1993, the
private respondent paid a total withholding tax in the amount of P1,603,433.00. However,
on October 29, 1993 the private respondent filed before the International Tax Affairs Division
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue a claim for refund of the overpaid withholding tax on
royalties in the amount of P963,266.00. The Commissioner, not having acted on the claim
for refund, the private respondent then filed a petition for review before the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) wherein the latter rendered a decision in favor of tax refund. The Court of
Appeals affirmed in toto the CTA ruling. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that under Article 13(2) (b) (iii) of the RP-US Tax Treaty, which is known
as the most favored nation clause, the lowest rate of the Philippine tax at 10% may be
imposed on royalties derived by a resident of the United States from sources within the
Philippines only if the circumstances of the resident of the United States are similar to those
of the resident of West Germany. Since the RP-US Tax Treaty contains no matching credit
provision as that provided under Article 24 of the RP-West Germany Tax Treaty, the tax on
royalties under the RP-US Tax Treaty is not paid under similar circumstances as those
obtaining in the RP-West Germany Tax Treaty.
Issue: WON S.C. Johnson & Son is entitled for refund.
Ruling: No. The Court ruled that the RP-US and the RP-West Germany Tax Treaties do not
contain similar provisions on tax crediting. Article 24 of the RP-Germany Tax Treaty,
expressly allows crediting against German income and corporation tax of 20% of the gross
amount of royalties paid under the law of the Philippines. On the other hand, Article 23 of
the RP-US Tax Treaty, which is the counterpart provision with respect to relief for double
taxation, does not provide for similar crediting of 20% of the gross amount of royalties paid.
The Court agreed with petitioner that since the RP-US Tax Treaty does not give a matching
tax credit of 20 percent for the taxes paid to the Philippines on royalties as allowed under
the RP-West Germany Tax Treaty, private respondent cannot be deemed entitled to the 10%
percent rate granted under the latter treaty for the reason that there is no payment of taxes
on royalties under similar circumstances. It bears stress that tax refunds are in the nature of
tax exemptions. As such they are regarded as in derogation of sovereign authority and to be
construed strictissimi juris against the person or entry claiming the exemption. The
burden of proof is upon him who claims the exemption in his favor and he must be able to
justify his claim by the clearest grant of organic or statute law. Private respondent is
claiming for a refund of the alleged overpayment of tax on royalties; however, there is
nothing on record to support a claim that the tax on royalties under the RP-US Tax Treaty is
paid under similar circumstances as the tax on royalties under the RP-West Germany Tax
Treaty.
China Banking Corporation vs. CA - 265 SCRA 327- December 5, 1996
Facts: China Banking Corporation (China Bank) extended several loans to Native West
International Trading Corporation (Native West) and to So Ching, Native Wests president.
Native West in turn executed promissory notes[1] in favor of China Bank. So Ching, with the
marital consent of his wife, Cristina So, additionally executed two mortgages over their
properties, viz., a real estate mortgage executed on July 27, 1989 covering a parcel of land
situated in Cubao, Quezon City, under TCT No. 277797,[2] and another executed on August
10, 1989 covering a parcel of land located in Mandaluyong, under TCT No. 5363.[3] The
promissory notes matured and despite due demands by China Bank neither private
respondents Native West nor So Ching paid. Pursuant to a provision embodied in the two
mortgage contracts, China Bank filed petitions for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the
mortgaged properties before Notary Public Atty. Renato E. Taguiam for TCT No. 277797,[4]
and Notary Public Atty. Reynaldo M. Cabusora for TCT No. 5363,[5] copies of which were
given to the spouses So Ching and Cristina So. After due notice and publication, the notaries
public scheduled the foreclosure sale of the spouses real estate properties on April 13, 1993.
Eight days before the foreclosure sale, however, private respondents filed a complaint
[6]with the Regional Trial Court[7]for accounting with damages and with temporary
restraining order against petitioners alleging the following cause of action: Defendants
failed to comply with the mandates of Administrative Order No. 3 of the Supreme
Court dated October 19, 1984.
On April 7, 1993, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin the
foreclosure sale. Thereafter counsels for the respective parties agreed to file their pleadings
and to submit the case, without further hearing, for resolution. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON Administrative Order No. 3 is superior over a statute.
Ruling: No. A statue is superior to an administrative directive and the former cannot be
repealed nor amended by the latter.At any rate, Administrative Order No.3 cannot prevail
over Act no. 3135 (Act 3135 Extra Judicial Foreclosure Law), as amended. It is an elementary
principle in statutory construction that a statue is superior to an administrative directive and
the former cannot be repealed or amended by the latter.

China Banking Corporation vs. HDMF- 307 SCRA 443- May 19, 1999
Facts: Petitioners applied for the renewal of waiver of Fund coverage for the year 1996.
However, their applications were disapproved by the respondent HDMF Board on ground that
their retirement plan is not superior to Pag-ibig Fund. Further, Section 1, Rule VII of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing R.A. 7742, and the HDMF Circular No. 124-B prescribing the
Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing Applications for Waiver or Suspension of Fund
Coverage under P.D. 1752, as amended by R.A. 7742 provides that to qualify for waiver or
suspension of fund coverage, a company must have provident and housing plan which are
both superior to Pag-ibig Funds. Petitioners thus filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati seeking to annul and declare void the aforesaid
Amendment and Guidelines claiming that respondents exceeded its limit. Furthermore, the
law provides as a condition for exemption from coverage, the existence of either a superior
(retirement) plan, and/or a superior housing plan, and not the existence of both plans. On
the other hand, respondents claimed that the use of the words and/or in Section 19 of P.D.
No. 1752 can only be used interchangeably and not together, and the option of making it
either both or any one belongs to the Board of Trustees of HDMF, which has the power and
authority to issue rules and regulations for the effective implementation of the Pag-ibig Fund
Law, and the guidelines for the grant of waiver or suspension of coverage. Respondents
filed a motion to dismiss, which was subsequently granted by the trial court. Petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari which, however, was dismissed by the trial court ruling that
respondents did not exceed its jurisdiction and petitioners have lost their right to appeal. In
addition, the trial court ruled that certiorari will not lie as a substitute for a lost remedy of
appeal. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this instant
petition.
Issue: WON the use of words and/or are to be used interchangeably.
Ruling: Yes. The controversy lies in the legal signification of the words and/or. In the instant
case, the legal meaning of the words and/or should be taken in its ordinary signification, i.e.,
either and or; e.g. butter and/or eggs means butter and eggs or butter or eggs. The term
and/or means that effect shall be given to both the conjunctive and and the disjunctive or; or
that one word or the other may be taken accordingly as one or the other will best effectuate
the purpose intended by the legislature as gathered from the whole statute. The term is
used to avoid a construction which by the use of the disjunctive or alone will exclude the
combination of several of the alternatives or by the use of the conjunctive and will exclude
the efficacy of any one of the alternatives standing alone. It is accordingly ordinarily held
that the intention of the legislature in using the term and/or is that the word and and the
word or are to be used interchangeably.

CIR vs CA - 301 SCRA 152 - January 20, 1999
Facts: Don Andres Soriano, a citizen and resident of the United States formed in the 1930s
the corporation A Soriano Y Cia, predecessor of ANSCOR. On December 30, 1964 Don
Andres died. On June 30, 1968, pursuant to a Board Resolution,ANSCOR redeemed 28,000
common shares from Don Andres estate. By November 1968, the Board further increased
ANSCORs capital stock to P75M divided into 150,000 preferred shares and 600,000 common
shares. About a year later ANSCOR again redeemed 80,000 common shared from Don
Andres estate, further reducing the latters common shareholdings. ANSCORs business
purpose for both redemptions of stock is to partially retire said stocks as treasury shares in
order to reduce the companys foreign exchange remittances in case cash dividends are
declared. In 1973, after examining ANSCORs books of account and records Revenue
Examiners issued a report proposing that ANSCOR be assessed for deficiency withholding
tax-at-source, pursuant to Sections 53 and 54 of the 1939 Revenue Code for the year 1968
and the second quarter of 1969 based on the transactions of exchange and redemptions and
exchange of stocks. In its decision, the CTA reversed the BIRs ruling after finding sufficient
evidence to overcome the prima facie correctness of the questioned assessments. In a
petition for review, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the CTA. Hence, the present
petition.
Issue: WON ANSCORs redemption of stocks from its stockholders as well as the exchange of
common shared can be considered as equivalent to the distribution of taxable dividend
making the proceeds thereof taxable under the provisions Section 83 (B) of the 1939
Revenue Act.
Ruling: No. Not being a taxpayer, a withholding agent, like ANSCOR in this transaction, is
not protected by the amnesty under the decree.
Codal provisions on withholding tax are mandatory and must be complied with by the
withholding agent.[55] The taxpayer should not answer for the non-performance by the
withholding agent of its legal duty to withhold unless there is collusion or bad faith. The
former could not be deemed to have evaded the tax had the withholding agent performed
its duty. This could be the situation for which the amnesty decree was intended. Thus, to
curtail tax evasion and give tax evaders a chance to reform,[56] it was deemed
administratively feasible to grant tax amnesty in certain instances. In addition, a tax
amnesty, much like a tax exemption, is never favored nor presumed in law and if granted by
a statute, the terms of the amnesty like that of a tax exemption must be construed strictly
against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority.[57] The rule on strictissimi
juris equally applies.[58] So that, any doubt in the application of an amnesty law/decree
should be resolved in favor of the taxing authority.
Layos, Alexander
CITY GOVERNMENT OF SAN PABLO, LAGUNA
vs. HONORABLE BIENVENIDO V. REYES
305 SCRA 353
March 25, 1999
FACTS: This is a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to review on a pure question of
law the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch 29 in Civil Case No.SP4459(96). The RTC declared the imposition of franchise tax under Section 2.09 Article D of
Ordinance No. 56 otherwise known as the Revenue Code of the City of San Pablo as
ineffective and void insofar as the respondent MERALCO is concerned for being violative of
Act No. 3648, Republic Act No. 2340 and PD 551. The RTC also granted MERALCOS claim for
refund of franchise taxes paid under protest.
Act No. 3648 granted the Escudero Electric Services Company, a legislative franchise to
maintain and operate an electric light and power system in the City of San Pablo and nearby
municipalities Section 10 of Act No. 3648 provides:
In consideration of the franchise and rights hereby granted, the grantee shall pay unto the
municipal treasury of each municipality in which it is supplying electric current to the public
under this franchise, a tax equal to two percentum of the gross earnings from electric
current sold or supplied under this franchise in each said municipality. Said tax shall be due
and payable quarterly and shall be in lieu of any and all taxes of any kind, nature or
description levied, established or collected by any authority whatsoever, municipal,
provincial or insular, now or in the future, on its poles, wires, insulators, switches,
transformers, and structures, installations, conductors, and accessories place in and over
and under all public property, including public streets and highways, provincial roads,
bridges and public squares, and on its franchise, rights, privileges, receipts, revenues and
profits from which taxes the grantee is hereby expressly exempted.
Escuderos franchise was transferred to the plaintiff (herein respondent) MERALCO under
Republic Act No. 2340.
ISSUE: Whether or not City Government of San Pablo, Laguna may impose a local franchise
tax to MERALCO.
HELD: Yes, A general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law by mere
implication unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest and it must be convincingly
demonstrated that the two laws are so clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they
cannot co-exist.
It is our view that petitioners correctly rely on the provisions of Section 137 and 193 of the
LGC to support their position that MERALCOs tax exemption has been withdrawn. The
explicit language of Section 137 which authorizes the province to impose franchise tax
notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special laws" is allencompassing and clear. The franchise tax is imposable despite any exemption enjoyed
under special laws.
Section 193 buttresses the withdrawal of extant tax exemption privileges. By stating that
unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently
enjoyed by all persons whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or
controlled corporations except 1) local water districts, 2) cooperatives duly registered under
R.A. 6938, (3) non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are withdrawn
upon the effectivity of this code, the obvious import is to limit the exemptions to the three
enumerated entities. It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention
of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others as expressed in the familiar
maxim expressio unius est exlcusio alterius. In the absence of any provision of the Code to
the contrary, and we find no other provision of the Code to the contrary, and we find no
other provision in point, any existing tax exemption or incentive enjoyed by MERALCO under
existing law was clearly intended to be withdrawn.
Reading together Sections 137 and 193 of the LGC, we conclude that under the LGC the
local government unit may now impose a local tax at a rate not exceeding 50% of 1% of the
gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar year based on the incoming receipts
realized within its territorial jurisdiction. The legislative purpose to withdraw tax privileges
enjoyed under existing law or charter is clearly manifested by the language used in Section
137 and 193 categorically withdrawing such exemption subject only to the exceptions
enumerated. Since it would be not only tedious and impractical to attempt to enumerate all
the existing statutes providing for special tax exemptions or privileges the LGC provided for
an express, albeit general, withdrawal of such exemptions or privileges. No more
unequivocal language could have been used.
It is true that the phrase in lieu of all taxes found in special franchises has been held in
several cases to exempt the franchise holder from payment of tax on its corporate franchise
imposed by the Internal Revenue Code, as the charter is in the nature of a private contract
and the exemption is part of the inducement for the acceptance of the franchise, and that
the imposition of another franchise tax by the local authority would constitute an
impairment of contract between the government and the corporation. But these magic
words contained in the phrase shall be in lieu of all taxes. Have to give way to the
peremptory language of the LGC specifically providing for the withdrawal of such exemption
privileges.
Layos, Alexander
COMELEC vs. Noynay

292 SCRA 254
July 9, 1998
FACTS: In 1996, the Commission on Elections filed criminal cases against certain individuals
for violations of the Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code. The cases were filed with a
Regional Trial Court in Samar presided over by Judge Tomas Noynay. Judge Noynay however
dismissed the said cases as he ruled that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the said cases
because said criminal offenses were punishable with less than six years imprisonment. He
said that said cases should be filed with the MTC.
Atty. Jose Balbuena, member of COMELECs legal department, filed a motion for
reconsideration. He cited a case entitled: Alberto Naldeza vs Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr.
According to Atty. Balbuena, in the said case he cited, the Supreme Court has already settled
the issue and Atty. Balbuena even copied in toto the said ruling by the Supreme Court in his
motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Tomas Noynay is right in dismissing the case.
HELD: No, The Supreme Court admonished Judge Noynay for dismissing the case as the
same was contrary to Section 32 of B.P. 129 as well as Section 268 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that election cases are within the
jurisdiction of the regional trial courts except certain cases (which were not the cases filed
by COMELEC in this case).
Section 32 of B.P. 129, on the other hand, provides that as a rule, Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
amount of fine EXCEPT otherwise provided by special law. The Omnibus Election Code is a
special law which provides that election offenses, regardless of penalties, are under the
jurisdiction of the regional trial courts.
Judge Noynay was not able to follow these rules. It is a judges duty to be studious of the
principles of law, to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the
law itself, to be faithful to the law, and to maintain professional competence.
On the other hand, Atty. Balbuena is also admonished for being reckless in citing cases. The
Supreme Court said that the passage cited by Balbuena in his Motion was not the actual
decision of the Supreme Court in the said case cited but rather the memorandum of the
court administrator which was quoted in the said case. Further, his citation of Naldeza vs
Lavilles, Jr. was wrong. Not only did he spell Naldeza wrong (as the correct spelling was
NALDOZA), he also cited the wrong SCRA. It should have been 254 SCRA 286 and not 245
SCRA 286.
Balbuena is reminded of Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which requires that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a
decision or authority.
Layos, Alexander
Commissioner of Customs v CTA
328 SCRA 822
July 21, 1993
FACTS: The berthing facilities of Iligan Bay Express Corporation at Kiwalan were constructed
and improved and are operated and maintained solely by and at the expense of Iligan
Express Corporation, a private corporation.
The MS "Chozan Maru", MS "Samuel S", MS "Ero", MS "Messinia", MS "Pavel Rybin", MS
"Caledonia", and MS "Leonidas" are vessels engaged in foreign trade and represented in the
Philippines by private respondent Litonjua Shipping Company Granexport Corporation as its
sub-agent.
On various dates, berthing facilities of the Iligan Bay Express Corporation at Kiwalan, Iligan
City were used by the above vessels and were assessed berthing fees by the Collector of
Customs which were paid by private respondent under protest.
Private respondent filed cases before the Bureau of Customs for refund of the berthing fees
paid under protest. The Collector of Customs of the City of Iligan denied the protest,
prompting private respondent to appeal to the Commissioner of Customs who, however,
affirmed the decision of the Collector of Customs. The decisions appealed from are hereby
reversed and respondent Commissioner of Customs is ordered to refund to petitioner the
amount of P40,551.00.
Commissioner of Customs appealed and contends that the government has the authority to
impose and collect berthing fees whether a vessel berths at a private pier or at a national
port. On the other hand, private respondent argues that the right of the government to
impose berthing fees is limited to national ports only.
ISSUE: Whether or not CUSTOM should refund private respondents amounting to P40, 551.
00
HELD: Yes, The subject vessels, not having berthed at a national port but at the Port of
Kiwalan, which was constructed, operated, and continues to be maintained by private
respondent Iligan Express Corporation, are not subject to berthing charges, and petitioner
should refund the berthing fees paid private respondent.
Section 2901 of the Tariff and Customs Code prior to its amendment and said section as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 34 are hereunder reproduced with the amendments
duly highlighted:
Sec. 2901. Definition Berthing charge is the amount assessed against a vessel for
mooring or berthing at a pier, wharf, bulkhead-wharf, river or channel marginal wharf at any
port in the Philippines; or for mooring or making fast to a vessel so berthed; or for coming or
mooring within any slip, channel, basin, river or canal under the jurisdiction of any port of
the Philippines (old TCC)
Sec. 2901. Definition Berthing charge is the amount assessed a vessel for mooring or
berthing at a pier, wharf, bulkhead-wharf, river or, channel marginal wharf AT ANY NATIONAL
PORT IN THE PHILIPPINES; for mooring or making fast to a vessel so berthed; or for coming
or mooring within any slip, channel, basin, river, or canal under the jurisdiction of ANY
NATIONAL port of the Philippines; Provided, HOWEVER, THAT IN THE LAST INSTANCE, THE
CHARGE SHALL BE FIFTY (50%) PER CENT OF RATES PROVIDED FOR IN CASES OF PIERS
WITHOUT CARGO SHED IN THE SUCCEEDING SECTIONS.
It will thus be seen that the word "national" before the word "port" is inserted in the
amendment. The change in phraseology by amendment of a provision of law indicates a
legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it originally had
(Agpalo, supra, p. 76). The insertion of the word "national" before the word "port" is a clear
indication of the legislative intent to change the meaning of Section 2901 from what it
originally meant, and not a mere surplus age as contended by petitioner, in the sense that
the change "merely affirms what customs authorities had been observing long before the
law was amended"
Layos, Alexander
Constantino v Desierto
288 SCRA 654
April 13, 1998
FACTS: In the special civil action of certiorari at bar Mayor Felipe K. Constantino of
Malungon, Sarangani Province, seeks invalidation of the Resolution of the Ombudsman dated
October 22, 1996, finding him guilty of grave misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service, and/or gross neglect of duty, and on that account dismissing him from the
service.
On February 22, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of Malungon, Sarangani Province, adopted
and issued Resolution No. 21which -- after declaring in its Whereas clauses inter alia that
1) It was the intention of the ** Government of Malungon to lease/purchase one (1) fleet of
heavy equipment composed of seven (7) specifically described units;
2) Due to the failure of two public biddings, the Municipal Mayor would be authorized to
enter into a negotiated contract (for said lease/purchase) ** in behalf of the Municipal
Government ** ;
3) The lessor/seller should assure that the heavy equipment is free from defects in
workmanship within the specified warranty period under normal use, with obligation to
repair or replace any defective parts free of charge subject to the terms and conditions
stipulated in the contract;
4) The contract "must be clear and explicit, acceptable to both parties. and be concurred by
the Sangguniang Bayan of ** Malungon ** before implementation;" and
5) The heavy equipment shall, before delivery, be inspected and tested by a special
committee chosen by the Mayor -Authorized Mayor Constatino to enter into a negotiated contract representing the
Municipality ** (with) any company dealing with heavy equipment, said contract to be
signed by PBAC members. The resolution, however, contained no parameters as to rate of
rental, period of lease, purchase price. The Sangguniang Bayan Members who voted for the
resolution were : Vice-Mayor Primitiva L. Espinosa, and Councilors Rafael J. Suson, Sr.
(Presiding Officer), Benjamin M. Guilley, Nemesio P. Liray, Nonito V. Nunez, Leo G. Ingay,
Cesar B. Nallus, Jr., Benjamin C. Asgapo, and Jannette S. Constatino.
Accordingly, on February 28, 1996 in Davao City, Mayor Constantino entered into an
agreement with a firm called the Norlovanian Corporation, for the lease by the municipality
from the latter of seven (7) units of heavy equipment of the types specified in the aforesaid
Resolution
ISSUE: Whether or not Mayor Constantino is guilty of grave misconduct of his duty.
HELD: No, In light of the foregoing facts, which appear to the Court to be quite apparent on
the record, it is difficult to perceive how the Office of the Ombudsman could have arrived at
a conclusion of any wrongdoing by the Mayor in relation to the transaction in question. It is
difficult to see how the transaction between the Mayor and Norlovanian Corporation -entered into pursuant to Resolution No. 21 -- and tacitly accepted and approved by the town
Council through its Resolution No. 38 -- could be deemed an infringement of the same
Resolution No. 21. In truth, an examination of the pertinent writings (the resolutions, the two
(2) instruments constituting the negotiated contract, and the certificate of delivery)
unavoidably confirms their integrity and congruity. It is, in fine, difficult to see how those
pertinent written instruments, could establish a prima facie case to warrant the preventive
suspension of Mayor Constantino. A person with the most elementary grasp of the English
language would, from merely scanning those material documents, at once realize that the
Mayor had done nothing but carry out the expressed wishes of the Sangguniang Bayan.
It would appear that Graft Investigator Buena, who drew up the Resolution (eventually
approved by the Ombudsman) -- finding Mayor Constantino guilty of grave misconduct or
gross neglect of duty -- might have been carried away by his disapproval of what he thought
to be various dubious maneuvers to delay the early and expedient disposition of ** (the)
case resorted to by the Mayor through his various counsels. How those maneuvers
(assuming their description as dilatory to be correct) could affect the intrinsic character of
the evidence submitted by the parties is, however, quite beyond the Court.
SEC 28. Investigation in Municipalities, Cities and Provinces. --The Office of the Ombudsman
may establish offices in municipalities, cities and province outside Metropolitan Manila,
under the immediate supervision of the Deputies for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, where
necessary as determined by the Ombudsman.
The investigator also opined that Resolution No. 21 should be interpreted in light of other
official documents, executed a year earlier. He does not explain why he did not adopt the
more obvious construction of Resolution No. 21 indicated by the elementary doctrine that it
is within the power and prerogative of the town council to repeal its prior acts, either
expressly, or by the passage of essentially inconsistent resolutions. When the town council
passed Resolution No. 21 without any mention whatever of those prior official documents
respecting the acquisition to heavy equipment, the evident intention was to supersede them
and to have such acquisition governed solely by Resolution No. 21. This conclusion is
strongly supported by the fact that the Sangunian expressly admitted -- in the Second
Whereas Clause of its Resolution No. 21 -- that there had been a failure of bidders to submit
bids despite of two biddings ... public announcement (sic) -- the two biddings being
obviously related to said earlier official acts of the town council. The conclusion is further
bolstered by the fact that the Council, with full awareness of said negotiated contract, and of
the delivery of equipment thereunder, had requested the Mayor to put the equipment into
operation for the town projects. The Court is thus satisfied that it was in fact the Councils
intention, which it expressed in clear language, to confer on the Mayor ample discretion to
execute a negotiated contract with any interested party, without regard to any official acts
of the Council prior to Resolution No. 21.
Legaspi, Gianne Claudette P.

Corporal vs. ECC 235 SCRA 165 August 05, 1994
Facts: Petitioners wife was employed as a public school teacher. She gave birth to a baby
boy with the help of a hilot. An hour later, she was rushed to the hospital due to profuse
vaginal bleeding. She underwent a hysterectomy but unfortunately, she died on the same
day due to shock, severe hemorrhage resulting from a prolapse(d) uterus post partum.
She was 40 years old when she died. Petitioner herein, filed a claim for compensation benefit
with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). The GSIS denied petitioners claim.
Petitioner filed several motions for the reconsideration of the denial of his claim.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners claim for death benefits of her wife under Presidential
Decree No. 626 is valid.
Held: NO. Petition was denied. But under the legal milieu of the case, SC can only suggest,
not mandate that respondents grant ex gratia some form of relief to their members similarly
situated as petitioners wife. The liberal construction and interpretation of labor laws may
not be applied where the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and P.D. No. 626 are clear
and leave no room for interpretation. With the evidence presented in support of the claim,
petitioners prayer cannot be granted.
Cyanamid vs. Court of Appeals 322 SCRA 639 January 20, 2000
Facts: Cyanamid Philippines, Inc It is engaged in the manufacture of pharmaceutical
products and chemicals, a wholesaler of imported finished goods, and an importer/ indentor.
CIR sent an assessment letter to petitioner and demanded the payment of deficiency income
tax for 1981. Petitioner protested the assessments particularly, (1) the 25% Surtax
Assessment (2) ) 1981 Deficiency Income Assessment (3) 1981 Deficiency Percentage
Assessment. Petitioner claimed that the surtax for the undue accumulation of earnings was
not proper because the said profits were retained to increase petitioners working capital
and it would be used for reasonable business needs of the company. The CIR, however,
refused to allow the cancellation of the assessment notices. Petitioner appealed to the Court
of Tax Appeals. During the pendency of the case, however, both parties agreed to
compromise the 1981 deficiency income tax assessment. However, the surtax on improperly
accumulated profits remained unresolved.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for the accumulated earnings tax, despite its
claim that earnings were accumulated to increase capital and to be used for reasonable
needs.
Held: Yes. The respondent court correctly decided that the petitioner is liable for the
accumulated earnings tax for the year 1981 based on the following grounds:
1. The amendatory provision of Sec. 25 of the 1977 NIRC, which was PD
1739,enumerated the corporations exempt from the imposition of improperly accumulated
tax such as banks, non-bank financial intermediaries, insurance companies and

corporations authorized by the Central Bank of the Philippines to hold shares of stocks of
banks. The petitioner does not fall among those exempt classes.
2. If the CIR determined that the corporation avoided the tax on shareholders by permitting
earnings or profits to accumulate, and the taxpayer contested such a determination, the
burden of proving is on the taxpayer. And in order to determine whether profits are
accumulated for the reasonable needs of the business to avoid the surtax
upon shareholders, it must be shown that the controlling intention of the
taxpayer is manifested at the time of accumulation, not intentions declared subsequently,
which are mere afterthoughts.
Furthermore, the accumulated profits must be
used within a reasonable time after the close of the taxable years. In this case, petitioner
did note stablish, by clear and convincing evidence when such accumulation of profit was for
the immediate needs of the business.
3. Lastly, in the present case, the Tax Court opted to determine the working
capital sufficiency by using the ratio between current assets to current liabilities. The
working capital needs of a business depend upon the nature of the business, its credit
policies, the amount of inventories, the rate of turnover, the amount of accounts receivable,
the collection rate, the availability of credit to the business, and similar factors. Petitioner,
by adhering to the bardahl formula, failed to impress the tax court with the required
definiteness envisioned by the statute. We agree with the tax court that the burden of proof
to establish that the profits accumulated were not beyond the reasonable needs of the
company, remained on the taxpayer. Hence, this Court will not set aside lightly the
conclusion reached by the CTA, which by the very nature of its function, is dedicated
exclusively to the consideration of tax problems and has necessarily developed
expertise on the subject unless there has been an abuse of improvident exercise of
authority.
DBP vs Court of Appeals 262 SCRA 245 August 16, 2001
Facts: Private respondents were the original owners of a parcel of agricultural land and
mortgaged it to the petitioner bank. The petitioner foreclosed the mortgage on the land and
emerged as sole bidder in the ensuing auction sale. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-10913 was eventually issued in petitioner's name. petitioner and private
respondents entered into a Deed of Conditional Sale wherein petitioner agreed to reconvey
the foreclosed property to private respondents. upon completing the payment of the full
repurchase price, private respondents demanded from petitioner the execution of a Deed of
Conveyance in their favor.
Petitioner then informed private respondents that the prestation to execute and
deliver a deed of conveyance in their favor had become legally impossible in view of Sec. 6
of Rep. Act 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or CARL) approved 10 June 1988,
and Sec. 1 of E.O. 407 issued 10 June 1990. The former states that, any sale disposition,
lease, management contract or transfer of possession of private lands executed by
the original landowner in violation of this act shall be null and void upon its effectivity while
the latter one requires all government instrumentalities hall immediately execute deeds of
transfer in favor of the Republic of the Philippines as represented by the Department of
Agrarian Reform and surrender to the department all landholdings suitable for agriculture.
Issue: whether or not said laws had rendered legally impossible compliance by petitioner
with its obligation to execute a deed of conveyance of the subject land in favor of the private
respondent.
Held: It is a rule that if the obligation depends upon a suspensive condition, the
demandability as well as the acquisition or effectivity of the rights arising from the obligation
is suspended pending the happening or fulfillment of the fact or event which constitutes the
condition. Once the event which constitutes the condition is fulfilled resulting in the
effectivity of the obligation, its effects retroact to the moment when the essential elements
which gave birth to the obligation have taken place (8 Manresa, 5th Ed. Bk.
1, pa. 33). Applying this precept to the case, the full payment by the appellee on April 6,
1990 retroacts to the time the contract of conditional sale was executed on April 6,
1984. From that time, all elements of the contract of sale were present. Consequently, the
contract of sale was perfected. As such, the said sale does not come under the coverage of
R.A. 6657 and E.O. 407.
R.A. 6657 refers to tha original owners of said agricultural lands and petitioner is not such.
De Mesa vs Court of Appeals 317 SCRA 24 October 19, 1999
Facts: Petitioner Dolores Ligaya de Mesa owns several parcels of land in Makati, Pasay City,
Cavite, and General Santos City[3] which were mortgaged to the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) as security for a loan she obtained from the bank. Failing to pay her
mortgage debt, all her mortgaged properties were foreclosed and sold at public auction held
on different days. The petitioner de Mesa requested DBP that she be allowed to repurchase
her foreclosed properties. , Mrs. de Mesa, under a Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage, sold the foreclosed properties to private respondent OSSA.
Issue: Whether or not the inconsistency arises between the contract recognition and the
sale of properties.
Held: No. the court discerns no inconsistency between the contracts recognition of the
preferential right of petitioner to redeem the mortgaged properties, and the sale of the said
properties to respondent OSSA. Petitioner can validly redeem subject properties and still
recognize the sale thereof to the respondent corporation because nothing therein is contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. it is a well-settled doctrine that in
the construction of an instrument where there are several provisions, or particulars, such a
construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all. Thus, the recognition of
both the preferential right of the petitioner to redeem the mortgaged properties and the sale
of the same properties to respondent OSSA is in order, as it would harmonize and give effect
to all the provisions of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage under controversy.
MARIN, ELJOHN C.
DEL MAR vs. PAGCOR, 346 SCRA 485, November 29, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Raoul B. del Mar, Federico S. Sandoval II, Michael T. Defensor and
intervenor Juan Miguel Zubiri, as taxpayers and in their capacity as members of the House of
Representatives, questioned the validity of the agreement between respondent Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) and Belle Jai Alai Corporation (BELLE) and
Filipinas Gaming Entertainment Totalizator Corporation (FILGAME) wherein it was agreed that
BELLE will make available to PAGCOR the required infrastructure and funding for jai-alai
operations. The petitioners argued that the present charter of PAGCOR, Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1869, does not give it jurisdiction or legislative franchise to open, pursue, conduct,
operate, control and manage jai-alai game operations in the country.
As response, a dissent pointed that the legislative intent must be sought first of all in
the language of the statute itself. In applying a literal interpretation of the provision under
Section 11 of PD 1869 that "x x x the Corporation is hereby granted x x x the rights,
privileges, and authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and
other recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming pools, i.e., basketball,
football, lotteries, etc. x x x," it contends that the extent and nature of PAGCOR's
franchise is so broad that literally all kinds of sports and gaming pools, including jai-alai, are
covered therein. It concluded that since under this section, games of skill like basketball and
football have been lumped together with the word "lotteries" just before the word "etc." and
after the words "gaming pools," it may be deduced from the wording of the law that when
bets or stakes are made in connection with the games of skill, they may be classified as
games of chance under the coverage of PAGCOR's franchise.
ISSUE:
WON the franchise granted to PAGCOR includes the right to manage and
operate jai-alai.
HELD: No. The Court rejected the dissent and opined that it was a simplistic reading of the
law considering the social, moral and public policy implications embedded in the cases at
bar. The plain meaning rule used in the dissent rests on the assumption that there is no
ambiguity or obscurity in the language of the law. The fact, however, that the statute
admits of different interpretations is the best evidence that the statute is vague
and ambiguous. It is widely acknowledged that a statute is ambiguous when it is capable
of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or more senses. In
the cases at bar, it is difficult to see how a literal reading of the statutory text would
unerringly reveal the legislative intent. To be sure, the term "jai-alai" was never used and is
nowhere to be found in the law. The conclusion that it is included in the franchise granted to
PAGCOR cannot be based on a mere cursory perusal of and a blind reliance on the ordinary
and plain meaning of the statutory terms used such as "gaming pools" and "lotteries."
Sutherland tells us that a statute is "ambiguous", and so open to explanation by extrinsic
aids, not only when its abstract meaning or the connotation of its terms is uncertain, but
also when it is uncertain in its application to, or effect upon, the fact-situation of the case at
bar.
MARIN, ELJOHN C.
DISTILLERIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 263 SCRA 303, October 17, 1996
FACTS:
La Tondena Distillers, Inc. (LTDI) filed a case against Distilleria Washington
(Washington) seeking to seize from the latter 18,517 empty white flint bottles bearing the
blown-in marks of La Tondena Inc. and Ginebra San Miguel. These bottles, it was averred,
were being used by Washington for its own Gin Seven products without the consent of
LTDI.
LTDI asserted that, as owner of the registrant bottles, it was entitled to protection by
Republic Act (RA) No. 623. Washington countered that the said law invoked by LTDI should
not apply to gin, an alcoholic beverage which is unlike that of soda water, mineral or
aerated water, ciders, milks, cream, or other lawful beverages mentioned in the law. The
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of LTD. Washington appealed in the Court, pointing out that,
inter alia, liquor products are not covered by RA No. 623, to wit:
SECTION 1. Persons engaged or licensed to engage in the manufacture, bottling, or selling
of soda water, mineral or aerated waters, cider, milk, cream or other lawful beverages in
bottles, boxes, casks, kegs, or barrels, and other similar containers x x x with their names or
the names of their principals or products, or other marks of ownership stamped or marked
thereon, may register with the Philippines Patent Office a description of the names or marks,
and the purpose for which the containers so marked are used by them, under the same
conditions, rules, and regulations, made applicable by law or regulation to the issuance of
trademarks.
SEC. 3. The use by any person other than the registered manufacturer, bottler or seller,
without written permission of the latter of any such bottle x x x or the possession thereof
without written permission of the manufacturer, by any junk dealer, - xxx- the same being
duly marked or stamped and registered as herein provided, shall give rise to a prima facie
presumption that such use or possession is unlawful.
ISSUE:
WON gin, an alcoholic beverage, is included under the term other lawful
beverages.
HELD: Yes. The Court said that in Cagayan Valley Enterprises, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals, it
held that:
The claim of petitioner that hard liquor is not included under the term other lawful
beverages as provided in Section 1 of Republic Act No. 623, as amended by Republic Act No.
5700, is without merit. The title of the law itself, which reads An Act to Regulate the Use of
Duly Stamped or Marked Bottles, Boxes, Casks, Kegs, Barrels and Other Similar Containers
clearly shows the legislative intent to give protection to all marked bottles and containers of
all lawful beverages regardless of the nature of their contents. The words other lawful
beverages is used in its general sense, referring to all beverages not prohibited
by law. Beverage is defined as a liquor or liquid for drinking. Hard liquor, although
regulated, is not prohibited by law, hence it is within the purview and coverage of Republic
Act No. 623, as amended.
MARIN, ELJOHN C.
DIVINAGRACIA vs. STO. TOMAS, 244 SCRA 595, May 31, 1995
FACTS:
Mayor Anastacio Prila notified Filomena R. Mancita that the latters position as
Municipal Planning Coordinator (MPDC) will be terminated. Private respondent Prescilla B.
Nacario, who was then a Municipal Budget Officer, was appointed in replacement of Mancita.
Nacarios vacant position was filled-up by petitioner Alexis D. San Luis, a former Cashier II of
Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
Mancita appealed her termination to Merit System and Protection Board (MSPB). MSPC
declared Mancitas separation from the service illegal and ordered the new Mayor Delfin
Divinagracia to reinstate the former as MPDC. The mayor then informed Nacario that she
was being relieved of her position in compliance with MSPBs decision to reinstate Mancita.
Nacario appealed. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) directed the restoration of Nacario to
her former position as Municipal Budget Officer. It relied on Sec. 13, Rule VI, of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of EO No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative
Code of 1978. Section 13 mandates the return of an appointee, in a chain of promotions, to
his former position once his appointment is subsequently disapproved, to wit:
Sec. 13. All appointments involved in a chain of promotions must be submitted
simultaneously for approval by the Commission. The disapproval of the appointment of a
person proposed to a higher position invalidates the promotion of those in lower positions
and automatically restores them to their former positions. However, the affected persons
are entitled to the payment of salaries for services actually rendered at a rate fixed in their
promotional appointments.
Petitioners contend that this provision does not apply to the present case because
the rule covers only appointments in a chain of promotions and not where a public officer
was merely transferred to another position of the same rank, grade and level.
Further, in the aforecited section, before a public official or employee can be
automatically restored to her former position, there must first be a series of promotions;
second, all appointments are simultaneously submitted to the CSC for approval; and third,
the CSC disapproves the appointment of a person proposed to a higher position. These,
according to contemporaneous construction of Sec. 13 of CSC, however, do not avail in the
case at bench.
ISSUE:
WON the contemporaneous construction of Sec. 13 of CSC be accepted by the
Court.
HELD: No. While the contemporaneous construction of Sec. 13 by the CSC is entitled to
great weight and respect, the Court said that it shall depart from such interpretation when it
is clearly erroneous or when there is no ambiguity in the rule, as is in the instant case, and
yield to the letter of the law taking its terms in their plain, ordinary and popular meaning.
The unconsented lateral transfer of Nacario from the Budget Office to the Office of
MPDC was arbitrary for it amounted to removal without cause, hence, invalid as it is
anathema to security of tenure. When Nacario was extended a permanent appointment and
she assumed the position, she acquired a legal, not merely an equitable, right to the
position. Such right to security of tenure is protected not only by statute, but also by the
Constitution and cannot be taken away from her either by removal, transfer or by revocation
of appointment, except for cause, and after prior notice.
The guarantee of security of tenure is an important object of the civil service system
because it affords a faithful employee permanence of employment, at least for the period
prescribed by law, and frees the employee from the fear of political and personal prejudicial
reprisal.
MARIN, ELJOHN C.
DOMINGO vs. COA, 297 SCRA 163, October 7, 1998
FACTS:
Petitioner Aida Domingo, a Regional Director of Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD), was informed by Regional Auditor Manuel Canares of the postaudit reports of the formers office which showed that officials provided with government
vehicles were still collecting transportation allowances. This act is prohibited by Section 28
of Republic Act 6688, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1989, to wit:
Section 28. Representation and Transportation Allowances - x x x "The transportation
allowance herein authorized shall not be granted to officials who are assigned a
government vehicle or - use government motor transportation, except as may be
approved by the President of the Philippines. Unless otherwise provided by law, no amount
appropriated in this Act shall be used to pay for representation and/or transportation
allowances, whether commutable or reimbursable, which exceed the rates authorized under
this Section. Previous administrative authorization not consistent with the rates and
conditions herein specified shall no longer be valid and payment shall not be allowed."
Undaunted, petitioner found her way to the Court, posing the issue of whether or not a
commutable transportation allowance may still be claimed by a government official provided
with a government vehicle, for the days the official did not actually use the vehicle.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a commutable transportation allowance may still be claimed
by a government official provided with a government vehicle, for the days the official did not
actually use the vehicle.
HELD: No. The aforesaid provision in the General Appropriations Law is based on
Presidential Decree 733 and Commission on Audit Circular No. 75-6 dated November 7,
1975, regulating the use of government vehicles, aircrafts and watercrafts. Portion of said
circular, reads:
"VI. Prohibition Against Use of Government Vehicles by Officials provided with transportation
allowance - "No official who has been furnished motor corporation allowance by any
government corporations or other office shall be allowed to use motor vehicle transportation
operated and maintained from funds appropriated in the above cited Decree. (Sec. 14, P.D.
733)."
The Court also cited the case of Bustamante vs. Commissioner on Audit, 216 SCRA 134,
decided on November 27, 1992 in which COA also disallowed the claim for transportation
allowance of the legal counsel of National Power Corporation because he was already issued
a government vehicle. Involving the circular aforementioned and almost the same facts as in
this case, it was therein held that COA Circular No. 75-6 is categorical in prohibiting the use
of government vehicles by officials receiving transportation allowance and in stressing that
the use of government motor vehicle and claim for transportation allowance are mutually
exclusive and incompatible.
The issue need no longer be belabored for no less than the Court ruled in the aforesaid case
that a government official, to whom a motor vehicle has been assigned, cannot, at the same
time, claim transportation allowance.
Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no need, in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, for any
interpretation. Words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary,
and common usage meaning.
Maurin, Nino Jay M.
Don Tino Realty and Development Corp. v Julian Florentino 314 SCRA 197,
September 10, 1999
Facts:
This appeal seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45162
which ordered the admission of a late and defective answer in an ejectment case. Before
this case was being filed, alleged the following:
Petitioner Don Tino filed against responder Florentino an ejectment suit. Don Tinio
alleged that he is the owner and in peaceful possession of a parcel of land covered by
TCT No. 32422. By means of stealth, force, and strategy, respondent Florentino
occupied the said parcel of land and built his house thereon.
Falling within the provisions of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, summons
were served upon respondent on February 13, 1997 requiring him to answer within
ten (10) days from receipt thereof.
On February 24, 1997, respondent filed his answer through Roel G. Alvear, president
of the Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng RMB, San Juan, Balagtas, Bulacan. The answer
is not verified. The trial court set the case for preliminary conference on April 13,
1997.
However, Don Tino filed a motion for rendition of judgment and motion to cancel the
preliminary conference on the ground that the answer of respondent was defective
and filed out of time.
The trial court granted the motion filed by petitioner. It declared that respondent
failed to comply with Section 3 (b) and Section 5 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure. It also noted that Roel G. Alvear has no authority to represent the
respondent as there is no special power of attorney executed in his favor. Thus, it
cancelled the preliminary conference and considered the case submitted for decision
in accordance with Section 6 of the said Rules.
Therefore, trial court rendered judgment and ordered the respondent to immediately
vacate the premises and deliver its possession to Don Tino and pay for 2,000 pesos
for rental for the use of the land from March 25, 1996 until he vacated the premises.
However, respondent Florentino filed a Manifestation with Motion to Lift Order through his
counsel. He alleged that his answer was filed late and by a non-lawyer because of its
economically destitute. He asked the trial court to consider because the same as honest
mistake and excusable negligence.
Thus, the trial court admitted the motion.
Issue:
Whether or not under the facts of the case, the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure may be
liberally interpreted in order to allow the admission of an answer filed one (1) day late.
Held:
No - Forcibly entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings designed to
provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession
of the property involved. It does not admit of a delay in the determination thereof. It is a
time procedure designed to remedy the situation.
In the case of Gachon vs. Devera, Jr., we ruled that the use of the word shall in the Rule on
Summary Procedure underscores their mandatory character. Giving the provisions a
directory application would subvert the nature of the Rule on Summary Procedure and defeat
its objective of expediting the adjudication of suits. Indeed, to admit a late answer, xxx, is to
put a premium on dilatory maneuvers-the very mischief that the Rule seeks to redress.
Considering this, the view of the Court of Appeals that such provisions should be liberally
interpreted is misplaced. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules
applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true
that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice
Maurin, Nino Jay M.
Dulay vs. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 220, April 03, 1995
Facts:
On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay
occurred at the Big Bang Sa Alabang, Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which
Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty.
Napoleon Dulay. Petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in
her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed an action for damages against
Benigno Torzuela and private respondents Safeguard and/or Superguard, alleged employers
of defendant Torzuela. Respondent Superguard filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
the complaint does not state a valid cause of action. Superguard claimed that Torzuelas act
of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of
shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed
by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. Superguard further alleged that a complaint for
damages based on negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one
filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to
quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the respondent
argued that petitioners filing of the complaint is premature considering that the conviction
of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employers subsidiary
liability. Respondent Safeguard also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant
on the ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees. Petitioners opposed both
motions, stating that their cause of action against the private respondents is based on their
liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code. Respondent judge declared that the
complaint was one for damages founded on crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of
the Revised Penal Code as distinguished from those arising from, quasi-delict.
Issue(s):
Whether or not Torzuela s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict
actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code
Whether or not Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally
committed
Whether or not the liability or respondents is subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code.
Held:
(1) Yes - Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Contrary to
the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article
2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the
doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts
which are voluntary and intentional.
(2) No - The term physical injuries in Article 33 has already been construed to include
bodily injuries causing death. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised
Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and
attempted homicide. Although in the Marcia case, it was held that no independent civil
action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it
must be noted, however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with
homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with
reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
(3) No - Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the
negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer
under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against
the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore,
it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
Maurin, Nino Jay M.
Eastern Shipping Lines v Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 546, July 12, 1994
Facts:
This is an action against defendants shipping company, arrastre operator and brokerforwarder for damages sustained by a shipment while in defendants' custody, filed by the
insurer-subrogee who paid the consignee the value of such losses/damages.
The losses/damages were sustained while in the respective and/or successive custody and
possession of defendants carrier (Eastern), arrastre operator (Metro Port) and broker (Allied
Brokerage).
As a consequence of the losses sustained, plaintiff was compelled to pay the consignee P19,
032.95, under the aforestated marine insurance policy, so that it became subrogated to all
the rights of action of said consignee against defendants.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: * trial court: ordered payment of damages, jointly and
severally * CA: affirmed trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not a claim for damage sustained on a shipment of goods can be a solidary, or
joint and several, liability of the common carrier, the arrastre operator and the customs
broker.
Whether the payment of legal interest on an award for loss or damage is to be computed
from the time the complaint is filed or from the date the decision appealed from is rendered;
and
Held:
Yes - it is solidary. Since it is the duty of the ARRASTRE to take good care of the goods that
are in its custody and to deliver them in good condition to the consignee, such responsibility
also devolves upon the CARRIER. Both the ARRASTRE and the CARRIER are therefore
charged with the obligation to deliver the goods in good condition to the consignee.
The common carrier's duty to observe the requisite diligence in the shipment of goods lasts
from the time the articles are surrendered to or unconditionally placed in the possession of,
and received by, the carrier for transportation until delivered to, or until the lapse of a
reasonable time for their acceptance by, the person entitled to receive them (Arts. 17361738, Civil Code; Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals, 161 SCRA 646; Kui Bai vs. Dollar Steamship
Lines, 52 Phil. 863). When the goods shipped either are lost or arrive in damaged condition,
a presumption arises against the carrier of its failure to observe that diligence, and there
need not be an express finding of negligence to hold it liable.
Maurin, Nino Jay M.
Employees Compensation Commission vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 717, June
28, 1996
Facts:
The deceased P/Sgt Alvaran was a member of Mandaluyong Police Station, assigned at the
Pasig Provincial Jail as 2nd Shifter Jailer with tour of duty from 7:00 PM to 7:00 AM. On
November 19, 1988 at around 11:50 in the evening, the deceased was infront of the Office
of the Crime Investigation Division of the Mandaluyong Police Station and was talking with
another policemen. When another policeman arrived, Pat. Cesar Arcilla, who had just arrived
immediately got off to the car and holding his service firearm and approached the deceased
without any saying word, he fired three successive shots. The deceased, however, although
critically wounded, shots twice back to Pat. Cesar Arcilla. Both fell fatally wounded. They
were rushed to the Mandaluyong Medical Center but Sgt. Alvaran died on the same day and
Pat. Cesar Arcial on the following day.
Furthermore, before the day of incident, it was learned that Sgt. Alvarans son, stabbed the
patrolmans nephew. On the day of the incident, Sgt. Alvaran came to the Mandaluyong
Police Station accompanying his son who was to be interviewed at the same time and
investigate the incident which he got involved a day before.
The wife of the deceased, appellant, filed a claim for compensation benefits under PD 626,
as amended. However, the GSIS denied the claim on the ground that at the time of the
accident the deceased was supposed to be at Pasig Provincial Jail as 2 nd shift Jailer and with a
specific duty to perform, in a particular place, his presence in Mandaluyong Police Station,
although, he was a member of the same, who was requested to be interviewed by another
policeman pertaining to the stabbed incident. In the other words, he was plainty acting as
father to his son, an act which is purely personal, foreign, and unrelated to his employment.
His death at the place where he was not required to be and not in performance of duty,
cannot be considered to have arisen out of and in the course of employment.
But, appellant requested a reconsideration of the respondents GSIS ruling. However,
respondent GSIS took a firm stand and elevate the case to the ECC for review.
Thus, ECC affirmed the holding of the GSIS that the death of the private respondents
husband is not compensable under P.D. 626, as amended.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of Sgt. Alvaran is compensable under P.D. No. 626.
Held:
Yes the court held that by the nature of his work, a police officer exercises his official duty
on a 24 hour basis and that his death came as an incident in the performance of his duties
in the police force and must be declared compensated under our law.
In case of doubt, the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries, and
the law, by its own terms, requires a construction of outmost liberality in their favour. For
this reason, the court lends a very sympathetic ear to the cries of the poor widows and
orphans of the police officers. If we must demand as we ought to strict accountability
from our policemen in safeguarding peace and order day and night, we must also to the
same extent be ready to compensate their loved ones who, by their untimely death, are left
without any means of supporting themselves.
Wherefore, Petition is DENIED and the assailed decision is again AFFIRMED. No costs.
Repancol, Christhia
Garcia v CA 258 SCRA 446 July 5, 1996
FACTS: In 1980, Dynetics Inc., through its president, acquired a P25M export loan from
Security Bank. In 1982, a credit accommodation (SWAP loan) was opened by Security Bank
in favor of Dynetics allowing it to acquire an additional $700k loan. This loan was secured by
an Indemnity Agreement signed by Antonio Garcia acting as a surety. This loan was not
availed of by Dynetics however.
In 1993, the SWAP loan was renewed but it was reduced to $500k. This time, Dynetics
availed of it. Garcia still acted as surety but there was no Indemnity Agreement involved.
Later, Dynetics, without Garcias knowledge, executed several Chattel Mortgages in favor of
Security Bank.
Dynetics defaulted from paying. Security Bank foreclosed the mortgages. The proceeds were
applied to the SWAP loan leaving a balance of P3.5M. The Export loan has a balance of
P464M.
Security Bank is now demanding Garcia, as surety, to pay for the deficiency in both loans.
ISSUE: Whether or not Garcia is liable for both loans.

HELD: No. The Indemnity Agreement specifically secured the $700k SWAP loan which was
not availed of. The Continuing Suretyship, on the other hand, specifically secured the
reduced $500k SWAP loan. The Indemnity Agreement is not involved in the reduced SWAP
loan. There was no reason for SBTC to require the execution of the Continuing Suretyship if
its intention were to have the earlier Indemnity Agreement secure the SWAP loan in both the
original and in the reduced amounts.
Garcia is not liable for the deficiency on the SWAP loan because Dynetics executed chattel
mortgages in view of the export loan in favor of Security Bank. And this was without Garcias
knowledge. This does not technically release Garcia as surety but since it is a chattel
mortgage which has nothing to do with Garcia (it does not bind him), then the deficiency will
have to be shouldered by Dynetics.
Repancol, Christhia
Genaro Reyes v. CA (July 14, 1994) 234 SCRA 116
FACTS: Petitioners filed petition to stop Respondent DPWH from implementing the notice of
pre-termination in their contract for construction of the flood control facilities and land
improvement works in Butuan City. Petitioners won in a public bidding held for this purpose.
Respondents claimed that with a 9.86% negative slippage (delay in the infrastructure
project), the government was either authorized to take over the project or let another
contractor finish it. Petitioners however claimed that not only were the delays caused
significantly by DPWH, but also termination of contract is only appropriate if the negative
slippage reaches 15%.
ISSUE: W/N termination of contract with Petitioners is valid.
HELD: No, Respondents may not terminate contract with Petitioners and award the contract
to other bidders. The discretion of Respondent DPWH to terminate or rescind the contract
comes into play only in the event the contractor shall have incurred a negative slippage of
15% or more, according to P.D. 1870 and DPWH Circular No. 102.
The intent of the law in allowing the government to take over delayed construction projects
with negative slippage of 15% or more is primarily to save money and to avoid dislocation
of the financial projections and/or cash flow of the government. Terminating the contract
and awarding it to Hanil, a previously disqualified bidder, would actually result in a financial
loss to the government
Repancol, Christhia
GSIS v CSC 245 SCRA 179 June 19, 1995
FACTS: Respondent Belo held the position of Vice-Governor of Capiz continuously from
January 5, 1972 up to February 1, 1988. From January 25, 1972 up to December 31, 1979,
she held office by virtue of an election and was paid a fixed salary. From December 31, 1979
up to February 1, 1988, she held the position of Vice Governor of Capiz in a holdover
capacity, broken down into two periods:
1. A period in which she was paid on a per diem basis from December 31, 1976 to December
31, 1979; and
2. A period in which she was paid a fixed salary from January 1, 1980 to February 1, 1988.
In its June 7, 1989 Resolution on the matter, CSC held that the services rendered for the first
holdover period between January 31, 1976 to January 1, 1979 was creditable for purposes of
retirement. CSC noted that during the entire holdover period, respondent Belo actually
served on a full time basis as Vice Governor and was on call 24 hours a day. Disagreeing
with the CSC's insistence that the period in which respondent Belo was paid on a per diem
basis should be credited in computing the number of years of creditable service to the
government, GSIS subsequently filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court,
questioning the orders of the CSC. Agreeing that per diems were not compensation within
the meaning of Section 1(c) of R.A. 1573 which amended Section 1(c) of C.A. No. 186
(Government Service Insurance Act)
ISSUE: Whether or not regular service in government on a per diem basis, without any other
form of compensation or emolument, is compensation within the contemplation of the term
"service with compensation" under the Government Service Insurance Act of 1987.
HELD: If the remuneration received by a public official in the performance of his duties does
not constitute a mere allowance for expenses but appears to be his actual base pay, then
no amount of categorizing the salary as a per diem would take the allowances received from
the term services with the compensation for the purpose of computing the number of years
of service in government. A per diem is a daily allowance given for each day an officer or
employee of government is away from his home base. It is intended to cover the cost of
lodging and subsistence of officers and employees when the latter are on duty outside of
their permanent station. The term per diem may be construed either as compensation or as
allowance. The clear intent of the Government Service Insurance Law was to exclude those
incidental expenses or those incurred on a daily basis covered by the traditional definition of
the term per diem.
Repancol, Christhia
GUERRERO vs. THE COMELEC 336 SCRA 458 July 26, 2000
FACTS
1. On May 8, 1998, Farias filed his Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC, substituting
candidate Chevylle V. Farias who withdrew on April 3, 1998.
2. On May 9, 1998, Ruiz filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion To Resolve Petition" with the
COMELEC, attaching thereto a copy of the Certificate of Candidacy of Farias.
3. On May 10, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC dismissed Ruizs petition, and
stated, "[T]here is none (sic) in the records to consider respondent an official candidate to
speak of without the filing of said certificate. Hence, there is no certificate of candidacy to be
cancelled, consequently, no candidate to be disqualified.
4. On May 11, 1998, the elections pushed through as scheduled. The post-election tally of
votes in Ilocos Norte showed that Farias got a total of 56,369 votes representing the highest
number of votes received in the first district. Farias was duly proclaimed winner.
5. On May 16, 1998, Ruiz filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that Farias could not
validly substitute for Chevylle V. Farias, since the latter was not the official candidate of the
Lakas ng Makabayan Masang Pilipino (LAMMP), but was an independent candidate. Another
person cannot substitute for an independent candidate.
6. On June 3, 1998, Farias took his oath of office as a member of the House of
Representatives.
7. On June 10, 1998, petitioner herein filed his "Petition-In-Intervention" in COMELEC Case
No. SPA 98-227. Petitioner averred that he was the official candidate of the Liberal Party (LP)
in said elections for Congressman, and stood to be adversely affected by Case No. SPA 98227. Guerrero contended that Farias, having failed to file his Certificate of Candidacy on or
before the last day therefor, being midnight of March 27, 1998, Farias illegally resorted to
the remedy of substitution provided for under Section 77of the Omnibus Election Code6
Guerrero then asked that the position of Representative of the first district of Ilocos Norte be
declared vacant and special elections called for, but disallowing the candidacy of Farias.
8. Petitioner Guerrero argues that the refusal of the COMELEC to rule on the validity or
invalidity of the certificate of candidacy of Farias amounted to grave abuse of discretion on
its part. He claims that COMELEC failed in its Constitutional duty to uphold and enforce all
laws relative to elections.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the
determination of the validity of the certificate of candidacy of respondent Farias is
already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, and whether or not the COMELEC failed in its Constitutional duty to
uphold and enforce all laws relative to elections.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioner. 1. NO. SC found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it
held that its jurisdiction over Case No. SPA 98-277 had ceased with the assumption of office
of respondent Farias as Representative for the first district of Ilocos Norte. While the
COMELEC is vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its
refusal to exercise that power following the proclamation and assumption of the position by
Farias is a recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating the COMELEC and the
Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives (HRET). Under Article VI, Section 17 of the
Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the
election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once
a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member
of the House of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.13 Thus, the
COMELECs decision to discontinue exercising jurisdiction over the case is justifiable, in
deference to the HRETs own jurisdiction and functions.
Rivera, Maria Rocel
LANGKAAN REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC., vs. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK,
and HON. COURT OF APPEALS
347 SCRA 542 DECEMBER 8, 2000
FACTS: Petitioner Langkaan Realty Development Corporation (LANGKAAN, for brevity) was
the registered owner of a 631,693 square meter parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 111322, and located at Langkaan, Dasmarinas, Cavite. n April 8, 1983,
petitioner LANGKAAN executed a Real Estate Mortgage over the above-mentioned property
in favor of private respondent United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) as a security for a loan
obtained from the bank by Guimaras Agricultural Development, Inc. (GUIMARAS) in the
amount of P3,000,000.00 and P2, 000, 000.00; totaling to P5,000,000.00.
GUIMARAS defaulted in the payment of its obligation, which, in their mortgage agreement,
there is a statement stating that any default in payment of the secured obligations will
render all such obligations due and payable, and that UCPB may immediately foreclose the
mortgage.
Thus, the UCPB filed a petition for sale of the said land by publishing the sale to the
newspaper and posting it to the public places. It was sold for P3,095,000.00 at public auction
to private respondent UCPB as the highest bidder, and a corresponding Certificate of Sale
was issued in favor of the bank. As petitioner LANGKAAN failed to redeem the foreclosed
property within the redemption period, the title of the property was consolidated in the
name of UCPB on December 21, 1987, and a new Transfer Certificate of Title with no. T232040 was issued in the latters favor.
In 1989, LANGKAAN wrote a letter to the UCPB offering to buy back the property with a
higher price. However, the bank rejected the letter arguing that the current selling price of
the property was higher to what the LANGKAAN offers.
The LANGKAAN filed a Complaint for Annulment of Extra-judicial Foreclosure and Sale, and of
TCT No. 232040 with Damages, with the RTC of Imus, Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No. 36089. Consequently, the RTC dismissed the petition of LANGKAAN stating that it lacks merit.
The petitioner filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the extra-judicial foreclosure sale is valid and legal on account of the
alleged non-compliance with the provisions of Act No. 3135 on venue, posting and
publication of the Notice of Sale, and of the alleged defects in such Notice.
HELD: YES. The court ruled that the notice of the extra-judicial foreclosure sale was duly
published and posted, and clerical errors are not sufficient to invalidate the notice and nullify
the sale. It was clear that the Notice of Sale was published to the Record Newsweekly and it
was enough for the public to be noticed of the said sale. Furthermore, it was counterclaimed
by the respondent that there was a posting of the sale in public places; by lack of merit and
evidence from the petitioner, the court accepted the argument of the respondent.
In the issue of non-compliance, the Court agreed with the petitioner could be held at Trece
Martires City, Cavite. Under Act No. 3135 Section 1: When a sale is made under a special
power inserted in or attached to any real estate mortgage hereafter made as security for
the payment of money or the fulfillment of any other obligation, the provisions of the
following sections shall govern as to the manner in which the sale and redemption shall be
effected, whether or not provision for the same is made in the power. Or, in the alternative,
at Dasmarinas, Cavite, wherein the land was stipulated, following the Section 2 of the
abovementioned Act. Despite of this, the Court finds the extra-judicial foreclosure sale held
at the RTC of Imus to be valid and legal. Thus, there is a principle that a venue is waivable.
The failure of any party to object to the impropriety of venue is deemed a waiver of his right
to do so. In the case at bar, it was found out that the waiver was exercised by the petitioner.
As such, the due publication and posting of the extra-judicial foreclosure sale of the
Dasmarinas property binds the petitioner, and failure of the latter to object to the venue of
the sale constitutes waiver.
Given these arguments, the Court denied the petition of LANGKAAN.
Rivera, Maria Rocel
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF
EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
258 SCRA 404
OCTOBER 6, 1995
FACTS: Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR
and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law. However, there are lapses on the monetary compensation given by
the DAR and Landbank. Private respondents questioned the validity of DAR Administrative
Order No. 6, Series of 1992 and DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, and sought
to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally
determine the just compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash
and bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust
accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same. At the same
time, private respondent argued that Administrative Order No. 9 was issued without
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because it permits the opening of trust
accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank
designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles are
cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657.
Petitioner DAR, however, maintained that Administrative Order No. 9 is a valid exercise of its
rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657. Moreover, the DAR maintained that
the issuance of the "Certificate of Deposit" by the Landbank was a substantial compliance
with Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and the ruling in the case of Association of Small Landowners
in the Philippines, Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14,
1989 (175 SCRA 343). For its part, petitioner Landbank declared that the issuance of the
Certificates of Deposits was in consonance with Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land
Registration Authority where the words "reserved/deposited" were also used.
The respondent court at that time rendered decision that is in favor with the private
respondent. The petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioners submit that the lower court erred in declaring the
DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 null and void. They also argued that In
opting for the opening of a trust account as the acceptable form of deposit through
Administrative Circular No. 9 (DAR) did not commit any grave abuse of discretion given that
they only exercised their power to promulgate the rules and regulations in implementing the
RA 6657, specifically the Section 16 stating that: (e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the
deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in
LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land
and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . . . (emphasis supplied).
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an error on the part of DAR and Landbank in including the
term deposit
HELD: The petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the appealed decision is
AFFIRMED in toto. It is very explicit in Section 16 of RA 6657 therefrom that the deposit must
be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that
the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a "trust
account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at
least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a
"trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to
warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit". Thus, it is observed that if there is
no ambiguity on the law, there is no need to interpret it. In the case at bar, the Sec 16 of RA
6657 has been very clear in stating that the deposit must be made only in cash and LBP
bonds. Thus, interpreting it in a way that is not included in the article will result to conflict.
Rivera, Maria Rocel
KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER vs.HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., the LAND
TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD, and the PROVINCIAL
BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
239 SCRA 386
DECEMBER 23, 1994
FACTS: Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then
LTFRB Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to charge
passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a
period of one (1) year. Thus, Remedios A.S. Fernando submitted the following memorandum
to Oscar M. Orbos stating that the implementation of the fare range scheme is not legally
feasible, and that it needs further studies and evaluation.
Consequently, Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, Inc. (PBOAP), the
private respondent, filed an application for fare rate increase. The application was opposed
by the Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. and Perla C. Bautista alleging that the
proposed rates were exorbitant and unreasonable and that the application contained no
allegation on the rate of return of the proposed increase in rates. Despite of the opposing
argument given, the LTRB still grant the fare rate increase.
Hereinafter, Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications Pete
Nicomedes Prado issued Department Order No. 92-587 defining the policy framework on the
regulation of transport services whereas Executive Order No. 125 as amended, designates
the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) as the primary policy,
planning, regulating and implementing agency on transportation.
Private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing
provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without
first having filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing,
announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares. Hence, the
petitioner, KMU, filed a petition to the LTRB opposing the adjustment of fare rates; however,
it was dismissed. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari wherein the petitioner questioned
the constitutionality and validity given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus operators to
set a fare range of plus or minus fifteen (15%) percent, later increased to plus twenty (20%)
and minus twenty-five (-25%) percent, over and above the existing authorized fare without
having to file a petition for the purpose. Hence, DOTC and LTFRB stated that petitioner does
not have the standing to maintain the instant suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provincial bus operators have authority to reduce and increase
fare rates based on the order of LTFRB
HELD: The court ruled that the authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators
to set a fare range over and above the authorized existing fare, is illegal and invalid as it is
tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative authority. Potestas delegata non delegari
potest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated. This doctrine is based on the ethical
principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed
by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the
intervening mind of another. The policy of allowing the provincial bus operators to change
and increase their fares at will would result not only to a chaotic situation but to an anarchic
state of affairs. This would leave the riding public at the mercy of transport operators who
may increase fares every hour, every day, every month or every year, whenever it pleases
them or whenever they deem it "necessary" to do so. It was already delegated to the LTFRB
the power of fixing rates of public services. However, there were no law that authorizes the
LTFRB to delegate that power to any other entity, which is the transport operators.
Thus, it was stated by the Court that the DOTC and LTFRB committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the DOTC Department Order No. 92-587 defining the policy framework
on the regulation of transport services and LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009
promulgating the implementing guidelines on DOTC Department Order No. 92-587, the said
administrative issuances being amendatory and violative of the Public Service Act and the
Rules of Court.
The petition is hereby granted.
Rivera, Maria Rocel
JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and ULPIANO L. DE LOS SANTOS
228 SCRA 129
NOVEMBER 22, 1993
FACTS: Following the Secs. 4 and 7, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules, the petitioner, a
recruiting agency, made the following: a) Paid the license fee (Sec. 4) ; b) Posted a cash
bond of 100k and surety bond of 50k(Sec. 4) ; c)Placed money in escrow worth 200k (Sec.
17). The petitioner appealed the decision of the POEA to the NLRC, however, it was
dismissed by the latter stating that the petitioner failed to post an appeal bond required
by Sec. 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules, which required a monetary award.
The petitioner, however, contended that a cash bond and a surety bond and the placement
of money escrow are enough. Thus, the petitioner cited the Sec 6 of the new Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC that reads: Sec. 6. Bond In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter
involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the
posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by
the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner still required to post an appeal bond despite the fact
that it has posted bonds of 150k and placed 200k in escrow before
HELD: Yes. The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in addition to the
cash and surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to
the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA. Obviously,
the appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment of the monetary award in favor of
the employee if it is eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.
Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. It is a principle that states that in interpreting a statute (or
a set of rules as in this case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect,
on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of
conflicting provisions. In the case at bar, it was found that contrary to what the petitioner
had claimed, Section 6 compliments Section 4 and 17.
Thus, the court ruled that in addition to the monetary obligations of the overseas recruiter
prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and the escrow agreement under
Section 17 of the same Rule, it is necessary to post the appeal bond required under Section
6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules, as a condition for perfecting an appeal from a decision
of the POEA.
Rodriguez, Angeline DC.
LAPID VS. COURT OF APPEALS - 334 SCRA 738 - June 28, 2000
Facts: The Ombudsman issued an order suspending petitioner Lapid for a period of six (6)
months without pay pursuant to Sec. 24 of RA 6770. The petitioner prayed for the setting
aside of the resolution issued by the Court of Appeals, denying his prayer for injuctive relief,
and for the issuance of a new one enjoining the respondents from enforcing the said
decision or, if it has already been implemented, to withdraw any action already taken until
the issue of whether or not the said decision of the Ombudsman is immediately executory
has been settled.
The Solicitor-General and the Office of the Ombudsman filed their respective comments to
the petition praying for the dismissal thereof. Regarding the issue of the immediate
enforcement of the decision of the Ombudsman, the Solicitor-General maintains that the
said decision is governed by Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court and is therefore,
immediately executory. The Office of the Ombudsman also stated that it has uniformly
adopted the provisions in the Local Government Code and Administrative Code that
decisions in administrative disciplinary cases are immediately executory.
After oral arguments, the court ruled that the respondents failed to establish the existence
of a law mandating the immediate execution of a decision of the Ombudsman in an
administrative case where the penalty imposed is suspension for one year. From resolution,
the Offices of the Solicitor-General and the Ombudsman filed the instant motions for
reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 and the Local
Government Code on execution pending review should be applied suppletorily to the
provisions of the Ombudsman Act
Held: No. The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner was charged administratively before the
Ombudsman and accordingly the provisions of the Ombudsman Act should apply in his
case. Petitioner was administratively charged for misconduct under the provisions of R.A.
6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989. Section 27 of the said Act provides as follows:
Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. - All provisionary orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory. A motion for reconsideration of any
order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days
after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on the following grounds:
Findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month's salary shall be final and unappealable.
The Local Government Code, under Section 68 thereof provides as follows:
"Section 68. Execution Pending Appeal. - An appeal shall not prevent a decision from
becoming final and executory. The respondent shall be considered as having been placed
under preventive suspension during the pendency of an appeal in the event he wins such
appeal. In the event the appeal results in an exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and
such other emoluments during the pendency of the appeal."
Similarly, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 6, Section 47, par. (4) of the Administrative
Code of 1987 provides:
"(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is
suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under preventive
suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal."
There is no basis in law for the proposition that the provisions of the Administrative Code of
1987 and the Local Government Code on execution pending review should be applied
suppletorily to the provisions of the Ombudsman Act as there is nothing in the Ombudsman
Act which provides for such suppletory application. Courts may not, in the guise of
interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided or
intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or
calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however later wisdom may recommend the
inclusion.
And while in one respect, the Ombudsman Law, the Administrative Code of 1987 and the
Local Government Code are in pari materia insofar as the three laws relate or deal with
public officers, the similarity ends there. It is a principle in statutory construction that where
there are two statutes that apply to a particular case, that which was specially designed for
the said case must prevail over the other. In the instant case, the acts attributed to
petitioner could have been the subject of administrative disciplinary proceedings before the
Office of the President under the Local Government Code or before the Office of the
Ombudsman under the Ombudsman Act. Considering however, that petitioner was charged
under the Ombudsman Act, it is this law alone which should govern his case.

LIBANAN v. SANDIGANBAYAN and DOCENA 233 SCRA 163 - June 14, 1994
Facts: Accused Gov. Lutgardo Barbo, Petitioner Vice-Gov. Marcelino C. Libanan, and
Sangguniang Panlalawigan members Nonato A. Gerna and Generoso A. Yu were suspended
from their respective public positions, or from any other public office that they may be
holding, the same to commence upon their receipt hereof and for a period of ninety (90)
days thereafter for having violated Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019.
Petitioner Libanan filed a motion for reconsideration, stating that the reasons sought to be
prevented by the suspension order pendente lite no longer exist. The Sandiganbayan denied
the petition. With this, petitioner appealed.
Issue: Whether or not the suspension of the accused public officials pendente lite is
contrary to law
Held: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the error raised by petitioner need not be delved
into. When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court
ratiocination or rationalization of the law.
Republic Act No. 3019 unequivocally mandates the suspension of a public official from office
pending a criminal prosecution against him. The amendatory provision of Section 13,
Republic Act No. 3019, here applicable, provides:
Sec. 13. Suspension and Loss of Benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under title 7, book II of the
Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution
and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. . . .
This Court has repeatedly held that such preventive suspension is mandatory, and there are
no "ifs" and "buts" about it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed resolution of respondent
Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED in toto.
Lim v. Pacquing 240 SCRA 649 - January 27, 1995
Facts: Associate Development Corporation (ADC) filed a motion for execution of a final
judgment rendered earlier which ordered the Hon. Alfredo Lim, Mayor of Manila, to
immediately issue to the ADC the permit/license to operate jai-alai in Manila under Manila
Ordinance No. 7065. Respondent Judge Pacquing issued in a civil case the following orders
which were assailed by Mayor Lim:
a. order dated 28 March 1994 directing Manila Mayor Alfredo S. Lim to issue the
permit/license to operate the jai-alai in favor of Associated Development Corporation (ADC)
b. order dated 11 April 1994 directing Mayor Lim to explain why he should not be cited for
contempt for non-compliance with the order dated 28 March 1994
c. order dated 20 April 1994 reiterating the previous order directing Mayor Lim to
immediately issue the permit/license to Associated Development Corporation (ADC)
Petitioner Guingona (as executive secretary) issued a directive to then chairman of the
Games and Amusements Board (GAB) Francisco R. Sumulong, Jr. to hold in abeyance the
grant of authority to Associated Development Corporation to operate the jai-alai in the City
of Manila, until the following legal questions are properly resolved:
1. Whether P.D. 771 which revoked all existing Jai-Alai franchises issued by local
governments as of 20 August 1975 is unconstitutional.
2. Assuming that the City of Manila had the power on 7 September 1971 to issue a Jai-Alai
franchise to Associated Development Corporation, whether the franchise granted is valid
considering that the franchise has no duration, and appears to be granted in perpetuity.
3. Whether the City of Manila had the power to issue a Jai-Alai franchise to Associated
Development Corporation on 7 September 1971 in view of Executive Order No. 392 dated 1
January 1951 which transferred from local governments to the Games and Amusements
Board the power to regulate Jai-Alai.
Respondent Associated Development Corporation (ADC) filed a petition for prohibition,
mandamus, injunction and damages with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner Guingona.
The RTC of Manila, through Judge Vetino Reyes, issued a Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining the GAB from withdrawing ADCs provisional authority. Said TRO was then
converted into a writ of preliminary injunction upon ADCs posting of a bond in the amount
of 2,000,000.
Subsequently, the Republic of the Philippines, through the GAB, filed an intervention. Judge
Reyes issued another order, this time, granting ADC a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction against Guingona and GAB to compel them to issue in favor of ADC the authority
to operate the jai-alai.
Issue: (1) Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is allowed to intervene in the case
(2) Whether P.D. 771 which revoked all existing Jai-Alai franchises issued by local
governments as of 20 August 1975 is unconstitutional.
Held: (1) Yes. The court ruled that the Republic (in contra distinction to the City of Manila)
may be allowed to intervene in this case. The Republic is intervening in the exercise, not of
its business or proprietary functions, but in the exercise of its governmental functions to
protect public morals and promote the general welfare. The well-settled rule is that the State
cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents (Republic
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90).
(2) No. The court ruled that Presidential Decree No. 771 valid and constitutional.
In the present case, the resulting injustice and injury, should the national government's
allegations be proven correct, are manifest, since the latter has squarely questioned the
very existence of a valid franchise to maintain and operate the jai-alai (which is a gambling
operation) in favor of ADC.
Additionally, the national government argues that even assuming, arguendo, that the
abovementioned ordinance is valid, ADC's franchise was nonetheless effectively revoked by
Presidential Decree No. 771, issued on 20 August 1975, Sec. 3 of which expressly revoked all
existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling facilities (including the jaialai) issued by local governments.
The time-honored doctrine is that all laws (PD No. 771 included) are presumed valid and
constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled by this Court. Not only this; Article XVIII Section
3 of the Constitution states:
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions
and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative
until amended, repealed or revoked.
There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed,
altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the executive still
exercised legislative powers).

Lina v. Carino 221 SCRA 515 - April 23, 1993
Facts: Senator Jose D. Lina, Jr. filed a petition against respondent Isidro D. Carino, in his
capacity as the then Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture & Sports ("DECS").
Petitioner disputes the legal authority of respondent Carino to issue DECS Order No. 30,
entitled Guidelines on Tuition and/or other School Fees in Private Schools, Colleges and
Universities for School Year 1991-1992 considering that authority to promulgate rules and
regulations relating to the imposition of school fees had been transferred to the State
Assistance Council (SAC) by Republic Act No. 6728.
Petitioner also contends that DECS Order No. 30 is inconsistent with Section 10 of R.A. No.
6728. In DECS Order No. 30 respondent Secretary exempted increases in school fees other
than tuition fee (or "other school fees" as distinguished from "tuition fee") from application
of the consultation requirement. According to petitioner, Section 10 above notwithstanding
its wording, covers increases in all types of school fees, which increases must first comply
with the requirement of consultation before promulgation in order that prohibitive and
burdensome fees (of any type) may be avoided.
The Solicitor General, representing respondent Secretary, maintains that the power to
prescribe maximum tuition and other school fees granted under B.P. Blg. 232 was not
withdrawn by R.A. No. 6728 and remains vested in the DECS Secretary.
Issue: (1) Whether or not DECS Order No. 30 is consistent with Section 10 of R.A. No. 6728
(2) Whether or not respondent DECS Secretary has the legal authority to issue DECS Order
No. 30 prescribing guidelines concerning increases in tuition and other school fees
Held: (1) It is hardly necessary to add that the Court, in reaching the above conclusion is
not saying that every paragraph add sub-paragraph of DECS Order No. 30 is necessarily
valid and consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute. We do not understand the
parties to be asking us to validate or strike down every such paragraph and sub-paragraph.
In respect of the issue that section 1(d) of DECS Order No. 30 is inconsistent with Section 10
of R.A. No. 6728, the court stated petitioner's stand is inconsistent with the very language
used in Section 10 of R.A. No. 6728 which states in relevant part that: "in any proposed
increase in the rate of tuition fees, there shall be appropriate consultations ---." Petitioner
Lina's argument here is, however, essentially an invocation of "justice and equity." Petitioner
argues that:
"There is no basis, legal or otherwise, for the respondent Secretary to view 'other fees' as
separate and distinct from 'tuition fee rate' for purposes of the consultation requirement of
the law. To exclude the imposition of 'other fees' from the consultation process would result
in an anomalous situation whereby so-called 'other fees' may become so burdensome that
the students and parents concerned may be deprived of the right of being heard or
consulted on matter directly affecting their interest. Justice and equity demand that any
increase in the tuition fee, tuition fee assessment or 'other fees' which in its totality
increases the cost of education, should and must be subjected to consultation, as required in
Section 10, R.A. No. 6728."
The Court believes that petitioner's argument -- cogent though it may be as a social and
economic comment -- is most appropriately addressed, not to a court which must take the
law as it is actually written, but rather to the legislative authority which can, if it wishes,
change the language and content of the law. As Section 10 of R.A. No. 6728 now stands, we
have no authority to strike down paragraph 1 (d) of DECS Order No. 30 as inconsistent with
the requirements of Section 10.
(2) Yes. The court ruled that the power to regulate school fees includes the power to increase
such fees. Such 57 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, otherwise known as The Education Act of
1982, vests the DECS with the power to regulate the educational system in the country, to
wit:
'Sec. 57. Educations and powers of the Ministry. -- The Ministry shall:
(3) Promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the administration, supervision and
regulation of the educational system in accordance with declared policy.
Section 70 of the same Act grants the DECS the power to issue rules which are likewise
necessary to discharge its functions and duties under the law, to wit:
'Sec. 70. Rule-making Authority. -- The Minister of Education and Culture, charged with the
administration and enforcement of this Act, shall promulgate the necessary implementing
rules and regulations.
In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes the power to prescribe
school fees. No other government agency has been vested with the authority to fix school
fees and as such, the power should be considered lodged with the DECS if it is to properly
and effectively discharge its functions and duties under the law.
We turn to the argument of petitioner Lina that the DECS Secretary was divested of his
authority to promulgate rules and regulations relating to the fixing of tuition and other
school fees, by R.A. No. 6728, and that such authority has been transferred instead to the
SAC. The Court is unable to agree with this contention. We do not see how R.A. No. 6728
could be regarded as vesting upon the SAC the legal authority to establish maximum
permissible tuition and other school fees for private schools. R.A. No. 6728 deals with
government assistance to students and teachers in private schools; it does not, in other
words, purport to deal at with the question of authority to fix maximum collectible tuition
and other school fees.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Ronquillo, Lance
Loong v Comelec
FACTS:
Automated elections systems was used for the May 11, 1998 regular elections held in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the Province of Sulu. Atty.
Jose Tolentino, Jr. headed the COMELEC Task Force to have administrative oversight of the
elections in Sulu.
On May 12, 1998, some election inspectors and watchers informed Atty. Tolentino, Jr. of
discrepancies between the election returns and the votes cast for the mayoralty candidates
in the municipality of Pata. To avoid a situation where proceeding with automation will result
in an erroneous count, he suspended the automated counting of ballots in Pata and
immediately communicated the problem to the technical experts of COMELEC and the
suppliers of the automated machine. After the consultations, the experts told him that the
problem was caused by misalignment of the ovals opposite the names of candidates in the
local ballots. They found nothing wrong with the automated machines. The error was in the
printing of the local ballots, as a consequence of which, the automated machines failed to
read them correctly. Atty. Tolentino, Jr. called for an emergency meeting of the local
candidates and the military-police officials overseeing the Sulu elections. Among those who
attended were petitioner Tupay Loong and private respondent Abdusakar Tan and intervenor
Yusop Jikiri (candidates for governor.) The meeting discussed how the ballots in Pata should
be counted in light of the misaligned ovals. There was lack of agreement. Some
recommended a shift to manual count (Tan et al) while the others insisted on automated
counting (Loong AND Jikiri).
Reports that the automated counting of ballots in other municipalities in Sulu was not
working well were received by the COMELEC Task Force. Local ballots in five (5)
municipalities were rejected by the automated machines. These municipalities were Talipao,
Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The ballots were rejected because they had the wrong
sequence code.
Before midnight of May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was able to send to the COMELEC en
banc his report and recommendation, urging the use of the manual count in the entire
Province of Sulu. 6 On the same day, COMELEC issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1747
ordering a manual count but only in the municipality of Pata.. The next day, May 13, 1998,
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 98-1750 approving, Atty. Tolentino, Jr.'s recommendation
and the manner of its implementation. On May 15, 1998, the COMELEC en banc issued
Minute Resolution No. 98-1796 laying down the rules for the manual count. Minute
Resolution 98-1798 laid down the procedure for the counting of votes for Sulu at the PICC.
COMELEC started the manual count on May 18, 1998.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
is the appropriate remedy to invalidate the disputed COMELEC resolutions.
2. Assuming the appropriateness of the remedy, whether or not COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering a manual count. (The main
issue in the case at bar)
2.a. Is there a legal basis for the manual count?
2.b. Are its factual bases reasonable?
2.c. Were the petitioner and the intervenor denied due process by the COMELEC when it
ordered a manual count?
3. Assuming the manual count is illegal and that its result is unreliable, whether or not it is
proper to call for a special election for the position of governor of Sulu.
HELD:
the petition of Tupay Loong and the petition in intervention of Yusop Jikiri are dismissed,
there being no showing that public respondent gravely abused its discretion in issuing
Minute Resolution Nos. 98-1748, 98-1750, 98-1796 and 98-1798. Our status quo order of
June 23, 1998 is lifted.
(1.) Certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner. The issue is not only legal but one of
first impression and undoubtedly suffered with significance to the entire nation. It is
adjudicatory of the right of the petitioner, the private respondents and the intervenor to the
position of governor of Sulu. These are enough considerations to call for an exercise of the
certiorari jurisdiction of this Court.
(2a). A resolution of the issue will involve an interpretation of R.A. No. 8436 on automated
election in relation to the broad power of the COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of
the Constitution "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election , plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent
of this provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve
the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
The order for a manual count cannot be characterized as arbitrary, capricious or whimsical.
It is well established that the automated machines failed to read correctly the ballots in the
municipality of Pata The technical experts of COMELEC and the supplier of the automated
machines found nothing wrong the automated machines. They traced the problem to the
printing of local ballots by the National Printing Office. It is plain that to continue with the
automated count would result in a grossly erroneous count. An automated count of the local
votes in Sulu would have resulted in a wrong count, a travesty of the sovereignty of the
electorate
In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the error in
counting is not machine-related for human foresight is not all-seeing. We hold, however, that
the vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC from levitating above the problem. . We
cannot kick away the will of the people by giving a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A.
8436 did not prohibit manual counting when machine count does not work. Counting is part
and parcel of the conduct of an election which is under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC. It ought to be self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that
cannot count the result of an election.
It is also important to consider that the failures of automated counting created post election
tension in Sulu, a province with a history of violent elections. COMELEC had to act desively in
view of the fast deteriorating peace and order situation caused by the delay in the counting
of votes
(2c) Petitioner Loong and intervenor Jikiri were not denied process. The Tolentino
memorandum clearly shows that they were given every opportunity to oppose the manual
count of the local ballots in Sulu. They were orally heard. They later submitted written
position papers. Their representatives escorted the transfer of the ballots and the automated
machines from Sulu to Manila. Their watchers observed the manual count from beginning to
end.
3. The plea for this Court to call a special election for the governorship of Sulu is completely
off-line. The plea can only be grounded on failure of election. Section 6 of the Omnibus
Election Code tells us when there is a failure of election, viz:
Sec. 6. Failure of election. If, on account of force majeure, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes, the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or
had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the
voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such
cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the
Commission shall on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due
notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election, not held, suspended
or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the
cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
There is another reason why a special election cannot be ordered by this Court. To hold a
special election only for the position of Governor will be discriminatory and will violate the
right of private respondent to equal protection of the law. The records show that all elected
officials in Sulu have been proclaimed and are now discharging their powers and duties.
These officials were proclaimed on the basis of the same manually counted votes of Sulu. If
manual counting is illegal, their assumption of office cannot also be countenanced. Private
respondent's election cannot be singled out as invalid for alikes cannot be treated unalikes.
The plea for a special election must be addressed to the COMELEC and not to this Court.
Ronquillo, Lance
Mactan V CA
FACTS: On April 16, 1952, the Republic, represented by the CAA, filed an expropriation
proceeding to the CFI of Cebu on several parcels of land in Lahug, Cebu City, which included
Lot 941, for the expansion and improvement of Lahug Airport.
In 1953, appellee Chiongbian purchased Lot 941 from its original owner, the original
defendant in the expropriation case. Subsequently, a TCT was issued in her name
Then in 1961, judgment was rendered in the expropriation case in favor of the Republic
which was made to pay Chiongbian an amount for Lot 941. Chiongbian did not appeal
therefrom.Thereafter, absolute title to Lot 941 was transferred to the Republic under a TCT.
Then, in 1990, Republic Act No. 6958 was passed by Congress creating the Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority (MCIAA) to which the assets of the Lahug Airport was
transferred. Lot 941 was then transferred in the name of MCIAA under a TCT.
In 1995, Chiongbian filed a complaint for reconveyance of Lot 941 with the RTC of Cebu,
alleging, that sometime in 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC) ventured to expand
the Cebu Lahug Airport. As a consequence, it sought to acquire by expropriation or
negotiated sale several parcels of lands adjoining the Lahug Airport, one of which was Lot
941 owned by Chiongbian. Since she and other landowners could not agree with the NACs
offer for the compensation of their lands, a suit for eminent domain was instituted, before
the then CFI of Cebu against 45 landowners, including Chiongbian, entitled Republic of the
Philippine vs. Damian Ouano, et al. It was finally decided in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Some of the defendants-landowners appealed the decision to the CA which rendered a
modified judgment allowing them to repurchase their expropriated properties. Chiongbian,
on the other hand, did not appeal and instead, accepted the compensation for Lot 941 upon
the assurance of the NAC that she or her heirs would be given the right of reconveyance for
the same price once the land would no longer be used as (sic) airport.[by an alleged written
agreement]
Consequently, the TCT of Chiongbian was cancelled and a TCT was issued in the name of the
Republic. Then, with the creation of the MCIAA, it was cancelled and a TCT was issued in its
name.
However, no expansion of the Lahug Airport was undertaken by MCIAA and its predecessorsin-interest. Thus, the purpose for which Lot 941 was taken ceased to exist.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondent Chiongbian and MCIAA was ordered
to restore to plaintiff the possession and ownership of the property denominated as Lot No.
941 upon reimbursement of the expropriation price paid to plaintiff. The RD is therefore
ordered to effect the Transfer of the Certificate Title from the defendant to the plaintiff.
MCIAA appealed the decision to the CA which affirmed the RTC decision. MR was
denied hence this petition.
ISSUE: Petioner questions whether or not:
1. THE CA ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURTS JUDGMENT THAT THERE WAS A
REPURCHASE AGREEMENT AND IGNORING PETITIONERS PROTESTATIONS THAT ADMISSION
OF RESPONDENTS ORAL EVIDENCE IS NOT ALLOWED UNDER THE STATUE OF FRAUDS.
2. THE CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MODIFIED JUDGMENT SHOULD INURE TO THE
BENEFIT OF CHIONGBIAN EVEN IF SHE WAS NOT A PARTY IN SAID APPEALED CASE, and in
RULING THAT THE RIGHT OF CHIONGBIAN TO REPURCHASE SHOULD BE UNDER THE SAME
TERMS AND CONDITIONS AS THE OTHER LANDOWNERS
3. [substantive aspects] whether the abandonment of the public use for which Lot No. 941
was expropriated entitles CHIONGBIAN to reacquire it.
On the other hand, aside from praying that this Court affirm the decision of the CA, the
private respondent CHIONGBIAN prays that:
a. The petition be denied for the reason that it violates the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure,
more specifically the requirement of a certification of non-forum shopping. (CHIONGBIAN
claims that the Verification and Certification on Non-Forum Shopping executed by the MCIAA
was signed by a Colonel Marcelino A. Cordova whose appointment as Assistant General

Manager of MCIAA was disapproved by the Civil Service Commission. It is CHIONGBIANs
position that since his appointment was disapproved, the Verification attached to the
petition for review on certiorari cannot be considered as having been executed by the
plaintiff or principal party who under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court can validly
make the certification in the instant petition. ) Consequently, the petition should be
considered as not being verified and as such should not be considered as having been filed
at all.
HELD: The Decision of the CA is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of
Chiongbian against the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority for reconveyance of Lot
No. 941 is DISMISSED.
1. CHIONGBIAN cannot rely on the ruling in Mactan Cebu International Airport vs.
CA wherein the presentation of parol evidence was allowed to prove the existence of a
written agreement containing the right to repurchase. Said case did not involve
expropriation proceedings but a contract of sale.
More importantly, no objection was made by petitioner when private respondents introduced
evidence to show the right of repurchase granted by the NAC to Inez Ouano. It has been
repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a protest or objection against the admission
of any evidence must be made at the proper time, and if not so made, it will be understood
to have been waived.
This pronouncement is not applicable to the present case since the parol evidence rule
which provides that when the terms of a written agreement have been reduced to writing, it
is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon, and there can be, between the parties
and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement applies to written agreements and has no application to a judgment of a
court. To permit CHIONGBIAN to prove the existence of a compromise settlement which she
claims to have entered into with the Republic of the Philippines prior to the rendition of
judgment in the expropriation case would result in a modification of the judgment of a court
which has long become final and executory.
And even assuming for the sake of argument that CHIONGBIAN could prove the existence of
the alleged written agreement acknowledging her right to repurchase Lot No. 941 through
parol evidence, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the evidence presented by
CHIONGBIAN was admissible.
Under 1403 of the Civil Code, a contract for the sale of real property shall be unenforceable
unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the
party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore of the agreement cannot be received
without the writing or a secondary evidence of its contents.
Contrary to the finding of the CA, the records reveal that MCIAA objected to the purpose for
which the testimonies of CHIONGBIAN and Bercede (BERCEDE) were offered, i.e. to prove the
existence of the alleged written agreement evincing a right to repurchase Lot No. 941 in
favor of CHIONGBIAN, for being in violation of the Statute of Frauds. MCIAA also objected to
the purpose for which the testimony of Attorney (PASTRANA) was offered, i.e. to prove the
existence of the alleged written agreement and an alleged deed of sale, on the same
ground. Consequently, the testimonies of these witnesses are inadmissible under the Statute
of Frauds to prove the existence of the alleged sale.
Moreover, CHIONGBIANs testimony shows that she had no personal knowledge of the
alleged assurance made by the Republic of the Philippines that Lot No. 941 would be
returned to her in the event that the Lahug Airport was closed. She stated that she only
learned of the alleged assurance of the Republic of the Philippines through her lawyer,
Attorney Calderon, who was not presented as a witness.
2. CHIONGBIAN cannot invoke the modified judgment of the Court of Appeals in the case of
Republic of the Philippines vs. Escao, et. al. where her co-defendants entered into separate
and distinct compromise agreements with the Republic of the Philippines wherein they
agreed to sell their land subject of the expropriation proceedings to the latter subject to the
resolutory condition that in the event the Republic of the Philippines no longer uses said
property as an airport, title and ownership of said property shall revert to its respective
owners upon reimbursement of the price paid therefor without interest. MCIAA correctly
points out that since CHIONGBIAN did not appeal the judgment of expropriation and was not
a party to the appeal of her co-defendants, the judgment therein cannot redound to her
benefit.
And even assuming that CHIONGBIAN was a party to the appeal, she was not a party to the
compromise agreements entered into by her co-defendants. A compromise is a contract
whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one
already commenced.Essentially, it is a contract perfected by mere consent, the latter being
manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause
which are to constitute the contract. A judicial compromise has the force of law and
is conclusive between the parties and it is not valid and binding on a party who did not sign
the same. Since CHIONGBIAN was not a party to the compromise agreements, she cannot
legally invoke the same.
3. The answer to that question depends upon the character of the title acquired by the
expropriator which has the right to acquire property under the power of eminent domain.
If, for example, land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when
that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of
course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the
property so expropriated
If, upon the contrary, however, the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple
title, then, of course, the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator, whether it
be the State, a province, or municipality, and in that case the non-user does not have the
effect of defeating the title acquired by the expropriation proceedings.
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the
exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land,
and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use,
without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former
owner.
In the present case, evidence reveals that Lot No. 941 was appropriated by the Republic of
the Philippines through expropriation proceedings. The terms of the judgment are clear and
unequivocal and grant title to Lot No. 941 in fee simple to the Republic. There was no
condition imposed to the effect that the lot would return to CHIONGBIAN or that
CHIONGBIAN had a right to repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was expropriated
is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used other than as the Lahug airport.
a. We are not persuaded by CHIONGBIANs claim that the Verification and Certification
against forum shopping accompanying MCIAAs petition was insufficient for allegedly having
been signed by one who was not qualified to do so. As pointed out by the MCIAA, Colonel
Cordova signed the Verification and Certification against forum shopping as Acting General
Manager of the MCIAA issued by the General Manager of MCIAA. Colonel Cordova did not
sign the Verification and Certification against forum shopping pursuant to his appointment
as assistant General Manager of the MCIAA, which was later disapproved by the Commission
on Appointments.
Ronquillo, Lance
Magtajas v. Pryce
Facts:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, itleased a
portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., renovated
andequipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmassea
son.Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious elements echoed
theobjection and so did the women's groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led by
themayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as
anaffront to the welfare of the city. The contention of the petitioners is that it is violative of
the Sangguniang Panlungsodof Cagayan de Oro City Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use
of buildings for the operationof a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the
operation of casinos.On the other hand, the respondents invoke P.D. 1869 which created
PAGCOR to helpcentralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and
sea within theterritorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of
the respondents. Hence, the petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not the Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are valid
Held:No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered toenact
ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expresslyvested
with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause nowembodied in
Section 16 as follows: Sec. 16.General Welfare Every local government unit shall exercise
thepowers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well aspowers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effectivegovernance, and those
which are essential to the promotion of the
generalwelfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local governmentunits shall
ensure and support, among other things, the preservation andenrichment of culture,
promote health and safety, enhance the right of thepeople to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific
and technological capabilities, improvepublic morals, enhance economic prosperity and
social justice, promote fullemployment among their residents, maintain peace and order,
and preservethe comfort and convenience of their
inhabitants. There is a requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute.Mun
icipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exerciseonly
delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmakingbody.
The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than thoseof the
latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts
of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by
mereordinance the mandate of the statute.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statutethat
cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance.
Ronquillo, Lance
Manila Jockey Club v CA
ISSUE: who was entitled to breakages (10% dividend of winning horse race tickets)
STATCON: There are two statutes that should be considered. RA 309 (amended by 6631 &
6632) is silent on the matter but the practice is to use breakages for anti bookie drive and
other sale promotions. E.O. 88 & 89 which allocated breakages therein specified. These two
should be construed in pari materia, thus all breakages derived from all races should be
distributed and allocated in accordance with Executive Orders because no law should be
viewed in isolation.
Roxas, Jolina C.
Manzano vs. Valera 292 SCRA 66 July 8, 1998
FACTS:
A criminal complaint for libel was filed in the sala of respondent Judge against Juanito
Manzano, the petitioner who was then Senior Police Officer 1. The private respondent Vilma
Bobila charged that with malicious intent to expose her to public ridicule, Manzano caused
to be entered and written in the PNP, Bangued Police Station Blotter (a public record) a
false, malicious and highly defamatory statements against Bobila and with no good
intentions or justifiable motive for preparing and writing the same.
The complaint in sum contained an account of the entry in the police blotter, which was the
alleged source of the libelous matter.
The respondent Judge initially recognized that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had jurisdiction
and forwarded the records to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. However, upon receipt
of the records, Prosecutor Edgardo Flores invoking the amendment in Paragraph 2, Section
32 of B.P. 129 which is now also Section 2 of Republic Act 7691, opined that the MTC should
take cognizance of the case.
In holding that the MTC had jurisdiction, respondent Judge made reference to RA 7691 which
according to him, amended Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code. Furthermore, he opined
that although Section 6, RA 769113 does not specifically state what laws fall within the
scope of the amendment, the provision on jurisdiction over libel being inconsistent with the
new enactment, the Code should now be considered amended.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC or MTC has the jurisdiction of libel cases
RULING:
The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, which categorically provides
that jurisdiction over libel cases are lodged with RTC. Although RA 7691 was enacted which
expands the jurisdiction of first level courts, said law is of a general character. Even if it is a
later enactment, it does not alter the provision of Article 360 of the RPC, a law of a special
nature. Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a particular court, are special in character,
and should prevail over the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of other courts like RTC
which is a general law.
Although RA 7691 was enacted which expands the jurisdiction of first level courts, said law is
of a general character. Even if it is a later enactment, it does not alter the provision of Article
360 of the RPC, a law of a special nature. Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a
particular court, are special in character, and should prevail over the Judiciary Act defining
the jurisdiction of other courts like RTC which is a general law.
A later enactment like RA 7691 does not automatically override an existing law, because it is
a well-settled principle of construction that, in case of conflict between a general law and a
special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Jurisdiction
conferred by a special law on the RTC must therefore prevail over that granted by a general
law on the MTC.
The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, which categorically provides
that jurisdiction over libel cases are lodged with the Courts of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Courts).
Roxas, Jolina C.
Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. vs. NLRC 313 SCRA 88, August 25, 1999
FACTS:
Private respondent Wilfredo T. Cajeras was hired by petitioner MARSAMAN, the local
manning agent of petitioner DIAMANTIDES, as Chief Cook Steward on the MV Prigipos,
owned and operated by DIAMANTIDES, for a contract period of ten (10) months with a
monthly salary evidenced by a contract between the parties dated 15 June 1995. Cajeras
started work on 8 August 1995 but less than two months later, or on 28 September 1995, he
was repatriated to the Philippines allegedly by mutual consent. The respondent filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners with the NLRC National Capital Region
Arbitration Branch alleging that he was dismissed illegally, denying that his repatriation was
by mutual consent. He further alleged that he was assigned not only as Chief Cook Steward
but to other impertinent duties which caused him sickness due to work overload.
Capt. Alekos had him examined at the Medical Center for Seamen. However, the physician
neither apprised private respondent about the diagnosis nor issued the requested medical
certificate allegedly because he himself would forward the results to private respondents
superiors. Upon returning to the vessel, private respondent was unceremoniously ordered to
prepare for immediate repatriation the following day as he was said to be suffering from a
disease of unknown origin.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner should award the respondents on damages when the former
dismissed the latter on his duty
RULING:
YES. In the Contract of Employment entered into with private respondent, which provides
that: 1. The employment of the seaman shall cease upon expiration of the contract period
indicated in the Crew Contract unless the Master and the Seaman, by mutual consent, in
writing, agree to an early termination
In the instant case, no document exists whereby Capt. Alekos and private respondent
reduced to writing their alleged mutual consent to the termination of their employment
contract. Instead, petitioners the entry made by Capt. Alekos in the Deck Log was dismissed
as of little probative value because it was a mere unilateral act unsupported by any
document showing mutual consent of Capt. Alekos. Moreover, Dr. Hoeds diagnosis that
private respondent was suffering from paranoia and other mental problems was likewise
dismissed as being of little evidentiary value because it was not supported by evidence on
how the paranoia was contracted, and its result was not known by the respondent by which
the petitioners suffices its claim that the former had paranoia and sickness.
In light of the foregoing,the petitioners should pay the damages under Section 10 of
Republic Act 8042, of which amount to award an illegally dismissed overseas contract
worker, i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or
three (3) months salary for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less, comes into
play only when the employment contract concerned has a term of at least one (1) year or
more.A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals that the choice of which amount to award
an illegally dismissed overseas contract worker, i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract or three (3) months salary for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less, comes into play only when the employment contract
concerned has a term of at least one (1) year or more. This is evident from the words for
every year of the unexpired term which follows the words salaries x x x for three months
Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. vs. NLRC, 313 SCRA 88, G.R. No. 127195 August 25, 1999
Roxas, Jolina C.
Martinez vs. People 332 SCRA 694, May 31, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner was accused of homicide in before the Regional Trial Court. During the hearing
petitioner objected to be allowed to litigate as pauper but this court denied it.
This prompted petitioner to go to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari
alleging that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it issued the assailed orders, but this court also denied his petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners
motion to appeal as a pauper litigant
RULING:
YES. On Sec. 16, Rule 41, of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, which provides that:
Sec. 16 Appeal by pauper.Where a party desiring to appeal shall establish to the
satisfaction of the trial court that he is a pauper and unable to pay the expenses of
prosecuting the appeal, and that the case is of such importance, by reason of the amount
involved, or the nature of the question raised, that it ought to be reviewed by the appellate
court, the trial judge may enter an order entitling the party to appeal as pauper. The clerk
shall transmit to the appellate court the entire record of the case, including the evidence
taken on trial and the record on appeal, and the case shall be heard in the appellate court
upon the original record so transmitted without printing the same. A petition to be allowed
to appeal as pauper shall not be entertained by the appellate court.
Even prior to the adoption of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, the Court had uniformly
frowned upon appellate courts entertaining petitions to litigate as pauper, holding that the
question of whether a party-litigant is so poor as to qualify him to litigate as pauper is a
question of fact which is best determined by the trial court. The trial court is the court which
may property decide or pass upon the question of fact which may require presentation of
evidence whether the appellant is an indigent and may appeal as such, and whether the
case is of such importance that, by reason not only of the amount involved but of the nature
of the question raised in the court below, it ought to be reviewed by the appellate court.
The 1965 Revised Rules of Court, even ratified by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in effect,
it still resolve to apply the present rules on petitioner retrospectively. Statutes regulating the
procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined
at the time of their passage. In that sense and to that extent procedural laws are
retroactive.16 We therefore hold that a motion to litigate as an indigent can be made even
before the appellate courts, either for the prosecution of appeals, in petitions for review or in
special civil actions.
Roxas, Jolina C.
Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
263 SCRA 490, G.R. No. 98310 October 24, 1996
FACTS:
The Acting Director of Bureau of Forest Development issued Provisional Timber License no.
30
Converting an area of 5400 hectares, to Milagros Matuguina who was conducting a business
Under the name of Matuguina Lumber Enterprises. A portion, 1990 hectares of the area was
located within the territorial boundary of Governor Generoso of Mati, Davao Oriental and
adjoined
The Timber concession of DAVENCOR
Milagros Matuguina became the majority stockholder of MIWPI on September 24, 1974,
When the latters Board of Directors approved by Resolution the transfer of 1M shares
From Henry Wee to Milagros Matuguina, thus giving her 70% stock ownership of MIWPI
In an undated letter to the Director of Forest Development on November 26, 1974, Milagros
Matuguina
Requested the Director for a change of name and transfer of management of PTL No. 30,
from
A single proprietorship under her name, to that MIWPI. This request was favorably endorsed
By the BFDs Acting Director to respondent Secretary of Natural Resources, who approved
The same on Septmber 5, 1975
On July 17, 1975, MLE and MIWP executed a deed of transfer, transfering all the rights,
interests, ownerships and participation in PTL no. 30 to the latter fir and in consideration of
P148000 shares of stock in MIWP.
On July 28, 1975 the DAVENCOR, through its General Manager, filed a complaint fir MLEs
illegal encroachment in their forest concessionaire.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the MIWP, Inc., the transferee of MLE, is liable for the latters illegal logging
within the licensed concessionaire area of DAVENCOR.
RULING:
According to section 61 of P.D. no. 705, the transferee shall assume all the obligations of the
transferor. However, the word obligations shall be construed in its common and ordinary
usage. It shall not be construed to mean those obligations and liabilities incurred by the
transferor as a result of transgressions of law, as these are the personal obligations of the
transferor. It means that the MIWP, the transferee, is not liable for the transferors illegal
encroachment into another forests concessionaire.
Wesnny Cxarles G. Tana
MERS vs NLRC 286 SCRA 647 2000
FACTS: On April 20, 1991, the jeepney drivers (petitioners) were told by the Olimpio Breton
(private respondent) that their shift was moved from 5PM-4AM to 7PM-6AM. In this regard,
the petitioners did not ply their routes to protest. The following day, the petitioners were met
by Breton where they were promised to change back the schedule to 5PM-4AM but they
were given suspension and fine. However, when they arrived for their respective jeepneys,
there are already new drivers and they were advised to look for work elsewhere.
The petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. On November 26, 1991, the
labor arbiter rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners wherefore the private
respondents should pay the amount of P95,550.00. On April 3, 1992, private respondents
were served a copy of the decision. On April 13, 1992, the private respondents filed their
appeal. Nevertheless, it was April 30, 1992, that they filed the appeal bond. Unfortunately,
the appeal bond was inauthentic.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal of the private respondents is perfected.
HELD: No, the perfection of an appeal requires it to be within the reglementary period and
coupled with the bond. Whereas, it is stated in Art 23 of the Labor Code that the appeals to
the Commission by any or both parties should be within ten (10) calendar days from receipt
of the decision. Hence, the decision of the Labor Arbiter became final and executory.
Wesnny Charles G. Tana
Misamis Oriental v DOF 238 SCRA 63 November 10, 1994
FACTS: Petitioner Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. is a domestic
corporation whose members, individually or collectively, are engaged in the buying and
selling of copra in Misamis Oriental. They are enjoying VAT exemption under Sec. 103(a) of
the National Internal Revenue Code since copra is an agricultural food product. However, on
June 11, 1991, the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue released an issue classifying copra
as an agricultural non-food product thereby denying the petitioner the exemption they
previously enjoyed. The petitioner contends that the BFAD and DOH and not the BIR is the
competent agency to determine the proper classification of food products.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reclassification done by the Commissioner of the Internal
Revenue is binding.
HELD: Yes, because the ruling was made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the
exercise of his power under Sec. 245 of the NIRC to "make rulings or opinions in connection
with the implementation of the provisions of internal revenue laws, including rulings on the
classification of articles for sales tax and similar purposes."
Municipality of San Narciso v Mendez 239 SCRA 11 December 6, 1994
FACTS:
On August 20, 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia issued Executive Order No. 353
creating the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the municipality
of San Narciso of the same province. However, on June 5, 1989, the Municipality of San
Narciso filed a petition against the officials of the Municipality of San Andres questioning the
creation of the new municipality.
On 27 November 1991, the Municipality of San Andres filed anew a motion to dismiss
alleging that the case had become moot and academic with the enactment of Republic Act
No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 stating that
municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of the Code shall continue to exist and
operate as such. The motion was opposed by the petitioner saying that it is not an existing
municipality because the mode of creation had been void ab initio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the municipality of San Andres shall continue to exist and
operate.
HELD: Yes, because the Local Government Code is curative in nature, which in essence is
retroactive, and aimed at giving validity to acts done that would have been invalid under
existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with. Also, as appended in the 1987
Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve
(12) municipalities composing the Third District of the province of Quezon.

Mustang v Court of Appeals 257 SCRA 430 June 18, 1996
FACTS:
On April 1, 1990, the Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID)
conducted a surveillance at Mustang lumberyard based on information that a huge pile of
narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of Mustang Lumber. The
team saw a truck loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber coming out of the lumberyard.
Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transport documents, the team
seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at DENR compound. Then, an
inventory was conducted by the team, and upon findings, a recommendation of suspension
and cancellation of petitioners business permit was filed.
Petitioner contended that possession of manufactured lumber is not punishable under
the Forestry Reform Code, as amended.
Sec. 68, P.D. No. 705. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest Products
Without License. - Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished
with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided,
That in the case of partnerships, associations or corporations, the officers who ordered the
cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable and if such officers are aliens, they
shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a lumber can be considered timber
HELD: Yes, though the Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or
lumber, the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3,
the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of Processing plant,
which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for
the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood,
wallboard, blackboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products.
Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.
Carlos, Paolo Gerardo L.
Republic of the Philippines v Court of Appeals 263 SCRA 759 October 30, 1996
FACTS:
Acil Corporation owned several hectares of land in Linoan, Montevista, Davao de Norte,
which the government took pursuance to be distributed to farmer beneficiaries under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Law (RA no. 6657) by cancelling Acil Corporations title certificates.
Acil Corporation filed a petition for just compensation to the RTC (sitting as Special Agrarian
Court) but was denied because it does not have jurisdiction and should have appealed to the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. Filed for reconsideration but was denied
then went to the Court of Appeals and filed for petition certiorari for just compensation
claiming that RTC has exclusive and original jurisdiction over the matter and was sustained.
The Government, represented by the Department of Agrarian Reform filed for review of
certiorari claiming for the Quasi-judicial powers of the Department of Agrarian Reform which
is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform (Section 50,
RA no. 6657).
ISSUE:
Whether or not DAR has original exclusive jurisdiction to hear just compensation for Agrarian
Reform.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that contention of the government has no merit
Section 57 of RA no 6657 provides special jurisdiction to special agrarian court (such as the
RTC) for determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all
criminal offenses under this Act.
Statutes can only confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies except for rules
of procedure.
Republic of the Philippines v Court of Appeals 227 SCRA 509 November 8, 1993
FACTS:
Henrico Uvero owner of the land which the government sought expropriation of certain
portion for the widening and concreting of the Nabua-Bato-Agos Section of the Philippine
Japan Highway Loan Road, demands for just compensation based on the market value and
not set by the Presidential Decree no. 76 as amended, which is based on lower price offered
in assessment of the assessor or value provided by the owner. RTC ruled in favor of Uvero;
CA affirmed trial courts decision.
Government contends that based on the ruling in EPZA v Dulay declaring PD no. 76, as well
as PD no, 1533 unconstitutional and as an impermissible encroachment of judicial
prerogatives.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an effect of judicial declaration when unconstitutional and void.
HELD:
The Supreme Court cited two views on the effect of the declaration of a statute
unconstitutional (Justice Isagani Cruz):
a. Orthodox view unconstitutional act is not a law, confers no rights, impose no duties,
affords no protection, creates no office, inoperative. It is as if it was not been passed
and existed. No person can invoke, no court can apply in cases. (total nullity)
b. Modern view the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not
annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the constitution. It simply
refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute
had no existence. It does not repeal, supersede, revoke or annul statute.
The strict view considers a legislative enactment which is declared unconstitutional as being,
for all legal intents and purposes, a total nullity, and it is deemed as if had never existed.
The law itself being per se repugnant to the Constitution, but It is not always the case
because a law can be constitutionally faulty per se. Thus, it may well be valid in its general
import, but invalid in its application to certain factual situations.
A valid law may be held unconstitutional only insofar as it is allowed to operate

retrospectively such as, in pertinent cases, when it vitiates contractually vested rights. To
that extent, its retroactive application may be so declared invalid as impairing the
obligations of contracts.
Recabo Jr. v COMELEC 308 SCRA 793 June 21, 1991
FACTS:
Francisco Reyes Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy as the official candidate as vice mayor of
Mainit, Surigao Del Norte of LAKAS NUCD-UMDP with nomination and acceptance certificate
signed by Fidel V. Ramos and Jose De Venecia as National Chairman and Secretary General
respectively.
Kaiser Recabo Jr. claims to be the official candidate of the LAKAS NUCD-UMDP as vice mayor
of Mainit Surigao Del Norte with certificate of nomination and acceptance signed by
Francisco Matugas a representative of the political party. He is a substitute candidate for his
mother Candelaria Recabo.
The certification of nomination of Candelaria Recabo was not signed by Robert Barbers,
District Chairman of the political party thus there was no valid nomination therefore she is
considered as an independent candidate and cannot be validly substituted based on Sec 11
of Comelec Resolution no. 2977 promulgated on January 15, 1998.
Comelec cancels Kaiser Recabo Jr. certificate of candidacy. An appeal for reconsideration was
filed but later was denied for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the certificate of nomination of Recabo Jr is valid.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held dismissing the petition of Kaiser Recabo Jr. the Court states that the
mother of petitioner is an independent candidate on the account of the invalidity of her
certificate of nomination and acceptance thus making her son a substitute candidate but
also encountered the same dilemma of having one signatory therefore the court finds him as
an independent candidate but in due course his certificate of candidacy is still considered
cancelled for it was file out of time and filing beyond the deadline is not valid (Section 4
Comelec Resolution no. 2977).
Principle of Statutory Construction: The best authority to interpret a rule is the source itself
of the rule.
Republic of the Philippines v Court of Appeals 299 SCRA 199 November 25, 1998
FACTS:
By virtue of Republic Act no. 1899 which authorize reclamation of foreshore land by
chartered cities and municipalities. Under Section 1 of the said Act constitutes the
reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of foreshore lands bordering them, and to
establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor
facilities in their own expense.
The city of Pasay passed an ordinance (121) for the reclamation of three hundred (300)
hectares of offshore lands in Pasay City as prescribed in RA 1899 and by virtue of a city
ordinance (158) authorizing the Republic Real Estate Corporation (RREC) to reclaim the
foreshore of Pasay under certain terms and condition.
The Republic questioned the agreement made by RREC and Pasay, such agreement was in
violation of RA no. 1899. RREC and Pasay answered the contention of the Republic stating
that agreement made by the two parties are within the commerce of man and the phrase
foreshore land as stated in RA no. 1899 has a broader meaning beyond what is supplied by
Websters third new international dictionary and the plan was approved by the authorities
concerned. Lower courts favored its judgement to RREC and Pasay City
ISSUE:
Whether or not foreshore land includes submerge land based on RA 1899.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held when the law speaks clear and categorical language then there is
no reason for interpretation or construction but only for application. There is no need to
resort to extrinsic aid like constitutional convention when the language is clear and
unambiguous.
The lower court erred in including submerge area in the definition of foreland citing that the
duty of the court is to interpret and cannot broaden its meaning much less widen the
coverage. If the intention Congress to include submerge area they should have expressly
provided its inclusion.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASE DIGEST
DAYANGHIRANG, ANNA MARIE B.
REQUEST OF CLERK OF COURT, Re: J, IMPERIAL 313 SCRA 134
FACTS:
Atty. Tessie L. Gatmaitan, Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals, in her letter
to the Honorable Chief Justice, inquired about the propriety/validity of computing the
compulsory retirement benefits of Associate Justice Jorge S. Imperial of the Court of
Appeals on the basis of the salary and allowances of a Presiding Justice in view of his
holding the said position in an acting capacity. However, Court Administrator Alfredo
L. Benipayo recommended the denial of the request based on the provision of Section
9 of Executive Order No. 964 and Section 259 of the Government Auditing Rules and
Regulations.
After a careful study by the Court, it was ruled that the provisions of law cited
by the Court Administrator were not applicable to the case under consideration. The
Court therefore favorably acted on the inquiry of Atty. Gatmaitan and on her request
that the retirement benefits of former Justice Imperial be computed and paid on the
basis of the highest salary, emolument and allowances received by him as of the
time of his retirement from the judiciary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the retirement benefits shall be based on the
highest salary, emolument and allowances received.
HELD:
YES. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; GOVERNMENT SERVICE

INSURANCE SYSTEM; RETIREMENT BENEFITS; COMPUTATION THEREOF BASED ON THE
HIGHEST SALARY RECEIVED; RATIONALE; CASE AT BAR. - Memorandum Circular No. 397 issued on July 7, 1997 by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) also
buttress the submission that a retiring justice of the Court of Appeals, like former
Justice Jorge S. Imperial, is entitled to retirement benefits computed on the basis of
the highest salary, emolument and allowances received. The said GSIS Memorandum
Circular succinctly directs that in the processing and adjudication of retirement claims
under Section 12(c) of RA 1616, as further amended by RA 4968, the computation of
the gratuity payable to a retiring government official or employee shall be on the
basis of highest salary received. Verily, retirement benefits, gratuity and separation
pay in the government service are invariably computed on the basis of the highest
salary, emolument and allowances received. There is no valid reason why the
retirement benefits of Justice Jorge S. Imperial who spent more than thirty-six (36)
years of the best years of his life in the judiciary, should not be computed on the
basis of the highest salary, emolument and allowances he received as Acting
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals. It is well-settled that: x x x Retirement laws
are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because their intention is to provide for
his sustenance and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to
continue earning his livelihood. The liberal approach aims to achieve the
humanitarian purposes of the law in order that efficiency, security and well-being of
government employees may be enhanced.

REYES VS COURT OF APPEALS - 320 SCRA 486 - DECEMBER 10, 1999
FACTS:
The Sangguniang Bayan of San Juan, Metro Manila implemented several tax
ordinances 87, 91, 95, 100 and 101. On May 21, 1993, petitioners filed an appeal
with the Department of Justice assailing the constitutionality of these tax ordinances
allegedly because they were promulgated without previous public hearings thereby
constituting deprivation of property without due process of law. However the same
was dismissed.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Whether or not the assailed ordinances are valid.
YES. A municipal tax ordinance empowers a local government unit to

impose taxes. The power to tax is the most effective way or instrument to raise
needed revenues to finance and support the myriad activities of the local
government units for delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of general
welfare and enhancement of peace, progress and prosperity of the people.
Consequently, any delay in implementing tax measures would be to the detriment of
the public. It is for this reason that protest over tax ordinance are required to be done
within certain time frames. In the instant case, it is our view that the failure of
petitioners to appeal to the secretary of justice within 30 days as required by section
187 of Republic Act No. 7160 is fatal to their cause.
Petitioners have not proved in the case before us that the Sangguniang Bayan
of San Juan failed to conduct the required public hearings before the enactment of
Ordinances 87, 95, 91, 100, and 101. Although the Sanggunian had the control of
records or better means of proof regarding the facts alleged, petitioners are not
relieved from the burden of proving their averments. Proof that public hearings were
not held falls on the petitioners shoulders. For failing to discharge that burden, their
petition was properly dismissed.
For the purpose of securing certainty where doubt would be intolerable, it is a
general rule that the regularity of the enactment of an officially promulgated statute
or ordinance may not be impeached by parol evidence or oral testimony either of
individual officers and members, or of strangers who may be interested in nullifying
legislative action. This rules supplements the presumption in favor of the regularity of
official conduct, which we have upheld repeatedly, absent a clear showing to the
contrary.

RODRIGUEZ VS CA - 245 SCRA 150 - JUNE 19, 1995
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 2, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP No. 14276,
which allowed, in an action for compulsory recognition, the testimony of the mother of
a natural child on the identity of the putative father. On October 15, 1986, an action
for compulsory recognition and support was brought before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 9, Baguio-Benguet, by respondent Alarito (Clarito) Agbulos against Bienvenido
Rodriguez, petitioner herein. At the trial, the plaintiff presented his mother, Felicitas
Agbulos Haber, as first witness. In the course of her direct examination, she was
asked by counsel to reveal the identity of the plaintiff's father but the defendant's
counsel raised a timely objection which the court sustained.
ISSUE:
In the instant petition for review on certiorari, petitioner alleged that
the Court of Appeals erred:(1) in not dismissing the petition for certiorari on the
ground that the order of the trial courtdisallowing the testimony of Felicitas Agbulos
Haber was interlocutory and could not bereviewed separately from the judgment; and
(2) in reversing the said order and allowing theadmission of said testimony.
HELD:
Errors of judgment or of procedure, not relating to the court's jurisdiction nor

involving grave abuse of discretion, are not reviewable by certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court (Villalon v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 144 SCRA 443
[1986]). However, there are exceptions to said rule. For instance, certiorari is justified
in order to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party, where the trial judge
capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment, or where there may be danger
of failure of justice. Certiorari may also be availed of where an appeal would be slow,
inadequate and insufficient (Presco v. Court of Appeals, 192 SCRA 232 [1990];
Saludesv. Pajarillo, 78 Phil. 754 [1947]).

ROMULO vs HDMF 333 SCRA 777
FACTS:
Petitioner Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc and De Los Angeles
(hereafter PETITIONER), a law firm, was exempted for the period 1 January to 31
December 1995, from the Pag-IBIG Fund coverage by respondent HDMF because of a
superior retirement plan. The HDMF Board of Trustees, pursuant to Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 7742, issued Board Resolution No. 1011, Series of 1995, amending
and modifying the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742. As amended,
Section 1 of Rule VII provides that for a company to be entitled to a waiver or
suspension of Fund coverage, 3 it must have a plan providing for both
provident/retirement and housing benefits superior to those provided under the PagIBIG Fund. PETITIONER submitted to the HDMF a letter explaining that the
Amendments to the Rules are invalid. In that the amendments are void insofar as
they abolished the exemption granted by Section 19 of P.D. 1752, as amended. The
repeal of such exemption involves the exercise of legislative power, which cannot be
delegated to HMDF. HDMF disapproved PETITIONERs application on the ground that
the requirement that there should be both a provident retirement fund and a housing
plan is clear in the use of the phrase and/or, and that the Rules Implementing R.A.
No. 7742 did not amend nor repeal Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 but merely implement
the law. The respondent Board was merely exercising its rule-making power under
Section 13 of P.D. No. 1752. It had the option to use and only instead of or in the
rules on waiver in order to effectively implement the Pag-IBIG Fund Law. By choosing
and, the Board has clarified the confusion brought about by the use of and/or in
Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752, as amended. PETITIONER filed a petition for review
before the Court of Appeals but was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the board of HDMF exceeded its delegated power.
HELD:
YES. The controversy lies in the legal signification of the words

and/or.
It seems to us clear from the language of the enabling law that Section 19 of P.D. No.
1752 intended that an employer with a provident plan or an employee housing plan
superior to that of the fund may obtain exemption from coverage. If the law had
intended that the employee [sic] should have both a superior provident plan and a
housing plan in order to qualify for exemption, it would have used the words and
instead of and/or.
Notably, paragraph (a) of Section 19 requires for annual certification of waiver or
suspension, that the features of the plan or plans are superior to the fund or continue
to be so. The law obviously contemplates that the existence of either plan is
considered as sufficient basis for the grant of an exemption; needless to state, the
concurrence of both plans is more than sufficient. To require the existence of both
plans would radically impose a more stringent condition for waiver which was not
clearly envisioned by the basic law. By removing the disjunctive word or in the
implementing rules the respondent Board has exceeded its authority. It is without
doubt that the HDMF Board has rule-making power as provided in Section 51 17 of
R.A. No. 7742 and Section 13 18 of P.D. No. 1752. However, it is well-settled that
rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new and
additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of
the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. 19 It
is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law,
and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by
law.
In the present case, when the Board of Trustees of the HDMF required in
Section 1, Rule VII of the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations
Implementing R.A. No. 7742 that employers should have both provident/retirement
and housing benefits for all its employees in order to qualify for exemption from the
Fund, it effectively amended Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. And when the Board
subsequently abolished that exemption through the 1996 Amendments, it repealed
Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. Such amendment and subsequent repeal of Section 19
are both invalid, as they are not within the delegated power of the Board. The HDMF
cannot, in the exercise of its rule-making power, issue a regulation not consistent
with the law it seeks to apply. Indeed, administrative issuances must not override,
supplant or modify the law, but must remain consistent with the law they intend to
carry out. Only Congress can repeal or amend the law.
Delmoro, Mel Loise M.

Roxas vs Court of Appeals 321 SCRA 106 (Dec. 17, 1999)
Facts: Petitioner Roxas and Co. Is a domestic corporation that owns 3 haciendas in
Batangas, which the government wishes to acquire under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL). Before the implementation of the law, the petitioner filed with the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) Hacienda Caylaway
pursuant to EO 229, which served as guidelines to the comprehensive agrarian program. The
two other haciendas however (Banilad and Palico) were placed under compulsory acquisition
by the DAR in accordance with the CARL.
DAR sent invitations to the representatives of Roxas and Co to discuss the findings of the
DAR study, which stated that both Hacienda Banilad and Palico qualified for acquisition
under the CARP. Petitioner Jaime Pimintel, the caretaker of the said hacienda, received the
letter of acquisition for both Hacienda Banilad and Palico. It was also the petitioner who
attended all the proceedings regarding the two haciendas. However, Roxas and Co claimed
during the trial that they were not informed of the acquisition proceedings on their two
haciendas. DAR then opened a trust account in favor of petitioner Roxas and Co. These trust
accounts were replaced by DAR with cash and Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) bonds.
Despite the results of the study, Roxas and Co still applied for the conversion of the
haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural. Nevertheless, DAR proceeded with the
acquisition of the two haciendas. It then issued and distributed certificate of land ownership
awards (CLOA) to farmer beneficiaries. In the case of Hacienda Caylaway, the petitioner
withdrew its offer to sell to the government. They also filed for the reclassification of
Caylaway from agriculture to non-agriculture authorized by the Sanguniang Bayan of
Nasugbu, wherein it has been declared as a tourist zone. DAR secretary denied Roxas
withdrawal of his Voluntary Offer Sell. According to the secretary, the withdrawal can only be
based on specific grounds such as unsuitability of soil for agriculture, slope of the lad is over
180 degrees and that the land is undeveloped. Despite the denial of their withdrawal,
petitioner still filed an application for conversion with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB),
which submitted the case to the Secretary of DAR for resolution. The DAR secretary
dismissed the case. Roxas and Co went to the CA but it was dismissed claiming that
petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Issue: Whether or not the acquisition proceedings made by DAR is valid; whether or not the
court has jurisdiction on the reclassification of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural
Held: Regarding the first issue, it was ruled that the acquisition proceedings undertaken by
DAR violated the right to due process of the petitioners. First, there was an improper service
of the Notice of Acquisition. Notices to corporations should be served through their
president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors or partners. But in the
case at bar, Notice of Acquisition was sent to Jaime Pimintel, who was neither of those
mentioned. Second, there was no notice of coverage as the parcels of land were not properly
identified before they were taken by the DAR. Under the law, the land owner has the right to
choose 5 hectares of land he wishes to retain. Upon receiving the Notice of Acquisition,
petitioner corporation had no idea which portions of its estate were subject to compulsory
acquisition. Third, The CLOAs were issued to farmer beneficiaries without just compensation.
The law provides that the deposit must be made only in cash or LBP bonds. DARs opening of
a trust account in petitioners name does not constitute payment. Even if later, DAR
substituted the trust account with cash and LBP bonds, such does not cure the lack of notice,
which still amounts to a violation of the petitioners right to due process. As regards to the
second issue, the court has enunciated that it has no jurisdiction to rule on the
reclassification of land from agricultural to non-agricultural. Despite DARs failure to observe
due process, it is not tantamount in giving the court the power to adjudicate over
petitioners application for land conversion. DAR is charged with the mandate of approving
applications for land conversion. They have the necessary tools and experience needed to
evaluate such applications; hence, they are the proper agency with which applications for
land use conversion are lodged. The petition is granted in part and the acquisition
proceedings over the three haciendas are nullified for respondent DAR's failure to observe
due process therein.
Sajonas vs Court of Appeals 258 SCRA 79 (July 5, 1996)
Facts: The spouses Ernesto Uychocde and Lucita Jarin agreed to sell a parcel of residential
land located in Antipolo, Rizal to the spouses Alfredo Sajonas and Conchita R. Sajonas on
installment basis. Then the Sajonas couple caused the annotation of an adverse claim based
on the said Contract to Sell on the title of the subject property. On the other hand, Domingo
Pilares filed a civil case for collection of a sum of money against Uychocde. A Compromise
Agreement was entered into by the parties wherein Uychocde acknowledged his monetary
obligation to Pilares amounting to P27,800 and agreed to pay the same in two years. When
Uychocde failed to comply with his undertaking in the agreement, Pilares moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the decision based on the compromise agreement.
Pursuant to the order of execution, defendant sheriff Garcia of Quezon City presented said
notice of levy on execution before the Register of Deeds of Marikina. This resulted to the
cancellation of the deed of absolute sale issued in the Sajonas Couple. Then petitioner
demanded the cancellation of the notice of levy on execution upon Pilares. Despite this,
Pilares refused to cause the cancellation of said annotation. The Sajonas couple filed a
complaint and the RTC ruled in favor of them. Thus the issue was raised in the Supreme
Court.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court failed to construe Section 70 of PD 1529 as a whole in
holding that the rule on the 30 day period for adverse claim is absolute
Held: In construing the aforesaid law, care should be taken that every part thereof be given
effect and a construction that could render a provision inoperative should be avoided, and
inconsistent provision should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of harmonious whole.
For taken in solitude, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from
the actually intended and evident when a word or phrase is considered with those with
which it is associated. In ascertaining the period of effectivity of an inscription of adverse
claim, the law must be read in its entirety. Sentence three, paragraph two of Section 70 of
PD 1529 states that The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the
date of registration. The said provision cannot be treated separately, but should be read in
relation to the sentence following it which reads: After the lapse period, the annotation of
adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing the verified petition therefor by the party in
interest.
If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force and effect after
the lapse of thirty days, then it would not have been necessary to include the foregoing
caveat to clarify and complete the rule. For then, no adverse claim need be cancelled. If it
has been automatically terminated by mere lapse of time, the law would not have required
the party in interest to do a useless act. The law, taken together, simply means that the
cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the
inscription will remain annotated and shall continue as a lien upon the property. To hold
otherwise would be to deprive petitioners of their property, who waited a long time to
complete payments on their property, convinced that their interest was amply protected by
the inscribed adverse claim.

Salinas vs NLRC 319 SCRA 154 (Nov. 24, 1999)
Facts: The case is a petition for review for the decision of both the labor arbiter and
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) declaring petitioners to be project employees
and not regular employees of respondent Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc.
Petitioner Alejandro Alonzo had been employed with AG & P in the several construction
projects of the latter from 1982 to 1989 as a laborer, and later as bulk cement operator, bulk
cement plant/carrier operator, and crane driver. Under similar circumstances, petitioner
Avelino Cortez had been employed with AG & P from 1979 to 1988 as carpenter/forklift
operator; petitioner Armando Samulde served as lubeman/stationary operator from 1982 to
1989; while petitioner Aurelio Salinas, Jr., used to work as carpenter/finishing carpenter from
1983 to 1988. Petitioners were dismissed from their work thus they filed against the
respondent corporation separate complaints for illegal dismissal, which cases were
consolidated and jointly heard by Labor Arbiter Manuel P. Asuncion. The Labor arbiter ruled
in favor of the respondent finding that petitioners are just project employees hired for a
specific project and their separation from as a result of the completion of the project or its
phase did not result in illegal dismissal.
Issue: Whether or not NLRC erred in declaring the petitioners as project employees
Held: Yes. NLRCs insistence of the petitioners status as project employees is devoid of any
legal basis. Under the Labor Code, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the
employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable
in the usual business or trade of the employer and that any employee who has rendered at
least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken shall be considered a
regular employee. In the case at bar, it is beyond cavil that petitioners had been providing
the respondent corporation with continuous and uninterrupted services; which can be
considered as necessary and desirable in the construction business of AG & P, its usual trade
or business.
It is basic and irrefragable rule that in carrying out and interpreting the provisions of the
Labor Code and its implementing regulations, the workingmans welfare should be the
primordial and paramount consideration. Such interpretation gives meaning and substance
to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law enunciated in Article 4 of Labor Code that
all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code
including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.
Therefore, the court set aside the decision of NLRC.
Santiago vs Guingona 298 SCRA 756 (Nov. 18, 1998)
Facts: In the election of officers in the Senate of the Eleventh Congress, Senators Fernan
and Tatad were nominated for the position of Senate Presidency. By a vote of 20 to 2,
Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate. Senator Tatad
thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other
member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that
those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had
voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the minority. During the discussion on who
should constitute the Senate minority, Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the senators
belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party -- numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority
-- had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on the matter was
arrived at. On the fourth session day, the majority leader informed the body that he was in
receipt of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, [9] stating that they had
elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President
formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. Senators
Santiago and Tatad then instituted an original petition seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto
T. Guingona Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the
rightful minority leader.
Issue: Whether or not the election of Senator Guingona as the minority leader is unlawful
and a violation of the constitution
Held: No. The court ruled that the interpretation proposed by petitioners on the concepts of
majority and minority finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the
Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. Majority, when referring to a certain
number out of a total or aggregate, simply means the number greater than half or more
than half of any total. The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause
simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the
senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the majority, much
less the minority, in the said body.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected
by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide
that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who
could thereby elect the minority leader. There is also no law or regulation states that the
defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. History would also show
that the majority in either house of Congress has referred to the political party to which the
most number of lawmakers belonged, while the minority normally referred to a party with a
lesser number of members.
Thereby, the Court finds that no constitutional or legal infirmity or grave abuse of discretion
attended the recognition of and the assumption into office by Respondent Guingona as the
Senate minority leader.
Morales, Katrina G.
EUGENIO vs DRILON, 252 SCRA 106
FACTS: Private respondent Prospero Palmiano purchased on installment basis two lots from
owner/developer Fermin Salazar (Petitioner) in the E & S Delta Village in Quezon City.
Petitioner suspended payment of his amortization in view of the failure of petitioner to
develop the village. Petitioner resold one of the two lots to spouses Rodolfo and Adelina
Arevalo. Private respondent asked for the nullification of the sale. Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission (HSRC) ordered petitioner to reinstate private respondents purchase
contract and since the title for the sale to the spouses Arevalo has already been transferred,
to refund all payments made by private respondent. Petitioner filed for review before the
Supreme Court claiming that HSRC Executive Secretary (Drilon) erred in applying P.D. 957
since the purchase agreements were made in 1972, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 957 on
1976.
ISSUE: Was there grave abuse of discretion in the part of HSRC Executive Secretary in
applying P.D. 957 retrospectively?
HELD: No. P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be
inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law. A strictly prospective application of the
statute will effectively emasculate it. Legislative intent must have been to remedy the
alarming situation by having P.D. 957 operate retrospectively. It is obvious and indubitable
that P.D. 957 was intended to cover even those real estate mortgages executed prior to its
enactment.
Morales, Katrina G.
FARIAS vs BARBA, 256 SCRA 396
FACTS: Carlito Domingo, a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte
and not belonging to any political party, resigned from his post. To fill the vacancy the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas recommended the appointment of Edward Palafox to
Mayor Angelo Barba and a resolution, containing the recommendation, was submitted to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte in compliance with Sec. 56 of the Local
Government Code (R.A. No. 7160). The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, acting under the
provisions of R.A. 7160, disapproved the resolution for the reason that the authority and
power to appoint Sangguniang Bayan members are lodged in the Governor, and therefore,
the Resolution should be addressed to the Provincial Governor." Accordingly, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan recommended to the Governor Rodolfo Farias the appointment
of Al Nacino. The Governor appointed Nacino and swore him to office. On the other hand,
Mayor Barba appointed Palafox to the same position. The RTC dismissed a petition for quo
warranto and prohibition and upheld the appointment of Palafox by Mayor Barba.
ISSUE: Who should have the power to appoint the replacement and in accordance with what
procedure?
HELD: Section 45 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160) provides that:
(a)
Permanent vacancies in the sanggunian where automatic succession provided above
do not apply shall be filled by appointment in the following manner:
(2) The governor, in the case of the sangguniang panlungsod of component cities and the
sangguniang bayan;
(c)
In case the permanent vacancy is caused by a sanggunian member who does not
belong to any political party, the local chief executive shall, upon recommendation of the
sanggunian concerned, appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy.
Thus, the power to appoint is vested to the governor as recommended by the Sangguniang
Bayan of San Nicolas (the Sanggunian concerned). Since the recommendation takes the
place of nomination by political party, the recommendation must be considered a condition
sine qua non for the validity of the appointment.
Neither Al Nacino nor Edward Palafox was appointed in the manner indicated above.
Therefore, neither is entitled to the seat in the Sanggunian which was vacated by Carlito
Domingo. Nacino was appointed by the governor but was not recommended by the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. Palafox, on the other hand was recommended by the
Sanggunian but was appointed by the Mayor and not the Governor. The RTCs decision to
dismiss action for quo warranto and prohibition is affirmed but for different reasons than
those given by the trial court in its decision.
Morales, Katrina G.
FILOTEO vs SANDIGANBAYAN, 263 SCRA 222
FACTS: Petitioner Jose Filoteo, Jr., a police investigator, was convicted of brigandage. Part of
the prosecutions evidence was a written confession signed by petitioner on May 30, 1982,
implicating him and other soldiers in the hijacking of a Postal Delivery Truck along McArthur
Highway.
ISSUES: Whether an extra-judicial confession made without the presence of counsel is
inadmissible? Should Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution be applied retroactively?
HELD: No. While Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "(p)enal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual
criminal," what is being construed here is a constitutional provision (Article III, Section 12 of
the 1987 Constitution) specifically contained in the Bill of Rights which is obviously not a
penal statute. Although a number of cases held that extrajudicial confessions made while
the 1973 Constitution was in force and effect, should have been made with the assistance of
counsel, the definitive ruling was enunciated only on April 26, 1983 through the Supreme
Court decision on Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile. The petitioners confession was made on May 30,
1982 (or before April 26, 1983), thus, the judicial decision made on Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile
cannot be applied retroactively. Although judicial decisions are not laws in themselves, they
are considered to form part of the law of the land and should therefore be treated with the
same maxim, ex prospicit, non respicit, as stated in Article 4 of the Civil Code.
Further, although not raised as an issue, the question of which law was violated by the
accused was discussed in the Supreme Court decision. Because the taking or robbery was
perpetrated on a national highway (McArthur Highway), the Court a quo concluded that
Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery
Law of 1974 was violated. However, it is said that brigandage or highway robbery involves
not just the locus of the crime. It is essential to prove that the outlaws were purposely
organized not just for one act of robbery but for several indiscriminate commissions
thereofWhat was duly proven in the present case is one isolated hijacking of a postal van.
There was also no evidence of any previous attempts at similar robberies by the accused to
show the "indiscriminate" commission thereof. The facts presented constitutes that the
crime of robbery was committed. Thus, the penalty imposed should be lightened. However,
this benefit shall be accorded only to the petitioner and not to his co-accused who did not
appeal the decision. Wherefore, the decision was affirmed with modification.
Morales, Katrina G.
GARCIA vs COMELEC, 237 SCRA 279
FACTS: Petitioners filed with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong a petition for annulment of
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, an ordinance issued regarding the inclusion of
the Municipality of Morong in the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with Republic Act
No. 7227. When no action was made by the Sanggunian 30 days after the submission of
petition, petitioners resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of
1991. Solicitation of signatures was made for the repeal of the said resolution. The COMELEC
denied the petition on the grounds that the subject is merely a resolution (pambayang
kapasyahan) and not an ordinance.
ISSUE: Whether Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10 can be the subject of an initiative.
HELD: YES. The scope of an initiative was delineated by section 32 Art. VI of the
Constitution which provised that, people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or
reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body. The
COMELECs decision to deny the petition was based on section 120, Chapter 2, Title XI, Book
I of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides: "Local Initiative Defined. Local
initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may
directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance." The Court found this interpretation to be a
narrow and literal reading of the above provision, thus would collide with the earlier
mentioned constitutional provision. The LGU Code does not limit the scope but merely
defines the concept of a local initiative. Petition is thereby granted and the COMELEC
resolution annulled and set aside.
Reyes, Adrielle
Hagad vs. Gozo-Dadole - 251 SCRA 242 - December 12, 1995
Facts: On 22 July 1992, Mayor Alfredo Ouano, Vice-Mayor Paterno Caete and Sangguniang
Panlungsod Member Rafael Mayol, all public officials of Mandaue City, were charged with
violation of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, Articles 1706 and 1717 of the Revised Penal Code,
and R.A. No. 6713. Councilors Dionson and Bercede stated that defendants caused the
alteration and/or falsification of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing the allocated
appropriation therein from P3,494,364.57 to P7,000,000.00 without authority from the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City.
On 05 August 1992, defendants argued that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to try, hear
and decide the administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions
against local officials, as well as to effect their preventive suspension, had now been vested
to the Office of the President.
Issue: Whether the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160) repealed the pertinent provisions of
the Ombudsman Act (R.A. 6770)
Held: The Court held that there is nothing in the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160) to
indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the
Ombudsman Act (R.A. 6770). The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so
inconsistent as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other. Well settled is the
rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored, and that courts must generally
assume their similar application. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear
finding must surface before an inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is:
interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi or every statute must be so
interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts
should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject.
The Court also noticed that Sections 61 and 63 of the present Local Government Code run
almost parallel with the provisions of the old code. According to Section 61 and Section 63 of
the Local Government Code of 1983, under the heading of Suspension and Removal:
SEC. 61. Form and Filing of Complaints.Verified complaints against local elective officials
shall be prepared as follows: (a) Against any elective provincial or city official, before the
Minister of Local Government.
SEC. 63. Preventive Suspension.(1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the
Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the
provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city or
municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official.
The authority to conduct investigation and to impose preventive suspension over provincial
or city officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it
became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A. No. 6770, specifically
under Sections 21 and 24. The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), did not
affect a change from what already prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution
of the title Minister of Local Government by the Office of the President.
Reyes, Adrielle
Heirs of Felicidad Dizon v Discaya - 303 SCRA 197 - February 15, 1999
Facts: Juliana Dizon and Gerarda Abilla, Heirs of Felicidad Dizon, filed a petition dated June
26, 1991 for the reconstitution of TCT (Transfer Certificate of Title) No. 75335 in the Registry
of Deeds of Quezon City. Petitioners filed an Amended Petition dated June 8, 1992 correcting
the number of the subject TCT from 75335 to 75355. In an Order dated July 29, 1996, the
petition was dismissed for failure of petitioners to prosecute the case for an unreasonable
length of time. The order of dismissal was later set aside upon the motion of petitioners for
reconsideration dated January 6, 1997. During the hearing of November 27, 1997,
petitioners presented documentary evidence to show their compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements. Petitioners submitted documents under the paragraph 5 of the LRC (Land
Registration Commission) Circular No. 35 dated June 13, 1983:
5. In case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in Sections
2(f) and 3(f) of Republic Act No. 26 in relation to section 12 thereof, the signed duplicate
copy of the petition to be forwarded to this Commission shall be accompanied by the
following:
(a) A duly prepared plan of said parcel of land in tracing cloth, with two (2) print copies
thereof, prepared by the government agency which issued the certified technical
description, or by a duly licensed Geodetic Engineer who shall certify thereon that he
prepared the same on the basis of a duly certified technical description. Where the plan as
submitted is certified by the government agency which issued the same, it is sufficient that
the technical description be prepared by a duly licensed Geodetic Engineer on the basis of
said certified plan.
(b) The original, two (2) duplicate copies, and a xerox copy of the original of the technical
description of the parcel of land covered by the certificate of title, duly certified by the
authorized officer of the Bureau of Lands or the Land Registration Commission who issued
the technical description.
(c) A signed copy of the certification of the Register of Deeds concerned that the original of
the certificate of title on file in the Registry was either lost or destroyed, indicating the name
of the registered owner, if known from the other records on file in said office.
On January 22, 1998, the Trial Court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for failure to
comply with the requirements of Section 2 of RA 26. Section 2 and Section 3 of RA 26 are as
follows:
Section 2. Original certificate of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources
hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order: a) The owners duplicate
certificate of title; b) The co-owners mortgagees or lessees duplicate of the certificate of
title; c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or
by a legal custodian thereof; d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration of
patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued; e) A
document, on file in the registry of deeds by which the property, the description of which is
given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of
said document showing that its original had been registered; and, f) Any other document
which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost
or destroyed certificate of title.
Section 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources
hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order: (a) The owners duplicate
of the certificate of title; (b) The co-owners, mortgagees, or lessees duplicate of the
certificate of title; (c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the
register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof; (d) The deed of transfer or other document
on file in the registry of deeds, containing the description of the property, or an
authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original had been registered and pursuant to
which the lost or destroyed certificate of title was issued; (e) A document, on file in the
registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said document,
is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing
that its original had been registered; and (f) Any other document which, in the judgment of
the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of
title.
Issue: Whether petitioners presentation of the documents enumerated in paragraph 5 of
LRC Circular No. 35 constituted a sufficient and proper basis for reconstitution under Section
3(f) of RA 26
Held: the Court held that when Section 2(f) of RA No. 26 speaks of any other document, it
refers to documents previously enumerated or those mentioned in Sections 2(a), (b), (c),
and (d). Though petitioners submitted before the lower court the following documents:
Certification from the Register of Deeds, technical descriptions, and tracing cloth plan, they
failed to follow the requirements of Section 2 (f) of R.A. No. 26.
Petitioners also contended that the governing Section should be Section 3, since it applies to
transfer of titles rather than Section 2 which applies to original certificates of title. The Court
held that Section 2(f), is an exact reproduction of Section 3(f), the disposition of the case
would still be the same, and the dismissal in question would have been a sound disposition,
had Section 3(f) been applied. Whether Section 2(f) or Section 3(f) is applied to the case, the
result would be the same.
The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court; however the Court modified and stated
that Section 3(f) of RA No. 26 instead of Section 2(f) governs the petitioners Petition for
Reconstitution of TCT No. 75355.
Reyes, Adrielle
Hold Departure by J. Abalos - 319 SCRA 131 - November 25, 1999
Facts: Felipe M. Abalos, who was the Acting Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in
the Cities (MTCC) of Dapitan and Dipolog issued an order dated November 20, 1998
directing the Bureau of Immigration to include Fe Cagatan, who was accused in a pending
bouncing checks case, in the Hold Departure List. The Court Administrator recommended
that Judge Abalos be reprimanded since Hold Departure Orders may only be issued by a
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in criminal cases.
Issue: Whether courts lower that the Regional Trial Court (RTC), such as the MeTC, MTC,
MTCC and MCTC, has authority to issue a Hold Departure Order in criminal cases
Held: The Court held that courts lower than the Regional Trial Court, such as the MeTC, MTC,
MTCC and MCTC, have no authority to issue hold departure orders in criminal cases. SC
Circular 39-97 dated June 19, 1997, states that: limits the authority to issue hold departure
orders to the Regional Trial Courts in criminal cases within their exclusive jurisdiction. Based
on the rule on legal hermeneutics of express mention implied exclusion, the Regional Trial
Court is the only court mentioned in SC Circular 39-97, courts lower than the RTC are not
allowed to issue hold departure orders in criminal cases. Thus, Judge Felipe M. Abalos is
hereby REPRIMANDED with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
Reyes, Adrielle
Intia v COA - 306 SCRA 593, April 30, 1999
Facts: On April 3, 1992, Republic Act No. 7354 or The Postal Service Act of 1992 was
enacted and approved. It created the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) and defined its
powers, functions, and responsibilities. Pursuant to the powers granted to the PPC Board of
Directors, it issued and approved Board Resolution No. 95-50, approving the three-year
progressive increase of Representation and Travel Allowance (RATA) benefits of the officials
of the Philippine Postal Corporation. In 1996, Republic Act No. 8174, otherwise known as
The General Appropriations Act of 1996 was approved. Section 35 of RA 8174 fixes the
monthly RATA rates of government officials, including the officials of the PPC. Starting
October 23, 1996, the Corporate Auditor for PPC served Notices of Disallowance on PPC
officials.
On February 7, 1997, the new Postmaster General, Irineo V. Intia, Jr. filed their Memorandum
of Appeal for the reversal of the Notices of Disallowance. One of their contentions is the
unconstitutionality of Section 6 of P.D. 1597 since, according to their legal consultants, it
violates the rule against the passage of irrepealable laws. The defendants argued that Sec.6
of P.D. No. 1597 was repealed by Section 25 of RA 7354. Section 6 stated the following:
Sec. 6. Exemption from OCPC (Office of Compensation and Position Classification) Rules and
Regulations.Agencies, positions or groups of officials and employees of the national
government, including government-owned and controlled corporations, who are hereafter
exempted by law from OCPC coverage, shall observe such guidelines and policies as may be
issued by the President governing position classification, salary rates, levels of allowances,
project and other honoraria, overtime rates, and other forms of compensation and fringe
benefits. Exemptions notwithstanding, agencies shall report to the President, through the
Budget Commission, on their position classification and compensation plans, policies, rates
and other related details following such specifications as may be prescribed by the
President.
While Section 25 of RA 7354:
Section 25. Exemption from Rules and Regulations of the Compensation and Position
Classification Office.All personnel and positions of the Corporation shall be governed by
Section 22 hereof, and as such shall be exempt from the coverage of the rules and
regulations of the Compensation and Position Classification Office. The Corporation,
however, shall see to it that its own system conforms as closely as possible to that provided
for under Republic Act No. 6758.
Issue: Whether P.D. No. 1597, specifically Section 6, was repealed by Section 25 of R.A. No.
7354
Held: The Court held that there is no express or implied repeal of Section 6, P.D. No. 1597
by Section 25 of R.A. No. 7354 because there is no irreconcilable conflict between the two
laws. According to the rules of Statutory Construction: the failure to add a specific repealing
clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. There is no
inconsistency and repugnancy that existed in P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 7354. Section 25 of
R.A. No. 7354 provides for the exemption of PPC from the rules and regulations of the OCPC.
On the other hand, Section 6 of P.D. 1597 requires PPC to report to the President, through
the DBM, the details of its salary and compensation system. It should be emphasized that
the review by the DBM of any PPC resolution affecting the compensation structure of its
personnel should not be interpreted to mean that the DBM can dictate upon the PPC.
Section 25 of R.A. No. 7354 and Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597 can thus be read together and
harmonized to give effect to both provisions. Therefore, no implied repeal can be deduced in
this case. Worth reiterating is the rule in statutory construction that repeals by implication
are not favored. When statutes are in pari materia, they should be construed together.
Hence, Petition for removal of disallowance was dismissed.
Toledo, Elizalde
Napolcom vs De guzman 229 SCRA 801
Facts:
The petitioner sent notices of retirement to private respondents who are all members of the
defunct Philippine Constabulary and have reached the age of Fifty six (56). In this regard,
private respondent filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer of issuance of an exparte restraining order and/ or injunction before the Regional Trial court of Makati. They cited
that the provisions of RA 6975, section 39 cannot be applied to them since they are also
covered by sec 89 thereof. Respondent judge De Guzman issued a restraining order followed
by a writ of injunction. He ( Judge De Guzman) declared that the term INP in Sec. 89 of the
PNP law includes all members of the Philippine National before its creation and
establishment, and Sec 39 thereof shall become operative after the lapse of the four year
transition period. Thus, the preliminary injunction issued is made permanent.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 89 of the PNP Law includes all members of the present Philippine
National police, irrespective of the original status of its present members and that Section 39
of RA 6975 shall become applicable to petitioners only after the lapse of the four-year
transition period.
Held:
No, the law is clear when it states that the application of Sec 89 specifically provides only to
the local police force formerly under the defunct PC-INP, the former being the civilian
component of the latter. It was evident that the said law defines a specific class for which it
applies, and needs not to be belabored on the supposed meaning of the term, as it was
discussed in Sec 90 of the RA 6975. It is not altogether correct to state, therefore, that the
legislature failed to define who the members of the INP are. In this regard, it is of no moment
that the legislature failed to categorically restrict the application of the transition period in
Sec. 89 specifically in favor of the local police forces for it would be a mere superfluity as the
PC component of the INP was already retirable at age fifty-six (56).
In the case at bar, the Court ruled that the petition was GRANTED. The writ of injunction
issued on January 8, 1992 was thereby LIFTED and the assailed decision of respondent judge
was REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Toledo, Elizalde
Nasipit vs. NWPC 289 SCRA 667
Facts:
On November 19, 1993, the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board (RTWPB) of
Region X, Northern Mindanao, Cagayan de Oro City, issued Wage Order No. RX-03.[3] This
Wage Order mandated a P7.00 increase in the minimum daily wage of all workers and
employees in the private sector in Region X receiving a daily wage of not more than P130.00
per day and an additional P10.00 allowance per day. Subsequently or on March 17, 1994,
Nasipit Lumber Company, Philippine Wallboard Corporation and Anakan Lumber Company
(herein petitioners) filed their separate application for exemption from compliance with
Wage Order No. RX-03, claiming they are distressed establishments whose paid-up capital
has been impaired by at least twenty-five percent (25%). After finding that the petitioners
indeed sustained financial losses which impaired their respective paid-up capital, the
RTWPB, in a consolidated Order dated December 3, 1994, granted petitioners a full
exemption from compliance with the said Wage Order for a period of one (1) year or from
December 8, 1993 to December 7, 1994.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is allowed for an extension of its exemption in compliance with
the law?
Held:
No, the guidelines sets for on the issue was clearly defined, which limit the exemption only
up to one year to those establishments in distress. It is noteworthy that the RTWPB, for its
part, implemented to the letter the said Guideline. Section 7 of the NWPC Revised Guidelines
on Exemption, which is the applicable rule on this matter, provides for the duration and
extent of exemption that can be granted to a qualified applicant establishment, to wit:
Establishments shall be granted full exemption of one (1) year from effectivity of the Order
for all categories of exemption.
Thus, the Court ruled on the petition as it is thereby DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated
July 3, 1996 and Resolution dated November 27, 1996 of the National Wages and
Productivity Commission (NWPC) were AFFIRMED.
Toledo, Elizalde
National Federation of Labor vs. NLRC 327 SCRA 158 (2000)
Facts:
Private respondents Charlie Reith and Susie Galle Reith, general manager and owner,
Patalon Coconut Estate, was forced to sell their estate, when congress passed, Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL),
Operation was ceased and employees were laid off without separation pay.
Issue
: The issue is whether or not an employer that was compelled to cease its operation because
of the compulsory acquisition by the government of its land for purposes of agrarian reform,
is liable to pay separation pay to its affected employees.
Held:
The closure contemplated under Article 283 of the Labor Code is a unilateral and voluntary
act on the part of the employer to close the business establishment as may be gleaned from
the wording of the said legal provision that "The employer may also terminate the
employment of any employee due to the use of the word "may," in a statute, denotes that it
is directory in nature and generally permissive only. 10 The "plain meaning rule" or
verba legis in statutory construction is thus applicable in this case. Where the words of a
statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation.
Note Bene:
Employees were claiming separation pay on the basis of Art. 283 Labor Code which states
that employer MAY also terminate the employment of an employee for reasons therein by
serving notice thereof and paying separation pay to affected employees
There was compulsory acquisition by the government of the employers land(Patalon
Coconut Estate) for purposes of agrarian reform which forced the employer to cease his
operation
Issue: whether or not employer is liable for separation pay?
Held: NO, employer is not liable for separation pay !o It is a unilateral and voluntary act by
the employer if he wants to give separation pay. This is gleaned from the wording MAY in
the statute MAY denotes that it is directory in nature and generally permissive only Plainmeaning rule is applicable To depart from the meaning expressed by the words is to alter the
statute, to legislate and not interpret
Maledicta est exposition quae corrumpit textum dangerous construction which is against
the text
Tolentino, Ma. Angelica L.
NHA vs. Allarde - 318 SCRA 22 - November 16, 1999.
FACTS:
Since as early as April 26, 1971, the Tala Estate (including the disputed lots) was reserved,
inter alia, under Presidential Proclamation No. 843, for the housing program of the National
Housing Authority, the same has been categorized as not being devoted to the agricultural
activity contemplated by Section 3 of R.A. No. 6657, and is, therefore, outside the coverage
of the CARL (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law).
Private respondent, Rufino Mateo, started farming and working on said lots in 1959.
Petitioner notified the respondent spouses of the scheduled development of the Tala Estate
including the lots in question, warning them that it would not be responsible for any damage
which may be caused to the crops planted on the said lots.
Mateo, together with Department of Agrarian Reform, filed a petition to the award them the
subject disputed lots under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). In
pursuance of the implementation of Proclamation No. 843, petitioner caused the bulldozing
of the rice fields of private respondents, damaging the dikes and irrigations thereon, in the
process. Private respondents prayed for writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin the
petitioner from bulldozing further and making constructions on the lots under controversy.
Petitioners contended that the said lots which were previously reserved by Proclamation No.
843 for housing and resettlement purposes, are not covered by the CARP as they are not
agricultural lands within the definition and contemplation of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6657.They
also stated that the housing program are infrastructure project within P.D. 1818,
respondent disagreed. The lower court issued writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioners.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) covers government lands
reserved for specific public purposes prior to the effectivity of said law
2) Whether or not housing, plants and resettlements are infrastructure projects within the
contemplation of P.D. No. 1818
HELD:
No. The housing program was not being devoted to the agricultural activity contemplated by
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6657, and is, therefore, outside the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Applying the principle ejusdem generis, the Court is of
the view, and so holds, that the government projects involved (2) For the various plants and
installations of the National Housing Corporation, for its future expansion and for its staff and
pilot housing development, and (5)For housing, resettlement sites and other uses
necessary and related to an integrated social and economic development of the entire
estate and environs, x xx. are infrastructure projects. Petition was granted by the Court.
The writ of preliminary injunction issued by virtue was dissolved. Well-settled to the point of
being elementary is the doctrine that before a writ of preliminary injunction may issue,
there must be a clear showing by the complaint of a right to be protected and that the acts
against which the writ is to be directed infringe such right. It was decisively clear that the
private respondents have no right to the relief sought for.
Tolentino, Ma. Angelica L. - 311 SCRA v 755 - August 5, 1999

FACTS:
Sometime in February 1994, the Resident Auditor of the COA in the NTA, Dalisay E. Aracan,
issued a Notice of Disallowance of the payment of the Educational Assistance Incentive
Bonus (EAIB) for the calendar year 1993 and 1994 stating that the NTA had no statutory
authority to grant the incentive. The COA, in its Decision dated February 7, 1995, affirmed
the disallowance of the EAIB. Consequently, the NTA, then as the petitioner and through its
then Administrator Amante Siapno and other employees, filed with the Court who granted
the petition to nullify the COA Decision disallowing the EAIB. But relying on the second
sentence of Section 12 of R.A. No. 6758, COA contends that the legislative intent was to limit
such additional compensation to the incumbents, as of July 1, 1989 only which the company
applied. The Act states that: Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in
kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the
standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COA gravely abused its discretion in disallowing the payment of the EAIB
to the employees of the NTA who were non-incumbents of the positions as of July 1, 1989,
the date when R.A. No. 6758 took effect.
HELD:
No. Again citing the second sentence (first paragraph) of Section 12 of R.A. No. 6758, the
Court, in the said case, took into consideration the intent of Congress to prevent any
diminution of the pay and benefits being received by the incumbents at the time of the
enactment of R.A. No. 6758. It, however, opined that the petitioners, non-incumbent
employees, therein could not claim that they had acquired a vested right over the EAIB
because the same was always subject to availability of funds. The petitioners are, in effect,
invoking the principle of equal protection of the law embodied in the Constitution. The
second sentence (first paragraph) of Section 12 of R.A. No. 6758 does not infringe the equal
protection clause of the Constitution as it is based on reasonable classification intended to
protect the right of the incumbents against diminution of their pay and benefits. The
petitioners in the present case, who are admittedly non-incumbent employees of the NTA as
of July 1, 1989, cannot, therefore, claim similar treatment as the incumbents as of the said
date, with respect to the grant of the EAIB. Petition is dismissed.
Tolentino, Ma. Angelica L. - 328 SCRA 749 - July 23, 1998
FACTS:
The petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the Government of India
while the private respondent is a private corporation duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines. The present conflict between the petitioner and the private
respondent has its roots in a contract entered into by and between both parties on February
26, 1983 whereby the private respondent undertook to supply the petitioner FOUR
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED (4,300) metric tons of oil well cement. In consideration
therefor, the petitioner bound itself to pay the private respondent the amount of FOUR
HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED U.S. DOLLARS ($477,300.00) by
opening an irrevocable, divisible, and confirmed letter of credit in favor of the latter. The oil
well cement was loaded on board the ship MV SURUTANA NAVA at the port of Surigao City,
Philippines for delivery at Bombay and Calcutta, India. However, due to a dispute between
the shipowner and the private respondent, the cargo was held up in Bangkok and did not
reach its point of destination. Notwithstanding the fact that the private respondent had
already received payment and despite several demands made by the petitioner, the private
respondent failed to deliver the oil well cement. Thereafter, negotiations ensued between
the parties and they agreed that the private respondent will replace the entire 4,300 metric
tons of oil well cement with Class G cement cost free at the petitioners designated port.
However, upon inspection, the Class G cement did not conform to the petitioners
specifications. The petitioner then informed the private respondent that it was referring its
claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of their contract
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between the petitioner and
the private respondent under Clause 16 of the contract?
HELD:
No. Petition was granted. Clause 16 should pertain only to matters involving the technical
aspects of the contract is but a logical inference considering that the underlying purpose of
a referral to arbitration is for such technical matters to be deliberated upon by a person
possessed with the required skill and expertise which may be otherwise absent in the
regular courts.
Tolentino, Ma. Angelica L. - 293 SCRA 26 - March 27, 2000
FACTS:
The trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The
State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, among others for having failed to
state all his former placer of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, 7 and to support his
petition with the appropriate documentary evidence. Petitioner admits that he failed to
mention said address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of
Residence containing it had been fully published, with the petition and the other annexes,
such publication constitutes substantial compliance with 7.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the documents annexed by the State to its appelants brief without having
been presented and formally offered as evidence under Rule 132, Section 34 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence justified the reversal of of the Trial Courts decision.
HELD:
YES. Decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. Petition was denied.
It is settled that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor
of the government and against the applicant. [T]he rule of strict application of the law in
naturalization cases defeat petitioners argument of substantial compliance with the
requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law.
[T]he reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally
offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner
cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents
submitted to the appellate court by the State.
VERA, ARSADON E.
Osmena v Orbos 220 SCRA 703 March 31, 19993
FACTS: Senator John Osmea assails the constitutionality of paragraph 1c of PD 1956, as
amended by EO 137, empowering the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) to approve the
increase of fuel prices or impose additional amounts on petroleum products which proceeds
shall accrue to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) established for the reimbursement to
ailing oil companies in the event of sudden price increases.
The petitioner avers that the collection on oil products establishments is an undue and
invalid delegation of legislative power to tax. Further, the petitioner points out that since a
'special fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing power of a State, such
amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to the special
purpose/objective for which it was created.
It thus appears that the challenge posed by the petitioner is premised primarily on the view
that the powers granted to the ERB under P.D. 1956, as amended, partake of the nature of
the taxation power of the State.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of the legislative power of taxation.
HELD: It seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are
exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State.
Moreover, that the OPSF as a special fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O.
137. It is segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to
as a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and
review of the COA.
The Court is satisfied that these measures comply with the constitutional description of a
"special fund." With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the Court
finds that the provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts
on petroleum products provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be
exercised.
In addition to the general policy of the law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing and
subsidizing domestic pump rates, P.D. 1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose
additional amounts to augment the resources of the Fund.
VERA, ARSADON E.
Pablo v Castillo 337 SCRA 176 August 3, 2000
FACTS: Alejandra Pablo was issued three bad checks in the total amount of 2,334.00 each
to Nelson Mandap. Thus, she was charged with a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
The said checks were issue in partial payment of a loan she obtained from Mandap, knowing
that at the time of issuance of such checks, she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the bank which led for the checks to be dishonored by the drawee bank upon presentment
for payment.
ISSUES: Whether or not that she should be denied probation on the ground of
disqualification from probation under Section 9 of P.D. 968.
HELD: The Court ruled that under Section 9 of the Probation Law, P.D. 968, the following
offenders cannot avail of the benefits of probation:
(a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years;
(b) convicted of any offense against the security of the State;
(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than Two
Hundred Pesos;
(d) who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and
(e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of this Decree
became applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof.
However, petitioner already had a prior conviction in Criminal Case No. 94-0199 thereby
placing her in disqualification from probation under Section paragraph (c) of P.D. 968.
It is a basic rule of statutory construction that if a statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without any interpretation. Not
only has that, in the matter of interpretation of laws on probation, the Court pronounced that
the policy of liberality of probation statutes cannot prevail against the categorical
provisions of the law.
VERA, ARSADON E.
PAL v NLRC 295 SCRA 89 September 3, 1998
FACTS: Private respondents were employed by Philippine Air Lines, Inc. (PAL) as Junior
Aircraft Mechanics with a salary of P1,860.00 a month. On October 1, 1987, they got a salary
increase of P400.00 a month, for a total monthly compensation of P2,260.00, under the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between PAL and the Philippine Airlines Employees
Association (PALEA).
On December 14, 1987, Republic Act No. 6640 (RA 6640) raising the minimum wage of
workers took effect, and private respondents salaries were adjusted.
In 1988, private respondents were promoted and got a a basic pay of P2,300.00 a month
plus a CBA wage increase of P400.00, thereby making their monthly gross pay P2,700.00.
However, they asserted that they should have been given P304.00 more representing their
wage increase under RA 6640, so that their gross monthly pay should be P3,004.00.
However, petitioner considered the increase of P440.00 as sufficient compliance with RA
6640; the P304.00 to cover the mandated salary increase and the remaining P136.00 as
promotional salary increase.
ISSUES: Whether or not Section 2 of RA 6640 is a wage distortion mechanism.
HELD: Section 2 of RA 6640 is not a wage distortion mechanism. It has been emphasized
that, for the purpose of the said act, wage distortion shall mean a situation where a
legislated increase in minimum wages results in the elimination or severe contraction of
intentional quantitative differences in wage or salary rates between and among employee
groups in an establishment as to effectively obliterate the distinction embodied in such wage
structure based on skills, length of service, or other logical basis of differentiation.
Petitioner interprets the underscored proviso of Section 2 supra as a wage distortion
mechanism, such that when there is no more wage distortion to address, application of the
said provision of law would cease.
In the case at bar, the Court regards as improper petitioners way of interpreting the
underscored legal proviso aforecited, by isolating Section 2 from the other provisions of RA
6640.
It is a rule of statutory construction that every part of a statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered with the
other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the enactment.
VERA, ARSADON E.
Pangandaman v Comelec 319 SCRA 283 November 25, 1999
FACTS: The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc issued an Omnibus Order to
declare failure of elections in municipalities and to hold special elections thereafter. The
petitions were reinforced by reports received by the Commission from its field officers and
deputies. A pre-trial for all cases in Lanao del Sur involving failure of elections was set and
parties, their counsels, and the election officers of concerned municipalities appeared.
However, petitioner asserts that COMELEC acted with grave abuse in the (1) By insisting on
holding special elections on July 18 and 25, 1998 more than thirty (30) days after the failure
to elect, (2) By failing to declare a total failure of elections in the entire province of Lanao del
Sur and to certify the same to the President of the Philippines and Congress so that the
necessary legislation may be enacted for the holding of a special election. (3) By ordering
only elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police who
are not assigned to the affected areas as members of the Board of Election Inspectors, and
(4) By insisting on machine counting despite the proven unreliability and undependability of
the counting of votes with use of computer machines
Moreover, petitioner insists on a strict compliance petitioner insists on a strict compliance
with the holding of special elections not later than thirty (30) days after failure to elect
pursuant to Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code and argues that the provision* is
mandatory because of the word shall. He further asserts that the prescribed time frame
actually delimits COMELECs authority to call for a special election and that instead, the
power to call for a special election after the 30th day now resides in Congress.
ISSUES: Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in issuing the said Omnibus Order.
HELD: The provision invoked cannot be construed in the manner as argued by petitioner for
it would defeat the purpose and spirit for which the law was enacted.
In the case at bar, the Court admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt
to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. It is a basic
precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the
Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the letter of the law determines its construction;
for that reason, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent.
Moreover, the Court has emphasized that there can hardly be any doubt that the text and
intent of Section 2 (1) of Article IX (C) of the Constitution which states enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall.. Thus, give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental
powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections.
*SEC. 6. Failure of elections.If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud

or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date
fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or
after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such
cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the
Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due
notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended
or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election
not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after
the cessation of the cause of such post-ponement or suspension of the election or failure to
elect.
Villena, Ivan
Paras v Comelec - 264 SCRA 49, 04 November 1996
Facts: A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong Barangay.
The recall election was deferred due to Petitioners opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No.
7160, no recall shall take place within one year from the date of the officials assumption to
office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election. Since the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted.
Issue: Whether or not the SK election is a local election.
Held: No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context, and it
must be considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. The evident intent of
Sec. 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall once during his term, as provided in
par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction.
Thus, interpreting the phrase regular local election to include SK election will unduly
circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision.
In interpreting a statute, the Court assumed that the legislature intended to enact an
effective law. An interpretation should be avoided under which a statute or provision being
construed is defeated, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory
Villena, Ivan
PBCOM v CA 253 SCRA 241 - 05 February 1996
Facts: PBComm filed a petition questioning the lower courts failure to include in its
computation the penalty stipulated in two promissory notes of the loan obtained by Carlos
Po (now succeeded by Spouses Casafranca). The two promissory notes in question, signed
by Carlos Po,15 are similarly worded and their pertinent provisions read: For value received,
I/we jointly and severally, promise to pay the Philippine Bank of Communications, at its office
in the City of Cebu, Philippines the sum of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P300,000.00), Philippine Currency, together with interest thereon at the rate of TWELVE %
per annum until paid, which interest rate the Bank may at any time without notice, raise
within the limits allowed by law, and I/we also agree to pay, jointly and solidarily 12% per
annum penalty charge, by way of liquidated damages should this note be unpaid or is not
renewed on due date. x x x Should it become necessary to collect this note through an
attorney-at-law. I/we hereby expressly agree to pay, jointly and severally, ten per cent (10%)
of the total amount due on this note as attorneys fees which in no case shall be less than
P100.00 exclusive of all costs and fees allowed by law stipulated in the contract of real
estate mortgage if any there be. However, the petitioner insists that it can collect the
penalty of the defaulted loan, because the penalties were covered under the provisions
stated in the mortgage contract signed by Spouses Casafrana, in which this provision states,
to wit: This mortgage is given as security for the payment to the MORTGAGEE on demand or
at maturity, as the case may be, of all promissory notes, letters of credit, trust receipts, bills
of exchange, drafts, overdrafts and all other obligations of every kind already incurred or
which hereafter may be incurred.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is authorized to collect the penalty for defaulted loan.
Held: After interpreting the mortgage contract strictly against the petitioner, considering
the intention of the parties as evidenced by their various pleadings and assertions, the
inescapable conclusion is that the mortgage contract did not authorize the petitioner to
include in the secured amount the penalty stipulated in the promissory notes. The mortgage
contract did not contain a trace of the said penalty and, proceeding by the rule that an
action to foreclose a mortgage must be limited to the amount mentioned in the mortgage,
such penalty cannot be recovered on the foreclosure of the mortgage. A mortgage which is
in the nature of a contract of adhesion is to be strictly construed against the party which
prepared it.- The mortgage contract is also one of adhesion as it was prepared solely by the
petitioner and the only participation of the other party was the affixing of his signature or
adhesion thereto. Being a contract of adhesion, the mortgage is to be strictly construed
against the petitioner, the party which prepared the agreement.
_______________________________________________________________
Villena, Ivan
People v Amigo 252 SCRA 43
Facts: Accused-Appellant Patricio Amigo was charged and convicted of murder by the
regional trial court, Davao City and was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Issue: Whether or not that the penalty or reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harsh and
pleads for sympathy.
Held: The duty of court is to apply the law disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for
the accused. The court, in all of its cases, is adeheres with the principle of "Dura lex sed lex".
People v Atop 286 SCRA 157
Facts: The trial court sentenced the appellant to death, holding that his common-law
relationship with the victims grandmother aggravated the penalty. Sec. 11 of RA 7659,
which amended Art. 335 of the RPC, provides that the death penalty for rape may be
imposed if the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the 3rd civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent
of the victim
Issue: Whether the common-law husband of the girls grandmother included
Held: No. Courts must not bring cases within the provisions of the law which are not clearly
embraced by it. No act can be pronounced criminal which is not clearly within the terms of a
statute can be brought within them. Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the
accused
Jell Effie B. Waje
People v Balasa ; 295 SCRA 49 ; September 3, 1998
Facts:
Panata Foundation of the Philippines, Inc., is a non-stock, non-profit
corporation operated by Priscilla Balasa (President & General Manager), Normita Visaya
(Corporate Secretary), Analina Francisco (Treasurer), Norma Francisco (Cashier), Guillermo
Francisco (Disbursing Officer), Lolita Gelilang, Cynthia Ang, Purabel Espidol, Melinda
Mercado, Rodolfo Ang, Jr. and Teresa G. Carandang.
The foundation, through the operators, solicits deposits from the public, assuring the
would-be depositors that their money would either be doubled after 21 days or trebled after
30 days. The operation started with few depositors investing small amounts, but grew bigger
after the promise of investment maturity was employed. However, on November 1989, the
foundation operation was closed. Non-operation continued, causing the depositors to
demand for reimbursement.
Sixty-four information, all charging the offense of estafa, as defined in Presidential
Decree No. 1689, were filed against the incorporators and employees. Warrants of arrest
were issued but only Balasa, Visaya, Guillermo Francisco, Norma Francisco and Analina
Francisco were arrested, the rest of the defendants have gone into hiding.
RTC convicted them guilty punishable by Reclusion Perpetua. Guillermo and Norma
Francisco appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not appellants violated PD 1689.
Held: Yes. The Court ruled that Guillermo and Norma Francisco are guilty of violating
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1689, and shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment.
Analina Francisco was acquitted by lack of sufficiently clear and convincing evidence as
against her.
Sec. 1 of Presidential Decree 1689 states that: "Any person or persons who shall
commit estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Article 315 and 316 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling
(estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed with the
intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, and
the defraudation results in the misappropriation of money contributed by stockholders, or
members of rural banks, cooperative, "samahang nayon(s)", or farmers association, or of
funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public. When not committed by
a syndicate as above defined, the penalty imposable shall be reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds 100,000 pesos."
In the case at bar, appellants established a foundation which, by its articles of
incorporation, was allegedly to uplift members economic condition by way of financial or
consultative basis. Organized as a non-stock, non-profit charitable institution, its funds were
to be obtained through membership dues and such other assessments as may be agreed
upon by its board of directors. Thus, constituting to fraud and deceit. Evidence also shows
that at least five persons Priscilla Balasa, Normita Visaya, Norma Francisco, Guillermo
Francisco, and the other incorporators of the foundation collaborated, confederated and
mutually helped one another in directing the foundations activities.
Waje, Jell Effie B.
People v Cawaling ; 304 SCRA 83 ; July 28, 1998
Facts: Ronnie Ilisan had a drinking session with his brother, Vicente, in a restaurant and
decided to go home. Upon walking home, the six accused, Mayor Cawaling, policemen
Hilario Cajilo, Andres Fontamillas, Ernesto Tumbagahan and Ricardo delos Santos, and
civilian Alex Batuigas blocked and chased them. Vicente was able to hide, but Ronnie fell on
his knees and was approached by the accused. They shot him and was left afterwards.
Vicente immediately went to their brother, Nelson, and reported the incident. According to
the death certificate, Ronnie died due to severe hemorrhage and gunshot wounds.
It was later found out that the motive to kill the victim was because Ronie had
witnessed Bonifacio Buenaventura (a former chief commander of the San Jose Police Force)
kill a certain Ruben Ventura. Cawaling, who was Buenaventura's first cousin, wanted Ronie
dead, because the latter had not followed his instruction to leave town to prevent him from
testifying in said case.
The accused were convicted of murder by means of treachery and with evident
premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strength in killing Ronnie Ilisan.
However, they appealed raising these issues: (1) jurisdiction of the trial court, (2) double
jeopardy, (3) credibility of prosecution witnesses and their testimonies, (4) self-defense, (5)
performance of lawful duty, (6) alibi, (7) conspiracy, (8) rule on equipoise; and (9) attending
circumstances as they affect the penalty.
Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellants be convicted of murder in basis of the issues
raised.
Held: Jurisdiction of trial court. Appellants insists that Sandiganbayan, not the regular
courts, had jurisdiction to try and hear the case as they were public officers at the time of
the killing. But, according to Section 4 (A-2) of PD 1606, two requisites must concur before
the Sandiganbayan may exercise exclusive and original jurisdiction over a case: (a) the
offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office; and (b) the
penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years, or higher than a fine of six thousand pesos (P6,000). The relation between the crime
and the office must be direct and not accidental. Meaning, the offense cannot exist without
the office. In the case at bar, the Information filed against the appellants contains no
allegation that appellants were public officers who committed the crime in relation to their
office. And so, Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over such.
Double Jeopardy. Appellants have presented no sufficient and conclusive evidence to
show that they were charged, arraigned and acquitted in a military commission, or that the
case was dismissed therein without their consent. Because to establish double jeopardy
these requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy has attached prior to the second; (2)
the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and, (3) a second jeopardy is for the same
offense as that in the first. And the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment;
(b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered;
and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Credibility of Witnesses. As a general rule, the factual findings of trial courts deserve
respect and are not disturbed on appeal, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted, and would otherwise
materially affect the disposition of the case. This rule, however, does not apply when the
judge who penned the decision was not the same one who had heard the prosecution
witnesses testify, as in the present case. Nonetheless, the court has carefully perused and
considered the records of this case, and find no reason to alter the findings of the court a
quo in regard to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies.
Self defense. Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is needed to invoke selfdefense. But as found by the trial court, unlawful aggression did not start with the victim,
but rather with the appellants. This is when Cawaling and his men proceeded to the
restaurant and waited for Ronnie to come out. And he did, they chased and shot him without
giving him any opportunity to defend himself.
Lawful Performance of Duties. The victim was not committing any offense at the
time. Killing the victim under the circumstances of this case cannot be considered a valid
performance of a lawful duty by men who had sworn to maintain peace and order and to
protect the lives of the people.
Alibi. Alibi and denial should be outweighed by positive identification that is
categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of the eyewitness
testifying on the matter. Which in this case, the appellants failed to prove.
Conspiracy. The trial court correctly appreciated the presence of
conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It does not matter who inflicted the
mortal wound, as the act of one is the act of all, and each incurs the same criminal liability.
Equipose Rule. The equipoise rule finds application in this case, that is, if the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which
is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then
the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and is not sufficient to support a
conviction. In this case, the inculpatory facts point to only one conclusion: appellants are
guilty.
Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances. Prior to the amendment of Section 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for murder was reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death. Appellants argue for the imposition of the lower penalty
of reclusion temporal, contending that their filing of bail bonds/property bonds before the
order for their arrest was issued should be treated as voluntary surrender. The Court did not
accept this contention for it has no factual basis, and appellants failed to prove the
requisites for voluntary surrender, which are: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested;
(2) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or to the latter's agent; and (3)
the surrender is voluntary.
With all these, the Court affirmed the decision that the convicting the appellants
guilty of murder punishable by reclusion perpetua.
Waje, Jell Effie B.
People v De La Cuesta ; 304 SCRA 83 ; March 2, 1999
Facts:
Mercedes Binasbas left her nine-year old daughter, Merma Binasbas (victim),
in care of her niece Lyka Mariano and her room boarder, Joven de la Cuesta (accused). On
the consecutive nights of January 18 to 23, the accused repeatedly raped the victim and
after each sexual encounter, threatened her not to report anything to her mother and gave
her twenty pesos.
One evening, Rodina Lipon, the house owner, overheard the accused telling Merma
to change her underwear and go upstairs. Rodina, relayed the incident to Lyka, who then
questioned the victim about the matter. Merma confessed that she was raped by Joven and
later on, was accompanied in the police station to file a formal complaint. Medico-Legal
officer testified that there were no evident signs or possibility of insertion because the
hymen was still intact and orifice was small.
The accused denied charges against him but the trial court gave full credence to the
testimony of the victim, which is found to be firm, categorical, and convincing. This causing
him a punishment of death penalty under R.A 7659, in which he appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused be punished of death penalty.
Held: No. The Court modified the decision of trial court sentencing Joven de la Cuesta of six
cases of rape, punishable by Reclusion Perpetua only. This was in basis of Republic Act No.
7659, Section 11 that stated:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances.
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty
shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the
occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall
be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1.When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
2. When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3. When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the
children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
4. When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
5. When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6. When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.
7. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent
physical mutilation. (As amended by Sec. 11, RA 7659.)
In the case at bar, it was not established that Joven served as a guardian because to
be considered as such, a judicial appointment was necessary. The mere fact that the mother
asked Joven to look after her child while she was away did not constitute the relationship of
guardian-ward as contemplated by the law. He was a mere custodian or caretaker of the

child over whom he exercised a limited authority for a temporary period. Also, the
restrictive definition of a guardian, that of a legal or judicial guardian, should be used in
construing such term for the purpose of imposing the death penalty under R.A. 7659.
Jell Effie B. Waje

People v Deleverio ; 289 SCRA 547 ; April 24, 1998
Facts:
Roxan Benarao, 8-year old victim, lived and shared the same room with her
step-grandfather, Jose Deleverio (accused). On April 7, while they were resting, the accused
loosened the victims short pants and inserted his penis to the victims vagina. The incident
was repeated on May 13.
Roxan reported the molestation to her grandmother but refused to believe her. She,
then, told her mother about the incident and was brought to the police station to file two
charges of rape. Physical examination showed that the victim has an old hymenal laceration.
Trial court found Jose Delverio guilty of two counts of rape and punished by death
penalty under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
Issue: Whether or not Jose Deleverio be punished with death penalty.
Held: No. The Court reduced the punishment of death penalty to Jose Deleverio by
Reclusion Perpetua only. This is in accordance with Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659 that states:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances.
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty
shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the
occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall
be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1.When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
2. When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3. When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the
children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
4. When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
5. When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6. When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.
7. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent
physical mutilation. (As amended by Sec. 11, RA 7659.)
In the case at bar, the victim may be under eighteen years old, however, the
offender, who was legally married to Roxans natural grandmother, and was merely a stepgrandparent. He was obviously neither an ascendant nor a step-parent of the victim. His
relationship, therefore, is not within those enumerated in the provision. Thus, punishment of
death penalty cannot be charged.
"It is a basic rule of statutory construction that penal statutes are to be liberally
construed in favor of the accused. Court's must not bring cases within the provision of a law
which are not clearly embraced by it. No act can be pronounced criminal which is not clearly
made so by statute; so, too, no person who is not clearly within the terms of a statute can be
brought within them. Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused."
(People vs. Atop)
Escamilla, Kenneth
1. Tobias v Abalos 239 SCRA 106
Facts: Petitioner: Robert Tobias Ramon Guzman, Terry Lim, Gregorio Gabriel
and Roberto R. Tobias, Jr. Respondents: Hon City Mayor Benjamin Abalos,
City Treasurer William Marcelino and the Sangguniang Panlungsod, all of the
city of Mandaluyong
As taxpayers and residents of mandaluyong, petitioners assail the
constitutionality of RA No.7675 otherwise known as An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as City
of Mandaluyong. Prior to the enactment of the statute,Mandaluyong and San
Juan belonged to one legislative district. Hon Congressional representative
Hon. Ronaldo Zamora sponsored the bill and signed by pres. Fidel Ramos
becoming RA No. 7675. A plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The turnout
of the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population: 18, 621 voted
yes while 7,911 voted no. Thus, RA 7675 was deemed ratified and in
effect.
Issue: RA No 7675 specifically Art VIII Sec 49 thereof is unconstitutional for
being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution. First objection
is that it contravenes theone-subject-one bill rule as enunciated in Art VI
section 26(1) of the Constitution (every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.) this
section embraces two principal subjects 1) the conversion of Mandaluyong
into a HUC and 2) the division of the congressional district of
SanJuan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.2)Second and third
objection involve Art VI, Sec 5 (1) and (4) of the Constitution. Petitioners
argue that division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional
districts has resulted in increase in the composition of the House of
representatives and that it preempts the right of Congress to reapportion
legislative districts pursuant to Sec 5(4).
Held: Contentions are devoid of merit. The petition is DISMISED for lack of
merit.
1)The creation of separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a
subjectseparate and distinct from the subject of conversion into a HUC but is
a natural andlogical consequence of its conversion into a HUC. A liberal
construction of the one title-one subject rule, it should be given a practical
rather than a technical construction. Itshould be sufficient compliance with
such requirement is the title expresses the generalsubject and all the
provisions germane to that general subject
2) Statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into HUC with a population of not
less than 250 thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the one city, one
representative proviso in the constitutionthe said Act enjoys the
presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes
including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum
requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts.
3) The present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The phrase unless
otherwise provided by law indicates that composition of Congress may be
increased if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment
therefore increase is not unconstitutional
4) Congress drafted and deliberated upon and enacted the assailed lawCongress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself
(reapportioning of legislative districts
5) The principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized citythe inhabitants of san juan were
properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the
change of status of mandaluyong
6)On the issue of GERRYMANDERING: (practice of creating legislative districts
to favor a particular candidate or party)rep Ronald Zamora, author of the
law is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/mandaluyong
district-by dividing the district his constituency has in fact been diminished
and not favorable to him.
Escamilla, Kenneth
2. Tolentino v Sec of Fin 235 SCRA 630
FACTS: The valued-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange
of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is
equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods
or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the

sale or exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax
base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending
the National Internal Revenue Code.The Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Association (CREBA) contends that the imposition of VAT on sales and leases
by virtue of contracts entered into prior to the effectivity of the law would
violate the constitutional provision of non -impairment of contracts.
ISSUE: Whether R.A. No. 7716 is unconstitutional on ground that it violates
the contractclause under Art. III, sec 10 of the Bill of Rights?
HELD: No. The Supreme Court the contention of CREBA, that the imposition
of the VAT on the sales and leases of real estate by virtue of contracts
entered into prior to the effectivity of the law would violate the constitutional
provision of non-impairment of contracts, is only slightly less abstract but
nonetheless hypothetical. It is enough to say that the parties to a contract
cannot, through the exercise of prophetic discernment, fetter the exercise of
the taxing power of the State. For not only are existing laws read into
contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but the reservation of
essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic
postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against
impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government which retains
adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. In truth,
the Contract Clause has never been thought as a limitation on the exercise of
the State's power of taxation save only where a tax exemption has been
granted for a valid consideration. Such is not the case of PAL in G.R. No.
115852, and the Court does not understand it to make this claim. Rather, its
position, as discussed above, is that the removal of its tax exemption cannot
be made by a general, but only by a specific, law.Further, the Supreme Court
held the validity of Republic Act No. 7716 in its formal and substantive
aspects as this has been raised in the various cases before it. To sum up,the
Court holds:(1) That the procedural requirements of the Constitution have
been complied with by Congress in the enactment of the statute;(2) That
judicial inquiry whether the formal requirements for the enactment of
statutes
Escamilla, Kenneth
3. Transfarm v Daewoo 343 SCRA 410
FACTS: Sometime in 1994, Daewoo Corporation (Daewoo) entered into a
joint venture agreement with Transfarm & Co. (Transfarm) for the delivery,
assembly, production and distribution of Daewoo cars in the Philippines.
Under the agreement, Transdaewoo Automotive Manufacturing Company
(TAMC) was to be incorporated with Transfarm owning seventy percent (70%)
and Daewoo holding thirty percent (30%) of the shares of stock. The new firm
was also to undertake the manufacture, assembly, marketing, wholesale
distribution and sale and after-sales service of Daewoo products. Transfarm
and the joint venture company TAMC were then to enter into a separate
agreement that would name Transfarm as the exclusive distributor in the
Philippines of Daewoo cars. The parties stipulated that any dispute,
controversy or claim among the parties arising out of, relating to, or in
connection with the joint venture agreement itself should be settled by

arbitration to be conducted in Hongkong. The joint venture agreement,
however, was to be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws
of the Philippines. The agreement went awry in December of 1997. Transfarm
and TAMC filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5, of
Cebu City, docketed Civil Case No. CEB-21367, against Daewoo and Daewoo
Motor Co., Ltd. (DMCL), a corporation organized under the laws of the
Republic of Korea and not doing business in the Philippines, praying that
Daewoo and DMCL be ordered to refrain from conducting and doing, directly
or indirectly, automotive business in the Philippines. On 20 January 1998,
Daewoo and DMCL filed a motion to dismiss the case moored, inter alia, on
the ground that the case involved an intra-corporate dispute cognizable
exclusively by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In its
resolution of 25 March 1998, the RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and
directed the defendants to file their respective answers. Transfarm and TAMC
filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court, in its 29th July 1999 decision, declared that the
jurisdiction over the case rested with the SEC and, accordingly, granted the
petition and ordered the dismissal of the complaint. The subsequent motion
for reconsideration was rebuffed.
Issue: WON the the jurisdiction over the case should be rested to SEC?
Held. Yes. The Court required respondents to file their comment and
petitioners to file their reply thereon, respectively, in its resolutions of 25
November 1999 and 21 June 2000. During the pendency of the petition,
Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise also known as The Securities Regulation
Code, was enacted into law, providing, inter alia, that - "5.2. The
Commission's jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general
jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court: provided that the Supreme
Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court
branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. The Commission
shall retain jurisdiction over pending cases involving intra-corporate disputes
submitted for final resolution which should be resolved within one (1) year
from the enactment of this Code. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction
over pending suspension of payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June
2000 until finally disposed." Statutes regulating court jurisdiction and
procedures are generally construed to be applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of the passage of said enactments. The instant
case, neither filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission nor
therewith pending, let alone ready for final resolution by it, is clearly
cognizable by the RTC under the amendatory law. WHEREFORE, the decision
of the appellate court subject of the instant petition for review is SET ASIDE,
and the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City for further
proceedings. No costs.
Escamilla, Kenneth
4. Tung Chin v Rodriguez 340
Facts: Petitioner , Tung chin Hui is an alien who has allegedly entered the
Philippine illegellay and was thus turned over to the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation (BID). Petitioner then filed for a writ of habeas corpus for
illegal detention while respondent, Rufus B. Rodriguez as Commissioner of
Immigration filed for an appeal five (5) days after its receipt of the order of
releasing Petitioner. Petitioner however, contends that the appeal was already
late under sec.18, rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court. Respondent on the
other hand avers that Petitioners claim has no merit because such provision
was completely abrogated by sec. 3, rule 41 of the 1997 rules of court.
Issue: WON the appeal made by respondent should be considered to be late?
Held: No. Sec.18, rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court is deemed omitted
from and thereby repealed by the 1997 Rules of Court, which completely
replaces Rules 1 to 71. This is because provisions of an old law that were not
reproduced in this case is the intention of the Supreme Court. Thus, declaring
the appeal of respondent to be not considered late in its submission to the
court.
Toledo, Elizalde
Navarro v. NLRC 327 SCRA 22
Case: Special Civil Action
Syllabi: Labor law, Appeals, Pleadings and Practice, Appeal bond, Statutory
Construction.
Facts:
Petitioners who were all jitney drivers, and practically employed to private
respondent, on a boundary basis. The former filed a complaint against the
person of Araceli Cornejo and Olimpio Briton, private respondent in this case.
The former filed a case of Unfair Labor Practice before the Regional
Arbitration Branch for Illegal Dismissal, although respondent Cornejo through
her lawyer averred that they are willing to take the petitioners back for work,
the offer was still turned down by the petitioner repeatedly for several times,
and the cause of action which was sought is merely for separation pay. They
prayed for severance pay, back wages with 12% legal interest per annum,
Fifty Thousand Pesos ( Php 50,000) to each complainant for exemplary
damages and Fifteen Thousand Php 15,000 as attorneys fees. In which the
labor arbiter rendered judgement in favor of the petitioners.
Private respondents received a copy of said Order on april 3, 1992. They filed
an appeal on April 13, 1992 with the National labor Relation Commission, but
failed to file an appeal bond on that day. The appeal bond was later complied
on April 30, 1992. However, said appeal bond was found out as a bogus one,
and was considered as a mere scrap of paper which has no effect. Despite
the fact the inexistence of said appeal bond was established, the public
respondent( NLRC) ruled in favor of the private respondent and ordered the
petitioner to go back for work. Un-swayed, petitioner filed an Appeal to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the appeal bond has its effect even if filed later on its
prescribed period?
Held:
No, it has no effect at all. Appeals, pleadings and practice, perfection of an
appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is
jurisdictional;, and non-compliance with such legal requirement is fatal and
has the effect of rendering the judgement final and executory.
The NLRC, as public respondent has no jurisdiction on the said case to hear
the appeal, since the prescribed period in filing of the said appeal bond had
made the Order of the Labor Arbiter, final and executory.
In the case at bar, the Court ruled; that the instant petition is Granted. The
assailed Decision rendered on July 29, 1993 by public respondent and its
resolution dated April 11, 1994 are Set Aside. The Decision of the Labor
Arbiter dated November 26, 1992 is hereby Reinstated.

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ALMORADIE, MA. CARIZA L.

People v Evangelista 253 SCRA 714 February 20, 1996

ALMORADIE, MA. CARIZA L.

resettlement area designated or earmarked by the government. What is meant by in

ALMORADIE, MA. CARIZA L.

Alo, John Ericson

By using force or intimidation;

When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and,

When the woman is under twelve years of age or demented.

Alo, John Ericson

People v Valdez 304 SCRA 140 March 3, 1999

ASTIBE, Maria Jennifer C.

ASTIBE, Maria Jennifer C.

Barangtay, Carlo Niel

Barangtay, Carlo Niel

Barangtay, Carlo Niel

Bondad, Jan Danielle R.

subjected to unnecessary anxiety and humiliation is therefore supported by the evidence on

GARCIA, DOREEN YSABELLE E.

JALALON, JEANINE VANESSA R.

JALALON, JEANINE VANESSA R.

JALALON, JEANINE VANESSA R.

COMELEC vs. Noynay

Legaspi, Gianne Claudette P.

tax such as banks, non-bank financial intermediaries, insurance companies and

Maurin, Nino Jay M.

ISSUE: Whether or not Garcia is liable for both loans.

Rodriguez, Angeline DC.

Rodriguez, Angeline DC.

was signed by a Colonel Marcelino A. Cordova whose appointment as Assistant General

Wesnny Charles G. Tana

A valid law may be held unconstitutional only insofar as it is allowed to operate

Whether or not foreshore land includes submerge land based on RA 1899.

YES. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; GOVERNMENT SERVICE

DAYANGHIRANG, ANNA MARIE B.

Whether or not the assailed ordinances are valid.

YES. A municipal tax ordinance empowers a local government unit to

DAYANGHIRANG, ANNA MARIE B.

Errors of judgment or of procedure, not relating to the court's jurisdiction nor

DAYANGHIRANG, ANNA MARIE B.

YES. The controversy lies in the legal signification of the words

Delmoro, Mel Loise M.

Delmoro, Mel Loise M.

Tolentino, Ma. Angelica L. - 311 SCRA v 755 - August 5, 1999

*SEC. 6. Failure of elections.If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud

guardian-ward as contemplated by the law. He was a mere custodian or caretaker of the

Jell Effie B. Waje

or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the

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