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Articles

774-782 (General Provisions)

By: CASTRO
ALVAREZ VS IAC
GR 68053 May 7, 1990
Doctrine: The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered
by the provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and
paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason
is that whatever payment is thus made from the state is ultimately a payment by the heirs or
distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that
the heirs would have been entitled to receive.
"Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations
are transmissible to the successors. The rule is a consequence of the progressive
'depersonalization' of patrimonial rights and duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco, has
characterized the history of these institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation from
person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony, with
the persons occupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases where the
obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of its
performance by a specific person and by no other. . . ."
Facts: Aniceto Yanes owned 2 parcels of land Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B. Aniceto Yanes was
survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents, Estelita,
Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private
respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her
child, Jovita (Jovito) Albib.
It is established that Rufino and his children left the province to settle in other places as a
result of the outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita, from the Japanese time up to
peace time, they did not visit the parcels of land in question but after liberation, when her
brother went there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that
Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773.
After Fuentebellas death, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to
Rosendo Alvarez. On May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino
filed a complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the return of the ownership and possession of
Lots 773 and 823.
During the pendency of said case, Alvarez sold the Lots for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason.
CFI rendered judgment ordering defendant Rosendo Alvarez to reconvey to plaintiffs the lots.

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Issue: Whether or not the liability or liabilities of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots
Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre to Dr. Rodolfo Siason, if ever there is any, could be
legally passed or transmitted by operations (sic) of law to the petitioners without violation of
law and due process.
Held: "Art. 774.Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through
his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law.
"Art. 776.The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which
are not extinguished by his death.
"Art. 1311.Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in
case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their
nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the
property received from the decedent."
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal
consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages.
That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is of no moment because by legal
fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary
estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the
payment of the debts of the estate.
It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of
their inheritance. With this clarification and considering petitioners' admission that there are
other properties left by the deceased which are sufficient to cover the amount adjudged in
favor of private respondents, we see no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions
of the Court of Appeals.
GEVERO VS IAC
GR 77029 August 30, 1990
Doctrine: The hereditary share in a decedents' estate is transmitted or vested immediately
from the moment of the death of the 'causante' or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the
Philippines, Art. 777), and there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting)
disposing of his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of
such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.
Facts: DELCOR purchased a lot (lot 2476-A; 20,119 sq met) from the late Luis Lancero. As
perDeed of Absolute Sale exec in favor of DELCOR, a TCT was issued. Luis acquired the
sameparcel of land from Ricardo Gevero(1952). The sale bet Luis and Ricardo waqs
annotatedat the back of an OCT covering a mother lot(lot no. 2476) in the names of Ricardo,
hismother Teodorica and his siblings.Teodorica died long before WW2. In 1966, an extrajudicial settlement and partition wasexecuted by the heirs of Teo. Lot 2476 was adjudicated in
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favor of Ricardo who was thenalive. DELCOR filed an action with the CFI of Misamis Oriental
to quiet title and/or annulthe partition made by the heirs insofar as the same prejudices the
land which it acquired.After trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff corporation. The
appellate court affirmed the decision.
Issue: WON the 1/2 share of interest of Teodorica in one of the litigated lots is included in
thedeed of sale.
Held: The hereditary share in a decedents' estate is transmitted or vested immediately from
the moment of the death of the 'causante' or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the
Philippines, Art. 777), and there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting
capacity) disposing of his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual
extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.
Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II, hence, the rights to the succession were
transmitted from the moment of her death. It is therefore incorrect to state that it was only in
1966, the date of extrajudicial partition, when Ricardo received his share in the lot as
inheritance from his mother Teodorica. Thus, when Ricardo sold his share over lot 2476 that
share which he inherited from Teodorica was also included unless expressly excluded in the
deed of sale.
LOCSIN VS CA
GR 89783 February 19, 1992
Doctrine: The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death,
and do not vest in his heirs until such time.
Facts: Mariano inherited extensive property from his father Getulio. He brought his
inheritanceinto his marriage with Catalina Jaucian. Catalina, for her part, brought into the
marriageuntitled properties which she had inherited form her parents.Mariano Locsin
executed a last will and testament instituting his wife as the sole anduniversal heir of all his
properties. The spouses being childless, they had agreed that theirproperties, after both of
them shall have died should revert to their respective sides of thefamily. After Mariano's
death, (1948) his will was probated without opposition from bothsides of the family. Nine years
after the death of Don Mariano, Catalina began transferring,by sale, donation or assignment,
Mariano's as well as her own, props to their respectivenephews and nieces.Catalina died in
1977. Four years before her death, she made a will affirming the transfersshe made. Six
years after her demise, some of Catalina's nephews and nieces filed an actionin the RTC of
Legaspi to recover the properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins,alleging that the
conveyances were innoficious, without consideration, and intended solelyto circumvent the
laws on succession. After the trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
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Issue: WON the PRs are entitled to inherit the properties which Catalina had already
disposed of more than 10 yrs before her death.
Held: The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private respondents,
nephews and nieces of Doa Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, entitled to inherit the properties
which she had already disposed of more than ten (10) years before her death. For those
properties did not form part of her hereditary estate, i.e., "the property and transmissible rights
and obligations existing at the time of (the decedent's) death and those which have accrued
thereto since the opening of the succession." 10 The rights to a person's succession are
transmitted from the moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until such
time. 11 Property which Doa Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other persons during
her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her death to which her heirs may
lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in her estate at the time of
her death devolved to her legal heirs; and even if those transfers were, one and all, treated as
donations, the right arising under certain circumstances to impugn and compel the reduction
or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the respondents since neither
they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs.
There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Doa Catalina, in
transferring the properties she had received from her late husband to his nephews and
nieces, an intent to circumvent the law in violation of the private respondents' rights to her
succession. Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that she
had any such, hence there were no legitimes that could conceivably be impaired by any
transfer of her property during her lifetime. All that the respondents had was an expectancy
that in nowise restricted her freedom to dispose of even her entire estate subject only to the
limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it were breached, the respondents
may not invoke: cdrep
"Art 750.The donation may comprehend all the present property of the donor, or part
thereof, provided he reserves, in, full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the
support of himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation, are
by law entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such reservation, the donation shall be
reduced on petition of any person affected
NATALIA OPULENCIA V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. no. 125835, July 30, 1998
Doctrine: We emphasize that hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the
moment of the decedents death. Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary
share the moment her father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the

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Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of

her share in the estate of her late father.

Facts: PRs Aladin Simundac and Miguel Oliven filed a complaint for specific performance
again Natalia Carpena Opulencia on the ground that the latter executed in their favor a
'contract to sell' of lot 2125. The defendant, despite demands, failed to comply with her
obligations under the contract. The
defendant averred that the property subject of the contract formed part of the Estate of
Demetrio Carpena, in respect of which a petition for probate was filed with the RTC of Binan.
The court ordered the parties to submit their evidence. Pet, instead of submitting evid, filed a
demurrer. Moreover, the pet maintained that the contract was null and void for want of
approval of the probate court.
Meanwhile, the court a quo granted the demurrer and dismissed the complaint. On appeal,
the appellate court set aside hte trial court's dismissal of the complaint.
Issue: WON a contract to sell a real property involved in estate proceedings valid and
binding without the approval of the probate court.
Ruling: Yezz naman. Hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the
decedent's death. Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the
moment her father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to
Sell, because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share in
the estate of her late father.
Petitioner contends that "[t]o sanction the sale at this stage would bring about a partial
distribution of the decedent's estate pending the final termination of the testate proceedings."
Petitioner's contention is not convincing. The Contract to Sell stipulates that petitioners offer
to sell is contingent on the "complete clearance of the court on the Last Will Testament of her
father." Consequently, although the Contract to Sell was perfected between the petitioner and
private respondents during the pendency of the probate proceedings, the consummation of
the sale or the transfer of ownership over the parcel of land to the private respondents is
subject to the full payment of the purchase price and to the termination and outcome of the
testate proceedings. Therefore, there is no basis for petitioner's apprehension that the
Contract to Sell may result in a premature partition and distribution of the properties of the
estate. Indeed, it is settled that "the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance,
subject to the pending administration, in no wise standsin the way of such administration."
EMILIO EMNACE V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 126334. November 23, 2001
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Doctrine: The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or administratrix
of the estate before she can file the action. She and her children are complainants in their
own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the very moment of Vicente Tabanaos
death, his rights insofar as the partnership was concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner were
transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a
mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the
value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted. Moreover, respondents became owners
of their respective hereditary shares from the moment Vicente Tabanao died.
FACTS: Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were partners in a
business concern known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. Sometime in January of 1986, they
decided to dissolve their partnership and executed an agreement of partition and distribution
of the partnership properties among them.
Petitioner failed to submit to Tabanao's heirs any statement of assets and liabilities of the
partnership, and to render an accounting of the partnership's finances. Petitioner also
reneged on his promise to turn over to Tabanao's heirs the deceased's 1/3 share in the total
assets of the partnership. Tabanao's filed against petitioner an action for accounting,
payment of shares, division of assets and damages.
ISSUE: WON the heirs of Vicente Tabanao Lacks the capacity to sue the petitioner.
HELD: No. The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or
administratrix of the estate before she can file the action. She and her children are
complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the very moment of
Vicente Tabanao's death, his rights insofar as the partnership was concerned were
transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
death of the decedent.
Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner were
transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a
mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the
value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted. Moreover, respondents became owners
of their respective hereditary shares from the moment Vicente Tabanao died.
BY: MACHADO Case Report by: Machado, Jerica Clara S.
TAEDO VS. CA
G.R. No. 104482. January 22, 1996
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Panganiban, J.
Doctrine: No contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases
expressly authorized by law.
Facts: On October 20, 1962, Lazaro Taedo executed a notarized deed of absolute sale in
favor of his brother, Ricardo Taedo, and the latters wife, Teresita Barrera in which he
conveyed a parcel of land which he will inherit. Upon the death of his father he executed an
affidavit of conformity to reaffirm the said sale dated February 28, 1980. On January 13, 1981,
he also executed another deed of sale in favor of the spouses covering his undivided share of
the parcel of land. In February 1981, Ricardo learned that Lazaro sold the same property to
his children, petitioners herein, through a deed of sale dated December 29, 1980. On June 7,
1982, the spouses recorded the deed of sale in the registry of deeds in their favor and the
corresponding entry was made in the Transfer Certificate of Title.
The children of Lazaro filed a complaint for rescission plus damages of the deeds of sale
executed by Lazaro in favor of Spouses Taedo covering the property inherited by Lazaro
from his father.
The trial court decided in favor of Spouses Taedo, holding that petitioners failed "to adduce a
proponderance of evidence to support (their) claim." On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court, ruling that the Deed of Sale dated January 13, 1981 was valid
and that its registration in good faith vested title in said respondents.
Issue: Whether or not the sale of a future inheritance valid?
Held: The sale made in 1962 involving future inheritance is not really at issue here. In
context, the assailed Decision conceded "it may be legally correct that a contract of sale of
anticipated future inheritance is null and void."
But to remove all doubts, we hereby categorically rule that, pursuant to Article 1347 of the
Civil Code, "no contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases
expressly authorized by law."
Consequently, said contract made in 1962 is not valid and cannot be the source of any right
nor the creator of any obligation between the parties. Hence, the "affidavit of conformity"
dated February 28, 1980, insofar as it sought to validate or ratify the 1962 sale, is also
useless and, in the words of the respondent Court, "suffers from the same infirmity."
Case Report By: Manalo,Carmina
SPS. SANTOS, vs. SPS. LUMBAO
G.R. No. 169129. March 28, 2007
Doctrine: Whatever rights and obligations the decedent have over the property were
transmitted to the heirs by way of succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and
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obligations of the decedent to the extent of the value of the inheritance of the heirs. Thus, the
heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of a transaction entered into by their
predecessor-in-interest because they have inherited the property subject to the liability
affecting their common ancestor. Being heirs, there is privity of interest between them and
their deceased mother. They only succeed to what rights their mother had and what is valid
and binding against her is also valid and binding as against them. The death of a party does
not excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a property right and the rights and
obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the deceased. Similarly,
nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when the other party has a property
interest in the subject matter of the contract.
Facts: On two separate occasions during her lifetime, Rita Santos sold to Spouses Lumbao
the subject property which is a part of her share in the estate of her deceased mother, Maria
Catoc (Maria), who died intestate. On the first occasion, Rita sold 100 square meters of her
inchoate share in her mother's estate through a document denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa,".
Spouses Lumbao claimed the execution of the aforesaid document was witnessed by
petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo, as shown by their signatures affixed therein. On the second
occasion, an additional seven square meters was added to the land as evidenced by a
document also denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa. After acquiring the subject property,
Spouses Lumbao took actual possession thereof and erected thereon a house which they
have been occupying as exclusive owners up to the present. As the exclusive owners of the
subject property, Spouses Lumbao made several verbal demands upon Rita, during her
lifetime, and thereafter upon herein petitioners, for them to execute the necessary documents
to effect the issuance of a separate title in favor of Spouses Lumbao insofar as the subject
property is concerned. Spouses Lumbao alleged that prior to her death, Rita informed
Proserfina Lumbao she could not deliver the title to the subject property because the entire
property inherited by her and her co-heirs from Maria had not yet been partitioned. Spouses
Lumbao claimed that petitioners, acting fraudulently and in conspiracy with one another,
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, adjudicating and partitioning among themselves
and the other heirs, the estate left by Maria, which included the subject property already sold
to respondents Spouses .Spouses Lumbao, through counsel, sent a formal demand letter to
petitioners but despite receipt of such demand letter, petitioners still failed and refused to
reconvey the subject property to the respondents Spouses Lumbao. Consequently, the latter
filed a Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages before the RTC of Pasig City. RTC denied
the complaint. On appeal, CA reversed the decision ordering petitioners to reconvey the
property and pay damages to Spouses Lumbao.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners are legally bound to comply with the "Bilihan ng Lupa and
consequently, reconvey the subject property to herein respondents spouses Lumbao.

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Held: YES. The general rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their
predecessors-in-interest applies in the present case. Article 1311of the NCC is the basis of
this rule. It is clear from the said provision that whatever rights and obligations the decedent
have over the property were transmitted to the heirs by way of succession, a mode of
acquiring the property, rights and obligations of the decedent to the extent of the value of the
inheritance of the heirs. Thus, the heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of a transaction
entered into by their predecessor-in-interest because they have inherited the property subject
to the liability affecting their common ancestor. Being heirs, there is privity of interest between
them and their deceased mother. They only succeed to what rights their mother had and what
is valid and binding against her is also valid and binding as against them. The death of a party
does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a property right and the rights
and obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the deceased. Similarly,
nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when the other party has a property
interest in the subject matter of the contract. In the end, despite the death of the petitioners'
mother, they are still bound to comply with the provisions of the "Bilihan ng
Lupa".Consequently, they must reconvey to herein respondents Spouses Lumbao the 107square meter lot which they bought from Rita, petitioners' mother. And as correctly ruled by
the appellate court, petitioners must pay respondents Spouses Lumbao attorney's fees and
litigation expenses for having been compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect their
interest.
Case Report by : Ambrosio Martinez
NHA VS ALMEIDA
GR no. 162784
Doctrine: The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property.
Margarita Herrera had an existing Contract to Sell with NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita
Herrera's demise, this Contract to Sell was neither nullified nor revoked. This Contract to Sell
was an obligation on both partiesMargarita Herrera and NHA. Obligations are transmissible.
Margarita Herrera's obligation to pay became transmissible at the time of her death either by
will or by operation of law.
Facts: The Land Tenure Administration awarded to Margarita Herrera several portions of land
in San Pedro, Laguna. She had two children, Francisca and Beatriz(she died before her
mother of PR). When Margarita passed away, Francisca executed a deed of self-adjudication
claiming that she was the only remaining relative of Margarita. The deed of was based on a
'Sinumpaang Salaysay' allegedly executed by Margarita. The surviving heirs of Beatriz filed a
case for annulment of the deed. A decision was rendered and the deed was declared null and
void. During the trial, Francisca filed an application with the NHA to purchase the same lots.
The NHA granted the application. The PR appealed to the Office of the President. The NHA
reso was affirmed. When Francisca died, her heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of her
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estate which they submitted to the NHA. The transfer of rights was approved by the NHA. The
heirs of Francisca directed PR to leave the premises that she was occupying. Feeling
aggrieved, PR sought the cancellation of the titles issued in favor of the heirs of Francisca.
She filed a complaint in the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna. She invoked her 40 year occupation
of the property and re-raised the fact that Francisca's declaration is a nullity because the
other heirs were disregarded. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The CA
reversed the decision and remanded the case for further hearing. The RTC rendered a
decision setting aside the resolution of the NHA and the decision of the Office of the
President. The Regional Trial Court ruled that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an
assignment of rights but a disposition of property which shall take effect upon death. It then
held that the said document must first be submitted to probate before it can transfer property.
The NHA and the heirs of Francisca filed their respective motions which were both denied.
The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue: WON the decision of NHA is arbitrary
Held: Yes. The NHA gave due course to the application made by Francisca Herrera
without considering that the initial applicant's death would transfer all her property, rights
and obligations to the estate including whatever interest she has or may have had over the
disputed properties. To the extent of the interest that the original owner had over the property,
the same should go to her estate. Margarita Herrera had an interest in the property and that
interest should go to her estate upon her demise so as to be able to properly distribute them
later to her heir in accordance with a will or by operation of law. When the original buyer died,
the NHA should have considered the estate of the decedent as the next "person" likely to
stand in to fulfil the obligation to pay the rest of the purchase price. The opposition of other
heirs to the repurchase by Francisca Herrera should haveput the NHA on guard as to the
award of the lots. Further, the Decision in the said Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning the
Deed of Self-Adjudication) which rendered the deed therein null and void should have alerted
the NHA that there are other heirs to the interests and properties of the decedent who may
claim the property after a testate or intestate proceeding is concluded. The NHA therefore
acted arbitrarily in the award of the lots.
ARTICLES 783-795 (Wills)
ARTICLES 796-803 (Testamentary Capacity & Intent)
ARTICLES 804-819 (Forms of Wills)
Case Report By: Mateo, Maria Angelica
CONDE VS. ABAYA
GR No. 4275; March 23, 1909
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Doctrine: While an estate is in the course of settlement in a special proceeding, no ordinary
action can be maintained by a person claiming to be an heir, against the executor or
administrator, for the purpose of having his rights in the estate determined.
As a general rule, the right of action of a child to enforce recognition of its legitimacy
lasts during the lifetime of such child, but the right of a natural child to compel
acknowledgment of its status continues only during the life of the alleged parents. The right of
action for a declaration of legitimacy is transmitted to the heirs of the child only when the latter
dies during minority or while insane, or in case the action has already been instituted. Action
by a natural child can only be brought against the heirs of the parents in the event of the
death of the parents during the minority of the child, or upon the discovery of a document,
after the death of the parents, expressly acknowledging such child. This right of action which
the law concedes to this natural child is not transmitted to his ascendants or descendants.
(Arts. 18 and 137, Civil Code.)
FACTS: Casiano Abaya died unmarried however leaving two unaknowledged children by
herein plaintiff-appellee Paula Conde. The latter, as a ascendant heir of her children, sued for
the settlement of the intestate estate of Casiano along with the acknowledgment of the two as
natural children of the deceased. The trial court, with the opposition of the defendantappellant Roman Abaya, brother of the deceased, rendered judgment bestowing the estate of
Casiano to Conde as legitimate heir of the decedent's natural children.
ISSUE: May the mother of a natural child now deceased, bring an action for the
acknowledgment of the natural filiation in favor of such child in order to appear in his behalf to
receive the inheritance from the deceased natural father.
HELD: The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his
whole life, while the right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child lasts only during the
life of his presumed parents. An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an
exception, be exercised against the heirs of the presumed parents in two cases: first, in the
event of the death of the latter during the minority of the child, and second, upon the
discovery of some instrument of express acknowledgment of the child, executed by the father
or mother, the existence of which was unknown during the life of the latter.
But such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised by him. It
cannot be transmitted to his descendants, or his ascendants.
BY: MATILLANO
PAMPLONA vs. MORETO (CA)
96 SCRA 775
DOCTRINE: Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which private respondents
received from their deceased parents and/or predecessors-in-interest included all the
property rights and obligations which were not extinguished by their parents' death.
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FACTS:
Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were husband and wife with 6 children.
During their marriage, they acquired adjacent lots Nos. 1495, 4545, and 1496. Monica
Maniega died intestate. more than (6) years after, Flaviano Moreto, without the consent of
the heirs of his said deceased wife, and before any liquidation of the conjugal partnership,
executed in favor of Geminiano Pamplona, the deed of absolute sale covering lot
No. 1495 for P900.00. The spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte constructed
their house on the eastern part of lot 1496 as Flaviano Moreto, at the time of the sale, pointed
to it as the land which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona. Flaviano Moreto died intestate. In
1961, the plaintiffs demanded on the defendants to vacate the premises on the ground that
Flaviano Moreto had no right to sell the lot which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona as
the same belongs to the conjugal partnership of Flaviano and his deceased wife. The
spouses Pamplona refused to vacate hence, this suit was instituted seeking for the
declaration of the nullity of the deed of sale as regards one-half of the property
subject matter of said deed.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners are entitled to the full ownership of the property in
litigation, or only one-half of the same.
RULING: The three lots have a total area of 2,346 sq. meters. It is therefore, clear that the
three lots constitute one big land. They are not separate properties located in different
places but they abut each other. And since Flaviano Moreto was entitled to onehalf pro-indiviso of the entire land area or 1,173 sq. meters as his share, he had a perfect
legal and lawful right to dispose of 781 sq. meters of his share to the Pamplona spouses.
Moreover, private respondents, as heirs are duty-bound to comply with the provisions of
Articles 1458 and 1495, Civil Code, which is the obligation of the vendor of the property of
delivering and transferring the ownership of the whole property sold, which is transmitted on
his death to his heirs, the herein private respondents.
Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which private respondents received
from their deceased parents and/or predecessors-in-interest included all the property
rights and obligations, which were not extinguished by their parents' death.
PEOPLE VS UMALI
193 SCRA 493 G.R. No. 84450, February 04, 1991

Doctrine: The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law" takes into
account Article 821 of the Civil Code which states that persons "convicted of falsification of a
document, perjury or false testimony" are disqualified from being witnesses to a will." (
Facts: Gloria and Suzeth Umali y Amado, defendants-appellants, were charged for violation
of Sec. 4, Art. 1 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The defendants-appellants were
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accused of selling marijuana as witnessed by Francisco Manalo, who was given 4 marked P5
bills which he used to buy 2 foils of marijuana. The Chief of the Investigation Division
petititoned for the
issuance of a search warrant as a justification for them to search the house of Gloria Umali.
The warrant was served and the 4 P5 bills were confiscated from the person of Gloria Umali
as well as a can of milo containing 16 foils of dried marijuana leaves. Francisco Manalo was
also being charged in a prior criminal case under the Dangerous Drugs Act and the Court
rendered judgment against him. In relation, the appellant denied the findings of the lower
court against her and alleged that witness (Francisco Manalo) is not reputed to be trustworthy
and reliable and that his words should not be taken on its face value. It was also stressed that
witness had several charges in court and because of his desire to
dismiss some of the cases, he was likely to tell falsehood. The Solicitor-General also claimed
that the witness testimony was also corroborated in its material respect by other prosecution
witnesses. The RTC ruled against defendant and such decision was appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendants-appellants were guilty of the crime charged against them?
Held:
Yes, The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law" takes into account
Article 821 of the Civil Code which states that persons 91 convicted of falsification of a
document, perjury or false testimony" are disqualified from being witnesses to a will." the fact
that said witness is facing several criminal charges when he testified did not in any way
disqualify him as a witness. Since the witness Francisco Manalo is not convicted of any of the
above-mentioned crimes to disqualify him as a witness and this case does not involve the
probate of a will, We rule that the fact that said witness is facing several criminal charges
when he testified did not in any way disqualify him as a witness.
Case Report by: Palad, Nolibelle Anne P.
TEOPISTA DOLAR VS. FIDEL DIANCIN ET. AL.
G. R. No. 33365 December 20, 193
Malcolm, J.
Doctrine: The requirement of the statute that the will shall be "signed" is satisfied not only by
the customary written signature but also by the testator's or testatrix's thumbmark.
Expert's testimony as to the identity of thumbmarks or fingerprints is admissible. The
method of identification of fingerprints is a science requiring close study.
Where thumb impressions are blurred and many of the characteristic marks far from
clear, thus rendering it difficult to trace the features enumerated by experts as showing the
identity or lack of identity of the impressions, the court is justified in refusing to accept the
opinions of alleged experts and in substituting its own opinion that a distinct similarity in some
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respects between the admittedly genuine thumbmark and the questioned thumbmarks, is
evident.
Facts: A will was allegedly executed by Paulino Diancin on November 13, 1927. A
thumbmark appears at the end of the will and on the left hand margin of each of its pages.
The will was detailed in nature and disposed of an estate amounting to 50K. A document of
sale containing an admittedly genuine thumbmark of Paulino was presented. Photographs of
the thumbmark were also offered in evidence. Carlos Jaena, attempted to qualify as an
'expert,' and thereafter gave his opinion that the thumbmarks had not been made by the same
person. Jose Villanueva likewise attempted to qualify that the thumbmarks were authentic.
Issue: Whether or not the fingerprints are admissible as evidence.
Held: Yes Admissible. The requirement of the statute that the will shall be "signed" is satisfied
not only the customary written signature but also by the testator's or testatrix' thumbmark.
Expert testimony as to the identity of thumbmarks or fingerprints is of course admissible. The
method of identification of fingerprints is a science requiring close study. Where thumb
impressions are blurred and many of the characteristic marks far from clear, thus rendering it
difficult to trace the features enumerated by experts as showing the identity or lack of identity
of the impressions, the court is justified in refusing to accept the opinions of alleged experts
and in substituting its own opinion that a distinct similarity in some respects between the
admittedly genuine thumbmark and the questioned thumbmarks, is evident.
By: Pastores
YAP TUA vs. YAP CA KUAN and YAP CA KUAN
G.R. No 6845 September 1, 1914
DOCTRINE: If the writing of a mark simply upon a will is sufficient indication of the intention
of the person to make and execute it, then certainly, the writing of a portion or all of the name
ought to be accepted as a clear indication of an intention to execute it.
While the rule is absolute that one who makes a will must sign the same in the
presence of the witnesses and that the witnesses must sign in the presence of each other, as
well as in the presence of the one making the will, yet, nevertheless, the actual seeing of the
signature made is not necessary. It is sufficient if the signatures are made where it is possible
for each of the necessary parties, if they so desire, to see the signatures placed upon the will.
FACTS:
Perfecto Gabriel, representing the petitioner, Yap Tua, presented a petition in the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila, asking that the will of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong be
admitted to probate. It appears that the will was signed by the deceased, as well as Anselmo
Zacarias, Severo Tabora, and Timoteo Paez. After due notice was given, was brought on for
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hearing on the 18th day of September, 1909. Timoteo Paez declared that he was 48 years of
age; that he
had known the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong; that she had died on the 11th day of August,
1909; that before her death she had executed a last will and testament; that he was present
at the time of the execution of the same; that he had signed the will as a witness; that
Anselmo Zacarias and Severo Tabora had also signed said will as witnesses and that they
had signed the will in the presence of the deceased.
The Judge ordered that the last will and testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong be allowed
and admitted to probate. The will was attached to the record and marked. The court further
ordered that one Yap Tua be appointed as executor of the will. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu
appeared and presented a petition, alleging that they were interested in the matters of the
said will and desired to intervene and asked that a guardian ad litem be appointed to
represent them in the cause alleging That the will dated the 11th day of
August, 1909, and admitted to probate by order of the court on the 29th day of September,
1909, was null, for the following reasons:
(a) Because the same had not been authorized nor signed by the witnesses as the law
prescribes.
(b) Because at the time of the execution of the will, the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong was
not then mentally capacitated to execute the same, due to her sickness.
(c) Because her signature to the will had been obtained through fraud and illegal
influence. Also, before the execution of the said will, which they alleged to be null, the said
Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong had executed another will, with all the formalities required by law.
Upon the foregoing facts the court was requested to annul and set aside the order of the 29th
day of September, 1909, and to grant to said minors an opportunity to present new proof
relating to the due execution of said will.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the allegation of the respondent deserves credence?
HELD:
No. The mere fact, however, that she executed a former will is no proof that she did not
execute a later will. She had a perfect right, by will, to dispose of her property, in accordance
with the provisions of law, up to the very last of moment her life. She had a perfect right to
change, alter, modify or revoke any and all of her former wills and to make a new one. Neither
will the fact that the new will fails to expressly revoke all former wills, in any way sustain the
charge that she did not make the new will. Said third assignment of error there is involved in
the statement that "The signature of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, in her first will was not
identical with that which appears in her second will. Several witnesses testified that they saw
her write the name "Tomasa." One of the witnesses testified that she had written her full
name. We are of the opinion, and we think the law sustains our conclusion, that if Tomasa
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Elizaga Yap Caong signed any portion of her name tot he will, with the intention to sign the
same, that the will amount to a signature. It has been held time and time again that one who
makes a will may sign the same by using a mark, the name having been written by others. If
writing a mark simply upon a will is sufficient indication of the intention of the person to make
and execute a will, then certainly the writing of a portion or all of her name ought to be
accepted as a clear indication of her intention to execute the will.
During the trial of the cause the protestants made a strong effort to show that Tomasa Elizaga
Yap Caong did not sign her name in the presence of the witnesses and that they did not sign
their names in their presence nor in the presence of each other. Upon that question there is
considerable conflict of proof.
In this case, It was also shown that from the bed in which Tomasa was lying, it was possible
for her to see the table on which the witnesses signed the will. While the rule is absolute that
one who makes a will must sign the same in the presence of the witnesses and that the
witnesses must sign in the presence of each other, as well as in the presence of the one
making the will, yet, nevertheless, the actual seeing of the signatures made is not necessary.
It is sufficient if the signatures are made where it is possible for each of the necessary parties,
if they desire to see, may see the signatures placed upon the will.
AVERA VS GARCIA
42 PHIL 145
Facts: In proceedings in the court below, instituted by Eutiquia Avera for probate of the will of
one Esteban Garcia, contest was made by Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez, the latter in
the capacity of guardian for the minors Jose Garcia and Cesar Garcia. Upon the date
appointed for the hearing, the proponent of the will introduced one of the three attesting
witnesses who testified with details not necessary to be here specified that the will was
executed with all necessary external formalities, and that the testator was at the time in full
possession of disposing faculties. Upon the latter point the witness was corroborated by the
person who wrote the will at the request of the testator. Two of the attesting witnesses were
not introduced, nor was their absence accounted for by the proponent of the will.
When the proponent rested the attorney for the opposition introduced a single witness
whose testimony tended to show in a vague and indecisive manner that at the time the will
was made the testator was so debilitated as to be unable to comprehend what he was about.
After the cause had been submitted for determination upon the proof thus presented, the trial
judge found that the testator at the time of the making of the will was of sound mind and
disposing memory and that the will had been properly executed. He accordingly admitted the
will to probate.
Issue:

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1) whether a will can be admitted to probate, where opposition is made, upon the proof of a
single attesting witness, without producing or accounting for the absence of the other two
2) whether the will in question is rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the signature of
the testator and of the three attesting witnesses are written on the right margin of each page
of the will instead of the left margin.
Ruling:
1) When the petition for probate of a will is contested, the proponent should introduce all three
of the attesting witnesses, if alive and within reach of the process of the court; and the
execution of the will cannot be considered sufficiently proved by the testimony of only one,
without satisfactory explanation of the failure to produce the other two.
In the present case no explanation was made at the trial as to why all three of the attesting
witnesses were not produced, but the probable reason is found in the fact that, although the
petition for the probate of this will had been pending from December 21, 1917, until the date
set for the hearing, which was April 5, 1919, no formal contest was entered until the very day
set for the hearing; and it is probable that the attorney for the proponent, believing in good
faith the probate would not be contested, repaired to the court with only one of the three
attesting witnesses at hand, and upon finding that the will was contested, incautiously
permitted the case to go to proof without asking for a postponement of the trial in order that
he might produce all the attesting witnesses.
Although this circumstance may explain why the three witnesses were not produced, it does
not in itself supply any basis for changing the rule expounded in the case above referred to
but this point was not raised by the appellant in the lower court either upon the submission of
the cause for determination in that court or upon the occasion of the filing of the motion for a
new trial.
2) A will otherwise properly executed in accordance with the requirements of existing law is
not rendered invalid by the fact that the paginal signatures of the testator and attesting
witnesses appear in the right margin instead of the left.
Case Report by: San Jose, Rica Pauline B.
NAYVE V. MOJAL
G.R. No. L-21755; December 29, 1924
Romualdez, J.
Doctrine: As each and every page used of the will bears the signatures of the testator and
the witnesses, the fact that said signatures do not all appear on the left margin of each page
does not detract from the validity of the will.
The fact that the sheets of the document are not paged with letters but with Arabic, is
within the spirit of the law and is just as valid as paging with letters.
The attestation clause must state the number of sheets or pages composing the will;
but when such fact, while it is not stated in the attestation clause, appears at the end of the
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will proper, so that no proof aliunde is necessary of the number of the sheets of the will, then
there can be no doubt that it complies with the intention of the law that the number of sheets
of which the will is composed be shown by the document itself, to prevent the number of the
sheets of the will from being unduly increased or decreased.
The fact that the testator and the witnesses signed each and every page of the will is
proven by the mere examination of the signatures in the will, the omission to expressly state
such evident fact does not invalidate the will nor prevent its probate.
Facts: Filomena Nayve filed a petition for the probate of the will of his late husband, Antonio
Mojal. The petition was opposed by Leona Mojal and Luciana Aguilar, sister and niece, of the
deacesed. The CFI of Albay admitted the will to probate. The will is composed of four sheets
with written matter on only one side of each. The four sides or pages containing written matter
are paged "Pag. 1," "Pag. 2," "Pag. 3," "Pag. 4," successively. Each of the first two sides or
pages, which was issued, was signed by the testator and the three witnesses on the margin,
left side of the reader. On the third page actually used, the signatures of the three witnesses
appear also on the margin, left side of the reader, but the signature of the testator is not on
the margin, but about the middle of the page, at the end of the will and before the attestation
clause. On the fourth page, the signatures of the witnesses do not appear on the margin, but
at the bottom of the attestation clause, it being the signature of the testator that is on the
margin, left side of the reader.
Issue: Whether or not the will can be admitted to probate?
Held:
1. Signed in middle - As each and every page used of the will bears the signatures of the
testator and the witnesses, the fact that said signatures do not all appear on the left margin of
each page does not detract from the validity of the will.;
2. Numbers not letters - Yes. Still within the spirit of the law;
3. Attestation clause did not state number of pages The last paragraph of the will stated
number of pages so the will is still valid.
4. Signed in the presence of each other - Yes. In the attestation clause above set out it is said
that the testator signed the will "in the presence of each of the witnesses" and the latter
signed "in the presence of each other and of the testator." So that, as to whether the testator
and the attesting witnesses saw each other sign the will, such a requirement was clearly and
sufficiently complied with. What is not stated in this clause is whether the testator and the
witnesses signed all the sheets of the will
Case Report by: SANGALANG, May Alili D.
In re: Probate of the Will of Pilapil.
MENDOZA VS. CALIXTO PILAPIL ET AL.
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72 Phil. 546, G.R. No. 47931. June 27, 1941
Diaz, J.
Doctrine: The purpose of the Act to establish the formalities required in a will, is certainly
secure and guarantee their authenticity against bad faith and fraud, to prevent those who
have no right of succession to the testator.
Facts: Deceased Reverend Eleuterio Pilapil was a parish priest in Muaboal, Cebu. Calixto
Pilapil, brother of the deceased, filed a case for intestacy in the absence of a will. Within few
days after Calixto was named as the estate administrator, a case was filed by Adriano
Mendoza, nephew of the testator and named executor in the will, for the probate of the last
will and testament of Fr. Pilapil.
Appellants Calixto et al opposed the probate of the will on the ground among others
that the will was not prepared, signed and witnessed in accordance with the provisions of
Article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, alleging that the pages were not numbered.
It is an undisputed fact that at the bottom of the first page there is a note that says clearly: "Go
to the 2nd page and at the bottom of the second page, there is this other note: "Go to the 3rd
page", that the last-paragraph of the second page reads: "... Consists of two items; contains
sixteen provisions and is written on three pages.
Issue: WON the will should be invalidated on the ground that its pages were not numbered.
Held: No. The purpose of the Act to establish the formalities required in a will, is certainly
secure and guarantee their authenticity against bad faith and fraud, to prevent those who
have no right of succession to the testator. It has fulfilled that purpose in the event when it
was established that, in the same body of the will and at the same page where clause
witnessing appears, or the third, it expresses that the will consists of three pages and that
each one of the first two carries of the note in letters and figures of the note, they are
respectively the first and second pages of it. These facts evidently exclude all fear, suspicion,
or any hint of doubt that another has replaced some of its pages.
TESTATE ESTATE OF ABADA VS ABAJA
450 SCRA 264 G.R. No. 147145; January 31, 2005
DOCTRINE: An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent form,
a record of the facts attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure of the
memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be proved. A will,
therefore, should not be rejected where its attestation clause serves the purpose of the law.
FACTS:
Abada and his wife died without legitimate children. Alipio Abaja filed with the CFI of Negros
Occidental a petitition for the probate of the will of Abada. The latter allegedly named his
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children as his testamentary heirs. Eulogio is the son of Abada's child. Nicanor Caponong
opposed the petition. The alleged intestate heirs of Abaja also filed their oppositions. The
oppositors are the nephews, nieces and grandchildren of Abada and Toray. Alipio filed another
peition before the RTC of Kabankalan for hte probate of the will. Caponong filed a petition,
praying for the issuance in his name of letters of administration. The RTC of Kabankalan
admitted the probate of the will. MR was denied. During the
proceedings, the presiding judge discovered that the former presiding judge had already
submitted the case for decision. Will was allowed for probate. The RTC-Kabankalan ruled on
the only issue raised by the oppositors in their motions to dismiss the petition for probate, that
is, whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause as required by law. The CA affirmed the
resolution of the trial court.
HELD:
ATTESTATION CLAUSE
1. Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages on
which the will is written and that the attestation clause fails to state expressly that the testator
signed the will and its every page in the presence of three witnessesThe first sentence of the
attestation clause reads: "Subscribed and professed by the testator Alipio Abada as his last
will and testament in our presence, the testator having also signed it in our presence on the
left margin of each and every one of the pages of the same." The attestation clause clearly
states that Abada signed the will and its every page in the presence of the witnesses.
Caponong-Noble is correct in saying that the attestation clause
does not indicate the number of witnesses. On this point, the Court agrees with the appellate
court in applying the rule on substantial compliance. While the attestation clause does not
state the number of witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that three witnesses
signed it.
EVIDENCE ALIUNDE
2. No. The question on the number of the witnesses is answered by an examination of the will
itself and without the need for presentation of evidence aliunde. They do not allow evidence
aliunde to fill a void in any part of the document or supply missing details that should appear
in the will itself. They only permit a probe into the will, an exploration within its confines, to
ascertain its meaning or to determine the existence or absence of the requisite formalities of
law
Case Report By: SERING, MOLLY V.
CANEDA v. CA
G.R. No. 103554 May 28, 1993
DOCTRINE: The rule on substantial compliance in Article 809 cannot be invoked or relied on
by respondents since it presupposes that the defects in the attestation clause can be cured or
supplied by the text of the will or a consideration of matters apparent therefrom which would
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provide the data not expressed in the attestation clause or from which it may necessarily be
gleaned or clearly inferred that the acts not stated in the omitted textual requirements were
actually complied with in the execution of the will. In other words, the defects must be
remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself. In the case at bar, contrarily, proof of
the acts required to have been performed by the attesting witnesses can be supplied only by
extrinsic evidence thereof, since an overall appreciation of the contents of the will yields no
basis whatsoever from which such facts may be plausibly deduced. What private respondent
insists on are the testimonies of his witnesses alleging that they saw the compliance with
such requirements by the instrumental witnesses, oblivious of the fact that he is thereby
resorting to extrinsic evidence to prove the same and would accordingly be doing by
indirection what in law he cannot do directly. It may thus be stated that the rule, as it now
stands, is that omissions which can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without
the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not
obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which
cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the
attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.
FACTS: The deceased Mateo Caballero, during his lifetime, executed a notarial will and
submitted it for probate. However, before the petition could be acted upon by the court,
Caballero died. Thereafter, a second petition was filed by the legatees, which was opposed by
the purported relatives of the deceased on the ground that the deceased could not have
possible executed the same due to his poor health. The probate court accepted the will as the
decedents last will and testament, to which the respondent court concurred.
ISSUE: W/N the will is valid.
HELD: NO. The fact that while the attestation clause recites that the testator indeed signed
the will and all its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well
the number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the
circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other.||| While it may be true that the attestation clause is
indeed subscribed at the end thereof and at the left margin of each page by the three,
attesting witnesses, it certainly cannot be conclusively inferred therefrom that the said
witnesses affixed their respective signatures in the presence of the testator and of each other
since, as petitioners correctly observed, the presence of said signatures only establishes the
fact that it was indeed signed, but it does not prove that the attesting witnesses did subscribe
to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The execution of a will is
supposed to be one act so that where the testator and the witnesses sign on various days or
occasions and in various combinations, the will cannot be stamped with the imprimatur of
effectivity.

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CODOY VS CALUGAY
312 SCRA 333
DOCTRINE: The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the
door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty
their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a
way as to attain these primordial ends. But on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of
the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to
make a will. However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged
as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, that law requires
three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.
FACTS:
On 6 April 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas,
devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de
Ramonal, filed a petition for probate of the said will. They attested to the genuineness and
due execution of the will on 30 August 1978.
Eugenio Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed their opposition claiming that the
will was a forgery and that the same is even illegible. They raised doubts as regards the
repeated appearing on the will after every disposition, calling the same out of the ordinary. If
the will was in the handwriting of the deceased, it was improperly procured.
Evangeline Calugay, etc. presented 6 witnesses and various documentary evidence.
The first witness was the clerk of court of the probate court who produced and identified the
records of the case bearing the signature of the deceased.The second witness was election
registrar who was made to produce and identify the voters affidavit, but failed to as the same
was already destroyed and no longer available.
The third, the deceaseds niece, claimed that she had acquired familiarity with the
deceaseds signature and handwriting as she used to accompany her in collecting rentals
from her various tenants of commercial buildings and the deceased always issued receipts.
The niece also testified that the deceased left a holographic will entirely written, dated and
signed by said deceased.
The fourth witness was a former lawyer for the deceased in the intestate proceedings of her
late husband, who said that the signature on the will was similar to that of the deceased but
that he can not be sure.
The fifth was an employee of the DENR who testified that she was familiar with the
signature of the deceased which appeared in the latters application for pasture permit. The
fifth, respondent Evangeline Calugay, claimed that she had lived with the deceased since
birth where she had become familiar with her signature and that the one appearing on the will
was genuine.
Codoy and Ramonals demurrer to evidence was granted by the lower court. It was
reversed on appeal with the Court of Appeals which granted the probate.

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ISSUE:
1. W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing that at least three witnesses explicitly declare
the signature in a contested will as the genuine signature of the testator, is mandatory or
directory.
2. Whether or not the witnesses sufficiently establish the authenticity and due execution of the
deceaseds holographic will.
HELD:
1. YES. The word shall connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word shall, when
used in a statute, is mandatory.
In the case at bar, the goal to be achieved by the law, is to give effect to the wishes of the
deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for
their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.
The paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true intent of the
deceased.
2. NO. We cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting of the deceased.
The clerk of court was not presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing
in the holographic will was that of the deceased.
The election registrar was not able to produce the voters affidavit for verification as it was no
longer available.
The deceaseds niece saw pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased and did
not declare that she saw the deceased sign a document or write a note.
The will was not found in the personal belongings of the deceased but was in the
possession of the said niece, who kept the fact about the will from the children of the
deceased, putting in issue her motive.
Evangeline Calugay never declared that she saw the decreased write a note or sign a
document.
The former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the
signature in the holographic will.
(As it appears in the foregoing, the three-witness requirement was not complied with.)
A visual examination of the holographic will convinces that the strokes are different
when compared with other documents written by the testator.
The records are remanded to allow the oppositors to adduce evidence in support of their
opposition.
The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against
bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth
and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to
attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact
that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise the right to make a will.
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However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of
the testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, the law requires three witnesses
to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.
Article 811, paragraph 1. provides: In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be
necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator
explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will
is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.
The word shall connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word shall, when
used in a statute, is mandatory.
TALATALA, ANGELO CARLO T.
SPOUSES AJERO VS. CA
G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994
PUNO, J.:
DOCTRINE: A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects
the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the
testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these
dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole
testament void.
FACTS: On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted for allowance of decedent's (Annie sand)
holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and
disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect
capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.
This was opposed on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the signature
therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not
duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure
and undue influence.
The trial court having found that the holographic will in question was written entirely,
dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix with three (3) witnesses to have explicitly
and categorically identified the handwriting with which the holographic will in question was
written to be the genuine handwriting and signature of the testatrix admitted the probate,
however on appeal with CA this was reversed and the petition for probate was dismissed on
the ground that it fails to meet the requirements for its validity by not complying articles 813
and 814 of the NCC.
Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed
without being dated, and the last disposition has a signature and date, such date validates the
dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior dispositions.

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Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will,
the testator must authenticate the same by his full signature.
It alluded to certain dispositions in the will, which were either unsigned and undated, or
signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made
thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was correct in disallowing the probate of the will based on the
provisions of Art Art 813 and Art 814?
HELD: NO. In a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved
are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testament;
(2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3)
whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was
executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of
the decedent.
In the case of holographic wills what assures authenticity is the requirement that they
be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as provided under Article 810 of
the New Civil Code. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the
disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the
validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator
fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be
effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.
AZAOLA VS SINGSON
109 PHIL 102 G.R. No. L-14003
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

August 5, 1960

DOCTRINE: Article 8111 is merely permissive and not mandatory.

FACTS: Petitioner submitted for probate the holographic will of Fortunata S. Vda. De Yance.
Maria Azaola was made the sole heir. Only one witness, Francisoco Azaola, was presented
to testify on the handwriting of the testatrix. The probate was opposed on the ground that (1)
the execution of the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the
part of the petitioner and his wife, and (2) that the testatrix did not seriously intend the
instrument to be her last will. The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of
the Civil Code, the proponent must present three witnesses who could declare that the will
and the signature are in the writing of the testatrix, the probate being contested; and because
the lone witness presented "did not prove sufficiently that the body of the will was written in
the handwriting of the testatrix."

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Petitioner appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to produce more than one
witness because the will's authenticity was not questioned; and second, that Article 811 does
not mandatorily require the production of three witnesses to identify the handwriting and
signature of a holographic will, even if its authenticity should be denied by the adverse party.
ISSUE: W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory or permissive.
HELD: Article 8111 is merely permissive and not mandatory. Since the authenticity of the will
was not contested, petitioner was not required to produce more than one witness; but even if
the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, Article 811 cannot be interpreted to
require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the
testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been
present at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil
Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witness possessing the requisite
qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent.
BY: TEMPERANTE
G.R. No. 131641
February 23, 2000
NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO VS CA
Doctrine: Adjudication of ownership necessarily includes delivery of possession. Indeed, it
would be defeating the ends of justice should we require that for the parties to obtain
possession of the property duly adjudged to be theirs from those who have no right to remain
therein, they must submit to court litigations a new. An exception however exists where the
actual possessor has shown a valid right over the property enforceable even against the
owner thereof.
Facts: Natividad is the sole and absolute owner of a land located in Naic, Cavite. She
contends that her brother Romeo and his wife convinced her to lend them the TCT of the lot
to be used as a collateral for a loan (for the construction of a cinema). Natividad agreed on
the condition that the property would be returned within one year from the completion of the
cinema. Thus, Natividad executed a Deed Of Sale. The cinema was completed but the
spouses refused to return the title, instead, they had the property transferred to their name.
The spouses averred that the property did not belong to Natividad and that it formed part of
the estateof the late Maximo Nazareno. According to Romeo, the property was his share in
their inheritance.
The trial court ruled in favor of the spouses. But the CA ruled otherwise. Hence, the RD was
ordered to restore the TCT in favor of Natividad. Natividad filed a Manifestation and Motion
with the RTC praying for the issuance of a writ of execution as well as a writ of possession of
the lot in question as well as the movie house constructed therein. The spouses opposed the
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motion on the ground that Natividad never prayed that she be placed in possession of the
subject premises. Neither did the CA order the petitioner to be placed in possession of the
property. The TC granted the writ prayed for but denied the issuance of a writ of possession.
MR denied.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner may be issued a writ of possession?
Ruling: No. Lot 504-A-3 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 51798 was owned by the
appellant in her own right as vendee and not appellee's share in the estate of their deceased
father. The Court of Appeals categorically declared that the claim of spouses Romeo and
Eliza over the disputed lot has utterly no factual basis. Therefore, they have no reason to
remain in possession of the property. But the same could not be said of the Naic Cinema. The
matter of ownership and possession of the Naic Cinema was never put in issue.
Consequently, petitioner cannot ask for a writ of possession to place her in physical
occupancy of the Naic Cinema. Being declared owner of subject lot does not also
mean that she is automatically entitled to possession of all the improvements therein.
Otherwise, the actual possessor would be deprived of his property without due process of law.
Petitioner cannot validly claim possession over the Naic Cinema since in her complaint and
subsequent pleadings, she has admitted not being the owner thereof. On the contrary, she
claims that the Naic Cinema belongs to the estate of her father. On the other hand,
respondent spouses have asserted dominion over the Naic Cinema. Plainly, petitioner cannot
wrest possession of the movie house from respondent spouses through a mere writ of
possession as she herself even disclaims being the owner thereof. Ownership over the Naic
Cinema must be threshed out in a proper proceeding. A mere prayer for the issuance of a writ
of possession will not suffice.
RIVERA VS IAC
182 SCRA 322 G.R. Nos. 75005-06, February 15, 1990
DOCTRINE: In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one
witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will
and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of
such witnesses shall be required.
FACTS: Adelaido J. Rivera filed, a petition for the probate of the holographic wills of a
prominent and wealthy resident of that town named Venancio Rivera. This petition was in turn
opposed by Jose Rivera, who reiterated that he was the sole heir of Venancio's intestate
estate. The respondent court considered the holographic wills valid because it found them to
have been written, dated and signed by the testator himself in accordance with Article 810 of
the Civil Code. It also held there was no necessity of presenting the three witnesses required
under Article 811 because the authenticity of the wills had not been questioned.
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The existence and therefore also the authenticity of the holographic wills were questioned by
Jose Rivera. In his own petition in SP No. 1076, he declared that Venancio Rivera died
intestate; and in SP No. 1091, he denied the existence of the holographic wills presented by
Adelaido Rivera for probate.
ISSUE: WON it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and
signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting
of the testator.
HELD: The flaw in this argument is that, as we have already determined, Jose Rivera is not
the son of the deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question. Hence, being a mere
stranger, he had no personality to contest the wills and his opposition thereto did not have the
legal effect of requiring the three witnesses. The testimony of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera,
Jr., who authenticated the wills as having been written and signed by their father, was
sufficient.
LABRADOR VS CA
184 SCRA 170 G.R. Nos. 83843-44, April 05, 1990
DOCTRINE: The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed
in the will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the
hand of the testator.
FACTS: Melecio died leaving behind a parcel of land to his heirs. However, during probate
proceedings, Jesus and Gaudencio filed an opposition on the ground that the will has been
extinguished by implication of law alleging that before Melecios death, the land was sold to
them evidenced by TCT No. 21178. Jesus eventually sold it to Navat.Trial court admitted the
will to probate and declared the TCT null and void. However, the CA on appeal denied
probate on the ground that it was undated.
ISSUE:
W/N the alleged holographic will is dated, as provided for in Article 810 of CC.
HELD:
YES. The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the
will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of
the testator.
The intention to show March 17 1968 as the date of the execution is plain from the tenor of
the succeeding words of the paragraph. It states that this being in the month of March 17th
day, in the year 1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed.
And the one who made this writing is no other than Melecio Labrador, their father. This
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clearly shows that this is a unilateral act of Melecio who plainly knew that he was executing a
will.
Case Report by: Nathaniel Torres
SEANGIO VS. REYES
G.R. Nos. 140371-72, November 27, 2006
DOCTRINE: A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated,
and signed by the hand of the testator himself.
FACTS:
Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late
Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 9890870 of the RTC, and praying for the
appointment of private respondent Elisa D. SeangioSantos as special administrator and
guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio. Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia,
all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition on reasons, among others, Segundo left a
holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private respondents,
Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that
in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be
automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the will. A
petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo before the RTC. Private
respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings[5] primarily on the ground
that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any
disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under
Article 783 of the Civil Code. Then, the probate court dismissed the petition for probate due to
preterition and being, on its face, it is intrinsically void.
ISSUE: Whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic
will.
HELD: YES. A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be
entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other
form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Segundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance
instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written,
dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa[9] can
be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative
disposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of
disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property
of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of

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Alfredo.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/november2006/14037172.htm - _ftn10
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator,
expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the
supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect
to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public
policy that it cannot be given effect.
Case Digest by: Melo Jean T. Trios-Peralta
CAPITLE VS. ELBAMBUENA
G.R. No. 169193
November 30, 2006
Doctrine: Although estranged from Olar, respondent Fortunata remained his wife and legal
heir, mere estrangement not being a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse
as an heir of the deceased spouse.Rosalinda, on the other hand, is the surviving spouse of
Olars son. The two are thus real parties-in-interest who stand to be injured or benefited by
the judgment on the cancellation of the CLOA issued in Olars name.
Facts: A parcel of agricultural land is the subject of the present controversy. A Certificate of
Land Ownership Award (CLOA) was issued to Olar covering the lot on account of which he
was issued a Transfer Certificate of Title. Respondents Fortunata and Rosalinda, spouse and
daughter-in-law, respectively, of Olar, now deceased, claim that Olar relinquished one-half of
the lot to Rosalinda by a "Kasunduan" dated July 17, 1992 the execution of which was
witnessed by petitioner Capitle; and that the remaining portion of the lot was surrendered to
Fortunata by an undated document.
Respondents alleged that on petitioners request, petitioners were allowed to occupy the lot to
pursue a means of livelihood. Since 1990, petitioners did not pay rentals despite demands,
and neither did they heed the demand to return the possession of the lot. Thus, respondents
filed a Petition for Recovery of Possession and Payment of Back Rentals against petitioners
before the DARAB.
Petitioners, on the other hand, claiming that they have been in possession of the lot since
1960, presented a "Waiver of Rights" executed by Olar wherein he renounced in their favor
his rights and participation over the lot; a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" wherein Olar acknowledged
that he co-possessed the lot with petitioner Capitle since 1960; and a Pinagsamang Patunay
certifying that petitioners are the actual tillers and possessors of the lot.
Petitioners further claim that since 1959, Fortunata was already separated from Olar and she
even remarried, thus giving her no right to inherit from Olar.
Issue: Who has better rights, the heirs or the tenants?

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Ruling: Petitioners argument that "it would be absurd for Olar to bequeath his property to his
estranged wife not to a relative who had indeed helped him in tilling the property and took
good care of his needs," is a virtual admission that their possession was not in the concept of
owners, they having merely "helped" in tilling the lot, thereby acknowledging that Olar
was the actual possessor and tiller.
Absent evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the public officers who issued
the CLOA to Olar regularly performed their duties.
Even assuming arguendo that petitioners were indeed the actual tillers of the lot, their petition
for the cancellation of the CLOA issued in favor of Olar would not bind respondents, as they
were not impleaded.
Although estranged from Olar, respondent Fortunata remained his wife and legal heir,
mere estrangement not being a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as
an heir of the deceased spouse.Rosalinda, on the other hand, is the surviving spouse of
Olars son. The two are thus real parties-in-interest who stand to be injured or benefited by
the judgment on the cancellation of the CLOA issued in Olars name.
GUERRERO VS BIHIS
521 SCRA 394 G.R. No. 174144, April 17, 2007
DOCTRINE: One of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution of a
notarial will is that it must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. This formal requirement is one of the indispensable requisites for the validity of a
will. In other words, a notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the instrumental witnesses is void and cannot be accepted for probate.
FACTS: Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Bella A. Guerrero and
respondent Resurreccion A. Bihis, died. Guerrero filed for probate in the RTC QC.
Respondent Bihis opposed her elder sisters petition on the following grounds: the will was not
executed and attested as required by law; its attestation clause and acknowledgment did not
comply with the requirements of the law; the signature of the testatrix was procured by fraud
and petitioner and her children procured the will through undue and improper pressure and
influence. Petitioner Guerrero was appointes special administratrix. Respondent opposed
petitioners appointment but subsequently withdrew her opposition. The trial court denied the
probate of the will ruling that Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with because the
will was acknowledged by the testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrixs residence at No.
40 Kanlaon Street, Quezon City before Atty. Macario O. Directo who was a commissioned
notary public for and in Caloocan City.

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ISSUE: Did the will acknowledged by the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses before a
notary public acting outside the place of his commission satisfy the requirement under Article
806 of the Civil Code?
HELD: No. One of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution of a
notarial will is that it must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. 6 This formal requirement is one of the indispensable requisites for the validity of a
will. 7 In other words, a notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the instrumental witnesses is void and cannot be accepted for probate.
The Notarial law provides: SECTION 240.Territorial jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a
notary public in a province shall be co-extensive with the province. The jurisdiction of a notary
public in the City of Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall possess
authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction.
The compulsory language of Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with and
the interdiction of Article 240 of the Notarial Law was breached. Ineluctably, the acts of the
testatrix, her witnesses and Atty. Directo were all completely void.

Case Report by: Zorilla, Ritchelle R.

SAMANIEGO-CELADA, V. ABENA
G.R. No. 145545. June 30, 2008.
Quisumbing, J.
Doctrine: While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court, after
examining the totality of the will, is of the considered opinion that error in the number of pages
of the will as stated in the attestation clause is not material to invalidate the subject will. It
must be noted that the subject instrument is consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C
which is a sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some of the pages. The
error must have been brought about by the honest belief that the will is the whole instrument
consisting of three (3) pages inclusive of the attestation clause and the acknowledgement.
The position of the court is in consonance with the "doctrine of liberal interpretation"
enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code
Facts:
Petitioner was the 1st cousin of decedent Margarita. Respondent is Margaritas lifelong
companion. Margarita died single and was survived by her first cousins including petitioner.
Before her death, Margarita executed a Last Will and Testament ||where she bequeathed 1/2
of her undivided share of a real property at Manila to respondent & et al. in equal shares or
1/3 portion each. She likewise bequeathed 1/2 of her undivided share of a real property at
Makati, to respondent, & et al. in equal shares or 1/3 portion each. Margarita also left all her
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personal properties to respondent whom she likewise designated as sole executor of her will.
Petitioner filed a petition for letters of administration of the estate of Margarita. Respondent
filed a petition for probate of the will of Margarita. RTC rendered a decision declaring the last
will and testament of Margarita probated and respondent as the executor of the will. CA
affirmed RTC ruling.
Issue: WON the will is invalid for failure to comply with the formalities required by law
Held: No. Anent the contestants' submission that the will is fatally defective for the reason that
its attestation clause states that the will is composed of three (3) pages while in truth and in
fact, the will consists of two (2) pages only because the attestation is not a part of the notarial
will, the same is not accurate. While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the
will, the court, after examining the totality of the will, is of the considered opinion that error in
the number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is not material to invalidate
the subject will. It must be noted that the subject instrument is consecutively lettered with
pages A, B, and C which is a sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some
of the pages. The error must have been brought about by the honest belief that the will is the
whole instrument consisting of three (3) pages inclusive of the attestation clause and the
acknowledgement. The position of the court is in consonance with the "doctrine of liberal
interpretation" enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code which reads:
"In the absence of bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue [and] improper pressure and
influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein
shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in
substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805."
The court also rejects the contention of the oppositors that the signatures of the
testator were affixed on different occasions based on their observation that the signature on
the first page is allegedly different in size, texture and appearance as compared with the
signatures in the succeeding pages. After examination of the signatures, the court does not
share the same observation as the oppositors. The picture (Exhibit "H-3") shows that the
testator was affixing her signature in the presence of the instrumental witnesses and the
notary. There is no evidence to show that the first signature was procured earlier than
February 2, 1987.
Finally, the court finds that no pressure nor undue influence was exerted on the
testator to execute the subject will. In fact, the picture reveals that the testator was in a good
mood and smiling with the other witnesses while executing the subject will.
ARTICLES 820-827 (WITNESSES TO WILLS AND CODICILS)
ARTICLES 828-837 (REVOCATION OF WILLS, REPUBLICATION & REVIVAL)
ARTICLES 838-839 (ALLOWANCE & DISALLOWANCE)

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BY: Abella
RODELAS V. ARANZA
119 SCRA 16
DOCTRINE: A photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed
because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of
Gan vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or
destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have
seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no
effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote
8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic
copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the
probate court." Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic
will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be
determined by the probate court.
FACTS: Rodelas filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of
Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor.
Aranza, et al. filed a MTD on the grounds of:
Rodelas was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce
the will within twenty days of the death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2
of the Rules of Court;
the copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of property after
death and was not intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was not a will, it
was merely an instruction as to the management and improvement of the schools and
colleges founded by the decedent;
the hollographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced,
otherwise it would produce no effect because lost or destroyed holographic wills
cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills
the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and attested
as required by law.
MTD was denied. Aranza et al. filed an MR, Rodelas filed an opposition.
The CFI set aside its order and dismissed the petition for the probate of the will stating that in
the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that 'in the matter of
holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as the
material proof of authenticity of said wills.
And that the alleged holographic will was executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B.
Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. The lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the execution
of the will to the death of the decedent and the fact that the original of the will could not be
located shows to that the decedent had discarded the alleged holographic will before his
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death. Rodelas filed an MR which was denied. Rodelas appealed to the CA. Aranza et al.
moved to forward the case to the SC as it involves a question of law not of fact.
ISSUE: W/N a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of
a photostatic copy.
HELD: If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the
will cannot be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator
in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten
statements of the testator and the handwritten will.
But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because
comparison can be made by the probate court with the standard writings of the testator. The
probate court would be able to determine the authenticity of the handwriting of the testator.
In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the
contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of
witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise,
it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of
authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a
photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar
means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited
and tested before the probate court,"
Case Report by: Ma. Ann Klaudine C. Abrugena
SPOUSES AJERO V. CA AND CLEMENTE SAND
G.R. No. 106720. September 15, 1994
Puno, J.
Doctrine: A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects
the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the
testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions
cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void. A
holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the
provisions of Article 814.
Facts: Petitioners instituted a special proceeding for allowance of decedent Annie Sands
holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and
disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect
capacitated to dispose of her estate by will. Private respondent opposed the petition on the
grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's
handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent;
and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence.
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Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to
probate. CA reversed. Hence, this petition.
Issue: W/N the subject holographic will failed to meet the requirements for its validity
(compliance with Arts. 813 & 814)
Held: The will is VALID. In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the
requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as
provided under Article 810 of the NCC. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not
result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the
testator. A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the
validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator
fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be
effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void. Likewise, a
holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the
provisions of Article 814.
NEPOMUCENO VS CA
139 SCRA 206 G.R. No. L-62952, October 09, 1985
DOCTRINE: Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. And for aught that
appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists
that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or
nullity of the will. Result. Waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the
practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the
issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question.
FACTS: Martin Jugo left a duly executed and notarized Last Will and Testament before he
died. Petitioner was named as sole executor. It is clearly stated in the Will that he was legally
married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, but he had been
estranged from his lawful wife. In fact, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner were
married despite the subsisting first marriage. The testator devised the free portion of his
estate to petitioner. On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for probate. On May 13,
1975, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging undue and improper
influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the Will, the testator
was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage with the
testator.
The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator
admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner. Petitioner appealed to CA. On June 2,
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1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
denying the probate of the will. The respondent court declared the Will to be valid except that
the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void.
ISSUE: W/N the CA acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and
Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic
validity of the testamentary provision.
HELD: No. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to
be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the
devise in favor of the petitioner null and void. The general rule is that in probate proceedings,
the courts area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of
the Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances,
the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon
certain provisions of the Will.
The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be
intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will
be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid v.
Nuguid)
The Will is void under Article 739. The following donations shall be void: (1) Those
made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the
donation; and Article 1028. The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations
inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions.
There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when Martin
Jugo executed his Will. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the
testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in
concubinage.
CAYETANO VS LEONIDAS
G.R. No. L-54919, May 30, 1984
DOCTRINE: Intrinsic validity of the will can be passed upon during probate of will. The
attested will is still valid even if the compulsory heir was deprived of his legitime because the
decedent, at the time of his death, was a citizen of US, and was governed by Pennsylvania
law which does not have a system of legitime and forced heirs. Adoracion can therefore
dispose of her whole estate and deprive Hermogenes of any share in her estate.
FACTS: Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving Hermogenes Campos (father) and her sisters,
Nenita Paguia, Remedios Lopez, and Marieta Medina as the surviving heirs. As the only
compulsory heir is Hermogenes, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication, adjudicating unto
himself the entire estate of Adoracion.
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Later that same year, Nenita filed a petition for reprobate of a will, alleging among
others that Adoracion was an American citizen and that the will was executed in the US.
Adoracion died in Manila while temporarily residing in Malate.
While this case was still pending, Hermogenes died and left a will, appointing Polly
Cayetano as the executrix. Hence, this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reprobation of the will is invalid for it divested the father of his
legitime which was reserved by the law for him and the same would work injustice and injury
to him.
HELD: No, the reprobation of the will is valid. Although on its face, the will appeared to have
preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate
outright, the private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time
of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
U.S.A.
As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of
the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance
with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity normally comes only
after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issues.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, the
national law of the decedent must apply. In Pennsylvania law:no legitimes, testator could give
away entire estate to strangers.
Case Report by: Laiza Avila
VDA DE MOLO VS. MOLO
G.R. No. L-2538. September 21, 1951
Bautista Angelo, J.
Doctrine: Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation: Where the act of destruction is
connected with the making of another will so as fairly to raise the inference that the testator
meant the revocation of the old to depend upon the efficacy of a new disposition intended to
be substituted, the revocation will be conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the new
disposition; and if, for any reason, the new will intended to be made as a substitute is
inoperative, the revocation fails and the original will remains in full force.
Facts: Mariano Molo executed two wills both instituting his wife, Juana Molo, the herein
petitioner, as the universal heir. The first will was executed on August 17, 1918, while the
second will was executed on June 20, 1939 which contains a revocatory clause. After the
death of Mariano, petitioner filed a petition seeking the probate of the will executed by her
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deceased husband on 1939. After hearing the court rendered decision denying the probate of
said will on the ground that the petitioner failed to prove that the same was executed in
accordance with law. In view of the disallowance of the will executed on 1939, the widow filed
another petition for the probate of the will executed by the deceased on 1918 which was
opposed by the nephew and niece of the deceased, the herein oppositors-appellants.
Issue: Whether or not the will executed on 1918 was subsequently revoked by the will
executed on 1939, hence, cannot be admitted to probate.
Ruling: No. The earlier will can still be admitted to probate under the principle of "dependent
relative revocation". The rule is established that where the act of destruction is connected with
the making of another will so as fairly to raise the inference that the testator meant the
revocation of the old to depend upon the efficacy of a new disposition intended to be
substituted, the revocation will be conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the new
disposition; and if, for any reason, the new will intended to be made as a substitute is
inoperative, the revocation fails and the original will remains in full force. The failure of a new
testamentary disposition upon whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the
non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and hence prevents the revocation of the original
will.

BY:BALICAS
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE JESUS FRAN vs. HON. BERNARDO LL. SALAS
DAVIDE, JR.,J.:
DOCTRINE: The probate judgment, long final and undisturbed by any attempt to unsettle it,
had inevitably passed beyond the reach of the court below to annul or set the same aside, by
mere motion, on the ground that the will is a forgery. Settled is the rule that the decree of
probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution of the will and it cannot be impugned
on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent
action or proceeding.
FACTS: Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo, a widow, died on 10 July 1972 in Cebu City with
neither descendants nor ascendants; she left real and personal properties located in Cebu
City, Ormoc City and Puerto Bello, Merida, Leyte. Earlier, on 23 April 1972, she executed a
last will and testament wherein she bequeathed to her collateral relatives (brothers, sisters,
nephews and nieces) all her properties, and designated Rosario Tan or, upon the latter's
death, Jesus Fran, as executor to serve without bond. Instrumental witnesses to the will were
Nazario Pacquiao, Alcio Demerre and Primo Miro.

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On 15 July 1972, Jesus Fran filed a petition with the Court of First instance of Cebu for
the probate of Remedios' last will and testament. The petition alleged that Rosario Tan is not
physically well and, therefore, will not be assuming the position of administratrix. Tan signed a
waiver in favor of Jesus Fran on the third page of the said petition. Meanwhile, on 31 July
1972, the court appointed petitioner Jesus Fran as special administrator.
Private respondents did not file any opposition. Instead, they filed a "Withdrawal of
Opposition to the Allowance of Probate (sic) of the Will" wherein they expressly manifested,
with their "full knowledge and consent that . . . they have no objection of (sic) the allowance of
the . . . will of the late Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo," and that they have "no objection to
the issuance of letters testamentary in favor of petitioner, Dr. Jesus Fran."
No other party filed an opposition. The petition thus became uncontested.
On 13 November 1972, the probate court rendered a decision admitting to probate the
will of the testatrix, Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo, and appointing petitioner Fran as
executor thereof.
The requisite notice to creditors was issued, but despite the expiration of the period
therein fixed, no claim was presented against the estate.
Subsequently, a Project of Partition based on the dispositions made in the will and
signed by all the devisees and legatees, with the exception of Luis Fran, Remedios C. Mejia
and respondent Concepcion M. Espina, was submitted by the executor for the court's
approval. Said legatees and devisees submitted certifications wherein they admit receipt of a
copy of the Project of Partition together with the notice of hearing, and state that they had no
objection to its approval.
After the hearing on the Project of Partition, the court issued its Order of 10 September
1973 approving the same, declaring the parties therein as the only heirs entitled to the estate
of Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo, directing the administrator to deliver to the said parties
their respective shares and decreeing the proceedings closed.
On 1 October 1979, private respondents filed with the new Branch VIII an Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration of the probate judgment of 13 November 1972 and the Order of
partition of 10 September 1973, in said motion, they ask the court to declare the proceedings
still open and admit their opposition to the allowance of the will, which they filed on 1 October
1979. They allege that:
(a) they were not furnished with a copy of the will;
(b) the will is a forgery;
(c) they were not notified of any resolution or order on their manifestation requesting time
within which to file their opposition, or of the order authorizing the clerk of court to receive the
evidence for the petitioner, or of the order closing the proceedings;
(d) the reception of evidence by the clerk of court was void per the ruling inLim Tanhu vs.
Ramolete;
(e) the project of partition contains no notice of hearing and they were not notified thereof;
(f) the petitioner signed the project of partition as administrator and not as executor, thereby
proving that the decedent died intestate;
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(g) the petitioner did not submit any accounting as required by law; and
(h) the petitioner never distributed the estate to the devisees and legatees.
Respondent Judge proceeded with the hearing of the Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration. He received the testimonies of private respondents and one Romeo O.
Varena, an alleged handwriting expert from the Philippine Constabulary, who averred that the
signature of the testatrix on the will is a forgery. The respondent Judge likewise issued an
Order on the same date stating that unless he received a restraining order from this Court
within twenty (20) days therefrom, he will reopen Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proceedings may be opened after the court has allowed the will
and has become final and executory?
HELD: NO, the proceedings cannot anymore be opened.
After the probate court rendered its decision on 13 November 1972, and there having
been no claim presented despite publication of notice to creditors, petitioner Fran submitted a
Project of Partition which private respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco voluntarily signed
and to which private respondent Espina expressed her conformity through a certification filed
with the probate court. Assuming for the sake of argument that private respondents did not
receive a formal notice of the decision as they claim in their Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration, these acts nevertheless constitute indubitable proof of their prior actual
knowledge of the same. A formal notice would have been an idle ceremony.
In Our jurisdiction, the following courses of action are open to an aggrieved party to set
aside or attack the validity of a final judgment:
(1)
Petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court which must be filed within sixty
(60) days after learning of the decision, but not more than six (6) months after such decision
is entered;
(2)
By direct action, via a special civil action forcertiorari, or by collateral attack, assuming
that the decision is void for want of jurisdiction;
(3)
By an independent civil action under Article 1114 of the Civil Code, assuming that the
decision was obtained through fraud and Rule 38 can not be applied.
It is not difficult to see that private respondents had lost their right to file a petition for
relief from judgment, it appearing that their omnibus motion for reconsideration was filed
exactly six (6) years, ten (10) months and twenty-two (22) days after the rendition of the
decision, and six (6) years, one (1) month and thirteen (13) days after the court issued the
order approving the Project of Partition, to which they voluntarily expressed their conformity
through their respective certifications, and closing the testate proceedings.
Private respondents did not avail of the other two (2) modes of attack.
The probate judgment of 13 November 1972, long final and undisturbed by any attempt
to unsettle it, had inevitably passed beyond the reach of the court below to annul or set the
same aside, by mere motion, on the ground that the will is a forgery. Settled is the rule that
the decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution of the will and it cannot
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be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or
independent action or proceeding.We wish also to advert to the related doctrine which holds
that final judgments are entitled to respect and should not be disturbed; otherwise, there
would be a wavering of trust in the courts.
This is so even if the decision is incorrect or, in criminal cases, the penalty imposed is
erroneous.
Case report by: Ian Basconcillo
CANEDA VS. CA
G.R. No. 103554. May 28, 1993
Doctrine: Omissions, which can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the
need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not
obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which
cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the
attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.
Facts: The attestation clause of the will totally omits the fact that the attesting witnesses
signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The
petitioners contended that the will of the testator is defective because it lacks the said fact.
The respondents countered that although such fact is omitted, substantial compliance will
suffice because the witnesses saw the testator and the witnesses comply in fact.
Issue: WON substantial compliance is applicable to defects in an attestation clause
Held: No. The rule on substantial compliance in Article 809 cannot be invoked or relied on by
respondents since it presupposes that the defects in the attestation clause can be cured or
supplied by the text of the will or a consideration of matters apparent therefrom which would
provide the data not expressed in the attestation clause or from which it may necessarily be
gleaned or clearly inferred that the acts not stated in the omitted textual requirements were
actually complied with in the execution of the will. In other words, the defects must be
remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself. In the case at bar, contrarily, proof of
the acts required to have been performed by the attesting witnesses can be supplied only by
extrinsic evidence thereof, since an overall appreciation of the contents of the will yields no
basis whatsoever from which such facts may be plausibly deduced. What private respondent
insists on are the testimonies of his witnesses alleging that they saw the compliance with
such requirements by the instrumental witnesses, oblivious of the fact that he is thereby
resorting to extrinsic evidence to prove the same and would accordingly be doing by
indirection what in law he cannot do directly. It may thus be stated that the rule, as it now
stands, is that omissions which can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without
the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not
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obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which
cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the
attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.
Case Report By: Joshua E. Bautista
AGAPAY VS. PALANG
GR No. 116668, July 28, 1997
Romero, J.:
DOCTRINE: proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the
latter and claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special
proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil
action which is for recovery of ownership and possession.
FACTS: Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on 1949. He left to
work in Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in May
1950. The trial court found evident that as early as 1957, Miguel attempted to Divorce Carlina
in Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to lived with Carlina and stayed
alone in a house in Pozzorubio Pangasinan.
The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year old Erlinda
Agapay, herein petitioner. 2 months earlier, they jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land
located at Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in the same place was likewise
purchased. On the other hand, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of
compromise agreement and agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels
of land to their child Herminia.
Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. In 1979, they
were convicted of concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. 2 years later, Miguel died. Carlina
and her daughter instituted this case for recovery of ownership and possession with damages
against petitioner. They sought to get back the land and the house and lot located at
Binalonan allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner.
Petitioner, as defendant below, contended that while the riceland is registered in their names
(Miguel and Erlinda), she had already given her half of the property to their son Kristopher
Palang. She added that the house and lot is her sole property, having bought the same with
her own money. Erlinda added that Carlina is precluded from claiming aforesaid properties
since the latter had already donated their conjugal estate to Herminia.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of
Erlinda Agapay.
2. Whether or not the lower court erred in adjudicating the parcel of land to Kristopher
Palang by way of his inheritance in an action for recovery of ownership and possession.
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HELD:
1. No, Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the business of buy and
sell and had a sari-sari store. However, she failed to persuade the court that she actually
contributed money to but the subjected riceland. When the land was acquired, she was only
around 20 years old compared to Miguel who was already 64 years old and a pensioner of
the US Government. Considering his youthfulness, its unrealistic how she could have
contributed the P3,750 as her share. Thus, the court finds no basis to justify the coownership with Miguel over the same. Hence, the Riceland should, as correctly held by CA,
revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased and Carlina.
2. Yes, the Court held that the trial court erred in making pronouncements regarding
Kristophers heirship and filiation inasmuch as questions as to who are the heirs of the
decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the
latter and claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special
proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil
action which is for recovery of ownership and possession.

Case Report by: Berdal, Joanne Juris L.

REYES VS. CA
281 SCRA 277
Doctrine: As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. Thus, the court merely inquires on its due
execution, whether or not it complies with the formalities prescribed by law, and the
testamentary capacity of the testator. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge
the validity or efficacy of the will's provisions. The intrinsic validity is not considered since the
consideration thereof usually comes only after the will has been proved and allowed.
Facts: Torcuato Reyes executed a will wherein he stated that he was bequeathing some of
his properties to his wife, Asuncion Reyes, and designating respondent Vivares as executor.
After his death, respondent filed a petition for the probate of the will which was opposed by
petitioners, Torcuato's natural children, and their mothers claiming that Asuncion Reyes was
never married to the testator because she was already married to Lupo Ebarle and that their
marriage was not annulled. The will was admitted to probate but the disposition to Asuncion
Reyes was declared by the trial court as null and void for being contrary to law and morals.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in its decision

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Held: Yes. As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass upon only the
extrinsic validity of wills and without jurisdiction to determine validity or efficacy of the will's
provisions. The propriety of the institution of Asuncion Reyes as one of the devisees/legatees
already involved inquiry on the will's intrinsic validity and which need not be inquired upon by
the probate court. Also, trial court erred in invoking Nepomuceno vs. CA - this case is different
from the Nepomuceno case. Testator Torcuato Reyes merely stated in his will that he was
bequeathing some of his personal and real properties to his wife, Asuncion Reyes. There was
never an open admission of any illicit relationship. In the case of Nepomuceno, the testator
admitted that he was already previously married and that he had an adulterous relationship
with the devisee (which is void).
SANCHEZ VS. CA (279 SCRA 647) BY: BETITA
G.R. No. 108947. September 29, 1997
Facts: Rosalia Lugod is the only child of spouses Juan and Maria Sanchez. Following the
death of Maria, Rosalia filed a Petition for Letters of Administration over Marias estate &
Juans estate. Juan was in a state of senility. Before the proceedings could be terminated,
Juan died.
Petitioners, who are illegitimate children of Juan, filed a Petition for letters of
Administration over Juans intestate estate. Rosalia opposed petition. A compromise
agreement was entered dividing the properties of Juan.
Issue: W/N the compromise agreement is valid?
Ruling: Yes. The compromise agreement is a consensual contract perfected by the meeting
of the minds of the parties. The parties freely entered into the agreement and were even
adequately assisted by their respective counsels. Judicial approval of the probate court was
no longer necessary to give validity to the compromise agreement.
Although denominated a compromise agreement, the document in this case is
essentially a deed of partition, pursuant to Article 1082 of the Civil Code: every act which is
intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be
a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other
transaction.
For a partition to be valid, Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, requires the concurrence
of the following conditions: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no debts, or if
there were debts left, all had been paid; (3) the heirs and liquidators are all of age, or if they
are minors, the latter are represented by their judicial guardian or legal representatives; and
(4) the partition was made by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the
Register of Deeds. We find that all the foregoing requisites are present in this case. We
therefore affirm the validity of the parties compromise agreement/partition in this case.

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Case Report by: Blancaflor
GANUELAS V. CAWED
G.R. No. 123968 April 24, 2003 Carpio Morales, J.;
Doctrine: The attesting witnesses failed to acknowledge the deed before the notary public,
thus violating Article 806 of the Civil Code which provides: Art. 806. Every will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public
shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of
Court. (Emphasis supplied)
Facts: On April 11, 1958, Celestina Ganuelas executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property
in favor of her niece Ursulina Ganuelas. On June 10, 1967, Celestina executed Revocation of
donation. A month later Celestina died. After Celestinas death, Ursulina had been sharing the
produce of the donated properties with private respondents Flores et. al, nieces of Celestina.
In 1982, Ursulina secured tax declarations in her name over the donated properties and since
then she refused to give private respondents any share in the produce of the properties
despite repeated demands.
Private respondents filed a case with RTC of La Union a complaint against Ursulina.
They contend that the Deed of Donation executed by Celestina was void for lack of
acknowledgement by the attesting witnesses before the notary public and the donation was
mortis causa which failed to comply with the provision of the Civil Code on formalities of will
and testaments. RTC held that the Deed of Donation is a donation mortis causa thus null and
void.
Issue: Whether or not the formalities of a will have been complied with?
Held: No. The deed of donation is void and produces no effect.
The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other
interpretation but that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to
Ursulina on her death, not during her lifetime.
That the donation was prompted by the affection of the donor for the donee and the
services rendered by the latter is of no particular significance in determining whether the deed
constitutes a transfer inter vivos or not, because a legacy may have an identical motivation. In
other words, love and affection may also underline transfers mortis causa.
Report by: (Brazal, Ricardo G.)
SICAD VS. CA
G.R. No. 125888 August 13, 1998
Doctrine: The real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by both its language and the
intention of the parties as demonstrated by the circumstances attendant upon its execution.
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Facts: In 1979, Aurora Montinola executed a deed entitled Deed of Donation Inter Vivos in
favor of her three grandchildren Catalino Valderrama, Judy Valderrama, and Jesus
Valderrama. The deed however provided that that the donation shall be effective only 10
years after Montinolas death. In 1980, the original title of the parcel of land subject of the
donation was cancelled and a new title was given to the Valderramas. Montinola however
retained the original title and she continued to perform acts of ownership over the parcel of
land.
In 1987, Montinola revoked the donation because of acts of ingratitude committed against her
by the Valderramas; that the Valderramas defamed her; that she overheard the Valderramas
plotting against her life. In 1990, she petitioned to have her title be reinstated and her
grandchildrens title be cancelled. She said that the donation is actually a donation mortis
causa and that the same is void because the formalities of a will were not complied with. In
the same year, she sold her property to spouses Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad.
The Valderramas opposed the petition. In 1993, while the case was still pending, Montinola
died. The petition was continued by the spouses Sicad.
Issue: Whether or not the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos is actually a donation mortis causa.
Held: Yes, the deed is a donation mortis causa. Montinola not only reserved for herself all the
fruits of the property allegedly conveyed, but what is even more important, specially provided
that without the knowledge and consent of the Montinola, the donated properties could not be
disposed of in any way, thereby denying to the transferees the most essential attribute of
ownership, the power to dispose of the properties. A donation which purports to be one inter
vivos but withholds from the done (in this case the Valderramas) the right to dispose of the
donated property during the donors lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a donation mortis
causa the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive. The
donation is therefore void because the formalities of a will, which is essentially a donation
mortis causa, were not complied with.
Case Report by: Dane Carag
The Incompetent, CARMEN CAIZA VS CA
GR. No. 110427 February 24, 1997 NARVASA, C.J.:
Doctrine: They could not assert any right of possession flowing from their ownership of the
house; their status as owners is dependent on the probate of the holographic will by which the
property had allegedly been bequeathed to them an event which still has to take place; in
other words, prior to the probate of the will, any assertion of possession by them would be
premature and inefficacious.

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FACTS: 94 years old Carmen Caniza, a spinter, a retired pharmacist and former professor
was declared incompetent by judgment of the RTC- Quezon City in a guardianship
proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo Evangelista, who was the appointed legal
guardian. The former was adjudged as such by the court because of her advanced age and
physical infirmities, which included cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia. Evangelista,
acting as the legal guardian, filed a complaint with the MTC to eject the defendants Estrada in
the house and lot owned by Caniza. Based on the amended complaint, it was alleged that
Caniza, out of kindness, allowed the defendants to temporarily reside, rent-free in the subject
house and lot. But because of the urgent need to meet her expenses for support,
maintenance and medical treatment due to her advanced age, Caniza requested the
defendants to vacate the subject property but no to avail. In their answer, the defendants
declared that they have been living in Canizas house since 1960s and the latter executed a
holographic will, wherein she bequeathed to the defendants the house and lot in question.
The MTC rendered a judgment in favor of Caniza, However, on appeal, the RTC reversed the
decision of the MTC and held that action by which the issue of defendants possession should
be resolved not in accion interdictal but rather in accion publiciana ,which is cognizable in the
first instance by the RTC. CA affirmed the RTCs judgment in toto. During the pendency of
the case with the SC, Caniza died and her heirs, Amparo Evagelista (niece) and Ramon
Nevado (nephew) substituted for her.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the defendants established the right of possession of the subject property without
the holographic will having been probated.
(2) Assuming the ejectment suit is proper, whether or not Evangelista, as Canizas legal
guardian had authority to bring said action.
RULING:
(1) NO. A will is essentially ambulatory which means that at any time prior to the testator's
death, it may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever
and no right can be claimed thereunder. Art. 838 of the NCC explicitly provide that "No will
shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with
the Rules of Court. An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing
property by his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the
meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case there was sufficient cause
for the owner's resumption of possession is apparent, which is she needed to generate
income from the house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her
extreme age.
(2) YES. Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general guardian of both the
person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Caiza. Her Letters of Guardianship clearly
installed her as the "guardian over the person and properties of the incompetent Caniza with

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full authority to take possession of the property of said incompetent in any province or
provinces in which it may be situated and to perform all other acts necessary.
Case Report by Aulaire Chupungco
JOSEPH CUA V. GLORIA VARGAS
G.R. No. 156536; October 31, 2006 Ponente: Azcuna, J.
Doctrine: Written notice is required to be served by an heir to his co-heirs in connection with
the sale of hereditary rights to a stranger before partition under Article 1088 of the Civil Code
cannot be dispensed with even when such co-heirs have actual knowledge of the sale.
Facts: A parcel of land was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas. The heirs executed a
notarized extrajudicial settlement among themselves, partitioning and adjudicating unto
themselves the lot in question, each getting 11 sqm. Among the heirs, only 5 signed it and 4
did not. The document was published for three consecutive weeks. An extra-j settlement with
sale was again executed. Once more, only those who signed partition signed and their shares
were sold to Joseph Cua. According to Gloria (one of those who did not sign), she came to
know of the settlement only when the original house was being demolished. She also claimed
that she was unaware of the first document. She sent a letter to petitioner in order to redeem
the property. When Gloria and Joseph failed to reach an amicable settlement, the former filed
a case for annulment of the EJS and legal redemption of the lot. MTC upheld the sale to Cua
because the transaction purportedly occurred after the partition of the property among the coowner heirs. RTC affirmed. CA reversed the ruling of both lower courts. MR was denied thus,
the filing of the present complaint.
Issues: 1. Whether heirs are deemed constructively notified and bound, regardless of their
failure to participate therein, by an extrajudicial settlement and partition of estate when the
extrajudicial settlement and partition has been duly published;
2. Whether the written notice required to be served by an heir to his co-heirs in connection
with the sale of hereditary rights to a stranger before partition under Article 1088 of the Civil
Code can be dispensed with when such co-heirs have actual knowledge of the sale.
Ruling: 1. The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the
heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the
fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and
was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In
this connection, the records of the present case confirm that respondents never signed either
of the settlement documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of
the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind

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respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as
they are concerned.
This is not to say, though, that respondents' co-heirs cannot validly sell their hereditary
rights to third persons even before the partition of the estate. The heirs who actually
participated in the execution of the extrajudicial settlements, which included the sale to
petitioner of their pro indiviso shares in the subject property, are bound by the same.
Nevertheless, respondents are given the right to redeem these shares pursuant to Article
1088 of the Civil Code. The right to redeem was never lost because respondents were never
notified in writing of the actual sale by their co-heirs. There is a need for written notice to start
the period of redemption, thus:
Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any
or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for
the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they
were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
2. Written notice is indispensable and mandatory, actual knowledge of the sale acquired in
some other manner by the redemptioner notwithstanding. It cannot be counted from the time
advance notice is given of an impending or contemplated sale. The law gives the coheir thirty
days from the time written notice of the actual sale within which to make up his or her mind
and decide to repurchase or effect the redemption. It should be kept in mind that the
obligation to serve written notice devolves upon the vendor co-heirs because the latter are in
the best position to know the other co-owners who, under the law, must be notified of the sale.
This will remove all uncertainty as to the fact of the sale, its terms and its perfection and
validity, and quiet any doubt that the alienation is not definitive. As a result, the party notified
need not entertain doubt that the seller may still contest the alienation. Considering, therefore,
that respondents' co-heirs failed to comply with this requirement, there is no legal impediment
to allowing respondents to redeem the shares sold to petitioner given the former's obvious
willingness and capacity to do so.
Case Report by: Monica A. David
RODRIGUEZ VS. RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. 175720. September 11, 2007. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Doctrine: Before any will can have force or validity it must be probated. Article 838 of the Civil
Code mandates that "[n]o will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved
and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court."
Facts: Juanito Rodriguez owned a five-door apartment located in Makati City, covered by
TCT No. 144865. In 1983, Juanito executed a "Huling Habilin at Testamento" giving petitioner
Cresenciana Tubo Rodriguez, his live-in partner, apartments D and E, and his children
Benjamin Rodriguez, apartment A, respondent Buenaventura Rodriguez, apartment B, and
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respondent Belen Rodriguez, apartment C. However, in 1984, Juanito executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale over the property in favor of petitioner. Thus, TCT No. 144865 was cancelled
and a new TCT No. 150431 was issued in the name of the petitioner. In 2001, petitioner filed
a complaint for unlawful detainer against the respondents, alleging that she is the lawful and
registered owner of the property; and that in 1984, she allowed respondents Evangeline out of
kindness and tolerance, to personally occupy units A, B and D, respectively. Respondents
claimed ownership over the subject property by succession. They alleged that while petitioner
is the registered owner of the property, however, she is not the lawful owner thereof because
the Deed of Absolute Sale was simulated and void. MTC rendered judgment in favor of the
respondents. On appeal, the RTC reversed the decision of the MTC. CA then reinstated MTC
judgment.
Issue: Whether or not CA erred in ruling that the Huling Habilin at Testamento transmitted
ownership of the specific apartments.
Held: Yes, there is preponderance of evidence in favor of the petitioner's claim. Respondents
failed to prove their right of possession, as the Huling Habilin at Testamento and the Partition
Agreement have no legal effect since the will has not been probated. Before any will can have
force or validity it must be probated. This cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of public
policy. Article 838 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court." As the will
was not probated, the Partition Agreement which was executed pursuant thereto can not be
given effect. Thus, the fact that petitioner was a party to said agreement becomes immaterial
in the determination of the issue of possession.
ARTICLES 840-856 (INSTITUTION OF HEIR)
ARTICLES 857-870 (SUBSTITUTION OF HEIR)
ARTICLES 871-885 (CONDITIONAL TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION & TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITION WITH A TERM)
RABADILLA vs. CA
G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000
DOCTRINE: A Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes
of his property, to take effect after his death. Since the Will expresses the manner in which a
person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator must
be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which
would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.

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FACTS: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was
instituted as a devisee of parcel of land. The Codicil provides that Jorge Rabadilla shall have
the obligation until he dies, every year to give Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, (75) (sic)
piculs of Export sugar and (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza dies. Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died. Private respondent brought a complaint,
to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil.
ISSUE: WON the obligations of Jorge Rabadilla under the Codicil are inherited by his heirs.
HELD: Under Article 776 of the NCC, inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of
his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the
decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
de la Cruz, Uri Ian D.
TERESITA BORDALBA V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 112443; January 25, 2002
Case Doctrine: In order that an heir may assert his right to the property of a deceased, no
previous judicial declaration of heirship is necessary.
Facts: A lot located in Mandaue City was originally owned by the late Carmeno Jayme and
Margarita de Jayme. In 1947, an extra-judicial partition was executed. Distributed as follows:
1. 1/3 in favor of - (a) their grandchild Nicanor Jayme, the deceased spouse of private
respondent Candida Flores and the father of private respondents Emmanuel, Dina, Evelia
and Gesila, all surnamed Jayme; and (b) their grandchild Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, whose
heirs are private respondents Angelo Baclay, Elnora Baclay and Carmen Jayme-Daclan; 2.
1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, mother of petitioner Teresita P. Bordalba;
and 3. 1/3 to an unidentified party. Nicanor's house stands on the land adjudicated to the
heirs. Sometime in 1964, Petitioner's mother, filed with the RTC an amended application for
the registration of the lot. Nicanor and Asuncion filed their opposition contending that said
application included the 1/3 portion inherited by them in the extra-judicial partition. The case
was dismissed. Subsequently, Petitioner filed with the Bureau of Lands an application for a
free patent. He was successfully granted a free patent. Thereafter, Petitioner caused the
subdivision of the lot into 6 lots. The private respondents filed with the RTC, the instant
complaint against the petitioner and the director of the BOL. The trial court, finding that fraud
was employed by Petitioner, declared said patent and title void and ordered its cancellation.
However, it declared that spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala as well as the Rural
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Bank of Mandaue are purchasers and mortgagee in good faith, respectively; and
consequently upheld as valid the sale of the lot. Both petitioner and private respondents
appealed to the CA which affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the parties are the legal heirs of the deceased.
Held: The Court held in the affirmative. Other than their bare allegations to dispute their
heirship, no hard evidence was presented by them to substantiate their allegations. Besides,
in order that an heir may assert his right to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial
declaration of heirship is necessary. The dead mans statute does not operate to close the
mouth of a witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way than
through personal dealings with the deceased person, or communication made by the
deceased to the witness. The Court ordered that the case be remanded to the lower court for
the determination of the partition.
HEIRS OF IGNACIO CONTI AND CA
Gr. No. 118464,Dec. 21, 1998
DOCTRINE: Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his
death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law. Legal or intestate
succession takes place if a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has
subsequently lost its validity. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or
a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent.
FACTS: Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario Cuario, and Lourdes Sampayo were co-owners of
the 539- square meter lot with improvements, covered by TCT No. T15374. On March 1986,
Sampayo died intestate. On April 1987, the private respondents, all claiming to be collateral
relatives of the deceased Sampayo, filed an action for partition and damages before the
Regional Trial Court of Lucena. Sps. Conti refused partition because of failure by the
respondents to produce documents that will prove that they were the rightful heirs of the
deceased. On August 30, 1987, Conti died and was substituted by his children as party
defendant.
At the trial, private respondents presented evidence to prove that they were the
collateral heirs of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo and therefore entitled to her rights as coowner of the subject lot. On the other hand, petitioner Rosario alleged that the subject
property was co-owned in equal shares by her husband Ignacio Conti and Lourdes Sampayo
and that her family had been staying in the property in question since 1937. She also testified
that her late husband paid for the real estate taxes and spent for the necessary repairs and
improvements thereon because there had been an agreement that Lourdes would leave her
share of property to them.

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Since no will, either testamentary or holographic, was presented by the petitioners, the
trial court declared that private respondents were the rightful heirs of Lourdes Sampayo and
ordered both parties to submit a project partition of the residential house and lot for
confirmation by the court. Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals contending
that the trial court erred in finding the private respondents were the heirs of Sampayo and that
they were entitled to the partition of the lot and improvements in question.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied.
HELD: The Supreme Court found the petition not meritorious. The Court ruled that a prior
settlement of the estate is not essential before the heirs can commence any action originally
pertaining to the deceased. Under Articles 777 and 494 of the Civil Code, from the death of
Lourdes Sampayo her right as the co-owner of the questioned property, incidental to which is
the right to ask for partition at any time or to terminate the co-ownership, were transmitted to
her rightful heirs. In so demanding partition, private respondents merely exercised the right
originally pertaining to the decedent, their predecessor-in-interest. Likewise, the Court found
that herein respondents, by preponderance of evidence, have been able to establish that they
are co-owners by way of succession as collateral heirs of the late Lourdes Sampayo. In view
thereof, the Court denied the instant petition.
Chico-Nazario, J .

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